DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI missions Italy |Defence policy |Foreign policy |NATO |Russia |Ukraine |Military safeguard national interests effectively. when reflecting on aneffective Italian defence policy, ifthisaimsto are two closely related issues that should beconsidered pivotal its relationships with R NATO wastoturnfrom an“insurance policy” tothe“trenches”in in international missions, andelaborate on theItalian position if elements of continuity anddiscontinuity of theItalian participation and defence policy. In the end,conclusions highlight some Kosovo andinAfghanistan, asaninstrument of theItalian foreign The thirdchapter deals with NATO’s missions, inparticular in and thus on therecent evolution of therelationships with R NATO asan“insurancepolicy” for European andnational security international anddomestic context. Thesecond chapter focuses on first chapter framesthetwo themestakinginto account thecurrent management missions inwhich Italy participates. In particular, the and theR bring toarole of thepolitico-military “trenches”betweentheWest national security; afunction that thecurrent crisiswith R hand NATO’s function as an “insurance policy” for European and two crucial aspectsof Italian foreign anddefence policy. Ontheone between thenational interests of Italy and NATO with regardsto This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the relationship Abstract and Carolina DeSimone by Alessandro Marrone, Paola Tessari From Missions toTrenches? Italian Interests andNATO: ussian Federation. Ontheotherhand,NATO-led crisis ussia. Bothwithin NATO andglobally, these ussia could ussia. keywords DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 2 * 1 debate on them.Theweakening of thepolitical consensus towards theEuropean the international level, that weaken thetraditional landmarks of theItalian public defence policy even more important today isrelated tothechangesoccurredat The second reason that makes thelinkbetweennational interests andforeign and foreign anddefence policy andtheinternational missions. opinion –andbytheelectorate –asasatisfactory reason tosupport theItalian with regardstonational interests. Theinvestments could beacceptedbythepublic of thedecision-makers toexplainthereasons andthegoals of theseinvestments spending on defence, andtoalesser extent on foreign policy, requiresaneffort The growing attention –ifnotthe scepticism –inrelation tothenecessary UN, NATO, theEUor through adhoccoalitions. increasing Italian participation ininternational missions undertheaegisof the in thelasttwenty years (1991-2011), aperiod characterizedbyaconsiderable and spend for theF-35 aircraft?” have become quite common, especially more than questions such as“How much does MareNostrum cost?”or “Why do weneedto in support of its international role, rather thanof its domestic policies. As such, extremely sensitive toany government decision concerning public spending to theausterity measuresadopted since2011,that inturnmadethepublic opinion The firstreason istheenduring economic crisisin Italy andintheEU, connected more actual thanever andfor at least two reasons. The topic of national interests inrelation toItalian foreign anddefence policy is 1. National interests andtheItalian foreign anddefence policy by Alessandro Marrone, Paola Tessari andCarolina DeSimone* From Missions toTrenches? Italian Interests andNATO: Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? . and Defence Programme at IAI. Programme Defence and Security the in researchers junior are Simone De Carolina and Tessari Paola (IAI). Internazionali for its content. its for responsibility full take and paper draft to the feedback for 2014 their November of 20 conference at the speakers the and 2014 on held 16 October seminar the in participants the interviewees, the do thank authors The 2014. December Division, of Diplomacy NATO Public support the Study produced within the framework of the research project Defence Matters 2014, with with 2014, Matters Defence project research of the framework the within produced Study Alessandro Marrone is senior fellow in the Security and Defence Programme at the Istituto Affari Affari Istituto at the Programme Defence and Security the fellow in senior is Marrone Alessandro

Interviews, 5 June, 23 June and 8July June and 2014. 23 5June, Interviews, 1 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 3 past two decades. Strategy, or aWhite Paper on Defence, adopted byWestern governments over the found inalmost every document which entails thecraftingof aNational Security environment is“uncertain”, “unpredictable”, “changing”, assuch expressions canbe Scholars andexpertshave sofarconstantly stressedhow theinternational security the “trenches.” interests. Arelationship analyzed through atwofold interpretation: “missions” and focusing inparticular on therelationship betweenNATO andtheItalian national to protect andpromote them.Thispaper aimstocontribute tothisdebate, by interests should guideaforeign anddefence policy that isinprinciple designed Italian national interests inthe current international context isnecessary. These In thiscontext, apublic, open, inclusive andin-depthdebate about what arethe international missions. benchmark of the Italian defence policy and in particular of the participation in vis-à-vis clear breachesof theinternational law, therebyremoving another the weaknessesof themultilateral institutions andof theinternational community multipolar equilibrium inwhich Western hegemony ischallenged, hasshowed all At theglobal level, theparalysis of theUnited Nations, due tothetransition toa dictatorships. or notatransition from secular dictatorships, which islikely toendup inIslamist and thenon-intervention (until mid-2014) inSyria. Second, whether tosupport crisis, with disastrous consequences occurredbothwith theintervention inLibya local establishments –tofacetwo dilemmas. First, whether tointervene or notina towards theMiddle EastandNorth Africa countries wasbasedon dialogue with 2 “enlarged Mediterranean” Instability intheArab World since2011hasled tocritical situations inall the a profitable economic relationship with theR with eachother:asolid political relationship with theUSon theone hand,and the crisisinUkraine,put two Italian traditional national interests incontrast The deterioration of therelations between NATO andR defence policy. Europe isaskingfor” unpopular inall fields, including thoseregarding foreign and in thelatest European Parliament elections, makes thejustification “Thisis what integration process, highlighted bytherelative success of theeuro-sceptical parties Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? European Council in Genoa on 2014. 9-10 Genoa in December Council European of the Presidency Italian the by organised Exhibition CPExpo conference international the within sessions of two point focal the by demonstrated further been for Italy has security” “maritime the CONCETTOST Difesa della di Stato Maggiore Capo del strategico concetto Il Staff, General Defence Italian SceltePoliticaEstera_090408.pdf; di estera scelte politica Le 2020.

Rapporto Rapporto Affairs, of Foreign Ministry see: Italian Mediterranean” of For“enlarged adefinition R ATEGICO/Pagine/default.aspx. The enduring importance of the Mediterranean and and Mediterranean of the importance enduring The ATEGICO/Pagine/default.aspx. 2 , April 2008, p. 57, p. 2008, , April http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc/ andbrought theItalian government –whose approach , March 2005, http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASMD/ ussian Federation on theother. ussia, inparticular with R apporto2020_ DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 4 defence, andinmany casesthereisacertain revaluation of thelatter at theexpense weight of both the “missions” and the “trenches”, the latter represented by collective However, theAlliance memberstates areundoubtedly rethinkingtherole and be theonly raison d’être of NATO inthecontext of anewColdWar with Moscow. 2015. Similarly, it does not necessarily mean that collective defence will return to Aden, and as it will happen with the of theUNandEU, asit iscurrently thecasefor Kosovo, Lebanon andtheGulf of management operations through NATO joint military command, or undertheaegis This does notmeanthat Western countries will notcontinue tocarryout crisis perception of adirectmilitary threat insome NATO memberstates. a turningpoint intherelations with R Ukraine marked thereturnof anarmedconflict intheOldContinent andrepresents At thesametime,fifteen years after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, thewarin operations have beenavoided. 2011 andintoday-operations inIraq andSyria, largescale andprotracted ground last years. And when theinterventions didtake place,asinthecaseof Libya in Western countries have intervened less in(even serious) crisissituations over the dwindling useof theUSmilitary incrisisareaspartly asaresult of budget problems, uncertain. Due to a number of reasons, including the Obama administration’s Today, however, thesetwo features of Italian foreign policy seemtobemore new contest inrelation tothepursuit of national interests. context and,tosome extent, hasattempted toseizetheopportunities offered bythe Italian foreign anddefence policy. Apolicy that adapted tothenewpost-ColdWar area” Western activism aretwo constant characteristics that have also marked the The absenceof adirectmilitary threat toNATO’s countries, coupled with “out of proliferation, arms control anddisarmament. countries and other international organizations, and through policies of non- security” through the enlargement of NATO itself, through partnerships with third Alliance, namely “crisis management operations” andthepursuit of “cooperative latest Strategic Concept adopted in2010.Thisaddstwo other“core tasks”for the according toArticle 5of theWashington Treaty, thisevolution isreflected inthe the traditional task of ensuring the “collective defence” of themembercountries a purely defensive alliance toacollective toolfor crisismanagement. Together with hoc coalitions. Thesetwo characteristics have marked theevolution of NATO from the territory of theAlliance undertheaegisof theUN, theEU, NATO, or through ad constant activism of thosesamestates incrisismanagement operations outside the Alliance eventually amounted to28.Ontheotherhand,significant and those which entered through enlargement phasestakingplaceuntil 2009,when security andterritorial integrity of theEuropean membersof NATO, including On theone hand,theabsenceof amore or less directmilitary threat tothe acquired since1991–theyear of thedissolution of theSoviet Union –onwards. In thiscondition of general uncertainty, at least two elements seemedtobe Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? R esolute Support mission in Afghanistan from ussia, totheextent that it changedthe DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 5 internazionali”, IAI in Documenti iai1205.pdf. Concept addresses collective defence by extending and updating the “insurance of theseveral actors involved intheEuropean framework. Even the2010Strategic R of deterrencethat characterizedtheColdWar hasnot disappeared, even ifNATO- occurrence of thedangeragainstwhich theypay tobeprotected. Similarly, therole implies aconstant investment bythecontracting parties regardless of theactual military apparatus ready tobedeployed at any time.Usually, aninsurancepolicy democratic countries with strong common security interests within apolitico- policy,” as an “insurance policy” for Europe and Italy has not decreased. Despite theacknowledged importance of international operations, NATO’s role 2. NATO as“insurancepolicy” andrelations with R a key instrument –ifnotthe best it issignificant because Italy hasmade its participation ininternational missions This kind of reflection is particularly important for two reasons. On the one hand, management, i.e.the“missions” chapter. Atlantic security –ifnotthereal “trenches”–andasatoolfor thecollective crisis and inparticular inrelation with NATO asbothan“insurancepolicy” for theEuro- how Italy canor should continue toprotect its national interests intoday’s reality, As aresult, it isappropriate toreflect on the ongoing andpastchangestodiscuss such astheNATO- countries, but it definitely remainsaninterlocutor inanimportant partnership Federation, which in turn is perceived as a threat and theforthcoming R tasks” of NATO hasincreased: suffice ittothinkthat some missions such as ISAF, At thesametime,andinaparadoxical way, thecorrelation betweenthethree“core of theformer. Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 4 3 management and/or relationships with states like R national interests diverge from thoseof theallied countries with regardstocrisis within theAlliance, andingeneral within theinternational community, when its NATO compared toexternal threats, but also towhat thecountry hastodefend From acertainperspective, for Italy the“trenches”refer notonly totherole of partner for Italy, e.g.for thegassupplies necessarytoensureItalian energysecurity. other hand,it isimportant sinceR post-Cold War foreign policy, from thefirstGulf War toR

