Post-Cold War U.S

Continuity and Change in U.S.-Congo Relations: A critical analysis of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire-Democratic Republic of Congo

by Annelisa Lindsay

B.A. May 2009, The George Washington University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

May 20, 2012

Thesis Directed by

Paul D. Williams Associate Professor of International Affairs

Abstract

Continuity and Change in U.S.-Congo Relations: A critical analysis of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire-Democratic Republic of Congo

At the end of the Cold War, a shifting global political climate began to change

U.S. foreign policy. U.S. policymakers soon realized that the United States no longer needed to compete with the Soviet Union for influence around the world. New policy priorities took the place of competition in proxy wars, which meant that Africa began to suffer from declining geostrategic importance. Zaire, which had shared a ―special relationship‖ with the United States during the Cold War, was not exempt from the growing malaise in U.S. Africa policy. This study seeks to analyze the continuity or change in U.S. policy toward Zaire, now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in the post-Cold War era by examining how different foreign policymaking institutions

(White House, Congress, national security bureaucracy) directed the decision-making process to influence situations (routine, crisis, extended crisis) in U.S.-Congo relations from 1989 to 2003. Historically, U.S. policy toward Africa has followed three specific patterns: routine situations correlating with bureaucratic decision-making, crisis situations with presidential direction, and extended crisis situations with domestic politics and Congressional involvement. This study reveals that while post-Cold War U.S. policymaking toward Congo followed the same patterns, the removal of bilateral assistance by Congress, shifting alliances led by the White House, and marginalization of

Africa policy within the bureaucracy led to the abandonment of the Congolese state as a priority for the United States. Instead, the absence of a comprehensive strategy and

iii resources to address the ongoing instability in Congo has led to the fragmentation of policy and has not contributed to the resolution of conflict in the country.

Table of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...…iii

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….vi

List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………….....vii

Chapter 1: Introduction….……………………………………………………………...... 1

Chapter 2: The Bush Years and the Waning of Mobutu, 1989-1992…………………....10

Chapter 3: Clinton: New Relations with Africa, 1993-1994…………………………….32

Chapter 4: Green Light to Rwanda and the Boot to Mobutu, 1994-1997……………….58

Chapter 5: Africa‘s World War and U.S. Non-Intervention, 1998-2003………………..96

Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..127

References………………………………………………………………………….…...136

List of Figures

Figure 1: Peter Schraeder‘s Table of Patterns and Processes in U.S. Africa Policy……..9

List of Abbreviations

ACRF African Crisis Response Force

ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative

AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo

AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

AMF American Mine Fields

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSP Division Spéciale Présidentielle

FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises

FAZ Forces Armées Zairoises

IMF International Monetary Fund

JCET Joint/Combined Exchange Training

JMC Joint Military Commission

JPC Joint Political Committee

MPLA People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

MLC Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

MNF Multinational Force

vii

MONUC United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NSC National Security Council

NSS National Security Staff

OAU Organization of African Unity

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)

PRP Party of the Populist Revolution

RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie

RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

SADC Southern Africa Development Communicy

SOCEUR U.S. Special Operations Command Europe

UDPS Union for Democracy and Social Progress

UN United Nations

UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

At the end of the Cold War, a shifting global political climate began to change

U.S. foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. policymakers realized that the United

States no longer needed to compete with the Soviet Union for influence around the world.

New policy priorities took the place of competition in proxy wars, which meant that

Africa began to suffer from declining geostrategic importance. Zaire was not exempt from the growing malaise in Africa policy, and the world soon began to see a shift in the

―special relationship‖ that it had shared with the United States during the Cold War. This study seeks to assess which foreign policymaking institutions led the decision-making process that led to continuity or change in U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire in the post-

Cold War era.

Cold War U.S. Relations with Congo

In 1960, following independence from Belgium, Congo became of great priority for the United States and other Western powers. America had long viewed the great country in the heart of the continent as the ―prize of Africa,‖ notably for its size, location, and resources. With its central location providing easy access to most of Southern Africa and its wealth in natural resources, especially minerals for weapons production, Congo held great strategic value, and the United States invested much in Congo to defend against falling into the hands of communists.1

1 Memorandum From the Chief of the U.S. Military Technical Advisory Team (Rockwell) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Mulcahy), Washington, March 7, 1975, National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1975, 820143-2376; Confidential Interview with former State Department

For this reason, the ―special relationship‖ with Congo developed, and the United

States offered repeated interventions for the sake of stability, the containment of communism, and the furthering of strategic business interests in Central Africa.

Beginning with the Congo Crisis of 1960, the United States and other Western governments sought to restore stability through military intervention, an effort that included the deployment of the first United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo.

The United States also sought to maintain pro-Western leadership in the rich

African state, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified and initiated bolstering financial and political support for Army General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu as an ally against communism and the popular Marxist leader Patrice Lumumba. With U.S. support, Mobutu‘s influence in Congo grew in the early 1960s, and by 1965 he seized central control of Congo and renamed the country Zaire.

While in power during the Cold War, Mobutu played the role of staunch anti- communist ally, providing regional support for U.S. proxy operations and refusing Soviet and Cuban access to Zaire‘s resources. In return for his support, the United States regularly responded to threats of communist intervention in Zaire, the ideological nature of which Mobutu sometimes overplayed to manipulate donors for more resources.

Additional interventions included U.S. complicity in the removal of Lumumba in 1960, secessionist uprisings in Katanga between 1960 and 1963, humanitarian missions during the hostage crisis of 1964, and defense against invasions of Shaba province in 1977 and

1978. By the time Mobutu finally left Zaire in 1997, the United States had delivered

Official #5, March 19, 2012; Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #6, March 22, 2012.

2 more than $300 million in military material and had trained more than one thousand

Zairian soldiers.2

The United States further supported Mobutu and the state of Zaire through an inflow of capital through private, public, and covert means. These resources helped

Mobutu maintain extensive patronage networks that ensured his control over Zaire, a country nearly one-fourth the size of the United States with dozens of ethnic groups and over two hundred spoken languages. In exchange, American businesses benefited from preferred access to almost every sector of the Zairian economy, especially valuable minerals including copper and cobalt.3

Scholars have marveled at the ―special relationship‖ between the United States and Zaire characterized by such support for the regime. In contrast, members of

Congress and human rights groups have criticized this relationship because of its tolerance for and contributions to corruption and economic mismanagement in Zaire. By the end of 1990, Zaire owed international creditors more than $10 billion in debt, half of which remained amassed in Mobutu‘s personal fortune.4 Nevertheless, between 1976 and 1990, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), under pressure from the United States authorized fourteen stabilization programs for Zaire.5 Mobutu, not only a master manipulator of domestic politics, also demonstrated political skill by playing donors

2 U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, 1981, 1990, and 1997 editions; U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY, 1986, 333; William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix, ―Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War,‖ World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, January 2000, 5-6. 3 David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 194; Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 104. 4 David Renton, David Sheddon, and Leo Zeilig, The Congo: Plunder & Resistance (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2007), 151; William Claiborne, ―Mobutu Refurbishing Image Tainted by Corruption Charge,‖ Washington Post, June 30, 1989. 5 William Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire,‖ African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1997, 148.

3 against one another and even manipulating the individual interests of different U.S. foreign policymaking institutions to maximize the inflow of resources. Even as criticism for human rights abuses and economic management grew during the Carter and Reagan

Administrations, continued U.S. support for Mobutu demonstrated the strength of high- level interest in maintaining the ―special relationship‖ during the Cold War.

Post-Cold War Transition

As the Cold War came to a close and the threat of communism faded, the U.S. relationship with Zaire began to change. In the midst of changing domestic and international policy environments, a lack of sustained support for Mobutu eventually led to his fall from power in Zaire. With the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Central Africa, or the Great Lakes region, beginning with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, ensuing U.S. policy decisions and recurring conflict in the region led to the overthrow of Mobutu and no intervention from the United States to defend him.

Analysts have surmised that the neutrality of the United States government during this time only fueled the perpetuation of conflict. Despite Western hopes for renewed stability in the region after the overthrow of Mobutu by Laurent Kabila, the ensuing war fueled by regional powers left a legacy of insecurity and violence that caused the deaths of more than five million people and displaced millions.6

6 International Rescue Committee, ―Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an Ongoing Crisis,‖ 2007, http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/migrated/resources/2007/2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf; Methodology for these numbers questioned by the Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 123-131, cited in Paul D. Williams, War & Conflict in Africa (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 29- 33.

Thesis Intent

This study seeks to determine how and why successive U.S. administrations pursued continuity or change in their policies toward Congo during the post-Cold War period from 1989 to 2003. In order to identify patterns in the policymaking process, this study employs an analytical framework to determine the correlation between the roles of different U.S. foreign policymaking institutions during different situational contexts in

Congo.

There are thus two sets of variables defined for this framework. The first set of variables refers to the situational context in which the policy decision is made as perceived by the United States: I label these contexts routine, crisis, or extended crisis.

The second set of variables examines which institution in the foreign policymaking process took the lead on policy formulation: the White House, the national security bureaucracy, or Congress. The correlation between institutional leadership in foreign policy interventions (military, diplomatic, and economic) in varying types of situations during the time period in this study will reveal the dominant patterns of continuity or change in U.S. policy toward Congo.

This study also seeks to compare the results of this analysis to the conclusions made by Africa scholar Peter Schraeder regarding U.S. policymaking toward Zaire during the Cold War. Schraeder‘s analysis revealed a correlation between the variables that resulted in three general patterns: routine situations and bureaucratic politics, crisis situations and presidential politics, and extended crisis situations with domestic politics and Congressional involvement. In situations of bureaucratic leadership, he noted

5 incremental change in policy, as opposed to Presidential or Congressional leadership, which often led to dramatic change.7

After conducting extensive research of public records, archival materials, varying viewpoints of Africa scholars and policy analysts, and personal interviews with leaders in

U.S. foreign policymaking during this time, I will determine if I have found the same correlation as Schraeder between the nature of the situation, leading policymaking institution, and change or continuity in U.S. foreign policy toward Congo.

Institutional Roles in Foreign Policymaking

Scholars who have explored the division of authority in the foreign policymaking process have found that even during the height of Africa‘s geostrategic importance to the

United States in the Cold War, the continent received a generally low level of

Presidential attention.8 Without crisis, the Africa policies of the previous administration were likely to continue, regardless of a change in administration ―worldview,‖ simply because of the large number of responsibilities balanced by the President.9 Only in times of personal predilection for African issues or crises affecting national security or public opinion of the President did the White House critically examine policy toward a particular African country and make key decisions to initiate change in previous policy.10

7 Peter Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 8 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa; Brennan M. Kraxberger, ―The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an ‗Age of Terror,‘‖ Africa Today, Vol. 52 (1) 47-68; Karl P. Magyar, United States Interests and Policies in Africa: transition to a new era (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2000); Donald Rothchild, ―Trends in US-Africa Relations: Implications for the Future,‖ in Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (eds.) Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 245-267; Peter Schraeder, "Sapphire Anniversary Reflections on the Study of United States Foreign Policy toward Africa,‖ The Journal of modern African studies, March 2003, 139-152. 9 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 30-31. 10 Ibid, 31.

When the President does not direct policy, the White House cedes the responsibility for policymaking decisions to the national security bureaucracy. The

Department of Defense, Department of State, and CIA manage routine situations and day-to-day relationships with their counterparts in foreign governments. The bureaucratic management of policy tends to cause only incremental change, since policymakers face bureaucratic hurdles that oppose dramatic change without support from the White House or high-level political appointees to break bureaucratic deadlock.

Each agency holds a specific ―curator mentality‖ as bureaucrats work towards the goals of their own mission.11 Seeking to maximize the influence of one‘s own agency in the policymaking process leads to a competitive instead of collaborative process. These tendencies cause the bureaucracy to also rely on previously established policy with strong resistance to change. A certain degree of ―clientitis‖ is expected, but ―going rogue‖ can threaten one‘s career.12

Schraeder and others have also noted that the longer a crisis persists, the more likelihood that actors outside of the executive branch will try to influence decision- making.13 This involvement most often comes from Congress, as an independent actor or spurred by public interests. Congress has the power to grant or remove policy options through appropriations and confirmation of political appointees, as well as the ability to pressure the executive branch on policy decisions through hearings. Schraeder has asserted that Congress employs these powers during times of extended crisis in order to

11 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 16. 12 Morton H. Halperin. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974). 13 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa; F. Chidozie Ogene, ―U.S. Policy-Making During the Congo Crisis 1960-64,‖ Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies of United States African Policy (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1983).

7 correct divergences between policymaking by the executive and the mainstream opinions of Congress and the American public.14

Although active outside of the formal policymaking process, interest groups also play an important role in influencing the formulation of foreign policy. Due to Congress‘ increased attention to foreign policy issues since the 1970s, demand and respect for the participation of outside groups in hearings and legislation has grown. Such groups include academic organizations, non-profit organizations, foreign lobby firms, private corporations, and human rights organizations.

In order to identify the correlation between these variables and to assess the situational, leadership, and power dynamics that influenced policy decisions and continuity or change, this study documents and analyzes U.S. policy decisions and interventions toward Congo from 1989 to 2003. President George H.W. Bush‘s worldview of the ―New Era‖ with the fall of communism had minimal impact on relations with Zaire, until the waning of Mobutu‘s strategic importance with the end of communist influence in Angola changed the U.S. policymaking response from Congress

(chapter 2). Africa policy in the Clinton years witnessed increased high-level attention to the continent. However, crises that unfolded in Somalia and Rwanda directly impacted the Administration‘s enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention (chapter 3) and led to deliberate neutrality regarding the overthrow of Mobutu (chapter 4). The unfolding of

Africa‘s ―World War‖ in the Great Lakes resulted in delegation of policymaking efforts to the bureaucracy, primarily the State Department through negotiations (chapter 5).

Analysis of these years will shed light on a neglected era in historical and policy analysis that held great consequences for subsequent events in Congo and formed a

14 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 42-46.

8 legacy for U.S. policy toward the country. The Bush and Obama Administrations have also demonstrated a marginalization of Africa issues by the presidency, with the exception of counter-terrorism as a priority for the North and Horn of Africa. Otherwise, these Administrations focused on ―boutique issues‖ in Congo, such as HIV/AIDS, conflict minerals, and violence against women, which demonstrate the policy results of personal predilection of leaders and limited additional strategic interests. However, more research is needed to examine the changing nature of the policymaking process and the effects of advocacy, leadership styles, and personal dynamics on policy (chapter 6).

Figure 1: Peter Schraeder’s Table of Patterns and Processes in U.S. Africa Policy15

External Environment US domestic environment Continuity and change

Levels of foreign involvement Local “Radical European Policy Policy Outcome Chance Situation powers” powers process determinants for Change Routine Low High Bureaucratic Organizational Incrementalism Low Politics missions Crisis High Low Presidential Administration Uncertainty High politics worldview Extended High Low Domestic Societal Uncertainty High Crisis politics Interests

15 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 49.

Chapter 2: The Bush Years and the Waning of Mobutu, 1989 – 1992

The ―special relationship‖ between the United States and Zaire during the Cold

War has long fascinated scholars of U.S. Africa policy. The United States saw Mobutu as a key ally in the containment of Soviet influence on the African continent when the

United States had significant interest in ―a stable and responsible government in

Kinshasa, which influences the stability, as well as the foreign and domestic policies of its nine bordering states.‖16 From 1965 to 1991, Zaire received more than $1.5 billion in economic and military aid from the United States to ensure this stability.17

U.S. policy toward Zaire during the post-Cold War years of President Mobutu‘s rule has undergone less scrutiny. While proclaiming the beginning of a ―New World

Era,‖ President George H. W. Bush pursued largely a continuation of Cold War relations with regards to Zaire, but encountered new hardship in maintaining support for the dictator in the face of increasing human rights abuses, economic decline, and political instability in Zaire. To these were added domestic pressure from Congress and, most importantly, the waning importance of Mobutu for U.S. strategic interests.

Soviet Decline and Effects on U.S. Africa Policy

Policymakers hold differing views on what point during the decline of the Soviet

Union most significantly altered U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Former Assistant

Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker and other scholars have asserted that the

16 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1986, 333. 17 U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Fact Sheet as of September 30, 1998, www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/FMS_FACTS/FMS_9_30_98/fulltext.pdf.

10 signing of the agreement leading to Namibian independence on December 22, 1988 marked the end of the Cold War in Africa, as U.S. and Soviet diplomats worked together to broker the deal.18 Others contend that the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 marked the ―beginning of the end,‖ leading to less tolerance for the corrupt and oppressive dictators around the world that the United States had supported to contain communism.

In March 1990, President Bush described democracy as a primary foreign policy objective in the post-Cold War context: ―In a new era, nurturing democracy and stability remains a basic goal, but one now freed from its traditional Cold War context. Foreign assistance is an indispensable means toward this end.‖19 In the same month, Secretary

James A. Baker announced at the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in Washington that

President Bush requested that all regional bureaus begin seriously pushing for democracy. This policy had already taken precedence in relationships with Latin

American countries, but had not yet been a priority for U.S. Chiefs of Mission in

Africa.20 Some diplomats and scholars perceived this moment as an unleashing of diplomatic enthusiasm for democracy promotion that had been long suppressed by the necessity of sustaining relationships with anti-communist dictators for the sake of winning the Cold War.21

18 Michael Clough, Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 12; Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. 19 National Security Strategy of the United States, George H. W. Bush, March 1990, 18. Accessed via National Defense University Digital Library. 20 Confidential Interview with State Department Official #1, November 10, 2011; Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 1989-1993, March 22, 2012. 21 Confidential Interview #1; Interview with Peter Rosenblum, policy analyst and human rights advocate at Columbia University, March 9 and 12, 2012.

The subsequent initiative of U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone stood as a testament to this effect. Ambassador Hempstone, a political appointee, had previously been skeptical about the potential for political change in Kenya. However, after the conference, he committed to return to Nairobi with a new perspective. Calling for democracy and multiparty elections, befriending dissidents and political opposition, and surviving two assassination attempts, Hempstone and his ―bulldozer diplomacy‖ successfully pushed for multi-party elections in Kenya in 1992, after ten years of single party rule.22 However, the same dramatic shift in policy did not occur in U.S. relations with Zaire due to lingering strategic importance of the country to U.S. anti-communist efforts in neighboring Angola.

U.S. Support for Democracy in Zaire: Incremental Bureaucratic Effort

As Soviet influence began to wane, relations between the United States and Zaire had undergone incremental change. William C. Harrop, Ambassador to Zaire during the

Bush Administration who also served in Zaire early in his career, noted that conversations about democracy and economic restructuring had taken place throughout the Cold War period. However, diplomats delivered these messages only in private meetings and never mounted public condemnation of Mobutu.23 Mobutu deflected these demands with skill, continuing to ―play the anti-Soviet card‖ to maintain U.S. support.24

22 Smith Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee, TN: University of the South Press, 1997). 23 Interview with William C. Harrop, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection; Michael G. Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990 (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1991), 70. For press coverage of relations with Mobutu, see: The Washington Post, July 1, 1989; The New York Times, June 30, 1989; The New York Times, July 2, 1989 and The Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 1989. 24 Confidential Interview #12.

Despite shared misgivings about Mobutu‘s political and economic practices, U.S. national security dictated that policymakers continue support for his regime.25

Although diplomats continued to push the agenda of democracy and economic reform in the days of Soviet decline, U.S.-relations with Mobutu were still ―in a kind of torpor‖ as the ambassador and embassy staff could not effect the change they desired.

Even as the Soviet Union began to fall, Ambassador Harrop described the difficulty of his relationship with Mobutu in the early days of the Bush Administration, as he was

―forever engaged in applying pressure on him to improve his record on human rights and the management of the Zairian economy,‖ which ironically put him in ―repeated confrontation with Mobutu at the same time that the United States Ambassador was probably the most important foreigner with whom he dealt.‖26

The budget environment for defense and diplomacy in Africa had tightened by the end of the 1980s, as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1986 had decreased overall allocations to the region.27 While the Reagan Administration had slightly increased economic aid to Zaire to reward Mobutu for his support, in the ―New

Era,‖ the Bush Administration prioritized resources for newly independent Eastern

European countries and a war in the Middle East. Thus, the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa faced minimal resources to support the new push for democracy.28

Even during a time of limited resources, Mobutu‘s value to the strategic interests of the United States led the bureaucracy to find creative ways to show support. In 1989, the State Department arranged for President Bush to receive Mobutu as the first African

25 Interview with Peter Rosenblum; Confidential Interview #6; Confidential Interview #12. 26 Interview with William C. Harrop, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 27 Schraeder, U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa, 102. 28 National Security Strategy of the United States, 1990, 18; National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, 1, 8, and 10; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 102.

13 head of state in the White House. President Bush thanked him as America‘s ―oldest and most valued friend on the continent‖ for helping negotiate an Angolan cease-fire, although the agreement later proved unsuccessful.29 While Mobutu did not encounter disapproval for corruption and his human rights record from the President, he faced strong criticism from Congress. The State Department came to his defense, telling the press that Mobutu was taking steps to address the abuses.30 Despite these concerns,

Mobutu‘s audience with the President helped to confirm for Congress, Western donors, and even Mobutu‘s opposition in Zaire, that he still maintained high standing with the

United States.

With the proclamation of a ―New Era‖ as the Cold War declined, the State

Department embraced the new push for democracy in Zaire. However, the national security agencies agreed that Mobutu himself would need to play a critical role in whatever democratic transition took place. Mobutu‘s control over resources and, most importantly the military, made his involvement critical to transition. The agencies presented this view – the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency more strongly than the State Department – and the White House agreed. The so-called

―Mobutu or chaos‖ theory, which the bureaucracy had proposed since the 1980s, thus remained the modus operandi even as the Cold War waned.31

After years of U.S. bureaucratic pressure for political and market liberalization in

Zaire, Mobutu began to feel a sense of urgency as he witnessed changes in Africa and around the world as Soviet influence declined. By 1990, dictators across Africa had

29David B. Ottoway, ―US Hails Angolan Talks as ‗Watershed,‖ Washington Post, June 24, 1989, pp. A18, A22. 30 Robert Pear, ―Mobutu, On Visit, Lauded and Chided,‖ The New York Times, June 30, 1989. 31 Confidential Interview cited by Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 107.

14 started accepting political reform, and decreasing credit from international donors began to weaken Mobutu‘s ability to maintain control through patronage. After the execution of close friend and fellow dictator Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, Mobutu decided to tour

Zaire in January and February of 1990 to engage in a ―direct dialogue‖ with the Zairian people.32 Testing the people‘s desire for democracy, this tour led to an ―extraordinary outpouring of sentiment against Mr. Mobutu and his autocratic rule.‖33 Calls for political and economic reform emanated from society and student groups, and Mobutu received

5,000 written responses.34

With the tour occurring within months of the March 1990 Chiefs of Mission

Conference where Secretary Baker called for reenergized support for democracy, the bureaucracy sought to reinforce the demands for change from the Congolese people. The

Secretary of State himself traveled to Kinshasa to meet with Mobutu, warning that he

―should heed the forces of change which were already visibly sweeping Africa, or risk being swept aside by them.‖35 Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman Cohen testified that this served as a ―benchmark‖ in the process of transition to democracy.36

Congressional Response to the “New Era” and Qualms with Mobutu

Congress also saw an opportunity to increase pressure on Mobutu, whose practices of corruption and human rights abuses had not changed the fact that Zaire was

32 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 78. 33 New York Times, April 14, 1990. Cited in Sean Kelly, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu in Zaire (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1993), 251. 34 Kelly, 251. 35 Herman Cohen, Statement to the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, November 6, 1991; Confirmed by Confidential Interview #12; See also Steven Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 5, 1996, 11, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub203.pdf. 36 Herman J. Cohen, Statement before the Senate Africa Subcommittee, 1991.

15 the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa at the time.37 Chair of the House

Subcommittee on Africa Howard E. Wolpe often spoke out against Mobutu, and had led previous upstages of the official government policy on these issues.38 In April of 1990,

Wolpe and a handful of Democratic Congressmen announced that they would oppose all military aid to Zaire and would only allow for economic aid to Zairian non-government organizations (NGOs).39

The New York Times article announcing their statement asserted that the ―end of the cold war removes any possible justification for this taxpayer subsidy to a repellent dictator‖ and described the state of destitution in Zaire:

―American aid dollars have not measurably helped Zaire's people. Annual per capita income is about $150; living standards are lower than when Mr. Mobutu took power. His Government has not built a single hospital in its 25 years. Only 3 percent of Zaire's budget goes to health and education while 23 percent goes to the military and 50 percent to ''political institutions.'' Meanwhile Mr. Mobutu's personal fortune has, by some estimates, grown to $6 billion.40 His holdings include perhaps a dozen French and Belgian chateaus, a Spanish castle and a 32- bedroom Swiss villa. Mr. Mobutu protests that his fortune is a mere $50 million, and that none of it has come out of the pockets of his people. But recent World Bank studies have found hundreds of millions of dollars in mineral revenues unreported in the national budget, and more gold and coffee smuggled out of the country than legally exported.‖41

Heeding this warning from Congress and seeming to accede to the demands of his own people, Mobutu proclaimed the beginning of a ―Third Republic.‖ In a speech on

37 U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Legislative Day of June 26, 1990, 15619. 38 Peter Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance: The Clinton Administration in Africa,‖ Current History, Vol. 101 (655), May 2002, 196. 39 ―Why Bankroll Africa's Ceausescu?‖ Op-ed in The New York Times, April 21, 1990. 40 Contrary to popular belief at the time, Ambassador Harrop maintained that this ―personal fortune‖ was not likely held in coffers anywhere but instead was primarily spent to support his networks of patronage and to buy support and power, albeit some of course was still spent on the largesse of the life he lived. Interview with William Harrop on April 6, 2012. 41 ―Why Bankroll Africa's Ceausescu?‖ The New York Times.

April 24, 1990, Mobutu announced that he would allow freedom of the press, political competition, and Christian names and business suits.42 Opposition groups began to form and numbered nearly two hundred organizations by the following year.43

After Mobutu‘s speech, Ambassador Harrop mentioned that U.S. officials never believed that Mobutu was sincere in his professed commitment to democratic change.

They presumed that this rhetoric represented a continuation of his antics to please

Western donors. Harrop also noted that, ―Of course, there was always hope.‖44

Before long, Etienne Tshisekedi, a long-time opposition leader in Zaire despite much repression, assembled student protests sponsored by his party, the Union for

Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). The Zairian police and military responded violently to these protests, and on May 11, 1990, killed a dozen students at the University of Lubumbashi.45 The United States attempted to investigate the killings to quell international criticism, but reported that Mobutu blocked U.S. inquiries into ―the number of casualties, the identity of the commandos who conducted the attack, and whether there was any involvement by national security, military, or political leaders.‖46 Otherwise, the embassy only raised the situation with Mobutu in private.47

Congress, however, responded to the killings with disdain and publicly expressed more concern. In June 1990, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs

Paul Simon added the testimonies of survivors and advocacy groups reporting on the

42 Christian names and business suits had been banned since the late 1960s when Mobutu pursued a policy of ―authenticity,‖ which evolved into a more cult-like following fashioned after the following of Mao Zedong, which came to be known in Zaire as Mobutuisme. Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 11. 43 Raymond W. Copson, ―Congo (formerly Zaire),‖ CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress. June 5, 2001, 12. 44 Interview with William Harrop, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire, 1987-1991, April 6, 2012. 45 Copson, 12. 46 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, 448. 47 Interview with William Harrop.

