MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ KATEDRA POLITOLOGIE
NATO WARSAW SUMMIT 2016 The Dynamics of Alliance’s Strategic Consensus Bakalářská práce
Pavel Faus
Vedoucí práce: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. UČO: 439616 Obor: Bezpečnostní a strategická studia Imatrikulační ročník: 2014 Brno, 2018
Prohlášení o autorství práce Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou práci na téma NATO Warsaw Summit 2016 vypracoval samostatně a použil jen zdroje uvedené v seznamu literatury.
V Brně, 17. 5. 2018 ......
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Declaration of Authorship
I hereby certify that this thesis has been composed by me, and is based on my own work, unless stated otherwise. No other person’s work has been used without due acknowledgment in this thesis.
May 17, 2018 Signature:
Brno, Czech Repubic
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Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Miroslav Mareš, for his guidance, thoughtful recommendations and for the support he has provided throughout my time of being his student at the Masaryk University. His insight into the topics of NATO had made writing this thesis achievable for me.
While composing this thesis, I greatly benefited from ideas that were presented to me at the University of Bologna during my study exchange. This way, I would like to thank to professors at UNIBO Campus Forlì, Italy.
Ultimately, I would also like to thank my girlfriend Aydan Er for her enduring support and for her patience during the final months of my preparation of the thesis.
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Anotace:
Práce se zabývá Varšavským summitem Severoatlantické aliance, který se konal v roce 2016. Text využívá strategickou teorii, pomocí které analyzuje význam a dopady summitu. Studie následně hodnotí míru shody na daných strategických prioritách mezi členy aliance. Text vychází z předpokladu, že kvůli absenci jasně definované hrozby se NATO v minulosti dlouhodobě potýkalo s nedostatkem strategického porozumění mezi členskými státy. Autor práce tvrdí, že aktuální konflikty na východní a jižní hranici NATO vedly ke zlepšení strategického porozumění mezi členy aliance.
Klíčová slova:
NATO, Varšavský, Summit, strategická teorie, shoda, rozpor, Rusko, prapor, Pobaltí
Abstract:
This thesis deals with the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit and the degree of cohesion on strategic issues within the Alliance. The study uses strategic theory to interpret decisions and their implementation in order to examine to what extent there is an agreement on the main strategic topics within NATO. Previously many argued, that due to post-Cold War security environment, the internal cohesion within NATO was absent. The aim of this study is to examine the validity of such claims. With regard to the developments in the NATO’s eastern flank in the recent years, the author of this text argues that NATO rediscovered its purpose and raison d'être.
Keywords:
NATO, Warsaw, Summit, Strategic Theory, Consensus, Divide, Russia, Battalion, Baltics
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List of abbreviations CSDP – Common Security Defense Policy (previously ESDP) DOD – Department of Defense EEAS – European External Action Service EU – European Union EFP – Enhanced Forward Presence IS – Islamic State ISAF – International Security Assistance Force JCPOA – Join Comprehensive Plan Of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC – Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (weapons of mass destruction) NRF – NATO Response Force Para. – paragraph PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation
RAP – Readiness Action Plan RF – Russian Federation SAM – Surface Air Missile SC – Strategic Concept UK – the United Kingdon UN – the United Nations US – the United States VJTF – Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
YPG – People's Protection Units (mainly-Kurdish militia)
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Table of Content
Introduction ...... 8 1. Methods of research ...... 11 1.1 Historical approach ...... 12 1.2 Theoretical concepts of strategy ...... 13 1.2.1 Strategic theory ...... 13 1.2.2 Strategic culture ...... 15 1.3 Limits and Drawbacks ...... 15 2. Historical background ...... 16 2.1. Multi-tier NATO framework ...... 16 2.1.2 Topic dividing the Alliance ...... 18 2.1.3 Questions the Allies needed to answer ...... 21 2.2 NATO’s search for a purpose in the post-Cold War era ...... 22 2.3 Remarks from NATO 2014 Wales Summit ...... 25 3. Warsaw summit 2016 ...... 28 3.1 Decisions taken ...... 29 3.2 Summit’s unfinished business ...... 33 3.3 Changing patterns of the Multi-tier division ...... 34 3.4 A new divide? ...... 44 3.5 Visualization of developments ...... 46 4. Conclusion ...... 47 5. Sources used ...... 49
The number of characters including spaces: 89 194.
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Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been created nearly seven decades ago. Originally, there were 12 countries at the signing of the Washington treaty on 4 April 1949 with a purpose to counter the assertiveness of the Soviet Union and to effectively restrain the spread of Soviet communism. Thirty years ago, its principal adversary the Soviet Union had collapsed and some voices claimed that NATO would soon follow the same path of vanishing (Mearsheimer 1990, Menon 2003), on the contrary, however, NATO not only continued its existence but in fact grew substantially via enlargements. Today, NATO consists of 29 member states.
One of the main aspects of Alliance’s decision-making process has always been the necessity of consensus. According to which „NATO decision is the expression of the collective will of all of 29 member countries“ (NATO 2018). Harmony of interest, expressed in the consensus principle, is naturally expected from a military alliance that is based around a pledge of collective defense. It had been this way since NATO was established within the bi-polar world in order to fulfill the need of countering a common threat that was familiar to all of its 12 members.
To maintain the solidarity and to reach a consensus among 29 member countries in the multipolar world may not always be a simple task, however. This is especially true, if we admit the absence of a common threat which all alliances members would share. This has been the case since the early 1990s‘ when with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO’s direction became questioned as the United State’s grip over the Alliance weakened (Ikenberry 2010: 552). This notion coincided with a broader spectrum of threats arising from the international security environment in the 1990‘ and early 2000‘, such as state failure and international terrorism (Rotberg 2004. comp. Leonard 2002).
Towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium, several authors suggested that the unity within the alliance was either in the process of erosion, or had already vanished. (Menon 2003, Gardiner 2008, Smith and Williams 2008, Noetzel and Schreer 2009). According to Smith and Williams „NATO faced with a strategic drift, with deep division inside the Alliance on future roles and missions.“ (Smith and Williams 2009). In 2009, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer described
8 this phenomenon which they called a Multi-tier Alliance1. What the term describes is an inside- NATO division and a struggle to maintain political cohesion (Schreer 2009: 393). With mainly Germany, together with some of European NATO countries, portraying itself as a counterweight to the US. As a result there was a number of strategic issues on which the United States faced a fierce opposition from its European partners (Schreer 2009: 384 – 393, comp. Noetzel and Schreer 2009).
The cause of this division is deeply connected to disagreements on the vision of what the Alliance ought to look like and what the main objective of NATO should be. In 2009, Schreer argued that in the current period post-Cold War environment, the complex set of security threats have become a matter of interpretation and of argument, about how agreed-upon threats should be addressed. (Schreer 2009: 394). However, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine has brought new dynamics into NATO member states strategic considerations. According to some, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a changing point of the post-Cold War security environment (Mandelbaum, 2017: 108. comp. Michta, 2016. comp. Wales Summit Communique, 2014. comp. NATO 2014f).
Taking the 2009 concept of Multi-tier NATO framework as granted and with a time gap of nearly a decade, this study aims to provide an up-to-date point of view on the Multi-tier Alliance phenomenon.
The time framework of the study is between 2009, when the Multi-Tier concept was described and 2017. This scope has been chosen for multiple reasons. Firstly, there was a significant deterioration in the relationship between many NATO member states and the Russian Federation since 2008. In the context of Russia’s actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the deterioration of the relationship between the NATO and Russia became even more apparent in 2014. This disagreement is apparent not only in rhetoric but also in practical aspects such as an increased number of incidents such as airspace violations (Dearden 2017), in the economic sphere by imposed sanctions that limit
1 Noetzel, Timo and Schreer Benjamin. 2009. "Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change". In International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 85, No.2. March, 2009, pp. 211-226.
9 trade exchange between the Russian Federation and many NATO member countries, and scrapping trade deals including arms industry, to name a few. Furthermore, a number of crises and security issues originating in the arc of instability alongside Europe’s south appeared. NATO tried to address them in its latest 2010 Strategic concept. Yet, as NATO involvement in Libya has shown, not all NATO members had been convinced about the Southern agenda. The bridge between the southern and eastern perception of what NATO’s main focus should be was put through at NATO 2014 Wales Summit. Since then, many Alliance members became involved in the Syrian war and the Alliance also established a military presence in its eastern flank to deter Russia. The current security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area had led to multiple invoking of Article 4 by Turkey, Poland and the Baltic States (UK Parliament 2014) and some argue, that recent years are the most challenging period in the Alliance’s recent history (US DOD 2018).
Recognizing that the Alliance’s ability reach consensus on core strategic issues had previously been challenged, it is the aim of this study to examine following questions.
If and to what extend Multi-tier division of NATO has prevailed? Along what lines is NATO divided today? Is Russia a dividing or unifying factor for NATO?