ussia relations have improved, but remainscrucial inthestrategic calculations Interviews, 8 July and 12 September 2014. September 8July 12 and Interviews, See, among others, Stefania Forte and Alessandro Marrone (eds.), “L’Italia e le missioni “L’Italia ele missioni (eds.), Marrone Alessandro and Forte Stefania others, among See, 4 we refer to the role played by NATO even after the Cold War by gathering R ussia Council. esolute Support, needlogistical assistancefrom theR , No. 12|05 (September 2012), http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/ 2012), (September , No. 12|05 3 ussia isanoticeable commercial andeconomic –notonly of its defence policy, but also of its ex Article 5 by some member ussia. esolute Support. Onthe ussia By “insurance ussian DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 6 to theinstitutional bodies of theAlliance. conflicts; andcivilian anddemocratic control over themilitary, andparticipation on market economy; respectfor minorities; commitment topacific resolution of Candidate countries should respecttheseparameters:ademocratic systembased criteria have gained more and more importance with respect to the military ones. cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm. 7 6 5 strong NATO presencebut also theenlargement of theAlliance toinclude countries Soviet countries. According to some experts, such situations not only required enlargement phases led to the emergence of highly unstable situations in theformer The geopolitical context resulting from theendof theColdWar triggering thefirst to thesecurity of theNorth Atlantic areatoaccedethisTreaty.” European State inaposition tofurthertheprinciples of thisTreaty andtocontribute which establishes that “theparties may, byunanimousagreement, invite any other NATO enlargement process isregulated byArticle 10of theWashington Treaty, 2.1 NATO enlargement and relations with Russia Alliance asawhole.” challenges where theythreaten thefundamental security of individual Allies or the against anattack exArticle 5of theWashington Treaty but also “emerging security that thecore taskof collective defence comprises also mutual assistancenotonly policy” inlight of themostrecent threats toNATO memberstates, totheextent Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 9 8 official_texts_17120.htm. neighbourhood policies. reforms in the former Soviet Union countries, pursuingcooperation andgood it has been contributing to stability byencouragingand supporting democratic resulting from thenewinternational scenario and,thankstotheenlargement, end, NATO has undergone a process of transformation in order to serve interests War wasaunique opportunity toimprove security intheEuro-Atlantic zone. To this According toNATO study on enlargement published in1995,theendof theCold has topursue theaimof security andstability intheNorth Atlantic area. refers totheaccessof newmemberstates asone of themeansAtlantic Alliance the new, more promising, erainEurope.” allies hadalready “agreedon theneedtotransform theAtlantic Alliance toreflect topics_49212.htm. par. 4, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm. 4, par. official_texts_23847.htm. NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, Enlargement NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010: Active Engagement, Modern Defence Engagement, Modern 2010:NATO’s Active Concept Strategic The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Alliance’s Strategic New The Treaty Atlantic North Study on NATOStudy Enlargement , last modified 12 June 2014, 12 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/June modified , last 5 7 , Washington, 4 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 4April , Washington, Indeed, among the requirements to access NATO, political , 1995, last modified 5 November 2008, http://www.nato.int/ 2008, 5 November modified last , 1995, , 1991, preamble, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ preamble, , 1991, 9 8 In 1991NATO Strategic Concept, the 6 , 20 November 2010, 2010, November , 20 Indeed, Article 10 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 7 Figure 1|NATO enlargement, 1949-2009 market economy andfor thisreason they neededastrong point of reference. experiencing asubstantial process of transition towards democratic systemsand equilibrium andthesecurity of theEuro-Atlantic region. and afterits collapse theybecamesource of instability andpotential threats tothe Union played arole of guarantor for theunity of thosecountries belonging toit, org/files/media/csis/pubs/NATO_Debate_guidebook.pdf. March 2003, p. 15, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/NATO_Debate_guidebook.pdf.http://csis. view/357/349. Urbinati Studi in 10 Poland, Hungary andtheCzechR After the fall of the Soviet Union, at 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO officially invited econ.st/1pkLGkw. Source: “NATO flexes its muscle memory”, inTheEconomist, 30August 2014,http:// that wereundertheinfluence or event part of theSoviet Union. Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 11

Mario B Mario The Debate on NATO’s Debate Evolution: The AGuide Assenova, Margarita offo, “L’allargamento e le altre trasformazioni della Nato della millennio”, “L’allargamentoall’alba offo, del terzo trasformazioni e le altre , ser. A, vol. 54, n. 3 (2003), p. 341, http://ojs.uniurb.it/index.php/studi-A/article/ 341, p. 3(2003), n. 54, vol. , ser. A, epublic tojoin theAlliance: theyformally joined , Washington, The CSIS Press, Press, CSIS The , Washington, 11 Furthermore, theywere 10 In fact,theSoviet DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 8 2009. Slovakia andR enlargement wastaken in2004,when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, that NATO role hadbeenannulled bytheendof theColdWar. Asecond phaseof demand” 15 14 13 12 the High Level Political Forum EU-Western Franco Frattini focused on thisissue during the2009Prague Summit andduring Atlantic security projects. In particular, theformer Ministerof Foreign Affairs situation inthearea,involving thosecountries inboththeEuropean and the in theWestern Balkans and thenecessity of pursuingthenormalization of the Many Italian stakeholders acknowledged thestrategic interests that Italy has influences thedefinition of Italian interests. to guarantee stability inanareathat, for its geographical position, significantly It isworth underlying that NATO presenceintheBalkans inthefirstplacehelped be dismissed.” role of NATO as“apolitical andstrategic heritage, tooimportant andtoorefinedto Soviet countries startedtoexpresstheirwill tojoin theAlliance. Thisconfirmed the NATO andtheaccession totheEuropean Union, many Western Balkans andformer peace inEurope, andbecause of theevident connection betweentheaccession to with thethreeBaltic R candidate countries andformally entered theEuropean Union in2004,together East. In 1997Poland, theCzechR in 1999. In the same years the European Union as well was enlarging towards Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 18 17 16 dangerous breedingground for conflicts close to Italian borders. area which, following thebreak-up of theformer Yugoslavia wasbecoming a participating totheprocess of pacification andstabilization of theBalkans, an confirmed its role as guarantor of thestability of the Euro-Atlantic area, actively function againstpotential armedattacks. After thefall of theBerlinWall, NATO safeguarded theentire Western Europe, Italy included, providing adeterrent Franco Angeli, 2001, p. 171. p. 2001, Angeli, Franco federation. the internal stability of states establishedafterthedissolution of theYugoslavia territories with peace-keeping missions, which have monitored andassumed former Yugoslavia, where it isstill present guaranteeing domestic security in these to crisis management. Thereupon, NATO has started conducting operations in 292. mission (SFO mission

NATO, NATO, Ibidem.

For instance the ongoing mission Kosovo Force (KFO Kosovo ongoingmission the For instance David S. Yost, Nato’s S. Act David Balancing La lunga alleanza. La Nato tra consolidamento, supremazia ecrisi Nato consolidamento, supremazia La tra lunga alleanza. La Colombo, Alessandro Interviews, 8 July and 13 September 2014. September 8July 13 and Interviews, Italy-Balkans Bilateral Relations Italy-Balkans Bilateral Affairs, of Foreign Ministry Italian 13 Enlargement 16 wasemerging,NATO wasable torespond with arenewedapproach 17 R ) in B ) in 12 omania, entered theAlliance; Albania andCroatia joined NATO in Indeed, theenlargement process wasalso areply tothosearguing osnia-Herzegovina from 1996 to 2004. 1996 from osnia-Herzegovina , cit. , epublics. Beingaware of NATO role inthemaintenance of , Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014, p. p. 2014, Press, of Peace Institute United States , Washington, epublic, Slovakia, Slovenia andHungary became Balkans, inJune 2010. R ) since 1999 and the Stabilization Force Stabilization the and 1999 ) since 14 DuringtheColdWar, NATO , last modified 26 August 2013, 2013, 26 August modified , last 15 As anew“security 18 If weaddress , Milano, Milano, , DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 9 promise,” enlargement intheR Sea. Nevertheless, NATO members’participation inanintegrated missile defence focused on mobile installations tobeadopted bytheAmerican Navy intheBlack which put asidetheideaof installing missile interceptors inEasternEurope, and reframed themissiles systemintheEuropean PhasedAdaptive Approach (EPAA), binding document. influence beyond united Germany borders. However, thisisnotconfirmed by any 20 19 http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa/balcani. 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. and thetwo EasternEuropean countries andbecameaNATO initiative during the R missile interceptors andaradarstation intheCzechR Middle East,Iran for example. In 2007,Bushannouncedhisintention toestablish missiles shield, setup toprotect NATO memberstates from attacks coming from the membership of Eastern Europe countries, is related tothe long-range anti-ballistic Another delicate issue betweenNATO andR 2010 its national security to the extent that it is enlisted among the external threats in Conversely, R Atlantic security. and highlighted that theenlargement would have represented aguarantee for the George Bushand most common American view of Europe asfree,peaceful andunited. Presidents itself. Nevertheless, theenlargement andthe“open door policy” werepartof the threat tothechances of cooperation with former Soviet countries andMoscow agree on theadvantage of NATO enlargement: it wasperceived bysome asa with R issue sincetheestablishment of theAlliance, especially asregardstherelations Nevertheless, theNATO enlargement process represents one of themostdebated as well astoits economy. contributed tothestabilization andthepacification of anareathat isclose to Italy benefiting theeconomic stability aswell; on theotherhand,thisprocess has Alliance haspromoted democratic developments inthenewly accessedcountries, the enlargement process is twofold. On the one hand, thestronger andbroader the Euro-Atlantic security from anItalian perspective, thebenefit deriving from Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 23 22 21 official_texts_8443.htm. rookings Institution, April 1999, p. 53, http://brook.gs/1IKorrJ 3). 53, (Chapter p. 1999, April Institution, Brookings

ussia opposed thisinitiative. Thistrilateral project involved, initially, theUSA NATO, NATO, Ibidem.

Ibidem, p. 292. p. Ibidem, NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions? What Purpose? What Daalder, NATOIvo H. Century: in the 21st NATO’s Balancing Act Yost, Balancing NATO’s S. David R ussia. At thebeginningof the1990s,American leadership itself didnot ussia military doctrine. Bucharest Summit Declaration Summit Bucharest 21 namely analleged commitment byNATO nottoextendits sphereof ussia hasalways considered NATO enlargement asundermining 19 22 ill Clinton confirmed thisidearespectively in1989and1994 ussian leadership, have often referred tothesocalled “broken 20 , cit., p. 291. p. , cit., 23 In order to justifythis fear, those opposing the , 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 2008, , 3April Afterwards, in2009,theObamaadministration ussia, also thisone linked tothe epublic andPoland. Clearly, , Washington, , Washington, 10 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75473.htm. Defense 28 27 26 25 24 system wasnotrejected,asit wasrestated during the2010Lisbon Summit. Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 30 29 Anders Fogh R Anders it/pdf/Oss_Transatlantico/103.pdf. R mutual confidence, transparencyandpredictability canbestserve oursecurity.” R and R Strategic Concept, which stressedtheimportance of collaboration betweenNATO mentioned below. Thecommitment tocooperation isalso reflected in2012 NATO relations andthepromotion of dialogue that took theshape intheinitiatives significant efforts to favour cooperation, through themaintenance offriendly At thesametime,it isworth underlying that boththeAlliance andNATO made separate missile defence systems. pointed out that apotential cooperation would anyway bestructured intwo 2012, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1933. 2012, not take any obligation regardingtheuseof theanti-missile shield. to non-NATO members, because of the fact that it is impossible outsource collective defence obligations NATO- Council tofacilitate common initiative inthesecurity sector substituted bythe Cooperation andSecurity few years later in1997,establishingthePermanent Joint Partnership for Peace, in1994;thesigning of theFounding Act on Mutual R for instancetheNorth Atlantic Cooperation Council in1991;R Many instruments pursuingdialogue andcollaboration have beenestablished, the counterpart, initially byencouragingR In order toavoid furthercontrast, NATO put serious effort tofindequilibrium with Federation’s strategic nuclear forces” andapparently breachedbytheUSactions. missile defence system“capable of reducing theeffectiveness of theR Arm between Lithuania andPoland, andsecondly thewithdrawal from theStrategic first thedeployment of Iskander Missiles in Kaliningrad, theR a substantial threat, theformer R Since theR official_texts_68828.htm. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_101397.htm. R Vershbow 2013 at the Alexander oma, Senate, November 2008 (Contributi di Istituti di ricerca specializzati n. 103), http://www.iai. n. specializzati ricerca di Istituti di (Contributi 2008 November Senate, oma,

ussia isintertwined andthat astrong and constructive partnership basedon

NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, r NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO, U.S. Offers Dialogue But No Legal Pledge to Russia on Missile on Missile Pledge Russia to ButLegal No Dialogue Offers U.S. (NTI), Initiative Threat Nuclear Marco Siddi, “Le spine nel fianco della difesa antimissile”, in AffarInternazionali antimissile”, difesa della fianco nel spine “Le Siddi, Marco Le relazioni della Russia con la Nato la con el’Unione europea Russia della relazioni Le Valerio and Briani, Alcaro iccardo R ussia explainingthat “weremainconvinced that thesecurity of NATO and , 1 November 2013, http://shar.es/13YxGw. 2013, , 1November eduction Treaty, on the basis of Article 4 forbidding the deployment of R NATO Defence and Missile NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 NATO’s Concept Strategic NATO: Attack Missile Defending Ballistic against Lisbon Summit Declaration Summit Lisbon ussia Council through thePratica di Mare(R ussians perceived thepresenceof missiles close totheirterritory as asmussen at the R at the asmussen 28 thenNATO SecretaryGeneral Anders Fogh R oyal United Services Institute, London, 15 June 2011, http://www. June 2011, 15 London, Institute, United Services oyal USI Missile Defence Conference, London, 12 June 2013, http:// June 2013, 12 London, Conference, Defence Missile USI , Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Ambassador General NATO Secretary by Deputy , Speech , 20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 2010, November , 20 , cit., par. 34. , cit., ussian President Dmitry Medvedev promised ussian cooperation inEPAA , Speech by NATO Secretary General General NATO by Secretary , Speech ome) Agreement, in2002. ussia accesstothe ussian enclave in , 13 December December , 13 27 26 Moreover, asmussen but it did elations, ussian , 30 24 29 25

