In March 1972 the Leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet

MueRecognitionller in Return for Détente?

Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973

✣ Wolfgang Mueller Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021

In March 1972 the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, unexpectedly suggested that the Soviet Union might be willing to recognize the European Economic Community (EEC). Until that point, the Soviet Union had refused to recognize the EEC and had regularly and vigorously attacked it as a “community of monopolists” and a stalking horse for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Brezhnev’s predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, had conveyed similar signals regarding possible recognition in 1962, but he never turned the idea into reality. In contrast, some ten years later, Brezhnev inspired the start of negotiations between the EEC and the Soviet bloc’s Council of Mutual Economic Assis- tance (CMEA). This article draws on Soviet archival documents as well as Western and Russian publications and memoirs to analyze the background, circumstances, and consequences of Brezhnev’s initiative. The article gives special attention to the following questions: What convinced Brezhnev and his colleagues in 1972 to change their hitherto uniformly negative assessment of the EEC? Was this change the result of a major policy reassessment or simply a byproduct of other considerations? How was the initiative linked with broader Soviet foreign policy goals? Why was it not ultimately successful? In answering these questions, the article traces the external and internal factors that inspired the Soviet initiative, including the EEC enlargement process, East-West détente, CMEA integration, Ostpolitik, and Soviet and East European economic and political developments. The ªrst section brieºy summarizes Soviet attitudes toward West Euro- pean integration up to 1969, analyzing Khrushchev’s abortive attempt to reach an agreement with the EEC in 1962. The article then sets the context for Brezhnev’s initiative of 1972, assessing the state of relations between the USSR and the EEC as well as contemporaneous CMEA responses to West European Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 13, No. 4, Fall 2011, pp. 79–100 © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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integration. The third section explores how Brezhnev’s policy toward the EEC was linked to other issues in 1972, particularly his effort to secure ratiªcation of the 1970 Moscow Treaty with West Germany. The ªnal sections of the article discuss Soviet policy toward the EEC in the wake of Brezhnev’s speech and examine the reasons for the new strategy’s failure.

The History: The USSR and West European Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Integration through 1969

In 1970 the EEC and the USSR could look back on more than a decade of tense non-relations. Since the era of Iosif Stalin, Soviet-bloc propaganda out- lets had denounced West European integration, and Soviet politicians had disparaged the EEC as a “trust of capitalists,” a “closed bloc” leading to discrimination in international trade, and the “economic foundation of NATO.”1 The Soviet Union had tried to thwart EEC integration in two ways. First, the Soviet-bloc media had depicted integration as an attempt by U.S. “imperialists” and West German “revanchists” to enslave European workers, turn Western Europe into a colony of capitalist monopolies, and prepare for war against the Soviet Union. Second, Soviet leaders had called for an increase in East-West or “all-European” cooperation, as for instance in the United Na- tions Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), in place of EEC integration.2 Not until the 1960s did Soviet foreign policymakers ªnally realize that the integration process could not be halted and that the EEC would not fall apart in the near future, despite long-standing predictions by Soviet-bloc propaganda. The community’s development seemed positive overall, and although Khrushchev had boasted about his aim to “catch up and surpass” Western economies, the Eastern bloc’s share of world trade in the mid-1960s stagnated at a meager 9 percent. In the same decade, EEC foreign trade reached 20 percent of the global total, as the community became the world’s largest importer of goods and its GDP grew by roughly 25 percent from 1958 through 1965. Real wages also increased, which made it increasingly difªcult for the Italian and French Communists to emulate the Soviet Union in

1. See, for instance, A. S. Namazova and B. Emmerson, eds., Istoriya evropeiskoi integratsii 1945–1994 (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Universal History, 1995); and Mikhail Narinskii, “La construction européenne vue par l’URSS de 1948 à 1953,” in Saki Dockrill et al. eds., L’Europe de l’Est et de l’Ouest dans la guerre froide 1948–1953 (Paris: PUPS, 2002), pp. 61–72. 2. Wolfgang Mueller, “The Soviet Union and Early West European Integration, 1947–1957: From the Brussels Treaty to the ECSC and EEC,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 67–85.

80 Recognition in Return for Détente? demonizing European integration. The Italian Communist Party, in particular, pressed for a less hostile position.3 Another unpleasant surprise for Soviet leaders was the British decision to apply for EEC membership—a step that Soviet economists viewed as marking a new phase of European integration.4 Confronted with these challenges, Soviet ofªcials in the summer of 1962 opted for a new approach involving three main elements. First, Soviet attacks against the EEC were intensiªed, as were attempts to deter new countries from joining the EEC and to persuade the community’s existing members to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 leave. In May 1962, Khrushchev tried to convince the president of Mali, Modibo Keita, to give up his country’s association with the EEC; in June he called on the Italian prime minister, Amintore Fanfani, to quit the European bloc; and in July he informed the Austrian chancellor, Alfons Gorbach, that the Soviet Union disapproved of the neutral country’s attempt to gain an association with the EEC. Another part of this offensive against the EEC was a new Soviet initiative in the UN against “closed trade blocs” and for cooperation within the UN Economic Commission for Europe.5 Second, in addition to discouraging EEC integration, Khrushchev sought to push forward the Eastern bloc’s own economic integration. From the time the CMEA was created in 1949, it had served as a Communist response to the Western economic challenge, and in 1962 the CMEA member- states approved Khrushchev’s proposal to implement the “basic principles of socialist division of labor.”6 The third (and most sensational) element of the new course was Khrush- chev’s offer to establish direct relations between the Eastern bloc and the EEC.7 Even before he made an explicit overture, he and Soviet political com- mentators had acknowledged that the EEC was a “reality” and that its economy had grown, a position outlined in the “32 Theses on the Imperialistic In- tegration in Western Europe” published in Pravda on 26 August 1962. Within the Eastern bloc, the second and third elements of the new Soviet approach likely entailed a quid pro quo. Poland and Hungary, both heavily

3. Gerda Zellentin, Die Kommunisten und die Einigung Europas (Bonn: Athenäum, 1964), pp. 108– 113. See also, Silvio Pons, “The Italian Communist Party between East and West, 1960–64,” in Wilfried Loth, ed., Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953–1965 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 98–107, esp. 101–102; and Maud Bracke, “From the Atlantic to the Urals: Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 33–53. 4. A. Arzumanyan, “Novaya faza evropeiskoi ‘integratsii,’” Pravda (Moscow), 23 May 1962, p. 5. 5. Bernhard Schalhorn, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik,” in Dietrich Geyer, ed., Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetunion Außenpolitik, Vol. 2, 1955–1973 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), pp. 61–145, esp. 100–102. 6. Renate Damus, RGW: Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Osteuropa (Opladen, Germany: Leske, 1979), pp. 272–278. 7. N. S. Khrushchev, “Nasushchnye problemy razvitiya mirovoi sotsialisticheskoi sistemy,” Kommunist, Vol. 39, No. 12 (1962), pp. 3–26, esp. 7–10.

