US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War

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US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School 4-29-2014 U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Dennis N. Ricci University of Connecticut - Storrs, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations Recommended Citation Ricci, Dennis N., "U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making" (2014). Doctoral Dissertations. 364. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/364 U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case-Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Dennis N. Ricci, Ph.D. University of Connecticut 2014 ABSTRACT The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions, especially in the absence of a great power rival. The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the normative question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. 1 Since both the situations and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what is driving the outcome. Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective are focused on standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under what conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made? Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important dynamic versus other variables and different measurements as to what drives the “go” or “no-go” decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory as well as a typology of military intervention in the post-Cold War era. KEY WORDS: International Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Presidential Decision Making, Military Intervention. 2 U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case-Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Dennis N. Ricci B.A., Framingham State College, 1976 M.A., University of Connecticut, 1978 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut 2014 3 Copyright by Dennis N. Ricci 2014 4 APPROVAL PAGE Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making Presented by Dennis N. Ricci, B.A., M.A. Major Advisor_____________________________________________________________ Stephen B. Dyson Associate Advisor__________________________________________________________ Jeremy Pressman Associate Advisor___________________________________________________________ Mark A. Boyer University of Connecticut 2014 5 Table of Contents ABSTRACT CHAPTER 1 U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 7 CHAPTER 2 BUSH I: PERSIAN GULF WAR—GO 24 CHAPTER 3 BUSH I: BOSNIA—NO-GO 45 CHAPTER 4 CLINTON: RWANDA—NO-GO 68 CHAPTER 5 CLINTON: KOSOVO—GO 103 CHAPTER 6 BUSH II: IRAQ—GO) 135 CHAPTER 7 BUSH II: IRAN—NO-GO 190 CHAPTER 8 ANATOMY & TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING 236 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 278 6 CHAPTER 1 U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA INTRODUCTION The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions, especially in the absence of a great power rival. This study has found that interventions are more likely when international factors (support or pressure from allies and intergovernmental organizations), momentum from previous interventions, continuity from predecessor administrations, lessons learned from prior decisions, and an optimistic appraisal of the military situation are favorable. LITERATURE REVIEW The question of U.S. military intervention and the direction (or drift) of American foreign relations since the end of the Cold War has received considerable attention in recent scholarship. 7 Kessler 1 finds that past intervention experiences influenced “cognitive constructs” in the decision-making process; “reasoning by historical analogy” was crucial in the determination of how and when to intervene; and “past lessons linked perceived interests to policy preferences.” Peterson’s study 2 of U.S. interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia finds that piecemeal application of historical analogies, perceived pressure due to U.S. membership in international organizations (i.e., NATO, UN), and the tendency to “demonize” individuals or groups involved in a conflict are key to decisions of armed intervention. Norton 3 analyzes the Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda decisions during the 1990s, concluding that U.S. involvement was in each case “nontraditional,” resulting from “intrastate” conflict, and motivated, at least partly, by “altruistic” aims. Hence, we synthesize the foregoing “list” or “menu” of theoretical reasons for military intervention suggested by these scholars to construct the larger puzzle that we intend to solve by looking hard at the chosen cases . THEORETICAL PUZZLE The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. On the one hand, does the president as an individual drive the decision-making process, or is the institutional presidency key, being his circle of key advisers? Thus, are “personality” and “informal factors” 4 1 Kessler, Bart Raymond: Military Intervention: A Cold War Assessment of the “Essence” of Decision. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, 2003. 2 Peterson, Shannon: Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding United States Decisions of Armed Humanitarian Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War Era (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 2003. 3 Norton, Richard James: Post-Cold War United States National Security Decision-Making: The Cases of Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 2003. 4 Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds.: Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962). 8 determinative? On the other hand, are decisions reactive or determined by a variety of external factors (for example, “hard” versus “soft” crises) 5: systemic, domestic, institutional, and strategic variables (for example, the “ornithological” shift of uniformed doves and hawks in three-piece suits since Persian Gulf War)? 6 Are our best explanations based on power defined as influence projected through presence, as Schelling 7 posits, or false optimism or pessimism regarding the likelihood or easiness of success, as Van Evera 8 maintains? By comparison, a “no-go” is likely when decision-makers see no “upside” to action (e.g., Bush I regarding Bosnia and Haiti, cited in Halberstam 9). Are decisions determined by the leadership (or management) style of the commander-in-chief, or mostly shaped by the self-motivated players participating in the decision-making process (i.e., what Condoleezza Rice called the “rarified staff” 10 )? If the style and personality of the chief executive are the drivers, should we seek answers in personal
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