11 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI eprint/6808. No. 4), 76, p. http://real.mtak.hu/id/ Studies European (East 2012 of World Economics, Institute of the Post-Soviet Area and Issues Other Russia with Partnerships Challenges. Eurasian nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_99887.htm. March 2014, http://www.reporternuovo.it/?p=102994. 2014, March 5 August 2014, http://fam.ag/1A 2014, August 5 34 33 32 31 Mare spirit,” R key role inreconciling NATO andR With respecttothementioned activities, thePratica diMareAgreement played a operations, military cooperation, defence systemreform, emergingthreats. the establishment of defensive measures against theatre ballistic missiles, rescue controls. Moreover, thebody also aimedat strengtheningmutual trust,through Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) non-proliferation, armament procurement over common areasof interests, like counter-terrorism, crisismanagement, The NATO- Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 37 36 35 the Georgia crisisandtheUkraine crisisoccurred,respectively in2008and2014. states, among which Italy, Germany, Hungary, from takingaclear position when analysts, thestrong dependenceon R 45 (19 March 2010), p. 233, http://www.pism.pl/index/?id=588e343066cf54ec3db5132231df7d68. 2010), 233, p. March (19 45 in theEuropean Union from R its total internal demand, and 30 out of 135 million of cubic meters of gas imported raw material. As anexample, Italy’s dependenceon R between R www.repubblica.it/online/esteri/natodue/vertice/vertice.html. Putin at the R by theformer Italian PrimeMinisterEnrico LettaandtheR is also reflected inthe28points agreement on finance,energyandindustry, signed countries exchanged goods for 31billion euro value in2013.Theprivileged relation they mutually have. Indeed Italy isR bound bya“privileged relationship,” asaresult of thesignificant economic interests Furthermore, from a closer point of view, one canargue that Italy andR of tackling drug trafficking from Afghanistan toCentral Asia. R countering narco-traffic in Afghanistan. Aspart ofthis,inDecember2005, NATO- In particular, theCouncil enabled cooperation betweenNATO andR through NATO- to deliver supplies toISAF personnel andgiving support toAfghan Air Forces collaborated with NATO mission inAfghanistan, byopening agate viaits territory,

NATO, NATO,

r ussia specifically. R ussia Council plannedatrainingprogram for themilitary personnel incharge

“Firmata l’Intesa Nato- l’Intesa “Firmata Antonella Scott, “A Trieste l’incontro Putin-Letta. Al B Al Putin-Letta. l’incontro “A Scott, Trieste Antonella Alice Passamonti, “Ucraina e questione energetica: cosa rischia l’Italia?”, in R in l’Italia?”, rischia cosa energetica: equestione “Ucraina Passamonti, Alice Foreign Affairs Snapshots Affairs Side of Foreign Interdependence”, Dark in “The Lorber, Eric and Gottlieb Stuart Marco Siddi, “Italy- Siddi, Marco obert Śmigielski, “Afghanistan in Foreign Policy of R Policy Foreign in “Afghanistan Śmigielski, obert NATO-Russia Council Expands Support to Afghan Air Support Force NATO-Russia Expands Council ome andMoscow, which isacrucial commercial partnerandsupplier of R 34 ussia Council wasestablishedtoencouragedialogue andconfrontation which hadabig impact on the already important economic relations ussian-Italian Business Forum in November 2013. R ussia Trust Fund. R ussia R ussia ome clearly benefited from what wasthennamedthe“Pratica di R ussia ‘Uniti contro il terrorismo’”, in Repubblica.it in il terrorismo’”, contro ‘Uniti ussia elations: Politics, Energy and Other B Other and Energy Politics, elations: R yJSL. ussia areaddressedtoItaly. 33 ussia intents ingeneral, andbetweenItaly and ussia’s fourth commercial partner,andthetwo ussian energystopped many EUmember Il accordi”, Il 28 in siglati Forum usiness ussian Federation”, Bulletin PISM in ussian ussian gasamounts to43%of usiness”, in Ludvig Zsuzsa (ed.), (ed.), Zsuzsa Ludvig in usiness”, ussian President Vladimir ussian President Vladimir , 23 April 2013, http://www. 2013, April , 23 35 According tosome 32 , 28 May 2002, http:// 2002, May , 28 37 Moreover, R It is also true that eporter Nuovo eporter , B ussia are udapest, udapest, ussia in , No. ussia , 14 36 31 ,

12 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI to support theseparatist republics andtoextend Moscow influence andpresence. 2008. While violence wasescalating, R forces and troops arrived to Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia on 8 August the Georgian government. TheGeorgian government intervened with thearmed secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetiaembarked protests against NATO memberstates. However, prospects changedwhen inAugust 2008the However, Ukraine andGeorgia could effectively seethemselves inthefuture as supported by the United States but opposed by some EU members like France. the formal launch of theaccess procedure through theMembership Actions Plan, 2008, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=931. 2008, Ramifications of Russian Aggression towards Ukraine towards Aggression Russian of Ramifications 39 38 corso-incontro-putin-letta-business-forum-siglati-ventina-accordi-152456.shtml. Sole24ore.com subscribed international obligations, pursuingapolicy of “strategic solitude” demonstrated that R with theUkrainian crisis in2014.Several scholarsargue that bothoccasions the two worsened mainly intwo occasions, theGeorgian crisis,in2008,and Despite theseveral initiatives tofavour NATO- 2.2 Theimplications of Russia-Georgia war in 2008 blocks its sources. they areexperiencing, cannotbetaken asaguaranteed supplier incaseR Norway, Algeria and Libya but these latest, because of the highly unstable situation Italy receives gassupplies from othercountries aswell, like theNetherlands and Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 41 40 before the crisis hadbroken up, astestified bytheR Some argue that theR Geneva. by France that hadthepresidencyof theEU bythat time–on 15August 2008in through aceasefire which wasmediated bythe European Union –andinparticular Bombings didnotenduntil 12August 2008.Theconflict endedinfavour of R that these countries will become members of NATO.” and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership inNATO. We agreedtoday Ukraine andGeorgia accesstoNATO, byaffirmingthat “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s At the2008Bucharest Summit theheadsof state andgovernment supported countries. resorting totheuseof armedforce toenhanceits influence on theneighbouring Agency (FOI), June 2014, http://www.foi.se/report?rNo=FOI- June (FOI), 2014, Agency

NATO, NATO, Giovanni Gasparini, “L’Invasione e russa l’Unione europea”, in AffarInternazionali Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen and Gudrun Persson (eds.), ARude Awakening. (eds.), Persson Gudrun and Malminen Johannes Granholm, Niklas Alice Passamonti, “Ucraina e questione energetica: cosa rischia l’Italia?”, cit. l’Italia?”, rischia cosa energetica: equestione “Ucraina Passamonti, Alice Bucharest Summit Declaration Summit Bucharest , 26 November 2013, http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-11-26/trieste- 2013, November , 26 38 ussia gives priority toits national interests againstany ussian intervention inGeorgia waspartof amove planned , cit., par. 23. , cit., ussian military wasalso deployed asameans , Stockholm, Swedish Defence R Defence Swedish , Stockholm, R ussia dialogue, relations between R --3892--SE. 40 However, this did not entail ussian troops presenceat , 2 September , 2September esearch esearch 39 ussia, ussia and 41

13 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 2011, http://reut.rs/sbLK3G. relations-after-georgian-conflict. 4-9, p. Vol. 2009), http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/nato-russia- No. 33, 7(November (May 2009), http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=148. 2009), (May elements of that decision, aswell assubsequent decisions.” Summit weagreedthat Georgia will become amemberof NATO andwereaffirm all possibility for Georgia tojoin theAlliance, bysustaining that: “At the2008Bucharest In September 2014, NATO Wales Summit final declaration revived, at point 93, the NATO. secessionist republics, led tothesuspension of theprocess for Tbilisi accessto the end,internal instability inGeorgia togetherwith R preventing any furtherNATO enlargement into theformer Soviet sphere. Dmitry Medvedev publicly declaredthat theintervention inGeorgia aimedat comments Indeed, astheUScondemned R As aconsequence, relations betweenWestern countries andR Georgian borders sincetheendof July 2008. Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 troops deployed along both countries’ borders in themonths prior totheconflict. notes/2010/201002.pdf. FRS Notes de la armed attack byR conflict inGeorgia, confirmed inthefinal report that therewasnopre-planned Tagliavini, inchargeof theIndependent International Fact-Finding Mission on the and Abkhazia against potential contrasts with Tbilisi. R 2004 (interview 8July 2014). (interview 2004 in Ukraine in crisis the during reaffirmed then was perception This countries. European Eastern of case the in especially Georgia, in events the with emerged strongly already had members release of R that could beinterpreted asfavouring thetwo separating entities for example the Furthermore, one should recall that R par. 29, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm. Declaration also: Summit See NATO, Chicago en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. in thePartnership for Peace program. in peacekeeping operations –apartfrom Afghanistan –but also theparticipation Council work wassuspendeduntil March 2009,aswell ascooperation with NATO www.balcanicaucaso.org/Tutte-le-notizie/

ussian forces asasupport toapeacekeeping operation aimedat protecting Ossetia

NATO, NATO,

Ibidem. According to some observers, the perception of R perception the to observers, some According Gilles Gallet, “Enseignements militaires et stratégiques du conflit d’août 2008 en Géorgie”, in Géorgie”, en d’août du conflit 2008 stratégiques et militaires “Enseignements Gallet, Gilles Maura Morandi, “ Morandi, Maura George Mchedlishvili, “ Mchedlishvili, George Denis Dyomkin, “ Dyomkin, Denis R “NATO and Braun, Aurel Marcel de Haas, “NATO- deHaas, Marcel Wales Summit Declaration Summit Wales , 9 August 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/193878. 2013, , 9August ussian passports toR , No. 2/10 (5 February 2010), p. 5, http://www.frstrategie.org/barreF 2010), 5, p. , No. 2/10 (5 February R R ussia. Osservatorio Balcani eCaucaso Osservatorio in Abkhazia”, ischio ussia says Georgia War Stopped NATO Reuters War in Stopped Expansion”, Georgia says ussia R R Chatham House Expert Expert House Chatham in Loss?”, War: Moscow’s ussia-Gerogia 44 ussia R ussia ussia: Post-Georgia Threat Perceptions”, in Russie.Nei.Visions in Perceptions”, Threat Post-Georgia ussia: Certainly, mutual accusations hadbeenexchanged about Atlantisch Perspectief in Atlantisch Conflict”, Georgian the after elations , Newport, 5 September 2014, par. 93, http://www.nato.int/cps/ par. 93, 2014, 5September , Newport, ussian-speaking people of Abkhazia andOssetia. ussian initiatives againstGeorgia, R ischio-Abkhazia-41523. ussia hadalready carried out some initiatives 48 In theaftermath, former R ussia as a hostile country by the NATO the by country ahostile as ussia 42 Othersclaimthat Moscow sent 43 TheSwissdiplomat Heidi 50 ussian support tothe , 14 May 2008, http:// 2008, , 14 May However, any actual ussia deteriorated. ussian President 47 R NATO- , 20 May 2012, 2012, May , 20 S/publications/ , 21 November November , 21 , No. 40 R ussia 49 In In , 46 45

14 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2581. 2004 Constitution andlimiting thePresident’s power wasreached. the supervision of Poland, Germany andFrance, anagreement re-establishingthe 53 52 51 with theuseof armedforces on 29-30 November 2013. in Maidan Square and asking for his resignation, to which the President reacted Yanukovych’s actions were met with protests by the Ukrainian people gathering 15 billion dollars incredit. after signed adeal with R Deep andComprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with theEUandsoon the UkrainianPresident Viktor Yanukovych suspendedthenegotiation for the by thecrisisinUkrainewhich beganinNovember 2013.Thecrisisoriginated when The already soured relationship betweenNATO andR 2.3 Theimplications of Ukraine crisis is achieved. after a normalization of theinternal situation and,above all of relations with R action towards Georgia – and Ukraine – access to NATO seems to be possible only Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 56 55 54 night 26-27 February 2014,pro- R Council of Crimea and of the Council of Ministers in the capital city Simferopol. the government majority voted tomodifythe2013 The Voice Russia of The Ukraine-passes-law-returning-to-2004-Constitution-1135. February 2014, http://bit.ly/1mIk18A. 2014, February a majority of Over themonths, clashes have spreadcross theEasternpartof thecountry where approach totheEUandresulting loss of R in EasternEurope and,on theotherhand,it isMoscow payback for Ukraine meaning. Ontheone hand,it shows Putin’s opposition to“Western interventionism” The annexation of Crimea toR the Ukrainianareathat werestill underthecontrol of Kiev. replaced byPetro Poroshenko, elected on 25May 2014,afterelections wereheldin Crimea wasannexed byR On 18March 2014afterareferendum that declaredits independence from Ukraine, in Crimea took the control and forced the government forces to leave the country. With thesupport of military andparamilitary

ussian asanofficial languageinmany Crimearegions andasaresult, inthe

A Rude A Awakening (eds.), Persson Gudrun and Malminen Johannes Granholm, Niklas “Ukraine: Yanukovych Signs Deal on Ending Crisis, R Crisis, on Ending Deal Signs Yanukovych “Ukraine: A Rude A Awakening (eds.), Persson Gudrun and Malminen Johannes Granholm, Niklas Ibidem, p. 22. p. Ibidem, Paolo Calzini, “Cosa vede l’occhio di Mosca”, di AffarInternazionali in l’occhio vede “Cosa Calzini, Paolo “Ukraine’s New Language B Language New “Ukraine’s R ussian-speakers live, and pro- , 21 February 2014, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_02_21/ ussia inorder tohave a33%discount on R ill Will B 51 ussia. President Yanukovych fled thecountry andwas ussia, abreachof international law, hasadouble e ‘ R ussian groups occupied theseat of theSupreme B Sputnik International Sputnik in Leader”, -Acting alanced’ R ussian influence on thepeninsula. ada R ada ussian forces, theR R ussian rebels still fight with the einstates 2004 Constitution”, in Constitution”, in 2004 einstates ussia hasbeenfurtheraffected 54 52 law that hadintroduced After threemonths, under , 25 March 2014, http://www. 2014, March , 25 ussian majority ussian gasand 53 Meanwhile, , cit., p. 21. p. , cit., , cit., p. 21. p. , cit., , 27 ussia, 56 55