81 Mueller dependent on the export of agricultural products to the West, seemed particularly eager to establish relations with the EEC as it prepared to erect common trade barriers.8 But the Soviet Union had reason to be concerned about the fate of the CMEA if the smaller members came under pressure from the EEC. This might be one of the reasons that the Central European states agreed on Soviet supranational planning schemes: to get Soviet consent for contacts with the EEC.

However, when French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s bid Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 to join the EEC in 1963—a decision hailed by the atheist Khrushchev as a “gift from heaven”—most of the Soviet proposals vis-à-vis the EEC lost mo- mentum.9 Although evidence from Soviet archival documents is murky, the failure of the British application seems to have been the main reason for the subsequent inactivity on the Soviet side. Because the West had failed to move into the predicted “new phase of capitalist integration,” no Soviet action was deemed necessary, and no direct contact between the CMEA and the EEC was instigated. The EEC Commission offered a reduction of European tariffs for Soviet crabmeat and vodka to try to lure Moscow and the East Europeans into establishing representations in Brussels and entering into direct negotiations, but these attempts were of no avail.10 Nor did the Soviet Union put much effort into fostering a true “socialist division of labor” in the Eastern bloc. With no economic relations with the EEC in sight, a strong argument in favor of Eastern economic integration ceased to exist, and the smaller CMEA members—Romania, in particular—resisted giving up national control for a scheme they feared was simply a subterfuge for Soviet dominance. The rest of the 1960s did not witness a breakthrough. The EEC proposal to start bilateral negotiations with each East European state was perceived in Moscow as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Communist bloc.11 Because the EEC Commission (which was expanded and renamed the Commission of the European Communities, or EC Commission, in July 1967) was strug- gling to establish control over the foreign trade of its members, the USSR an-

8. Rolf Sannwald, “Die Sowjetunion und die westeuropäische Integrationspolitik,” in Erik Boettcher, ed., Ostblock, EWG und Entwicklungsländer (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), p. 101. 9. On de Gaulle’s veto, see Michael Gehler, Europa: Ideen, Institutionen, Vereinigung (Munich: Olzog, 2005), p. 162. 10. Marie-Pierre Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe? Les décideurs soviétiques face à l’intégration ouest- européenne, 1957–1991,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 7–27. See also, Gisela Hueners-Pohl, “Einführung einer gemeinsamen Handelspolitik der EWG- Mitgliedstaaten gegenüber den sozialistischen Staaten Osteuropas,” Ph.D. Diss., Berlin, 1975, pp. 234–241. 11. Otdel mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh organizatsii, “Struktura i mekhanizm Obshchego rynka,” 7 June 1965, Listy (Ll.) 38–50, in Delo (D.) 20, Papka (P.) 96, Opis’ (Op.) 45, Fond (F.) 66, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF).

82 Recognition in Return for Détente? swered in kind by ignoring the Commission and developing separate ties with individual EEC states. The Soviet Union had long looked to France as a pre- ferred West European partner. Nonetheless, as Harold Macmillan observed, de Gaulle said Europe and meant France, and Moscow said France and meant Europe.12 Thus, when Soviet ofªcials invoked the “traditional friendship between France and Russia” and catered to French anti-German as well as anti- American sentiments, they always kept an eye on the European integration process. Treating the Grande Nation with deference signaled that France could Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 and should do without the EEC, without NATO, and without the United States and the West Germans. Shortly after de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s military command structures and plunged the EEC into the deepest crisis it had experienced,13 he traveled to Moscow and Leningrad, where he was treated with honors that no Western statesman had previously been granted in a Communist country.

The Setting of Brezhnev’s Initiative of March 1972

Although the EC Commission, in its communiqué of 17 October 1969, declared that it was ready for East-West trade despite the Soviet policy of non- recognition and as long as the Commission was consulted beforehand,14 the Eastern bloc’s attitude toward the Community remained negative. In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact’s calls for the convocation of an all-European conference on security—calls that had been voiced with increasing insistence since July 1964 and again after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—adopted a distinctly anti-EEC connotation.15 In general, the Soviet project of an all-European conference was designed to cement the postwar status quo in Europe, to bolster Soviet hegemony over the east of the conti- nent including East Germany, to foster détente and East-West trade, and to undermine the coherence of the Western bloc and its transatlantic ties. The

12. Julie M. Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 61. 13. N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2006); and Ludger Kühnhart, ed., Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Response, 1945–2005 (New York: Berghahn, 2009). 14. Mikhail Lipkin, “Sovetskii Soiuz i evropeiskaia integratsiia v nachale 1970kh gg.: Ideologiia i ‘real- politik,’” in Rossiia i Zapad: Istoricheskii opyt XIX–XX vekov (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences: Institute of Universal History, 2008), pp. 268–282, esp. 271. 15. On the history of the various initiatives for a CSCE, see Thomas Fischer, “‘A Mustard Seed Grew into a Bushy Tree’: The Finnish CSCE Initiative of 5 May 1969,” Cold War History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 177–205.

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demand for all-European economic cooperation, which was part and parcel of the Soviet campaign, was aimed against the EEC.16 The Warsaw Pact in its Budapest appeal and Prague declaration of 1969 underlined the Soviet bloc’s desire to establish economic links and non-discrimination, and Soviet com- mentators increased their criticism of the EEC, accusing it of being responsi- ble for the division of Europe and an obstacle to the progress of détente.17 In early 1971, EC Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf tried to break the

stalemate by inviting the Soviet Academy of Sciences to cosponsor a research Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 project on “possibilities for economic cooperation between the EEC and the CMEA.” The CPSU Politburo, however, did not allow the project to be initi- ated. In an internal assessment, the CPSU Science Department argued that the Eastern bloc had not yet found a common position regarding the Western advances.18 The West German foreign minister, Walter Scheel, during his visit to Moscow in November 1971, also tried to convince Soviet leaders of the peaceful nature of the West European integration process and later provided detailed information about the EEC.19 However, even though Soviet experts internally advocated a new approach,20 the ofªcial Soviet attitude toward European integration seemed un- changed. Because Moscow was uninterested in strengthening the EEC, Soviet leaders refused to grant it even the slightest sign of recognition, whether for- mal or informal (even though the Community had already entered the ªfteenth year of its existence). In February 1971, Brezhnev told the Finnish president, Urho Kekkonen, that the Soviet Union would not accept the implementation of the EEC’s control over the foreign trade of its member-states and would continue to negotiate with the respective national governments instead of Brussels.21 Invitations by the EC Commission to the East European