Structure of the thesis follows the objective of this study, that is to analyze the development in the integrity of consensus among NATO member states, since the Cold War era, until the Summit in Warsaw 2016, that reacted to the new developments in NATO’s close proximity and beyond. Firstly, an introduction has been provided, together with the description of the driving factors that prompted this study and the research questions this thesis aims to answer. The following first chapter provides a review of the literature dealing with the topic, followed by methodology and drawbacks of the study. In the second chapter the conceptual framework that is used in this study together with a brief overview of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s historical development is provided in order to explain the origins of the strategic environment of Warsaw Summit 2016. The core third chapter analyses the outcomes of Warsaw Summit decisions and interprets them in the context of the previous theoretical chapter. It examines the developments. The Warsaw Summit there, serves as a benchmark point through which the level of coherence within NATO is analyzed.
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Ultimately, the fourth chapter compares findings to the theoretical framework of Multi-tier NATO, and presents concluding remarks.
1. Methods of research
This thesis is based on realist paradigm in international relations. It studies the behavior of states as the principal actors in the international arena, and it seeks to examine the current cohesion of the NATO’s members states priorities and goals, via studying the decision made during 2016 NATO Warsaw summit within the context of the current strategic environment.
Based on existing primary sources and secondary source literature, the text will identify the main determinants that shaped the strategic environment in which the summit took place. This way, the study will be able to interpret the decisions taken in Warsaw in the context of current relations both among NATO member countries and beyond, especially with regards to Russia.
Theoretical segments of this text are based, among others, on works of Collin S. Gray and Craig A. Snyder, who described the concept of strategic theory, that is employed as the main approach in this study. Historic insight into NATO’s changing position within the international system has been based on John G. Ikenberry’s contribution The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War in 2010 Cambridge History of the Cold War. For a comprehensive insight into NATO’s developments since its early days, a 2014 book NATO‘s Balancing Act written by David S. Yost has been used. Ultimately, the study of Warsaw Summit decisions will be based upon primary sources, namely Warsaw Summit Communique and other statements issued by NATO via its official website. Additionally, audio-visual and written primary source materials are used when appropriate. Summit took place nearly two years ago and implementation of its decisions is still underway, nevertheless there are secondary sources, such as publicly available reports by Congressional Research Service, that this paper will often use to support its arguments.
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There was a clear purpose behind choosing the Multi-tier concept described by professors Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer in 20092 as an example of the NATO divide. There are several works by various authors that study NATO‘s division, and its possible downfall3. For this study, a theoretical framework mentioned above was chosen for its complexity of inquiry. While many texts offer tangible arguments about on what issues NATO members are growing apart, the Multi- Tier framework does not only provide case examples of division, but also lays down a set of questions that NATO was (is) required to find an agreement upon, in order to remain effective. We will aim at answering those questions. This way, the concept will provide us with a basis on which the division can be examined, compared and evaluated.
1.1 Historical approach
This thesis will approach the Warsaw Summit and developments in Allied consensus via historical approach. This method is qualitative in its nature as it allows the author to analyze a sheer amount of source material available from primary sources, official documents, speeches given by key actors, interviews and other relevant sources (Hoefer 2011: 29). This study uses induction as a process when data from relevant sources will first be analyzed and results of the analysis will gradually be compared to the findings of Multi-tier concept. Through this comparison it will be possible to compare the developments and draw a conclusion on our research questions. In this sense the study is explanatory and it seeks to describe and explain the developments that are related to NATO’s consensus. The historical approach comes close to the telling of a story based on credible sources (Hoefer 2011).
Martín argues, the historical method considers that the study of history may contribute with a better knowledge of the current problems. According to this method, what is happening now can only be understood keeping in mind that the present is a consequence of the past (Martín 2015). In this text, we seek to analyze the development of NATO’s strategic consensus. In order to do that, we need
2 Noetzel, Timo and Schreer, Benjamin. 2009. "Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change". Published in International Affairs, Vol. 85, No.2 (Mar., 2009), pp. 211-226. 3 See for example Menon, Rajan. 2003. "The End of Alliances ". In World Policy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 1- 20, or a conservative take on NATO division published in the Weekly Standard by: Gardiner, Nile. 2008. "A Two-Tier Alliance" The Weekly Standard. April 1, 2008. Available at: http://www.weeklystandard.com/a-two-tier-alliance/article/16026 1/5
12 to be familiar with the wide meaning of the term strategy and with the strategic theory as a concept through which strategy can be studied.
1.2 Theoretical concepts of strategy
Despite its strong military meaning, strategy can be found in a variety of contexts and environments. For instance, it became an integral part of business planning. Nowadays, its meaning reaches far beyond the original Greek expression strategos, that stood for the art of troop leader or the art of a general (Galatík et al. 2008: 10) and for this reason, strategy may appear to be problematic to conceptualize. In this text, strategy will be used solely in the context of political decision making. That means the way states form their policy as a grand strategy. Grand strategy is multifaced and certainly not reducible to military might, but it does include it. It contains "the ideas that leaders use to understand and relate to the world, the various means and ends they pick to act within it, and the institutions they create to help achieve their objectives“ (Menon, 2007). Gray argues, that strategy has always been present throughout the history, despite the absence of a single definition. People act strategically, even if they are not fully realizing it (Gray 2013, 363). When forming a strategy the weight of historical experiences may affect their strategic consideration (Ibid).
1.2.1 Strategic theory
If strategy concerns itself with the use of available resources to gain an objective and strategic theory seeks to explain the complexity of taking a strategic decision. Various descriptions and concepts of the strategic theory are making a simple definition difficult. For example, "strategic theory examines how political actors perceive their immediate reality and how effectively they respond to that perception toward the achievement of their strategic goals" (Mazska, 2017: 2).
A very convenient explanation of the purpose of strategic theory is provided by Harry Yarger, according to whom, "Strategic theory opens the mind to all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those
13 of our adversaries, allies, and others" (Yarger, 2014: 2). This implies that strategy is interactive and each side tries to understand the point of view of the other side as well. However, adversary’s value system may be alien and his actions may be unexpected from our point of view. This factor is called strategic culture and we will address it later in the text4.
Learning from Yarger’s point of view, it is a tool that can be used to study a complexity. When defining strategy, we examine the way how we can use available means (that can be of any nature) to effect or control the course of events in a geographical area, in order to achieve our political objectives (Yarger, 2014). It is still important to keep in mind, that strategic theory is not one universal concept. Gray argues, that there are no universal strategic approaches that would fit every occasion (Gray, 2013, 263).
Given its unstable nature, it is this author’s opinion, that by far most user-friendly method of explaining the strategic theory has been described by professor Michael Rainsborough5 (Smith, M. L. R. 2011). According to whom strategic theory can be seen via seven assumptions:
1) the study of ends and means (means an actor employs in order to influence an outcome) 2) the study of political actor (state) as the central unit of analysis 3) understanding the political actor's value system and preferences 4) an actor’s interests will be influenced by the wider strategic environment 5) the actor is behaving rationally in pursuit of its aims 6) the acceptance of clashing interests 7) the observance of moral neutrality (efficiency of actions are more important than its moral content).
In this work, we will employ the strategic theory to analyze how certain NATO member states approach issues that need to be addressed jointly by the Alliance. That means, what way and under
4 See following segement - 1.2.2 Strategic Culture, on page 15. 5 Michael Rainsborough is a professor of Strategic Theory at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London. He writes as Smith, M. L. R.. 14 what circumstances their approaches had been formed and what caused them to adjust them. We will study their objectives and how they leveraged their available means to achieve them.
1.2.2 Strategic culture
The concept of Strategic culture has gained attention during the Cold War era. In 1977 RAND‘s Jack Synder presented a study of a misconception between the US strategic expectations and consequent reaction of the USSR in a way, that had not been anticipated. According to Snyder, the US was expecting the same pattern of behavior as they would apply themselves. From Washington‘s point of view, Moscow often acted irrationally, while it may have simply acted in their own perception of rationality. In 1977 Snyder described strategic culture a “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy“ (Snyder, 1977:8).
One of the most known scholars of strategic theory is Colin S. Gray, who sees strategic culture as a set of ideas, patterns of behaviors that explain why different states approach strategic affairs in different ways. According to Gray, Strategy “culture comprises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience“ (Gray, 2006: 153).
Strategic culture also works as a tool to explain the continuity and changes in state’s policies as Gray adds “Furthermore, strategic culture(s) can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated. Culture, however, changes slowly“ (Ibid.).
1.3 Limits and Drawbacks
The limits of the strategic theory are explained by M.L.R Smith, according to whom “strategic ‘theory’ cannot aspire to any hard scientific understanding that survives experimental testing under exactly replicable conditions, that is because it is applicable in a realm of a “study of
15 the infinitely varied scale of human conduct“ (Smith, M.L.R. 2011). The application of strategic theory into the methodological framework is cumbersome as the subject of strategic theory appears to fall between two stools. Too formalized to be an art. To lose to be scientific. (Smith, M.L.R. cited in Neumann 2003: 20). Nevertheless, the strategic theory can be used as a framework for analyzing the actions of a state towards a particular issue (Ibid). Strategic theory is not the same as a historical approach, it is more coherent than that. The strategic theory represents a system of assumptions through which vast amounts of data can be organized, thus guiding the selection of evidence as well as the questions that need to be addressed (Ibid).
2. Historical background 2.1. Multi-tier NATO framework
The core theoretical framework through which we will approach the Warsaw Summit 2016 has been created by Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer in 2009, in an article Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change, which described NATO as a Multi-tier organization where three different perceptions of what the alliance should do in key strategic affairs co-existed side by side (Noetzel and Schreer 2009). Using this nearly a decade old framework and comparing it to the 2016 era will allow us to understand the developments of NATO’s strategic consensus.