15 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 59 58 57 Kiev compatible with theEurasian Economic Union. contribute inthissensewith any attempt tomake theassociation agreement with without pursuingformal NATO membership. TheEuropean Union could also be found inanapproach which aimsat granting support tocertaincountries In order toovercome theopposition betweentheEUandR of 298passengers. down of theMalaysia Airlines planeMH17on 17July 2014which caused thedeath Ukrainian crisishasbeenmarked byothertragic facts,for instancetheshooting support from Moscow basedon theright toprotect R Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 62 61 60 October 2014, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2844. European Union. Constitution, andfor thesereasons theresults areconsidered invalid bythe the autonomous R President Poroshenko. At the sametime, other elections were organized within Parliament on 26October 2014won bythedemocratic andpro-European partyof NATO. people unity, values andinterests asanalternative toEuropean integration and the support for its leadership among R safeguarding Moscow interests intheneighbouring countries andat enhancing union, arepartof abigger framework of foreign anddomestic policy, aimingat in thefuture. Apparently, boththemilitary intervention, aswell asthecustom ucraina_3ca655eb-a994-4bcd-9d85-cd9f2e15a365.html. July 2014, http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2014/07/17/aereo-di-linea-malese-caduto-in- sovietiche”, in RaiNews in sovietiche”, Soviet countries, The crisisalso shows how R “business asusual” afterUkraine. Cold War. NATO leaders have reaffirmed that relations with experts astheworst episodemarking NATO- R place inUkraine.In fact,it isworth underlying that thecrisisisconsidered bysome which aims,instead, at analysing thepolitico-strategic aspectsof theevents taking agriculture andtransports. pursue thedefinition of acommon policy in key areassuch asenergy, industry, a space of free movement of goods, services, capitals and workers, and it will also will become theEuro Asian Economic Community (EAEC) in2015.It will comprise R R also intheestablishment of multilateral organizations gathering countries under

ussia, Belarus,andKazakhstan.Thecustom union wasestablishedin2010and ussian influence. Thisisthecase, for example, of thecustom union among

Francesco Giumelli, “Chi paga i costi delle sanzioni alla R alla delle sanzioni icosti paga “Chi Giumelli, Francesco Claudio Salvalaggio, “Missile abbatte un aereo malese in Ucraina, 298 morti”, in ANSA in morti”, 298 Ucraina, in malese aereo un abbatte “Missile Salvalaggio, Claudio “Nasce l’Unione economica euroasiatica: Putin rafforza i legami con le R i legami rafforza Putin euroasiatica: economica l’Unione “Nasce A Rude A Awakening (eds.), Persson Gudrun and Malminen Johannes Granholm, Niklas Margarete Klein and Markus Kaim, “NATO- Kaim, Markus and Klein Margarete A Rude A Awakening (eds.), Persson Gudrun and Malminen Johannes Granholm, Niklas 60 Theseelements emergedalso during theelections heldfor theUkrainian 58 61 andthisfear isreflected not only intheuse of armed force but epublics of Lugansk andDonetsk, inbreachof theUkrainian 57 , 29 May 2014, http://shar.es/13YDwE. 2014, May , 29 However, such episodesfall out of thescope of thispaper 59 ussia feels threatened byNATO presenceintheformer Armenia andKyrgyzstan would possibly join theEAEC R ussian citizens, astheguarantee of R ussia R ussia elations after the Newport Summit Summit Newport the after elations ussia relations sincetheendof the ussia?”, in AffarInternazionali in ussia?”, 62 ussian people inUkraine.The R ussia, asolution might ussia will not continue epubbliche ex ex epubbliche , 18 , 18 , cit., p.15. , cit., , cit., p. 25. p. , cit., , 20 , 20 ussian 16 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI in RaiNews in nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112460.htm. newsbrief&ref=A54059C6251C64. 2014),Vol. No. https://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=articles_ 5(September 34, traffic, terrorism, support todisarmament and WMDs proliferation. regge”, Europa in http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2793. leaders agreedon theso-called “R 69 67 66 65 64 63 R Gulf and maritime security, focused instead on the relation with in December2014,on R agenda, that wasexpectedtofocus on theendof operation ISAF inAfghanistan core of the Wales Summit held on 4-5 September 2014 in Wales. The Summit The Ukrainiancrisisandtheneedfor effective response bythe Alliance wasthe civilian andmilitary cooperation with R and military support toUkraine.Finally, theAlliance hassuspendedall practical Eastern European countries. Secondly, NATO hasbeenproviding bothfinancial in thearea,airforce patrolling theBaltic regions, andallied joint exercises with has beenreassuringits Easternmemberstates byenhancingthemilitary presence events so far has been structured according to three elements. Firstly, the Alliance for a politico-diplomatic solution of the crisis. In particular, NATO response to the While thesituation hasbeenaggravating, Western leaders have repeatedly called Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 68 www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm. natolive/news_108501.htm. joint exercise inUkraine 1997: a solution that reassures new NATO members. NATO also plans to carry out on arotating basisinorder nottoviolate theMutual Act signed with R to the Allies, at all times,” asit wasstated bySecretaryGeneral R in memberstates with theobjective tosendaclear message;“NATO protects all includes command andcontrol systems,pre-positioning supplies andequipment within afew days with air,seaandSpecial Forces support. Thespearhead unit also represented byavery high readinessforce comprising landtroops ready todeploy around 15million euros. and control andcommunications. NATO’s assistancetoUkrainewill amount to sectors: rehabilitation for injured troops, cyberdefence, logistics, andcommand nato_russland_beziehungen.html. 4, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/ SWP Comments SWP in Guarantees”, Security and Cooperation eassurance, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO,

NATO, NATO,

Michael Clarke, “The NATO Summit: The Long Agenda of One Item”, of One Agenda Long Newsbriefs NATO The RUSI in Summit: “The Clarke, Michael Alessandro Marrone, “La Nato e la partita con Mosca”, con AffarInternazionali in Nato partita ela “La Marrone, Alessandro Lorenzo B Lorenzo “Ucraina, Ue: ipotesi nuove sanzioni contro Mosca; Londra: oltre 4.000 soldati russi nel paese”, paese”, nel russi soldati 4.000 oltre Londra: Mosca; contro Ue: nuove sanzioni ipotesi “Ucraina, R eadiness Action Plan, NATO presence in Eastern Europe will be organized NATO Leaders Take Decisions to Ensure Robust Alliance Robust to Ensure NATO Take Decisions Leaders Statement byNATO Ministers Foreign NATO Leaders Pledge Support to Ukraine at Wales to Summit Ukraine Support NATO Pledge Leaders , 20 August 2014, http://shar.es/13YD6C. 2014, August , 20 iondi, “C’è l’accordo tra Ucraina e ribelli. R eribelli. Ucraina l’accordo “C’è tra iondi, , 5 September 2014, http://www.europaquotidiano.it/?p=316005. 2014, , 5September 69 68 esolute Support andon NATO interests inthePersian andtoadopt measurestohelp Ukraineinthefollowing eadiness Action Plan”, russels, 1 April 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 2014, 1April , Brussels, ussia, enzi: valuteremo su sanzioni se la tregua tregua la se sanzioni valuteremo su enzi: 63 including trainingagainst narco- , 5 September 2014, http://www. 2014, , 5September , 4 September 2014, http:// 2014, , 4September 66 with aspearhead unit asmussen. , No. 41 (October 2014),, No. p. 41 (October , 1 September 2014, 2014, , 1September R 64 ussia. 67 According 65 ussia in , NATO 17 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI September 2014, http://24o.it/2N50E 2014, September 2014, forthcoming. 2014, EU imports one third of its oil consumption and one fourth of gas from against theenergysector have beenraisingdeepconcern inEurope, sincethe with the53%of thelatter passingthrough theUkrainianterritory. confindustriarussia.it/ucraina-confindustria-russia-a-squinzi-sanzioni-preoccupano. money flows toR foreign financiers, whose loans will be suspended due to the sanctions against 938 million and2.4 billion euros. sector. As regards the years 2014-2015, the loss could reach an amount between R 41% of its usual profit from gasexports. 74 73 72 71 70 by thesanctions. into account theinterests of Italian companies inR representing Italian industry) Giorgio Squinziandasked Italian stakeholders totake expressed hisconcern tothePresident of Confindustria (themain organization economy, inMarch 2014ErnestoFerlenghi, President of Confindustria R As concerns more closely theimpact of sanctions andcounter-sanctions on Italian technology, andcertainenergy-related equipment andinstruments. lending tothefive major R against thefinancial, defence andenergysectors andfreezinginternational The European Union aswell has reactedimposing sanctions toR stop vis-à-visany thirdcountry’s veto –clearly referring toR applied tothosecountries meetingthemembership criteria andthat should not defined by the Secretary General an “historic success”, that will continue to be As concerns theenlargement, NATO will always adheretothe“open door” policy, Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 76 75 5% to6.5%inthesameyear. GDP growth in2015werecut from 2% to1%,andinflation isexpectedtorisefrom already inadifficult situation before thecrisis. Infact,the projections for R the sanctions will probably hit R it isready toextendthem technology andtextile industry. Thefirsteffects from banning imports of food products from theEU, Canada,Australia andNorway, and adopted such measures, R PER http://www.asca.it/news-*_Sanzioni__in_

ussia have decreased by 25% corresponding to a loss of 100 million euros for each Alice Passamonti, “Ucraina e questione energetica: cosa rischia l’Italia?”, cit. l’Italia?”, rischia cosa energetica: equestione “Ucraina Passamonti, Alice Sissi B Sissi “Ucraina: Confindustria R Confindustria “Ucraina: Giovanna De Maio, “Sanzioni alla R alla “Sanzioni Maio, De Giovanna European Union, EU sanctions Against R Against sanctions EU Union, European “Sanzioni in R in “Sanzioni European Crisis Union, over Ukraine Against Russia sanctions EU CENTO_-1416354.html. ellomo, “Allarme gas dalla Polonia: dimezzate le forniture di Mosca”, di IlSole24Ore.com in le forniture dimezzate Polonia: dalla ellomo, “Allarme gas ussia: allarme inflazione: ora prevista al 6,5%”,in ASCA al prevista ora inflazione: allarme ussia: 75 ussia. In fact,according totheItalian Trade Agency, Italian exports to 73 ussia a Squinzi, sanzioni preoccupano”, in AGI in preoccupano”, sanzioni aSquinzi, ussia Furthermore, inthefirstquarter of 2014, Moscow has lost ussian banks,prohibiting exports of dual usegoods and ussia responded with anumber of counter-sanctions 72 Moreover, R R . ussia, boomerang sul made in Italy”, in AffarInternazionali in made sul boomerang ussia, 76 ussian economy inthenearfuture, sinceit was R ussia over Ukraine Crisis, cit. Crisis, Ukraine over ussia ussia_allarme_inflazione__ora_prevista_a_6_5_ 74 ussian banksowe 600billion dollars to ussia andthedamagecaused , http://europa.eu/!Vy68pK. , 26 August 2014, 2014, August , 26 ussia. , 14 March 2014, http:// 2014, , 14 March ussia, directed 71 After theEU 70 Sanctions R ussian ussia, ussia, , , 11 , 11 18 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI possibile-una-risposta-adeguata-5915. www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2702. aspx. October 2014, http://www.aco.nato.int/nato-tracks-largescale-russian-air-activity-in-europe-2. dollars percubic metreuntil theendof 2014. end of 2014.R to theagreement, Kiev will have tosolve its 4billion dollar debttoGazprom bythe the Vice President of theEuropean Commission Gunther H.Oettinger.According between R October 2014,October http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1238_en.htm. 80 79 78 77 international air space in the days NATO intercepted anunusually high number of R However, afterthis agreement wasreachedintheenergysector, on thesame to theaverage. while sofar Ukrainehasbeenreceiving gasat asignificantly low price ifcompared flows toKiev, whose price could riseby200 dollars every thousandcubic meters, With reference totheenergysector, thecrisisinUkrainehasalready hit R Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 82 81 Libya. gas sources other than Moscow are located in highly unstable countries such as countries, above all thoseentirely dependingon R the internal demand.Thiswould undermineenergysupply of many European of thegaspassingthrough its territory anddirectedtoEurope inorder tosatisfy 500 to5,500kilometres. and conventional ground-launched ballistic andcruisemissiles with rangesof States andtheSoviet Union toeliminate andpermanently renouncetotheirnuclear Intermediate- NATO aggravated when President BarackObamaaccusedR they posedaserious risktocivilian airtraffic. The contrast betweenR flight plansanddidnotmaintain radio contact with civilian airtraffic control, representing aserious threat totheUnited States andall NATO members. and testingof ground-launched cruisemissiles carried out byR com/l6qj3p. ru/2014_07_31/Gli-Stati-Uniti-hanno-accusato-la- Russia della voce La in adeguata”, risposta una possibile

Ibidem.