17 killings at Lubumbashi to the Official Congressional Record of the Senate.48 In a hearing on the killings, representatives of the human rights community criticized the Ambassador and the Administration for not making public condemnations like France and Belgium.49

Angolan Peace Diminishes U.S. Obligations to Zaire

U.S. policymakers note that a significant change in U.S. policy toward Zaire did not occur until the removal of the communist threat in Angola in 1991. In the words of

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen, ―Our last connection with

[Mobutu] was mainly to use airfields to help the anti-Communist rebels in Angola, but that ended in 1991.‖50

For many years during the Cold War, the CIA had funneled support through Zaire for Jonas Savimbi‘s rebel group, the National Union for the Total Independence of

Angola (UNITA), to counter the Marxist-Leninist government of Angola.51 Ambassador

Harrop noted that access to Angola and Mobutu‘s provision of safe haven for Savimbi were primary reasons to ―embrace this extraordinary, authoritarian, selfish, dictator.‖52

48 U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Legislative Day of June 26, 1990, 15618-15622. 49 Peter Rosenblum stated that French and Belgian condemnation of the killings at Lubumbashi appeared throughout the European press, first in Le Soir and Le Monde. Peter Rosenblum, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, The Situation in Zaire: hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1991. 50 Cited in A. Huliaras, ―(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions: The United States, France, and the Crisis in Zaire,‖ in Howard Adelman and Govind C. Rao, War and Peace in Zaire/Congo (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 287. 51 Confidential Interview #6; Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #12, April 6, 2012. 52 Interview with William C. Harrop, August 24, 1993, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html.

In 1991, however, Cuban forces withdrew from Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government announced multi-party elections, and the United States ended assistance to UNITA.53 Assistant Secretary Cohen noted that before this point, Republicans in Congress would never have allowed the U.S. government to stop aiding UNITA and provided staunch rhetorical support for Mobutu for this reason.54 Peace in Angola coincided with the end of the Soviet empire, further shifting Congress and the executive branch‘s views towards Mobutu. As one senior level official stated, ―Mobutu ceased to be an ally and became the problem.‖55

In the August 1991 National Security Strategy, President Bush stated definitively that ―the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved,‖ and that Africa would ―no longer be seen as a battleground for superpower conflict.‖56 He called for a new focus on

―enhancing security – in the developing world particularly – through means that are more political, social and economic than military.‖57 Thus the White House again directed the

State Department, Pentagon, and U.S. Agency for International Development to renew energy for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization.

The Strategy also acknowledged with prescience that ―many Africans now fear that the outside world will lose interest in their troubled continent.‖58 True to their fears, when the threat of communist influence in Africa evaporated, so did the United States‘ need for Zaire and Mobutu.

53 Tony Hodges, Angola: anatomy of an oil state (Oxford: Fridtjof Nansen Institute in association with James Currey, 2004), 50. See also mention of Angolan forces withdrawing in the National Security Strategy of the United States, 1990, 18; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 106; Copson, 14. 54 Interview with Herman J. Cohen. 55 Confidential Interview with State Department Official #14, May 2012. 56 National Security Strategy of the United States, George H. W. Bush, August 1991, 1, 8, 10. Accessed via National Defense University Digital Library. 57 National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, 10. 58 Ibid.

Congress Initiates Dramatic Change

As Mobutu‘s strategic value to the United States quickly diminished, Congress reinforced its earlier protests by rejecting the Bush Administration‘s FY1992 proposal for

$4 million in military and $40 million in economic assistance.59 In response to the

Administration‘s arguments for Mobutu as the lynchpin for regional stability,

Representative Stephen Solarz retorted: ―What jeopardizes the prospects of regional stability is the existence of a kleptocracy in Zaire that has driven the standard of living lower than it was at the time of independence three decades ago.‖60 Thereafter, the

United States could only contribute food aid and humanitarian assistance to Zaire.61

Bureaucratic Efforts Unleashed

Congress‘ removal of bilateral assistance sparked stronger diplomatic efforts to encourage Mobutu to reform in order to restore bilateral assistance to Zaire. However, the withdrawal of aid began restricting how much influence the United States could contribute toward promoting democracy. Assistant Secretary Cohen sought to address the gap by recruiting Foreign Service officers interested in human rights and helped arrange appointments for ambassadors who would drive the democracy message, including

59 International Herald Tribune, March 13, 1991; New York Times, May 16, 1991. Clifford Crauss, ―U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire, Setting Off a Policy Debate,‖ The New York Times, November 4, 1990. See also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Zaire, January 1, 1993, http://unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca62c.html. Reference to Mobutu‘s lobbyists: Edward T. Pound, ―Congo Drums: With Dictators Falling, Zaire‘s Mobutu Hires Lobbyists to Make Sure He Retains American Aid,‖ Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1990. 60 Clifford Crauss, ―U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire.‖ 61 Herman J. Cohen, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, November 6, 1991; Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 11; Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa,‖ Vol. 10, No. 1(A), March 1998, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/africa/africlin.htm.

Melissa F. Wells who arrived as U.S. ambassador to Zaire in June 1991.62 The State

Department also facilitated a letter from President Bush to Mobutu, which reassured him that ―despite the restrictions imposed by Congress, Zaire remains one of the principal beneficiaries of U.S. aid in Africa.‖63 These actions demonstrated the continued high- level of support from the executive branch despite restrictions from Congress. The removal of funds, diplomatic pressure, and positive reinforcement from the President encouraged quick results from Mobutu, as he soon announced that Zaire would hold a national political conference. The Sovereign National Conference launched the next year.64

Armed with an embassy team of more than three hundred people, Ambassador

Wells began pushing White House-led priorities in Zaire. No longer restricting pressure for political and economic reform to private meetings, Wells soon became known as the face of America to the people of Zaire. She cultivated relations with civil society, playing the warm, personal, and encouraging role of a mentor to aspiring non- government groups in contrast to previous diplomats restricted to relations with Mobutu and the government. Even human rights advocates commented that ―Wells successfully gave the impression that President Bush wakes up in the morning and thinks about

Zaire,‖ conveying that not only was America pushing for democracy but cared to see

Zaire succeed and was paying attention at the highest levels.65 Given full access to the local television stations and license to say anything, Wells made regular appearances to encourage the people of Zaire. This role earned her the nickname ―Tantine,‖ or auntie, as

62 Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92. 63 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Zaire, January 1, 1993, http://unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca62c.html. 64 Copson, 12. 65 Interview with Peter Rosenblum.

21 the people of Zaire saw her as ―someone… to whom you go with your troubles and who gives you good advice.‖66

Assistant Secretary Cohen visited Kinshasa frequently and bolstered Wells‘ unprecedented meetings with Mobutu and Tshisekedi to negotiate an agreement for a transitional government. However, the United States still had no interest in renewing high-level support for Mobutu, as demonstrated by the absence of Kinshasa on U.S. Vice

President Dan Quayle‘s itinerary in Africa in September 1991, which broke a long tradition of vice presidential visits to Zaire since 1968.67

First Post-Cold War Crisis in Zaire: Bureaucracy Responds

By late 1991, the Government of Zaire had abandoned all pretext of economic reform. The Zairian economy suffered from long-term economic mismanagement, impatient international creditors, and the refusal of bilateral aid from the key donors including the United States, France, and Belgium. In an attempt to repay Zaire‘s debt and replenish his patronage systems, Mobutu printed money in mass causing inflation to rise

23,000 percent.68 He extracted all profits from the formal and informal economies, causing even the largest state-owned mining company Gécamines to without funds to

66 Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, May 4 1995, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Women Ambassadors Series, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html. 67 Kelly, 252. 68 Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, The Situation in Zaire: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1991.

22 sustain the high-maintenance machinery.69 100,000 Congolese now faced unemployed and industries were ―taken apart and sold as scrap across the border in Zambia.‖70

In hindsight, Ambassador Wells apportioned some of the blame for this decline to the United States and Congress for ending U.S. assistance.71 Assistant Secretary Cohen confirmed this, saying that the bureaucracy struggled to effect change for these priorities at a time when the rest of the government ―stopped caring to spend money on places like

Congo.‖72

When Ambassador Wells tried to convince the mining companies to free the forced laborers, the companies threatened to withhold cobalt from the United States.73

Wells informed them of their place in the New Era: ―The Cold War is over. We are no longer producing bombs and we have a huge cobalt surplus pile and we're going to start selling it… The world has changed. You are falling off the map.‖74 This conversation demonstrated the removal of Zaire‘s leverage of strategic position and resources over the

United States that had occurred since the end of the Cold War. The United States no longer needed to tolerate such manipulation.

On September 23, 1991, Zairian troops poured through the streets of Kinshasa, looting everything in sight to compensate for months without payment. Nearly one month later, the military in the southern mineral-rich province of Shaba also revolted and looted Lubumbashi. Ambassador Wells recalls that Washington anticipated ―another

Congo crisis of the sixties,‖ during many of which foreign nationals were targets of anti-

69 Renton et al., The Congo, 150-1; Kenneth B. Noble, ―Zaire‘s Rich Mines are Abandoned to Scavengers,‖ The New York Times, February 21, 1994. 70 Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 71 Ibid. 72 Interview with William C. Harrop. 73 Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 74 Ibid.

23 colonial sentiments and violence. Fortunately, this rebellion did not target civilians and the uprising resulted in minimal loss of life. Instead, low-level troops took ―the economic mismanagement of decades into their own hands.‖75

When similar rebellions had taken place during the Cold War, former colonial powers, with generous support from the United States, had quickly intervened to evacuate citizens and defend Mobutu‘s central control. The U.S. response to the 1991 rebellion mirrored previous evacuation strategies, as the U.S. military lent France several C-141s and helped coordinate the evacuation. The U.S. response to this crisis did not escalate to the level of France and Belgium, however, which deployed their own troops to ensure stability.76 Three thousand Americans evacuated by air and hundreds more flooded over

Zaire‘s borders, leaving only 350 American citizens in Zaire, most of whom remained as lifelong missionaries or dual citizens.77 A Foreign Service officer assisting with the evacuation from neighboring Zambia noted that he ―had never seen an evacuation like this,‖ as people brought boats and Mercedes with them across the border.78 Expats, money, and capital left Zaire, foreshadowing the impact on further disintegration of the

Zairian economy.

The State Department also evacuated most of the diplomatic presence, reducing the embassy to a skeleton staff of twenty-five people and closing the consulate in

Lubumbashi.79 The United States provided no direct defense of Mobutu, and rumors

75 Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 76 Neil Henry, ―France, Belgium Send Troops to Zaire,‖ Washington Post, September 25, 1991, A19; U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, September 30, 1991. 77 Cohen, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 1991; State Department Noon Briefing, September 30, 1991, cited in Kelly, 253. 78 Confidential Interview with Senior Administration Official, #13, April 9, 2012. 79 Cohen, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 1991.

24 circulated that he began to seek asylum but was denied by Belgium, France, and

Switzerland.80

After the rebellion, the United States began the push Mobutu for democratic reform with renewed force. The State Department sought new tactics to pressure Mobutu and escalated diplomatic pressure through close coordination with Belgium and France.

In late 1991, Assistant Secretary Cohen met with the Belgium Prime Minister and his

French counterpart and ―decided that our analysis of the situation in Zaire is identical.‖

Thus began the ―troika‖ alliance that would mount collective pressure against Mobutu.81

Ambassador Wells subsequently delivered a carefully coordinated message to

Mobutu demanding that ―he must share power, give way to a transitional government that would include the opposition, and let them lead the country to a democratic election‖82

In January 1992, the United States joined Belgium and France for the first time in a joint public statement, opposing the suspension of the National Conference.83 Assistant

Secretary Cohen later told Congress, ―We believe that our trilateral efforts may yield results where previous bilateral approaches have not.‖84

Congress Responds: Escalating Demands

The rebellions fueled Congress‘ fury about Mobutu‘s ―obvious lack of concern for the people of his country,‖ and many members began to call for his resignation.85

American missionaries who had returned to the United States in the 1991 evacuation also

80 Kelly, 252. 81 Cohen, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 1991 82 Ibid. 83 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. 84 Cohen, Emergency situation in Zaire, 1992. 85 Barbara Crossette, ―Sentiment Grows in Washington for Shift in U.S. Zaire Policy,‖ The New York Times, November 13, 1991.

25 pushed the Administration to end support for Mobutu.86 Senator Paul Simon asked the

Bush Administration to persuade Mobutu to leave Zaire. Even Representative Dan

Burton, a Republican and long-time supporter of Mobutu, admitted that Mobutu should step down.87 Both the House and Senate passed resolutions calling for Mobutu‘s removal.88

At a November 6th hearing in the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs,

Senator Simon questioned how the United States could play a constructive role in Zaire after over $1 billion in aid was not successful.89 Skirting the human rights issue,

Assistant Secretary Cohen still asserted, ―We feel that [Mobutu] still has a political role to play in Zaire until their election takes place.‖90 Demonstrating continued political savvy and skill at playing to the expectations of the West, Mobutu appointed a new Prime

Minister and renewed the country‘s commitment to the previously stalled National

Conference only days after the Senate hearing.

As the National Conference reopened, the U.S. embassy began hosting talks with members of parliament, opposition leaders, and the government to discuss a new way forward.91 Before long, however, leaders of the National Conference suspended progress as a protest against the limited ability to operate under Mobutu‘s strict control.

86 Warlick, Nancy H., ―Mobutu Oppression in Zaire Must End,‖ Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, March 20, 1993. 87 Crossette, ―Sentiment Grows in Washington.‖ 88H.Con.Res. 238 and S.Con.Res. 80, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 1991. 89 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, The Situation in Zaire. 90 Cohen, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 1991. 91 Confidential Interview #6.

Stalled Progress and Continued Incremental Change

The Administration began to struggle more seriously to facilitate political transition without causing more deterioration of the country, or worse, the region. The

State Department still saw Mobutu‘s involvement as essential, and Assistant Secretary

Cohen told Congress in February 1992 that:

―We‘re not asking him to leave. We feel that he should remain President so that he can control the military forces until there is an election – at which point the people will decide… Unless it resumes rapid progress toward a genuine Democratic transition, the risk of Zaire‘s sliding into chaos, an event which would destabilize Zaire‘s neighbors and cause enormous human suffering, is greater than ever.‖ 92

The United States also escalated pressure by raising the message to the

Presidential level. In March, the embassy delivered a letter from President Bush to

Mobutu that urged reform. In July 1992, Assistant Secretary Cohen publicly announced that the United States was ―impatient to see the start of the transition in Zaire.‖93

On August 3, Mobutu and the members of the National Conference compromised to begin a transitional government. Mobutu conceded to let Prime Minister Etienne

Tshisekedi oversee two years of transitional government, but only if Mobutu maintained control of the Central Bank, the military, and diplomatic representation abroad.94

A bitter rivalry began. Tshisekedi became consumed with overthrowing Mobutu, refusing to pay his salary and even cutting off his access to phones. U.S. officials tried to redirect his energy to constructive preparations for democracy, but could not persuade

92 Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Emergency situation in Zaire and Somalia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102nd Cong.,, 2nd sess., February 5, 1992. 93 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. 94 Ibid.

Tshisekedi.95 Mobutu soon began to undertake creative measures to undermine his opponent, including convincing the Governor of Shaba to begin inciting ethnic violence against Kaisians, Tshisekedi‘s ethnic group. Violence ensued and 200,000 Kasaians fled

Shaba by force or out of fear for their lives. Mobutu sent the 41st Brigade to North Kivu allegedly to quell rebel activity, but the presence of which resulted in more ethnic violence and led to 7,000 deaths and 30,000 refugees by 1993.96

Mobutu began blaming the instability on political liberalization, and on December

1, 1992, he issued a decree to dismiss Tshisekedi and dissolve the transitional government. He continued to sponsor harassment of the press, deaths and disappearances of political leaders, and even launched an attack on the March of Hope, the largest peaceful demonstration ever organized in Zaire. Unlike previous years, the United States publicly criticized this repression.97

Mobutu‘s attempts to maintain power, eliminate enemies, and pay patronage instead of feeding the Zairian people continued to tear the country apart. Central control faded, and Mobutu blamed Western interference for the disintegration.

Analysis

The fading of the Cold War brought change in U.S. policy toward Zaire and the waning of Mobutu‘s power and influence. This change did not emanate from a single decision or turning point. Instead, a combination of decreased White House interest in supporting dictators against communism, shared distaste for Mobutu between the

95 Confidential Interview #6. 96 Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 14-15. 97 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993; ―Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage,‖ The Washington Office on Africa distributed in collaboration with the Africa Office of the National Council of Churches, June 1992, 21-26.

28 diplomatic community and Congress, and decreased strategic need for an ally against communism in Africa created a union of foreign policy institutions and momentum for change.

The ownership of decision making points leading up to this change in policy correlate precisely with the types of situations in Zaire as perceived by the United States, whether routine, crisis, or extended crisis. During the first year of the Bush

Administration, Mobutu remained in power uncontested and continued to provide critical support for U.S. efforts to counter communism in Angola. Per the analytical framework, the management of such a routine situation should be delegated to the bureaucracy, and continuity in relations would be expected.

With examination of the above evidence for the first year of the Administration, this correlation has proven true. Elsewhere in Africa, the new worldview of the Bush

White House renewed support for democracy and spurred some members of the bureaucracy to respond with fervor, such as Ambassador Hempstone in Kenya. However, forceful change in Zaire was delayed as neither the President nor Congress made significant decisions that affected U.S. relations with Zaire. The White House recognized that Zaire posed an exception to the new policy due to its continued strategic importance in the region and did not press the State Department to force democratic change. Despite criticism of Mobutu from several members of Congress, staunch advocates for his regime warned of the chaos that would ensue if he were unseated and kept liberal disapproval in check.

Thus, the national security bureaucracy maintained the reigns of the relationship with Zaire. The State Department continued to uphold rhetoric for the principles of

29 democracy and liberal economics without pushing too hard so as to destabilize Mobutu‘s control, and the CIA and Pentagon continued to funnel arms and support for the Angolan rebel group, UNITA. As a result, the continued support for Mobutu from all institutions in the bureaucracy and key members in Congress combined with general White House inattention to Zaire allowed for continuity in U.S. policy as Soviet global influence began to decline. The few advocates for change in Congress and the State Department were prevented from changing policy to remove support for Mobutu or force democratic change.

However, as the Soviet empire crumbled and the communist threat dissipated in

Angola, Mobutu‘s shortcomings, including extensive economic mismanagement and political repression demonstrated by the killings in Lubumbashi, began to rise to the level of extended crisis. According to the analytical framework, Congress usually responds with dramatic action to encourage the executive branch to address such extended crises, which subsequently results in dramatic changes to policy. This pattern remained true in

1991 when, without the anti-communist justification for support for Mobutu, liberals and conservatives in Congress united to bar further U.S. assistance to Zaire. Crises in

Somalia and the Middle East seized the attention of the President, who provided only limited high-level encouragement to Mobutu after the withdrawal of resources. Had the

White House provided a successful justification to Congress for the continuance of funds, the bureaucracy may have had more resources to incentivize positive progress in Zaire.

However, Congress noted that this practice had not succeeded for over thirty years, so distrusted any justification along these lines.

Having no choice but to comply with Congress‘ discontinuance of appropriations for Zaire, the national security agencies strove to pursue their own agendas with significantly less material support. The State Department, which still sought transition to democracy in Zaire, continued diplomatic efforts without resources to encourage

Mobutu‘s participation in the process. The CIA continued to seek replacements for

Mobutu, and still urged for transition to not happen too quickly, especially since

Congress had just cut a critical component that sustained central control of the state. By this time, the Pentagon had no major interests in Zaire, and thus the removal of appropriations for military training and supplies did not significantly impact the agency‘s mission in Africa after the elimination of the communist threat in Angola.

While the beginning of the Bush Administration marked continuity in U.S. policy toward Zaire, the continuing deterioration of the political, human rights, and economic situation in Zaire over the next few years that received little tangible response from the

United States reaffirmed the divergence from a ―special relationship‖ with Zaire in the new post-Cold War era. As the Cold War came to an end, the White House‘s worldview had changed the overarching policy to replace dictators with democratic leaders,

Congress cut the aid sustaining Mobutu, and the efforts of the bureaucracy became fragmented as agencies attempted to drive constructive change toward democracy. In

U.S. foreign relations, Zaire now represented a mostly bureaucratic backwater caught between the tide of change and a relationship of lingering strategic importance.

Chapter 3: Clinton: New Relations with Africa, 1993-1994

As the Bush Administration came to a close, President Clinton inherited a number of pressing foreign policy dilemmas. Crisis in the Balkans, financial meltdown in Asia, feuding in the Middle East, and humanitarian crisis in Somalia had all attracted attention during the election. However, domestic drivers limited the president‘s involvement in foreign policy as White House staffers steered President Clinton‘s attention to the challenging economic issues in a highly critical political environment. Although Clinton had a personal predilection for international issues and had high hopes for Africa, in the first year, staffers refused to let Clinton host any foreign visitors from Africa except

Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk.98 Pressing domestic issues prevented high-level attention to Zaire, yet crises in the region would soon draw the attention and policy leadership of national security staff.

Clinton and Hope for Africa

Despite the ongoing crisis in Somalia, the Clinton White House had high hopes for Africa. From the beginning of his campaign for the presidency, Clinton proclaimed that he would seek new relationships with the African leaders. National Security Adviser

Anthony Lake gave his first speech at the Brookings Africa Forum on May 3, 1993, announcing Administration priorities of democracy, economic development, and

98 A.J. Hostetler, ―Mandela, De Klerk Accept Liberty Medal from Clinton,‖ Associated Press, July 5, 1993; ―Mandela, de Klerk win praise: Clinton says agreement paves way for democracy,‖ The Milwaukee Sentinal, September 9, 1993.

32 peacekeeping in Africa.99 On May 21, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke of ―a new relationship‖ with Africa as he addressed the African-American Institute.100 As a symbolic gesture of this new worldview and after a many years of diplomatic pressure for peace in southern Africa, the United States extended diplomatic recognition of Angola in

June 1993.101

Bureaucratic Transition: Zaire a Priority without Resources

As the bureaucratic transition began and political appointees from the previous administration trained new appointees for their posts, policy toward Zaire remained consistent. One week into the Clinton Administration, State Department Spokesman

Richard Boucher informed the press about President Bush‘s letters to Mobutu urging democratic transition and stated resolutely, ―We reaffirm the continuity of this policy.‖102

Leading up to his swearing-in as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

George Moose recalled transition briefings with Assistant Secretary Cohen that focused on Mobutu and Zaire. Cohen told Moose that Mobutu, living in Gbadolité, was no longer seriously engaged in the real problems of his country and that the opposition was growing even though they were divided, equally corrupt, and had no real agenda. The U.S.

99 Anthony Lake, Remarks at the Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon, Washington, DC, May 3, 1993, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19930503.html. 100 Address by Secretary State Warren Christopher before the 23rd African-American Institute Conference, ―The United States and Africa: A New Relationship,‖ Reston, Virginia, May 21, 1993, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9305/930521dossec.html. 101 U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government, Statement by President Clinton, Washington, DC, May 19, 1993. Embedded within: ―Humanitarian crisis in Sudan,‖ US Department of State Dispatch, May 24, 1993, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-13186717/humanitarian-crisis-sudan-assistant.html. 102 State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, January 29, 1993, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9301/930129db.html.

33 position was to ease Mobutu towards the exit and to build the transition process to prevent a vacuum with his departure.103

Because of Congress‘ restriction on resources to the Zairian government, leveraging influence with Belgium and France was still critical.104 The significance of

Belgian and French interests in Zaire was demonstrated by the high-level of interlocutors with whom the U.S. Assistant Secretaries met, including the Belgian Foreign Minister and the French Foreign Minister or President‘s principal foreign policy advisor at the

Elysée.105

However, any strategy contrived between members of the troika was limited as the United States still had scant resources to support any efforts. Congress believed that since the United States had won the Cold War, it could now rest its efforts on foreign relations on the ―peace dividend.‖ State Department management came under pressure to close embassies and consulates in many parts of Africa to cope with limited appropriations from Congress, including consulates in the periphery of Zaire.106 The

Defense Intelligence Agency reflected similar attitudes as it motioned to ―close up shop‖ in Kinshasa, redirecting resources to bolster new goals rooted in the breakup of the Soviet

Union. Only after persistent pressure from the defense attaché in Kinshasa did DIA headquarters in Washington decide to keep the two-man presence in Zaire.107

103 Interview with George Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 1993-1997, March 23, 2012. 104 U.S. Military and economic assistance to Zaire were still prohibited. Since September 1991, U.S. spent $5 million on aid to Zairian non-governmental organizations in the form humanitarian aid. Boucher, January 29, 1993. 105 Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #8, March 23, 2012. 106 Ibid. 107 Thomas P. Odom, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 202-203.

Second Post-Cold War Crisis in Zaire: Congress Again Directs Policy

In January 1993, a dispute between Mobutu and Tshisekedi over control of the currency led to another military mutiny. Unlike the 1991 looting of Kinshasa, one thousand deaths resulted from this uprising, including the French Ambassador to Zaire

Philippe Bernard, killed by a stray bullet.108 Most Americans and other foreign nationals had been evacuated in 1991, and those who had returned evacuated again with the assistance of French troops.109

On March 11, Representative Donald Payne and thirty-five cosponsors put forward House Resolution 128 Concerning Democracy for Zaire. The resolution called upon President Clinton to continue working with Belgium and France to apply

―diplomatic pressure necessary for democratic change in Zaire;‖ to pressure Mobutu to

―leave Zaire so that the legitimate transitional government can complete the process of democratization as mandated by the Sovereign National Conference;‖ and to impose a sanctions including denying visas to and freezing the bank accounts of Mobutu, his family, and associates and expelling Zaire‘s ambassador to the United States. The resolution also recommended that the United States ―support the suspension of Zaire from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, impose an arms embargo, and ban all imports from Zaire if further measures are needed to ensure Mobutu's departure.‖110

If these measures proved unsuccessful, the House recommended that Clinton

―encourage Belgium, France, and other allies to join the United States in urging the

108 Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 15. 109 ―French Troops Enter Zaire; 45 Reported Killed in Riots,‖ The New York Times, January 30, 1993 110 H.RES.128 -- Concerning democracy for Zaire. (Introduced in House - IH), March 11, 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session.

United Nations Security Council to consider other options, including intervention to stabilize the situation in Zaire,‖ and to offer incentives for Mobutu‘s departure by considering waiving sanctions against Zaire.111

Dismayed by escalating unrest and continued political disarray in Zaire, the State

Department responded to pressure from Congress and began to take action. In an environment where the Africa Bureau was told to ―keep these problems off the

Secretary‘s desk,‖ the leadership in transition strove to keep Zaire under control and began to implement some of the requested sanctions.112

Instead of expelling Mobutu‘s ambassador to the United States, Washington recalled Ambassador Wells in May 1993, instructing her to inform Mobutu that ―there would not be a U.S. ambassador until such time that there was a transitional government according to the National Conference.‖113 Although France and Belgium maintained their ambassadors in Kinshasa, the troika began collective efforts to deny visas for

Mobutu and continued to coordinate joint public statements. Assistant Secretary Moose dutifully informed Congress of these actions in response to a hearing in June.114

With the removal of the ambassador, no prospect of renewed bilateral funding, and only a skeleton staff left in the embassy, the new leadership in Washington became even more restricted in how it could press for reform. Pressure from Congress had again inadvertently weakened any pressure the United States could mount for transition in

111 H.RES.128 -- Concerning democracy for Zaire. 112 Interview with former State Department Official #9, March 27, 2012. 113 Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 114 George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Policy toward Liberia, Togo, and Zaire: Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June 9, 1993; .Africa Confidential, Vol. 35, No.23, December 16, 1994; Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa.‖

Zaire. High-level engagement remained limited to responding to Congressional hearings and delivering rhetoric against continued repression and unrest.

