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Detente Or Razryadka? the Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977

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Detente Or Razryadka? the Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship 2013 Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American- Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977. Daniel S. Stackhouse Jr. Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Stackhouse, Daniel S. Jr.. (2013). Detente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977.. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 86. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/86. doi: 10.5642/cguetd/86 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. A final project submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. Claremont Graduate University 2013 Copyright Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr., 2013 All rights reserved. APPROVAL OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Janet Farrell Brodie, Chair Claremont Graduate University Professor of History William Jones Claremont Graduate University Professor of History Joshua Goode Claremont Graduate University Professor of History ABSTRACT Détente or Razryadka? The Kissinger-Dobrynin Telephone Transcripts and Relaxing American-Soviet Tensions, 1969-1977 by Daniel S. Stackhouse, Jr. Claremont Graduate University: 2013 The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After twenty-five years of the Cold War, President Nixon made a historic visit to Moscow in May, 1972, to sign both the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. SALT I froze the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides at then-current levels for five years, while the ABM treaty limited defensive nuclear weapons permanently. The leaders of the two superpowers also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific and communication technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet summits followed throughout the decade. The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing tensions,” the difference in terms was indicative of a difference in understanding of what “relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically by respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining from interference in nations of the developing world. For the Soviets, razryadka referred strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of state-to-state relations: arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect as a co-equal superpower. One of the principle means of conducting US-Soviet detente was through a private “backchannel” between US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin. This dissertation argues that transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 reveal that the backchannel enabled Kissinger and Dobrynin to establish a relationship which provided the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two countries. Consequently, the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy. To my mother and father, Sarah Jane Kautter Stackhouse and Daniel Stinger Stackhouse, Sr. No dissertation is merely the work of its author. The dissertation committee plays an indispensable role in the project’s development from concept to completion. The Chair of my committee, Dr. Janet Farrell Brodie, helped me immeasurably with the manuscript’s organization. Dr. William Jones has introduced me to numerous works over the years which have contributed tremendously to my knowledge and understanding of history. Dr. Joshua Goode helped me to realize that my dissertation was not just about the Cold War or détente, but also a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy. I thank them all for helping to make the final product much better than it would have been otherwise. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction: Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship.....1 Historiography of Detente Kissinger’s and Dobrynin’s Views of Détente The Backchannel Sources Organization and Focus Chapter 1: Arms Control: A Balance of Power or the Correlation of Forces?............36 Arms Control and Detente SALT I ABM SALT II Chapter 2: Human Rights: A Diplomatic Issue or an Internal Affair?........................92 Human Rights and Detente Jewish Emigration The Helsinki Accords A Few “Hardship Cases” Chapter 3: Foreign Interventions: Preserving Stability or National Liberation?.......152 Foreign Interventions and Detente Vietnam The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War Angola Conclusion: The Role of Relationships………………………….......……....…...…..222 Bibliography: …………………………………………………………………………..242 vii INTRODUCTION Détente, Razryadka, and the Kissinger-Dobrynin Special Relationship “Now, what it all gets down to is how two great powers, the two major powers in the world, are going to be able to talk about their differences rather than fight about them? You’ve got to set up a relationship [italics mine] on a personal basis or in some fashion whereby the differences can be discussed and the areas of self-interest can be discovered, worked out, and then increased. And that is what détente is all about.”1 -Richard Nixon The 1970s witnessed improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, known today as the period of “détente.” One of the most noteworthy events of this era occurred when US President Richard Nixon made a historic visit to Moscow in May, 1972, to sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The treaty had two components: the Interim Agreement which froze offensive nuclear missiles at then-current levels for five years, and the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) permanently limiting defensive nuclear weapons. Nixon and Brezhnev also concluded agreements on trade, sharing scientific and communication technology, as well as cultural exchanges. Several more US-Soviet summits followed throughout the decade. Originating in the late 1960s, détente was an effort to relax tensions after more than twenty years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, two nations with competing social systems – democratic capitalism and communism, respectively. The overriding concern was that the two superpowers might allow their differences to spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear war. Several factors precipitated the change from confrontation to negotiation including the development of nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union, the emergence of powerful economic rivals 1 Frost/Nixon – The Complete Interviews, 400 min., Paradine Television Inc., 1977, DVD. 1 in Western Europe and Japan, as well as the emergence of newly independent former European colonies in the developing world where both Washington and Moscow competed for influence. However, by the end of the 1970s détente – the relaxing of tensions which had brought so much hope and progress to efforts of avoiding confrontation and even a potential nuclear war – was dead. While many believed that the immediate cause stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal of a second treaty known as SALT II from Senate consideration, a deeper examination revealed fissures in the rapprochement almost from the very beginning. Accusations by both sides of violating agreed upon limits in nuclear weapons plagued the period. In addition, disagreements on the subjects of human rights and foreign interventions in the developing world further endangered progress. The Americans used a French word, détente, for this thaw in the Cold War, while the Russians preferred razryadka. While both can be translated as “relaxing tensions,” the difference in terms indicated a fundamental difference in understanding of what “relaxing tensions” actually meant. For the Americans, détente meant peace through arms control, trade, and various forms of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. However, it also included an anticipated change in Soviet behavior, both domestically in terms of respecting Western notions of human rights and internationally by refraining from interference in the affairs of newly formed nations in the developing world. For the Soviets, razryadka referred strictly to those subjects they considered appropriate topics of state-to-state relations: arms control to prevent nuclear war, trade, and earning respect
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