Oleg Nekhay, “Gli Stati Uniti hanno accusato la R la accusato Uniti hanno Stati Nekhay,Oleg “Gli Nicolò Sartori, “Sul gas Mosca e Kiev ai ferri corti”, in AffarInternazionali in corti”, ferri ai eKiev Mosca gas “Sul Nicolò Sartori, Breakthrough: 4,6 billion dollar Deal Secures Gas for Ukraine and EU for Ukraine Gas billion Secures 4,6 dollar Breakthrough: Deal Commission, European “US Accuses R Accuses “US NATO Tracks Large-Scale Russian Air Activity in Europe Air Activity Russian Large-Scale NATO Tracks Operations, NATO Command Allied 78 Onesteptowards asolution wastaken with theconclusion of anagreement ussia andUkraineat theendof October2014,thankstothemediation of egarding newsupplies, Ukrainecommitted topay monthly about 385 R reach... B Breach... of Nuke Treaty ussia 77 ange Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in1987requiringtheUnited If R ussia suspendedits supply toUkraine,thelatter could usepart 81 Obama’s accusation originated from thedevelopment Baltic region. ut Has It?”,ut Has News RT in R ussia di aver violato il trattato sulle armi: armi: sulle il trattato aver violato di ussia ussia-di-aver-violato-il-trattato-sulle-armi- 80 79 Since the aircraft did not file their , 31 July http://italian.ruvr. 2014, ussian gas,but also Italy whose ussian fighter flying over , 30 July, 30 http://on.rt. 2014, ussia of breachingthe , 23 June 2014, http:// June 2014, , 23 ussia since2008, ussian gas ussia and 82 , 30 , 30 , 29 , 29 19 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI leg16/dossier/Testi/di0238.htm. that could bedefinedaslimited. internazionali”, cit., p.49. Source: StefaniaForte andAlessandro Marrone (eds.),“L’Italia ele missioni Figure 2|Italian Armed Forces participation inoperations abroad inthelastdecade troops annually. 2000, aperiod inwhich theItalian Armed Forces deployed anaverage of 8,700 went up to 30 in 1999 and remained at that level for the entire decade following Kingdom. Duringthe1990s,Italy averaged more than20missions annually, which presence of European countries such asFrance, Germany, Italy andtheUnited most partUnited States-led, themissions also saw thestrong, albeit asymmetrical, Balkans, SaharanandSub-Saharan Africa, theMiddle EastandCentral Asia. For the assortment of international missions invarious operational theatres, chiefly inthe In the period following the Cold War, Western nations embarked on a broad 3. NATO missions asanItalian foreign anddefence policy tool Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 85 84 83 missioni militari internazionali militari missioni did notresult in adequately servingItalian national interests

Interviews, 5 June and 13 September 2014. September 13 5June and Interviews, Italian Chamber of Deputies- Chamber Italian Interviews, 5 June, 23 June and 8July June and 2014. 23 5June, Interviews, 83 Nevertheless, thisconsiderable engagement insuch missions , R R oma, June 2010 (Quaderni No. 4), http://documenti.camera.it/ (Quaderni June 2010 oma, Nuovi profili della partecipazione alleitaliana partecipazione profili Nuovi della Office, esearch 85 84 andyielded returns 20 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Edizione 2000 Edizione L’Italia (eds.), al. et internazionale. politica ela Aliboni Edizione 2012 Edizione estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra secondo italiana del estera 86 powerful partnerstoprotect what arein some measurecommon security interests. those areas on its own, has historically relied on “asymmetrical alliances” with more southern banksof theMediterranean and,unable toinfluence developments in is surrounded byunstable regions stretchingfrom theWestern Balkans to the According toone interpretation widely embracedbyscholarsandpundits, Italy – but notsolely –asaconsequence of theColdWar. security aswell asof thesystemof alliances of which thecountry ispart,principally Second World War, theUnited States hasbeenthecornerstone of Italian national in thehistory of theforeign policy of theItalian R The goal of maintaining good andclose relations with Washington isnothingnew 3.1 TheUnited States, theAtlantic Alliance and Italy’s international status more broadly understoodinternational community. States andbolsteringItaly’s role bothspecifically within NATO aswell asinthe latter category includes, for example, maintaining solidrelations with theUnited policies focused on thepursuit of more general national interests objectives. This defence policies directly concerned with national security, but also of foreign in international missions hasprogressively become aninstrument notonly of evolution inItaly’s post-ColdWar foreign policy: indeed,theuseof armedforces and 1989.Deployment inoperations that include combat tasksisasignificant – four times thenumber (30)that fell on missions in theforty years between1949 full 134Italian troops lost theirlives on foreign missions between1990and2012 increasingly challenging and perilous mandates that included combat tasks. A This sustained, large-scale deployment of Italian troops took the form of Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 88 87 the Mediterranean, the Middle East and other regions of the world and, therefore, United States aguarantor of thesecurity of Europe, andalso tosome extent of 356-357. military strengthtodefend alone. and/or functionally linked with interests that thecountry lacks the political and ranging from security totrade routes tothestability of areasgeographically resources andexporter of goods andservices, necessarily leads toglobal interests, Moreover, Italy’s economic structure, asanimporter of raw materials andenergy active presenceintheregion for thepurposeof low-intensity crisisresolution. confronting issues concerning former-Yugoslavia andAlbania, including NATO’s was inItalian interests toadopt amultilateral andinstitutionalised approach to For instance,with theoutbreak of theWestern Balkans crisis intheearly 1990s,it relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992 1943 dal internazionali relazioni r

La politica estera dell’Italia. dell’Italia. estera politica La (eds.), Greco Ettore and Colombo Alessandro others: among See, Stefania Forte and Alessandro Marrone (eds.), “L’Italia e le missioni internazionali”, cit., p. 28. p. cit., internazionali”, “L’Italia ele missioni (eds.), Marrone Alessandro and Forte Stefania oberto Menotti, “I rapporti politici transatlantici e la trasformazione della Nato”, della R in trasformazione ela transatlantici politici rapporti “I Menotti, oberto , B Il Mediterraneo nella politica politica nella Mediterraneo Il (ed.), Leonardis De Massimo 2012; Mulino, Il ologna, , B , R ologna, Il Mulino, 2003; Antonio Varsori, L’Italia Varsori, Antonio 2003; Mulino, nelle Il ologna, oma- 88 From thisstandpoint, theItaly considers the B ari, Laterza, 1998, only War Cold for period. the 1998, Laterza, ari, epublic. Since theendof the , B ologna, Il Mulino, 2000, p. p. 2000, Mulino, Il ologna, oberto oberto 86 87

21 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI international missions. allies in function of their military and political contributions to American-led September 2001,Washington beganincreasingly toassesstherole of its European Modern Italy Modern in Government”, view/UNIS1111130017A. Papers Discussion and Pakistan. and policy at adisadvantage. the United States inmilitary operations would put Italian foreign anddefence 1990s that, inthenewphasethat beganwith theendof theColdWar, notbacking became fundamental toits standing with its USally. It was already clear intheearly 93 92 91 90 89 intersection with bothmilitary andpolitico-diplomatic cooperation. more specifically predicated on collaboration inthedefence industry, given its close Finally, it must beconsidered that thepost-Cold-War Italy-US relationship became Europe andtheBalkans tothe“Greater Middle East” Furthermore, asthefocus of USforeign anddefence policy startedshiftingfrom the ColdWar. has underpinnedclose bilateral cooperation, notleast inthetwo decadesfollowing the characteristics of Italian strategic practice, arational calculation of interests security interests. In otherwords, beyond cultural affinities, historical heritage and useful tothepursuance of national interests – including, although notexclusively, Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 95 94 along with afirmanchorage to Europe with theUnited States tobeone of two key foreign anddefence policy objectives, government coalitions inthepost-ColdWar period have considered good relations of which werelater cancelled bytheObamaadministration. Virtually all Italian D penetrate theAmerican market, with Finmeccanica’s purchase of theAmerican programmes, asinthecaseof theF-35, but also anattempt byItalian firmsto saw notonly anintensification incollaboration on international procurement Italy’s position vis-à-visotherEuropean countries such asFrance andGermany. focused on building astrong bilateral bond with Washington inorder tostrengthen in Iraq), Europeanism andAtlanticism werepredominantly complementary. R of theleading European nations (asinthecaseof the2003military intervention some clashesinperiods of heightened tension betweentheUnited States andsome to placetheaccent on Europe, andthecentre-right on theAtlantic Alliance. Despite Cahiers de la Méditerranée de la Cahiers in perspective”, industrial adefense War post-Cold period: Italy the in and of America United States the between for US-Italian Relations CeMiSS-

R For an up-to-date analysis see: Alessandro Marrone and Alessandro Ungaro, “ Alessandro and Marrone Alessandro see: up-to-dateFor an analysis Leopoldo Nuti, “The R “The Nuti, Leopoldo Guida alla politica estera italiana estera politica alla Guida Romano, Sergio UNISCI UNISCI Politics”, in Internal and Foreign between Atlanticism “Italy’s Leonardis, De Massimo Osvaldo Croci, “Much Ado about Little: the Foreign Policy of the Second B Second of the Policy Foreign the Little: about Ado “Much Croci, Osvaldo According to George W. to George B According S Technologies firmandwith thesigning of aseries of major contracts –some R AND, 89 , No. 25 (January 2011), p. 17-40, p. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/ 2011), (January , No. 25 Changing U.S. Defence Policy and Policy the War Implication Defence on for Terrorism: Italy U.S. and Changing , Gaeta, Artistic & Publishing Co., 2002 (Collana CeMiSS No. 1.25), p. 46. p. No. 1.25), CeMiSS (Collana 2002 Co., &Publishing Artistic , Gaeta, ichest and Farthest Master is Always B Always is Master Farthest and ichest 91 ush’s approach the “Greater Middle East” also includes Afghanistan Afghanistan includes also East” Middle “Greater the ush’s approach , Vol. 10, No. 1 (May 2005), p. 62. p. , Vol. 10, No. 2005), 1(May 92 Italy’s participation inforeign operations consequently , No. 88 (June, No. 88 2014), 157-181. p. 94 –inany case,with thecentre-left tending , Milano, R , Milano, 90 izzoli, 2004, p. 258. p. 2004, izzoli, est. US-Italian R US-Italian est. inthewake of theevents of 11 erlusconi erlusconi elations in in elations R elations elations 93 The2000s ome 95