In a June 1993 Senate Foreign Relations hearing, the new Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs George Moose echoed messaging from the previous administration that, while regretting the current crisis as ―a tragic consequence of the

Cold War era… Our position has not been that Mobutu must depart Zaire.‖115 After

Moose met with a Zairian envoy, new State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry spoke out against the crisis, stating that the United States ―hold[s] President Mobutu responsible for a situation which puts at risk the lives and welfare of millions of his countrymen and the stability of an entire region.‖116 In October 1993, members of an interagency working group led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Edward Brynn reported the limit of U.S. influence over Zaire, but also warned of complete disorder anarchy if Mobutu disappeared completely. Thus, the ―Mobutu or chaos‖ policy continued and affirmed existing policy decisions: to reform, refuse aid, and ostracize Mobutu.117

Meanwhile, Embassy Kinshasa became even more of a bureaucratic backwater without an ambassador to provide strategic direction and high-level engagement with the government of Zaire. In stark contrast to the three hundred U.S. staff at the embassy at the outset of the Administration, remaining staff consisted only of a few political officers, a defense attaché, a CIA contingent, and regional security and foreign service nationals - all led by a mid-level chargé d‘affaires, John M. Yates. The embassy‘s objective became to downsize the Zairian military as the answer to ending unrest in the country and

115 George E. Moose, U.S. Policy toward Liberia, Togo, and Zaire. 116 ―U.S. Bluntly Tells Zairian President to Yield,‖ New York Times, July 22, 1993. 117 Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 24.

37 preventing the collapse of the heart of Africa.118 This objective demonstrated the shortsightedness and limited capacity of the officers in the embassy. The United States had tried to downsize the Zairian military since 1960 to no avail, but without resources to focus on democratic institutions, reorganization of the military seemed a more realistic objective. The CIA continued to try to influence politics and often conflicted with the rest of the embassy as it tried to validate support for Mobutu while looking for a replacement among his cronies.119

Mobutu faced even further economic isolation and decline as the United States agreed with international finance institutions‘ requests to cease lending and attempting reform. The World Bank closed its office in Kinshasa in early 1993 and the International

Monetary Fund suspended funds to Zaire in 1994.120

Crisis in Somalia and Legacy of Aversion to Intervention

In early 1993, the Bush Administration had left a legacy of response to the conflict in Somalia. The American public had been moved by images in the media of starvation in the Horn of Africa. President Bush responded to the failures of initial UN peacekeeping efforts with a United States-led multinational force code-named Operation

Restore Hope, which sent combat troops to Somalia to secure routes for humanitarian assistance from December 1992 to May 1993.

During the early days of the Clinton Administration, however, the President scaled down the operation and the United Nations began UNOSOM II. ―Mission creep‖

118 Odom, 64. 119 Ibid, 60. 120 Ingrid Samset, ―Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC.‖ Review of African Political Economy, 29, no. 93/4 (2002), 463-80.

38 commenced as the original objective of the military presence began to encompass more than safeguarding humanitarian assistance. After Mohammed Farah Aidid launched an attack against the peacekeepers on June 5, 1993, the UN mission expanded to include disarming the Somali people and capturing Aidid of to secure a final solution.121 On

October 3-4, 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. The American media played repeatedly the footage of one soldier‘s body dragged through the streets.

After sending a surge of troops for six months who still made no progress, Clinton recalled all U.S. forces and ―Somalia syndrome‖ began, dramatically decreasing U.S. willingness to intervene in conflict resolution in Africa.

In response to the Somalia disaster, President Clinton initiated an interagency review of U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations. After a year of review and consultations with both sides of Congress, conclusions resulted in Presidential Decision

Directive 25 establishing a "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" on

May 3, 1994. The policy restricted U.S. support for UN missions to only those that would advance U.S. interests and where a clear threat to international security existed.122

Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration still maintained strong rhetoric of support for Africa. In June 1994, President Clinton hosted the first-ever White House

Conference on Africa "to unleash the human potential of the people of the African continent in ways that [would] lead to a safer and more prosperous world."123 The 1994

National Security Strategy emphasized new priorities for the era following the Cold War,

121Donatella Lorch, ―U.N. Denies It Is Seeking Somali Clan Leader's Arrest,‖ The New York Times, June 19, 1993. 122 Presidential Decision Directive 25, May 3, 1994: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm. Context of the policy described in National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, William J. Clinton, July 1994. 123 William J. Clinton, ―Remarks by the President to the White House Conference on Africa,‖ The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, June 27, 1994.

39 including democracy and human rights, humanitarian assistance programs to ―pave the way for progress towards establishing democratic regimes,‖ and specifically mentioned democratic reform in Zaire.124

Genocide in Rwanda and Legacy of Guilt for Non-Intervention

The Administration‘s rhetoric was put to the test when, beginning in April 1994,

Hutu extremists orchestrated a campaign to exterminate the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. In the first one hundred days of what the United States could not bring itself to call genocide, approximately 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu sympathizers were slaughtered.

While the Rwandan government and genocidal militias called Interahamwe conspired to kill all Tutsi in Rwanda, the rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) advanced further into Rwanda. A Rwandan Tutsi, General Paul Kagame, led the group.

Kagame had grown up in a refugee camp in Uganda, served as chief of intelligence for

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, and received military training from the United

States. As the RPF neared Kigali in early May, the Rwandan government, military

(Forces Armées Rwandaises or FAR), Interahamwe, and conspirators began to flee over the border as ―refugees‖ to Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, herding the rest of the

Rwandan Hutu population with them.

Although Embassy Kigali and the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, UNAMIR, cabled reports to Washington and the UN on the government‘s preparations for mass murder, American policy leaders ignored the crisis, and the U.S. government refused to label the conflict as a genocide.125 Nevertheless, some voices clamored for action.

124 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994, 20 and 26. 125 Confidential Interview #8.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell and staff from the

Bureaus for Population, Refugees, and Migration and Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor spoke out in interagency meetings about the necessity of intervention.126 However, the impact of the deaths of American soldiers less than a year before still weighed heavily on the Administration, Congress, and the American public. ―Somalia syndrome‖ therefore contributed to the refusal of the White House, Pentagon, and political appointees in the State Department to authorize intervention in the conflict. U.S. non- intervention during the genocide would now lead to ―Rwanda syndrome,‖ a guilt that would drive ―irrational‖ policy decisions in response to later events in the region.127

Regional Ties: Mobutu’s Role

Due to the limited capacity of Embassy Kinshasa, the extent of Mobutu‘s role in the events precipitating after the genocide did not influence U.S.-Zaire policy. It had been well known that Mobutu had been a long-time friend of Hutu Rwandan President

Juvénal Habyarimana who had been killed in the plane crash that sparked the genocide.

France had also been loyal economically, politically, and militarily to the Hutu government and saw the English-speaking RPF as a threat to the Francophone world and

French influence in Africa.128 Serving mutual interests, Mobutu supported the Rwandan government against the RPF invasion from 1990-1993. In 1993, he also sent Zairian

126 Interview with Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration, March 27, 2012; Confidential Interview #8; Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 329-390. 127 Robert E. Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), 77; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 339; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 200. 128 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 27.

41 troops from the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) to join the 150 French troops protecting the Hutu government in Kigali.129

At the height of the genocide in April 1994, French officials had broken with the troika‘s collective distance from Mobutu to meet with him in Gbadolité to discuss renewal of support in exchange for his assistance to the Hutu regime. When Kagame took over Kigali in May, Mobutu provided French troops with a rear base for Operation

Turquoise, the controversial ―humanitarian operation‖ with the alleged mission to protect

Rwandan civilians from genocide while functioning to protect the retreating Hutu government and genocidaires themselves.130

In addition to a desperate need to refill his coffers, Mobutu had much to lose if the

RPF began to support the Banyamulenge population in eastern Zaire, who had historical ethnic ties to the Rwandan Tutsi. A Banyamulenge rebellion would weaken his hold over his patronage networks in the mineral-rich Kivu province. Mobutu promptly instigated violence between the refugees, local population, and potential separatist leaders in Kivu, similar to his 1992 divisive actions in the east.131 He also tacitly allowed the extremist government and Interahamwe to rearm while permitting the presence of humanitarian organizations that provided life-saving support to both civilians and combatants.132

Mobutu‘s support for France and the former Rwandan regime had double prospects of financial reward and defending his sovereign control over eastern Zaire.

These efforts also served to begin reestablishing his credibility in the Francophone

129 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1995, 100-1. 130 Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire;‖ Prunier, Africa’s World War, 27. 131 Jean-Pierre Pabanel, "Conflits locaux et stratégie de tension Nord-Kivu," Politique Africaine, 52, December 1993, 132-4. 132 Steven Metz, Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1994).

42 diplomatic world, which would help sustain his power for the next few years as he allied against the ―Anglo-Saxon‖ threat.133 The United States did not take this complicity into account in directing bilateral relations with Mobutu during this time, as demonstrated by the planned intervention by the White House and the reactions of Embassy Kinshasa to the refugee crisis.

White House Intervention

One month after the genocide began, the United States began to feel more pressure to respond to the crisis. As thousands of seemingly innocent refugees crossed the borders of Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, suffering from hunger, disease, and exhaustion, the bureaucracy began to closely monitor the situation. The State

Department and USAID briefed Congress often, reporting on assistance provided through international and non-government organizations, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and smaller NGOs such as

International Rescue Committee.134 The French secured Mobutu‘s blessing for the presence of their armed troops to protect the refugees, their allies from the Hutu government, despite the fact that many of them were now killers.135

However, a lack of firsthand information collected by the national security agencies and the unwillingness of the White House to coordinate with the State

Department meant that the complicated dynamics of the refugee situation were not

133 Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire;‖ Odom; Africa Confidential, Vol. 38, no. 10 (9 May 1997), 2. 134 Declassified U.S. State Department document: Chronology of U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda. Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net. 135 Odom,77.

43 understood.136 The President and the NSC perceived only the surface of the situation, deeming it an increasingly worsening humanitarian crisis. In July, news of cholera outbreaks in Goma began to run in the American press with 6,700 people dying each day.

The French in Goma hired engineers and bulldozers to dig trenches for mass graves and burned bodies when the graves reached capacity.137 Only at this point did the Rwanda crisis overcome the other major stories in the American media, including the O.J.

Simpson trial and crises in Bosnia, South Africa, and Haiti.138

With dying refugees in the news, despite the fact that many of them had participated in the genocide, the White House leaped into action. While both the leadership in the White House and leaders of the national security bureaucracy refused to intervene during the genocide, the highest levels of the Administration now suffered from an overwhelming sense of guilt from their inaction. ―Rwanda syndrome‖ thus began to cloud the complicated details of the refugee situation in Zaire and the Administration began to plan for an ―easy in and out‖ humanitarian operation.139

Under direction of the President Clinton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Major General John Shalikashvili began planning a humanitarian airlift and airdrop to

―stop the dying.‖140 On July 22, President Clinton signed a Presidential Determination to allocate $75 million in supplies and services to the relief effort, and on the same day,

Operation Support Hope commenced. The U.S. Special Operations Command Europe

(SOCEUR) advance team landed in Goma with ―orders to commence airdrop operations

136 Gribbin, 176. 137 Odom, 105-6; Chris McGreal, ―Beyond Despair,‖ The Guardian, July 26, 1994. 138 Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, and Death (New York: Routledge, 1999), 294-6. 139 Interview with Prudence Bushnell; Confidential Interview #8. 140 Odom, 105.

44 within twenty-four hours.‖141 When Lt. Colonel Odom, Embassy Kinshasa‘s defense attaché on temporary duty in Goma, questioned the origins of the order, the commander responded, ―The White House wants to see U.S. airdrops on television.‖142

The White House and Pentagon undertook the operation with minimal coordination with the State Department. In Washington, Assistant Secretary George

Moose charged Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell with the U.S. response to the genocide and refugee crisis while he focused on elections in South Africa. Bushnell regretted not being given the chance to contribute broader understanding of the situation to the operation, noting that ―the State Department never would have instructed them to give aid to people that had participated in genocide.‖143 She learned only from a newspaper that the Vice President‘s wife Tipper Gore visited Goma in August with

Shalikashvili.144 By then, five percent of the refugee population had died, totaling around

50,000 people.145 Reflecting on the operation, Assistant Secretary Moose proposed that

―the intensity of the involvement was a reflection of the guilt and remorse that many in the Administration felt over the failure… to mount a more vigorous response to the genocide itself.‖146

Furthermore, on August 22, 1994, the White House retracted the original

Presidential Directive for assistance to the refugees when it came to the attention of

141 Odom, 107. 142 Ibid, 108. 143 Interview with Prudence Bushnell. 144 Ibid; Raymond Bonners, ―With French Exit Near, Rwandans Fear the Day,‖ The New York Times, August 9, 1994; Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 294-6.; Confidential Interview #8; Declassified cable: Situation Report No. 35, 08/04/94 from Washington to all diplomatic posts. www.state.gov/documents/organization/164985.pdf; Declassified U.S. State Department document: Chronology of U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at www.rwandadocumentsproject.net. 145 Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 294-6. 146 Interview with George Moose.

45 senior National Security Staff that technical errors had been made and Congress had not been consulted.147 The omission of the essential step of consultations with Congress for such a drawdown demonstrated inattention to detail by national security staff both new to

White House procedures and rushing to implement an order ―from the top.‖

In Kinshasa, the chargé of the embassy sent only military attachés Lt. Colonel

Thomas Odom and Sgt. 1st Class Stan Reber, to report and coordinate the operation in

Goma. Odom asserted that the attaché in Kinshasa was not willing to ―commit his best,

Peter Whaley,‖ a Foreign Service political officer who would later act as Deputy Chief of

Mission in Kigali. From the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),

Kate Crawford was stationed in Goma on extended duty. Odom and Crawford had not been consulted for the operation until troops arrived. 148

Despite the primary need for water purification, Washington ordered the operation to airdrop six pallets of biscuits, cooking oil, blankets, and even mittens in an extremely dangerous environment for such an exercise with high mountains, turbulent weather, and a crowd of half a million refugees. Although no one was injured, the operation came close to dropping pallets on some international observers and the refugees

147 Action Memorandum from Anthony Lake to the President to Authorize the Drawdown of $75 million in Defense articles and services for the purpose of providing disaster relief in and around Rwanda, correcting technical errors and having not consulted Congress for the July 22 version previously signed by the President, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH4a38/7ef43012.dir/2936.pdf. 1) Presidential Determination 94-38 to Authorize the Furnishing of Supplies and Services in Support of Efforts to Care for Refugees from Rwanda, President William J. Clinton, July 22, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH92a6/1dc662eb.dir/2424.pdf. 2) Another version of the Presidential Determination was signed on August 22, 1994 that specified ―defense articles‖ instead of ―supplies‖ and left out reference to the United Nations. Presidential Determination 94-44 to Authorize the Drawdown of Defense Stocks and Services for Disaster Assistance for Rwanda, President William J. Clinton, August 22, 1994, www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH0108/35142986.dir/2939.pdf. 148 Odom, 84.

46 themselves.149 The decision to drop these goods immediately from the air while later delivering water purification supplies through regular transport procedures further demonstrated the White House‘s motivation for intervention in the crisis as performing for a domestic audience rather than solely for the benefit of the refugees.

The Joint Chiefs deployed 2,100 military personnel to the region, and U.S. troops in Goma faced a hostile reception from non-government organizations that resented the soldiers for endangering the neutrality of the humanitarian environment. However, when the first waves of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) began to arrive - 20,000-30,000 soldiers with military vehicles, cargo, and ammo - the NGOs embraced the American military presence and later protested their early withdrawal.150

In August, Operation Support Hope ended almost as quickly as it began. Noting a decrease in water consumption and hearing rumors that refugees were returning to

Rwanda, the Joint Task Force saw an opportunity to depart. The suggestion of achieving a longer-term solution by separating the civilians from the genocidaires and returning the refugees to Rwanda promised to be complicated and dangerous, since the still-armed

Interahamwe and ex-FAR were in control of the camps, exploiting the civilian refugees to manipulate assistance.151 Any attempt to separate them would surely would have led to bloodshed, since the ex-FAR never hesitated to sacrifice civilians to save

149 Jerry Gray, ―The Rwanda Disaster: Relief, U.S. Aid Airdrop Off to Ragged Start,‖ The New York Times, July 25, 1994. 150 Odom, 89. 151 Secretary of Defense Perry noted in a memo to the President the operation‘s success in lowering death rate and beginning to quell cholera epidemic, President Pasteur Bizimungu‘s appreciation for the assistance and desire for refugees to come home. UNHCR‘s confirmation that the camps do pose a threat and have the potential to become long-term problems because Hutu extremists would want to keep refugees in the camps as recruits for future campaigns. Declassified Memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Perry to the President of the United States, August 1, 1994, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net.

47 themselves.152 This reasoning reinforced the White House and Pentagon‘s motivation to remove the troops without delay, and by August 25, 1994, all troops were withdrawn and heavy equipment transferred to UNHCR.153 In hindsight, Assistant Secretary Moose noted that ―even Goma proved to be ‗too hard‘ for an administration that was under scrutiny and an assault from conservatives in Congress for overextending the U.S. internationally.‖154

In reality, only small numbers of refugees had begun to return and others only pushed further into the Zairian bush. The ex-Far and Interahamwe continued to rearm with the help of the Zairian military and protection of the presence of international humanitarian organizations. Without U.S. presence on the ground, intelligence about the persisting crisis would revert to being muddled in conflicting reports from Kinshasa and

Kigali.

This operation demonstrated the first effect of ―Rwanda syndrome‖ that plagued the highest levels of U.S. leadership. Having not intervened to save the 800,000 lives lost in the genocide, the White House seemed eager not to suffer from another media debacle and to stifle the human rights‘ community‘s criticism for non-intervention. The quick and short-term intervention attempted to compensate for earlier inaction; however, the

American media criticized the logistics of the airdrop and NGOs criticized the premature drawdown of troops.155 Nevertheless, Odom noted that the overall U.S. contribution had

152 The genocidaires repeatedly demonstrated this fact, which an officer from Embassy Kigali would witness firsthand in 1995 with the Kibeho massacre in Rwanda. Odom, 223-229. 153 Chronology of U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance to Rwanda. 154 Interview with George Moose. 155 Gray, ―The Rwanda Disaster: Relief.‖

48 been successful in achieving the goal of ―stopping the dying‖ and had provided clean water for the refugees.156 It did nothing, however, about the genocidaires.

Despite the Crisis, Diplomats Continue Previous Policy Priorities

The Rwandan genocide and precipitating events in the region began to put Zaire back on the map for the United States, but not as a result of proactive policy. Embassy

Kinshasa had been in a holding pattern since the departure of Ambassador Wells in May

1993, and despite more than one million refugees flooding into eastern Zaire, the embassy saw the crisis as merely a distraction from its main goal of ―getting rid of

Mobutu by encouraging democracy in Kinshasa.‖157 The embassy‘s economic section remained focused on the crash of the Zairian economy and dual currencies and struggled to understand an economy built on theft and patronage.158

Even when demarches inundated the embassy concerning the government of

Zaire‘s response to the crisis, U.S. diplomats delegated responsibility for disarming the combatants to the Zairian Army (FAZ), which led to only more problems and instability in the east. The aircraft that delivered the troops to Goma flew back to Kinshasa carrying arms confiscated from the ex-FAR, later believed to be sold back to the Hutu extremists by the FAZ. The FAZ pillaged the camps, raped refugees, and robbed and extorted bribes from NGO workers. The refugees themselves mounted the most effective response to these antics, as they were plenty skilled with machetes. In late August 1994, Kinshasa

156 Odom, 153-4. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid, 139.

49 recalled the troops, who were later revealed as the same troops that led pillages of

Kinshasa in 1991 and 1993.159

Seeing an opportunity to renew foreign support and reinvigorate patronage systems, Mobutu began to leverage the humanitarian situation in hopes of regaining U.S. support. Mobutu hired new public relations lobbyists who had worked in the Bush

Administration to improve his image in the United States.160 He also implemented a recommendation from former Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen in his World Bank capacity to replace Tshisekedi with Leon Kengo wa Dondo as Prime Minister. Cohen had recommended Kengo as a technocrat who would help the economy while not threatening

Mobutu‘s security.161 Mobutu convinced his own parliament and Tshisekedi‘s supporters to merge under the new Prime Minister Kengo in June 1994. True to Cohen‘s recommendation, the appointment of Kengo gave Mobutu more secure control over affairs in Kinshasa since Kengo did not have an ethnic support base like Tshisekedi.162

Embassy Kinshasa began to see Kengo as a ―sincere reformer,‖ a reliable interlocutor who acknowledged Zaire‘s debts, and a moderate who offered new opportunity for democratic transition in Zaire. The embassy designed a strategy to help

Kengo sever ties to Mobutu and to begin to build his own support.163 Kengo even visited

Washington to discuss the resumption of bilateral aid and to renew communications with the World Bank and IMF.164 During a visit to Kinshasa in October 1994, Deputy

159 Odom, 120-6. 160 Cohen linked Mobutu to Barbara Hayward, a former Reagan and Bush advisor and Cohen's business partner, and James Woods, former Secretary of State for Defense for Africa. Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire;‖ Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 24. 161 Confidential Interview #6. 162 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 51. 163 Stephen Greenhouse, ―U.S. Trying New Tactic With Zaire,‖ New York Times, November 8, 1995, 3; Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 49. 164 Confidential Interview #6; Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 24.

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott mentioned that the United States had even begun to contemplate sending a U.S. ambassador back to Zaire.165

The larger regional security issue sparked by the Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis had now gained White House attention to Mobutu and the status of reform in the Zairian government. National Security Staff began to ask the State

Department for scenarios for Mobutu‘s departure. However, while the White House asked for solutions, the bureaucracy still expressed concern about the power vacuum that would occur if he Mobutu left the helm of Zaire. When National Security Staff asked for creative solutions and assurances that a replacement to Mobutu would improve the situation, the bureaucracy still had no answer.166

Rwanda Syndrome and Watershed White House Visit

In addition to renewed interest in Zaire, the White House began to express unprecedented support for Rwanda. In July 1994, the United States recognized the RPF as the new government of Rwanda and by mid-August, the State Department was relaying requests from General Kagame to the Pentagon for additional assistance.

Kagame wanted to expel the French Operation Turquoise and bring the refugees home, not entirely for humanitarian reasons. Civilians mixed with genocidaires in eastern Zaire posed a serious national security concern for new RPF government in Kigali. If allowed to regroup, the ex-FAR could easily begin incursions from the border. When Kagame met with Secretary of Defense William Perry himself in Washington in August, Perry

165 Howard W. French, ―U.S. Weighs Sending Ambassador to Zaire, a Dictator's Fief,‖ The New York Times, October 25, 1994. 166 Confidential Interview #8.

51 believed he had made clear that unilateral action was not advisable. Kagame understood, however, that no protest meant U.S. acceptance of his proposed plan.167

The State Department also faced UNHCR‘s growing concern for the militant nature of the camps and the Zairian army‘s inability to ―exercise effective control over the seized weapons.‖ Assistant Secretary Moose began to take initial steps to determine options to address the risk with allies Belgium and France.168 However, lower-level policymakers discredited the threat and denied the need for more intervention. In a memo to Assistant Secretary Moose, Central Africa Director Arlene Render stated that

―Hutu hardliners in the Rwandan refugee camps were engaged in military training exercises and planned an attack around Christmas… [however], while an incursion is possible, analysts do not believe that the ex-FAR or militias pose any serious threat to the

RPA [Rwandan Patriotic Army] or the Kigali government at this time.‖169

In late September, UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations also began to report human rights abuses and reprisal killings by the RPF. Robert Gersony, a UN human rights investigator, claimed to have proof of reprisal massacres but never published his findings. Heeding a recommendation from the Ambassador in Kigali,

Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth publicly rejected Gersony‘s alleged findings at the United Nations in New York.170 The refusal to take interest in possible reprisal killings began to further demonstrate the effects of ―Rwanda syndrome,‖

167 Gribbin, 175-6; Odom, 198-99. 168 Declassified Cable from Washington, Subject: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose Discusses Refugee Security Issues with French and Belgian Chargés, September 1994, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net. 169 Declassified State Department Memorandum from Central Africa Director Arlene Render to Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose, December 12, 1994, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net. 170 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 31.

52 as the U.S. Government seemed to show partiality to the views of the RPF government under Kagame.

The national security agencies and individual actors within them did not share the same view of events in the Great Lakes. The Departments of Defense and State presented disjointed opinions to the White House. Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell and the

Refugee Bureau in the State Department expressed concern for the remaining refugees in

Zaire and frustration at the lack of political or military attention to solve a problem with such potential to destabilize the region. Secretary Christopher and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright did not view the issue as a persisting crisis. The

Department of Defense, still influenced by ―Somalia syndrome,‖ had serious concerns about the viability of proposals to launch further military intervention and discounted the risk posed by the refugees. Kagame‘s visit to the Pentagon had only increased those tensions, as advocates in State were nervous of the increasing Rwanda bias.

In December 1994, the President sent his National Security Adviser Anthony

Lake, NSC Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping Susan Rice, State, and Defense personnel to Kigali in an attempt to secure direct information from the field.

Colonel Odom, now military attaché in Kigali, noted that the visit ―marked the end of a

State filter on information flowing out of the country. The president‘s national security advisor does not go to a region unless there is a need for a fresh set of high-level eyes on the program.‖171 However, rather than providing a different critique of the situation, the visit served to reaffirm support to the new government in Rwanda. In a press conference in Kigali, Lake mentioned that the United States had given half a billion dollars in humanitarian assistance and reassured Rwandans that ―Rwanda is of tremendous

171 Odom, 201-202.

53 importance to the American people and specifically to President Clinton.‖ He promised continued assistance to ―help create the conditions of security and progress.‖172 Despite the NSC‘s attempt to coordinate views, the visit ended with increased White House predilection for the views of the government of Rwanda and the bureaucratic struggle continued between State and Defense, still at odds over solving the refugee crisis or non- intervention.173

Analysis

The first few years of the Clinton Administration witnessed disorderly democratic transition, violent repression of dissent, and continued economic decline in Zaire, rendering the country in a state of extended crisis. U.S. policy responded to this situation according to the analytical framework as Congress continued to take the lead on directing dramatic change in U.S. policy, the President traded concerns about Zaire for bigger crises in the region, and the bureaucracy continued to adapt to changes demanded by

Congress.

During the first year of the Administration, deteriorating conditions in Zaire continued to represent a state of extended crisis both for the people of Zaire suffering from repression and economic mismanagement and for U.S. interest groups advocating for the political and human rights of these individuals. Accordingly, Congress responded and delivered a list of specific demands for President Clinton to sanction Mobutu‘s poor performance, including expelling the Zairian ambassador and restricting visas and bank accounts for Mobutu and his family. While Congress did not mandate these demands, the

172 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Remarks at Press Conference at USIS Kigali, Rwanda, December 16, 1994, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/166108.pdf. 173 Odom, 202.

