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March 21, 1968 Memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian CP About Tensions in Czechoslovakia

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March 21, 1968 Memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian CP About Tensions in Czechoslovakia Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified March 21, 1968 Memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian CP about tensions in Czechoslovakia Citation: “Memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian CP about tensions in Czechoslovakia,” March 21, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, Ll. 18-23. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112161 Summary: A report on a conversation between Yu. V. Il’nyts’kyi, Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian CP, and Jan Koscelanský, 1st Secretary of the KSC’s East Slovakia regional committee on the developing situation in Czechoslovakia. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation C P S U C C Attached is an informational memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian CP, Cde. Yu. V. Il'nyts'kyi, about the events in Czechoslovakia. P. SHELEST 21 March 1968 No. 1/22 CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE STATUS REPORT For your information I want to report that on 18 March 1968, the 1st Secretary of the KSC's East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Jan Koscelanský, called me and requested that we meet at the border that same day. I should note that we have been having these sorts of meetings more or less regularly, mainly at his request. The meetings allow Cde. Koscelanský to share his views about ongoing party and economic work and also about events in the country. The most recent meeting before this one occurred on 10 January, when he informed me about the results of the October, December, and January plenums of the KSC CC. At previous meetings, Cde. Koscelanský always had been accompanied by the chairman of the provincial executive committee and one or two secretaries from the regional committee. We have had the same level of representation on our side. But on this latest occasion, at his request, the meeting was one-on-one. Cde. Koscelanský informed me about recent events in his country. He said that the municipal and regional party conferences in their country were very tempestuous. Sharp criticism was directed against the old methods of leadership, which had given rise to a cult of Novotný. 22 In his view, the conferences went well. The first set of cadres in the party committees were elected by a secret vote. Regarding the events under way in Czechoslovakia as a whole, he stated that they are wider and more profound, and will have more far-reaching consequences, than the events of 1948. The Czechoslovak comrades believe that social development in their country after 1948 moved in the right direction until the beginning of the 1950s, when a period of the cult of personality began both in their country and in other socialist countries. 23 In the CSSR this cult took a particularly monstrous form once Novotný arrived. At present, new progressive forces have been growing, who have waged a decisive struggle against the conservatives. Now the question has arisen of how to foster conditions for the development of democracy in the full sense of that word. Why, for example, was it possible in the bourgeois republic to criticize the president and to make caricatures of him, whereas it is impossible to do this in the socialist countries? The Czechoslovak comrades believe that full democracy requires the elimination of any kind of censorship, the ending of instructions and orders from above to the radio, press, and television, the elimination of judicial proceedings and repression against citizens for their political views and statements, and the rehabilitation of all those who were repressed. 24 In connection with this the State Security organs behaved improperly during the cult of personality. To ensure that there are no antagonistic classes in the country, the StB organs will be reduced to a minimum and the regular police organs will be expanded. Citizens will be permitted to leave the country, either permanently or temporarily, without any sort of restrictions; and the electrified fence along the border with the FRG will be removed. 26 Cde. Koscelanský said that they must work in such a way that the capitalists are fenced off from them, rather than being fenced off themselves from the capitalists. The opportunity will arise to create new social organizations (student, peasant, and other organizations). A decision also has been adopted to postpone regular elections so that favorable conditions can be created for them. A very important question, in their view, is the linkage of broad democracy with the leading role of the party. They understand it this way: Officials in party organs must be so authoritative and must speak with the masses so convincingly that the masses will support these officials as well as the party without any sort of pressure from above. For this purpose they need new cadres who are able to play such a leading role. Many questions have been raised at the party conferences about why Comrade L. I. Brezhnev came to Czechoslovakia in December of last year. 27 In response to this question, the Czechoslovak comrades have been saying that Novotný invited Cde. L. I. Brezhnev without consulting any of the other members of the CC Presidium. When Comrade L. I. Brezhnev saw that there were two different points of view in the Presidium about how to resolve festering problems, he responded that we will not interfere in your internal affairs, since your party is monolithic and solid, and the healthy forces in it can resolve all the problems. 28 Such an answer and such behavior by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev won universal approval. Further on, Cde. Koscelanský said that some of the conservatives, in particular the CSSR representative at CMEA, Simunek, justify the obsolescence of the economy by attributing it to the unequal trade agreements between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. 29 In reponse to this, I remarked to Cde. Koscelanský that I can't speak about trade as a whole, but Czechoslovakia now is third in the world in the production of metals per capita, and once you begin operating the metallurgical combine in Košice with a capacity of 6 million tons of steel a year— a combine that was equipped with assistance from the USSR and with our raw materials, and every day receives 23,000 tons of Kryvyi Rih iron ore and 6,110 tons of Donets'k coal—your country will occupy first place in these categories. 30 And this is at the same time when, for example, in our oblast there is a shortage of metal and we are unable to keep the work force busy. 31 Cde. Koscelanský agreed with this and assured me that they are waging and will continue to wage a struggle against all those who try to cover up for their inactivity by making accusations against the USSR. Turning to the national question, Cde. Koscelanský said that Czechoslovakia will be a federated republic (Czechs and Slovaks), and the national minorities (Hungarians and Ukrainians) will be given autonomy. 32 In response to this I said to him that autonomy is their internal affair, but I requested that he take a look at the Ukrainian newspaper “Nove zhittya,” published in Prešov, which features nationalist opinions about the Transcarpathian in the name of the workers of the province, something that is completely unacceptable. 33 Cde. Koscelanský assured me that the current events are not a repetition of the events of 1956 in Hungary, since in Hungary the popular masses rose up against the party and Central Committee, whereas in the CSSR they are speaking out against the conservatives and the Novotný group and are supporting their party, the CC, and friendship with the Soviet Union. The CC First Secretary, Dubcek, enjoys great authority among all spheres of the population. He cited an example that when Cde. Dubcek recently had to go to the hospital, students visited him and brought him bouquets of flowers and bottles of “Elinek” plum brandy. Further on, Cde. Koscelanský reported that on 28 March, they have a CC plenum scheduled, where an “Action Program” will be adopted and the question of Novotný's tenure as President of the Republic will be decided. 34 In his view, the shortcomings of the current campaign arise not because many dishonorable people have joined in, but because some do not understand it properly. In addition, the Czechoslovak students sent a greeting to the Polish students, which obviously caused Cde. Gomulka to be angry at the Czechoslovak comrades. 35 In conclusion, Cde. Koscelanský requested that we convey to the Soviet friends that, beginning with Cde. Dubcek and going through every rank-and-file Communist, they will do everything possible to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union and to advance the cause of socialism on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. FIRST SECRETARY, TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST COMMITTEE, CP OF UKRAINE Yu. IL'NYTS'KYI 22 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Following the death of Klement Gottwald in March 1953, Antonín Novotný became First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. When Novotný's main rival, Antonín Zapotocký, the President of the CSSR, died in November 1957, Novotný succeeded him while also keeping his post atop the Communist Party. From that point until the end of 1967, Novotný ruled as both KSC First Secretary and President of the CSSR. 23 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This period marked the height of show trials in Czechoslovakia, which continued even after the deaths of Josif Stalin and Klement Gottwald in March 1953. For the official report on this era, which was suppressed in Czechoslovakia after the August 1968 invasion, see Jirí Pelikán, ed., Potlacená zpráva: Zpráva Komise ÚV KSC o politických procesech a rehabilitacích v Ceskoslovensku 1949-68 (Vienna: Karz, 1970).
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