According to 2009 concept, there was a series of events that in long-term led to the division. Both the decline of the US leadership in NATO and the loss of consensus did not happen at once. In fact, during 1990‘ the NATO had reinvented itself, firstly by focusing on stabilizing its eastern neighborhood and furthermore by including its former adversaries to into the Alliance (Noetzel and Schreer 2009: 213). The accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were not creating any turmoil among other members. Nevertheless, the consent was soon to be changed by a number of events between early 2000 and 2008.
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Firstly, before the 9/11 attacks and the war on terror, there was European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy initiative which authors identify as a first disruption of the coherence. From the United States, this initiative was seen as an attempt to undermine prominent American position vis a vis other European members of the alliance. On the other hand, for France and Germany the ESDP became an opportunity to promote European perspective. ESDP became attractive mainly thanks to its soft power element while its military component was quite limited (Ibid). Secondly, the Yugoslavia air campaign showed a capability gap between the US and its European allies. The NATO witnessed problems in coordination and planning, and therefore especially for Washington, the experience of joint cooperation at alliance level was rather cumbersome. A further blow into the alliance’s well being came after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. After the US was hit, the allies quickly responded by invoking Article 5 for the first time in history, to support the US in the struggle against international terrorism. Despite this fact, the US administration preferred to employ its own military forces rather than NATO troops in the unraveling of the campaign in Afghanistan. This decision broadened the expectations and delivery gap between some European members and the United States. Ultimately, it was the US-led war against Iraq, that in spite of the fact that NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or to conduct it (NATO 2015b), it had shown the division of the alliance (Noetzel and Schreer 2009: 214). Already before the campaign started, France, Germany and Belgium had blocked Turkish requests for developing a defense plan in case of Iraqi forces would attack Turkey. More importantly however, Germany and France strictly opposed the war and this situation resulted in a deep conceptual rift among NATO allies (Ibid.). Based on this cases, in 2009 Noetzel and Schreer argued that NATO’s ability to reach consensus on most strategic issues became problematic.
2.1.1 Interest groups within the Multi-tier framework A reformist tier consisting of the United States and Great Britain seeks to enlarge Alliance‘s objectives to tackle a broad set of challenges – combating the proliferation of NBC, facing threats of nuclear terrorism and providing energy security, this making NATO’s role global and in accordance with US strategic objectives. A status-quo tier that consisting of France and Germany is reluctant to pursue a global role for NATO as they fear to alienate other major powers such as Russia and China. Instead, they
17 favour a European point of view which also results in the push for ESDP as a counterweight of the US-led reformist tier. A reversal tier is made up of mainly Central and East European countries. Best examples are Poland and the Baltic States, for whom the Article 5, collective defense, and Russian threat are the main considerations. That was especially true with regards to 2008 Russo-Georgian war. For this reason territorial defense remained a priority, while expeditionary forces build up and out of area operations were only secondary to that.
In the first part of the following segment, we will review the dividing issues as they were described in 2009. Secondly, we will outline the unresolved questions that NATO struggled to find an answer for. This way we will be able to address them in the fourth chapter of this study.
2.1.2 Topic dividing the Alliance6 Authors illustrate the cases over which NATO was divided by following questions on which the Allies were not able to find a sustainable consensus.
1) What role for the alliance? As we have said earlier, the United States had been enjoying their unipolar moment since the end of Cold War. This position came with a burden as well. The foreign policy of the US was often challenged not only by non-NATO members but also by its main allies within the Alliance. a) reformists tier pushed for a global role for the Alliance. The US and UK would prefer to take up a broader spectrum of challenges, including the proliferation of NBC weapons, tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism and providing energy security. NATO’s role would be in concert with US grand strategic considerations. b) status quo tier led by Germany and France were skeptical about the global role of NATO, they sought to enlarge the role of ESDP. Furthermore, the position of other major powers such as Russia and China was to be taken into account. This reluctance to back up US ambitions was especially apparent during George W. Bush administration.
6 Arguements presented in this chapter are taken from Noetzel and Schreer 2009, unless stated otherwise. 18
c) reversal tier was represented by countries of Central and Eastern Europe, according to which preserving Article 5 and pledge of collective defense was the main role of NATO. In their eyes, conventional warfare and reappearance of a Russian threat after 2008 Georgian-Russo war, were core objectives.
2) Does NATO enlargement have limits? The question NATO had to deal with was if the NATO expansion is limited by geographical boundaries. On one hand, Article 10 states that any European state may be invited to become a member and the administration of George W. Bush was keen on bringing Saakashvili’s Georgia into the Alliance. For years, Tbilisi tried hard to prove itself as a valuable asset for NATO but its geographic position within the Caucasus, where the interest of regional and global actors meet, combined with internal problems of the country, made Georgia‘s accession quite problematic. a) According to the US and the UK, the 2008 war was partly due to the inability of NATO to offer Georgia and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan. In general, Washington seemed to be willing to invite states, that were located far beyond European territory and regardless of political interests expressed by Moscow. b) For Germany and France the situation was opposite, the 2008 war in Georgia proved, that for Tbilisi it is not possible to become an integral part of NATO due to its border disputes and frozen conflicts in Ossetian and Abkhazia. Status quo sees invitation of Georgia and Ukraine as a net loss for the Alliance, since it would further complicate NATO-Russian relations. c) Reversal countries were in general in support of enlargement eastwards, however they feared NATO’s attention elsewhere could potentially neglect their regional concerns.
3) What to do about Afghanistan? On this point division was mainly between the status quo and reformist tier. The core issue was that the heavy fighting took place in the south where reformist countries were deployed. There are
19 more than 30 provinces in Afghanistan, but two southern parts Helmand and Kandahar had the biggest concentration of casualties 1518 out of total 3548 for the whole country (Icasualities, 2018). a) The US together with the UK and Canada were engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign. According to their expectation, other allies should share the burden equally. b) Status quo states led by Germany intended to carry out mainly a stabilization and reconstruction mission while remaining reluctant to deploy troops in the southern part of the country, where most allied casualties took place.
The reversal tier was not mentioned in this issue, but we can assume its position was closer to the reformist tier. The reason for that is that we can see that reversal tier states participated in the Operation Enduring Freedom generally in southern parts. Poland, which has suffered the highest amount of loses with total 40 killed soldiers mainly in central regions of the country and Romania lost 24 mostly in the southern parts – Kandahar and Zabol (Icasualities, 2018).
4) What military capabilities does the Alliance need? The dispute was about the optimal use of Alliance’s emerging new types of forces. As Yost describes, NATO has been going through a transformation via adopting new roles such as cooperative and security instrument, crisis management and peace operations (Yost, 1998: 3). To counter newly arising threats of the 21st century NATO Response Force (NRF) of up to 25,000 troops was created (Zlatohlávek, 2007: 34). The disaccord between the allies was about the optimal way for this rapidly deployable unit to be used. a) reformists intended to use them in all sorts of operations, including ongoing ISAF in Afghanistan. b) Status quo members argued that NRF should only be used for tackling high-intensity operations as they arise.
20 c) Reversal tier was not active in this debate. But in general terms, reversal states often focused on expeditionary forces within their modernization efforts to be able to live up to NATO’s burden sharing.
However, there was also a broader debate that was closely linked to the issue of NATO’s search for its purpose. Should there be more attention to expeditionary forces, as the majority of challenges that NATO faced since 2001 were out of the area, asymmetric campaigns with ongoing Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency operation being a case example? Or should NATO members focus their spending on providing traditional military assets useful for conventional war, that Europe has not seen in decades (EEAS 2017b)? An additional problem was NATO’s strategic ballistic missile defense. NATO could not agree on whether such capabilities were needed, so the US eventually started to promote their private initiative on a bilateral basis with the UK, Denmark, Poland and the Czech Republic.
2.1.3 Questions the Allies needed to answer
Authors also laid down three questions that, in order to preserve effectivity and cohesion of NATO, the Allies needed to define answers for. Just like in the previous segment, we will shortly review them in order to address them all together in the further segment of the text7.
1) What is NATO’s raison d'être? After the Cold War, external pressure to find a consensus diminished and this rendered NATO’s strategic decision-making the process even more challenging. Major threats, as NATO Bucharest 2008 Summit identified they were 1) terrorism, 2) proliferation of NBC, 3) ballistic missiles threat (Bucharest Summit Declaration, cited by Noetzel and Schreer, 2009). This range of threats coincided well with the American led reformist part of NATO, other Alliance members had their own personal picks however.
As authors presented, the reversal tier viewed Russia as the main source of threat and this feeling grew especially after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. While for instance Germany, belonging to
7 See chapter 3.3 - Changing patterns of the Multi-tier division, on page 34. 21 status quo, ranked environmental challenges higher than NBC weapons in the hands of terrorist and the threat posed by Russia raked even lower than them (Ibid.). The allies could not find a general consensus on what the main purpose of NATO’s existence is.