54 sense of Congress was clear, and the State Department responded to the requests in hopes of moving toward reestablishing funding for the country. Still unable to effect change in political reform, Embassy Kinshasa began to focus on seemingly more manageable goals as a means to achieving democracy, including downsizing the military and trying to reverse a bankrupt and corrupt economy. The CIA and DOD were increasingly unconcerned with Zaire and did not take part in diplomats‘ continued pressure for democratic transition. Despite President Clinton‘s goal of new relationships with African leaders, the Somalia crisis quickly forced the Administration to change its worldview on military intervention and shaped the Administration‘s response to crises thereafter. Such

―Somalia syndrome‖ did not yet affect relations with Zaire in 1993 and early 1994, as the

White House did not give the country priority attention.

During the genocide, the U.S. government approached the Zaire as a continued state of extended crisis. Political disintegration continued and Mobutu resorted to desperate measures to maintain control. In accordance with the analytical framework, bureaucratic management of relations with Zaire meant that U.S. policy remained unchanged. Both Embassy Kinshasa and the State Department seemed blind to the impact of the crisis on the periphery of Zaire was having on Mobutu. However, while the

U.S. embassy continued to push for democracy and economic progress, Mobutu manipulated the humanitarian situation and crisis environment to regain support from

France. He further used the appointment of Kengo as an attempt to recover U.S. and international creditors. These ploys were all interpreted as routine by the U.S. government, and thus the State Department continued business as usual.

The refugee crisis emanating from the genocide transformed the Rwandan crisis into a regional crisis, and relations with Mobutu received slightly more attention as the

State Department asked for military assistance in addressing the militarization of the

Hutu refugee camps, but the Pentagon remained reluctant to engage. However, when the

American media began portraying the deaths of thousands of seemingly innocent refugees, the White House began to perceive the situation in eastern Zaire as a crisis that could not be ignored for fear of more embarrassment that would result from continued inaction. In response, the President instructed the Pentagon to perform a quick, uncoordinated, and flashy response in eastern Zaire to show the American public that the

U.S. was doing something to help. Although the U.S. government had received pleas for

U.S. intervention to guarantee political freedom in Zaire, this selective intervention showed the world that democracy in Zaire was incomparable to thousands of dying refugees blanketing the American news.174 Furthermore, U.S. leadership sought first to protect U.S. troops, and the intervention lacked any long-term objective including the necessary goal of de-militarization of the camps for sustained resolution of the problem.

Thus this example of White House intervention did create significant change in U.S. policy toward Zaire.

However, the incompetence of Mobutu‘s response to U.S. requests during this crisis sparked unprecedented questions from the White House about the possible removal of diplomatic support for Mobutu to inspire change. Nevertheless, this high-level interest did not progress further than internal conversations, as the bureaucracy was still unable to provide realistic alternatives to Mobutu in power.175

174 Kelly, 255. 175 Confidential Interview #5.

Meanwhile, Congress watched the crisis unfold from the sidelines and stayed passively informed by regular briefings from all institutions of the executive. The

Administration still did not seek to change the sense of Congress or to grant waivers to renew bilateral assistance for Zaire. Instead, high-level U.S. policy leaders continued to develop a bias for the perspective of Rwandan leadership as a result of ―Rwanda syndrome,‖ which began to greatly alter the Administration‘s worldview. Guilt from non-intervention during the genocide would prove to sustain interest in Rwanda from leading Africa staff of the National Security Council, causing keen White House support for bilateral relations with the new government of Rwanda, to whom the United States began to defer matters of regional security.

While the beginning of the Clinton Administration demonstrated continuity with previous years‘ policy towards Zaire, demands from Congress continued to impact U.S. relations with Mobutu‘s regime. The White House and Pentagon‘s quick intervention in the refugee crisis following the genocide demonstrated the sole example of Presidential attention to the situation. The correlation between such extended crisis and crisis situations with the policymaking leads of Congress and the White House correspond to the predicted correlations of the analytical framework. The White House‘s growing bias for relations with Rwanda demonstrated personal predilection for and public interest in this policy, providing an example of when the White House still directs policy outside of a crisis situation. White House inattention to Zaire and the ceding of foreign policymaking to Congress and the backwater post in Kinshasa would prove to lead to missed opportunity to prevent continued instability in the region.

Chapter 4: Green Light to Rwanda and the Boot to Mobutu, 1994-1997

Conflict prevention and response now become key priorities for the Clinton White

House, as leaders continued to suffering from the guilt of non-intervention. Elsewhere in

Africa, the White House sought to advance goals of economic development, partnerships with Congress and African leaders to open unprecedented trade networks, and key alliances to guard security interests against the growing Islamist threat in Sudan.

Relations with Mobutu remained mostly an afterthought for the Administration, except for the escalating insecurity caused by cross-border attacks and continued ethnic violence on the border with Rwanda. This insecurity would lead to dramatic change in the region, and unprecedented U.S. neutrality for the fate of Mobutu as he faced internal rebellion and foreign invasion.

The White House and Genocide Preparedness

The Administration, still seized by ―Somalia syndrome‖ and sensitive to the

Republican Congress‘ shared aversion to intervention, which extended to some

Democrats as well, began to build the rhetoric that would become the policy of ―African solutions for African problems.‖ The 1995 National Security Strategy confirmed the

President‘s non-interventionist stance as he stated, ―No outside force can create a stable and legitimate domestic order for another society—that work can only be accomplished by the society itself.‖176

176 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, William J. Clinton, February 1995, iii. Accessed via National Defense University Digital Library.

By early 1995, President Clinton created new positions in the bureaucracy to focus on conflict prevention, especially in Africa and the Great Lakes region. Through these new appointments and positions, the President hoped to facilitate direct communication between embassies, the State Department, and the White House.

President Clinton appointed Timothy Wirth as Under Secretary for Global Affairs,

Ambassador Richard Bogosian as Coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi, former

Congressman Howard Wolpe as special envoy for the Great Lakes, David Scheffer as ambassador at large for Genocide and War Crimes, Reverend Jesse Jackson as special envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, and Paul Hare as special envoy to

Angola to prevent disturbance of the new peace in Angola.

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake urged the national security agencies attention toward Burundi, where ethnic tensions and the simmering refugee crisis on the border with Zaire seemed to be on the verge of disaster.177 The Pentagon described conflict intervention as a priority in sub-Saharan Africa, but stressed the leading role of

Africans themselves.178 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff charged Ambassador Bogosian with developing the idea of training an African Crisis

Response Force (ACRF), which would empower Africans to respond to genocide themselves by providing peacekeeping training to key African allies.179

Relations with Rwanda had further strengthened, as the Administration sought to support the military that had ended the genocide by providing support to counter new

177 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, October 15, 1998, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html. 178 Conflict prevention is depicted as a main goal in: U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: Office for International Security Affairs, 1995), 3. 179 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection.

59 ethnic cleansing of Zairian Tutsi by the FAZ and ex-FAR. Despite objections from within the U.S. government and among some NGOs, Ambassador Bogosian and U.S.

Ambassador to Rwanda Robert E. Gribbin requested the renewal of military assistance to the new Rwandan army under General Paul Kagame. In the name of genocide prevention, the NSC blessed the idea and relayed it to the Pentagon, who soon began training the Rwandan military.180

The change in humanitarian aid as a policy tool in the post-Cold War period continued as Clinton continued to see humanitarian aid through international organizations and NGOs as a quick alternative to intervention. This method had bipartisan support and could be used to encounter communal violence, disintegrating state structures, and civilian displacement. By 1995, humanitarian assistance was still the only resource allowed into Zaire. Clinton provided a high of $829 million in humanitarian aid to Africa in 1994, primarily in response to the Rwandan genocide, and a low of $508 million in 1997 as most of the refugees were believed to have returned to

Rwanda.181

A Wary Eye on Zaire: White House Interest and Bureaucratic Shuffling

After the genocide, Mobutu continued to struggle to maintain the balance of power in Zaire. Civil society had begun to grow with some Western support for non- government organizations. Mobutu kept control of urban areas and critical natural resources, but otherwise his patronage networks and loyalties in distant areas, including

180 Odom, 220-237. 181 Victor Tanner and Nan Borton, ―Strengthening U.S. Government Humanitarian Action in Africa,‖ in Africa Policy in the Clinton Years (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001): 120-139.

60 eastern Zaire, were left withering without inflows of foreign assistance. Renewed diplomatic support from France and creditors‘ interest in Kengo was not enough to undo the damage to Mobutu‘s central control.

While Kengo had been an attractive choice for Prime Minister for economic and political reasons, by late 1995 his actions began to threaten Mobutu‘s strategic relationships in the east. Heeding demands from international creditors, Kengo called for the expulsion of Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire.182 By doing so, he endangered the long- lasting alliance between Mobutu and the former Rwandan regime for which he had provided safe haven and more weapons for his own defense.183 The presence of these fighters on the border protected Mobutu from the new Tutsi-led Rwandan military, whose influence and ethnic ties in eastern Zaire he feared as a threat to sovereignty. The refugee crisis itself had also continued to bring new promises of aid to Zaire, and Mobutu desired to continue to use the seemingly innocent, dying refugees as leverage for support.184

The White House held a growing distaste for Mobutu as reports continued to arrive of his complicity for re-arming the genocidaires in the refugee camps. Despite

Mobutu‘s lobbying efforts in Washington, national security staff returned to conversations about leadership transition in Zaire.185 To reengage directly, the

Administration appointed a new ambassador to Zaire, Daniel H. Simpson, who deployed in October 1995.186

182 Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire.‖ 183 Odom, 261; Shaharyar M. Khan, The Shallow Graves of Rwanda (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 142-3; Howard W. French, ―Zaire's Military Reported to Arm Rwandan Exiles to Fight Rebels,‖ The New York Times, February 19, 1997. 184 Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire.‖ 185 Thomas Lippman, "Seeking US Visa, Mobutu Enlists Friends," International Herald Tribune, August 7, 1995. 186 ―To Back Reform, Envoy Is Named to Zaire,‖ The New York Times, June 17, 1995.

Energized by new leadership, the embassy restarted momentum on two priorities: democracy in Zaire and a resolution to the refugee problem on the border with Rwanda.

On democracy, the ambassador engaged with Mobutu himself, the Zairian opposition, and the large number of expat Zairians that had fled to South Africa during the 1991-

1993 instability in Zaire.187 Assistant Secretary Moose and CIA Director George Tenant visited Mobutu in Gbadolité to persuade him to leave a legacy of orderly transition.188

The State Department even began working through President Jimmy Carter and the

Carter Center to encourage Mobutu toward democracy and to solve the refugee crisis.189

Although the White House and State Department insisted on pressing for transition, the

CIA station chief in Kinshasa and Larry Devlin, a former CIA station chief from the

1960s still active as a Mobutu loyalist with diamond interests in Zaire, pushed for renewed support for Mobutu still threatening chaos if he departed.190

The White House‘s desire for direct intervention in the refugee crisis had been satisfied with the quick and seemingly successful Operation Support Hope. However, throughout 1996, the State Department remained seized with refugee issues as they received reports of ethnic cleansing of Zairian Tutsi, or Banyamulenge, by the

Interahamwe in eastern Zaire. Banyamulenge had long been targets of discrimination for economic and ethnic differences in the region, and the ex-FAR played on existing

187 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire 1995-1998, March 17, 2012. 188 Confidential Interview #8. 189 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 165. 190 Deane R. Hinton, "Telegram 641 From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State, January 23, 1975, Office of the Historian, Retrieved March 15, 2011, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/d269; Confidential Interview #6.

62 tensions to organize local anti-Tutsi campaign.191 These reports were confirmed when in early 1996, 10,000 Banyamulenge fled Zaire seeking refuge in Rwanda.192

In response to this violence and known Zairian complicity, Congress and UNHCR urged the President to address the issue.193 The new Rwandan government also pressed for action, playing on U.S. guilt for non-intervention during the genocide. Vice President

Kagame asked the U.S. Ambassador to Kigali Robert E. Gribbin and high-level U.S. visitors on multiple occasions specifically for international assistance in protecting the

Banyamulenge in Zaire and returning the Hutu refugees to Rwanda.194 The State

Department responded and escalated diplomatic efforts to find a resolution. Assistant

Secretary for African Affairs George Moose and Ambassador Bogosian conducted shuttle diplomacy between Rwanda and Zaire, pressing Kengo to deny arms to the ex-FAR and

Interahamwe and to use the Zairian army to quell the violence.195

In June 1996, Kagame told Secretary of Defense William Perry that he intended to intervene to separate militants from civilians in the camps. Perry believed he clearly advised against unilateral action.196 Kagame also broached his idea with State

Department and other Clinton Administration officials in an August visit, from whom he

191 Copson, 8. 192 Gribbin, 173. 193 Although Congress was apprehensive about direct intervention, leaders urged the President to do something about Zairian forces arming the refugee camps and supporting incursions into Rwanda. H.RES.399 – House Resolution Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to the promotion of democracy and civil society in Zaire, 104th Congress, 2d Session, March 29, 1996; UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, repeatedly requested U.S. and international intervention to provide renewed protection for the innocent civilians in the refugee camps and to prevent further militarization, Confidential Interview #14 and Prunier, Africa’s World War, 29-33. 193 Gribbin, 123, 145. 194 Gribbin, 123, 145. 195 Ibid, 124. 196 Ibid 145-6; Mahmood Mamdani, ―Why Rwanda admitted to its role in Zaire,‖ Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 8 August 1997; Odom, 270; Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #7, March 22, 2012; Confidential Interview #8.

63 found no suggestions. Afterwards, Kagame told reporters that he had been ―looking for a solution,‖ but returned home sensing that war was inevitable.197

Multinational Force for Eastern Zaire and Intervention Delegated to Rwanda

By the fall of 1996, all parties realized that Zaire did not have the capacity to address the refugee problem. Intervention seemed to be the only option for an effective solution. An interagency group led by Ambassador Bogosian began to meet regularly in

Washington to try to develop an action plan. The White House had indicated that the

U.S. would not commit forces to a combat situation, but could provide military elements to a humanitarian operation.198 However, disputes between the agencies and beliefs about exaggerated refugee numbers caused conflict between policymakers from political, security, and humanitarian perspectives, and prevented consensus on action.199

The State Department took the lead, and Secretary Warren Christopher announced the renamed Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in a trip to Africa in October.

However, he faced resistance to the planned 10,000-man force from key partners, including Mandela in South Africa and Congress.200 Disputes in the Security Council caused further delay as the United States and France could not agree on terms for intervention.201

197 John Pomfret, ―Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo,‖ Washington Post, July 9, 1997. 198 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 199 Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #2, December 7, 2011; Confidential Interview #7; Confidential Interview #8. 200 ―An American in Africa,‖ East African (Nairobi), October 14-20, 1996, 8; Paul Omach, ―The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests,‖ African Affairs, Vol. 99 (2000), 85. 201 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection; United States and France reference in Huliaras, ―(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions,‖ 289.

Meanwhile, a seemingly Congolese-led ―Banyamulenge rebellion‖ began in

South Kivu. Rumors of attacks trickled over the border into Rwanda and Burundi.

Missionaries and humanitarian personnel reported ―Tutsi-looking soldiers,‖ believed to be Rwandans, amongst the rebels. Kagame denied the reports and nothing seemed out of the ordinary with the RPA, the embassy noting no cross-border movement, key officers missing, abnormal flights, or drawdown.202

From the beginning of the conflict, the United States suffered from a lack of firsthand information on the violence, which would contribute to the perceived Rwanda bias demonstrated by subsequent policy choices. There had been no sustained U.S. presence in eastern Zaire since the U.S. consulate closed in the 1980s, the new ambassador in Kinshasa sent no one to survey the situation, and Kigali‘s defense attaché was forbidden to enter Zaire, leading to disjointed reporting that relied on outside sources.203

In early October, a governor in South Kivu ordered all Tutsi to leave and revoked their Zairian citizenship, a long-contested issue in the region manipulated by Mobutu in previous attempts to destabilize the region.204 On October 2, the rebellion moved towards the refugee camps and Kagame informed Ambassador Gribbin that the ex-FAR in Panzi Camp had begun to mobilize.

The situation became more complicated when reports of Rwandan complicity began. On October 30, Rwandan troops engaged, crossing the border and attacking Panzi

Camp, clearing Bukavu of the Zairian Army (FAZ) and the Interahamwe. The refugees

202 Gribbin, 176, 185-6. 203 Gribbin, 176. 204 David Barouski, ―Laurent Nkundabatware, His Rwandan Allies, and the Ex-ANC Mutiny: Chronic Barriers to Lasting Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,‖ February 13, 2007, http://www.ias.uni-bayreuth.de/resources/africa_discussion_forum/07-08_ws/LKandexANC.pdf.

65 disappeared from the camps and tens of thousands went missing. The ex-FAR was rumored to be pushing them along as a buffer while they escaped.205 Reports surfaced of

Banyamulenge herding Hutu refugees back across the border into Rwanda, where they were screened and some shot immediately.206 On November 11, the armed groups expelled all international press from Goma, as they prepared for an assault against the camp in Mugunga.207

The State Department and UNHCR began debating whether or not to close the camps completely.208 Special Envoy Howard Wolpe met with the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to describe U.S. Government efforts to support a neutral humanitarian intervention force.209

On November 12, 1996, National Security Adviser Lake led a U.S. delegation to

Ottawa to discuss intervention options with representatives from Canada and the United

Kingdom. Kagame had firmly refused any French participation in intervention, so these powers discussed a Canadian-led Multinational Force (MNF) to open safe corridors for the refugees to return to Rwanda. The group would seek UN Security Council blessing, but the MNF would not operate as UN blue helmets.210 The following day, White House

Press Secretary Mike McCurry announced the President‘s agreement with the plan.211

Learning from the coordination mistakes of Operation Support Hope, President Clinton immediately informed the Cabinet and then began to alert members of Congress of the

205 Gribbin, 187. 206 IRIN Bulletin, November 5, 1996. Cited in Prunier, Africa’s World War, 117. 207 Gribbin, 191-197. 208 Ibid, 185-6. 209 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #182, Glyn Davies, John Shattuck, November 12, 1996. 210 White House Daily Press Briefing, Press Secretary Mike McCurry, November 13, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48843#axzz1syCyIhwi. 211 Gribbin, 191-197. International Herald Tribune, November 14, 1996.

66 decision.212 The Pentagon announced initial plans of sending one thousand troops to the region, and Susan Rice from the NSC said in an interview that a key objective would still be to ―get out very quickly.‖213

With direction from the White House, the Pentagon deployed 325 military personnel for Joint Task Force Guardian Assistance to conduct logistics assessments for participation in the MNF.214 Whether the force would have authority to engage in combat was fervently debated, as considerations for how to separate civilians from the genocidaires troubled diplomats.215 Kagame asked Ambassador Bogosian if the MNF was willing to disarm the rest of the refugees. Bogosian responded that they were not.216

On November 15, to the surprise of the United States, UNHCR, and the NGO community, a flood of Rwandan Hutu refugees began to stream into Rwanda. Half a million people were estimated to have crossed the border in four days. No one had planned on returns in such massive scale, but UNHCR went to work, Washington poured resources and disaster experts into the USAID mission, and local authorities registered returnees and helped send them to their homes.217

The MNF had already begun to conduct aerial surveillance of Zaire to track the dispersal of the refugees. The overhead reconnaissance confirmed that not all of the

212 White House Daily Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, November 14, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48844#axzz1syCyIhwi. 213 U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing, Kenneth H. Bacon, November 14, 1996, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=718; PBS, ―US Plans Zaire Mission,‖ November 13, 1996, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/november96/zaire_12-13.html. 214 Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a Report on the United States Participation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire – Received in the United States House of Representatives December 3, 1996; U.S. Department of Defense, ―Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda;‖ Declassified Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from Acting Director H. Diehl McKalip on Additional Information on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, October 9, 1997, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net; Gribbin, 193. 215 Gribbin, 191-197. 216 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 217 Gribbin, 196.

67 refugees had returned home and about thirty to sixty thousand remained; most of whom were believed to be militants and unfortunate ―hostages‖ used as a human shield for the genocidaires.218 UNHCR estimated that 200,000 to 300,000 were unaccounted for from their earlier estimate of a total refugee population of 1.2 million.219

Kagame claimed that ―international agencies [were] inflating the numbers of those left behind for their own purposes.‖220 Embassy Kigali reported that all refugees that wanted to had already returned, and that those remaining were likely genocidaires.

State Department officials in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration did not believe the cables and pressed for assistance to continue for innocents who had been pressed farther into the jungle.221 A few days later, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 1078, which was aimed at creating, but fell short of, a multinational force with a Chapter VII mandate for humanitarian purposes in Zaire.222

Shortly afterwards, Kagame told the U.S. Ambassador in Kigali and UN officials that, because of such large numbers of returns, the MNF was no longer needed.223 By

December 14, the UN plan for intervention was put on hold and the MNF, which never actually engaged in Zaire, began to withdraw.

A second withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region elicited protests from officers in the Refugee Bureau at the State Department who were still concerned with missing

218 Gribbin, 197. Wayne Madsen had reported that these flights were to locate Hutu refugees for direct U.S. participation in massacres alongside the Rwandan army. French newspapers reported similar stories of U.S. complicity in the invasion. Wayne Madsen, Author, Suffering and Despair: Humanitarian Crisis in the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights in the Committee of International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2001. See also Huliaras, ―(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions,‖ 287. 219 Gribbin, 198. 220 IRIN Bulletin, no. 33 (November 20, 1996). 221Confidential Interview #2. 222 UN Security Council Resolution 1078, November 9, 1996. 223 Gribbin, 197; U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #185, Nicholas Burns, November 15, 1996, http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1996/96-11-15.std.html.

68 refugees and the lack of political resolution to the greater problem.224 Because the White

House and Pentagon saw the situation as purely humanitarian, the underlying political nature of the problem never piqued the interest of the White House, whereas issues of potential conflict in Burundi and support for African peacekeepers did.225 Had the MNF continued with its plans to secure the safety of all refugees in eastern Zaire, the subsequent events might have been inadvertently prevented.

Leading a Congolese Rebellion: Laurent Kabila

By the end of November, the North Kivu camps had been cleared, Goma fell to the rebels, and a political group began to take credit for the rebellion: L’Alliance des

Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL). Laurent Désiré Kabila was appointed spokesman for the Alliance and told BBC he was uniting forces with the

Banyamulenge to overthrow Mobutu.226 Kabila, originally from Shaba province, worked with Che Guevara supporting revolution in eastern Zaire in the 1960s and1970s and led a

Marxist political group, the Party of the Populist Revolution (PRP). Kabila was remembered by long-time bureaucrats in the State Department as the radical leftist who kidnapped Stanford students to finance his rebellion in 1975, but seen with tentative hope by new officials, as he now touted multiparty democracy.227

Ambassador Gribbin arranged for Bogosian to meet with Kabila in Kigali.

Knowing that Kabila had spent the last twenty years out of Zaire‘s political scene, the ambassadors did not take his threat to overthrow Mobutu seriously and saw him as a front

224 Gribbin, 199; Confidential Interview #2; Confidential Interview #14. 225 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 226 Gribbin, 189. 227 James C. McKinley, ―Mobutu‘s Nemesis Keeps His Plans to Himself,‖ The New York Times, April 1, 1997.

69 for the RPA‘s primary objective of restoring Rwandan national security.228 Sensing

Rwandan involvement from the outset, Gribbin echoed every message to Kabila with one to Rwandan interlocutors.229 Despite their doubts at the time, policymakers have admitted that they should have recognized the plan of master political strategist Kagame and should have believed that Kabila would follow through.230

Kabila’s Advance: U.S. Diplomatic Thrust and Non-Intervention

Kabila‘s forces indeed continued past the Kivus and crossed Zaire, taking every major city with little to no resistance, inviting anti-Mobutu activists, disaffected military, and various militia and rebel groups to join the original Banyamulenge and Banyamasisi groups. They pledged to exterminate the Mobutu regime and to implement democracy, respect for human rights, and economic management.231

Washington now suffered from mixed messages from its embassies in addition to lack of firsthand information. Embassy Kinshasa relayed Kengo‘s plea for assistance as a country that had been invaded by its neighbor. He requested U.S. support for a counter- offensive, but facing rejection from all key supporters, including France, Mobutu returned to Zaire himself and hired Serbian mercenaries for his defenses.232 Embassy

Kigali cabled that they had no proof of direct Rwandan involvement or of reprisal killings of Hutu refugees and that all innocent refugees had returned.233 True to the existing

Rwanda-bias, Washington listened more to Kigali‘s view. Not mentioning the rebellion

228 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. 229 Gribbin, 204. 230 Ibid, 205. Confidential Interview #6; Confidential Interview #7. 231 Ibid, 203. 232 Ibid, 213. 233 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 200; Gribbin, 198.

70 as an invasion, State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns informed the press that,

―We don‘t agree with the attempt to overthrow a country through violent means; to put a whole region of Zaire into chaos… to endanger the lives of innocent refugees … we're asking Mr. Lawrence Kabila to agree to the cease-fire.‖234 Sensing the bias from the field, Ambassador Simpson in Kinshasa even filed official complaints regarding the cross reporting on events in Zaire.235

Months after Kabila began his advance, the State Department and USAID in

Washington responded by deploying two people to have ears on the ground.236 Former ambassador to Uganda, Bob Houdek deployed to eastern Zaire on a USAID Disaster

Assistance Response Team (DART) mission with additional orders from State‘s Africa

Bureau. Houdek was to ―be the oil between Rwanda, Uganda, the UN system, and

Kabila‘s rebel forces, all of whom had an abysmal relationship with deep suspicions and accusations, an irony because of their common objective.‖ Ambassador Simpson in

Kinshasa objected strongly to Houdek‘s presence with the advance, noting correctly that it might be perceived as U.S. support for the attacks.237 However, deployed with a laptop, satellite phone, and a briefcase of dollars, Houdek was able to gain valuable information for Washington‘s understanding of the situation. Rwanda and Angola were providing direct military assets and logistical support to the advance and troops were armed with weapons supplied by Uganda. 238 Top Eritrean diplomats were also advising

234 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #41, Nicholas Burns, March 19, 1997, http://hri.org/news/usa/std/1997/97-03-19.std.html. 235 Odom, 259. 236 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Press Statement by Nicholas Burns, March 14, 1997. 237 Confidential Interview #7. 238 Jean Boyne, ―The White Legion: Mercenaries in Zaire,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review 9:6 (June 1997), 278-281; Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire.‖

71 the advance, including their ambassador to the OAU who functioned as an honorary cabinet member in the Rwandan government.239

In an effort to prevent more bloodshed, Washington pushed for resolution through negotiations instead of acquiescing to Kengo‘s requests for armed intervention. A White

House official told the press that ―We tend to think of Somalia at moments like this.‖240

Instead, American diplomats, working hand in hand with the UN and OAU, facilitated multiple cease-fire negotiations, which although they allowed intermittent access for humanitarian aid did not last for more than two weeks. Rwandans continued to deny direct involvement and Zairians refused to believe that the forces were led by a domestic rebellion.241

Human rights concerns were rampant as the embassies received reports that the advancing forces reportedly killed and raped innocent women and children refugees along the way. 242 On the ground, UNHCR officials asked the rebel troops if they were instructed to shoot refugees and reported that the young soldiers ―nodded enthusiastically.‖243 Embassy Kigali maintained that they still had no proof of these abuses and meekly tried to address the issue with Rwandan officials who denied any involvement or control of the troops. Kinshasa‘s only hope was to still lean on Kengo to use the FAZ to restore order, but by early 1997 it was decades too late to instill understanding of respect for human rights in these ―bandits in uniform.‖244

239 Confidential Interview #14. 240 R. W. Apple, Jr., ―U.S. Influence Over Zaire Now Appears to be Limited,‖ The New York Times, May 17, 1997. 241 Gribbin, 206-7. 242 James C. McKinley with Howard W. French, ―Hidden Horrors: A special report: Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire's Long Trail of Death,‖ The New York Times, November 14, 1997. 243 Gribbin, 213. 244 Ibid, 212.