22 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Washington, 8July http://www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/opinions_111614.htm. 2014, Washington, Fogh R Anders General NATO Secretary Century. The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle of an Power Aspiring Assertiveness New The Century. as well as a“seat” continuing pursuit of amultilateral framework for its diplomatic and military action 48. B and Giacomello 2010”, Giampiero in useful andnecessary–more difficult for R powers that renderdiplomatic efforts on apurely bilateral plane– while still and economic capabilities gap between“middle” powers such asItaly international actions. and defence policy, definingboththe opportunities andthelimits regarding Italy’s multilateral forums have beenthemainframework of reference for Italian foreign other multinational organisations that have a strong presence in Europe. These Dynamics of thissort have traditionally surfacedwithin theAtlantic Alliance and global status of some individual countries vis-à-visothers. management of crisespertinent toEuropean security, andthecontinental and typical of European history: political rivalries, theformation of directoires for the was accompanied bybilateral EU-member dynamics that continued tobethose various 1990sand2000s Italian governments wereforced tocope. Thisconstant followed it, despite thechangesat domestic andinternational levels with which the States was an element of continuity between the Cold War and the period that una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità adoggi dall’Unità l’Italia potenza: media una 99 98 97 96 Iraq after Relations US-European Atlantic Alliance under The Stress. (ed.) Andrews M. David in Perspective”, Historical by some USauthors, crises intheWestern Balkans andtheMediterranean. Overall, asunderscored This approach torelations with theUScontinued through the1990s,during the Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 100 security during theColdWar, andeven afterwardsremainedan“insurance policy” From this standpoint, NATO embodied the foremost warranty on Italian national States andprincipal European countries. management Contact Groups formed over timeon theimpetus both of theUnited Il Mulino Il in disarmato”, Fogh R against any deterioration in the international scenario, as well as a means for B Middle of an Power Aspiring Twenty-First Assertiveness New The Century. B and Giacomello Power”, Giampiero a Middle in B and Giacomello Giampiero see: concept, the of discussion for a http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1200; 2009, AffarInternazionali in potenza?”, omedia al vertice oItalietta, “Italia Silvestri, Stefano see: Spectator ooks, 2011, p. 13-28. p. 2011, ooks,

See R See La politica estera di estera politica Santoro, La M. Carlo power”, see: of concept the “middle of For adefinition The “seat” policy does not always have a positive meaning. See Angelo Panebianco, “Il paese paese “Il Panebianco, Angelo See meaning. apositive have not always does policy “seat” The See, among others: R others: among See, The term has been used also in official speeches by the NATO Secretary General, Anders Anders General, the Secretary by NATO speeches official in also used been has term The A Strong Transatlantic Bond for NATO, Bond an World Unpredictable See Transatlantic AStrong asmussen. oberto Menotti, “Italy’s Growing B Growing “Italy’s Menotti, oberto , Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 2007), p. 431-444. p. 2007), No., Vol. 3(September 42, , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 189. p. 2005, Press, University Cambridge , Cambridge, 99 invarious international assemblies, including thevarious crisis , No. 349 = 5/1993 (September-October 1993), p. 898-904. p. 1993), =5/1993, No. 349 (September-October . Craig Nation, “Intra-Alliance Politics: Italian-American R Italian-American Politics: “Intra-Alliance Nation, . Craig 96 97 maintaining good relations betweenItaly andtheUnited They have also become a means for reducing a military ertjan Verbeek, “It’s the Perception, Stupid! The Hard Life of Italy as of Italy as Life Hard The Stupid! Perception, the “It’s Verbeek, ertjan Italy’s Foreign Policy in Policy Foreign Italy’s the Twenty-First Verbeek (eds.), ertjan asmussen at the Atlantic Council of the United States, United States, of the Council Atlantic at the asmussen The International International The in Policy”, Security in of Choice urden , B ologna, Il Mulino, 1991; for a brilliant critique, critique, for abrilliant 1991; Mulino, Il ologna, Italy’s Foreign Policy in Policy Verbeek (eds), Foreign Italy’s the ertjan ome. Thisisanotherreason for Italy’s , Lanham, Lexington B Lexington , Lanham, , Lanham, Lexington Lexington , Lanham, elations, 1946- elations, ooks, 2011, p. p. 2011, ooks, 98 , Speech by by , Speech andmajor , 17 July 100

23 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI December 2013,p.18,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=2&contentid=1034. Figure 3|Perception of NATO’s role: bestfor Italy has thus farbeenindispensable toensuringnational security. reasons, keeping theAtlantic Alliance politically andmilitarily solidandoperative standing within NATO andtheinternational community ingeneral. For all these is, inturn,ameansfor strengtheningrelations with theUnited States andacertain Foreign Policy, R Source: LindaBasile, Pierangelo Isernia andFrancesco Olmastroni, Italians and and strengthensolidarity among allies. economic costsandrisks;have avoice insettingcoalition objectives incrisisareas; in placestoodistant and/or tooonerous for asingle nation; sharehuman and made it possible to:extendareasof intervention inthedefence of national interests The management of missions through international organisations like NATO has foreign anddefence policy asregardsboththeUnited States andits European allies. alone. TheAtlantic Alliance has also provided afundamental framework for Italian Danubian Europe. However, NATO’s functions have not beenlimited tothosetwo extending the area of peace, security and freedom of Western, Eastern and Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 102 101 and technologically up todate with thoseof more militarily advanced allies modernisation of theItalian Armed Forces, andfor keeping theminter-operable 2014). 7 June 5and (interviews, capabilities operational and credibility both to build forces armed Italian the for major opportunity a offered NATO in missions Italy’s participation of observers, majority

Stefania Forte and Alessandro Marrone (eds.), “L’Italia e le missioni internazionali”, cit. p.44. cit. internazionali”, “L’Italia ele missioni (eds.), Marrone Alessandro and Forte Stefania At first in the various B various the in At first esearch report byCIR alkans missions and then in Afghanistan with ISAF, according to the to the ISAF, according with Afghanistan in then and missions alkans CaP/LAPS (University of Siena) andIAI,17 101 Finally, NATO isthemainvector for the Balkans/ 102 and 24 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI United States bore thebrunt with more than80%of all sorties. sorties, against Germany’s 2%, the United Kingdom’s 5% andFrance’s 6%, while the composition. UN Security Council, aswell asinthewiderdiplomatic dispute over theCouncil’s for instance,insuccessfully obtaininganon-permanent seat on the2007-2008 a parameterwould undoubtedly give R mission participation asacriteria for selecting countries tosit on theCouncil. Such forth) –do notmake acomparable contribution tointernational security. who – while they can point to other strongpoints (economic, demographic, and so dall’Iraq alla Libia 1991-2011 Libia alla dall’Iraq it/content.asp?langid=2&contentid=1109. and Needs Trends operations theatre –andItalian ports on theAdriatic Sea. from 12NATO andUSbaseslocated on Italian soil –inproximity therefore tothe all, of logistics: more than50%of theallied planes usedon themission took off was notonly, andnotsomuch, consequent tothenumber of sorties but, above involvement wasessential tothemission’s launch, pursuanceandsuccess. This 104 103 1,072 sorties that clocked a total 2,903 mission flight hours. 50 combat aircraft: Air Force Tornados, AMXsandF-104, andNavy AV-8Bs flew Italy took part inthe1999NATO Allied Force operation inKosovo with more than Kosovo (1999)andAfghanistan (2002-2014). security interests at stake incrisistheatres, isclear inthecasesof theoperations in to theUnited States, NATO andtheinternational community, andthedirectnational The interaction betweenthegeneral objectives of Italian foreign policy with regard policy 3.2 TheKosovo and Afghanistan missions: national interests and foreign UN, theEUandG8. country’s position andcredibility inkey multilateral forums such asNATO, the Cold War participation ininternational missions ameansbywhich tobolsterthe More ingeneral, Italian policy-makers have traditionally considered Italy’s post- Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 106 105 1 (January-March 2004), p. 101-122. p. 2004), 1 (January-March Spectator International Choices”, The in Policy Italy’s Foreign and System International

Ibidem.

See, among others, Paolo Guerrieri and Stefano Silvestri, “New Alliances, Governance of the of the Governance Alliances, “New Silvestri, Stefano and Guerrieri Paolo others, among See, The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations: Operations: Management Role of Italian in Fighter Crisis The Aircraft al., et Camporini Vincenzo Qualcosa ècambiato? L’evoluzione Qualcosa edi italiana difesa estera politica della Coticchia, Fabrizio 104 , R Indeed, Italy hassteadfastly supported including international oma, Nuova Cultura, March 2014 (IAI R (IAI 2014 March Nuova Cultura, oma, 103 , Pisa, Pisa University Press, 2013, p. 35. p. 2013, Press, University Pisa , Pisa, Italy’s contribution tointernational security wasanasset, ome anadvantage over othercompetitors esearch Paper 10), p. 46, http://www.iai. 10), 46, p. Paper esearch 105 Italy flew 3% of NATO 106 Italy’s military , vol. 39, no. , vol. 25 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI the Serbianrepression of ethnic Albanians inKosovo werenotstopped. public andspreadingthe–notentirely unfounded –dreadof wholesale exodus if wave of migrants from across theAdriatic wasfuelling debate among theItalian criminal elements among them.Thereal threat of anew, massive andinexorable public order, given thenumber of persons beingtaken inandthepresenceof refugees toward Italy that wasbeginningtocreate problems interms of domestic security. First, it contributed tocontaining, with thehopes of halting, aflow of that included theuseof force pursued atwo-fold objective directly linked tonational general in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, regional stabilisation efforts In thecaseof Kosovo, andof theconflicts that erupted inthe Western Balkans in Management Operations: Trendsand Needs, cit., p.46. Source: Vincenzo Camporini et al., spiralling regional crisis. intervention that could potentially trigger bothanadditional refugee influx and continued to favour apolitical solution inlight of therisksassociated with an in Kosovo –what’s more, controversial andconducted without UNapproval –Italy for international organised crime.R whose dual threat included potential regional warandthecreation of lawless havens spread of destabilisation inaregion adjacent toItaly along landandsea borders, The second objective directly associated with national security wastoavoid the Table 1|Sorties andcorresponding flight hours–Operation Allied Force Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 107 4 F-104 ASA, 6AV-8 B IDS, 4Tornado ECR/IDS, F-104 ASA, 6Tornado 22 Tornado, 6AMX, Italian contribution (March 1999-June 1999) Germany (2%) Netherlands (3%), UK (5%),Italy (3%), US (80%),France (6%), Coalition Forces General information (March 1999-June 1999)

Carlo Scognamiglio Kosovo del Pasini, guerra La Aircraft Chain ofCommand ight up tothe start of NATO military operations Sorties NATO 1.072 The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis , Milano, R , Milano, Resolution UN Security Council izzoli, 2002, p. 54. p. 2002, izzoli, Flight Hours Flight 2.903 No 107 26 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Italian Politics. The Faltering Transition The Italian Politics. (eds.), Pasquino that, inacertainsense,it hadbeenaquestion of “passingourexams”. of bilateral relations with theUnited States: thethen-Prime Ministerlater admitted of Italian foreign and defence policy. Asimilar mechanismwastriggered in terms NATO memberand,therefore, one more way toprove thesteadinessandreliability R fact that thegovernment washeadedfor thefirsttimeinhistory of the Italian air campaign would have beenmuch less effective andinfinitely more costly. Indeed, it bearsrecalling that without theuseof Italian military bases,theNATO of credibility at international level wereequally compelling motives at thetime. of Italy’s position intheAlliance, of asolidrelationship with theUnited States and Nevertheless, thesewerenottheonly aimsof theItalian government. Maintenance avoiding its collapse. maintaining prospects for adiplomatic settlement with theSerbianregimeand 108 for Foreign Affairs at thetimestated that, regardingthe NATO intervention in important element inforging thecountry’s position during thecrisis:Minister Finally, the recognition Italy sought from the international community was an share intheadministration of Balkan security.” government at thetime:“It wasaquestion of decidingwhether or nottohave a the best way to influence its outcome. As stated afterwards by a member of the that directparticipation inthemission, within thelimits of possibility, would be against theleadership of Slobodan Milosevic, theItalian government decided appeared obvious that theUnited States would lead NATO inamilitary operation had supported the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Nevertheless, once it position wascombined intheearly 1990swith anotherCatholic-based vision that reasons (affinities between the Italian Communist Party andthe Tito regime). This for historical reasons (common struggle againstAustria-Germany) andideological This approach wasassociated with asegment of theItalian elite’s affinity for Serbia, Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 113 112 111 110 109 exclusively for thebombardment of Kosovo, andnotof Belgrade, example, tomoderate themilitary escalation againstSerbiabyusingItalian bases shouldering tasksthat proved relatively onerous for its Armed Forces. crisis in particular, Italy’s desire to share in the Alliance’s strategic decisions meant audiz2/1999/0420/pdfel.htm. 1999 23-25del aprile NATO italiano di Washington al vertice Governo del posizione sulla Pasini, Scognamiglio Carlo to” fulfil its pledges to NATO. Alliance wasat stake: therewasaperception among theleadership that Italy “had Italy’s position asanactive, reliable andresponsible memberwithin theAtlantic epublic byaformer communist constituted an ulterior testof Italy’s reliability asa