16. Eberhard Schulz, Moskau und die europäische Integration (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), pp. 147– 151. 17. Rainer Rotermundt, Ursula Schmiederer, and Helmut Becker-Panitz, Die Sowjetunion und Europa: Gesellschaftsform und Außenpolitik der UdSSR (Frankfurt: Campus, 1979), pp. 126–131. 18. Soviet Academy of Sciences to Central Committee, 30 March 1971, Ll. 14–16, in D. 115, Op. 63, F. 5, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI). 19. Report Bondarenko, 4 October 1972, L. 11, in D. 98, P. 98, Op. 17, F. 757, AVPRF. See also, Conversation Gromyko with Scheel, 28 November 1971, in Karl Peter Schwarz et al., eds., Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1971, Vol. III (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), pp. 1831–1832. 20. Yurii A. Borko, “Evolyutsiya vzglyadov na evropeiskuyu integratsiyu v SSSR i Rossii: Politicheskii i nauchnyi podkhody” (paper presented at the “40 let Rimskim dogovoram: Evropeiskaya integratsiya i Rossiya” conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, 1997), http://www.edc.spb.ru/activities/conferences/ 40years/borko.html, p. 4. 21. Suvi Kansikas, “From Categorical ‘No’ to Piecemeal Adjustment: Soviet Policies on the EEC En- largement and the Finnish Free-Trade Agreement,” paper presented at the XIV International Eco-

84 Recognition in Return for Détente? states to send diplomatic representatives to Brussels were rebuffed by Soviet ofªcials, who indicated that envoys could be sent only after an elected Euro- pean president was in power.22 At the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin attacked “closed blocs like the Common Market,”23 and on 18 November 1971 the main CPSU newspaper, Pravda, cited “voices” calling for the “rejection of existing blocs, of supranational illu- sions, and micro-European concepts” and proposing to create an all-European organization. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Soviet propaganda intended to frighten the small European states with the EEC “monopoly monster” also continued, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told West German Foreign Minister Scheel that the EEC was a “di- nosaur born in a zoo”—huge, but outdated and not ªt for survival.24 At the same time, the USSR in 1971 attempted to counter the progressing West Eu- ropean economic integration by launching with great fanfare the so-called Complex Program for socialist integration in the CMEA. Secret sections of the program contained regulations on how to contain and hamper West Eu- ropean integration.25 Soviet proposals advanced at the 1970 and 1971 sessions of the UNECE and UN Conference on Trade and Development again con- demned the “discriminatory” nature of the EC. Given this well-known negative Soviet attitude, Brezhnev surprised West- ern European leaders when, in his speech at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on 20 March 1972, he ofªcially mentioned the EEC and declared:

The Soviet Union does not ignore the reality that has emerged in Western Eu- rope, particularly the existence of an economic group of capitalist countries such as the “Common Market.”...Ourposture toward its members will depend on the extent to which they, for their part, recognize the reality in the socialist part of Europe, particularly the interests of the member-states of the [CMEA].26

Western ofªcials reacted enthusiastically. Jean Monnet, one of the founding architects of West European integration; Walter Hallstein, the former presi- nomic History Congress, Helsinki, 2006, http://www.helsinki.ª/iehc2006/papers3/Kansikas.pdf, p. 11. 22. Theodor Schweisfurth, “Sowjetunion, westeuropäische Integration und gesamteuropäische Zusammenarbeit,” Europa Archiv, Vol. 27, No. 8 (1972), pp. 261–272. 23. Excerpts from Kosygin’s speech reproduced in Europa Archiv, Vol. 27, No. 8 (1972), p. D252. 24. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev,” Jour- nal of European Integration History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996), pp. 85–98; and G. Bennett and K. A. Hamil- ton, eds., Documents of British Policy Overseas III, Vol. 1, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968–1972 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Ofªce, 1997), p. 254. 25. Mikhail Lipkin, “Sovetskii Soyuz, SÌV i evropeiskaya integratsiya v kontse 1960kh–1970kh gg.,” Evropeiskii almanakh, 2007, p. 12. 26. “Speech of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev,” Pravda, 21 March 1972, p. 2.

85 Mueller

dent of the EEC Commission; and even West German Chancellor Willy Brandt were convinced that Brezhnev was preparing for the recognition of the EEC.27 During a conference in Leverkusen in mid-April 1972, Brandt called for increased cooperation between the EEC and the CMEA countries.28 On 19 April, EEC Commission President Sicco Mansholt responded to Brezh- nev’s announcement by declaring that the EEC, in return, was “ready to accept the realities” in Eastern Europe and to cooperate with East European

countries within the framework of the EEC’s common foreign trade policy.29 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Several months later, the EEC heads of government resumed their discussions regarding a new policy toward the Soviet Union.30 Although an internal Brit- ish paper advocated a wait-and-see approach and suggested that the EEC should not take the initiative,31 France proposed that the Community offer the Soviet Union an economic agreement. However, Brezhnev’s announcement was, for the most part, misunder- stood by EEC leaders. First, it was actually less sensational than was perceived at the time. In contrast to Khrushchev’s overtures ten years earlier, Brezhnev did not offer ofªcial or direct contacts with the EEC but merely with its “members.” Because such contacts had already existed for a long time, his announcement was largely cosmetic. Second, despite claiming to recognize the “reality” in Western Europe, Brezhnev ignored that the ºedgling EEC of 1958 was about to transform into a Common Market with nine or ten members including Great Britain, a community with political aims and the ambition to control the foreign trade of its member-states. The most intriguing aspect of Brezhnev’s initiative, however, was that it was aimed not so much at the EEC as at a different goal.

27. Monnet declared at the conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Leverkusen in April 1972: “We see that the USSR, which has hitherto refused to recognize the European Union [sic], cautiously but safely draws closer to this recognition.” See Soviet Embassy Bonn to Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID), 19 April 1972, Ll. 51–82, in D. 47, P.374, Op. 34, F. 46, AVPRF. See also, Lothar Jung, “Die Annäherung zwischen dem Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (RGW) und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) seit 1972,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Hamburg, 1987, p. 213. Hallstein expressed his conªdence that the USSR would offer recognition of the EC as a “morning gift” for the CSCE. Jan Jacobs, Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und die sowjetische Völkerrechtsdoktrin (Hamburg: Rüegger, 1977), p. 38. On Brandt, see Helmut Allardt, Politik vor und hinter den Kulissen: Erfahrungen eines Diplomaten zwischen Ost und West (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1979), p. 317. 28. Soviet Embassy Bonn to MID, April 1972, L. 3, in D. 98, P. 98, Op. 17, F. 757, AVPRF. 29. Harry Luttikholt, “The Soviet Union and the European Communities 1957–1976,” Co-existence, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 79–99. 30. Soviet Embassy Bonn to MID, 6 November 1972, Ll. 29–38, in D. 98, P. 98, Op. 17, F. 757, AVPRF. 31. Takeshi Yamamoto, “Détente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet Policy Change toward the Common Market, 1970–75,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), pp. 75–94.