2) What role for the use of force? The rift was most accentuated between the approach of Germany and the US – the UK in the debate on under what circumstances military might should be employed. For reformists, the military component was crucial in Alliance’s efforts to make a strategy and pre-emptive option was always on the table. Germany viewed the use of military power as a very limited option and other European states followed this approach. This divide was represented also by the mismatch in defense budgets of the US and other members, as Washington traditionally carried the majority of NATO’s expenses.
3) Is NATO becoming Europeanized? The European pillar of NATO was growing for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was due to the fact that since 2001 the US opted more often for a coalition of willing instead of using NATO’s command structures. Furthermore, the US defense policy was shifting from stable Europe towards Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. Secondly, European states became involved in European Security Defense Policy initiative, which could, according to text, in a long run lead to the duplicity of assets and an overall NATO-EU competition. As a reaction to Washington’s loosened leverage over NATO and its unilateral behavior, the status quo states moved forward to balancing the US leadership. This situation threatened to create more friction between status quo on the one hand, and reformist and reversal on the other.
2.2 NATO’s search for a purpose in the post-Cold War era
As we have seen, the division took place in the background of events that NATO member states engaged with during the 1990s‘ and early 2000s‘ when NATO members cherished their own interests and more often they proved to be reluctant to make compromises for the sake of supporting the Alliance as a whole. The evolution of NATO’s Cold war policies proved to be a more dividing than uniting factor, and the key determinant of NATO’s fragmentation was the non-existence of an
22 external force that would pressure member states equally. According to Ikenberry, order and cohesion in the West existed as a result of cooperation to balance against an external threat (Ikenberry, 2007:547). With the demise of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Warsaw treaty the external pressuring factor vanished and unity of NATO became less assured. Washington started to lose its grip over deciding on what the role of the Alliance in the post-Cold War world should be (Ibid.), and the gap between European NATO and the US grew8. In short, NATO could not find its raison d'être. This reality is well illustrated by the (r)evolution in NATO’s Strategic Concepts within the past two decades.
Since the end of the Cold War, the allies formed their purpose and tasks NATO should be pointed towards in a form of Strategic Concepts (SC), an official and publicly available document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces (NATO 2017b). Priorities stated in SC should be enduring but when we look at the evolution of past SCs, it is clear that NATO’s purpose had been often redesigned from a scratch. It can be viewed as an indicator showing the profoundness of Alliance’s identity crisis, that Multi-tier concept described above. The Allies have redefined NATO’s purposes and core tasks in multiple ways since the end of the Cold War (Yost 2014: 11).
NATO SC 1991 was the first public concept. It argued for smaller forces with enhanced flexibility and mobility to counter aggression against any Ally. SC did not envisage the participation in any crisis management operations. The core mission remained collective defense and the language of the SC endorsed self-defense (Yost: 2014: 9). According to Yost, most important elements of Alliance’s transformation were the new types of missions outside NATO’s territory that allies started to call as crisis management and cooperative security (ibid.). At this point, the Soviet military capability was still directly addressed as the most significant factor which the Alliance had
8 For instance, Yost mentions, the Alliance had trouble even in agreeing what were the drivers for the Cold War confrontation, to come to an end. In the US the end of Cold War is perceived as a success of containment and a hard-line approach. In Germany’s point of view, the conflict ended as a result of détente and Ostpolitik (Yost 2014: 8).
23 to take into account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe (Yost 2014: 12). Also, the terminology defines Europe as the main objective (Ibid.)
Four main fundamental security tasks were described by 1991 SC. 1) to provide a stable security environment in Europe and to prevent any coercive action of one state against another one 2) to serve as a Transatlantic forum in accordance with Article 4 3) to deter and defend the territory of any NATO member state 4) to preserve the strategic balance within Europe
In NATO SC 1999 declared policy changed entirely. Most importantly, there was no explicit reference to Russia with the exception dialogue, cooperation and partnership efforts. Furthermore, 1999 SC put more emphasis on efforts to shape the broader international security environment and not only to ensure the safety of Allied territory and the terminology now worked with the Euro- Atlantic area. The emphasis on the enlarged scope of NATO, crisis management and partnerships were a significant departure from Cold War assumptions of NATO’s role (Yost, 2014: 12).
Five fundamental security tasks were listed 1) security 2) consultation (Art4.) 3) deterrence and defense (Art5.) 4) crisis management (Art7.) 5) partnership
Ultimately, 2010 NATO SC makes no remark to geographic limitations and lists three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members. 1) collective defense 2) crisis management 3) cooperative security
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Examples above were shown to clearly illustrate, that the main objectives as well as threats and challenges NATO set itself to focus on were adjusted and changed multiple times up to the 2010 SC. Since the latest SC was adopted, new dynamics to the security situation alongside NATO’s borders both to the East and South took place and the security environment around of NATO’s territory changed significantly again. It was particularly, the 2011 Operation Unified Protector that reacted to Libyan civil war within the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (Yost, 2014: 170). The multi-faced Syrian war, that has been going on since 2011 and involves a number of parties including main NATO powers such as the US, UK, France and Turkey, albeit they are not always fighting for the same outcome. And ultimately, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s backed militias and regular troops fight the Ukranian military.
It is not the aim of this thesis to provide an in-depth description of that events. Such task is well beyond the scope of this study. In the following chapter however, we will look at the practical implications of events mentioned above when necessary. Two years before the Warsaw meeting, summit in Wales took place and its agenda had already been shaped previously mentioned events. Some of Wales decisions have been revisited in Warsaw and for this reason Wales Summit will be briefly introduced as well.
2.3 Remarks from NATO 2014 Wales Summit
The 2014 annexation of Crimea and emergence of Russia-supported separatist republics in Eastern Ukraine had a profound impact on the security environment of the Euro-Atlantic area (Mandelbaum, 2017: 108, comp. Michta, 2016), and Wales Summit was the first chance for NATO to define its position. NATO has taken side along with Kiev against Moscow’s actions (Wales Summit Communique, paragraph 26). As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated “We clearly face the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War“ (NATO, 2014f).
In Wales 2014 Russia was arguably the main topic. This new reality is well illustrated by the explicit references towards Russia‘s actions in Ukraine since the first paragraph of Wales Summit Declaration. (We) “...have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security.
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Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.“ (Wales Summit Communique, paragraph 1).
The Allies also recognized transnational and multi-dimensional threats growing in the southern neighbourhood, but the reaffirmation of territorial defense as greatest responsibility in defending territories and populations as set in Article 5 (Ibid., para. 4), and the enduring references to Russia’s actions through paragraphs 16-31, and suspending all all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia9 (Ibid., para 22), leave little doubt what the main issues were.
To tackle a wide range of challenges a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was adopted to face both Russia and threats emanating from the southern neighborhood (Ibid., para. 5). NATO also addressed hybrid threats as “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures employed in a highly integrated design“. (Ibid., para. 13). RAP represented a fundamental shift from the post-Cold War force posture when it had adopted out of area deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan. In Wales it came back to its former foe (Brooke-Holland, 2016: 7).
Wales Summit created a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) of up to 6,000 troops to be deployed on five days‘ notice (Kearns, 2014), to respond to developing crises alongside NATO borders. In Wales however, the NATO did not establish a permanent presence in the eastern border. On this issue, the old pattern of divided alliance reemerged. While eastern members who are most exposed to Russia argued for NATO bases to be installed, other European allies, namely Germany opposed such initiatives, on the basis of 1997 NATO-Russia agreement. The inability to define a unified and solid position on how to approach Russia is considered the main missed opportunity of the summit (Kearns, 2014).
According to Kearns, the main drawback of the summit was that NATO could not define any firm and strategy towards Russia. As he remarks, the rhetorics were certainly clear and tough (Kearns, 2014). Despite this fact, NATO was not only unwilling to confront Russia militarily but Allies could not even agree on the appropriate weight of sanctions mainly because states were being cautious of potential consequences, that would harm their economic interests (Ibid.). Also, despite
9 Political levels of communication were not part of sanction regime and they remained open. 26 of grave debates about the change in European security with regards to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine another recurring issue prevailed, the military spending.
Kearns argues that “European leaders approach the end of 2014, in overall resource commitment terms, behaving as though nothing of significance has changed in the European security environment over the last 12 months“ (Kearns 2014). Reading from summits declaration, Allies failed to commit members to spend 2% of GDP on defense, instead they have only committed strive to meet that number within a decade (Wales Summit Communique, para. 14). Reluctance to commit to a 2% GDP pledge may suggest that for European leaders, the Ukraine events had not been as much game-changer as their rhetorics present it (Kearns 2014).
If in 2014 the Alliance was still not convinced that the security environment called for a firm and unified approach, the number of benchmark tests, which had taken place between Wales and 2016 Warsaw, proved them otherwise.
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3. Warsaw summit 2016
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 2016 summit was held in Warsaw, Poland. It was the second meeting of the Alliance’s 28 heads of states, since 2014 events in Ukraine, that led to the deterioration of relations between the NATO and Russia. In the atmosphere of renewed tensions especially between eastern NATO member states and Moscow, the venue of the summit could be perceived as symbolic because Warsaw gave a name to former NATO’s Cold War adversary, the Warsaw Pact.