Osvaldo Croci, “Forced Ally? Italy and Operation Allied Force”, in Mark Gilbert and Gianfranco Gianfranco and Force”, Gilbert Ally? Mark Allied in “Forced Operation Italy and Croci, Osvaldo Massimo D’Alema, Kosovo: gli italiani guerra Massimo ela Qualcosa è cambiato? è Qualcosa Coticchia, Fabrizio Audizione dei ministri degli affari esteri, Lamberto Dini, e della difesa, ItalianDini, e della difesa, Lamberto Parliament, esteri, degli affari Audizione dei ministri Umberto R Umberto Interview 11 November 2014. November 11 Interview International Herald Tribune International in task”, to the Equal Proves “Italy anieri, , 20 April 1999, http://leg13.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stencomm/0304/ 1999, April , 20 111 Furthermore, bothingeneral andintheKosovo , cit. p. 163. p. , cit. , Milano, Mondadori, 1999, p. 4. p. 1999, Mondadori, , Milano, , New York,, New B 108 Aparticipation that sought, for erghahn B erghahn ooks, 2001, p. 42. p. 2001, ooks, 109 with aview to 112 113 , 12 June 1999. , 12 Finally, the 110

27 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI preparing tomake theiractive, albeit uneven, contribution totheoperations. and theUnited Kingdom, againstwhich Italian ambitions were measured,were is especially true considering that European countries such asFrance, Germany East. The Hour of the EU? The East. B in Expectations”, European SPECIALS/war.casualties. 116 115 114 regarding theirdeployment. quantitative, innumbers of troops, aswell asqualitative, e.g.fewer national caveats and, inthemeantime, insistingon increasedcontributions from its EU allies: both as well asdictating themission’s objectives, (shifting)strategies andtimetable mission on Afghan soil, assuming its command uninterruptedly from 2007onward States must firstbeunderscored. Firstly, the United States strongly advocated for a Italy’s involvement inISAF, the mission’s importance for NATO andtheUnited Going on tothecaseof Afghanistan, inorder tounderstandthereasons behind in international hierarchies astoits participation inthesingle currency.” Kosovo, Italy’s cohesive conduct was“equal inimportance toItaly’s future rank Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 118 117 aprile 1999 aprile NATO italiano di Washington al vertice 23-25 del Governo del posizione sulla Pasini, Scognamiglio Americans. insurgents. BySeptember2014its death toll stoodat 3,447, of which 2,508were full-blown counter-insurgency, with frequent, prolonged and fierce battles with initial peacekeeping phase,notunlike similar experiences inthe1990s,toone of similar duration in the Western drop down to41,000in2014–amuch more massive military force thanthat of and combat vehicles, with acontingent that peaked at 131,000 troops in2011, to This hasbeenNATO’s largestmission todate intermsof number of ground troops bolstering thesituation aheadof thesubsequent withdrawal of combat troops. in 2009,decidedtosend51,000American reinforcements for thepurposeof White House continued into thefirstterm of theObamaadministration, which, posts tocover theentire Afghan territory bytheendof 2006.Pressurefrom the extending its range of action in2004,eventually settingup regional command assumed thecommand of ISAF asof August 2003and,on American impetus, began armed forces toconcentrate on thewarinIraq. It wasnoaccident that NATO allies toboosttheircommitments inAfghanistan, not least inorder toallow US management consultations betweenWashington, London, Paris andBerlin. and theprincipal European members,but wascontinuously involved incrisis Italy wasexcluded from theContact Group formed bytheUnited States, R Indeed, it should berecalled that inthebeginningof theWestern Balkans crisis, Macmillan, 2011, p. 98. p. 2011, Macmillan,

r

CNN, CNN, See, among others, Alessandro Marrone, “Obama and Afghanistan. AR Afghanistan. and “Obama Marrone, Alessandro others, among See, Jason W. Davidson, America’s Allies and War. W.Jason Davidson, and Iraq Afghanistan, Kosovo, Audizione dei ministri degli affari esteri, Lamberto Dini, e della difesa, Carlo ItalianDini, e della difesa, Lamberto Parliament, esteri, degli affari Audizione dei ministri oberto Menotti, “I rapporti politici transatlantici e la trasformazione della NATO”, della 369. p. cit., trasformazione ela transatlantici politici rapporti “I Menotti, oberto , latest access 5 September 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/ 2014, 5September access , latest Afghanistan Casualties: , cit., p. 9. p. , cit., 118 Themission witnessed thecommitment notonly of the28Alliance russels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012, p. 81-94. p. 2012, Lang, Peter P.I.E. , Brussels, Europe and Europe Faleg the Middle (eds.), Giovanni and Wassenberg irte 117 TheGeorge W. Bushadministration asked European Balkans. At the same time, ISAF went from an eality Check for Check eality , New York,, New Palgrave 114 116 ussia This 115

28 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI troops andair-to-ground attacks. reconnaissance (ISR),but also with supplying close airsupport tocombat ground 8,447 in-theatre flight hours,and weretasked with intelligence, surveillance and and AMXcombat aircraft, whose 3,031sorties from 2002to2014clocked atotal of to 2006.In addition to theground-based component, Italy also utilised Tornado General Mauro DelVecchio took over leadership of theentire mission from 2005 Various government coalitions have maintained Italy’s pledge for over adecade. number of Italians fallen inmilitary operations sincetheSecond World War. 53 soldiers tothemission betweenJanuary 2002andAugust 2014–thehighest from political, diplomatic, economic and, above all, military standpoints. Italy lost 119 political responsibility. country, with theexception of Germany, tomaintain that amount of military and remained Head of commands into which theISAF mission wasdivided. Headquartered inHerat, Italy the training mission aftertheUnited States. Moreover, Italy wasplacedat theheadof addition of another200instructors in2010,thesecond largestcontributor tothat to theNATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, tothepoint of becoming, with the United States, theUKandGermany. Italy also madeasignificant contribution in linewith theprincipal European countries, and ranked fourth behindthe launched in2002,with acontingent that rose innumber toover 4,000in2009, involvement inthemission. Italy hasbeenparticipating inISAF sinceit was ISAF’s importance for NATO andtheUnited States iskey toexplainingItaly’s the Alliance’s collective crisismanagement capacity. as well asanotherfundamental testingground for inter-alliance solidarity andfor United States, ISAF hasbeenNATO’s principal mission for approximately adecade, For thesereasons, andespecially due totheimportance Afghanistan heldfor the the command of ISAF, which, in turn, interacted with the UN and EU missions. members, but also of 20additional partners, for atotal 48armedforces under Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 121 120 2014; R B 4th Trends and Needs Trends safe haven such as a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would certainly have contributed proximity to Italy. Undoubtedly, depriving international Islamic terrorism of a influx of refugees, or of the general destabilisation of aregion with geographical defence of national security: therewascertainly nodiscernible riskof anincreased obvious linkemergesbetween the useof military force intheAfghan theatre andthe In attempting toanalyse thisdecision, which differs from thecase of Kosovo, no from 2006 to 2010). 2006 from Netherlands the and Canada UK, of the leadership rotating the under South Command of asingle part (previously leadership US of Turkey; under West, leadership South the and under Kabul), South

In detail: 2nd and 3rd B and 2nd detail: In The other R other The The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations: Operations: Management Role of Italian in Fighter Crisis The Aircraft al., et Camporini Vincenzo R erlusconi government, 2008-2011; Monti government, 2011-2013; Letta government, 2013- government, 2011-2013; Letta Monti government, 2008-2011; government, erlusconi egional Command West when it was created in 2005 as one of six regional enzi government, 2014. government, enzi egional Commands include: North, led by Germany; East, US-led; Capital (only Capital US-led; East, Germany; by led include: North, Commands egional , cit., p. 53. p. , cit., R egional Command West until 2014 and was the only European erlusconi governments, 2002-2006; 2nd Prodi government, 2006-2008; 2006-2008; government, Prodi 2nd 2002-2006; governments, erlusconi 119 Within the context of the rotating ISAF command, Italian 120 Themission, therefore, hasbeensignificant 121

29 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 122 have underminedR to gaininternational influence andthat, vice-versa, unilateral withdrawal would insisted that acountry such asItaly neededconstancy inforeign policy inorder opposition from theleft-wing majority. At thesametime,foreign minister for aparliamentary confidence vote on refinancing the Italian ISAF mission, despite community ingeneral. On21February 2007,theR to ISAF with aview tomaintaining its standinginNATO andintheinternational In addition toits relations with the United States, Italy madethe military commitment security during theupcoming Afghan elections. announcement that America would besendinginreinforcements toISAF toboost decided tosendinanadditional 1,000troops inlate 2009immediately following an two years intheWhite House, it isclear why theSilvio Berlusconi government as its centrepiece. Given theimportance Obamaplacedon Afghanistan inhisfirst relationship with its American ally took shape, with theintervention inAfghanistan Middle East”, it isprecisely inits positions vis-à-visthat region that Italy’s preferential administration weremarked byUSmilitary operations intheso-called “Greater As for bilateral relations with Washington, sincetheeight years of theBush enhance its role intheinternational community. with theUnited States; second, tostrengthenItaly’s Alliance standingand,thirdto policy objectives during theBalkans operation. First, tomaintain close relations there mainly served the samethree,previously analysed, Italian foreign anddefence Afghanistan as there had been in Kosovo, participating in international missions Therefore, iftherewerenodirectnational security interests inthebalance in in military operations wastosupport theUnited States. national interest” inAfghanistan perse,thus thereal reason for Italian participation any home-grown version. According tosome observers, Italy hadno“significant appear inthefirstdecade of the2000stobemore active or dangerous in Italy than in 2001,or of London in2004andMadrid2005,nor didIslamic-based terrorism not beentheobjectof terrorist attacks such asthoseof New York andWashington New York and Washington, its potency has gradually weakened over time. Italy has public opinion andpolicy-makers inthemonths following theterrorist attacks in If fear of international Islamic terrorism wasastrong factor intheperception of Italy’s. to reinforcing overall international security andtherefore, tosome degree,also Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 125 124 123 February 2007, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/ p. 6, February recruitment activities). in part Italy in (for most the operating terrorists of suspected of anumber made were arrests and soil, on Italian installations military and stations railway seaports, airports, tightened in were

Comunicazioni del ministro degli affari esteri sulle estera linee politica esteri di Comunicazioni degli ministro del affari Senate, Italian Jason W. Davidson, America’s Allies and War W.Jason Davidson, It must not be forgotten that in the months following 11 September 2001, security measures measures security 2001, September 11 following months the in that forgotten notIt be must Qualcosa è cambiato? è Qualcosa Coticchia, Fabrizio 122 ome’s international credibility. , cit., p. 194. p. , cit., , cit., p. 124. p. , cit., 124 omano Prodi government called 125 According tothegovernment B 123 GT/00253523.pdf. , 21 , 21 30 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI “The R “The Nuti, Leopoldo See: relationship. enhanced of this evidence are Afghanistan in and Yugoslavia former the involvement in Italian The pre-1989 to the period. regards with stronger become has 127 126 Libya. among thosecompleted inthepost-ColdWar era:inKosovo, Afghanistan and and thejoint military command tosome of themostdemandingmilitary operations role, compared totheUNandEU, offering bothapolitico-diplomatic framework missions, theAtlantic Alliance asaninternational organization hasplayed amajor multilateral within NATO, also thanktoItaly. However, within thisrangeof 2011, apolitico-military Franco-Anglo-American initiative which thenbecame It is worth mentioning the controversial case of the intervention in Libya in in 1997. between 2003and2006,or led byItaly, asinthecaseof operation Alba inAlbania well asoperations within theUS-led “coalitions of thewilling”, for instanceinIraq of NATO, such asthoseinLebanon since2006andinSomalia intheearly 1990s,as peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN and without the involvement the post-ColdWar era.Indeed, thespectrumof such operations includes major the spectrumof military operations of acertainscope conducted byItaly in The two international missions considered inthispaper arenotexhaustive of Conclusions such asNATO –it waswilling tobrave domestic political crisis. to maintain that credibility andfulfil thepledges undertaken in multilateral forums was tobolsterItaly’s credibility within theinternational community and–inorder at thetime,one of theprincipal motives for remainingcommitted inAfghanistan Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 128 centre-right andcentre-left parties in the Italian government coalitions alternation betweendemocrats andrepublicans at theWhite House andbetween Italian engagement in international missions. This happened regardless of the proved tobeacornerstone of Italian foreign anddefence policy, particularly of First of all, even inthepost-ColdWar eratherelationship with theUnited States international missions. particular regardingthelinkbetweennational interests andItalian participation in current context canbe drawn from thetwo examples analyzed inthispaper andin if, of course,such alternation didinfluence thebilateral relations. L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Edizione 2008 Edizione L’Italia internazionale. politica ela Cuore Università Sacro del politiche Cattolica di Scienze Dipartimento del Quaderni italiano”, in militare

