Ambassador Malcolm Toon
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The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR MALCOLM TOON Interviewed by: Dr. Henry E. Mattox Initial interview date: June 9, 1989 Copyrig t 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Childhood and orld ar II experience Khrushchev and Kennedy Israel 1975-1976 Appointment Kissinger+s policy to,ards Israel Press conferences -enachem Begin Top Israeli Officials ..S. attitude to,ards -iddle 0ast -osco, 1976-1979 Pro1lems ,it appointment Carter+s decision to keep Toon as am1assador Br2e2inski and 3ance Bre2hnev ..S.-Soviet relations 4eorge Kennan Thomas atson+s appointment Conclusion Accomplishments Foreign Service as a career INTERVIEW $: Ambassador Toon, let me start off t is one, as I do on occasion, by as)ing you ow it was t at you came to be interested in a Foreign Service career. 1 TOON6 ell, I think primarily because I8m a first-generation American. -y mother and father ,ere graduates of 0llis Island. They came from Scotland in 1912, I think it ,as. And then ,e ,ent back to Scotland ,hen I ,as six years old. I started my schooling over there, primarily because my folks discovered that things ,ere a little bit tougher here than they had anticipated. So the plan ,as to move back completely, but then they discovered things ,ere even tougher back there, so they came back to this country. But ,hile I ,as there--and I ,as a very young person--I traveled :uite a bit ,ith my family and became interested in foreign cultures and languages. Then I started my schooling at Tufts .niversity, and my interest in becoming a career diplomat intensified at that time. I passed my Foreign Service examinations just prior to orld ar II, but decided that it ,as not really accepta1le to go into the diplomatic service ,hen ,e ,ere at ,ar. So I ,ent into the Navy for five years, mostly as a PT boat Skipper in the south and south,est Pacific and then joined the diplomatic service right after orld ar II ,hen I ,as demo1ili2ed. At that time, unless you ,ere a complete idiot, you had to recogni2e that the real pro1lem of the post- orld ar period ,as going to be the Soviet .nion. So after I joined the diplomatic service, I :uickly opted for the Soviet specialist program and then ,ound up, as you kno,, as am1assador in -osco,. $: Did you ever ave occasion to run into t at ot er famous PT boat s)ipper in t e Sout Pacific, TOON6 You mean Jack Kennedy? $: -es. TOON6 Yes, I met him in Rendova just after I joined my s:uadron and just after he had lost his boat. And then I met him again after he became President ,hen I ,as stationed in London. He came through after his meeting ,ith Khrushchev in 3ienna. Since I ,as the Soviet specialist in the political section in the em1assy, I ,as assigned as his note-taker for his meetings ,ith -acmillan, ,ho ,as then prime minister. But because of the ,ay Kennedy operated, I never took any notes. Kennedy and -acmillan met together alone. But I did have a chance to chat ,ith him again. I must say, to his credit and to my surprise, he remem1ered our meeting during the ,ar. $: .ood. He didn/t ave any occasion to say anyt ing at t at time about is experience wit K rus c ev in w ic common perception is t at e came out second best by far, TOON6 I don8t agree ,ith that. I think that if any1ody misinterpreted the other, it ,as Khrushchev ,ho misinterpreted Kennedy. Khrushchev came a,ay from that meeting convinced that Kennedy ,as a lot softer than, in fact, he ,as. Not, I think, primarily 1ecause of ,hat ,ent on at the meeting itself, but ,hat had gone on before the meeting-- for example, the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Khrushchev had read that as an indication of 2 ,eakness on Kennedy8s part. And, of course, that ,as a mistake in judgment on his part, as ,e kno,, ,hen the Cu1an missile crisis materiali2ed. $: I/ve ad occasion recently11t is is just a sidelig t11to interview yet anot er PT boat s)ipper in t e Sout Pacific at t at time, a fellow named Mi)e Holova), w o ad been an all1American football player. Did you ever run across im, TOON6 I think I did. Certainly the name is familiar to me. I don8t kno, ,hether I met him in the South Pacific or back at Ne,port, Rhode Island, ,hich ,as the PT training base. -ost of us came back from the Pacific to be ,hat ,e call under,ay instructors. I did meet him some,here, yes. $: In 