86 Recognition in Return for Détente?

The Background of Brezhnev’s Initiative and the Ratification of the Moscow Treaty

Some three years earlier, in 1969, West Germany, which until then had been repeatedly singled out by Moscow as the main culprit in East-West tensions (in addition to the United States), embarked on Chancellor Willy Brandt’s neue Ostpolitik and quickly proceeded to improve relations with its eastern neighbors.32 East Germany was for the ªrst time accepted by a West German Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 government to be a “state.”33 In 1970, West Germany concluded treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. Both treaties on the renunciation of force and the inviolability of borders were seen as cornerstones for postwar reconcilia- tion and détente, as well as major preconditions for moving forward with the Soviet pet project of an all-European conference on security. At the same time, West Germany and the USSR intensiªed their bilateral trade.34 Nevertheless, the ratiªcation of the West German–Soviet treaty by the West German parliament was uncertain because Brandt’s Social Democrat and Free Democrat coalition held such a slim majority. Most Christian Dem- ocrat (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) opposition members in the Bundestag were not ready to support the government’s policy. They felt be- trayed by the cabinet’s unilateral renunciation of Konrad Adenauer’s course.35 Their leaders argued that the treaty violated the consensus that, until a post– World War II peace agreement was in place, no West German government was entitled to conclude treaties regarding borders of Germany in its entirety (Gesamtdeutschland)—a position shared by the ruling coalition.36 Further- more, the CDU and CSU strongly criticized Brandt’s acceptance of the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse Line as the German-Polish border as possibly fore-

32. Brandt’s election was hailed by Soviet propaganda as a product of the “consistent peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist camp.” Aleksei Filitov, “Sovetskii Soyuz i ‘Novaya vostochnaya politika’ FRG,” in N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’yan, eds., Kholodnaya voina i politika razryadki: Diskussionnye problemy, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Institute of Universal History, 2003), pp. 163–186. 33. Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev: An Anal- ysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), p. 116. See also Brandt’s government declaration, 28 October 1969, in Boris Meissner, ed., Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–1970: Kontinuität und Wandel: Dokumentation (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 380–383. 34. Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 106. For the text of the Moscow Treaty, see http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/1970/moskauer- vertrag.html. 35. Peter Bender, Die Neue Ostpolitik und ihre Folgen: Vom Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung, 3rd Ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), p. 201. 36. Gerhard Wettig, “Alois Mertes und die Haltung der CDU/CSU zu den Ostverträgen der sozialliberalen Bundesregierung,” Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen: Archiv für Christlich- Demokratische Politik, Vol. 16, No. 10 (2009), pp. 199–216.

87 Mueller

closing any future change of borders including the reuniªcation of Germany. Last but not least, they suspected that the Soviet Union might use the treaty and the planned conference on all-European security to undermine West Eu- ropean integration.37 Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel took great pains to rebut such accu- sations. A “Letter on German Unity,” written by the West German government and handed to the Soviet side when the Moscow Treaty was signed on

12 August 1970, declared that the treaty would “not contradict the political Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a status of peace in Europe in which the German nation [Volk] will achieve its unity in free self- determination.”38 In several of his speeches to the Bundestag, Brandt also claimed that “European integration will not be affected by the treaty.” The Soviet embassy in Bonn reported to Moscow that the chancellor went even further by stating that “the treaty does not separate us from our NATO allies, nor does it foreclose the proceeding West European uniªcation.”39 Scheel, in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg some weeks later, also stressed that “the treaty does not interfere with economic or political integration.”40 However, these claims were not enough to dispel the suspicions of the West German opposition.41 The experiences of the CDU opposition leader, Rainer Barzel, on his trip to Moscow in December 1971 reinforced his doubts about Soviet policy. Before leaving Bonn, Barzel had made clear that the So- viet Union had to recognize the EEC if it wanted to achieve détente.42 This step was meant to ensure that integration would not be hampered by the Soviet–West German rapprochement.43 When Barzel arrived in Moscow, he asked Gromyko why the Soviet Union, despite its self-proclaimed respect for the “reality” in Europe, did not recognize the EEC. Gromyko declared that his government, “on principle, was against all military and other group-

37. Soviet Embassy Bonn to Gromyko, 2 June 1970, Ll. 7–9, in D. 1, P.93, Op. 15a, F. 757, AVPRF. See also Jung, “Die Annäherung zwischen RGW und EG,” pp. 215–233. 38. Scheel to Gromyko, 12 August 1970, http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/1970/brief-zur- deutschen-einheit.html. The Soviet side conªrmed receipt of the letter in 1970, but did not take for- mal notice of the document until 1972 during the ratiªcation process. 39. Soviet Embassy Bonn to Falin, 13 September 1970, Ll. 64–68, in D. 1, P. 93, Op. 15a, F. 757, AVPRF. 40. Soviet Embassy Bonn to MID, 15 October 1970, Ll. 69–80, in D. 1, P. 93, Op. 15a, F. 757, AVPRF. 41. See the statements by CDU and CSU politicians recorded in Soviet Embassy Bonn to MID, 15 October 1970. 42. Rainer Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1978), p. 141. 43. Andreas Grau, Gegen den Strom: Die Reaktion der CDU-CSU-Opposition auf die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition 1969–1973 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005), pp. 223, 233.

88 Recognition in Return for Détente? ings.”44 In another “tense” conversation in the Soviet capital, the West Ger- man opposition leader was confronted with further attacks against the EEC. Kosygin accused the bloc of planning to erect a “Chinese Wall” between East- ern and Western Europe and of “dictating” its will to the Soviet Union.45 He underlined Moscow’s intention to continue to conclude trade agreements only with national governments instead of consulting with the EEC.46 After returning home, Barzel reafªrmed his determination not to recommend the

Ost Treaties for ratiªcation in the Bundestag as long as the Soviet Union de- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 nied Germany the right to self-determination, blocked freedom of movement between the two German states, and sought to use détente to weaken the EEC. In January 1972, on the eve of the ratiªcation process, the leaders of the CDU approved this position, stressing that “the Soviet Union denies recognition to the European Communities, on which the political future of Germany depends.”47 In light of the link between the uncertain ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty and the CDU’s implicit demand for Soviet recognition of the EEC—a link Barzel articulated on 23 February 1972 in the Bundestag—Brezhnev’s statement in his speech on 20 March 1972 was likely designed to generate support for ratiªcation of the treaty.48 This thesis, which was voiced at the time by the West German ambassador to Moscow, Helmut Allardt, as well as by the contemporary West German analysts Gerhard Wettig and Johann Karat, was rejected out of hand by Foreign Minister Scheel, who insisted he had “rarely read a more stupid interpretation of a speech than this one.”49 Nonetheless, this thesis was relaunched by historian Takeshi Yamamoto in an article published in 2007.50 Yamamoto mentions the ratiªcation of the Ost Treaties as one possible motive for Brezhnev’s initiative, in addition to considerations that the rise of the EC would increase inter-imperialist rivalries and

