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The Intervention in Afghanistan · and the Fall of Detente

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The Intervention in Afghanistan · and the Fall of Detente I I I Nobel Symposium 95 I I The Intervention in I Afghanistan I · and the Fall of Detente I I Lysebu September 17-20, 1995 I --·····-- I Transcribed by Svetlana Savranskaya I Edited by David A. Welch and I Odd Arne Westad i --·····-- i The Norwegian Nobel Institute Oslo 1996 I "" I I I I Nobel Symposium 95 I I The Intervention in I Afghanistan I and the Fall of Detente I I Lysebu September 17-20, 1995 I ..•.. I Transcribed by Svetlana Savranskaya I Edited by David A. Welch and I Odd Arne W estad I ..... I The Norwegian Nobel Institute Oslo 1996 I I I ~ I I INTRODUCTION This is the full transcript ofthe Nobel Symposium held at Lysebu from 17 to 19 September 1995. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the reasons for the collapse of the period of I detente in US-Soviet relations in the late 1970s, and especially the causes and effects of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The participants at the symposium were former I political, diplomatic, and military leaders from Russia and the United States, and a small group of American, Russian, and European·,, scholars with special knowledge of this period. I The symposium was the final meeting in a series of conferences on this topic organized by the Center for Foreign Policy Development of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. In addition to looking more closely at the deterioration ofUS-Soviet I relations from 1977 to 1980, this project aimed at investigating some of the comparative aspects of processes of decline in great power cooperation. The transcripts of the first I conferences are available at the Watson Institute. We are very grateful to the former leaders who agreed to participate throughout the series of conferences. It is their willingness to share their experiences with a wider audience which has I given this project its unique character. Some of the "veterans" became close collaborators with the organizers of the the conferences in providing the necessary record of documents -­ often requesting and overseeing the declassification of large numbers of documents from their I own institutions. Without their participation and assistance, this project would not have succeeded the way it did. I We are also grateful to our main institutional collaborators --the Watson Institute, the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Science, and the National Security Archive. The head of the Institute of General History, Alexander 0. Chubarian, was very I helpful in organizing the preparations for the symposium in Moscow. The staff of the National Security Archive -- and especially Malcolm Byrne and Vladislav Zubok -- assisted by expertly putting together the briefing book and chronology for the symposium. Svetlana Savranskaya I ofEmory University and David A. Welch of the University of Toronto worked miracles with I transcribing and editing the many hours of tapes. Our main thanks goes to James G. Blight and janet M. Lang, who were the inspirators of this project at its infancy and throughout its existence. Their efforts and abilities made this I exceptional enterprise succeed. I --Odd Arne Westad I I I PARTICIPANTS I RUSSIAN VETERANS I Mr. Anatolii Dobrynin USSR ambassador to Washington 1962-1986. I Mr. Karen Brutents I Former Deputy Head, CPSU CC International Department, expert on Soviet Third World policy. General Valentin Varennikov I Former Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Ground Forces in the USSR General Staff. General Leonid Shebarshin KGB resident in Teheran in the late 1970s, later Head, First Main Directorate (foreign I intelligence), KGB. General Makhmud Gareev I Former First Deputy Chief ofUSSR General Staff. Mr. Sergei Tarasenko I U.S. and Middle East expert, USSR Foreign Ministry, later Eduard Shervardnadze's main policy adviser. I AMERICAN VETERANS I Admiral Stansfield Turner Former Director of Central Intelligence. I General William Odom I Former Director of Soviet affairs, NSC. Dr. Marshall Shulman I Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1977-1981. Mr. Mark Garrison I Former Deputy Chief, US Embassy, Moscow. Dr. Gary Sick I Former NSC staff member, Iran and Middle East expert. I OTHER PARTICIPANTS Dr. James Blight Brown University I Dr. Malcolm Byrne National Security Archive Dr. Dan Caldwell Pepperdine University Dr. Alexander Chubarian Institute of General History, RAN Dr. John Gaddis Ohio University Dr. llya Gaiduk Institute of General History, RAN Dr. Kjell Goldmann Stockholm University Dr. James Hersh berg Woodrow Wilson Center Dr. janet Lang Boston University Dr. Robert Legvold Columbia University Dr. Geir Lundestad The Norwegian Nobel Institute General Alexander Lyakhovsky Russian Ministry of Defense Dr. Vojtech Mastny John Hopkins University