By the time the rebels were in sight of Kisangani, the heart of the mineral rich south of Zaire, representatives at the United Nations and Organization for African Union had agreed to a five-point plan to end the conflict. UN/OAU Special Representative

Mohamed Sahnoun had developed the plan that called for cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of foreign forces, including mercenaries; reaffirmation of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire and other states; protection and security for all refugees; and rapid and peaceful resolution of the crisis.245 Washington convened an interagency meeting on February 18, the day the Security Council endorsed the plan in

Resolution 1097.246 Representatives from the State Department, DIA, CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council met for the first time during the advance to decide on a coordinated approach, sharing the fear that war would spread through the region.247

Vice Presidents Al Gore and Thabo Mbeki agreed that South Africa would host private negotiations between Kabila and Mobutu.248 After receiving a call from Susan

Rice, Kabila agreed to attend. Mobutu, ailing from prostate cancer, refused to attend but sent chief of security, Honore Ngbanda, in his stead. Nelson Mandela, Vice President

Mbeki, UN Representative Sahnoun, former Secretary for African Affairs George Moose,

Susan Rice, and Great Lakes Envoy Howard Wolpe awaited the pair in South Africa.

Kabila arrived, but when Mandela leaked the talks to the press Mobutu recalled

245 Gribbin, 214. 246 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 133. 247 Ibid, 135. 248 George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Zaire: Collapse of an African Giant? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., April 8, 1997.

Ngbanda.249 Kabila was then left proudly standing with Mandela, which in the public eye seemed to be a strong, albeit unintentional, endorsement.250

The battle for Kisangani began on March 14, 1997. On March 17, Kabila refused to agree to any kind of cease-fire, stating that ―only direct talks with Mobutu might bring some kind of a pause.‖251 Mobutu proposed that only after a cease-fire would he agree to direct talks. A second round of high-level talks was seen to be possible at an OAU general meeting in Lomé, in advance of which Zairian officials suggested that Mobutu might be open to a power-sharing agreement. However, one day after the meeting,

Kabila declared that he would never ―enter into any kind of power-sharing arrangement with the Kinshasa government.‖252

Mobutu panicked and tried to replace Kengo with Etienne Tshisekedi to gain broader domestic support. Tshisekedi, however, promised seats in the new cabinet to

AFDL members in addition to Mobutu loyalists, cancelling his own utility to Mobutu and creating enemies on both sides.253 On April 10, White House spokesman told the press,

"Mobutuism is about to become a creature of history, because the support for President

Mobutu is not sufficient to lead Zaire into the next chapter of its history."254

With Kabila settled in Kisangani, a political officer from Kinshasa, Dennis

Hankins, replaced Houdek to begin establishing more official relations with Kabila.255

Hankins noticed marked Angolan presence among the troops at this point in the advance

249 Gribbin, 215. 250 Peter Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo,‖ Current History, Vol. 97 (619), May 1998, 193-199. 251 IRIN Bulletin, no. 130, March 18, 1997. 252 Libération, March 27, 1997. Cited in Prunier, Africa’s World War, 134. 253 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 134. 254 James Rupert, ―Zairian City Falls; Leader Sacks Rival,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 1997, pA01. 255 R. W. Apple, Jr., ―U.S. Influence Over Zaire Now Appears to be Limited,‖ The New York Times, May 17, 1997.

74 and understood their motivation for their involvement as ―boundless hatred of Mobutu‖ due to his long history of allowing U.S. support to UNITA during the Cold War.256

After repeated failure to convince Mobutu to leave, Washington now deployed

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson to Kinshasa to at least try to negotiate a ―soft-landing‖ for Kabila as he invaded Kinshasa.257 Richardson delivered a letter from President Clinton that demanded that Mobutu meet with Kabila immediately.258 At this point, the only incentive Richardson offered to Mobutu was that

―You get out alive, as opposed to having your body dragged through the streets.‖259

Richardson and the President‘s correspondence achieved initial success. Mobutu and Kabila agreed to meet on the South African warship Outeniqua on May 2. Mobutu arrived as planned, but Kabila kept Mobutu, his family, and negotiators waiting for two days. 260 If it had not been so disappointingly unsuccessful, Simpson noted that the first meeting of the old and new leaders of the Congo proceeded unsuccessfully as Kabila refused eye contact with Mobutu believing that Mobutu could hypnotize with his eyes.

The meeting ended with Mobutu saying that ―I will never be the former President of

Zaire, only the late President of Zaire.‖261

In a last attempt to avoid a bloodbath in Kinshasa, a city of 5 million people living in dire poverty where 10,000 troops were still loyal to Mobutu, Ambassador Simpson met with Mobutu‘s commander of the armed forces General Mahele Bokungu and encouraged him to speak with Kabila to negotiate terms. From Simpson‘s home, Mahele

256 Howard W. French, ―Zairian President is Ready to Quit, U.S. Diplomats Say,‖ The New York Times, May 4, 1997; Quote in Huliaras, ―(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions,‖ 287. 257 Copson, 14. 258 Howard W. French, ―Zairian President is Ready to Quit.‖ 259 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson. 260 Howard W. French, ―Zairian President is Ready to Quit;‖ Prunier, Africa’s World War, 135. 261 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson.

75 phoned Kabila and decided that Mahele would maintain order and keep Kinshasa quiet for a bloodless entrance and handover of authority to Kabila.262 Mahele informed Mobutu that the army would not defend the city, and paid for this decision with his life, murdered by Mobutu‘s son the next day.263

A day before the invasion of Kinshasa, the ailing leader that had ruled Zaire for thirty-seven years left the country. Mobutu brought with him the remains of his old friend late Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana.264 Only months later, Mobutu died in Morocco after a long battle with prostate cancer.

On May 17, 1997 AFDL troops seized the city and Kabila renamed the country

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), declaring himself president with a formal swearing-in on May 29.265

The policy-making process in response to this crisis did not mark a dramatic departure from previous years of post-Cold War U.S.-Zaire relations delegated to backwater bureaucrats. It did, however, demonstrate a shift from proactive U.S. support for and military defense of Mobutu during the Cold War. During the Cold War, Zaire was seen as the prize of Africa for its size, location, and resources, and the United States was keen to not let it fall into the hands of communists, as exemplified by the U.S. airlift of Moroccan troops into Zaire to defend the Shaba province in 1977 against what Mobutu portrayed as a communist invasion from Angola.266 In 1996, the Banyamulenge rebellion, recognized by U.S. policymakers to have external elements, the potential

262 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson. 263 Allan Little,‖ Hope and retribution in Zaire,‖ BBC News, 24 May 1997; Howard W. French, ―Mobutu‘s Son Lingers, Reportedly Settling Scores,‖ The New York Times, May 18, 1997. 264 Howard W. French, ―Ending a Chapter, Mobutu Cremates Rwanda Ally,‖ The New York Times, May 16, 1997; Gribbin, 221; Little, ―Hope and retribution in Zaire.‖ 265 Copson, 5; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 134. 266 Confidential Interview #12.

76 overthrow of a key Cold War ally no longer prompted U.S. military intervention.

Longstanding disgust for Mobutu‘s oppressive tactics, human rights failures, and outstanding debt further had further diminished the need to defend the current regime.

U.S. neutrality during the overthrow provided evidence for the first time that even the highest levels of the United States government would not intervene to save Mobutu.

After the Cold War, no one wanted to own the problems of Zaire, and so the United

States allowed other actors to step in, including Zaire‘s neighbors and the UN through investigators and future peacekeeping missions.267

Kabila in Power: White House Hopes and Bureaucratic Skepticism

Once Kabila claimed Kinshasa, the United States held cautious optimism for the realization of promises for democracy that had raised hopes for many Western donors.

Pleased with little bloodshed during the transition of power and optimistic about a power at the helm of Congo other than Mobutu, the Clinton Administration quickly extended recognition to the new regime on May 19 and pledged to help develop a democratic government. Kabila promised a transitional agenda and elections to be held in July

1997.268 Congressman Ed Royce led a delegation to meet with Kabila only a few days after his inauguration.269

The White House had hope that Kabila could restore order and organize national unity. Susan Rice wanted to believe his promises of democracy, and her personal

267 Confidential Interview #5. 268 Metz, ―Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire,‖ 18. 269 House Committee on International Relations, Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Relations, House Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2000.

77 connections with Secretary Albright meant that her opinions became Albright‘s.270 The two soon began planning the Secretary‘s visit to Zaire to welcome Kabila into the club of

―new African leaders,‖ despite the concerns held by the rest of the bureaucracy.271

Ambassadors Gribbin and Simpson and other long-time diplomats maintained reservations about having such high faith in a former ―thug,‖ but had no choice but to proceed with relations as they were directed from the top.272 In Kinshasa, Ambassador

Simpson urged Kabila and his senior aides to immediately embrace the political opposition, including Etienne Tshisekedi, and to begin making progress toward democracy.273 In meetings, however, Kabila refused to reveal the military or new government‘s structure, which was increasingly suspicious as donors and Congolese alike noticed that highest in commands were Kinyarwanda, Swahili, and English-speaking men.274 Pressure for transition to democracy remained the primary goal of the embassy.

Pressure for Human Rights Investigation

Second to the goal of democracy was the embassy‘s need to address scathing reports of human rights abuses by Kabila and his forces during the advance across the country. Reports of suspected massacres of Hutu refugees that had begun to surface before Kabila arrived in Kinshasa grew louder as he began to consolidate power.275

Ambassador Gribbin in Kigali had proposed an independent investigation to put to rest

270 Interview with Peter Rosenblum. 271 Confidential Interview #2. 272 Confidential Interview #6. 273 Steve Lee Myers, ―U.S. Accepts Kabila, but Cautions on Democracy,‖ The New York Times, May 20, 1997, p. A9; Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo.‖ 274 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 150. Copson, 6. 275 International Herald Tribune, "Evidence Mounts of Mass Killings by Kabila's Forces in Congo," June 12, 1997; Howard W. French, ―Refugees From Congo Give Vivid Accounts of Killings,‖ The New York Times, September 23, 1997.

78 the discrepancies with refugee numbers and allegations of massacres. U.S. envoys in the region were skeptical about the killings after hearing repeated denials from Rwandan officials and having not found any evidence in personal inquiries. Ambassador Houdek who had accompanied Kabila‘s advance and seen many alleged sites of massacres presumed the presence of graves of insurgent fighters and women and children who perished from indirect effects of war, malnourishment and disease.276 The U.S. military attaché deployed to Goma during Operation Support Hope had witnessed mass graves of refugees who had, for the most part, died from exhaustion, cholera, or other water born diseases. Lt. Col. Odom admitted witnessing the death of accused-Tutsis and Hutu conspirators, but these were at the hands of the Hutu militias themselves in an effort to maintain unity and deter defectors.277

Seeking concrete conclusions, U.S. diplomats began to press bilaterally for an investigation. Gribbin noted in hindsight that ―near obsession with this goal, as we waited for Kabila to meet our expectations for real democratic change, precluded pragmatic opportunities that might have abetted stability and accountability over the long term.‖278

The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Roberto Garreton, the UN Commission for Human Rights special rapporteur for Zaire, as special envoy for the investigation. The selection of Garreton proved troublesome as Kagame saw him as

―French appendage‖ since he had condemned the AFDL invasion from the outset.279

When Garreton and his team arrived in Kinshasa, Kabila repeatedly obstructed their

276 Gribbin; Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #3, March 13, 2012. 277 Odom, 106. 278 Gribbin, 239. 279 Ibid, 239-40.

79 attempts to access sites in question, despite U.S. and UN diplomatic pressure.

Ambassador Simpson noted that it seemed Kabila‘s hands were tied on the issue by continued Rwandan influence.280

U.S. negotiations with Kabila and Kagame for agreement on the investigation took many months. Kagame‘s blessing was seen as crucial since alleged victims and perpetrators were both Rwandan. Kabila was wary of the investigation that would reveal that either he was powerless over his troops or he would have to admit responsibility for crimes against humanity and possible genocide.281 Rwanda also harbored reservations about an investigation, as it would likely expose the RPA role and potential reprisal killings that had taken place. In a higher-level bilateral to press for investigation, U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson deployed to Kinshasa to pressure Kabila to allow the human rights mission to investigate.282 Finally, when Wolpe stressed that aid for both

DRC and Rwanda would be contingent upon how investigations were handled, Kagame agreed.283

When results from a January investigation were revealed, Kagame asserted that the investigation was not a mission to find facts, but instead to prove opinions and only emanated from the guilt of the international community to act responsibly in response to the refugee crisis. Kabila later called the investigation a French smear campaign.284

As the attempts by investigators to discover the truth heightened, Kagame admitted to Rwanda‘s role in the overthrow of Mobutu.285 Days later, the Rwandan

280 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson. 281 Collette Braeckman, L’enjeu congolais: l'Afrique centrale aprés Mobutu (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 134. 282 ―Gloomy U.S. Envoy Departs for Congo,‖ The New York Times, October 24, 1997. 283 Gribbin, 238-41. 284 Philip Gourevitch, ―Continental Shift: A Letter from the Congo,‖ New Yorker, August 4, 1997. 285 John Pomfret, ―Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo,‖ Washington Post, July 9, 1997.

80 government tried to back-track the confession, but undermined its own efforts by providing more justifications for why Kabila‘s success was crucial to Rwandan security.286

When Garreton returned with a team of investigators in July, Kabila repeatedly obstructed their access. By July 1998, after months without progress, the UN investigation team withdrew.287 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees also made the unprecedented decision to withdraw in protest for the ―complete disregard of international humanitarian norms in the handling of the remaining Rwandese refugees.‖288 Kabila had expelled many other humanitarian aid and human rights NGOs, but accounts of new killings and mass graves continued to reach the press.289 The State

Department begged the UN not to drop the investigation and Congo with it.290

UN investigations were only allowed to proceed on a very limited scale after the peace process in 1999 and most recently in 2006, which culminated in the 2010 UN

Mapping Report.291 These investigations revealed many suspected massacres and human rights abuses that did not end after Kabila‘s invasion.

286 Le Monde, July 17, 1997. 287 IRIN Bulletin, no. 449, July 1, 1998. 288 IRIN Bulletin, no. 244, September 9, 1997. 289 ―Congo Weighs Expelling More Aid Groups,‖ The New York Times, October 6, 1997; Gribbin, 239-241; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 157-8; Dennis McNamara, Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, Rwanda: The Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., May 5, 1998. 290 Le Monde, April 12-13, 1998. 291 Garreton did publish a report following the Second Congo War: ―Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,‖ submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission resolution 1998/61, August 2010. A more comprehensive report was published in 2010: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ―Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,‖ English translation, August 2010, First Congo War, 70-150.

Alleged U.S. Complicity in the Overthrow

After Kagame admitted Rwanda‘s complicity in the overthrow of Mobutu, and because American diplomats never publicly pressured Rwanda about the reports of human rights abuses and massacres, the American media, NGOs, and Congress began to condemn the apparent U.S. favoritism and even accused the U.S. military of complicity in the killings.292 The confirmation of Rwandan complicity seemed to implicate U.S. involvement as the public grew more wary of the new ―special relationship‖ between the

Clinton Administration and the new Rwandan government. Nevertheless, Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William

Twaddell, and Susan Rice in her October nomination hearing to be Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, defended the embassy staff in Kigali against accusations of

―clientitis.‖293

In response to reports of U.S. complicity, former Assistant Secretary of State for

African Affairs Herman Cohen, said to a New York Times reporter that, ―I wish I could give credit to the U.S. Government for the broad vision and policy of doing something like this, but I can‘t. It‘s day-to-day policy. One problem at a time builds up, and the

292 Neil A. Lewis, ―Rights Group Blames Rwandans In Attacks on Civilians in Congo,‖ The New York Times, July 17, 1997; Barbara Crossette, ―October 5-11: New Regime, New Massacres,‖ The New York Times, October 12, 1997; Lynne Duke, ―U.S. Faces Surprise, Dilemma in Africa,‖ The Washington Post, July 14, 1998, A01; Amnesty International, Rwanda: Ending the Silence, September 25, 1997; Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, October 1997; William H. Twaddell Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hearing on Liberia before the House International Relations Committee, June 26, 1996; House Committee on International Relations, Zaire: Collapse of an African Giant? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1997; Physicians for Human Rights, Rwanda: The Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 5, 1998; Gribbin, 233-4; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 201. 293 Correspondence from the State Department in response to letter from Representative Christopher Smith to the President on August 28, 1997; Reyntjens, The Great African War, 70; Susan Rice defended Embassy Kigali in her confirmation hearing. Gribbin, 233-234.

French, with their paranoia, see a grand design.‖ A senior administration official at the time described that the policy-making process was ―not a well oiled machine to make decisions, but a group of very busy people who try to make decisions in a crisis with often limited knowledge.‖294 Washington analysts also summarized their impression of

U.S. Africa policy as ―haphazard and uninspired.‖295

However, despite the Pentagon‘s assessment of ―very little traditional strategic interest in Africa‖ in 1995, State and Defense Departments trained hundreds of Rwandan soldiers.296 After the genocide, Kagame urged the United States to help lift the weapons ban originally imposed on the former regime during the genocide.297 Ambassador

Bogosian was the first person in the State Department to recommend military assistance to the new Rwandan government in 1995.298 With U.S. pressure, the UN lifted the embargo in August 1995.299

Instead of sending weapons, the United States trained Rwandan military officers from 1994 to August 1997 on human rights and the rule of law, principles of the Geneva

Conventions, emergency response, and demining. Humanitarian personnel trained civilians to assist with the repatriation of refugees returning from Zaire. Equipment transferred to Rwanda during this time did not include any arms, although some marksmanship training had been incorporated in the Joint/Combined Exchange Training

294 Interview with Prudence Bushnell. 295 Howard W. French, ―France Fears U.S. Advance in Africa,‖ The New York Times, April 4, 1997. 296 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, 3. 297 UN Security Council Resolution 918, May 17, 1994. 298 Odom, 235-6. 299 UN Security Council Resolution 1011, August, 16, 1995.

(JCET) program. U.S. military personnel were also deployed to assist with humanitarian emergencies in 1994 and 1996.300

One Clinton Administration official described the military training as "a matter of practical policy interests and common sense. Assuming diplomacy fails and [ethnic conflict] grows, somebody needs to be in a position to contain it."301 Ambassador

Bogosian defended the efforts as operating within ―exclusively the human rights end of the spectrum‖ and Assistant Secretary Moose had justified it as support for stability in the region, which was critical to peace in Angolan and good relations with South Africa.302

U.S. complicity was also suggested when American mining companies began to make deals with Kabila. Before Kabila had taken over Kinshasa, American Mineral

Fields (AMF), an Arkansas-based mining firm, had promised a $1 billion mining deal.303

Zairians, Europeans, and Canada, knowing Clinton‘s Arkansas origins, saw the hands of the U.S. government behind the deal.304 Once Kabila was in power, he signed contracts with De Beers and AMF worth $3 billion per year. All of these investments waned by

1998 as Kabila alienated foreign firms by changing investment laws and additional taxes.305 Some scholars argue that these initial investments were critical to finance the war effort and helped to begin developing Kabila‘s credibility with outsiders.306 Others

300 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 34. 301 Lynne Duke, ―U.S. Faces Surprise, Dilemma in Africa,‖ The Washington Post, July 14, 1998. 302 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Vincent Kern, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1997. 303 Stefaans Brummer, ―Business at War for Zaire‘s Wealth,‖ Mail and Guardian, April 25, 1997; Chris Gordon, ―Kabila Dumps De Beers,‖ Business Mail, May 2, 1997. 304 Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo.‖ 305 Renton et al., The Congo,181-2; Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, ―Laurent-Desire Kabila‘s Assassination: An Attempt to End Three Decades of a Nationalist's Political Struggle for Independence,‖ African Journal of International Affairs and Development, Vol. 6 No. 1, 2001, 19-30. 306 Reno, ―Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire.‖

84 state that few if any payments were actually made to Kabila due to contractual disagreements and subsequent legal battles.307

The mining sector under Mobutu had been literally disassembled as foreign investors fled the violence in the country in the early 1990s. Ambassador Simpson noted that he did not need to spend a lot of time advocating for U.S. business interests in Zaire or Kabila‘s DRC, because the large mining corporations spoke for themselves. Other than the mining sector, there were not many opportunities for openings in the market for

American investors.308

Great Lakes Policy Review Prevented by High-Level Loyalties

By September 1997, representatives at the UN pondered how to move past the failed investigations attempts and to move forward with relations with Kabila and the

DRC.309 A ―Friends of the Congo‖ meeting was planned for December to restart economic cooperation, where U.S. diplomats played a key role in arranging meetings with donors and the World Bank to create a multinational fund for development for DRC.

Donors pledged $575 million for economic reform.310 Ambassador Simpson began to press Washington for resources to support electoral transition, and the embassy planned a strategy to employ former Peace Corps volunteers to support civil society.311

Congress began to demand that the U.S. government review its policy toward the

Great Lakes in light of Rwanda‘s admitted complicity in the overthrow of Mobutu and

307 Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo.‖ 308 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson. 309 Prunier notes his reflections on a UN meeting in New York September 26-27 where people were ―wondering how to get regular cooperating restarted in the DRC.‖ Prunier, Africa’s World War, 159. 310 Ibid, 164. 311 Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo;‖ and Confidential Interview #6.

85 any human rights violations that occurred during the war, Kagame‘s obstruction of

―preemptive multilateral efforts to quell the crisis,‖ U.S. biased support for Rwanda, and

Kabila‘s obstruction of human rights investigations.312 Some members of the State

Department agreed that a reevaluation of policy was warranted, but the opportunity was thwarted by senior administration officials‘ uninterrupted loyalty to Rwanda and, by extension, Kabila –the ouster of the increasingly problematic Mobutu.

Secretary Albright‘s trip to Kinshasa in December of 1997 extended high-level recognition of the legitimacy of Kabila‘s new regime. The Administration organized the visit to seven African countries to affirm the Administration‘s support for the ―new

African leaders‖ and overcome the skepticism of Congress about assistance to Africa.313

Albright‘s visits to Rwanda and DRC unofficially inducted Kabila and Kagame into

Clinton‘s ―new generation of African leaders‖ who included Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea,

Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.314 Before correcting herself, Albright stated at a press briefing in Kinshasa that ―I just finished with President

Kabila, making it clear that he is among those leaders.‖315 She also called Kabila one of

Africa‘s new ―strong leaders working in favor of regional cooperation,‖ and proudly informed the press that she would work with Congress on an aid package of $30 million package for eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and $10 million pledge to World Bank

312 Representative Christopher Smith (NJ), Rwanda: The Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., May 5, 1998. 313 Rosenblum, ―Kabila‘s Congo.‖ 314 Interview with Richard W. Bogosian, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection; Confidential Interview #2; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 195. Gérard Prunier, ―Sudan‘s Regional War,‖ Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1997. 315 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 198.

86 trust fund for Congo. Albright warned specifically that Congress would be attentive to respect for human rights as a condition for this assistance.316

Although she preached democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization, she did not acknowledge that each of these leaders had come to power through military might, did not have open democratic regimes, and that the United States had provided military training to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda since 1995.317 Regardless of this fact, she declared at the OAU that ―it is time for the people of the United States to open a new chapter in our relations with the people of this continent‖ and skillfully deflected questions about these leaders, stating that all countries have ―room for improvement.‖318

Albright then faced an unexpected anti-democratic outburst from Kabila, who responded to a question about a jailed journalist by saying he would continue to imprison his opponents, smirked, and shouted ―Vive la démocratie!‖319 Kabila also complained in an interview with The New York Times that the $10 million was ―insignificant, absolutely insignificant,‖ and that he hoped further aid would arrive ―without conditions.‖320

316 ―After Rwandan Terror, Albright Promises Greater Vigilance,‖ The New York Times, December 10, 1997; Carole J.L. Collins, ―Donors begin to aid the new Congo,‖ Africa Recovery 11, no. 3 (February 1998); Howard W. French, ―On Visit to Congo, Albright Praises the New Leader,‖ The New York Times, December 13, 1997. 317 In 1996, Clinton approved $20 million in military aid to these three countries, as their individual security interests merged with those of the United States regarding the Sudan regime. ―Arms against a sea of troubles,‖ Africa Confidential 27, 23 (1996), 1. See also Prunier, ―Sudan‘s Regional War;‖ M.W. Makgoba (ed.), African Renaissance: The New Struggle (Cape Town: Mafube, 1999); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Vincent D. Kern, Zaire: Collapse of an African Giant? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1997. 318 ReliefWeb Report, ―Rwanda: There is no forgetting Rwanda's genocide, Albright says,‖ December 12, 1997; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 198. 319 Howard W. French, ―Albright in Africa: The Embraceable Regimes? A curious pro-democracy tour where power was won by the gun,‖ The New York Times, December 16, 1997. 320 French, ―On Visit to Congo, Albright Praises the New Leader.‖

During her trip, Albright did not meet with opposition leaders. This inconsistency with her call for democracy promotion puzzled Zairian activists, and one opposition leader stated:

―We are somewhat confused by the signals Washington is sending to Africa these days. For years we were lectured about the virtues of democracy and the need for the rule of law, and we took this to heart. But in reality, if you want to get Washington‘s attention and respect, you are better of picking up the gun.‖321

The distance between rhetoric on democracy and human rights and the reality of the situation in DRC also sparked flow of criticism from The New York Times.322

As if the trip had not suffered from enough bad press, the last days of Albright‘s visit in Rwanda brought the slaughter of more than one thousand Congolese Tutsis in

Rwanda from a cross-border incursion by Hutu militias from Zaire. The Secretary dispatched the Ambassador for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer back to Rwanda to investigate the killings.323 Scheffer and Gribbin witnessed hundreds of bodies and noted the eerie absence of the other 17,000 Congolese Tutsi that had resided there only weeks previously. They reported back that to Washington that the Department should increase support to the Rwandan government in the anti-genocide effort with additional training and equipment for the army and the justice program.324 This event only confirmed for the

Secretary and Rice that U.S. support was needed to sustain the government of Rwanda.

321 Serge Kalonji, a Congolese opposition leader quoted in Howard W. French, ―Albright in Africa: The Embraceable Regimes.‖ 322 A series of New York Times articles noted criticism for Albright‘s trip to the region. Howard W. French, ―On Visit to Congo, Albright Praises the New Leader: Washington supports Kabila despite human rights complaints in Congo,‖ The New York Times, December 13, 1997. Howard W. French, ―Albright in Africa: The Embraceable Regimes?‖ ―Ms. Albright‘s Awkward African Tour,‖ The New York Times, December 17, 1997. 323 Gribbin, 249. 324 Ibid, 250-1, and 262.

Missed Opportunity

Policymakers agree that the decisions to recognize Kabila‘s authority but to immediately press for human rights investigations and democratic transition resulted in a missed opportunity for positive change in the Congo. Diplomats have mentioned that this policy deviated from the norm of ―looking the other way when bad things are happening to people we need.‖325

Instead, albeit with good intentions, diplomats ―went after him tooth and nail for perfect human rights,‖326 whereby he was not given room to ―crawl, walk and run which eventually [caused him to be] disillusioned‖ with U.S. demands. Policymakers and analysts alike at the time believe that this frustration combined with Kabila‘s initial suspicions of the United States caused U.S. policymakers to miss an opportunity to foster a more effective beginning for the new leader.327 Ambassador Simpson argued in hindsight that the United States should have given him ―a good dose of aid to put toward the right things.‖328

However, the promised assistance to DRC soon faded due to the deteriorating political situation. Impediments to assistance included Congress‘ attention to the human rights violations and Rwandan complicity and the President‘s unwillingness to seek a waiver for aid. Albright had warned Kabila of these restrictions, but Kabila remained suspicious U.S. efforts after such long commitment to Mobutu and was still manipulated by the Rwandan influence who did not want an investigation to reveal their complicity.