44. FRG Embassy report, transcribed in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), p. 507. See also Allardt, Politik, pp. 314–315. The West German ambassador erroneously dated Barzel’s visit to early 1972. 45. Conversation Barzel with Kosygin, 15 December 1971, in AAPD 1971, Vol. III, p. 1962. Barzel later declared that Kosygin had “shown himself as being absolutely stubborn.” Protocol, Conversation Government with Opposition on 28 April 1972, 1 May 1972, in AAPD 1972, Vol. I, p. 507. 46. Allardt, Politik, p. 316. 47. Archiv der Gegenwart, 23 December 1971, p. 16777; Archiv der Gegenwart, 24 January 1972, p. 16842; and Grau, Gegen den Strom, pp. 238, 244. 48. See Remarks of CDU Leader Barzel to the Bundestag, 23 February 1972, in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 310 n. 16. 49. Allardt to Auswärtiges Amt, 21 March 1972, in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 310; Gerhard Wettig, Europäische Sicherheit: Das europäische Staatensystem in der sowjetische Außenpolitik 1966–1972 (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1972), p. 137; and Johann Karat, “Sowjetunion und Europäische Gemeinschaften,” Außenpolitik, Vol. 23, No. 7 (1972), pp. 393–402. 50. Yamamoto, “Détente or Integration,” p. 78.

89 Mueller

make East-West trade easier. Another motive, according to Yamamoto, was Brezhnev’s wish that the CMEA communicate with the EEC as a single voice. However, Yamamoto was unable to use Soviet documents and to weigh the merits of these claims. Although many relevant archival sources in Moscow are not yet available, enough evidence has emerged now to assess Soviet mo- tives more clearly. That the Moscow Treaty was the main factor behind Brezhnev’s EEC

proposal is underlined by the wording of the speech itself, particularly by the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 context in which Brezhnev referred to the Common Market. Before claiming that ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty by the Bundestag would induce a “qualitatively new and more fruitful stage” in Soviet–West German relations, Brezhnev asserted that his country, against all allegations by “enemies of détente,” had neither hostile feelings toward the EEC nor any intention of “placing a mine” under it by convoking the all-European summit or, as it was later called, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Critics in the CDU and CSU had accused Moscow of precisely such an intention, which they cited when opposing ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty and participation in the CSCE project. Being aware of this obstacle, Brezhnev in August 1971 had discussed with his East European counterparts how to facilitate ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty and thereby help achieve détente and the launching of the CSCE.51 In the following months, Brezhnev, who identiªed himself with the treaty and felt that Brandt would continue to play an important role in promoting détente,52 received support for quick ratiªca- tion from several West European politicians and even the Vatican. The link between Brezhnev’s EEC initiative and the Moscow Treaty is conªrmed by memoirs and archival documents. Anatolii Chernyaev, who in later years became one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s main advisers, worked in 1972 in the CPSU International Department and was one of the ofªcials charged with drafting Brezhnev’s speech for the trade unions’ congress. He later re- called having been present at a telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Gromyko in which the decision was made to include some positive words on

51. Brezhnev Report to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 22 November 1971, Ll. 21–102, in D. 248, Op. 3, F. 2, RGANI; and Brezhnev Report to Central Committee Plenum, 19 May 1972, Ll. 2– 74, in D. 270, Op. 3, F. 2, RGANI. See also the protocol of Brezhnev’s meeting with East European party leaders on the Crimea, 2 August 1971, http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/16043/ ipublicationdocument_singledocument/2C05B6F4-3FC1-40BE-8407-9D366A64D05A/pl/ 710802_Crimea_Polish.pdf. 52. Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 214; and Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), p. 612.

90 Recognition in Return for Détente? the EEC in the text of the speech in order to gain support in the Bundestag for ratiªcation of the Soviet–West German treaty.53 In his recently published diary of these years, Chernyaev reports, under the date of 9 March 1972, this very conversation in extenso:

B[rezhnev]: We have to help Brandt. I am thinking of inserting [zakavychit’] some paragraphs into my speech in order to back him against the arguments of

the opposition. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 G[romyko]: That would be very important. We will send you our proposals according to your request. On this occasion, one should mention the Common Market. This we should decide soon. The opposition [in the Bundestag] is con- stantly trumpeting that the USSR supposedly wants to normalize [its relations] with the FRG in order to separate it from the Common Market. And in general, [they say] you shouldn’t deal with [the USSR] because it is striving to wage an ir- reconcilable struggle against the Common Market. B[rezhnev]: Yes, I will consider saying this.54 The next day, the CPSU Politburo approved the “‘arguments’ for Brandt in his struggle against the opposition to the Moscow Treaty” and ordered the So- viet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, to bring them to the chancellor’s attention.55 On 13 March, Falin, who had been assigned the task of securing ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty, informed Brandt of the Soviet position regarding Bonn’s “Letter on German Unity” and also underlined the Soviet Un- ion’s readiness to acknowledge “the reality of the European Economic Com- munity.”56 Further evidence that Brezhnev’s statement of 20 March 1972 regarding the EEC was a tactical move to facilitate ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty comes from the fact that a new Soviet policy toward the Community had yet to be deªned and adopted at that time—as the CMEA secretary, Nikolai Faddeev, admitted only a few days after Brezhnev’s speech in a conversation with the executive secretary of the UNECE, Janez Stanovnik.57 The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade indicated on 31 December 1971 that the CMEA had repeatedly discussed the issue without changing the ofªcial line, which

53. A. S. Chernyaev, Moya zhisn’ i moe vremya (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye othnosheniya, 1995), p. 286. 54. A. Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod: Dnevnik dvukh epokh, 1972–1991 gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008), p. 9. 55. Ibid., p. 10. 56. See the ofªcial statements in Europa Archiv, Vol. 27, No. 8 (1972), p. Z74. See also Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), pp. 50, 190. 57. Conversation Faddeev with Stanovnik, 28 March 1972, Ll. 22–27, in D. 46, P.374, Op. 34, F. 46, AVPRF.