Naturally, Warsaw agenda borrowed topics as previous 2014 Wales meeting and two main security issues were discussed. Firstly, the reaction to events in Ukraine. Allies tried to define their approach towards Russia and deterrence was a key concept in Warsaw. (Warsaw Summit Communique 2016, paragraph 6). One of the key decisions was the NATO’s enhanced forwards presence in the eastern flank. Secondly, NATO’s ability to project stability beyond NATO’s borders was discussed. In the fifth paragraph, the summit’s official text states that there is an arc of insecurity and instability alongside NATO’s periphery and beyond and it identifies a range of threats from the east and south.
Allies firstly address Russia, whose “…aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability…“ (Ibid., para. 5). And secondly, they speak of security issues in the Middle East and North Africa, specifically about threat posed by the so-called Islamic State and terrorism, that “…has risen to an unprecedented level of intensity, reaches into all of the Allied territory, and now represents an immediate and direct threat to our nations and the international community … and instability in the Middle East and North Africa also contributes to the refugee and migrant crisis.“ (Ibid, para. 5).
The Allies once again stressed that, to protect and defend NATO’s territory and populations against attack were the greatest responsibility in accordance with Article 5. Importantly, “renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defense“ (Ibid, para. 6) was shown and the
28 collective defense reassurance pledge was instantly followed by assuring that the Alliance will respond to crises beyond its borders as well (ibid).
The decisions taken in Warsaw are easily dividable into two areas, inside and outside of NATO. Enhancing deterrence, primarily through forward deployment to Eastern Europe, and Projecting stability beyond NATO, in particular to the Middle East and North Africa (Belkin, 2016).
3.1 Decisions taken
“We have taken decisions to respond to crises beyond our borders by working with our partners around the world and we have taken decisions to renew our deterrence and defense at home. In an unpredictable world, with challenges from the south and the east, NATO remains an essential source of stability.“ (NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Warsaw Summit, 9 July 2016).
According to NATO’s official statement, the main outcomes of the summit were (NATO, 2017c): • Enhanced Forward Presence • Training and capacity building in Iraq • Support for the counter-ISIL coalition • Operation Sea Guardian • Cyberspace as an operational domain • Commitment to enhance NATO’S resilience • Ballistic Missile Defense • Support for Afghanistan • Support for Ukraine • Cooperation with the EU
On a first glance, it may seem that the focus of Warsaw Summit was equally distributed towards both directions. However as Lesser points out, "…virtually every official and unofficial statement in Warsaw stressed the dual nature of the current strategic environment, with challenges from Russia in the east, and an equally pressing but far more diffuse set of challenges emanating from
29 the south, from the Mediterranean and beyond. In reality, and perhaps inevitably given the venue, Warsaw was very much a summit focused eastward. " (Lesser, 2016: 131). The NATO’s official brief of decisions taken during the summit would support that idea as well, only half of the points mentioned above are relevant for the Eastern flank. However, Russia dominated the agenda in Warsaw, just like it did in Wales two years before (Brooke-Holland, 2016: 6).
Warsaw’s final communique provided a extensive list of Russia’s actions including illegal annexation of Crimea, violation of sovereign borders by force, deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, large military exercises and provocative military activities near NATO borders in both Baltic and Black Sea Region and the Mediterranean, its nuclear rhetorics and violations of Allied airspace, plus military intervention in Syria and support of local regime were all posing risks and challenges for the security of Allies and others (Warsaw Summit Communique 2016, paragraph 10). NATO reacted by enhancing its deterrence and defense posture by establishing a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance (Ibid., para. 11), and reaffirming other measures taken previously in Wales10.
For years, Alliance‘s eastern (and at the same time newest) member states argued that the danger Russia possesses to their territory would best deter by a presence of Allied troops on the ground (Michta, 2016). During past years, up to 80 percent of NATO‘s available troops were situated in Western Europe (Lanoszka and Hunzeker, 2016: 12). The decision to deploy allied troops in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was the arguably the headline of Warsaw summit decisions (Brooke-Holland, 2016: 11).
The heads of states agreed on deploying four multinational battlegroups in the Baltic nations and Poland as a part of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s use of force against its neighbors and its military build-up in the Baltic region and beyond. NATO also strengthened its multinational presence in the Black Sea region, based around a Romanian-led multinational framework brigade. In total around 4000 troops were to be sent on NATO’s Eastern Flank (Belkin, 2016: 1). The deployment of troops would take place under the leadership of framework nation in each country.
10 See chapter 2.3 - Remarks from NATO 2014 Wales Summit, on page 25. 30
Battlegroups became fully operational in summer 2017 (NATO, 2017g) in the following setting11. • Canada leading the battlegroup in Latvia, with contributions by Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. • Germany leading the battlegroup in Lithuania, joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. • The United Kingdom leading the battlegroup in Estonia, joined by France. • The United States leading the battlegroup in Poland, joined by Romania and the UK.
Despite being a major step, the enhanced forward presence was not the desired outcome that Poland and Baltic states wished for. From their perspective, permanent NATO contingents in their territory would be optimal (Belkin, 2016: 3), this vision however, was not shared by other member states. Firstly, because of 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and also because as some argue, cooperation with Moscow should be the desired outcome, rather than deterrence. This approach was advocated mainly by the main European powers, Italy, France, and Germany (Ibid).
The Allies also decided to bolster its capacities in the Black Sea region. Romania agreed to host a multinational land brigade, and NATO’s naval presence in the region would be enlarged by Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States (Belkin, 2016: 3).
NATO also agreed to increase its support for Ukraine. Still they would not provide Ukraine with lethal weapons or improvided intelligence capabilities. Instead, financial aid that would lead to improving command and control, strengthening cyber defense and rehabilitating wounded soldiers were promised (Belkin, 2016: 5).
The second set of goals set in Warsaw was responding to threats from the south, especially MENA region. Allies primarily focused on ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and the wave of terror attacks and migration phenomenon. In comparison to concrete steps negotiated for the Eastern flank, Warsaw summit was much less concrete about specified outcomes and decisions towards the south. One reason could be, that threats emanating from the south are more complex
11 The composition of each battlegroup is subject to change because the deployment is rotational, data are from initial 2017 deployment. 31 and diverse, compared to the eastern threat (Lesser, 2016:132). As Lesser argues, tackling the eastern threat may be expensive but it is a relatively conventional problem. In the south on the other hand, strategic concepts are elusive and efficient strategy requires cooperation with multiple other institutions (Ibid.). The Allies needed to define NATO’s position in the fight against non-state actors such as the Islamic State. However, the crucial question is to what extent NATO can deter a terrorist organization such as the Islamic State? (Chatham House, 2016).
Even before Warsaw, many member states had been active within the international coalition against the Islamic State. A comprehensive NATO response, however, was lacking. Allies agreed to expand its training activities in Iraq, to deploy NATO’s own AWACS surveillance aircraft to assist in fighting the Islamic State, and a new naval mission in the Mediterranean that would target terrorist activities was also negotiated (Belkin, 2016:5). NATO did not engage in further activities12, because France advocated the stronger role of the European Union, instead of NATO (Ibid).
The issues in Syria are multifaced. The US, France and the UK have been involved in fighting IS for years and since 2015 Russia is also present. Its agenda is closely tied with the regime in Damascus and it often collides with the efforts of western powers in the region. Additionally, Turkey has its own stakes in Syria war that are hardly compatible with the ones of the US and other Allies (Aljazeera 2018). The core issue here, was the approach towards various Kurdish fighting groups, that with the aid of the US managed to gain control of wast territory captured from the IS, only to be targeted by Turkey‘s internal and external security concerns regarding an emergence of a powerful Kurdish entity within or in the proximity of its borders.
The decisions on Afghanistan fall between the East and South divide. NATO pledged to carry on its 2015 Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan with over 13,000 troops, half of which were American, followed by Germany, Italy and non-NATO state, Georgia (Ibid). Ultimately, the allies formally invited Montenegro to become the 29th member of NATO, marking the first enlargement since 2009 Croatia and Albania accession. The rationale for Montenegro to join was the premise
12 This changed in 2017 NATO meeting in Brussels, where NATO officialy joined the coalition against the Islamic State (NATO 2017h). 32 of bringing stability to the region. As some argue, the Allies sent a signal, that NATO’s open door policy was still on for other aspiring members (Belkin, 2016:7).
3.2 Summit’s unfinished business
The agenda has left several topics untouched. Most notably, the summit took place shortly after Britain’s decision to leave the EU, which sheds concerns over the future development of Britain’s economy which directly affects NATO as well (Lesser, 2016: 132). In 2015, Britain made up nearly one-quarter of all NATO European defense spending (Belkin, 2016: 6). Brexit could cause the UK to become more deeply involved with the NATO, as it would loosen its ties with Europe’s Defense and Foreign Policy. On the other hand, the possibility of weakening either British or European Union’s economy would in both cases be negative for NATO (Lesser, 2016: 132). This is especially true at the time, when the United States calls for European members to assume larger responsibility for their own security (Rettman 2017).
Lesser also points towards the North, which up until now did not receive much attention. However, for NATO’s Norway and anyone else who has stakes in Arctic security, this agenda has potential to become a security topic (Lesser, 2016: 132). Moscow has been adjusting its strategy in the North as well. Nowadays, "...there are both elements of conflict and cooperation in Russia’s Arctic security affairs. Ultimately, it comes down to the perspective through which one chooses to perceive Russian Arctic policy." (Devyatkin 2018).
