Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst
BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 15 NO. 17 4 SEPTEMBER 2013 Contents
Analytical Articles
RUSSIA RAMPS UP PRESSURE ON TAJIKISTAN 4 Dmitry Shlapentokh
KAZAKHSTAN PLANS TO REWRITE ITS INNOVATION STRATEGY BY HOSTING EXPO-2017: WILL IT WORK? 7 Rafis Abazov and Arystanbek Mukhamediuly
KAZAKHSTAN’S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES FOR THE POST-2013 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 11 Jacob Zenn
TAJIKISTAN'S PRIVATE SECTOR LOSES ITS LEADER AND COORDINATING COUNCIL 15 Oleg Salimov
Field Reports
VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS BAKU 19 Mina Muradova
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SPARKS TENSIONS BETWEEN KYRGYZSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN 21 Arslan Sabyrbekov
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV SETS NEW GOALS BEFORE PARLIAMENT 23 Georgiy Voloshin
AZERBAIJAN APPLIES FOR PACE RESOLUTION ON THE SARSANG RESERVOIR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH 25 Bakhtiyar Aslanov THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST
Editor: Svante E. Cornell
Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson
Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova
Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."
Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.
Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.
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Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 4
RUSSIA RAMPS UP PRESSURE ON TAJIKISTAN Dmitry Shlapentokh
Tajikistan, one of the most impoverished states of Central Asia, has a tense relationship with neighboring Uzbekistan and faces a potential threat from Islamist radicals from Afghanistan, a threat that will most likely increase after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmon has been on an endless search for geopolitical partnerships. While China, the U.S. and Iran are all seen as potential partners, Russia remains Tajikistan’s principal patron. Yet, Dushanbe’s own demands for bilateral security arrangements have antagonized Moscow, which is increasingly threatening to deport Tajik migrant workers as a means for influencing Dushanbe’s policies.
BACKGROUND: In October 2012, The political observer Leonid Savin Moscow and Dushanbe seemed to have noted that if Rakhmon would create resolved most problems on their problems for Moscow, he could well be bilateral agenda. Dushanbe agreed to replaced by a “more reasonable” keep a Russian military base in the person, which could be justified to the country free of charge in exchange for West as “promoting democracy.” Russia’s implicit protection of Moscow has not only engaged in talks Rakhmon’s regime and considerable but also in actions aimed at economic and military aid. Yet, soon destabilizing Rakhmon’s regime, most after accepting Moscow’s demands, prominently by threatening to deport Rakhmon stated that he does not see Tajik migrant workers, which would any true benefits for Tajikistan from imply serious economic and political integrating with regional military problems for Tajikistan. This threat organizations sponsored by Russia and was first discussed in March 2013 demanded a dramatic increase in when a Russian observer noted that Russian investments in Tajikistan’s Tajikistan, more than any other hydroelectric project, along with other country in Central Asia, should stay on demands. good terms with Russia since “around By March 2013, tensions rose rapidly one million Tajiks, one eighth of the between Dushanbe and Moscow. On county’s entire population, is in March 15, the Chief of the Russian Russia.” General Staff and Tajikistan’s Minister The threat became more pronounced of Defense discussed the October in April 2013, when nationalist Duma agreement between Putin and member Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated Rakhmon, but the negotiations that if Russia would deport Tajik labor apparently led nowhere, causing Igor migrants, Tajikistan would be in the Shuvalov, First Deputy Premier of hands of Islamists. Moscow also sent Russia, to cancel his visit to Tajikistan. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 5
Dushanbe and Moscow seems ready to take a step in this direction. Dushanbe has responded by seeking to upgrade its relations with China, Iran and the West, foreign policy moves that clearly irritated Putin, who invited Rakhmon to visit Moscow on August 1, the signal that it was seriously 2013. The negotiations were contemplating deportations. inconclusive and Russia’s response to The Russian public was prepared for a Rakhmon’s visit was rather skeptical. possible action against Tajik migrants Centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta noted as Russian authorities provided a that Rakhmon came to Moscow empty- variety of justifications for its handed and should understand that a approach, claiming that Tajikistan is a “multi-vector” foreign policy is for hotbed for terrorists who then move to “clever and strong” leaders and he Russia. The information was widely definitely does not fall into this accepted by the Russian public, among category. The Kremlin implicitly which anti-migrant opinions, warned that Tajikistan’s attempt to especially against Caucasians and engage with NATO and the U.S. on the Central Asians, are quite popular. A one hand, and China and Iran on the series of demonstrations took place in other, could lead to not only a foreign Russian cities on April 14, echoing the policy debacle but to the collapse of call for stricter migration controls for the regime, which Moscow would labor migrants. facilitate by deporting Tajik migrant IMPLICATIONS: Moscow also sought workers. to employ carrots in its relations with Russian observers noted that Tajikistan. During a May 2013 meeting Dushanbe is wrong to assume that between Rakhmon and Putin, the Tajik migrants are of any importance latter hinted that trade between to Russia. Pro-government Regnum Russia and Tajikistan could be also noted that former Soviet countries increased. Yet, the meeting brought no who encourage their citizens to go to visible results despite Putin’s call on Russia should remember that Russia is Rakhmon to speed up the ratification under no obligation to accept them of the October 2012 treaty, which and that the right to be in Russia is a stipulated the conditions for Russia’s privilege. Moreover, the number of military presence in Tajikistan. The migrants that Russia is ready to accept Kremlin’s displeasure was conveyed will decline and only countries who by articles published in the Russian are members of the Eurasian Union, or press, implying that Rakhmon’s regime are at least on good terms with Russia, is extremely unstable and could easily will enjoy privileges of sending their be overturned. The potential problem migrants to Russia. Another Russian of Tajik migrants being deported from observer noted ominously that Russia would be devastating for “Rakhmon is aware that if Russia Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 6 would lose patience and would send designs could indeed prove successful back several planes with deported and the Kremlin would be able to Tajik migrants, it would lead to chaos install a less problematic counterpart in Dushanbe.” in Dushanbe, there is also a risk of the In early August 2013, soon after Kremlin’s assertions about