325 Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Leonard Hawley cited in Christopher R. Cook, ―American Policymaking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996-1999: The Anti-Kabila Bias and the Crushing Neutrality of the Lusaka Accords,‖ African and Asian Studies 9 (2010), 403. 326 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson. 327 Interview with Leonard Hawley cited in Cook, 403; Interview with Peter Rosenblum. 328 Interview with Daniel H. Simpson.

Analysis

The three years following the genocide in Rwanda and the immediate refugee crisis, changing events in eastern Zaire and Rwanda led to shifting institutional leads in

U.S. foreign policymaking toward the region. As the refugee situation became an extended crisis, Congress advocated changes in policy and the State Department continued subdued relations with Zaire as usual. The uprising of a rebellion in eastern

Zaire drew in limited White House involvement and planned military intervention.

However, the seeming resolution of the refugee crisis and the initial advance of Kabila‘s forces towards Kinshasa met with little response from U.S. policymakers as they lent tacit acceptance to the overthrow of Mobutu.

As the refugee crisis simmered on the Zairian border of Rwanda and Mobutu used the humanitarian situation to begin to regain support from international donors, Zaire remained in a state of extended crisis from the U.S. policy perspective. In line with the analytical framework, the State and Defense bureaucracies were limited in their actions in the region without high-level direction from the White House, which left Congress to take the lead on decision-making. In 1996, Members of Congress expressed their dissatisfaction with the present handling of the situation by the President and Mobutu and their concerns about the persisting problem of genocidaires conducting cross-border incursions into Rwanda.

However, the White House took no immediate action, even though National

Security Advisor Anthony Lake continued to call for attention to genocide preparedness within the interagency, demonstrating a new and reactionary worldview built on guilt of non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide. Ambassador Bogosian‘s limited mandate

90 including only Rwanda and Burundi demonstrated White House prioritization of relations with these countries for genocide prevention and marginalization of Mobutu in Zaire during the crisis. President Clinton did not direct the attention of his envoys to Zaire, but

Bogosian did lead preparations of scenarios for intervention including the ACRI and a

Canadian-led Multinational Force.

The extent of the Administration‘s efforts to bolster influence with the government of Zaire was to appoint a new ambassador to the country. Otherwise, the

State Department continued to conduct shuttle diplomacy between Kinshasa and Kigali to press for Zairian political reform. Assistant Secretary Moose testified about the bureaucracy‘s success in incremental change, noting that the years of diplomatic work towards orderly transition in Zaire had successfully ―shaped the attitudes and the views and opinions of a great many people in the region and in the international community.‖329

Circumstances changed in the fall of 1996 with the outbreak of a rebellion seemingly led by Congolese Tutsi, or Banyamulenge. The extended crisis of the refugee situation in eastern Zaire now lapsed into a period of fresh crisis for U.S. policymakers as they viewed the uprising as evidence of Mobutu‘s inability to stabilize the situation.

Recognizing that more ethnic conflict and bloodshed would not serve the best interests of the White House, Lake leapt into action to finalize preparations for a Multinational Force.

The President announced that he would mobilize U.S. troops as part of the MNF to respond to the situation, and the Pentagon, engaging only after directive from the

President, deployed troops and surveillance missions.

329 George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1997.

The situation changed again when only days after the deployment of the first troops from the MNF, the Banyamulenge assisted by Rwandan troops began to send the

Hutu refugees back to Rwanda where they peacefully resettled. High-level U.S. policymakers understood this turn of events to mean that the crisis had been resolved, despite the cries from lower-level State Department officials who warned that many refugees still remained. As this crisis waned and the United States quickly acquiesced to

Kagame‘s request for the removal of the Multinational Force, the White House returned to the policy of delegating African problems to African leaders, Rwanda in particular.

Sensitive to the views of Congress and the American public who were still scarred from the intervention disaster in Somalia, the White House appreciated the opportunity to avoid further entanglement of U.S. troops in Africa. Yet, had the MNF remained in an attempt to fulfill its mandate to solve the problem of militant refugees, the Rwandan invasion under the guise of the Banyamulenge rebellion may not have proceeded as easily.

Without the presence of the MNF, Kabila now began his Rwanda and Uganda- sponsored mission to overthrow Mobutu unhindered by international observers. This situation, which would have been deemed a crisis during the Cold War, now elicited minimal response from the United States. In stark contrast with the White House‘s willingness to intervene to prevent genocide, the bureaucracy was only able to mount diplomatic pressure during Kabila‘s advance through Zaire, demonstrating that U.S. policymaking institutions deemed the invasion no more than a routine event. Only when

Kabila seized Kisangani and it became clear that Mobutu would need to relinquish power or suffer brutal consequences did the State Department even escalate the level of

92 diplomatic pressure to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Washington deployed experienced

Africa policymakers and diplomats, including Special Envoy Howard Wolpe and U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson. Wolpe boasted regional expertise after many years chairing the Subcommittee for Africa and his mandate spanned broader than

Ambassador Bogosian‘s jurisdiction of just Rwanda and Burundi. Ambassador

Richardson brought the weight of both the United States and the United Nations to negotiations, and thus the team demonstrated significantly higher-level involvement in an attempt to ease Mobutu‘s transition. The practice of facilitating the departure of dictators who had been friends of America during the Cold War was not unprecedented, and White

House and State Department trusted these diplomats to accomplish the task.

While the United States seemed to demonstrate neutrality during the conflict by seeking mutually negotiated cease-fires and not openly choosing sides, the position of the

United States was not one of total impartiality. The policymaking institutions had long shared the desire to transition away from Mobutu. As a result, the White House and

Pentagon did not mount a defense for Mobutu, the State Department did not call for support the territorial integrity of Zaire and did not openly recognize the participation of outside states in the ―rebellion,‖ and no one in the Administration or Congress advocated serious sanctions against the external actors involved. Instead, the high-level support for

Rwanda across the executive, the recognition of Kabila‘s military power and Congolese support, and the precedence of maintaining alliances with the invading countries in order to meet U.S. security interests in Africa tipped the scales in Kabila‘s favor. Thus, the

U.S. policy decision to allow Kabila‘s entrance, although seemingly neutral, said volumes about changing loyalties in the post-Cold War era as U.S. support transitioned

93 from Mobutu to an alliance with ―new African leaders.‖ As one analyst described it,

―Voluntary non-intervention where intervention is expected is… the same as intervention itself.‖330

As Kabila began to consolidate power in Kinshasa, the situation in DRC returned to a state of extended crisis. In accordance with the analytical framework, Congress responded first and urged a policy review in light of the alleged human rights abuses in

DRC and Rwanda‘s complicity in the invasion. However, high-level loyalties between the White House, Pentagon, State Department (led by Susan Rice and Madeleine

Albright) and Kagame and Kabila, usurped the will of Congress and lower-level officers to reexamine the regional strategy.331 Thus, the Rwanda-bias and initial support for

Kabila continued, as demonstrated by Albright‘s visit to Kinshasa in December 1997.

U.S. inaction and apparent neutrality demonstrated a true delegation of decision-making to regional leaders instead of U.S. policymakers. However, as the results of this decision would show, the consequences of these decisions were not in the best interests of the suffering Zairians in a war-torn homeland, of the American people, or even U.S. national security. This approach has been criticized as the U.S. ultimately did take sides instead of defending itself against manipulation by Rwandan forces playing on the guilt of non- intervention in the genocide. Thus, ―Rwanda syndrome‖ began to have larger implications for Zaire‘s domestic and regional security.

Decisions led by the White House during this time demonstrated narrow security interests and concerns for domestic image, which restricted bureaucrats‘ ability to make

330 Quoted in Huliaras, ―(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions,‖ 281-305, 282. 331 Terrence P. Lyons, ―U.S. Diplomatic Strategies to Resolve Conflicts in Africa,‖ in Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration, Ed. J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 33-54.

94 incremental change in Congo. U.S. leaders‘ approach of ―African solutions to African problems‖ offered the option of forced removal of Mobutu, and U.S. policy institutions united behind a front of neutrality to allow the invasion with efforts to ensure minimal bloodshed. While Congress called on the President to address human rights concerns in the conflict, the White House did not request waivers to incentivize progress in Congo, contributing to the missed opportunity to encourage Kabila toward democratic governance. Thus, dramatic change occurred in Congo without corresponding proactive support from the White House or Congress. However, high-level support for the external actors in the invasion and inaction to prevent their intervention had the same effect of causing a significant change in U.S. policy.

Chapter 5: Africa’s World War and U.S. Non-Intervention, 1998-2003

After the dramatic upheaval and historic overthrow of President Mobutu of Zaire, the United States had high hopes for the new, self-declared president Laurent Kabila.

Although the State Department continued to press for political reform and respect for human rights, Kabila‘s disregard for the expectations of the United States and international donor community caused high-level U.S. leadership to begin to lose faith.

When Rwanda and Uganda launched a second invasion of the Congo and privately informed U.S. diplomats of their intent to replace Kabila with a more moderate leader,

U.S. diplomats never anticipated that members of the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) would intervene on Kabila‘s behalf and thus begin the historic conflict now known as Africa‘s World War. The U.S. public response to the rebellion, or invasion, was quiet; and events in Congo coinciding with the U.S. electoral cycle would shape the response by the White House. The humanitarian impact and peacekeeping elements of the cease-fire seized the attention of Congress, and the State Department continued to struggle for political, economic, and human rights reform with only rhetorical support from the highest levels.

White House Priorities during Clinton’s Second Term

Clinton‘s second term began with a renewed focus on Africa. Congress continued to pay close attention to reports of human rights violations when considering appropriations, and the Administration began stronger efforts to persuade decision- makers on the Hill that African countries had the potential to share common values and

96 investment. In the press and through public diplomacy, senior Administration officials continued to call for the respect for human rights and democracy throughout Africa.

Clinton sought to strengthen military alliances with the ―new generation of leaders‖ facing increasing concerns about insecurity emanating from terrorist organizations supported by the Government of Sudan.332 Following the President‘s ―trade not aid‖ approach to new relations with Africa, the White House also renewed support for the

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which would provide American businesses access to African markets and give trade preferences to certain African goods while providing incentives for improvements in labor rights and market liberalization. On conflict resolution, however, the Administration would maintain the view of ―African solutions for African problems,‖ especially as another conflict began to unfold in the

Great Lakes.

Kabila and Unraveling Transition

Increasingly seen as an outsider, Kabila soon faced blame by the Congolese people for the presence of foreigners in Kinshasa. The Rwandan Tutsi embedded in the government and military did not blend in well with the Congolese, and were even rumored to have evicted many Kinshasa natives to secure housing.333 Kabila had failed to establish a strong central authority, and civil servants and the military promised weak loyalties receiving only intermittent pay.

332 Cook, ―American Policymaking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996-1999,‖ 396; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 197; Ian Taylor, ―Conflict in Central Africa: Clandestine Networks and Regional/Global Configurations,‖ Review of African Political Economy 95 (2003): 49. 333 Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #4, March 17, 2012.

The new President recognized his deteriorating legitimacy with domestic and international audiences and began to realize he would need to take dramatic action to have any hope of maintaining power. In an attempt to force control, Kabila reverted to

Mobutu‘s oppressive tactics while claiming that the country was not yet ready for democracy. He banned free press and political activity, forcing other parties to merge with the ADFL or face violent repression.334 Kabila tried to model Mobutu‘s political schemes by pitting members of the government and factions against each other, but unlike the stabilizing effect that this strategy had under Mobutu, under Kabila it only resulted in more internal conflict.335 Arbitrary arrests and detention were also used to repress opponents and dissidents.336

Envoys Intercede

In early February, the White House deployed Clinton‘s Special Envoy for

Democracy in Africa Reverend Jesse Jackson to Kinshasa to investigate the detention of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi and to reinforce priorities of inclusive political reform and respect for human rights.337 Kabila spurned Jackson after he met with

Tshisekedi prior to his scheduled appointment with Kabila.338 This action only further demonstrated to the United States that Kabila continued to disregard diplomats‘ pressure for an inclusive political process. Nevertheless, Embassy Kinshasa continued to hammer

334 James C. McKinley Jr., ―Kabila Bans Party Activity in Kinshasa,‖ The New York Times, May 27, 1997; Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa.‖ 335 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 151. 336 For a list of political prisoners, see Amnesty International, DRC: Civil Liberties Denied, Washington, DC, February 1998, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/016/1998/en/bf05f42b-dabf-11dd- 80bc-797022e51902/afr620161998en.pdf. 337 Congo Opposition Leader Arrested in Kinshasa,‖ The New York Times, February 13, 1998; Reyntjens, The Great African War, 166; Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa.‖ 338 ―Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa.‖

98 the government on priority issues of Tshisekedi‘s detention and exile, intimidation of the

UN human rights investigators, and attempting to integrate other opposition groups into the Kabila government.339

Soon afterwards, the White House announced that President Clinton would travel to Africa, marking the most extensive visit of a U.S. president to the continent and the longest overseas tour of the Clinton presidency. National Security adviser Samuel R.

Berger told the press that, ―We have to demystify Africa for Americans,‖ and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright continued to preach about the ―new generation of African leaders."340

Days before the President embarked on the journey to Africa, Chairman of the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Jesse Helms convened a hearing to discuss this ―new generation‖ and the President‘s mission to the continent. In opening remarks, Senator John Ashcroft and others echoed concerns about the Administration‘s support for these ―new leaders,‖ none of whom promoted democratic values and respect for human rights themselves. Further issues of inconsistency with U.S. democracy promotion included the silence of the United States and United Nations after Kabila repeatedly oppressed the opposition, obstructed human rights investigations, and Angola assisted with toppling a democratically elected government in Republic of the Congo.

The Senators urged President Clinton on his trip should make clear that such new leaders should implement ―political reform.‖341

339 Gribbin, 274. 340 John F. Harris and Lynne Duke, ―Clinton Seeks to Change African Views,‖ The Washington Post, March 22, 1998, p. A01. 341 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1998.

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice testified in defense of U.S. efforts at the hearing and attempted to allay Congress‘ concerns. Rice stated that the

State Department and the rest of the Administration ―remain deeply concerned about

President Kabila‘s detention of opposition leader Tshisekedi, the detention and harassment of journalists, and by the trial of civilians before military tribunals.‖ She promised that diplomats would continue to press for respect for human rights, democracy, and prosperity, and press loudly for full accounting of human rights violations. However, she made no commitments for the president to address the specific records of political reform of the countries on his itinerary.342

Clinton’s Visit to Africa

In March 1998, President Clinton embarked on his visit to Africa with a primary objective of convincing Congress and the American public that ―Africa was worthwhile,‖ and to overcome the images of ―disease, corruption, and war.‖343 Facing increasing criticism for AGOA on the hill, the visit provided an opportunity to show the delegation and the American public through the press that the ―new generation of African leaders‖ shared commitments to democracy, open governance, and sound economic policies.344

Visiting Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal, Clinton skipped DRC, but invited Kabila to join him for a summit in Entebbe, Uganda. The

White House also initially planned for Clinton to skip Rwanda, due to security concerns.

However, when President Bizimungu refused to travel to Uganda to discuss a genocide

342 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Democracy in Africa. 343 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 195. 344 ―Africa After Clinton: Happiness in the Bush,‖ Economist, April 2, 1998, www.economist.com/node/361209.

100 that occurred in Rwanda, Clinton personally made the decision to make a brief stop in

Kigali.345

During the summit, Clinton demonstrated closeness with Rwandan and Ugandan delegates and did not mount any criticism for human rights records. In private, however, it became clear that Clinton‘s expectations for Kabila had waned, and he took a strong approach with Kabila in a closed meeting stating, ―We are fed up. You have six months to free the opposition politicians, stop harassing the civil society, NGOs, and the press and curb your army. If you fail to do that, in six months we drop you flat.‖346

The overall outcome of the summit included heads of states‘ commitments to the

Entebbe Principles, which promised transparent partnership and long-term meaningful engagement for peace and prosperity and to stop genocide. The Administration and the press deemed the visit a success, but domestic news overtook the press coverage as killings at a junior high school in Arkansas flooded the media.347

However, by June 1998, several important African leaders rejected AGOA in principle and the new leaders had already begun to fall apart. South African President

Nelson Mandela opposed the bill, stating that, ―We resist any attempt by any country to impose conditions on our freedom of trade."348 In May, Kabila hosted a summit to celebrate one year after his rise to power; however, the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, and Eritrea declined to attend. Their notable absence at the reception demonstrated the first visible to warning sign that the alliance that brought him to power began to fade.349

345 Gribbin, 257-8. 346 Quote cited in Prunier, Africa’s World War, 160. 347 Gribbin, 262. 348BBC Special Report, ―Clinton offers trade - and aid - to Africa,‖ March 29, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/03/98/africa/71093.stm. 349 Gribbin, 274.

101

Museveni began manipulating elections, conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea,

Rwanda and Uganda soon began another intervention in the Congo, and the Angolan civil war resumed. 350 The principles and messaging about ―Africa‘s new leaders‖ disappeared from public statements, and conflict resolution began to take precedence for Clinton‘s envoys and the bureaucracy.

Disintegrating Alliances, Invasion, and Africa’s World War

In the fall of 1997, U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda Robert E. Gribbin recalled that

Kabila had begun show signs of insubordination to the Rwandan allies. At a State Dinner in Kigali hosted by Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, Kabila publicly recognized

Rwandan assistance for the first time and parsed warnings against Rwanda's "hegemonic ambitions‖ for the Congo.351 Following this dinner, Gribbin reported hearing about increasing marginalization of Rwandan Tutsi who had been embedded in the Kabila‘s government and military. In private, Rwandan military officials began to increasingly raise the issue of cross-border insurgencies by the remaining ex-FAR and Interahamwe in eastern Congo, and Gribbin reported to Washington Rwandan that Kabila had begun collaborating with rebel Hutu forces.352

Further demonstrating defiance of his previous allies, Kabila traveled to Cuba in

July to reinvigorate connections with former Marxist allies. After these meetings, Kabila returned to the country and immediately ordered the withdrawal of all Rwandan troops from the Congo through a ―midnight communiqué‖, thanking them for their ―solidarity‖

350 Paul Omach, ―The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests,‖ African Affairs, Vol. 99 (2000), 93; Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 196. 351 Gribbin, 273. 352 Ibid, 274.

102 and the Congolese people for ―tolerating and sheltering‖ the troops.353 Kabila fired his chief of staff, Rwandan military officer James Kabarebe, and high-level Tutsi officials disappeared from Kinshasa over the next few days.354 Gribbin reported from Kigali that the Rwandan army had already planned these withdrawals for months.355

On August 2, just over a year after the end of the war that brought Kabila to power, another war began in a strikingly similar fashion. A new rebellion of Banyamulenge in eastern Congo emerged, and another ―war of liberation‖ was proclaimed.356 Not long after fighting commenced, Kabila‘s former foreign minister and former RPA Commander

General Bizimba Karaha scheduled a meeting with Ambassador Gribbin to introduce him to Wamba dia Wamba, a Congolese anti-Mobutist professor who would lead the new rebellion against Kablia. Karaha told Gribbin, ―Ambassador, we are here for another green light.‖ Taken aback by the assertive statement, Gribbin responded that the United

States had never condoned the first intervention and reiterated the priority of conflict resolution through peaceful negotiations, not war.357

Despite Gribbin‘s response, the overall silence from the United States during the rebellion led Rwanda to believe they had achieved a tacit ―green light;‖ however,

Rwanda and Uganda still publicly denied any involvement.358 The new rebel group soon formed a political entity, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), and on August 4, launched an airlift of RCD, RPA, and Ugandan troops from eastern Zaire to the Kitona army base in Bas-Congo, 150 miles away from Kinshasa. The forces

353 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 178; Agence France-Presse, ―Congo Says Foreigners Have Quit Its Army,‖ The New York Times, July 29, 1998. 354 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 198. Gribbin, 274. 355 Gribbin, 274 and Prunier, Africa’s World War, 179. 356 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 201. 357 Gribbin, 281. 358 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 201.

103 assembled thousands of ex-FAZ who had been re-trained by Rwandan officers from the

FDLR, cut of Kinshasa‘s access to the Matadi port and the Inga power plant, and advanced toward Kinshasa.359 An additional column of Rwandan forces operated within the ghettos of Kinshasa, giving arms and bribes to youths, hoping to spark a popular revolt against Kabila.360

On August 7, Kabila labeled the attacks as ―Rwandan aggression‖ that sought to

―colonize‖ Congo.361 Kabila also began to incite anti-Tutsi and anti-foreigner rhetoric to gain popular support. Enlisting help from Hutu extremists in eastern DRC, Kabila inspired public lynching of Tutsis in the streets of Kinshasa. This rhetoric helped build a

―popular defense‖ for Kabila, which RCD and RPA forces began to battle as they moved toward Kinshasa."362

Mandela began quiet efforts to organize a summit for the parties to come to a negotiated solution, but the war escalated before any parties were willing to agree to discuss resolution. At a meeting of the Southern African Development Community on

August 19, Kabila won the support of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.363 Before long

Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Namibian battalions, artillery, and vehicles arrived to defend

Kabila and Kinshasa.364 On August 23, Kisangani fell to RCD and RPA, but Zimbabwe

359 Herbert Weiss, War and peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 2000). 360 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 196-8. 361 Lynne Duke, ―Kabila Vows Reprisal Against ‗Aggression,‘‖ The Washington Post, August 7, 1998. 362 BBC News, ―Hate messages on East Congolese radio,‖ August 12, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/149901.stm. 363 Gribbin, 276. 364 Ian Steward and Ross Herbert, ―Angola and Zimbabwe unite to bomb Congo rebels,‖ The Independent (London), August 26, 1998; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Washington, DC, December 20, 2000.

104 and Angolan armies had intervened and brought fighting to a standstill. Rwandan and

Congolese rebel forces were reluctant to test the military might of these troops.365

U.S. Reactions

As soon as the fighting began, White House Spokesman P.J. Crowley told the media that ―We are in touch with several governments in the region to assess what is going on there and what we can do to prevent a widening of this situation.‖366 The State

Department showed poor understanding of the context of the fighting and partiality toward information gathered from Rwandan informants, as they told the press that ―This is an internal Congolese military rebellion, as best we can judge‖367 and called for protection of the Tutsi, an ―embattled regional minority.‖368

On August 7, terrorists launched attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania, killing 253 persons, including twelve Americans. As the rebel troops neared

Kinshasa and Congolese waived anti-American and anti-French placards, Washington evacuated embassy personnel including the Deputy Chief of Mission Roger A. Meece, twenty staff members, and six U.S. Marines, leaving only foreign nationals in charge of the grounds. This response was the strongest among diplomatic missions in Kinshasa, where other diplomats stayed to organize departures of their national staff. Troops from the United States, Britain, France, and Belgium began to position themselves around

365 Copson, 6-7. 366 Gus Constantine, ―Tutsi mutiny in Congo shatters Kabila‘s coalition: Clinton‘s concept of ‗new Africa‘ is put in jeopardy,‖ The Washington Times, August 6, 1998. 367 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 201. 368 Lynne Duke, ―Military Rebels Threaten Assault of Congo Capital; U.S. Embassy Evacuates Staff Amid Anti-Foreigner Sentiment,‖ The Washington Post, August 16, 1998.

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West Africa ―for possible intervention to rescue foreigners.‖ Two U.S. amphibious assault ships with 1,200 Marines lingered off the Congo‘s coast.369

On August 19, the State Department responded. State Spokesman James Foley told the press that, ―The United States remains concerned about the spiraling conflict in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo,‖ which ―has the potential to spin out of control, producing a long-term cycle of political fragmentation, widespread bloodshed and further regional destabilization.‖ 370 Foley continued his statement to reveal the U.S. position of stark neutrality:

―We are particularly concerned that foreign involvement may exacerbate the conflict. Countering genocide is in the national security interest of Rwanda and other countries in the region. The failure of the Congolese Government to deal with border security and citizenship for the Banyamulenge population has undermined regional security. Nevertheless, we can in no way condone or accept military intervention into Congo by Rwanda, Uganda or any other government in the region. We strongly support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo and condemn any violation of this fundamental principle.‖371

True to the pattern of delegating African problems to African leaders themselves, the

United States quickly announced support for conflict resolution efforts by Mandela: ―We support regional efforts to bring about an immediate ceasefire and to resolve the conflict peacefully.‖372 The South African government moved into action, seeking a peaceful resolution between all sides.373

369 Duke, ―Military Rebels Threaten Assault of Congo Capital.‖ 370 U.S. Department of State, ―The U.S. Supports Regional Efforts to End Congo Crisis,‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman, August 19, 1998. 371 Ibid. 372 Ibid. 373 Norimitsu Onishi, ―As Help Arrives, Congo Officials Reject Talks with Rebels,‖ The New York Times, August 21, 1998; Alex Duval Smith, ―Fearful African leaders urge ceasefire,‖ The Guardian (London), August 24, 1998.

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In private, policymakers at the time contend that they were ―not fooled‖ by

Rwanda‘s denials of participation, but believed and supported the Rwandan rationale of intervention for purposes of national security.374 Rwandan officials accused Kabila of launching another genocide against the Congolese Tutsi and supporting the ex-FAR and

Interahamwe, and U.S. State Department Spokesman James Foley said emphasized the role of ethnic conflict in the violence, citing reports that Tutsis "are being rounded up, detained, beaten, tortured and killed because of their ethnicity."375 Nevertheless, in order to counter reports of U.S. complicity in a second invasion of the Congo by Rwanda, the

White House directed the Pentagon to immediately recall the JCET Special Forces Unit in Rwanda and the Africa Crisis Response Initiative training team in Uganda.376

U.S. diplomats realized that suspicions of U.S. complicity undermined any credible role for the United States in negotiations, despite multiple public denials of involvement.377 The country had lost its credibility with the Congolese and regional actors for supporting Rwanda and Kabila from the beginning of the AFDL invasion, and

374 Gribbin, 283. 375 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 196; Gribbin, 275, 279. 376 Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Democratic Republic of Congo in crisis: hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., September 15, 1998. 377 July 28, 1999: Assistant Secretary Rice denies that the United States had ―in any fashion taken sides‖ in the DRC conflict. In interview, said she had ―in no way condoned the intervention by Rwanda and Uganda.‖ IRIN-CEA Update No. 725, July 29, 1999; In September, Special Envoy Wolpe also condemned the invasion and refuted suspicions of U.S. support for Rwandan and Ugandan escapades in Congo. Howard Wolpe, Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Lusaka Peace Accords and Beyond: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 1st sess., September 28, 1999; Ambassador Holbrooke also denied U.S. complicity before Congress. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Relations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2000.