Unofficially, the Allies have also shown concerns about the internal instability in Turkey and also its unpredictable foreign policy. According to Lesser, Turkey dominated the unofficial discourse between meetings (Lesser, 2016: 133). One week after the summit, a failed coup took place in Turkey. Furthermore, the developments of Ankara’s foreign policy towards Syria would soon prove to be of NATO‘s interest (IISS, 2018b).
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3.3 Changing patterns of the Multi-tier division
In the final segment of this study, we will examine how the consensus over the core questions evolved with regards to the profound changes in the security environment. Decisions taken at Warsaw Summit will serve as indicators of change in comparison with original framework. The concept of Multi-tier division was described by a set of questions that had been dividing the Alliance. As for reversal tier, we argue that their main considerations have in fact been addressed by 2016 summit. The main difference can be seen from the perspective of status quo and reformist tier. In order to understand the changes in Multi-tier pattern we will examine strategic considerations of relevant actors where necessary.
What role for the Alliance? The divide came from the reformist group led by Washington, to take up a broad and global role for the Alliance. Although, the key question is whether the global role has ever been possible.
The expectation for NATO to assume a global role was strongly promoted during early post-Cold War years when the United States enjoyed an unprecedented moment of unipolarity. According to Ikenberry, at this time Washington developed a strategic planning document "Defense Planning Guidance" of 1992, also known at Wolfowitz Doctrine, that argued for the US to assume a global role and to block the rise of other rival states or peer competitors. This included its own allies in Japan, Germany and in united Europe. (Ikenberry 2010: 542). On the contrary to American expectations, the disappearance of the Cold War removed some leverages from the hands of the US. The centralizing tendency of security was common in the bipolar competitive struggle. With its end, the security problems inevitably decentralized into regional ones. The United States continue to play a role in many of these regional security trouble spots, but its overall leverage as the global security provider is diminished (Ibid., 552). When President Bush came to office in 2001, there already was a reserved approach towards the American actions of unipolar order against despotic states and hostile regimes in peripheral regions, where threats were handled by often controversial use of American military force. Unfortunately for Washington, its approach has backfired. As Ikenberry puts it, in the end, it had the capacity to dominate the world, but not the legitimacy to rule. It had power but not authority (Ikenberry 2010: 550).
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Nowadays, the approach of the United States shows that expecting NATO to have a multipurpose global role actually makes execution of its desired policy ever more cumbersome. There are several examples manifesting this change.
In the recent years, the US more often opted for a coalition of the willing, instead of NATO framework to conduct military interventions such as 2003 Iraq. Even in the aftermath of 9/11, the helping hand offered by NATO members to Washington was not leveraged to its fullest. Early after September 12, 2001 when the Article 5 was invoked for the first time, US declined direct support of NATO (Hoehn and Harting 2010: 13). Instead, United States started the Operation Enduring Freedom on their own with a few selected partners and only later NATO became fully involved. Another example of this change can also be seen in dropping the expectation for NATO to play a key role in combating NBC weapons. A historical Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran Nuclear Deal) where Washington played a key role was negotiated between Iran, China, France, Russia, the UK, and Germany (The White House, 2015). NATO did not play a role in the JCPOA negotiations.
This does not imply that NATO lost its purpose. For status-quo tier, the role of NATO was to safeguard European security in accordance with multilateralism and multipolarity. NATO’s task was not only traditional territorial defense and NATO for example provided assistance during 2004 Greece Olympics or led an intervention against Libyan regime in 2011. The perspective of reversal tier appears as the easiest to accommodate within the 2014 security environment. Since Poland, other Central European and Baltic states joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 respectively, their main security concern has been Russia. After 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the conventional aspect of NATO became stronger. In Warsaw, it was reformist countries who argued for a permanent presence in their territory.
In simple terms, NATO persisted because as an organization it has proven to be able to adapt in a way so its members find it useful (Becker, 2012: 12). As historical part of this study shown, the Alliance has defined its role through various strategic concepts and the Allies often adjusted its purpose accordingly to the security environment. It went from a regional defense organization
35 focused exclusively on deterring the Soviet Union to an alliance confronting an array of complex security challenges across the globe (Belkin, 2016: 11-12). The transformation and search for a new purpose have been based on one key premise – that Russia no longer poses a significant threat (Ibid). This assumption is now questioned by most members of the Alliance.
Since 2014, the Alliance has now pursued a renewed focus on strengthening territorial defense in Europe and deterring Russia (Belkin, 2016: 11-12). It was not only Ukraine war that changed Russia’s image in the west. There have been a number of military and non-military (read political) incidents between NATO members and Russia in the recent years. For instance Russia has allegedly taken part in interference with the US elections in 2016, hacking attacks against Germany and Denmark or in the 2016 political turmoil in Montenegro (UK, HM Government 2018).
Does NATO enlargement have limits? The main argument in this case was that for Germany and France Georgia’s accession to NATO was problematic as they did not want to alienate Russia by disrupting its area of interest. We argue, that the sole (dis)approval of Russia is not the decisive factor itself.
Tbilisi had been invited in spite of its unresolved border and national minority issues, that already lay an obstacle to Alliance’s membership rules. The question however remained, if Georgia’s accession would benefit the Euro-Atlantic security as a whole, or if the costs and risks were higher. For sure, its armed forces contributed significantly to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but was that enough to risk a survival of the NATO?
NATO may be advocating a freedom to chose a side for every state. However, from a geopolitical point of view ignoring Russia’s perspective on an area of influence would be a mistake. That remains true even if it contradicts the values NATO seeks to represent. Russia’s liking or disliking is one factor, the geopolitical reality is whole another. The Caucasus and the Black Sea region are areas where Russia has been projecting influence since its Tsarist times. From Moscow's point of view the waves of NATO’s enlargement greatly restricted its maneuverability in the Black Sea Region (Toucas 2017) and Georgia’s membership would be another lose for Russia’s security considerations.
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Georgia was invited during G.W. Bush era, when the unilateral actions of the US not only diminished country‘s credibility in the international arena but also sparkled a rift inside of NATO itself.13 Considering the security environment from a European perspective, where a conventional war was not probable and the EU took credit for its decades of peace, it is hard to judge whether the Alliance would be willing to act in Article 5 situation, had it been invoked for Georgia.
Similarly, the membership for Montenegro that joined NATO in 2017 was also at the annoyance of Moscow to the extent that the political turmoil that preceded the accession is sometimes referred as Russia-orchestrated failed coup (Tomovic, 2017. or Luhn, 2017). Whether the coup attempt allegations are genuine or not, Montenegro’s membership clearly did not please Russia as we could see from reactions of its state-funded media (Russia Today, 2017). As an immediate answer to joining NATO, Moscow threatened the Balkan country with economic sanctions (Brunnstrom, 2017). The comparison with Georgia is therefore applicable.
Nevertheless, Montenegro became 29th NATO member. The limits of NATO enlargement should not be viewed only from an ideological point of view but also by taking geographic realities and geopolitics into account. The limits are set by the extent of the willingness of NATO members to live up to a collective defense promise and to the core idea that enlargement is supposed to bring stability. In case of Georgia, both aspects remained uncertain.
What to do about Afghanistan? ISAF has been the longest NATO mission. Currently, the mission has been transformed into an assistance-oriented Resolute Support Mission and all main allies including Germany and Italy participate in a large scale which is in contrast with the previous deployment. Out of 13,576 troops, the major burden still lies on the US with 6,951 troops, Germany provided 980, Italy 1,037 and the UK sent 500 (NATO, 2017d). There is a general consensus on the future of Afghan assistance mission. Nevertheless, the evolution of internal stability of Afghanistan, which is far beyond the scope of this study, will for sure have a direct impact on NATO’s involvement.
13 See segment: What role for the Alliance? on page 34. 37
What military capabilities does NATO need? Originally, the issue focused mainly towards what the optimal use of NATO response forces should be. However, after 2014 a conventional approach makes a return. For decades, the NATO faced with insurgency campaigns and it did not require a heavy military hardware used in a conventional war. Nowadays, there are clear signs that balance between traditional and non-traditional means of war is required. After Libya, European allies have a clear idea about key cutting-edge technologies they were lacking during Operation Unified Protector and they should proceed accordingly14. Similarly, the Ukraine conflict has brought back aspects of conventional war (Vasagar 2015).
The military spending of many member states seems to react to this realities as well. The decreasing trend, that took place steadily since the global economic downturn in 2008 was reversed in 2014. This trend is visible after the Wales Summit and has been reaffirmed in 2017 Brussels meeting as well (NATO 2017h). Only from 2014 to 2015, the number of allies meeting NATO’s 2% defense spending target increased from three to five (Belkin, 2016), while Germany, UK, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Spain and other European states are have announced plans to enlarge their military budgets in following years (IISS: 2018).
What is NATO’s Raison d'être? The efforts of post-Cold War transformation has led NATO to be able to tackle various security tasks out-of-area operations, that have long dominated the NATO agenda. Despite the costs, working together in Afghanistan and another mission has been a beneficial experience. If nothing else, various members learned to work alongside their partners and each country’s military tested its interoperability within the Alliance. Not only combat skills matter. Also proven ability of each NATO member to cooperate smoothly counts. For instance, when Canada-led battalion in Latvia was being deployed it faced a number of technical issues among diverse militaries of Poland, Italy, Spain, Slovenia, and Albania, which complicated initial cooperation (Brewster, 2017).