Islamism in Putin’s meeting with Rakhmon, the Tajikistan becoming a self-fulfilled Russian authorities seemingly decided prophecy. Such a development would to tackle the problem in earnest. There have profound implications not only is a plan to build 83 camps for illegal for Tajikistan but also Uzbekistan, and migrants in Russia, where they can be would by extension create a serious detained awaiting deportation. One problem for Moscow itself. This such camp is already built in Moscow. possibility is understood by Kremlin While the camps and arrests of officials, who also likely grasp the thousands of immigrants are not extremely negative impact that mass designated only to target Tajiks, the deportations of migrant workers, authorities clearly regard the new regardless of ethnicity, would have for policy as a means for pressuring Russia’s image across Central Asia, and Tajikistan and making credible the that this would damage the prospects assertion that limiting Tajik migration for establishing the Eurasian Union. to Russia, or even expelling a Finally, mass deportations would hurt considerable number of Tajiks, is the Russian economy. indeed on the table. By extension, this The variety of problems which mass demonstration has implications also deportations could create not just for for other countries of Central Asia and Dushanbe but also for Russia itself will the Caucasus – some observers believe likely prevent the Kremlin from full that Moscow could start to deport implementation of its threat. Still, the Azerbaijanis if Baku does not follow prospect of selectively limiting Moscow’s bidding. migration and deportations in a CONCLUSIONS: Limitations to Tajik smaller scale is clearly becoming a tool labor migration to Russia would be a of Russian foreign policy toward serious problem for Rakhmon’s former Soviet states and possibly regime, and could indeed trigger social beyond. upheaval resembling the recent unrest AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh in Kyrgyzstan. The results of such is Associate Professor of History, unrest would be manifold and Indiana University at South Bend unpredictable. While Moscow’s Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 7
KAZAKHSTAN PLANS TO REWRITE ITS INNOVATION STRATEGY BY HOSTING EXPO-2017: WILL IT WORK? Rafis Abazov and Arystanbek Mukhamediuly
Kazakhstan plans to host World EXPO under the theme “Energy of the Future” in 2017 as part of its ambitious Innovation Strategy, designed to develop skill-intensive sectors and to promote innovative businesses, especially in the alternative energy sector. In preparation for the event, the Kazakh government plans to spend between US$ 3 and 5 billion on alternative energy development and infrastructure, respectively. Opinions in the country are deeply divided. Some believe that this is an excellent opportunity to promote targeted industries and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the alternative energy sector. Others are very skeptical, considering it likely to become another white elephant with little impact on Kazakhstan’s national economy.
BACKGROUND: The government US$ 3-5 billion) on World EXPO – an considers World EXPO-2017 as an international exhibition to be hosted opportunity to catch a very promising in Kazakhstan’s new capital Astana in economic tide, as many economists summer 2017. around the world predict a significant In fact, World EXPO-2017 has become potential for job and business creation an integral part of what President and economic growth in a new Nursultan Nazarbayev calls “energy- approach to economic development – ecological security” and a “green the creation of a green economy. bridge” to growth. Astana won the Kazakhstan – like many countries in right to host World EXPO-2017 the CIS – is working hard to reinvent beating another strong contender, itself in the post-global financial crisis Belgium, by a large margin of 148 era. This includes the search for votes against 44 on November 22, country recognition in the 2012. Kazakhstan selected a very international market, development of appealing topic for the event – internationally and regionally alternative energy – and committed to competitive industries and steering spend between US$ 300 and 400 clear of high dependency on energy million on EXPO site facilities, US$ 1- exports and the so-called Dutch 1.3 billion on a city railway system, Disease. roads and new construction, and In this context, the government is about US$ 3 billion on promoting its investing great hope and a very own alternative energy sector. In substantial amount of money (some addition, the country hopes to attract local experts estimate that the total the latest hi-tech in the field of bill will be about US$ 10-12 billion, in contrast with government estimates of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 8
IMPLICATIONS: The Kazakh economy is indeed in need of innovative public policy initiatives and effective policy actions in order to address the country’s economic challenges and stimulate economic diversification and competitiveness. The highly concentrated investment
efforts announced in the World EXPO- alternative energy and, according to 2017 preparation initiatives could Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the UN become steps in the right direction if Byrganym Aitimova “to share it with implemented effectively. the least developed and developing The government already spent almost countries.” It also established an US$ 10 billion on the country’s new ambitious target of attracting between capital Astana and a network of multi- four and five million visitors to this billion dollar techno- and industrial event alone. parks, and US$ 3 billion on a highway For comparison, according to the State project that includes an East-West Statistics Agency, Kazakhstan cross-national highway section of the attracted less than five million visitors World Bank-supported Western during all of 2012, of whom only about Europe – Western China highway 13 percent were tourists, and ranked (WE-WC). Human capacity building 88th out of 140 in the World Tourism projects include Kazakhstan’s multi- Ranking for 2013 (behind Latvia in billion flagship Bolashak (Future) 48th place, Russia in 63rd and educational program, which has Ukraine in 76th place). funded several thousand Kazakhstani Achieving these ambitious goals is students to study at major prestigious quite a challenge for a nation of just 16 universities in the West and in East million without access to large Asia. In addition, the government maritime communication routes and plans to spend billions of dollars on which just a decade ago was one of the domestic education projects, such as largest international donor aid Nazarbayev University and massive recipients in the former Soviet space. funding of several national research The country made considerable universities. It also spent several achievements in its economic billion dollars to back up its banking development during the energy boom sector during the global financial crisis era that started around 2001-2002 of 2008-2009, when Kazakhstan’s and that has driven the price of oil to economy plunged from double digit double or as much as triple compared growth of its national GDP in 2001 to with energy prices in the 1990s, and 1.2 percent in 2009. GDP per capita grew from US$ 5,900 The multi-billion dollar EXPO-2017 in 2001 to an estimated US$ 13,900 in initiative is