107 thus perceived only limited opportunity to participate in ending the broadening conflict.378

Nevertheless, U.S. diplomats still engaged bilaterally and in private, questioning

Kagame and Museveni about their roles in the ―rebellion.‖ Secretary Albright herself raised U.S. concerns about Rwandan and Ugandan complicity with Kabila, Museveni,

UN Secretary and General Kofi Annan.379 Assistant Secretary Rice had discussed the conflict with Rwandan leadership, Kabila‘s ambassador, and the governments of Angola,

Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Uganda.380 The President‘s Envoy Howard Wolpe deployed to meet with leaders in Congo, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, and Angola in search of mutual grounds for a political settlement. He also reached out to non-state actors, including the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and the Mai Mai militia in eastern

Congo.381 In Kigali, Gribbin began pressing the Rwandan government for cease-fires and reinforced Mandela‘s regional efforts to assemble all parties for negotiation.382

In addition to these efforts, the Administration consulted with the Senate to make a recess appointment of the President‘s next nominee for ambassador to DRC, William

Swing. This appointment would address the gap in leadership at the post, and

Ambassador Swing and a minimal staff operated across the river in Brazzaville, the diplomats worked quickly to establish contacts with Kabila and political opponents and to secure the safety of American citizens.383

378 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 202; Prunier reported mercenary sightings by Bukavu residents who testified that U.S. mercenaries fought alongside RCD forces, just as they had in the First War alongside FDRL. Prunier, Africa’s World War, 223. 379 Susan Rice, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998. 380 Ibid. 381 Ibid. 382 Gribbin, 282-3. 383 Susan Rice, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 223.

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The United States also sought to use multilateral forums to increase pressure on all parties to the conflict. On August 31, a U.S.-prompted UN Security Council

Resolution passes and calls for a cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops from the

DRC, and highlighting an end to ethnic violence.384

Testifying before Congress, the Rwandan Ambassador to the United States denied that the Rwandans had any involvement in the rebellion.385 At the same hearing,

Assistant Secretary Susan Rice also denied U.S. involvement in the invasion. However, demonstrating the Administration‘s partiality to Rwanda and Uganda, Rice said,

―We have indicated to both Uganda and Rwanda that we fully understand their legitimate security interests in countering insurgent attacks from Congolese soil. We also share regional and international frustration with the Kinshasa government's failures with respect to both democratization and human rights.‖

At the same time, Assistant Secretary Rice still upheld the State Department‘s position of condemning the foreign involvement, stating that ―foreign intervention to topple the

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not acceptable.‖386 Her statement also confirmed the delegation of conflict resolution efforts to African leaders as she asserted that ―the United States must also emphasize and acknowledge that Africans themselves will plot their own destiny--their own path toward peace and stability.

Neither the United States nor any external actor can resolve this conflict for the people of the Congo or for the region.‖387

By the end of September, reports surfaced that troops from Chad, Libya, and

Sudan had also entered the war. The State Department maintained messaging about the

384 Gribbin, 276; Susan Rice, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998. 385 Susan Rice, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid.

109 territorial integrity of DRC, the withdrawal of foreign troops, respect for human rights and protection of civilians, pressure for cease-fires, and support for African-led problem- solving.388

In early November, Assistant Secretary Rice and Africa Director Gayle Smith from the NSC undertook a round of diplomacy with the relevant actors, demonstrating higher-level U.S. attention to resolution.389 After United States and African leaders, including Mandela, had pressed Rwanda to reveal its role in the conflict in DRC, Kagame finally admitted the presence of Rwandan forces.390

A Winding Path toward Resolution and Continued Conflict: Bureaucracy in Charge

By early July 1999, regional efforts for a negotiated resolution to the conflict began to show some success. On July 7, the United States welcomed the announcement of a cease-fire agreement between the regional Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Lusaka, Zambia hosted by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba.391 The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, disengagement of armed of military units operating in the country, the release of hostages and protection of civilians, withdrawal of foreign armed forces organized by a Joint Military Commission, a National Dialogue for

388 U.S. Department of State, ―The Congo Conflict,‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, September 22, 1998; U.S. Department of State, ―The Congo Conflict,‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, October 20, 1998; U.S. Department of State, ―Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, March 4, 1999. 389 U.S. Department of State, ―The Congo Conflict and Rwandan Troops,‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, November 6, 1998. 390 International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo. 391 U.S. Department of State, ―Peace Agreement for Congo,‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman, July 7, 1999.

110 reconciliation led by inter-Congolese political negotiations, and a UN peacekeeping force to ensure implementation.392

The State Department publicly offered U.S. assistance to UN implementation of the agreement, which began to spark concerns about U.S. support to the planned UN

Chapter VII peacekeeping mission.393 The United Nations dispatched an observer mission on July 15. When questioned by Congress on July 28, Assistant Secretary Rice said that the United States would consider peacekeeping proposals from the UN but would ―need to be confident that we have partners in the government and civil society with whom we can work.‖394 President Clinton informed the UN, Congress, and Congo that the U.S. would support peacekeeping operations when implementation of the other provisions of Lusaka had begun. A week later, the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 1258, which deployed military liaison personnel to capitals of the signatories in order to begin establishing the Joint Military Commission (JMC).395 The United States pledged $1 million to support the operations of the JMC.396

By the end of the month, the rebels had still not signed the agreement, and rifts between Rwandan and Ugandan forces soon became apparent with repeated confrontations between troops for the diamond-rich city of Kisangani. Control of resources became increasingly important to finance the fighting and Rwanda and Uganda had both profited immensely from the war. Uganda‘s diamond and gold exports grew

392 Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement, July 10, 1999, http://reliefweb.int/node/156184. 393 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo,‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, July 28, 1999. 394 IRIN-CEA Update No. 725, July 29, 1999. 395 UN Security Council Resolution 1258, August 6, 1999. 396 U.S. Department of State, ―The Congo Conflict,‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, Spokesman, October 22, 1999.

111 exponentially from 1995 to 1997.397 Rwanda‘s exports of diamonds and coltan also skyrocketed.398 The International Monetary Fund and World Bank praised Rwandan and

Ugandan increased gross domestic product, even though it resulted from illicit trade in stolen minerals.399 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other orgs raising awareness about exploitation of Congo‘s resources, including ―blood diamonds,‖

―conflict minerals,‖ and ensuing humanitarian crises.

Fighting between militias began on August 7 and continued in spurts, forcing much of the city‘s civilian population to seek refuge in the bush.400 The conflict escalated such that only after the United States facilitated a meeting between President Museveni and Vice President Kagame was a cease-fire arranged.401 Only in the last days of August did rebel leaders agree to the cease-fire, including Emile Ilunga for the Rwanda-backed

Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Wamba dia Wamba for the Uganda-backed faction of RCD faction, and Jean-Pierre Bemba for the Uganda-backed Movement for the

Liberation of the Congo (MLC).402

In September, Congress held a hearing on ―The Lusaka Peace Accords and

Beyond,‖ where Special Envoy Wolpe testified that the United States supported the regional-lead in implementation of the process. Wolpe skirted questions on Rwandan and

Ugandan illicit trade in minerals extracted from the Congo, but Albright delivered a

397 ―Africa: New Fingers on Zaire‘s Trigger,‖ Africa Confidential, May 9, 1997. International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo, 31. 398 1996-7 Rwanda‘s coltan production doubled and brought in more than $20 million per month for Rwanda and the rebels. Rwandan diamond exports rose 184-fold from 1998 to 2000. Ugandan diamond exports from 1997-8 jumped eight-fold and gold ten-fold since 1996. Dena Montague and Frida Berrigan, ―The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Who Benefits?‖ Arms Trade Resource Center, World Policy Institute, July/August 2001; Reyntjens, The Great African War, 249; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 137-40. 399 Montague and Berrigan, ―The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?‖ 400 International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo. 401 ―UPDF, RPA fight it out in Congo,‖ Monitor (Kampala), August 16, 1999, 1-2, cited in Omach, ―The African Crisis Response Initiative,‖ 81; Lyons, 33-54. 402 Copson, 1-2.

112 statement to the UN Security Council bringing attention to the economic effects of the conflict later in September and the State Department hosted an international conference with public and private partners to focus on the issue of conflict diamonds within the context of the Congo war.403 Congress renewed its interest in the conflict diamonds and dedicated a hearing to the topic in May 2000, and the State Department continued to work with multilateral partners on this issue.404

The National Dialogue had planned to commence on October 15, but on October

4, Kabila‘s government announced creation of a Constitutional Assembly that did not include the rebels, the opposition, or conditions of the Lusaka framework.405 Kabila also continued to arrest and harass opponents and only allow political activity through the single party.406 These breaches were also met with breaches of the cease-fire and renewed fighting in the Congo.407 The United States issued statements calling for respect for the previous agreement.408

UN Peacekeeping Mission to the Congo Announced and Floundered

By December, plans for a UN peacekeeping mission had still not materialized.

Disagreements between France and the United States stalled consensus, and U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke told the press that the United States was

403 U.S. Department of State, ―History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993- 2001),‖ Released by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8531.htm; Howard Jeter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Africa’s Diamonds: Precious, Perilous Too? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 2000. 404Jeter, Africa’s Diamonds: Precious, Perilous Too? 405 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 235-6. 406 House Committee on International Relations The Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Lusaka Peace Accords and Beyond: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, , U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 1st sess., September 28, 1999. 407 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 247. 408 U.S. Department of State, ―Renewed Fighting in Congo,‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, October 4, 1998.

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―dragging our feet not because we are opposed to peacekeeping in the Congo but because we don‘t want to write the DPKO [UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations] a blank cheque, we want to get it right.‖409 To more closely examine the situation, Ambassador

Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary Rice, and Special Envoy Wolpe toured the region again in early December and stressed the importance of all actors‘ commitment to the Lusaka agreement.410

In January Ambassador Holbrooke as president of the UN Security Council, declared a ―Month of Africa‖ to focus on resolving conflicts in the region. The U.S. government increased engagement with the UN to direct the drafting of Security Council

Resolution 1291, which devised the terms for deployment of the UN Secretary General‘s proposed five thousand troops in Congo. Resolution 1291 formed the first mandate for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (MONUC).411 On February 7, the State Department informed Congress of its intent to support the Resolution.412 Testifying before Congress in February, Holbrooke asserted that the Resolution contained the plan ―that the U.S. Government, including the

Pentagon, has advocated as the best approach‖ and mentioned the unusual cooperation of

Defense and State on this issue, noting Secretary of Defense William Cohen‘s unprecedented meetings with the UN in New York and African tours.413

409 IRIN Bulletin, No. 829, December 22, 1999. 410 Lyons, 33-54; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 340; IRIN-Central and Eastern Africa Update No. 822, December 14, 1999. 411 UN Security Council Resolution 1291, February 24, 2000; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo; Hartung and Moix, ―Deadly Legacy,‖ 1. 412 Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, 2000 Foreign Policy Overview and the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs Budget Request: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, United States Senate, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 8, 2000. 413 Richard C. Holbrooke, US Ambassador to the United Nations, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington DC, February 15, 2000; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo.

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Only two days after Holbrooke‘s testimony, President Clinton delivered a speech on Africa policy that specifically addressed what Secretary Albright had now deemed

―Africa‘s first world war.‖ Clinton asserted that he would fulfill his promise of supporting a peacekeeping operation now that the nations of the region had reached an agreement that the international community could support. He also emphasized, however, that this initiative emanated from African countries taking the lead.414 On

February 24, 2000 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1291, which authorized the expansion of MONUC to 5537 military personnel and civilian staff.

The President also focused attention on Africa in March through the first U.S.-

Ministerial Partnership for the 21st Century which brought together African and

American ministers and heads of agencies.415 In May, President Clinton also finally signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act into law, which had been a longstanding goal of the Administration and impetus for trying to influence the sense of Congress regarding Africa.

The End of High-Level Attention to the Conflict

Meanwhile, the State Department bureaucracy continued to push for political resolution to the conflict through a new version of the National Dialogue, the Inter-

Congolese National Dialogue led by former Botswana President Quett Masire, the Joint

Political Committee (JPC), and the Joint Military Commission.416 Special Envoy Wolpe

414 William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to Opening of National Summit on Africa, Washington, DC, February 17, 2000. 415 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k. 416 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Joint Political Committee Meeting,‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, April 10, 2000; U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Renewed Fighting in Kisangani and Equateur, Cotonou Meeting‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, June 7, 2000; U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of

115 and John Prendergast from the NSC held frequent meetings to push for the implementation of all elements of the Lusaka agreement.417

Even the bureaucracy began to suffer from even more marginalization of resources for Africa, further undermining bilateral influence in the region. The Africa

Bureau lost one Deputy Assistant Secretary position and sixty officer positions, and even remaining positions stayed hard-to-fill with more than 25 positions usually left vacant.

State was forced to rely upon special envoys to compensate for senior personnel, who risked coordination of efforts as they often eclipsed the authority of ambassadors and were inadequately integrated into higher-level decision making in the U.S. policy process, despite their symbolic status as direct emissaries of the President. USAID faced the closure of more than twelve missions in Africa, and the intelligence community continued to face reductions in resources.418 The lack of U.S. Government personnel further contributed to the lack of firsthand information and increased U.S. reliance on secondary sources for information, including other governments, private businesses, academics, non-governmental organizations, and journalists.419

Renewed fighting broke out between Rwanda and Uganda in Congo around

Kisangani in May, but this time MONUC was able to send a handful of military observers to the conflict to begin demilitarization of the town. The fighting had stranded tens of thousands of residents without food or water, and at least 60,000 fled into the bush. The continued fighting meant that parties had not upheld the Lusaka priorities with

the Congo: United States Supports UN Cease-fire Agreement for Kisangani,‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, June 9, 2000; U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: United States Supports Inter-Congolese National Dialogue,‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, August 7, 2000; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 248. 417 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance.‖ 418 Lyons, 41. 419 Frazer and Herbst, ―U.S. Investment in Security Operations in Africa,‖ 55-72.

116 regard to removal of foreign forces and disengagement, and Holbrooke traveled to the region again to plead for conditions to be met to enable larger scale MONUC deployment.420

In 2000, the State Department contributed $30.2 million to the assessments for and deployment of MONUC.421 During the following year, however, Kabila‘s government only allowed for the deployment of 224 military liaison officers and military officers by December 1, 2000. The government continued to obstruct the new Inter-

Congolese National Dialogue, and the Congolese people became increasingly frustrated with the lack of international attention to abuses.422 In August, Kabila‘s government declared two U.S. diplomats persona non-grata and Washington responded in kind.423

On August 23, Kabila unilaterally suspended all Lusaka implementation and commenced a series of attacks to repress civilians and rebel groups, to which the United States responded by sending Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer to

Kisangani and Eastern Congo to investigate. Scheffer found that widespread violence against the civilian population of the Kivus had been perpetrated by all forces in the conflict.424 These abuses sparked complaints from Congress during a hearing on U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in September and October, where members of Congress blamed the UN for not intervening sooner to disarm the combatants and

420 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Situation in Kisangani and Equateur,‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, June 1, 2000. 421 Copson, 3. 422 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: United States Supports Inter-Congolese National Dialogue,‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, June 13, 2000; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo. 423 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo Expulsion of Diplomats,‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, August 21, 2000. 424 U.S. Department of State, ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: War Crimes Investigation‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, August 29, 2000.

117 questioned whether or not the U.S. should change tactics from supporting an ineffective operation impeded by Kabila.425

In close cooperation with the United Kingdom and UN Panel of Experts, the

Administration continued to press for resolution to the issue of conflict diamonds, and in

September and October 2000 ministerial meetings in Pretoria and London to endorse the concept of creating an international certification system for rough diamonds.426

Transition to the Bush Administration: Less Tolerant Leaders

As President Clinton‘s second term came to a close, a transition team handed over efforts for peace in Congo to a new administration with the election of George W. Bush in the fall of 2000. The ongoing war and attempted peace negotiations had left a legacy of an unending cycle of violence around ethnic differences, repression, and abuses of civilians.427

On January 16, 2001, the situation in the Congo began to change dramatically after a bodyguard assassinated President Laurent Kabila. Joseph Kabila, his son, succeeded him as President.428 Kabila immediately met with Ambassador Swing and proceeded to reach out to the international community recommitting Congo to the Lusaka

Accords. In a speech on January 26, Kabila echoed international messaging perfectly as he demanded the withdrawal aggressor states, defense of the country‘s territorial

425House Committee on International Relations, United Nations Peacekeeping: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., September 20, 2000; House Subcommittee on International Relations, U.S. Policies toward U.N. Peacekeeping: Reinforcing Bipartisanship and Regaining Equilibrium: House Subcommittee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., October 11, 2000. 426 U.S. Department of State, ―History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency.‖ 427 Gribbin calls the violence in the war ―terrorism‖ because of the regular practice of indiscriminate bombings, violence against women, oppression, and deprivation of basic needs. Gribbin, 285. 428 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 249.

118 integrity, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, reviving the Lusaka accord, and liberalize economic activities. He also mentioned relations with the United States specifically, committing to renew bilateral relations through the new Bush

Administration.429

Days before the inauguration, President-Elect George W. Bush met Vice

President Kagame for the first time. The Bush Administration‘s worldview began to change in U.S.-Africa policy.430 Without the burden of guilt from Rwanda weighing on the new Administration, policy leaders acted more strongly on the rhetoric conveyed by the Clinton Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell made clear that he would not tolerate the rejection of the Lusaka Accords by its signatories, and specifically instructed the delivery of this message to Kigali. When meeting one-on-one with Kagame, Powell shocked the Rwandan leader as he delivered a clear message that Rwanda must remove its troops from Congo.431 The new Foreign Service officers that cycled into Embassy

Kigali were keenly aware of the Rwanda bias that had driven reporting and past decision- making, and immediately tried to reestablish a balanced policy.432

In response to this high-level U.S. attention and the new Kabila‘s commitment to

Lusaka, the activities of the armies froze. Joseph Kabila attended President Bush‘s

National Prayer Breakfast with Kagame in Washington and met with Colin Powell on

February 1, 2000. On February 2, he told the United Nations in New York that he was willing to begin dialogue with his political and military enemies and would be

429 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 258. 430 Ibid, 235. 431 Confidential Interview #6. 432 Rosenblum, ―Irrational Exuberance,‖ 202.

119 recommitted to the Lusaka Accords.433 Only weeks later, he announced the resumption of cooperation with Ketumile Masire, the UN appointed facilitator for the Inter-

Congolese National Dialogue. Rwanda and Uganda announced partial troop withdrawals, followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1341 which formalized the initial withdrawal of foreign troops in DRC and endorsed a new proposal for peacekeepers.434

The new Administration responded well to this signal of change, reaffirmed support for Lusaka, and requested $83.5 million for MONUC for 2002, whose authorization had been extended by Security Council Resolution 1332.435 By the time parties to the conflict signed the Sun City Agreement in 2003, most foreign troops had been removed, although observers reported continued proxy involvement and natural resource exploitation via rebel groups in eastern Congo.436 During the Bush

Administration, the initial high-level attention to the conflict in the Congo waned and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the White House became increasingly focused on global security, as demonstrated by the formation of

AFRICOM.437 With the delegation of leadership on policymaking to Congress and the

433 Renton Sheddon, and Zeilig, The Congo, 201. 434 Copson, 15. 435 Ibid, 3; Frazer and Herbst, ―U.S. Investment in Security Operations in Africa,‖ 55-72; U.S. Department of State, ―Death of President Kabila, Democratic Republic of the Congo‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, January 19, 2001; Renton, Sheddon, and Zeilig, The Congo, 201; International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo. 436 Renton, Sheddon, and Zeilig, The Congo, 201. 437 Nicolas Van De Walle, ―U.S. Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and the Obama Administration,‖ African Affairs, 109/434, 2009, 6-14; Princeton Lymon, ―US Foreign Assistance and trade policies in Africa,‖ in Cooke and Morrison (eds), Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 111-140; William Bellamy, ―Making better sense of US security engagement tin Africa,‖ in Cooke and Morrison (eds), Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years, 110-20.

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State Department, these institutions focused increasingly on activists‘ reports of the humanitarian nature of the problem, Rwandan intervention, and mineral exploitation.438

Analysis

As Kabila continued to renege on promises of democracy and economic reform and Rwanda and Uganda mounted a second invasion of Congo that resulted in Africa‘s

World War, the Great Lakes continued to represent an issue of extended crisis for U.S. policymakers. Congress continued attention to the humanitarian situation, progress of cease-fire negotiations, and inconsistencies in U.S. rhetoric for democracy and its actual support for warring authoritarian leaders. Continued loyalties of the White House and senior State Department officials with Rwanda meant that in Central Africa, the U.S. government upheld the approach of ―African solutions to African problems.‖ Accepting the inability to change the Administration‘s Rwanda bias or to solve the Congo conflict as a whole, Congress and diplomats changed their approach to address smaller components of the crisis, including human suffering and exploitation and illicit trade in natural resources.

Congress and U.S. policymakers began to lose patience for Kabila as his policies continued to ravage Congo and showed no sign of improvement. When Congo‘s

438House Committee on International Relations, Suffering and Despair: Humanitarian Crisis in the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2001; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations Report, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Weak States in Africa – U.S. Policy Options in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2002; House Committee on International Relations, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Key to the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives 108th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 2003.

121 neighbors launched a second invasion, also disguised as an internal rebellion, the United

States reacted as if the uprising represented only an extension of the ongoing crisis in

Congo. A few months after the rebellion began, Congress summoned the Administration to discuss the apparent complacency of U.S. policy in addressing the conflict and its affect on civilians, but did not take action to force change in U.S. policy.

The White House continued to rely on Rwandan direction to determine the outcome of events in the Great Lakes, as President Clinton‘s worldview continued to focus on the ―new generation of African leaders,‖ increased trade through the Africa

Growth and Opportunity Act, and ―African solutions to African problems.‖ The

President‘s visit to Africa in March 1998 seemed to launch a shift toward higher-level attention to Africa, as a delegation of this power and size had never made such an extensive tour of the continent, however this high-level attention did not translate to the plight of the Congolese and the Administration was never able to produce significant financial resources for Africa.

At the hearing, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice defended the

Administration and the State Department by citing U.S. statements condemning the invasion, the violation of Congo‘s territorial integrity, and supporting diplomatic African- led cease-fire negotiations. Marginalization of the Africa bureau within the State

Department, intelligence resources, and the Pentagon‘s continued aversion to the continent meant that officers had little resources with which to respond with more than rhetoric. Again, lower level officials in the State Department bureaucracy had to acknowledge their limited ability to change the high-level loyalties allowing the tacit

―green light‖ for the invasion, which thus resulted in continuity in U.S. policy.

122

One year after the conflict began, the Lusaka Accords brought promise for peaceful resolution, but as the fighting continued, Congress held a hearing to question inconsistencies in the Administration‘s rhetorical support for the territorial integrity of the Congo while acquiescing to foreign military intervention in Congo. Congressman

Royce noted that even the peace agreement formalized Rwanda and Uganda‘s security role in Congolese territory and argued that ―African solutions to African problems‖ should not excuse American disengagement form the conflict.439 From 1999 to 2000, the conflict continued and Representatives repeatedly raised concern for these inconsistencies in additional hearings on the conflict. Congress paid increasing attention to U.S. peacekeeping commitments for Lusaka implementation by holding hearings to discuss the reasons for intervention and to caution the Administration against it.

Congress also began to call more attention to non-government and international organization reports on civilian suffering and mineral exploitation in Congo.

In the final years of the Clinton Administration, the White House had renewed efforts to increase economic and military partnership with Africa while maintaining rhetorical enforcement of democracy and human rights priorities. Responding to the concerns of Congress, witnessing the destabilizing effects of war on the economic prospects that had been touted for eight years, and facing the end of the Administration, the White House directed one final, elevated attempted to push parties of the conflict to implement the terms of the Lusaka agreement. With U.S. Ambassador to the UN

Holbrooke‘s leadership in the UN Security Council and the President‘s announcement that the U.S. would now support a peacekeeping mission, the Pentagon began

439 Congressman Edward Royce, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Lusaka Peace Accords and Beyond: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 1st sess., September 28, 1999.

123 unprecedented work hand-in-hand with the State Department and United Nations to design the terms of engagement, which resulted in Resolution 1291.

However, in Congo, extended crisis persisted as a result of Kabila‘s perpetual defiance of the agreement prevented the successful deployment of peacekeepers beyond military observers before the end of the Clinton Administration. In accordance with the analytical framework, sustained repression of the Congolese people and instability in

Congo maintained Congress‘ attention, and Representatives called for a reevaluation of

U.S. policy toward Lusaka implementation.

Coinciding with the days leading up to the inauguration of President George W.

Bush, the assassination of Laurent Kabila and his succession by his son Joseph Kabila led to dramatic change in the Congolese government‘s approach to Lusaka implementation and was thus perceived with crisis-like attention by the U.S. government. This shift in the situation in Congo calculated a crisis for the incoming Bush Administration, whose high-level leaders saw the assassination and the new Kabila‘s openness as an opportunity to push for change. As the new Kabila courted international players including the United

States, the Bush Administration responded favorably, reaffirming support to the Lusaka process and taking stronger action to condemn the destabilizing roles played by Rwanda,

Uganda, and other remaining forces. Once high-level attention waned and the new leadership grasped the intricacy of Congo‘s problems, the White House once again delegated foreign policymaking to Congress and the bureaucracy, primarily the State

Department, who both would heed listen more and more to advocacy organizations‘ reports on the ―boutique issues‖ in the Congo Crisis, including blood diamonds and the humanitarian crisis. President Bush‘s personal predilection for health and the advocacy

124 constituency for U.S. response to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur led to further inattention to Congo and Africa policy fragmentation under the Bush Administration.440

As the years of Africa‘s World War demonstrated, without the direct attention of the White House, the rest of the national security bureaucracy, including the State

Department and intelligence agencies, floundered to effect incremental change. They failed to cope with diminished legitimacy during peace negotiations with the parties of the Congo conflict. Diplomats promoted internationally recognized standards for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and negotiated agreements, but were held hostage by the

Administration‘s unwillingness to unleash stronger sanctions against friendly states.

Thus, while the State Department still managed day-to-day relationships with interlocutors when the White House neglected the issues, the bias and worldview of the

White House prevented any forcible efforts to truly affect change on the continent.

African problems were still left to African solutions - to no avail until the Bush

Administration inaugurated a shift in Congo policy, permitted by the change in leadership in Kinshasa, refusing to accept any further intervention. However, even the new

Administration soon became bogged down by the complexities of the Congo crisis and seemingly unstoppable illicit plunder of natural resources. Support for political transition, peacekeeping, and resolution to the issues of conflict minerals and violence against women continued over the next decade, resulting in a continually fragmented approach delegated to the State Department bureaucracy, Congress, and advocacy groups.

The policymaking dynamics of the last years of the Clinton Administration and the transition to the Bush White House correlate somewhat with previously established

440 Van De Walle, 1-21.

125 patterns of foreign policy. Events in the Congo only seized the attention of the White

House at the onset of crisis and when the Administration saw public interest in becoming directly involved, such as considering whether to leave a legacy of turmoil in the heart of

Africa or to attempt a final surge for negotiations and support for peacekeeping.

126

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In comparison with expansive U.S. support for the staunch anti-communist ally

Mobutu during the Cold War, the years following the Cold War demonstrated overall significant change in U.S. relations with Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

By examining the correlation between the type of situation in Congo and the foreign policymaking institution that directed policy, this study determined the varying drivers for continuity and change at critical points of U.S. relations with Congo in the post-Cold

War era.

When Soviet global influence began to fade in 1989, the Bush Administration promoted the ―New Era‖ and unleashed diplomatic forces around the world to push for democracy where the United States had previously supported dictators for the sake of containment of communism. Lasting geopolitical interests in Zaire, however, enabled

Mobutu to benefit from continuity in U.S. Cold War policy for a couple more years. By

1991, the removal of communist influence in Angola meant that the United States had no incentive or national interest in responding to the continued deterioration of the political, human rights, and economic situation in Zaire. The Pentagon and CIA ended support for

Mobutu and UNITA, and Congress prohibited further provision of the U.S. assistance that had sustained Mobutu‘s central control of Zaire for three decades. The State

Department tried to encourage Mobutu‘s beginnings of political and economic liberalization, but the lack of resources to reward progress hindered his desire for change.