Because of the current strategic environment, NATO has a dual purpose. There is a Cold War sense of defense and a post-Cold War sense of security (Dempsey, 2016). There are issues that require primarily national efforts and assets, such as countering homegrown terrorism within member
14 See following segment: Is NATO being Europeized? on page 42. 38 states. There are global problems such as Iran’s nuclear program where NATO has little authority, let alone legitimacy, and for that international community is required. And then there are threats to the Euro-Atlantic area where NATO is proving vital assistance, that no other institution is able to provide at the moment.15 NATO has also proven to be helpful for capabilities sharing. For instance, while single member states follow their priorities in Syria, NATO is providing reconnaissance for a common use.
Above that, there is Russia’s foreign policy that puts various tensions on many NATO countries as we have discussed before. Here, Alliance is the binding factor that safeguards the big problem, the territorial defense and deterrence, so the threat remains as little as possible. As we will see in the next chapter, safeguarding NATO-European (and European Union’s territory alike) would be hardly achievable without cooperation with the US.
Yet collective defense is only one part of a more complex security environment and it is not a coincidence that summit debates on NATO’s priorities reflect the two complex situations in the East and in the South. Ironically for Moscow, the fact that Russia’s foreign policy and its military deployment plays a larger role also in the south, and that Russia‘s footprints are visible in a number of internal issues in Germany, the United States, the UK and others (UK, HM Government 2018), its position in the eyes of most NATO members becomes even more aggravated.
What is the role of the use of force? The debate on the use of force was mainly driven by the reformist and status quo tiers. Germany- led status quo had mostly been reluctant to the use of the military to gain its objectives therefore from its perspective the US-led reformist tier used it over too much. The division has grown smaller in the sense that Germany is currently willing to send its troops if certain conditions such as described below are met. At the same time the US is more often opting for an ad-hoc coalition as it puts fewer strains on decision making than NATO structures. To understand the change that Enhanced Forward Presence deployment means for status quo tier, we will further examine this issue from the perspective of Germany’s strategic culture.
15 See following segment: Is NATO being Europeized? on page 42. 39
Berlin showed a long-standing reluctance to confront Russia and the recent change in Germany‘s approach has been described as monumental (Theil, 2017). In Warsaw, Germany not only condemned Russia’s actions and assumed a position of negotiator together with France. It agreed to provide security for Eastern members by becoming a framework nation for deployment in Lithuania, and it also contributed in Romania. It became one of the key outcomes of Warsaw Summit and this approach is clearly contradictory to the 2009 Multi-tier assumptions about Germany.
Within the Multi-Tier concept, Berlin was frequently shown as the example of NATO ally, who had a different approach towards the core issues Allies needed to agree about. Berlin was known for maintaining its close ties to Russia and adjusting its approach towards NATO’s collective actions accordingly. This balancing effort often created tensions within the NATO (Belkin, 2016: 1). There were many occasions when Germany was reluctant to commit its forces to be deployed alongside NATO’s policy such as Libya 2011. Berlin’s peculiar posture towards NATO operations can be understood through country’s specific strategic culture, that was often referred to as a civilian power (Kříž, 2011: 177). As such, it solves issues through multilateral frameworks and liberal institutions instead of opting for the military as a foreign policy tool. Since its reunification, Germany followed a path based on principal multilateralism and strong Atlantic bond (Kříž, 2011: 179). Germany had been reluctant about using its military to project power, and it pledged itself to acting in accordance with the international law (Ibid.). For instance, Berlin often opposed American-led initiatives such as in the case of 2003 Iraq war, mainly because they did not take place within a multilateral framework (Kříž, 2011: 180). From Berlin’s point of view, the overthrowing of Saddam’s regime was American decision (Ibid.) There were also other occasions, when Berlin demonstrated an unwillingness to deploy its troops in Alliance’s missions such as 2011 Libya operation. However, an important aspect of Germany’s strategic culture is also the effort to be perceived as a worthy and dependable ally by other European countries (Kříž, 2011:181) and this factor has a strong impact on nowadays approach of Berlin.
Germany’s post-Cold War approach has determined by strictly adhering to norms and values, which consist of multilateralism and defense of human rights but recently this notorious reluctance to the use of power, has diminished. In fact, Germans were deployed in 16 countries in the past two
40 decades (Theil, 2017: 11). Still, Germany’s approach to the international relations is determined by country’s economic power rather than its military might. Bundeswehr’s power has been steadily declining. By the end of the 1990s‘, it reached up to 360,000 troops (Kříž, 2011: 181), whereas in June 2016 (at the time of Warsaw summit), only 176,000 active personnel served. This was the lowest size of Bundeswehr since its 1955 inception (IISS, Military Ballance 2017). According to Theil, the German army was in an abysmal state. For instance, only one-third of 123 Typhoon fighter jets were fully deployable as well as just five out of 60 Sikorski CH-53 transport helicopters (Theil, 2017: 10).
Since 2014, Berlin’s posture towards Russia has changed. One reason could be that Germany has for long been trying to assume a position of a European leader. In the post-2014 environment, one of the main challenges Germany has to face when assuming Europe’s leading position is the challenge Russia poses to continent’s postwar order (Theil, 2017:11). In relations towards Moscow, Berlin had previously been known for its soft approach that favoured economic considerations rather than Alliance’s solidarity. In Warsaw however, Germany’s approach changed profoundly as a reaction to Russia’s actions.
Berlin has led Europe’s response to Moscow’s aggression (Eichler, 2016: 216). According to Chancellor Merkel, Germany could no longer depend completely on the UK and US, and Europeans must take their destiny into own hands (Theil, 2017: 10). Germany pledged to hit 2% defense spending by 2024, but the possibility of reaching that goal remains disputed (Theil, 2017: 11). Nevertheless, Germany raised the budget of the army for the first time since Cold War. Berlin also seeks to establish cyber and information warfare center and it recently formed a cooperation with other EU states as a pan-European fighting force (Ibid.).
Still EFP was less than permanent military bases that Baltic Allies asked for (Allers 2017), and Germany supposedly denied as it would create more tension between Moscow and the West. In fact, Germany still maintains strong economic and industrial ties with Russia. Recently, chancellor Merkel confirmed Nord Stream 2 has a pipeline to be built by German Russian consortium (Theil, 2017: 11). What is the strategic reasoning behind Berlin’s considerations then?
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Firstly, in its eyes the world is multipolar and Russia can hardly be ignored as a power (this has also shown in Georgia’s NATO membership topic) and military confrontation is also off the table. This logic holds up even in spite of Russia’s flagrant international law violations, that Germany is keen to promote. From Berlin’s point of view, isolating Russia completely would be a lose-lose situation nevertheless. Interdependence is to blame. At the moment, a major part of Europe is consuming Russian natural resources and Russia is dependable on their revenues. Russia can lose more by refusing to cooperate, therefore some level of mutual dependence is needed to bring Moscow to a negotiation table where long-term stable decisions can be made. Which is the way Germany prefers and, considering its hard power assets, has to act.
Is NATO becoming Europeanized? Originally, authors focused towards two aspects of this question. Firstly, the uncertain future of US leadership was questioned because for years there was a notion that the US is looking away from its European commitments. It focused on Asia instead, as major security concerns for the western world have shifted towards the Asia-Pacific region and the greater Middle East and the peaceful European theatre was becoming less relevant. In this situation, NATO would remain relevant only if its members adopted reformist ambition. Studying the 2016 Warsaw Summit, we can argue that such assumptions were not accurate. Firstly, the American commitment was reaffirmed in the light of 2014 events, furthermore the US actively decided to provide more for Europe (Brooke-Holland, Louisa, 2016: 12).
In 2014 the US launched its European Reassurance Initiative through which it allocated $3.4bn over the course of 2016/17. Washington also announced deploying a persistent rotational armored brigade in Europe, starting in 2017. Furthermore, it pledged to deploy troops in Romania to bolster south-east area as well (Cronk, 2016). Within the framework of Operation Atlantic Resolve, a joint cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland and Baltic states is taking place (US Army Europe, 2018). The previous shift away from Europe was based on the notion that Russian threat was out of date (Mandelbaum, 2017: 112).
The second aspect of this question was what is the effect of European initiatives to provide for their own security on NATO. Authors predicted a growing role of CSDP because of its focus on soft
42 security that opposed to American interventionist approach. And also that the capabilities developed through European initiatives would be duplicating those of the Alliance and NATO and CSDP would eventually become competitors. In this study we can argue that it is not the case.
Clearly, the development of the CSDP has gained momentum in the recent years. The EU actively pursues its own foreign policy and its assertiveness could be seen from Europe’s reaction towards president Trump’s statements on the Iran Nuclear Deal. EU’s representative Frederica Mogherini challenged the unilateral statements questioning the validity of the treaty by president Trump (EEAS 2017c). On November 13, 2017 the EU also took a step towards what could once become a joint army (Rettman and Tani, 2017), when twenty-three states signed the declaration of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) among EU member states. So far this initiative is mainly concerned about planning acquisition of tools and hardware and is far from being physically operational. As for now, the scenario of EU or certain European NATO states creating an actual substitute for NATO seems unrealistic. So far PESCO has mainly been concerned about planning and preparatory training and acquisition of military tools and hardware. Even when fully operational, the initiative plants to keep military capacities developed within PESCO in the hands of Member States, therefore troops should be always available for other operations in the context of either the UN or NATO (EEAS, 2018a).