already channeling 2012. significant investments into large Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 9 national projects with a certain impact building and maintaining traditional on the country’s economic power-transmitting lines to remote development and GDP growth. areas is extremely costly and First is a concentrated direction of complicated. resources targeting some sectors of The fourth impact is job creation, the economy with high potential in the education reform and research in the regional markets and stimulating the field of alternative energy. New development of the innovative SME projects are already hiring university sector. In a time of weakening demand graduates with appropriate skills, for Kazakhstan’s traditional exports, paying significant salary premiums the government is trying to stimulate and bonuses for those who have the domestic consumption, domestic requisite knowledge and experience. markets and those economic sectors CONCLUSIONS: Heated policy that experienced losses during the debates still continue on the merits of crisis or have lost their international hosting the World EXPO in Kazakhstan competitiveness. in 2017, though the discussion is Second, Astana has also increased gradually shifting toward the investments into the development of implementation process. The national infrastructure including experience of Kazakhstan and many highways, railways and neighboring countries underline the communication lines. Many highways importance of a high-quality and local roads outside the implementation policy to successful strategically important Almaty-Astana completion of national programs and highway form a veritable Tetris of projects. In this context, Kazakhstan’s holes and patches. International government should work carefully to development experts suggest that a identify high-priority infrastructure good national infrastructure is an projects, economic sectors and attracting point for international enterprises that might pioneer new investors as well as for visitors and technologies and new approaches, and tourists. avoid “white elephant” super-large Third, Kazakhstan has begun investing construction projects which would be resources into alternative energy abandoned upon the conclusion of production including opening its first World EXPO. Second, the government US$ 130 million solar panel should use a public-private manufacturing operation in Temirtau partnership (PPP) approach to and a US$ 100 million innovative stimulate a high level of investments wind-powered electricity station in in the private sector, especially SMEs, Zhambyl. These sources of energy are both in the development of new still quite expensive and heavily energy-saving technologies and in subsidized from the state budget, yet preparation for World EXPO. Last but such moves make sense in a country not least the government should avoid with strong solar radiation and the trap experienced by many regular wind patterns, and where developing countries where much Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 10 money is spent on infrastructure and Soviet International Politics in buildings, but inadequate amounts on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and building human capital through Uzbekistan” (1999), “The Culture education and training. Kazakhstan and Customs of the Central Asian should continue investing in human Republics” (2007) and “The Role of capacity building among the general Think Tanks in the Policy-Making population and especially among its Process in Kazakhstan” (2011). young people, and should make Arystanbek Mukhamediuly, PhD, is regular needs assessments to identify Professor and Rector of T. Zhurgenov skills and competencies that will be Kazakh National Academy of Arts. He invaluable in the new and innovation- is author of ten books on modern driven economy in the context of Kazakhstan, including “The Art of Kazakhstan’s national development. Independent Kazakhstan in the AUTHOR’S BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, Context of Cooperation with UNESCO” is a visiting professor at Al Farabi (2011). In the past he has chaired Kazakh National University and a several international festivals and director of Global Classroom conferences. Program. He also teaches at SIPA, Columbia University, NY. He is author of “The Formation of Post- Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 11
KAZAKHSTAN’S COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGIES FOR THE POST-2013 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Jacob Zenn
Since the first terrorist attacks struck Kazakhstan in 2011, the country has reformed its counter-terrorism strategy to confront emerging threats. Kazakhstan learned that more intelligence and understanding of extremists could have prevented the attacks. The country also saw that counter-radicalization programs are necessary to counter Salafism, which is anathema to the country’s religious traditions and can serve as a gateway to jihadism. In the near future, Kazakhstan will also focus on regional counter-terrorism cooperation to limit the fallout of wars abroad on the home front.
BACKGROUND: Between May and secular institutions, religious policies, August 2011, Kazakhstan’s and the Zhanaozen labor protests of westernmost provinces witnessed a December 2011. The use of these series of attacks that served as wake- forums, which are administered by al- up call to the government. In May, Qaeda representatives, showed that there were suicide and vehicle JaK was an international terrorist bombings in Aktobe near National group. Later in 2012, evidence Security Committee buildings emerged that JaK’s amir in Afghanistan involving Kazakh and Kyrgyz citizens. was an al-Qaeda member and a Swiss In June and July, there were shootings citizen of North African descent, who of police and armed forces officers in trained Muhammed Merah to carry out Shubarshi, Aktobe. In early September, a shooting spree in Toulouse, France in there was another suicide bombing in March 2012, in which four French Atyrau. paratroopers and three Jews were From October to December 2011, Jund killed. al-Khilafah (JaK), with connections to In 2012, the activities of Salafist- militants in the North Caucasus and Jihadist groups like JaK were curtailed, Afghanistan, claimed three attacks in but Kazakhstan saw a new extremist Atyrau, Taraz and Boraldai village in trend. There was an uptick in activities Almaty. Like the series of attacks in of Salafist groups like Tablighi Jamaat western Kazakhstan, JaK’s attacks (TJ), which harbors the goal to involved police shootings and suicide Islamize majority-Muslim countries bombings. However, a key difference was that JaK used jihadist forums to claim the attacks and issue propaganda to condemn Kazakhstan’s Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 12
Kyrgyzstan, or any other country” and engage in jihad. The prospect of the return of jihadists from abroad to Kazakhstan after the U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan or a potential rebel victory in Syria may be the next trend Kazakhstan faces. IMPLICATIONS: Rather than being