These policy decisions reaffirmed the U.S. departure from a ―special relationship‖ with

Zaire in the new post-Cold War era.

127

Without support from the United States or other donors, Mobutu‘s initial attempts at political liberalization and the loss of resources to fuel patronage networks and maintain control began to cause even more disintegration of the state. The beginning of the Clinton Administration demonstrated continuity of the previous years‘ policy toward

Zaire, and demands from Congress continued to direct U.S. relations the Mobutu regime as the U.S. recalled its ambassador and instituted a coordinated effort with the troika on visa restrictions against Mobutu and his family. When a refugee crisis precipitated after the Rwandan genocide as the former Rwandan army and Interahamwe militias fled

Rwanda, the White House ordered a limited-mission humanitarian intervention in order to prevent more criticism about U.S. non-intervention. The airlift and airdrop of supplies demonstrated the only example of White House attention to this issue in 1994. Mobutu took the opportunity to lobby for renewed international support as he conveyed his role to the United States as the distributor of aid to the refugees and won French support by protecting the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Otherwise, diplomats continued to promote incremental change for a transition to democracy in Kinshasa and viewed the refugee crisis as a distant problem.

In the following three years after the genocide, dramatic changes precipitated in the Great Lakes region and U.S. policymaking institutions responded in correlation to the type of situation. As Mobutu‘s inability to manage the refugee crisis became clear, the

White House began to act on plans developed by the State Department for a

Multinational Force to restore order on the eastern Zairian border with Rwanda. White

House perceptions of Mobutu‘s incompetence initiated internal discussions about how to replace him, but the bureaucracy was unable to provide realistic alternative options to his

128 rule, and Mobutu himself began to promote the ―Mobutu or chaos‖ theory, sensing his own marginalized utility once again. When the Rwanda and Ugandan-supported rebellion began in eastern Zaire, seeming to solve the refugee crisis, the U.S. policymakers‘ sense of urgency to respond diminished, and in response the White House delegated African problems to regional leaders and left the State Department to return to routine maintenance of relationships. However, the White House did not anticipate that their inattention to the subsequent events would result in the overthrow of Mobutu, which constituted another crisis to which the White House would have responded during Cold

War times, but which was delegated to high-level diplomats to negotiate. U.S. policy institutions united behind a front of neutrality to allow the invasion while negotiating to ensure minimal bloodshed.

With Kabila in power, Congress called on the President to address human rights abuses and alleged massacres that had occurred during his advance across the country.

Facing this pressure from Congress, the White House and bureaucracy did not request waivers for bilateral assistance that could have encouraged progress in Congo, contributing to the missed opportunity to encourage Kabila toward democratic governance. Thus, dramatic change occurred in Congo without corresponding proactive support from the White House or Congress. However, high-level support for the external actors in the invasion and inaction to prevent their intervention had the same effect of causing a significant change in U.S. policy.

Despite the Administration‘s high hopes for Kabila in Congo, the situation in

Congo continued to disintegrate. Kabila‘s rogue antics caused his previous allies to abandon him and mount another effort to install a stable leader in Congo. The reactions

129 of the United States to the second invasion demonstrate that the conflict was perceived as only an extension of ongoing instability. The White House continued to delegate attention to Congo to the State Department and Congress, both of which struggled to effect change. Diplomats faced the challenge of diminished legitimacy in peace negotiations and were left with only the ability to promote international standards for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the terms of negotiated agreements. The

Administration‘s unwillingness to unleash stronger sanctions against its African allies thus continued to allow for only incremental change.

When progress had begun to be made and the Clinton Administration neared its final months, the President announced that the terms had been met for U.S. deployment of peacekeepers. However, the extended crisis situation on the ground continued to prohibit deployment of active forces until the subsequent Administration.

African problems had still been left to African solutions, but without much progress until high-level leadership in the new Bush Administration inaugurated a shift in

Congo policy. The Secretary of State made clear to Kagame that the United States would no longer tolerate further intervention, and the change of leadership after the assassination of Laurent Kabila helped to break the deadlock in implementation of the political and military components of the Lusaka Accords. However, the intricacy of the

Congo crisis meant that soon even the new Administration delegated policymaking to

Congress, the national security bureaucracy, and advocacy groups. Realizing their inability to affect resolution of the conflict, the State Department undertook priorities of support for political transition, peacekeeping, and resolution to the issues of conflict minerals and violence against women continued over the next decade. The fragmented

130 approach of addressing these issues resulted in an increasingly non-comprehensive policy.

The patterns that have emerged from the variables in this analysis confirm that

U.S. foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War period followed the same or similar correlations as during the Cold War: routine situations managed by bureaucratic politics, crisis situations dominated by presidential politics, and extended crisis situations attracting the attention of domestic politics and Congressional involvement. U.S. policy managed by agencies of the national security bureaucracy resulted in continuity in policy or incremental change, whereas Presidential and Congressional attention to crisis and extended crisis often brought dramatic change.

However, unlike policymaking dynamics during the Cold War, the CIA and

Pentagon played diminished roles in the bureaucratic management of relations with

Congo after the strategic importance of Congo for the containment of communism waned. In the post-Cold War period, the Department of Defense only engaged in planning for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations in Congo only after receiving concrete directions from the White House. During the Cold War, the CIA and military regularly engaged the Zairian army through training and material support. This pattern demonstrates the lingering effects of ―Somalia syndrome‖ on the U.S. military.

Furthermore, the high-level loyalties to Rwanda during the Clinton

Administration created a new policymaking dynamic in which ―Rwanda syndrome‖ and the previous guilt of non-intervention allowed the new government of Rwanda to manipulate the United States in the same way that Mobutu had manipulated U.S. policymakers during the Cold War. The unceasing, tacit ―green light‖ given to Vice

131

President Kagame and the RPA mirrored the blind eye that the United States turned to misgivings about Mobutu during his three decades of rule. Kabila in Congo, on the other hand, received unusually harsh attention from the Administration and Congress for allegations of human rights abuses and repression, which policymakers have noted served as disincentive for him to acquiesce to U.S. demands. Meanwhile, policymakers knew that they would have no hope of reestablishing assistance to Congo without marked improvement in these areas. Thus, Kabila suffered from a disjointed policy of U.S. desire to assist Congo with political transition and military disengagement with a prohibitively critical eye for violations.

The Bush Administration began to reverse the biased policy toward Rwanda and fortunately never faced the difficulties of working with Joseph Kabila‘s father.

Nevertheless, the determination of external actors to remain involved in exploitation of

Congo‘s resources through proxy forces meant that eastern Congo still continues to suffer from instability and humanitarian crisis.

The complexity of conflict in Congo, even as the war ended in 2003 and elections took place in 2006 and 2011, has led to continued fragmentation of policy. Spurred by extended crises in many areas of Africa, U.S. Africa policy has been largely led by

Congressional and advocacy groups‘ interests. This fragmentation led Congress and policymakers in the bureaucracy to focus on ―boutique issues,‖ such as mineral exploitation and human suffering, especially violence against women, and regional efforts through the lens of Bush‘s grand strategy for a ―war on terror.‖

Thus while post-Cold War U.S. policy toward Congo followed the same policymaking processes as during the Cold War; however, the removal of bilateral

132 assistance by Congress, shifting alliances led by the White House, and marginalization of

Africa policy within the bureaucracy led to the abandonment of the Congolese state as a priority for the United States. Instead, the absence of a comprehensive strategy and resources to address the ongoing instability in Congo has led to fragmentation of policy priorities and has not contributed to the resolution of conflict.

Many questions remain unanswered about how alternate foreign policy decisions could have resulted in a vastly different chain of events. Scholars agree that the war that continues to wreak havoc in many parts of Congo emanated from an improper resolution to the refugee crisis following the genocide in Rwanda. If the United States had accepted a more interventionist approach toward the refugee crisis, it could have directly implemented or at least overseen the disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, thereby eliminating the security risk to Rwanda and the need for Rwandan intervention in eastern Congo. If the United States still preferred multilateral intervention, it could have worked more quickly to deploy and maintain a Multinational Force or UN peacekeepers with a Chapter VII mandate to address the issue.

Removing the possibility of direct intervention, given the attitude of Congress and the American public after the disaster in Somalia, consider if the United States had maintained ambassador-level leadership at the embassy in Kinshasa and sustained military training for the Zairian army throughout the crisis periods. Might U.S. policymakers have been in a better position to enforce the accountability of the Zairian army in disarming the militias themselves without requiring any direct U.S. intervention at all? Even if the refugee issue persisted, if the United States had intervened to protect

133 the Mobutu regime, might the burgeoning civil society and weakening central power have generated organic and sustainable democracy in Zaire?

If these scenarios had unfolded differently, a decade-long war involving countries from across the African continent that resulted in more than five million deaths and lasting insecurity in eastern Zaire might have been prevented. However, as the evidence in this study has shown, crisis situations that garner the attention of the President are usually and inextricably linked to U.S. domestic or national security priorities, and unless these priorities or a personal predilection for attention to the issue exists, dramatic change in U.S. policy as suggested in the above hypothetical situations would not have resulted.

Extended crises, such as the usual state of Congo in much of the post-Cold War era, can allow Congress to make policy decisions with America‘s best interests in mind, but that can have serious unintended consequences. In 1991, Congress suspended bilateral assistance to Zaire in the best interest of the American taxpayers whose millions of dollars had gone to sustain a corrupt dictator. However, these resources that had been used to maintain stability in Zaire dried up as soon as Mobutu had begun to make positive political change, leaving him severely disempowered and causing him to revert back to oppressive methods of control rather than enabling the United States and other donors to wean his regime from foreign assistance. Sustained Congressional attention to the issue of conflict minerals in eastern Congo provides a current example of such unintended consequences, as 2010 legislation meant to address civilian suffering from the effects of illicit trade in minerals has now resulted in mass unemployment for Congolese artisan

134 miners, hesitance of U.S. corporations to access needed minerals, and the loss of market access to Chinese competitors.441

While a foreign policy backwater for the White House still today, Congo still represents a country of interest to the United States, as demonstrated by the amount of

Congressional attention and the personal predilection of high-level policymakers including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. However, Congo continues to represent such a multi-faceted array of problems and extended crisis that as a recent U.S.

Ambassador to DRC said, ―no one wants to try to understand the whole thing... There are terrible problems and no one feels able to approach them comprehensively, so they pick one at a time to make it seem more manageable.‖442 Another Ambassador to DRC who served in Kinshasa both during and after the Cold War noted, that ―Now, you almost miss

Mobutu during the Cold War when mass campaigns of murder and rape didn‘t happen when he was the strong man.‖443

Continued analysis is needed for to critically examine the precise situational, leadership, and power dynamics that influenced policy decisions leading to continuity or change during the remainder of the Bush Administration, taking into account the

Administration‘s worldview of anti-terrorism, and the Obama Administration, noting particularly the similarities and differences in policy that have resulted from the reappearance of the same personalities that favored regional delegation to Rwanda during the Clinton Administration, including Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice.

441 Center for Global Development, ―What‘s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy - Working Paper 284,‖ January 5, 2012; ―The Dodd Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail,‖ Economist, February 19, 2012. 442 Interview with Daniel Simpson. 443 Confidential Interview with former Ambassador to Zaire/DRC, April 6, 2012.

135

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Interview with William C. Harrop, August 24, 1993, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html.

Interview with Melissa Foelsch Wells, May 4 1995, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Women Ambassadors Series, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html.

Lake, Anthony, Remarks at Press Conference at USIS. Kigali, Rwanda, December 16, 1994, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/166108.pdf.

Lake, Anthony. Remarks at the Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon, Washington, DC, May 3, 1993, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19930503.html.

U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing, Kenneth H. Bacon, November 14, 1996, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=718.

U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, 1981, 1990, and 1997 editions.

U.S. Department of Defense, ―Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, 1994 - August 1997,‖ June 16, 1998, www.dod.gov/pubs/rwanda/summary.html.

U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: Office for International Security Affairs, 1995).

U.S. Department of State.―The Congo Conflict.‖ Press Statements by James P. Rubin and James B. Foley, September 22, 1998; October 20, 1998; October 22, 1999.

U.S. Department of State. Correspondence in response to a letter from Representative Christopher Smith to the President, August 28, 1997.

141

U.S. Department of State. Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, September 30, 1991; January 29, 1993; #185, Nicholas Burns, November 15, 1996; #182, Glyn Davies, John Shattuck, November 12, 1996; #41, Nicholas Burns, March 19, 1997.

U.S. Department of State. ―Death of President Kabila, Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, January 19, 2001.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Expulsion of Diplomats.‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, August 21, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Joint Political Committee Meeting.‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, April 10, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Renewed Fighting in Kisangani and Equateur, Cotonou Meeting.‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, June 7, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: Situation in Kisangani and Equateur.‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, June 1, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: United States Supports Inter-Congolese National Dialogue.‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker and Richard Boucher, June 13, 2000; August 7, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: United States Supports UN Cease-fire Agreement for Kisangani.‖ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, June 9, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. ―Democratic Republic of the Congo: War Crimes Investigation.‖ Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, August 29, 2000.

U.S. Department of State. Dispatch. U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government, Statement by the President. Washington, DC, May 24, 1993, www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-13186717/humanitarian-crisis-sudan- assistant.html.

U.S. Department of State. ―History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001).‖ Released by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8531.htm.

U.S. Department of State. ―Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, March 4, 1999.

142

U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Report, 1990.

U.S. Department of State. Press Statement by Nicholas Burns, Spokesman, March 14, 1997.

U.S. Department of State. ―Renewed Fighting in Congo.‖ Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, October 4, 1998.

U.S. Department of State. ―The U.S. Supports Regional Efforts to End Congo Crisis.‖ Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman, August 19, 1998.

White House. Action Memorandum from Anthony Lake to the President to Authorize the Drawdown of $75 million in Defense articles and services for the purpose of providing disaster relief in and around Rwanda, correcting technical errors and having not consulted Congress for the July 22 version previously signed by the President, Accessed through the Rwanda Documents Project at www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/collect/usdocs/index/assoc/HASH4a38/ ef43012.dir/2936.pdf.

White House. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a Report on the United States Participation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire – Received in the United States House of Representatives December 3, 1996.

White House. Daily Press Briefing, Press Secretary Mike McCurry, November 13, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48843#axzz1syCyIhwi.

White House. Daily Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, November 14, 1996, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48844#axzz1syCyIhwi

White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. George H. W. Bush. March 1990.

White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. George H. W. Bush. August 1991.

White House. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. William J. Clinton, July 1994.

White House. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, William J. Clinton, February 1995.

White House. Presidential Decision Directive 25. May 3, 1994, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm.

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White House. Presidential Determination 94-38 to Authorize the Furnishing of Supplies and Services in Support of Efforts to Care for Refugees from Rwanda, President William J. Clinton, July 22, 1994.

White House. Presidential Determination 94-44 to Authorize the Drawdown of Defense Stocks and Services for Disaster Assistance for Rwanda, President William J. Clinton, August 22, 1994.

Congressional Records

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Africa’s Diamonds: Precious, Perilous Too? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 2000.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Key to the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 2003

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Lusaka Peace Accords and Beyond: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess., September 28, 1999.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. The Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., May 5, 1998.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Markup of H. Con. Res. 142 and bloody hands: foreign support for Liberian warlords: Markup and Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., June 26, 1996.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Relations, House Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2000.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Suffering and Despair: Humanitarian Crisis in the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights in the Committee of International Relations, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2001.

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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. United Nations Peacekeeping: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., September 20, 2000.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. U.S. Policies toward U.N. Peacekeeping: Reinforcing Bipartisanship and Regaining Equilibrium: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., October 11, 2000.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Zaire: Collapse of an African Giant? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 1997.

U.S. Congress. House. Concerning democracy for Zaire. HR 128. 103rd Cong., 1st sess.

U.S. Congress. House. House Resolution Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to the promotion of democracy and civil society in Zaire. HR 399. 104th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1996.

U.S. Congress. House. HR 238. 102nd Congress, November 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 2000 Foreign Policy Overview and the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs Budget Request: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 8, 2000.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1998.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Emergency situation in Zaire and Somalia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 1992.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in Zaire: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Policy toward Liberia, Togo, and Zaire: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 1993.

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U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Weak States in Africa U.S. Policy Options in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2002.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Legislative Day of June 26, 1990, 15619.

U.S. Congress. Senate. SR 80, 102nd Congress, November 1991.

Newspaper Articles and Other Periodicals

―Africa after Clinton: Happiness in the Bush.‖ Economist, April 2, 1998, http://www.economist.com/node/361209.

―After Rwandan Terror, Albright Promises Greater Vigilance,‖ The New York Times, December 10, 1997.

―An American in Africa,‖ East African (Nairobi), October 14-20, 1996.

―Clinton offers trade - and aid - to Africa,‖ BBC Special Report, March 29, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/03/98/africa/71093.stm.

―Congo Opposition Leader Arrested in Kinshasa,‖ The New York Times, February 13, 1998.

"Evidence Mounts of Mass Killings by Kabila's Forces in Congo," International Herald Tribune, June 12, 1997.

―French Troops Enter Zaire; 45 Reported Killed in Riots,‖ The New York Times, January 30, 1993.

―Gloomy U.S. Envoy Departs for Congo,‖ The New York Times, October 24, 1997.

―Mandela, de Klerk win praise: Clinton says agreement paves way for democracy,‖ The Milwaukee Sentinal, September 9, 1993.

―Ms. Albright‘s Awkward African Tour,‖ The New York Times, December 17, 1997.

―The Dodd Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail,‖ Economist, February 19, 2012.

―To Back Reform, Envoy Is Named to Zaire,‖ The New York Times, June 17, 1995.

―U.S. Bluntly Tells Zairian President to Yield,‖ New York Times, July 22, 1993.

146

―Why Bankroll Africa's Ceausescu?‖ Op-ed in The New York Times, April 21, 1990.

Apple, Jr., R. W. ―U.S. Influence Over Zaire Now Appears to be Limited,‖ The New York Times, May 17, 1997.

Bonners, Raymond. ―With French Exit Near, Rwandans Fear the Day,‖ The New York Times, August 9, 1994;

Brummer, Stefaans. ―Business at War for Zaire‘s Wealth,‖ Mail and Guardian, April 25, 1997.

Claiborne, William. ―Mobutu Refurbishing Image Tainted by Corruption Charge,‖ Washington Post, June 30, 1989.

Constantine, Gus. ―Tutsi mutiny in Congo shatters Kabila‘s coalition: Clinton‘s concept of ‗new Africa‘ is put in jeopardy,‖ The Washington Times, August 6, 1998.

Crauss, Clifford. ―U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire, Setting Off a Policy Debate,‖ The New York Times, November 4, 1990.

Crossette, Barbara. ―October 5-11: New Regime, New Massacres,‖ The New York Times, October 12, 1997;

Crossette, Barbara. ―Sentiment Grows in Washington for Shift in U.S. Zaire Policy,‖ The New York Times, November 13, 1991.

Duke, Lynne. ―Military Rebels Threaten Assault of Congo Capital; U.S. Embassy Evacuates Staff amid Anti-Foreigner Sentiment,‖ The Washington Post, August 16, 1998.

Duke, Lynne ―U.S. Faces Surprise, Dilemma in Africa,‖ The Washington Post, July 14, 1998, A01.

French, Howard W. ―Albright in Africa: The Embraceable Regimes? A curious pro democracy tour where power was won by the gun,‖ The New York Times, December 16, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―Ending a Chapter, Mobutu Cremates Rwanda Ally,‖ The New York Times, May 16, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―France Fears U.S. Advance in Africa,‖ The New York Times, April 4, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―On Visit to Congo, Albright Praises the New Leader: Washington supports Kabila despite human rights complaints in Congo,‖ The New York Times, December 13, 1997.

147

French, Howard W. ―Mobutu‘s Son Lingers, Reportedly Settling Scores,‖ The New York Times, May 18, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―Refugees from Congo Give Vivid Accounts of Killings,‖ The New York Times, September 23, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―U.S. Weighs Sending Ambassador to Zaire, a Dictator's Fief,‖ The New York Times, October 25, 1994.

French, Howard W. ―Zaire's Military Reported to Arm Rwandan Exiles to Fight Rebels,‖ The New York Times, February 19, 1997.

French, Howard W. ―Zairian President is Ready to Quit, U.S. Diplomats Say,‖ The New York Times, May 4, 1997.

Gordon, Chris. ―Kabila Dumps De Beers,‖ Business Mail, May 2, 1997.

Gourevitch, Philip. ―Continental Shift: A Letter from the Congo,‖ New Yorker, August 4, 1997.

Gray, Jerry. ―The Rwanda Disaster: Relief, U.S. Aid Airdrop Off to Ragged Start,‖ The New York Times, July 25, 1994.

Greenhouse, Stephen. ―U.S. Trying New Tactic with Zaire,‖ New York Times, November 8, 1995, 3.

Harris, John F. and Lynne Duke, ―Clinton Seeks to Change African Views,‖ The Washington Post, March 22, 1998, A01.

Henry, Neil. ―France, Belgium Send Troops to Zaire,‖ Washington Post, September 25, 1991, A19.

Hostetler, A.J. ―Mandela, De Klerk Accept Liberty Medal from Clinton,‖ Associated Press, July 5, 1993.

Lewis, Neil A. ―Rights Group Blames Rwandans In Attacks on Civilians in Congo,‖ The New York Times, July 17, 1997;

Lippman, Thomas. "Seeking US Visa, Mobutu Enlists Friends," International Herald Tribune, August 7, 1995

Little, Allan. ―Hope and retribution in Zaire,‖ BBC News, 24 May 1997.

Lorch, Donatella. ―U.N. Denies It Is Seeking Somali Clan Leader's Arrest,‖ The New York Times, June 19, 1993.

148

Mamdani, Mahmood. ―Why Rwanda admitted to its role in Zaire,‖ Mail and Guardian (South Africa), August 8, 1997.

McGreal, Chris. ―Beyond Despair,‖ The Guardian, July 26, 1994.

McKinley, James C. ―Kabila Bans Party Activity in Kinshasa,‖ The New York Times, May 27, 1997.

McKinley, James C. ―Mobutu‘s Nemesis Keeps His Plans to Himself,‖ The New York Times, April 1, 1997.

McKinley, James C. and Howard W. French, ―Hidden Horrors: A special report: Uncovering the Guilty Footprints along Zaire's Long Trail of Death,‖ The New York Times, November 14, 1997.

Myers, Steve L. ―U.S. Accepts Kabila, but Cautions on Democracy,‖ The New York Times, May 20, 1997, A9.

Noble, Kenneth B. ―Zaire‘s Rich Mines are Abandoned to Scavengers,‖ The New York Times, February 21, 1994.

Onishi, Norimitsu. ―As Help Arrives, Congo Officials Reject Talks with Rebels,‖ The New York Times, August 21, 1998.

Ottoway, David B. ―US Hails Angolan Talks as ‗Watershed,‖ Washington Post, June 24, 1989, A18, A22.

Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), ―US Plans Zaire Mission,‖ November 13, 1996, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/november96/zaire_12-13.html.

Pear, Robert. ―Mobutu, On Visit, Lauded and Chided,‖ The New York Times, June 30, 1989.

Pomfret, John. ―Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo,‖ Washington Post, July 9, 1997.

Pound, Edward T. ―Congo Drums: With Dictators Falling, Zaire‘s Mobutu Hires Lobbyists to Make Sure He Retains American Aid,‖ Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1990.

Prunier, Gérard. ―Sudan‘s Regional War,‖ Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1997.

Rupert, James. ―Zairian City Falls; Leader Sacks Rival,‖ The Washington Post, April 10, 1997.

149

Smith, Alex D. ―Fearful African leaders urge ceasefire,‖ The Guardian (London), August 24, 1998.

Steward, Ian and Ross Herbert. ―Angola and Zimbabwe unite to bomb Congo rebels,‖ The Independent (London), August 26, 1998.

Warlick, Nancy H. ―Mobutu Oppression in Zaire Must End,‖ Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, March 20, 1993.

Personal Interviews

Confidential Interview with senior State Department Official #1, conducted in Washington, DC, November 10, 2011.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #2, conducted in Washington, DC, December 7, 2011.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #3, conducted via telephone, March 13, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #4, conducted via telephone, March 17, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #5, conducted via telephone, March 19, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #6, conducted in Washington, DC, March 22, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #7, conducted in Washington, DC, March 22, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #8, conducted in Washington, DC, March 23, 2012.

Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #12, conducted via telephone, April 6, 2012.

Confidential Interview with senior State Department Official #13, conducted in Washington, DC, April 9, 2012.

Confidential Interview with senior State Department Official #14, conducted in Washington, DC, May, 2012

150

Interview with Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration, conducted via telephone, March 27, 2012

Interview with Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 1989 1993, conducted in Washington, DC, March 22, 2012.

Interview with William Harrop, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire, 1987-1991 conducted via telephone, April 6, 2012

Interview with George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 1993- 1997, conducted in Washington, DC, March 23, 2012.

Interview with Peter Rosenblum, policy analyst and human rights advocate at Columbia University, conducted via telephone, March 9 and 12, 2012.

Interview with Daniel H. Simpson, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire 1995-1998, conducted via telephone, March 17, 2012.

Reports

Africa Confidential. 35, no. 23. December 16, 1994.

Africa Confidential. 38, no. 10. May, 9 1997.

―Africa: New Fingers on Zaire‘s Trigger.‖ Africa Confidential, May 9, 1997.

―Arms against a sea of troubles.‖ Africa Confidential 27, 23 (1996), 1.

Amnesty International, DRC: Civil Liberties Denied, Washington, DC, February 1998, www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/016/1998/en/bf05f42b-dabf-11dd- 80bc-797022e51902/afr620161998en.pdf.

Center for Global Development, ―What‘s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy - Working Paper 284,‖ January 5, 2012.

Barouski, David. ―Laurent Nkundabatware, His Rwandan Allies, and the Ex-ANC Mutiny: Chronic Barriers to Lasting Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ February 13, 2007, www.ias.uni-bayreuth.de/resources/ africa_discussion_forum/07-08_ws/LKandexANC.pdf.

Garretón, Roberto. ―Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.‖ submitted by the Special Rapporteur in accordance with UN Human Rights Commission resolution 1998/61, August 2010.

151

Human Rights Watch, ―Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa.‖ 10, no. 1(A). March 1998. www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/africa/africlin.htm.

Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, October 1997.

Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92.

Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993 – Zaire, January 1, 1993, http://unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca62c.html.

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k.

Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

International Crisis Group. Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War. Washington, DC, December 20, 2000.

International Rescue Committee. ―Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an Ongoing Crisis,‖ 2007.

IRIN Bulletin, no. 33. November 20, 1996.

IRIN Bulletin, no. 130. March 18, 1997.

IRIN Bulletin, no. 829, December 22, 1999.

IRIN- Central and Eastern Africa Update no. 725, July 29, 1999.

IRIN-Central and Eastern Africa Update no. 822, December 14, 1999.

Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations Report, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ―Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,‖ English translation, August 2010, First Congo War, 70-150.

UN Security Council Resolution 918, May 17, 1994.

UN Security Council Resolution 1011, August, 16, 1995.

152

UN Security Council Resolution 1078, November 9, 1996.

UN Security Council Resolution 1258, August 6, 1999.

UN Security Council Resolution 1291, February 24, 2000.

153