Dr. Olav Njolstad Institute for Defense Studies Dr. 0yvind 0sterud University of Oslo Dr. Helge Pharo University of Oslo Dr. Carol Saivetz Harvard University Dr. David Welch Toronto University Dr. Odd Arne Westad The Norwegian Nobel Institute Dr. Vladislav Zubok National Security Archive NOBEL COMMITTEE AND NOBEL FOUNDATION Dr. Francis Sejersted The Norwegian Nobel Committee Mr. Michael Sohlman Nobel Foundation INVITED GUESTS Mr. Yuri Fokine Russian ambassador to Norway Mr. Thomas Loftus U.S. ambassador to Norway Dr. Thomas Blanton National Security Archive Dr. Terrence Hopmann Watson Institute, Brown University Dr. Olav Knudsen Norwegian Institute oflntemational Affairs Dr. Olav Riste Institute for Defense Studies Dr. Dan Smith Peace Research Institute in Oslo Ms. Sherry Jones Washington Media Associates Ms. Svetlana Savranskaya Emory University STAFF Ms. Sigrid Langebrekke The Norwegian Nobel Institute Ms. Inger-Guri Flogstad The Norwegian Nobel Institute INTERPRETERS Ms. Irina Arm Ms. Lina Pekler I I AGENDA I Sunday, September 17: I Introduction and social events. I Monday, September 18: I Session 1: Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 1978-79. What were the reasons behind the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan after the April 1978 coup? Which strategic objectives did the Soviet leadership have in the region? How did relations between the Soviet and the Afghan leadership develop up to August 1979? What were US perceptions of the Soviet role, their motives and plans? What was the relationship between the US government and the Afghan rebels up to the fall of 1979? Session 2: The United States, Iran, and Afghanistan. How did events in Iran influence US perceptions of Soviet actions in Afghanistan? What were the Soviet views of development of the Iranian revolution and Iran's links with the United States? Which strategic objectives did the United States have in the region? How did the US links with the Afghan rebels develop up to the Soviet intervention? 0 Session 3: Reasons for the Soviet intervention. The purpose with this session is to follow Soviet decisionmaking n and planning month by month from August 1979 to the intervention took place in December. What did the United States 0 know and how was the Carter administration preparing to respond? 0 Session 4: Follow-up questions to sessions 1,2 and 3. 0 Tuesday, September 19: Session 5: After the Afghan intervention. What was the initial reaction in Washington to the Soviet intervention? What kind of reaction did the Soviet leaders foresee? What significance did the Afghan intervention have on u US policymaking with regard to the Soviet Union for the remaining months of the Carter administration? How did Soviet perceptions ~ of the war and the Western reaction develop in I 980-8 I? Session 6: Follow-up questions to session 5. Wednesday, September 20: Session 7: Why did detente collapse? In the minds of the veterans, looking back at their experience and the results of these three meetings, what were the most important reasons why detente collapsed? Domestic US or Soviet politics? Third World rivalries? The dynamics of the arms race? Incompatible ideologies and societies? Session 8: Follow-up questions to session 7. u u u u u u u 11 I I Lysebu 17.-19. Sept 1996 • • I I I I I I From left: MnlcolmeByme, William Odom, Vojtech Mastny, Stansfield Turner, Leonid Shebars!ilil, Anatolii Dobrynin. I I I I I I I I I From left: James Blight, Malcolme Byrne, Odd Arne Westad, Geir Lundestad. I Lysebu 17.-19. Sept. 1995 I I J 1 I From left: John Gaddis, William Odom, Dan Caldwell. ] l ) ) I I J J The symposium at sea. J ] ] Robert Legvold ] Marshall Shulman ] IJ Lysebu 17.-19. Sept 1996 I I I Collette Shulman, Stansfield Turner I Vladislav Zubok, Michael Sohlman I I Geir Lundestad, Marshall Shulman, Odd Arne Westad I I Sherry Jones, Karin Turner I I I I I I Valentin Varennikov I I I I Photo: Sigrid Langebrekke. I r r SESSION 1-SEPTEMBER 18-MORNING I I SEPTEMBER 18 * ) SESSION 1 I AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1978-FALL 1979 I ODD ARNE WESTAD: Could I call the meeting to order, please? My name is Arne Westad. I am with the Nobel Institute. I am going to be chairing 1 our sessions today and tomorrow before Bob Legvold arrives, and takes over for the final session. As some of you know, Bob chaired the two I first conferences in the series, and did so in an admirable way. In my opinion, this symposium promises to be one of the most I interesting oral history events for quite some time. That is not only my opinion, but also that of some of the many people who would have I liked to be here, but whom, unfortunately, we could not fit into the program. There was a large and substantial interest from different 1 individuals and organizations to be present here, but room at the table is quite limited, so we had to limit ourselves to the group of eminent I participants who are here.
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