caught behind the curve as in 2011, and create a global Islamic Caliphate. Kazakhstan is now working to prevent TJ’s mashura (Arabic for “council”) new threats before they surface, in exists parallel to Kazakhstan’s particular threats to the home front Spiritual Directorate of Muslims; from “hot-spots” around the world. In therefore by implication it rejects the May 2013, Kairat Lama Sharif, country’s political and religious Kazakhstan’s Head of the State Agency authorities. TJ has also been connected for Religions, acknowledged that the to al-Qaeda in countries ranging from country was “concerned” about JaK Mali to Pakistan. However, it focuses and other terrorist organizations that on religiously moderate groups like were recruiting Kazakh youths to “so- Kazakhs and Kyrgyz because TJ called holy wars,” such as in Syria, the believes they are most in “need” of a North Caucasus and Afghanistan. “revival of Islamic piety.” In 2012, Similarly, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Kazakhstan reported that it Chairman of the National Security suppressed an all-time high of more Commission, Kabdulkarim than 200 TJ missionaries. Abdikazimov, acknowledged that “the In 2013, there have been fewer reports most serious threat is posed by of Salafist-Jihadist and TJ activity, but terrorist organizations located in the an increase in reports of Kazakh Afghanistan-Pakistan border area that jihadists abroad. Kazakh citizens, are planning to build a ‘khalifat’ in possibly including ethnic Chechens, Central Asia.” To anticipate worst-case are believed to be the largest scenarios, Kazakhstan has looked at contingent of Central Asians in the the history of terrorist attacks in its North Caucasus. There are also an near abroad for examples of what estimated 200 Kazakhs in Afghanistan could be expected. The Kazakh Special and Pakistan and an unknown number Forces have therefore trained for in Syria, some in leadership positions. hostage negotiations in a “Beslan- For example, on July 15, 2013, a style” attack, referring to the town in Kazakh named “Brother Abu-Mu’adh North Ossetia, Russia, where in 2004 al-Muhajir” appeared in a video with more than 380 people, mostly Syrian rebels introducing the students, were killed at an elementary “mujahedeen from Kazakhstan” and school during a terrorist takeover of calling on “those who live in tyranny” the entire school. to “emigrate from Kazakhstan, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 13
Consistent with viewing terrorism as years old. Some Salafists, including regional issue, Kazakhstan has reached JaK’s founders, were radicalized out, in particular, to Afghanistan not through viewing jihadist propaganda only by increasing investment, but also online, especially the Russian jihadist by providing educational grants to Said Buryatskiy, who was killed in the Afghans to study in Kazakhstan. North Caucasus in 2012. Kazakhstan hopes that when the Kazakhstan has therefore blocked Afghan students return home and take more than 950 websites that promote leadership positions, they will terrorism after receiving court influence the country to adopt a more permission in 2011-2012. At the same liberal approach to religion and time, Kazakhstan launched an anti- society, thus mitigating the potential terrorism website, Counter-terror.kz, Talibanization of the country post- which posts materials to discourage 2013. At the same time, Kazakhstan is terrorism. On the legal front, in 2013, working to secure its own borders, Kazakhstan amended the Criminal including — on the directive of Code and the Law on Combating President Nazarbayev — developing Terrorism to combat the use of the Near-Border Services, improving information systems or educational customs authorities, and more closely materials to radicalize others. In total, monitoring freight delivery to prevent Kazakhstan has invested more than weapons or drugs from being US$ 1 billion on countering religious trafficked. In addition, in July 2013, extremism. Kazakhstan’s intelligence services CONCLUSIONS: Recognizing the uncovered local Salafist groups importance of a stable internal funding terrorist groups abroad. environment for continued economic Farther afield, Kazakhstan has also growth and political liberalization, begun cooperating with the European Kazakhstan has taken the terrorist Union on a joint counter-terrorist threat seriously. As President propaganda program. Nazarbayev said in December 2012, Yet, in light of the homegrown cells “the secular nature of Kazakhstan is a that carried out attacks in 2011 and crucial precondition for the nation’s the increased activities of groups like further development.” The attacks TJ, Kazakhstan has been forced to look Kazakhstan suffered in 2011 and the inwards to address radicalization. activities of grassroots Salafist groups According to Kazakhstan’s National and international ones like TJ have Security Commission, there are over compelled the country to respond to 20 radical Salafi Jamaats (“Societies”) the reality that even though Kazakhs with approximately 500 members in are religiously moderate, their country the country. In western Kazakhstan, is not immune to extremist influences which is closest to the North Caucasus from beyond Kazakhstan’s borders. and where JaK’s founders came from, Since 2011, Kazakhstan has minimized there are several thousand Salafists, the previous year’s threat: the the majority of whom are under 30 homegrown Salafist-Jihadist threat in Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 14
2011 did not repeat itself in 2012. China and the Ural region in Russia, Moreover, TJ has been less effective in remain stable, Kazakhstan will likely recruiting in 2013 than in 2012, be able to withstand the increasingly especially after Kazakhstan proscribed complex – and dangerous – it as a violent extremist organization. operational environment across In 2013, however, Kazakhstan is not Eurasia that will likely emerge after acting retroactively, but preparing its the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the end security framework for the future. The of the Syrian civil war. security threats Kazakhstan will face AUTHOR’S BIO: Jacob Zenn is an will be tied to regional developments. Analyst of Eurasian Affairs for The Thus, the country is seeking to prevent Jamestown Foundation and a non- citizens from being influenced by resident research fellow of the Center extremists abroad, especially in Syria, of Shanghai Cooperation Organization the North Caucasus and Afghanistan, Studies (COSCOS) in Shanghai. He while also developing international testified before the U.S. Congress on partnerships to prevent extremists Islamist Militant Threats to Central abroad, including Kazakhs already in Asia in February 2013. foreign theatres, from gaining influence in Kazakhstan. As long as Kazakhstan’s neighbors in Central Asia, including Xinjiang in Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 15
TAJIKISTAN'S PRIVATE SECTOR LOSES ITS LEADER AND COORDINATING COUNCIL Oleg Salimov
The upcoming presidential elections in Tajikistan this fall will be a determinant of political developments in the country in coming years. There is little doubt that the current president Emomali Rakhmon will seize the opportunity to stay in power for a fourth presidential term secured by a 2003 referendum. While there has been no formal statement on whether Rakhmon will run again, his political opponents have recently experienced increased pressure, implying that Rakhmon is preparing the ground for a head start. The arrest of Zaid Saidov, a businessman and leader of the newly founded political party New Tajikistan, demonstrates the precautions taken by the Tajik government ahead of the presidential elections.
