Continuity and Change in U.S.-Congo Relations: A critical analysis of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire-Democratic Republic of Congo by Annelisa Lindsay B.A. May 2009, The George Washington University A Thesis submitted to The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts May 20, 2012 Thesis Directed by Paul D. Williams Associate Professor of International Affairs © Copyright 2012 by Annelisa Lindsay All rights reserved ii Abstract Continuity and Change in U.S.-Congo Relations: A critical analysis of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire-Democratic Republic of Congo At the end of the Cold War, a shifting global political climate began to change U.S. foreign policy. U.S. policymakers soon realized that the United States no longer needed to compete with the Soviet Union for influence around the world. New policy priorities took the place of competition in proxy wars, which meant that Africa began to suffer from declining geostrategic importance. Zaire, which had shared a ―special relationship‖ with the United States during the Cold War, was not exempt from the growing malaise in U.S. Africa policy. This study seeks to analyze the continuity or change in U.S. policy toward Zaire, now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in the post-Cold War era by examining how different foreign policymaking institutions (White House, Congress, national security bureaucracy) directed the decision-making process to influence situations (routine, crisis, extended crisis) in U.S.-Congo relations from 1989 to 2003. Historically, U.S. policy toward Africa has followed three specific patterns: routine situations correlating with bureaucratic decision-making, crisis situations with presidential direction, and extended crisis situations with domestic politics and Congressional involvement. This study reveals that while post-Cold War U.S. policymaking toward Congo followed the same patterns, the removal of bilateral assistance by Congress, shifting alliances led by the White House, and marginalization of Africa policy within the bureaucracy led to the abandonment of the Congolese state as a priority for the United States. Instead, the absence of a comprehensive strategy and iii resources to address the ongoing instability in Congo has led to the fragmentation of policy and has not contributed to the resolution of conflict in the country. iv Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...…iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….vi List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………….....vii Chapter 1: Introduction….……………………………………………………………......1 Chapter 2: The Bush Years and the Waning of Mobutu, 1989-1992…………………....10 Chapter 3: Clinton: New Relations with Africa, 1993-1994…………………………….32 Chapter 4: Green Light to Rwanda and the Boot to Mobutu, 1994-1997……………….58 Chapter 5: Africa‘s World War and U.S. Non-Intervention, 1998-2003………………..96 Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..127 References………………………………………………………………………….…...136 v List of Figures Figure 1: Peter Schraeder‘s Table of Patterns and Processes in U.S. Africa Policy……..9 vi List of Abbreviations ACRF African Crisis Response Force ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act AMF American Mine Fields CIA Central Intelligence Agency DART Disaster Assistance Response Team DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DOD Department of Defense DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo DSP Division Spéciale Présidentielle FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises FAZ Forces Armées Zairoises IMF International Monetary Fund JCET Joint/Combined Exchange Training JMC Joint Military Commission JPC Joint Political Committee MPLA People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola MLC Movement for the Liberation of the Congo MNF Multinational Force vii MONUC United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NGO Non-governmental Organization NSC National Security Council NSS National Security Staff OAU Organization of African Unity OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID) PRP Party of the Populist Revolution RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front SADC Southern Africa Development Communicy SOCEUR U.S. Special Operations Command Europe UDPS Union for Democracy and Social Progress UN United Nations UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNSC United Nations Security Council USAID U.S. Agency for International Development viii Chapter 1: Introduction At the end of the Cold War, a shifting global political climate began to change U.S. foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. policymakers realized that the United States no longer needed to compete with the Soviet Union for influence around the world. New policy priorities took the place of competition in proxy wars, which meant that Africa began to suffer from declining geostrategic importance. Zaire was not exempt from the growing malaise in Africa policy, and the world soon began to see a shift in the ―special relationship‖ that it had shared with the United States during the Cold War. This study seeks to assess which foreign policymaking institutions led the decision-making process that led to continuity or change in U.S. foreign policy toward Zaire in the post- Cold War era. Cold War U.S. Relations with Congo In 1960, following independence from Belgium, Congo became of great priority for the United States and other Western powers. America had long viewed the great country in the heart of the continent as the ―prize of Africa,‖ notably for its size, location, and resources. With its central location providing easy access to most of Southern Africa and its wealth in natural resources, especially minerals for weapons production, Congo held great strategic value, and the United States invested much in Congo to defend against falling into the hands of communists.1 1 Memorandum From the Chief of the U.S. Military Technical Advisory Team (Rockwell) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Mulcahy), Washington, March 7, 1975, National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1975, 820143-2376; Confidential Interview with former State Department 1 For this reason, the ―special relationship‖ with Congo developed, and the United States offered repeated interventions for the sake of stability, the containment of communism, and the furthering of strategic business interests in Central Africa. Beginning with the Congo Crisis of 1960, the United States and other Western governments sought to restore stability through military intervention, an effort that included the deployment of the first United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo. The United States also sought to maintain pro-Western leadership in the rich African state, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified and initiated bolstering financial and political support for Army General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu as an ally against communism and the popular Marxist leader Patrice Lumumba. With U.S. support, Mobutu‘s influence in Congo grew in the early 1960s, and by 1965 he seized central control of Congo and renamed the country Zaire. While in power during the Cold War, Mobutu played the role of staunch anti- communist ally, providing regional support for U.S. proxy operations and refusing Soviet and Cuban access to Zaire‘s resources. In return for his support, the United States regularly responded to threats of communist intervention in Zaire, the ideological nature of which Mobutu sometimes overplayed to manipulate donors for more resources. Additional interventions included U.S. complicity in the removal of Lumumba in 1960, secessionist uprisings in Katanga between 1960 and 1963, humanitarian missions during the hostage crisis of 1964, and defense against invasions of Shaba province in 1977 and 1978. By the time Mobutu finally left Zaire in 1997, the United States had delivered Official #5, March 19, 2012; Confidential Interview with former State Department Official #6, March 22, 2012. 2 more than $300 million in military material and had trained more than one thousand Zairian soldiers.2 The United States further supported Mobutu and the state of Zaire through an inflow of capital through private, public, and covert means. These resources helped Mobutu maintain extensive patronage networks that ensured his control over Zaire, a country nearly one-fourth the size of the United States with dozens of ethnic groups and over two hundred spoken languages. In exchange, American businesses benefited from preferred access to almost every sector of the Zairian economy, especially valuable minerals including copper and cobalt.3 Scholars have marveled at the ―special relationship‖ between the United States and Zaire characterized by such support for the regime. In contrast, members of Congress and human rights groups have criticized this relationship because of its tolerance for and contributions to corruption and economic mismanagement in Zaire. By the end of 1990, Zaire owed international creditors more than $10 billion in debt, half of which remained amassed in Mobutu‘s personal fortune.4 Nevertheless, between 1976 and 1990, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), under pressure from the United States authorized fourteen stabilization programs for Zaire.5 Mobutu, not