91 Mueller

considered “ofªcial contacts” with the EC “disadvantageous” (netselesoo- brazno).58 On 1 April 1972, the West German state secretary Egon Bahr sent a telegram to the U.S. national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, surmising that the Warsaw Pact’s Prague conference had ordered a working group to draft a new strategy toward the EEC by the end of the month.59 But at a CPSU Cen- tral Committee plenum in May, Brezhnev announced that the new strategy was still in the making. He told the audience, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Together with our allies, we must deªne, in the near future, which practical line we should follow with respect to the EEC, the so-called Common Market, [which] comprises ten West European countries at the moment, among them the largest: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, England, and Italy. The Politburo has ordered the Soviet part of the CMEA to draft proposals on this issue.60

Brezhnev suggested that the new Eastern strategy should take advantage of the emergence of the EEC as a new center of capitalism that was likely to change the balance of power and deepen the contradictions between Europe and the United States. The new Soviet strategy toward the Community was made public in a second speech by Brezhnev, delivered on 21 December 1972. Declassiªed documents indicate that this speech (not the one on 20 March) codiªed the change in the Soviet line.61 However, ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty on 17 May 1972 in the Bundestag was achieved only partially because of Brezhnev’s signal regarding the Soviet attitude toward the EEC. In early May, the CDU and CSU were still not convinced of the USSR’s sincere intentions regarding European integration and demanded an ofªcial Soviet clariªcation.62 It was rather the joint declaration drafted by all Bundestag factions in close coordination with Falin, stating that the Ost Treaties would not attempt to “create a legal basis for the existing borders,” that persuaded most Christian Democrats to let the treaty’s ratiªcation pass the Bundestag.63 The Bundestag declaration was accepted without challenge by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, the indirect linkage between West German ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty (which the

58. Zorin to Zademidko, 31 December 1971, L. 13, in D. 1016, Op. 2, F. 302, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE). 59. Bahr to Kissinger, 1 April 1972, in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 352. 60. Brezhnev Report to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 19 May 1972, Ll. 2–74, emphasis added. 61. Soviet Representative Geneva, Proposals for the Soviet Position in the 28th Session of the UNECE, March 1973, Ll. 62–77, in D. 26, P. 381, Op. 35, F. 46, AVPRF. 62. Grau, Gegen den Strom, p. 304. 63. Bender, Die Neue Ostpolitik, p. 203. For further details, see Wettig, “Alois Mertes”; and Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, pp. 188–202. The draft declaration is published in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, pp. 533–534. The ªnal version has identical wording. See AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 536 n. 4.

92 Recognition in Return for Détente?

CDU and CSU criticized) and Soviet ratiªcation of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (which the CDU and CSU wanted) made further efforts by the opposition parties to block the Moscow Treaty appear unwise.64 Nonetheless, Brezhnev’s signal regarding the EEC seems to have helped achieve the intended effect—despite the doubts voiced by the West German ambassador to Moscow and by Barzel in Bonn.65 On the basis of Brezhnev’s speech, the joint declaration of the Bundestag afªrmed that West Germany would “continue its policy of European uniªcation” and that West Germany Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 was “acting on the assumption that the Soviet Union and other socialist states will begin cooperation with the EEC.”66 A week earlier, Brandt had reached an understanding with the CDU and the CSU that “the Soviet Union cannot derive from the [Moscow] Treaty any rights of intervention against the development of the European Economic Community or against its further ad- vancement into a Political Union.”67 In a speech to the Bundestag on 10 May, the chancellor also stressed that “the Soviet side conªrmed that the Soviet Union was not hostilely pitted against the EEC, nor did it want to undermine [the Community]; [the USSR] did not rule out cooperation with [the EEC].”68 The Soviet embassy in Bonn claimed that Brezhnev’s speech “to a high degree helped” in gaining ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty, and Brandt’s aide, State Secretary Egon Bahr, acknowledged that “the [Soviet Union] cer- tainly undertook special efforts to contribute to the clariªcation of certain questions that had been raised by the opposition” during the ratiªcation process.69

64. Although Barzel was convinced that a vote for ratiªcation would be correct, he understood that it would be impossible to gain approval of the treaty from the whole of the CDU-CSU. Because he knew that the CSU rejected the treaty, he supported Walter Hallstein’s (CDU) appeal to abstain from voting. Five members of the CSU faction and four of the CDU voted against the ratiªcation; 238 members abstained. On the position of the CDU and CSU, see Grau, Gegen den Strom, pp. 332–376, esp. 357, 360, 365. 65. Allardt wrote: “It is doubtful whether it [Brezhnev’s speech] will have a positive effect on the ratiªcation debate.” Allardt to Auswärtiges Amt, 21 March 1972, in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 308. Barzel mentioned to Falin that Brezhnev’s statement had “not been ignored” in Bonn but was not “sufªcient” to convince the CDU and CSU of the USSR’s sincere intentions. Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, p. 190. In his memoirs, Willy Brandt wrote that Brezhnev “in his wooden, but unmis- takable manner” had recognized the EEC as a “reality.” See Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), p. 297. Brandt’s opponent Barzel called Brezhnev’s speech “nuanced.” See Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, p. 158. 66. See the text of the joint declaration in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, pp. 534, 536 n. 4. 67. Brandt speech to the Bundestag, 10 May 1972, in AAPD 1972, Vol. I, p. 503 n. 18. 68. Ibid. 69. Soviet embassy Bonn to MID, 21 August 1972, L. 46, in D. 34, P. 103, Op. 18, F. 757, AVPRF; and Note from Bahr, 4 April 1972, in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 357.

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The New Soviet Approach toward the EEC

Despite the “success” of Brezhnev’s March 1972 speech, a new Soviet approach toward the EEC seemed necessary also for other reasons. In particular, certain small East European states that relied on exporting agricultural produce and manufactured goods to the Common Market were interested in reg- ulating their relationship. The EEC’s adoption of a Common Agricultural

Policy and a Common Commercial Policy made such regulations appear even Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 more urgent. Yugoslavia had already established relations with the EEC, Ro- mania was about to follow in mid-1972, and Hungary was demanding an im- provement in relations between the Eastern bloc and the EEC.70 By mid-1972 the Soviet Foreign Ministry had learned of Romania’s and Hungary’s readiness to sign agreements with the EEC.71 Furthermore, the revitalization and enlargement of the EEC in the years 1969 to 1972 also suggested that coming to terms with the West European bloc would be advantageous for Moscow. When Brezhnev announced the drafting of a new line toward the EEC in his report to the CPSU Central Committee in May 1972, he argued, most proba- bly with these developments in mind, that this new line of the Eastern bloc would protect the interests of the USSR and its allies.72 The Soviet Union’s desire to convene an all-European summit (the CSCE) was another reason to free East-West European relations from the strain of mutual non-recognition of both sides’ economic organizations. This link was to become more visible in Brezhnev’s 21 December 1972 speech, which mentioned the topic. A further incentive to change the Soviet approach came from the People’s Republic of China, which in 1971 had welcomed the emergence of a European bloc on the international stage and signaled its will- ingness to establish diplomatic relations with the EEC.73 All these factors might have convinced Soviet leaders to reassess their approach toward the EEC. Brandt had tried to facilitate this process by stating on 5 May that the EEC “is not directed against anybody. It is ready for cooperation and communication with the Soviet Union and the East European countries and could continue the impulse for reviving East-West contacts.”74 In his speech on 21 December 1972, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Brezhnev ªnally announced that the Soviet government would be interested in ªnding a basis for direct relations between

70. Jung, “Die Annäherung zwischen RGW und EG,” p. 252. 71. Soviet embassy Bonn to MID, 14 June 1972, Ll. 7–10, in D. 98, P. 98, Op. 17, F. 757, AVPRF. 72. Brezhnev Report to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 19 May 1972 (see note 57 supra). 73. Wettig, Europäische Sicherheit, p. 136. 74. Brandt’s comments are recorded in AAPD, 1972, Vol. I, p. 434 n. 33.