BACKGROUND: Saidov, a former Saidov was arrested in May 2013, a government official and head of month after he announced the Coordination Council of Business and founding of the political party New Public Associations (CCBPA), was Tajikistan. During the announcement, arrested on multiple charges in May Saidov indicated that his party would ahead of November’s presidential not affiliate itself with either pro- elections. Shortly before his arrest, a government or opposition formations special session of CCBPA members and would pursue compromise declared the council disbanded. solutions for resolving economic and Rakhmon, known for his social issues through close cooperation uncompromising tactics in dealing with the general public and with the political opposition, has government. Saidov particularly eliminated not only direct rivals but stressed that he did not intend to run also former allies considered potential in the upcoming presidential elections, threats to his status. Over time, a claim that nevertheless failed to Rakhmon’s tactics towards his critics protect Saidov from arrest. and challengers have toughened Following Saidov’s arrest, a special progressively. According to an session of the CCBPA enacted the Amnesty International report of July 3, decision to dismantle the Council, 2013, Tajikistan's government has stating that the organization had arrested domestic opponents on outlived its purpose and was used by various charges and sentenced them to Saidov as a platform for his personal lengthy imprisonment terms, while political ambitions. Saidov headed the expatriate critics have been tracked council for less than a year before his down and forcefully returned to arrest and only a month after he Tajikistan. announced his political party. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 16
2008. They explain the discrepancy in time between the committed crimes and the accusations by the late reaction of Saidov’s victims. The government's inactivity regarding Saidov’s alleged construction tender fraud revealed in 2009 remains an open question. Another controversy in council, which gathered around 50 Saidov’s case is the fact that, contrary business associations, was formed in to the law, his detention and arrest on 2007 with the purpose of protecting May 19 preceded the revocation on the interests of its members, assisting May 20 of his immunity as a legislator in developing the private sector, and of the city of Dushanbe legislative creating an attractive environment for assembly. investments. The former chairman of CCBPA Nekrui IMPLICATIONS: The coincidence of Zabirov initiated the dismantling of the such factors as the upcoming Council on May 13, motivating the presidential election, Saidov’s measure by the Council's proclaimed political independence and incompetency and violation of the maturity, and Rakhmon’s intolerance principle of political neutrality. The to opposition on the one hand, and the official explanations also included range of Saidov’s charges from leadership failure and Saidov's abuse polygyny to corruption and the rapid of power by using CCBPA for his dismantling of CCBPA on the other, personal political ambitions. However, suggest that Saidov’s arrest is CCBPA members argue that these politically motivated. arguments are inconsistent: first, Initially, Dushanbe city prosecutor’s Saidov's alleged failures motivate the office accused Saidov of polygyny, election of a new chairman and a which is illegal in Tajikistan. Shortly revision of the CCBPA's charter, but thereafter, Tajikistan's state anti- not a complete liquidation of the corruption agency incriminated Saidov Council that has existed for six years. of fraud based on a 2009 state audit of Second, the accusation of Saidov’s the construction tender fulfilled by exploitation of the Council for personal Saidov’s company. These accusations political ambitions is irrelevant to were later amplified by charges of statements of the CCBPA's corruption, extortion, abuse of office, incompetency and political sway. and rape and coercion to abortion of Third, the dismissal of Saidov and an underage person. According to liquidation of the CCBPA were not Tajik officials, Saidov committed most substantiated by evidence and sensible of these crimes in 2002-2006 while he explanations. Observers have reported served as the Minister of Industry, that the decision was made based on while the rape allegedly took place in the demands of Zabirov and a few other Council members. The fact that a Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 17 special CCBPA session was called two businesses in Tajikistan, while also days after Saidov was publicly accused performing regulative and informative of polygyny and fraud suggests a tasks for business associations. It was premeditated and controlled scenario. a body, autonomous from the The developments involving Saidov government, which coordinated the and the CCBPA have two major development of the country's business implications. First, it is unlikely that sphere. The instantaneous and abrupt Rakhmon’s ruthless elimination of a decision to liquidate the Council median political opponent will disregarded years of laborious work provoke a revolutionary mood among aimed at expanding Tajikistan's Tajikistan's public. On the one hand, private sector. Saidov's arrest constitutes a test of the This decision can be seen as ill- public atmosphere preceding the considered for at least two reasons. elections. Hence, Rakhmon seeks to The Council's founders were determine whether he has reached the concerned over the difficulty in peak of public compliancy or whether establishing trust in associations and there is a need to adjust his pressure the Council among its members. This mechanisms. On the other hand, he trust will now be extremely difficult to leaves little room for dissent by restore. It also left the public sector restraining even nominal hints of scattered and dependent on the opposition. Frequently described by government. critics as a talented conciliator but a The other reason is that the arrest of a poor manager, Rakhmon has high-profile entrepreneur and neutralized a rival capable of liquidation of the Council could accumulating support among those intimidate foreign investors, who may disillusioned with current policies. The interpret the developments as a threat two years until Tajikistan's next to their business assets in Tajikistan parliamentary elections in 2015 could and a limitation to the perspective of have provided the business-minded business development in the country. Saidov and his New Tajikistan party In 2005, the European Bank of with sufficient time to establish Reconstruction and Development themselves as a viable alternative to assessed investment input in the currently inert political parties. By Tajikistan as the weakest among the arresting Saidov, Rakhmon has former Soviet republics, in part due to ensured that he remains in total extensive government involvement in control of Tajikistan's political process. the private sector. The Bank’s most Second, the liquidation of CCBPA could recent report from 2012 noticed a slim have a negative impact on the improvement of the business country's economy. The Council was environment, which could reflect seen as a vital institution for positively on the country’s investment Tajikistan’s fragile private sector. It outlook. Yet, instead of the expected was developing a culture of lobbying improvement, the Tajik government's and protecting the interests of growing interference with the private Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 18 sector, marked by Saidov’s arrest and Rakhmon has demonstrated that he the closure of CCBPA, can return a will not shy from using his powers as negative investment input. president to extend his political CONCLUSIONS: The grounds for longevity. Therefore, the breakdown Saidov’s arrest and the following or persecution of Saidov’s New closure of CCBPA remain questionable. Tajikistan party can be expected in a Both events can damage Tajikistan’s near future. political image and investment AUTHOR'S BIO: Oleg Salimov holds portfolio. Saidov’s arrest demonstrates a PhD in Interdisciplinary Studies the arrival of a new phase of (Public Administration, Political Tajikistan’s development. Saidov Science, Education, Sociology) from sensed the necessity in shifting state The University of Montana. policy away from managing the aftermath of the civil war towards establishing market-oriented institutions and acted accordingly. Yet, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 19
VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS BAKU Mina Muradova
In mid-August, Russia’s President signed an agreement on cooperation Vladimir Putin paid his first visit to and the general terms and conditions Baku after resuming his presidency. for oil deliveries. A document on No significant political declarations cooperation between the emergency were made, but observers considered ministries of the two countries for the visit to be a gesture aimed at 2013-2015 was also signed, as were dismissing speculations that the intergovernmental agreements on Kremlin is supporting an opposition cooperation in air search and rescue, candidate with Russian citizenship in on the construction of a road bridge Azerbaijan’s presidential elections, over the Samur River across the scheduled for October. The visit was Russian-Azerbaijani state border, and intended to demonstrate that bilateral a Program for Humanitarian relations between the two countries Cooperation through 2015. are developing, even in the face of Relations between Russia and recent setbacks. Azerbaijan have been tense for some On August 13, President Putin arrived time after the termination of two in Baku with a large delegation major intergovernmental agreements; including the foreign minister, defense a 1996 deal to transport oil from minister, minister of transport, energy Azerbaijan through the Baku- minister and the presidents of energy Novorossiysk pipeline and another companies Rosneft and Lukoil. The last agreement regarding Russia’s lease of time Putin visited Azerbaijan was in the early warning radar station Darial 2006. in the Gabala region of Azerbaijan. At the end of his visit, Putin termed Apart from this, speculations that the Azerbaijan “one of Russia’s long- Kremlin intended to use the finances of standing, traditional and reliable some oligarchs of Azerbaijani ethnicity partners,” with whom he had to shift of power in Azerbaijan to a discussed details of “strategic Moscow-supported leader poured oil partnership.” He underlined “an on the flames, especially when the obvious record” of trade between the opposition announced Rustam two countries in trade, which grew Ibragimbekov, a 74-year-old Oscar- between 37 and 47 percent last year. winning screenwriter with Russian After official bilateral negotiations, citizenship, as their united single Putin and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham presidential candidate. Aliyev witnessed the signing of a However, by making this visit Moscow number of intergovernmental intends to demonstrate that documents. Russia’s Rosneft oil Azerbaijan is still within Russia’s company and the State Oil Company of sphere of influence and to publicly the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 20 show support for the incumbent However, military cooperation President Aliyev. between the two countries is growing. Azerbaijan will hold presidential “Today, military cooperation between elections on October 9, 2013, and Russia and Azerbaijan is estimated at Aliyev was recently registered as a around US$ 4 billion and it is a candidate for the ruling party and growing trend,” said Aliyev at the news stands a high chance of staying in conference at the end of negotiations. power. Two weeks after Putin’s visit, Rasim Musabekov, an MP and a Azerbaijan’s Central Election political analyst told journalists that Commission (MSK) refused to register “Azerbaijan has become one of the Ibragimbekov as a candidate for the leading countries among buyers of Presidential elections. The commission Russian military equipment, which is said its decision on August 27 was considered, rightfully, as among the based on the fact that Ibragimbekov best worldwide … This is not just has dual citizenship and is not a military-technical cooperation. It's permanent resident of Azerbaijan. very important to discuss questions Although Ibragimbekov applied to which can affect Azerbaijan. For cancel his Russian citizenship, this example, the situation in the Caspian, issue was delayed by Russian where military activity is increasing, governmental agencies. there is the context of Iran, developing Ali Ahmadov, the Executive Secretary events in the Middle East, plus the of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, most important – settlement of the dismissed claims that Putin arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” Baku to demonstrate support for Aliyev ahead of the elections. “Ilham On the eve of Putin’s visit, another MP, Aliyev doesn’t need support from Zahid Oruj, stated to Trend news Vladimir Putin. The only force agency that Azerbaijan and its supporting President Aliyev is the strategic ally Turkey were forming a Azerbaijani people, the voters,” he unified army: “The creation of joint stated. Azerbaijani-Turkish military units There was some expectation that Putin proves that the two countries share a would push Azerbaijan to integrate unified view of regional problems and with its regional economic and security issues. The old formula for our political-military structures, such as cooperation, ‘One nation, two states’ the Eurasian Union, the Customs must be replaced by another slogan: Union, the Eurasian Economic ‘One nation, one army’.” He noted that Community (EurAsEC), and the the two countries “undertake joint military Collective Security Treaty strategic actions,” which are supported Organization (CSTO), but no by “political will and adequate declarations on these topics were resources.” made. A significant moment of Putin’s visit was the arrival of two military ships from Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 21 missile ship Dagestan and the small plan to make a return visit to artillery ship Volgodonsk, and the Astrakhan,” Putin said, underlining fleet’s commander Vice Admiral Sergey that there are still many unresolved Alekminsky. According to BBC, issues relating to the Caspian Sea, Dagestan can fire missiles at a range of including security, border delimitation, 300 kilometers, which is slightly less and conserving biological diversity. than the width of the Caspian Sea and which supersedes the capacity of all other Caspian states. “It is symbolic that our talks coincide with a friendly visit of a detachment of the Russian Caspian Flotilla to Baku. The Dagestan missile ship and the Volgodonsk small artillery ship are among the vessels. At the end of 2013 Azerbaijani sailors