1935, e organi5ed t e Melville, R ode Island, base football team. TOON6 Oh, yes, that8s right. $: T ey ad occasion to play t at powerful Army team t at year7 got slaug tered. TOON6 I remem1er it very ,ell, yes. That8s correct. $: It was in connection wit t at, not foreign affairs, t at I interviewed Holova). Part of your fairly long career included a senior assignment as counselor for political affairs in Moscow in t e /80s and t en s ortly t ereafter, four ambassadors ips to C5ec oslova)ia, -ugoslavia, Israel, and t e Soviet :nion. It seems fairly obvious t at t e training for appointment as ambassador to t e Soviet :nion11your training suited you and aimed you in t at direction, it was only logical t at you became, eventually, ambassador to t e Soviet :nion. How is it, owever, t at you became ambassador in Tel Aviv, How did t at come about, TOON6 ell, that8s an interesting story. Primarily 1ecause of Henry Kissinger, ,ho ,as Secretary of State, of course, ,hen I ,ent to Israel as am1assador. Henry had become very upset ,ith the Israelis, because he claimed that they had sa1otaged and ruined his diplomatic shuttle exercise. So he ,anted to send, as he put it, I think, rather crudely, "a tough-minded S.O.B." to Israel as am1assador in order to put the Israelis in their place. I had gained a reputation, ,hether justified or not--it depends on your o,n point of vie,-- of being rather blunt, outspoken, tough, in dealing, primarily, ,ith eastern 0uropeans and the Soviets. So Henry decided it ,ould be a good idea to send me there. Let me finish the story, because it is very interesting. Shortly after I arrived in Israel, Henry ,anted to resume his meetings ,ith Ra1in, ,ho ,as then the prime minister. Ra1in ,as going to 4ermany on a state visit. Henry ,as coming over for talks ,ith the 4ermans. It ,as arranged that he ,ould meet ,ith Ra1in in 4ermany to resume, he 3 hoped, the shuttle diplomacy exercise. I ,as summoned to 4ermany, of course, as the ne, am1assador to Israel. hen I ,as there, Kissinger said, "No,, I ,ant to have a private ,ord ,ith you." And so ,e did. e had a long conversation before a formal dinner ,ith the 4ermans. He said, "No,, ,hat I ,ant you to do, as the American am1assador to Israel, is get yourself out on the streets, meet the people, hold press conferences, get yourself on television, meet all the mem1ers of the Knesset, if necessary go behind the backs of the government to get the message across that ,e have a ne, policy." That policy, he said, ,as "to esta1lish a good relationship ,ith the moderate Ara1 states, if necessary, by supplying them ,ith arms." I said, "You ,ant me, as the American am1assador, to behave this ,ay in Israel?" I pointed out, "No American am1assador has ever said, 8Boo,8 has never uttered a statement of su1stance. He has al,ays been, more or less, in the Israeli pocket." He said, "Yes, that8s ,hat I ,ant you to do." I8ve kno,n Dr. Kissinger for many years. I kne, him at Harvard and later in the hite House. e had al,ays called each other Henry and -ac. But no, he ,as Secretary of State, and I addressed him as -r. Secretary. I said, "-r. Secretary, I am going to ask you something that ,ill pro1a1ly make you really mad, but I8ve got to kno, the ans,er. Does the President approve of this?" He got mad. He said, "Are you :uestioning my integrity? Are you :uestioning my authority?" I said, "No. I just ,ant to kno, if the President is behind this or not, because, you kno,, this is a very tricky business that you are mandating." He said, "Yes, he8s behind it." I said, "Okay." So I ,ent to Israel, and Kissinger8s prescription ,as basically the pattern of behavior that I had to assume as am1assador. And it produced, frankly, a rather a1rasive relationship ,ith the Israelis. They ,ere not used to that sort of behavior by the American am1assador. But I think, ultimately, ,hat they decided ,as that ,hat I ,as telling them ,as for their o,n good. Because if, in fact, ,e had a differently nuanced policy to,ard the -iddle 0ast that had developed, ,e had to back our relations ,ith the emerging moderate Ara1 states ,ith heavy e:uipment. $: Were t ey convinced t at t e c anged policy was going to remain c anged, 4 TOON6 I think they, ultimately, ,ere convinced of that, not only on the basis of ,hat I ,as saying pu1licly in Israel, but also on the basis of their o,n understanding as to ,hat ,as going on inside ashington.