94 Recognition in Return for Détente? international organizations such as the CMEA and the EEC, if the latter would do away with all alleged attempts to discriminate against the other side and would foster bilateral relations and European détente. He elaborated:

In our opinion, the time has come to put on the agenda preparations for an all- European program of economic and cultural cooperation. This leads to the question: Will it be possible to ªnd a common basis for some sort of businesslike relations between the currently existing European international organizations for trade and economy, the CMEA and the Common Market? Presumably yes, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 if the EEC countries refrain from any attempt at discriminating against the other side and if they contribute to developing natural bilateral relations and all- European cooperation.75 In other words, the invitation was valid only on the condition that the Euro- pean Commission recognize the CMEA as an equal, that it give up its attempt to control the foreign trade of its members, and that individual EEC states develop bilateral ties with the East and join the Soviet effort to use the CSCE as a platform for intensifying East-West trade. This was basically a return to Khrushchev’s position regarding the EEC in 1962. In addition to these bitter pills, the Soviet advance was made even harder to swallow by its explicit rejection of the supranational nature of West European integration, which had always been a special source of pride for the EC Commission. As in the case of Brezhnev’s announcement of 20 March 1972, the new Soviet line toward the EEC, launched on 21 December, was the byproduct of another strategy. Whereas in the ªrst case the primary Soviet goal had been to facilitate ratiªcation of the Moscow Treaty, in the second case Soviet leaders apparently aimed to establish the CSCE as a tool for fostering détente and East-West trade. Furthermore, the Soviet Union intended to use an agreement between the EEC and the CMEA not only as a framework for bilateral East-West contracts but also as a way of providing the Eastern bloc with West- ern recognition—a move designed to strengthen Soviet control over Eastern Europe. All these conditions and Brezhnev’s caveats were indicators of the So- viet Union’s unwillingness to accept West European integration on its own terms, rendering the initiative unpalatable to the EEC. Nonetheless, regarding the expected consequences of the establishment of ofªcial relations between the CMEA and the EEC, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which since the 1960s had been a major Soviet think-tank for relations with the West, was optimistic.76 An internal report sent to the CPSU In- ternational Department recommended the establishment of such relations as

75. See the transcript of the speech in Archiv der Gegenwart, 21 December 1972, p. 17,555. 76. On IMEMO, see P. P. Cherkasov, IMEMO: Portret na fone epokhi (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2004).

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an important contribution to détente in Europe.77 Furthermore, links between the CMEA and the EEC were expected to be conducive to the consoli- dation of the Eastern economic bloc, the modernization of the USSR’s economy, and the strengthening of Soviet inºuence in Western Europe by way of increased competition between the EEC and the United States. Because of the economic weakness of the East European countries, the authors of the report deemed it essential that the CMEA countries coordinate their relations with

the EEC. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021

The Aftermath: EC-CMEA Negotiations and No Agreement

Ofªcial talks started in 1973. During a meeting with French President Geor- ges Pompidou in Moscow in January 1973, Brezhnev reconªrmed his statement of 21 December 1972 and suggested considering direct cooperation between the CMEA and the European Community.78 In July, Luxembourg’s foreign minister, Gaston Thorn, was informed about the CMEA’s readiness to start ofªcial negotiations,79 and a month later Fadeev visited Denmark, then holder of the EEC’s rotating presidency, and proposed the nomination of del- egations for the talks. A few months later, the CMEA secretary was informed by the Danish embassy that the proposal had been forwarded to the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, which in September welcomed the proposal and agreed to examine the matter further.80 However, as soon became clear, neither the EEC nor the Soviet Union was interested in fulªlling the other side’s preconditions for striking a deal. The West Europeans had no interest whatsoever in dealing with the CMEA—on the contrary. Negotiating with CMEA was seen in Brussels as strengthening Soviet control over Eastern Europe, including East Germany. The EEC wanted to gain recognition as a bloc and, as a bloc, to deal with each East European state separately.81 For this reason, in May 1974 the West German presidency of the Community expressed readiness to start negotiations with East European countries, and the vice president of the EC Com-

77. Memorandum from IMEMO to CPSU Central Committee, 30 January 1973, in D. 207, Op. 66, F. 5, RGANI. 78. Schulz, Moskau und die europäische Integration, p. 84. 79. Schalhorn, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik,” p. 143. 80. Conversation, Fadeev with Stanovnik, n.d. (1974), Ll. 16–19, in D. 1160, Op. 2, F. 302, RGAE. 81. Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe,” p. 19.

96 Recognition in Return for Détente? mission, Christopher Soames, encouraged East Europeans to establish direct relations with the EEC.82 The intent was not only to provide the EEC with ofªcial recognition but also to enable the East European countries to increase their maneuvering space under Soviet rule. However, if the East was unwilling to recognize the EEC, the Western bloc could take comfort in being recognized by more than 100 governments worldwide, including the United States and China. From the economic point of view, there was no real incentive for the EEC to deal with the CMEA, given that internal trade in the EEC was Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 many times higher than the exchange of goods with Eastern Europe. The USSR, for its part, wanted to control the EEC’s dealings with the Warsaw Pact states by establishing tight control of the CMEA and to under- cut the EEC by strengthening bilateral ties with each West European state. The “carrot” of offering recognition to the EEC was to be used in exchange for further integration of the CMEA and for ofªcial recognition by the EEC. From the economic point of view, Moscow, an exporter mainly of oil, natural gas, and weaponry, was not interested in striking a deal with Brussels. This was in contrast to the East European states, which relied on the export of agricultural produce and manufactured goods and were confronted by EEC im- port restrictions. Given these contradictions, the ªrst trip of an ofªcial EEC delegation to Moscow, which was supposed to pave the way for a visit to Moscow by EC Commission President François-Xavier Ortoli in February 1975, was doomed to fail.83 After the EEC had approved draft agreements between the Commu- nity and East European countries in 1974, a CMEA delegation to Luxem- bourg in February 1976 conveyed its own proposal for a treaty on the establishment of mutual relations between the two organizations. The draft was based on the assumption that the EEC and the CMEA had equal treaty- making power (an assumption that was rejected with indignation by the supranational EEC). The CMEA proposal also envisaged bilateral economic relations between EEC members and CMEA countries and the extension of most-favored nation status to all CMEA countries by the EEC (stipulations that were all equally unacceptable to the Brussels club).84 Presumably, these demands reºected some combination of several factors, including Moscow’s