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SPARKS TENSIONS BETWEEN KYRGYZSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN Arslan Sabyrbekov
On August 26, 2013, the Kyrgyz accident occurred. The press officer Foreign Ministry sent a note of protest also stated that the immediate medical to official Tashkent regarding a traffic check of the other driver revealed no accident involving Uzbek high ranking alcohol consumption. The other diplomats that, according to the persons involved in the accident did reports, led to a scuffle. not go through this check due to their According to the information from the diplomatic status. It was also reported Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs that Uzbekistan’s Embassy in Bishkek (MIA), a car with an Uzbek Embassy refused to provide any comments license plate CMD 111 collided with regarding the incident. another vehicle after midnight on This is not the first time that the August 23, 2013, near a night club in Foreign Ministries of the two countries Bishkek. The eyewitnesses recorded exchange protest notes. Only a few that all passengers of the diplomatic weeks prior to this incident, another vehicle were intoxicated, stepped out diplomatic scandal erupted between of their car, and assaulted the driver of the two neighbors, this time involving the other vehicle causing physical an official of the Kyrgyz Embassy in injuries. According to the press officer Uzbekistan, Kanatbek Sharshenbek. of the Kyrgyz MIA, Uzbekistan’s According to the news source Ambassador Komil Rashidov was also Zamondosh, the Kyrgyz diplomat did in the diplomatic car when the not obey the traffic rules in Tashkent Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 22 and used nationalistic rhetoric, governments, those taken into custody insulted and injured the team of were freed. Yet, instead of cooperating medical workers who arrived at the to examine the causes of the incident scene. The Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry and find possible solutions, both sides immediately recalled its diplomat back simply traded accusations. to Bishkek and an investigation is As history shows, ethnic tensions underway. between various communities are In light of these developments, experts common in the region, as are border foresee further tensions between incidents around areas which have not Bishkek and Tashkent. An independent yet been delimited. According to Josef member of the Kyrgyz Parliament, Lang from the Center for Eastern Ravshan Jeenbekov, believes that the Studies, the scale of the events in the diplomatic tensions will have a Sokh enclave demonstrates that there negative impact on the overall bilateral is a clear tendency for such conflicts to relations, which even before those escalate. This was the first time when incidents were quite frosty and an ethnic conflict overlapped with antagonistic. Jeenbekov stressed the mutual animosity between the two importance of using diplomatic tools to countries. Previous ethnic conflicts improve the relations, instead of have mainly concerned citizens of exchanging protest notes. Kyrgyzstan of different ethnic The tensions between Uzbekistan and backgrounds. The illegal crossing of Kyrgyzstan have escalated sharply another country’s border and taking over the course of this year. On its citizens captive is alarming and January 6, 2013, a major border reminiscent of the overall unstable incident occurred in Sokh, an Uzbek situation in the region. enclave on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Experts are making unanimous calls to Residents of the village Hushar on the Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities to Uzbek side of the border attacked a intensify bilateral dialogue at all newly constructed Kyrgyz border possible levels and show commitment watchtower and illegally entered and willingness to resolve border Kyrgyz territory. As a result of this related issues, which have already cost incident, more than 30 Kyrgyz a number of lives. Kyrgyz border residents from a nearby village were officials recently shot dead two Uzbek captured and held hostage in the Sokh counterparts on charges of illegal enclave. Following negotiations border crossing. between officials of the two
PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV SETS NEW GOALS BEFORE PARLIAMENT Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 23
Georgiy Voloshi
On September 2, Kazakhstan's business legislation to potential President Nursultan Nazarbayev entrepreneurs. officially opened the new session of Another proposal regarding the the country’s Parliament after a pursuit of Kazakhstan’s social stability traditional summer recess. At the is related to the elaboration of a new beginning of his address, the head of law regulating the activities of trade state commended the work of the unions. According to Nazarbayev, such current legislature formed as a result legislation could upgrade the culture of of early parliamentary elections in labor relations by increasing the January 2012. Apart from the ruling awareness of hired workers about Nur Otan party, which dominated the their rights and ensuring better labor lower chamber of Parliament for the standards. The Ministry of Regional five preceding years, two other Development and Samruk-Kazyna’s political parties are since represented Center for Social Partnership, both there, even if their relative weight established in September 2012, are remains insignificant. Nazarbayev’s already pursuing the goal of facilitating praise also comes as a confirmation of the resolution of labor disputes and his lasting trust in the deputies, guaranteeing the respect of workers’ whereas a number of experts rights, together with the task of previously predicted new snap after stimulating job creation. However, the the controversy caused by the pension role of trade unions has been mostly reform law. inconsequential on this front, and the As Kazakhstan’s economic proposed law would seek to increase performance in the first half of 2013 their involvement in both national and was marked by decreasing tax local social issues. revenues, poor export statistics and President Nazarbayev’s address to the disappointing GDP growth results, parliamentarians also included now- Nazarbayev has outlined a set of frequent references to the green socioeconomic measures in response economy signaling the country’s to the worsening domestic situation. In willingness to move away from fossil his address to the Parliament, the fuels to innovative technologies. This president urged the deputies to adopt fall, the Parliament is thus expected to a new law regarding entrepreneurial adopt a number of draft laws activities in the country, with a view to providing for the widest possible supporting small and medium implementation of energy saving businesses and ensuring their schemes and the rapid introduction of protection against administrative alternative sources of energy. The abuse. This proposal echoes earlier EXPO-2017 exhibition whose measures defended by Nazarbayev, organization has become a matter of namely the creation of regional entities national pride for the Kazakhstani entrusted with presenting the existing government is widely expected to Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 24 provide further proof of Kazakhstan’s western Kazakhstan’s town of growing attention to environmental Zhanaozen. These very goals are concerns