Furthermore, there is a good evidence suggesting, that European NATO members throughout the multi-tier spectrum, including France and the UK need America‘s assistance for conducting larger complex military operations. This experience was learned through NATO’s 2011 Operation Unified Protector. Although a Foreign Affairs article by that time NATO General Secretary Rasmussen dismissed voices, claiming that Allies did lack sufficient strike capabilities (Rasmussen, 2011), the data, at least from a European perspective, show otherwise. The operation was mainly led by European member states, the UK and France. The Obama’s administration supposedly approached the operation as leadership from behind, to quote a popular statement of an anonymous advisor to the US president (Lizza, 2011). In fact, non-US Allies struck 90% of more than 6,000 targets in Libya (Yost, 2014: 175) and the midget size of US role was unprecedented. Despite this fact, the mission has shown a significant dependence on the United States to provide key capabilities. The US stayed behind only after it had dealt with key Libyan air
43 defense systems, within the first days of the operation (Ibid.). For illustration, the US conducted 35% of all sorties in the Libyan campaign, 77% air refueling sorties and 27% of intelligence and reconnaissance and surveillance missions. During the operation, some countries stocks were depleted so they had to rely on American supply of ammunition (Ibid.). According to Yost, without the initial strikes against Libya anti-air defense systems and furthermore without providing intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance and capabilities to jam regime communications, the European-led operation in Libya would not have accomplished the mission (Yost, 2014: 179). The engagement in Libya thus served as an important example, that the European part of the Alliance is hardly capable of conducting large full-scale military operations without the provision of core assets from the US.
From this perspective, it appears that pan-European initiatives do not, at the time, poses a challenge to the Euro-Atlantic partnership. At the same time, European allies hardly have enough capacities, that would be needed to provide for their own defense of EU’s territory, without the provision of the United States.
The last finding can be a pretext for another line of division between reversal-tier and countries involved in EU-led initiatives. Reversal-tier countries could be skeptical about European pillar as long as it might weaken the trans-Atlantic bond with the US.
3.4 A new divide?
The Allies might have found agreement on most issues, however as security threats evolve, new issues most notably Syrian war come to the surface. For instance, at a 2017 NATO meeting in Brussels, NATO became a member of the coalition against the Islamic State. At the same time Washington (Lamothe, 2017) and London (Sommerwille 2016) both deployed troops on the ground. However, there are more conflict lines in Syria than just IS. Among issues that NATO will have to deal with at earliest convenience is the divergence of strategic interests of Turkey, the US and other members, which are far from being similar. Allies need to answer what Turkey’s role in the conflict is and to what extend Allies should carry on the support of Kurdish YPG forces that figure on Ankara’s blacklist. Furthermore, as the government in Ankara continues its
44 rapprochement with Moscow via economic and military deals, the new patterns of the divide are likely to take place alongside the Syrian war.
Furthermore, we have previously16 mentioned the growing security concerns in the North. According to Lesser, security in the Arctic is becoming more important for several NATO members and their strategic considerations (Lesser, 2016: 132). Previously, the US and Canada had disputes about the territorial and maritime issues in the Arctic and with the use of so-called Northwest Passage (Dufresne, 2008). Recently however, this dimension became ever pressing as the rising temperatures change the landscape in the area allow for more economic opportunities, resource exploitation and trade. Already, there has been a significant growth in military dimension in the Arctic where not only Russia but also Canada, Norway and other NATO members conducted large military drills in the recent years (Singh, 2013). The area is valuable not only because it contains a vast amount of natural resources, but also because it allows navigation which is made easier thanks to melting an iceberg. For Russia, this means up to 37% shorter trip when shipping to Europe from the East (Hille, 2016). With economic developments military dimension comes along hand to hand. In 2013 Russia announced it would put some of the Soviet-era bases in the Far East back to use (Singh, 2013).
As for Warsaw summit in 2016, the Northern dimension has not been addressed as a security concern (Lesser, 2016: 132). However, it can be expected that with the growing military dimension and enlargement of the number of actors in the region, there is also a significant conflict potential.
16 See chapter 3.2 – Summit‘s Unfinished Business, on page 33. 45
3.5 Visualization of developments
Table I. serves as a guide to the developments. Vertical collum lines out issues that 2009 Multi-tier concept saw as vital and horizontal collum shows the changes identified by this study followed by main concepts related to the issue.
Issue17 Multi-tier (2009) Warsaw (2016) Main concepts Raison d'être 3 tier division Allied consensus Territorial defense and out-of- on area stability projection. Threat perception 3 tier division 2 tier division Agreement on revisionism, terrorism, unlawful actions. However, the south-east division is prevailing. Europeanization 3 tier division Division changed Strong EU-pillar can support its nature NATO overall.
Article 5 3 tier division Allied concensus Deterrence, territorial integrity. on Enlargement 3 tier division 2 tier division Open door policy for all / limits between of geopolitics (reversal tier). Global NATO 3 tier division Allied consensus Security in the extended Euro- on Atlantic area. Afghanistan 3 tier division Allied consensus Broad engagement in support on operation. Capabilities 3 tier division Allied consensus Conventional (traditional) as on well as expeditionary force required, missile defense is active. Strategy in Syria New issue Allied divided Syria status quo? Turkey against with a new the US-backed Kurdish. pattern. Turkey - Russia New issue Turkey’s security Syria status quo? rapprochement considerations Rapprochement with Russia and vary from other military cooperation (SAM member states. systems for Ankara) Struggle for North New issue Allies compete for Arctic Sea Route. Exploitation economic of mineral resources and opportunities, plus consequent militarization of the they face Russia’s area. foreign policy in the region.
17 Original table and issues it describes have been adopted from Schreer and Noetzel Multi-tier concept from 2009. Syria, Northern dimension and Turkey Russia rapprochement have been added by the author. 46
4. Conclusion
The aim of this research was to examine the degree of cohesion on main strategic issues from the perspective of 2016 Warsaw Summit. Paper provided an insight into the evolution of NATO’s consensus, its dynamics and predicted what the future may look like. This study has shown that the Alliance is far from disintegration and also there has been a positive change in defining the main purpose of NATO.
Using the strategic theory as defined by Yarger, we have examined the way how states use available means to affect the course of events in a geographical area. In our case we have focused on NATO members and their strategic interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. By examining main dividing issues described through Multi-tier concept, we have come to the conclusion, that the diverging trend has been reversed. The main security concerns of NATO members are far from being identical, however there have been improvements on most core topics. These improvements have been shown via comparison of 2009 Multi-tier framework with the outcomes of 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw. Based on decisions taken there, it can be argued that the main issues described by Multi- tier framework have been solved. Importantly, the reformist, status quo and also reversal tier had to adjust their priorities in some cases, and there is not one Tier that took it all at the expense of others. Gradual adjustments across the Alliance took place instead.
From reformist tier perspective, the global vision of NATO operation has been dropped for a more modest approach that focuses on the Euro-Atlantic area. Its calls for enlarging military expenditures have recently been addressed by other tiers as well. The status quo tier has adjusted its posture towards the military deployment and most importantly towards the Russian Federation. It no longer restraints to use the force alongside other member states. From the perspective of reversal tier, we argue that its main security concern has been accepted by other members in a general consensus. After Warsaw, Eastern dimension is on pair with the Southern dimension that has previously been favored. A few issues remained unresolved however.
Firstly, the European pillar of defense which in general benefits the NATO as a whole and which is appreciated by the reformist, but in the eyes of reversal the European initiatives could potentially
47 harm the strength of the trans-Atlantic bond. Also the question of the limits of NATO’s enlargement remained undefined. So far the limits have been partly defined by geopolitical considerations, and the interests of both NATO on one side and Russia on another.
One of the main changes took place is NATO‘s relationship with Russia. Previously, diverging approaches towards Russia as either partner or threat, resulted in the formation of a gap among the Allies. Comparing earlier NATO Strategic Concepts with both Wales and Warsaw Summit outcomes, consensus on the latter is evident. Russia is no more a dividing factor for NATO members. With regards to limits that each member state has in pursuing its own security, it became more vital to maintain NATO’s collective defense pledge and readiness. The latest commitments to enlarge military spendings across NATO supports this opinion.
Russia’s role as a security concern for NATO is taking shape also in the southern dimension because of the Syrian war. Some Allies have previously struggled to accommodate their preferences such as Turkey and the US. As more NATO members become involved with troops on the ground, the situation may become even more complicated. At the Syrian theater, Russia’s position cannot be neglected and there is little to do as long as Moscow’s and Western goals remain inverse. Strategy in Syria has also proven itself to be an issue for NATO countries alike. So far, the search for an optimal solution for a Syrian war has shown to be a core dividing issue for the Alliance mainly between Turkey and the US.
Ultimately, Russia’s economic interests in the Arctic are predicted to become another NATO security concern. It can be expected that the northern dimension will be added to the South - East considerations.
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