82. Klaus-Peter Schmidt, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft aus Sicht der DDR (Hamburg: Kovac, 1991), p. 79. 83. See Fadeev to Titov, 24 January 1975, L. 1, in D. 1428, Op. 2, F. 3, RGAE. 84. Jean-Claude Gotron, “Otnosheniya mezhdu Evropeiskim Soyuzom i Rossiei: Istoricheskii i teoreticheskii aspekty” (paper presented at the “40 let Rimskim dogovoram: Evropeiskaya integratsiya i Rossiya” conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, 1997), http://www.edc.spb.ru/activities/conferences/ 40years/gotron.html, pp. 4–5.

97 Mueller

determination to shield the East European countries from the EEC, concern among Soviet leaders about the East Europeans’ growing independence, and an effort by the Soviet Union to gain as much as possible by recognizing the EEC. Although the negotiations were revived by two visits to Moscow by EC Commission Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp, in May 1978 and Novem- ber 1979, the talks achieved no substantial progress and were discontinued in 1981.85

In the meantime, each side continued to ignore the other’s economic Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 bloc. The Soviet Union was successful in luring West European states into signing proªtable bilateral trade agreements, thus violating the EEC’s Com- mon Commercial Policy (CCP). Although the president of the EC Commis- sion, Jean Rey, had in 1969 criticized the member states’ habit of bypassing the Community’s rules for foreign trade, state-to-state trade agreements with the Soviet Union were signed by, among others, Italy, West Germany, Britain, France, and Belgium. Once the USSR started to export natural gas to Western Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, new agreements on the delivery of West European pipes in exchange for Siberian gas were concluded. Thus, until the mid-1970s the EEC was forced to delay the implementation of its CCP no less than three times. When the trade agreements of all EEC members expired on 31 December 1974, new “cooperation agreements” were concluded.86 Not until 1988 did the USSR, after 30 years of non-recognition, recognize the EEC.87

Conclusions

Russian archival documents and memoirs leave little doubt that the Soviet initiatives of 1972 to establish direct contact with the EEC were mainly tactical maneuvers to foster support for the Moscow Treaty with West Germany and for a wider détente in Europe. When Brezhnev mentioned the EEC in his March 1972 speech, a new Eastern strategy toward the West European bloc

85. Carl Alexander Krethlow, Wirtschaftskrieg und Monopolkapital: Das Bild der europäischen Gemeinschaft in der sowjetischen Presse 1979 bis 1985 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), p. 234. 86. Before the conclusion of such agreements, the EC Commission had to be consulted. Hans von der Groeben, “Die Außenbeziehungen der Gemeinschaft zwischen Statik und Dynamik,” in Eberhard Schulz, ed., Die Ostbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Von nationalstaatlicher Politik zu gemeinsamer Verantwortung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1977), pp. 25–48. 87. Wolfgang Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” in Michael Gehler, ed., From the Rome Treaties to European Union Building (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 617–662, esp. 659. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the USSR and the EEC did not entail Soviet recognition of the Community. See Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), p. 211.

98 Recognition in Return for Détente? had yet to be deªned. The forging of a new approach took months, and the resulting political line was not fully set until Brezhnev’s second speech on the topic, in December. Although the Moscow Treaty was the starting point for Brezhnev’s initiative in March, détente and the CSCE along with other factors lay behind the declaration of December. This second overture (after that of 1962) for launching talks between the EEC and the CMEA occurred in the context of a gain in power by the EEC (through further integration and ex- pansion) and growing East European interest in striking a deal with the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Brussels club. By establishing contacts between the EEC and the CMEA, the Soviet Union hoped to foster East-West trade, gain recognition for the CMEA, and both intensify and control (via the CMEA) the bilateral ties between East European and West European states. However, the unsuccessful course of the talks between the EC and the CMEA indicates that neither Moscow nor Brussels was ready to pay the price the other side demanded for establishing relations, and no agreement was reached in the 1970s. The USSR did not endorse the integration process of Western Europe until many years later, under Gorbachev. Prior to that, Soviet leaders had no desire to see a powerful United States of Europe emerge, a union that would be able to compete with the Soviet Union and attract the small states of East- ern Europe. Even if Brezhnev had not been inºuenced by Marxist-Leninist teachings about inter-capitalist conºicts and had been able to grasp that integration actually reºected the West European states’ common interests, he was not interested in fostering the integration process by recognizing the Com- munity on its own terms. He was prepared to accept the Common Market only on the Soviet Union’s terms; to wit, as an international economic organization that did away with “discrimination” against third countries and, together with the CMEA, facilitated “businesslike economic relations” between East and West European states. Brezhnev’s unwillingness to accept West Euro- pean integration as conceived in the West (i.e., a supranational regional struc- ture that was per deªnition “discriminatory” toward third countries and aimed at gradually creating a political union) might have been ideologically predetermined or, more likely, motivated by Moscow’s determination to fore- stall a possible shift in the balance of power in favor of the EEC. In any case, the option of supporting the EEC to make it a counterweight to U.S. in- ºuence was never seriously contemplated. Although Soviet-bloc propaganda tried to use the motto “Europe for Europeans” in order to weaken the West European alliance with the United States, Soviet leaders never decided to take the chance of wholeheartedly endorsing the project. To hamper integration, the Soviet Union relied mainly on two tactics: (1) the denial of ofªcial recognition and the circumventing of common Euro- pean institutions, and (2) the promotion of “all-European” forums (instead of

99 Mueller

West European or transatlantic organizations) and the intensiªcation of state- to-state contacts and trade agreements with EEC members to highlight the beneªts of sovereignty versus integration. The inadvertent “accomplices” in this Soviet tactic were the governments of various West European states, which proved only too willing to jeopardize their own integration project for the sake of short-term national beneªt. Before the advent of Mikhail Gorba- chev, no fundamental change in the Soviet attitude took place. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/13/4/79/697792/jcws_a_00167.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021

Acknowledgments

The author expresses his gratitude to the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s archive, the Russian State Archive for the Econ- omy, and the Russian State Archive of Modern History, as well as to Michael Gehler, William D. Godsey, Jr., Suvi Kansikas, Mikhail Lipkin, Cynthia Peck, and Gerhard Wettig.

100