and the rational use of defined as priorities by the energy resources. Kazakhstan-2050 strategic program This, however, does not mean that that Nazarbayev unveiled last Kazakhstan would create impediments December in lieu of a previous vast to the future development of reform agenda of 1997. Unlike in the hydrocarbon deposits which continue preceding years when the country’s to represent the major source of prosperity was still mostly founded on revenues, despite the ongoing the rapid development of its energy diversification of the national sector, today’s global economic economy. Speaking before the outlook favors a different orientation Parliament, Nazarbayev once again of state policies. Thus, the current promised to ease the delivery of emphasis on innovative cooperation subsoil use rights to both domestic and with Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and foreign investors. Already in late economic partners implies a more November 2012, he urged the regional active introduction of state-of-the-art governors to lift bans on the technologies on Kazakhstani soil. exploitation of new deposits in In this regard, Nazarbayev has exchange for modern technologies and insisted on the need to encourage knowhow on the part of selected foreign companies to support subsoil users. As Kazakhstan struggles Kazakhstan’s diversification agenda to maintain the same high level of by sharing their best practices and exports against the backdrop of investing in local businesses. pessimistic trends on the world’s However, it remains to be seen energy markets, the arrival of more whether the country’s leadership investors could boost industrial would be able to implement its production and lead to the creation of ambitious plans in practice, given the new jobs in the provinces. considerable share of the extracting Overall, the Kazakhstani President’s industry in Kazakhstan’s economic outline of upcoming legislative well-being. The expected launch of oil proposals to be debated by the and gas production at the Kashagan Parliament has largely concentrated deposit on the Caspian Sea only on the need to ensure stable long-term complicates the otherwise arduous economic growth and the preservation task of building an innovation-based of social peace, especially in light of the economy. December 2011 popular uprising in
AZERBAIJAN APPLIES FOR PACE RESOLUTION ON THE SARSANG RESERVOIR IN NAGORNO- KARABAKH Bakhtiyar Aslanov Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 25
The Sarsang water reservoir is one of from Shamakhi Elkhan Suleymanov, the highest reservoirs supplying who is also a member of Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijan with water and is located in delegation to the Parliamentary the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Assembly of the Council of Europe controlled by Armenia. It is located at (PACE) and president of the an altitude of 726 meters above sea Azerbaijani Association for Civil level with a dike of 125 meters and a Society Development, noted at the capacity to hold 560 million cubic Geopolitics of Azerbaijan and meters of water. The reservoir was European Energy Security conference built in 1976 on the Tartar River and that the “Sarsang reservoir has extends across 14.2 square kilometers currently become a serious source of in the area of Aghdere. Sarsang is said threat. Obviously, any accident will to provide 40-60 percent of the result in both an ecological crisis and unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh mass casualties of civilians and a Republic’s electric energy and is humanitarian crisis”. operated by the Artsakh HEK OJSC Nagorno-Karabakh’s Deputy Prime electric company. It has the capacity to Minister Arthur Aghabekyan issued a provide irrigation water for 100,000 response on August 14, 2013. hectares of agricultural land in six According to Armenian News, he rayons in Azerbaijan, Tartar, Agdam, emphasized the de facto republic’s Barda, Goranboy, Yevlakh and readiness to begin dialogue and Aghjabadi. discussions with Azerbaijan on joint Azerbaijan claims that the Sarsang management of water resources in reservoir and its installations have not Nagorno-Karabakh and the additional been technically served since war seven surrounding Azerbaijani erupted between Azerbaijan and districts that are currently under Armenia in the early 1990s. This lack Armenian military control. Underlining of maintenance, Azerbaijan claims, the importance of the Sarsang poses a serious risk to the reservoir reservoir and water flowing from the and to the lives of 400,000 inhabitants Tartar River, Aghabekyan stressed that in non-occupied peripheral provinces the “Sarsang reservoir has more in Azerbaijan. A possible collapse of capacity than it is currently used. Both Sarsang could result mass causalities the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides and a humanitarian catastrophe in the will gain from proper use of the water region. Consequently, the reservoir has canals that were built during the recently become a topic for debate in Soviet era.” He underlined that if Azerbaijan as well as Armenia. Azerbaijan reacts positively to the Azerbaijani diplomats have raised this proposed cooperation, the Armenian issue as an urgent question on the side will be responsible for financing agendas of different international large investments in the territories organizations, like the Council of under its control in order to Europe. In June, the Azerbaijani MP reconstruct the water resources. No Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 September 2013 26 answer was delivered to this assistance to prevent the possible statement by Azerbaijani officials. catastrophe in advance. On August 28, Suleymanov put In a comment to Armenian News on forward a proposal on the Sarsang Azerbaijani media reporting on the water reservoir to the PACE leadership Sarsang issue, a spokesman for on 2 September 2013, signed by 45 Nagorno-Karabakh’s President Davit MPs from 18 countries, for review at Babayan claimed that Nagorno- the PACE Bureau meeting in Dubrovka Karabakh’s government expressed its on the same day. He sent letters to intention to work jointly on the PACE’s Secretary General Wojciech management of water resources, but Sawicki, PACE President Jean-Claude that Azerbaijan instead applied to Mignon, and members of the PACE PACE about “Armenians whose actions Bureau. will lead to a humanitarian disaster.” Suleymanov stated in the letter that He added that “instead of complaining especially in the summer when people to various agencies, the majority of and agriculture mostly need water, the which have no mandate to tackle such Armenian side frequently stops the problems, Azerbaijan should better water. However, in winter, the water pick up enough courage to appeal to from Sarsang is opened, flooding the Karabakh side.” agricultural and eroding roads, which Suleymanov’s proposal for statement, has seriously damaged Azerbaijan’s called “On the possibility of agriculture since the occupation. He humanitarian catastrophe of the stated that the purpose of his proposal Sarsang reservoir in the occupied was to raise awareness in Azerbaijani territory of Azerbaijan” was approved society as well as in the international by the PACE Presidential Committee at community about the risk of the PACE Bureau meeting in Dubrovka humanitarian, ecological and biological on 2 September 2013. crisis connected to the Sarsang reservoir, and obtain international