Alessandro Marrone, “Il rapporto tra le missioni NATO e la trasformazione dello strumento dello strumento NATO trasformazione ela le missioni tra rapporto “Il Marrone, Alessandro Marco Clementi, “La politica estera italiana”, in Alessandro Colombo and Natalino R Natalino and Colombo Alessandro in italiana”, estera politica “La Clementi, Marco According to some authors, the bilateral relationship with Washington in the post-Cold War post-Cold era the in Washington with bilateral relationship the to authors, some According , a. 4, n. 7 (2014), p. 150, http://www.educatt.it/libri/ebooks/A-00000370%20QDSP07_2014.pdf. 7(2014), 150, p. n. 4, , a. The International Spectator International The in Policy”, Italy’s Foreign ole of in US 127 Without makingthemistake of over generalising, some reflections on the , B ologna, il Mulino, 2008, p. 107. p. il 2008, Mulino, ologna, , 2004, (Vol. 38, No.1), p. 99. p. No.1), 38, (Vol. , 2004, 126 onzitti (eds.) (eds.) onzitti 128 –even 31 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI unstable and countries’ positioning more fragile than in the past. As a result, for course the development of globalization, make theinternational hierarchies more powers inEurope, Asia, theMiddle Eastandinotherregions of theworld, andof other frameworks such astheEU, the emergence–or re-emergence– of regional of universal multilateral institutions such astheUN, thedifficult transformation of – but notlimited to–NATO andtheUnited States. In thelastdecade,weakening motivating andinfluencing Italian participation inmissions, especially with regards responds toItaly’s interests and ambitions isasteady andsignificant factor in Thirdly, theneedtokeep aposition intheinternational community that properly Eastern Europe in2015. the participation intrainingandexercises within NATO, such asthoseforeseen in example thecommitment toallocate 2%of theGDP tothedefence budget) andin in theprocurement andmaintenance of adequate military capabilities (seefor continues totake shape inthecontribution tointernational missions, aswell as to maintain apolitical, military andeconomic investment. An investment which for theItalian national security. From theItalian perspective, thispolicy requires States inEuropean security seemtoenhanceNATO’s role asan“insurancepolicy” policy. Moreover, thesamecrisesthat have increasedtheweight of theUnited importance of the Alliance as a fundamental framework for the Italian defence to pursue a new equilibrium between them and collective defence, reaffirms the which aftertwenty years of commitment tocrisismanagement operations seems European countries andtheUnited States. Theongoing transformation of NATO, by themembership toNATO andits meaningregardingrelations with others missions, andingeneral its foreign anddefence policy, have beinginfluenced Secondly, afterthefall of theBerlinWall, Italy’s participation ininternational Islamic State inIraq and Syria. military advisors, totheinternational coalition led bytheUnited States againstthe unmanned Predator aircraft, atanker for air-to-air refuel, and280trainers Italian armedforces beguntocontribute with four Tornado combat aircraft, two push Italy toparticipate innewinternational missions. Indeed, inNovember 2014 American pressure on European allies for a joint military intervention would still and bytheway thetransition in Afghanistan hasbeen handled. However, a strong were accomplished, with thedramatic consequences now visible inbothcases, withdrawal from Iraq in2011,theabandonment of Libya once NATO airoperations characterized by the disengagement in crisis areas.This is proved by the complete European security and thus for Italy. So far, the Obama administration has been to strengthen – or at least to confirm – the importance of the United States for the deterioration of therelations betweenWestern countries andR neighbourhood andingeneral inthe“enlarged Mediterranean”, coupled with The recent increaseof instability intheEuropean continent, aswell asinits Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 129 con-compiti-di-ricognizione_fce9fd7a-68f8-494d-b222-2d537fc1f68f.html. http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2014/11/16/isis-italia-invia-tornado- 2014, November 16

“Isis, Italia invia Tornado con compiti di ricognizione. M5s: ‘Pinotti entra in guerra’”, in ANSA in guerra’”, in entra ‘Pinotti M5s: ricognizione. Tornado compiti con di invia Italia “Isis, 129 ussia seem , 32 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI public opinion tothesematters. turn contributes tocreate avicious cycle with the already limited attention bythe consider thelinkbetweencrisisinUkraineandNATO importance for Italy. do notfeel threatened byR European continent, but also inmakingsurethat NATO andEU memberstates On theone hand,Italy hasaninterest notonly inthestability andpeaceof the to thecountry’s energysecurity. even more complex because of its economic ramifications, including those relating In thecaseof NATO- use asaninstrument of theItalian foreign anddefence policy. participation ininternational missions, particularly thosewithin NATO, andtheir in thepresent document remains,therefore, fundamental ininfluencing Italy’s The interaction betweenelements of discontinuity andcontinuity asidentified Italian academia(with few exceptions) and when necessary. In addition tothat, little attention ispaidbythemediaand maintenance of themilitary meansnecessarytoallow Italy’s possibility toactif in open opposition, not only to Italian international commitment, but also to the circumstances andeconomic priorities. Thisresults inaweaksupport, and/or and investments in defence policy in general – as an expendable cost, given the on domestic issues andtojudge Italian commitment ininternational missions – cut government spending –hasled thepublic opinion andtheelectorate tofocus unemployment’s growth, GDP contraction, arisingpublic debtandtheneedto level, theeconomic downturn inItaly sincetheendof 2011–characterizedby of intervention experimented inthepost-Cold War period. At thedomestic places significant limits to Western interventions incrisis areas, at least totypes military commitments –afteradecadeof USoperations intheMiddle East– regional powers, combined with therecent American reluctance tosignificant and theotherwith a domestic nature. At theglobal level, theemergenceof the useof international missions asameansof foreign policy, one with aglobal As mentioned above, however, thereareat least two elements of instability in required. appropriate political andmilitary effort towards thedesiredposition isconstantly the international community isnever fulfilled once for ever, andtherefore an countries like Italy, theaimof achieving or maintaining acertainposition within Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 132 131 130 growth –as it was,mutatis mutandis, during theColdWar. Thepursuit of this since security inthissenseisaprerequisite topolitical stability andeconomic uncertain, fluid, unpredictable andchanginginternational context like thecurrent, In otherwords, thereistheneedfor NATO toactasan“insurancepolicy” also inan

Interview 18 June 2014. 18 Interview Interview 23 June 2014. 23 Interview Interview 23 June 2014. 23 Interview R ussia relationship, theissue of theItalian national interests is ussia -even if at least initially many Italians didnot 131 130 tosecurity anddefence issues, andthisin 132

33 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI relevance andcredibility, mainly with respect tothesetwo “core tasks”. third countries –regardless of theirpartnership with NATO –judge theAlliance, its given the growing unrest in Africa and in the Middle East. Not to mention that same time,theability toconduct crisismanagement operations remainscrucial, with Moscow isacrucial variable for international security andstability. At the the collective defence of its memberswhile pursingthenormalization of relations national interests –needstofindplace. At the global level, NATO’s ability toensure for negotiation of different visions of themember states –visions guidedbytheir related to the two “core tasks”: here there is a political linkage and thus the room and NATO’s institutional framework actasatrait d’union betweentheactivities of memberstates. elaboration of thePolitical Guidancefor thedevelopment of military capabilities the prioritization of eachof thesetwo “core task”, adebate that also influences the and globally. As seenabove, ongoing debate istakingplacewithin theAlliance on Moscow. But also because theyaretwo sidesof thesamecoin bothwithin NATO with “cooperative security”, which isalso strongly influenced bytherelations with the three“core tasks”declaredinthelatest Strategic Concept of 2010,together are closely related for anumber of reasons. Not only because theyaretwo out of From NATO’s perspective, relations with R to amereandineffective reaction toR architecture to pursue peace and stability in the Old Continent, and it is not limited provided byNATO andtheEU. Astrategy that ismeant torebuild regional security also takes into account theItalian position, makingthebestout of theframework and defence policy, it isthus necessarytodiscussaWestern common strategy that to thedifferent respective bilateral relations with Moscow. For the Italian foreign diverge with some of themasfor therelations with R with key allies within NATO andtheEU. Indeed, theItalian interests andvision in theGermancase. the major commercial partnerstoR Together with Italy infact, also Germany, the Netherlands andPoland are among benefit theentire European economy andnot only thecrucial energy field. economic relations betweentheEUandR economic exchanges with R At thesametime,Italy hasaninterest inthemaintenance andgrowth of its corresponding primarily tothesanctions adopted bytheEU. also economic, andasimportant asthemilitary one for thestrategic implications, a request to beinthe “trenches” along with theotherallies. The“trenches”that are require apolitical andmilitary pressurefrom NATO on R interest, at thesametimenational andcollective for theEuropean countries, may Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? 134 133 content.asp?langid=2&contentid=1210. IAI Documenti in Security”, International

Francesco Giumelli, “Chi paga i costi delle sanzioni alla R alla delle sanzioni icosti paga “Chi Giumelli, Francesco Giulia Formichetti and Paola Tessari, “After the NATO Wales Summit: Prospects for NATO “After the Prospects Wales Summit: Tessari, Paola and Formichetti Giulia 134 More generally, at thepolitico-diplomatic level, boththeallies 133 In thiscase,the“trenches”mainly concern therelationship ussia, andingeneral inthenormalization of the , No. 14|09 (November 2014), p. 5, http://www.iai.it/ 2014), 5, p. (November , No. 14|09 ussia, reaching75billion exchanges in2013 ussian actions. ussia andcrisismanagement missions ussia. Anormalization which would ussia?”, cit. ussia?”, ussia, andthisisalso due ussia, which may result in 34 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI effectively safeguarding Italy’s national interests. overall context, particularly with regards to NATO, inorder toenable thispolicy to In conclusion, astrategic reflection on Italian defence policy should consider such Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? Updated 22December2014 35 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 4), http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/di0238.htm missioni militari internazionali, R Camera deiDeputati-Servizio Studi,Nuovi profili della partecipazione italiana alle http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2581 Paolo Calzini, “Cosavede l’occhio diMosca”, inAffarInternazionali, 25March 2014, Visions, No. 40(May 2009), http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=148 Aurel B it/index.php/studi-A/article/view/357/349 millennio”, inStudi urbinati, ser.A,vol. 54,n.3(2003),p.339-359, http://ojs.uniurb. Mario Boffo, “L’Allargamento e le altre trasformazioni della Nato all’alba delterzo 2013, http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=2&contentid=1034 Policy, R Linda Basile, Pierangelo Isernia andFrancesco Olmastroni, Italians and Foreign guidebook.pdf CSIS Press,March 2003,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/NATO_Debate_ Margarita Assenova, 103), http://www.iai.it/pdf/Oss_Transatlantico/103.pdf europea, R R B Antonio Varsori, University of Padoa Ferdinando Sanfelice diMonteforte, University of Trieste Giorgio Pastori, Catholic University of Milan Massimo Panizzi, Alpine B Lucio Martino, Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) Umberto Gori, University of Florence Giampiero Giacomello, University of Bologna Massimo DeLeonardis, Catholic University of Milan Fabrizio Coticchia, European University Institute, Fiesole Luciano Bozzo,University of Florence Luigi Bonanate, University of Turin (CeMiSS) Claudio Bertolotti, University of TurinandMilitary Centre for Strategic Studies Interviews Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? iccardo Alcaro andValerio B ibliography raun, “NATO andR esearch report byCIR oma, Senate, November 2008(Contributi diIstituti diricerca specializzati The Debate on NATO’s Evolution: A Guide, Washington, The rigade Taurinense ussia: Post-Georgia Threat Perceptions”, inRussie.Nei. riani, Lerelazioni della Russia con laNato el’Unione CaP/LAPS (University of Siena) andIAI,17December oma, Camera deiDeputati, June 2010(Quaderni 36 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Operations: Trends and Needs, Vincenzo Camporini etal., TheRole of Italian Fighter Aircraft in CrisisManagement Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? dopoguerra, Bologna, IlMulino, 2003 Massimo DeLeonardis (ed.),IlMediterraneo nella politica esteraitaliana del secondo es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/UNIS1111130017A in Massimo DeLeonardis, “Italy’s Atlanticism betweenForeign andInternal Politics”, York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 Jason W. 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Partnerships with Russia and OtherIssues of the Marco Siddi, “Italy- Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? obert Śmigielski, “Afghanistan inForeign Policy of R R ussia R elations: Politics, EnergyandOtherBusiness”, inLudvig ussian Federation”, inPISM AffarInternazionali, oma- Bari, 42 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 12E - December 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Latest DocumentiIAI Italian Interests andNATO: From Missions toTrenches? www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo B and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIandR publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational Spectator), anonline webzine and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain that end,it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. To economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurther Founded byAltiero Spinelli in1965,does research inthefields of foreign policy, political Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 14 |07 14 |08 14 |09 14 |10 14 |11 14 |12 14 |12E 14 |13 14 |06 06 3224360 06 3224363 Symposium 2014 Light of theUkraine Crisis.Report of theTransatlantic Security R trincea? interessi nazionali dell’Italia elaNATO: dalle missioni alla Alessandro Marrone, Paola Tessari eCarolina DeSimone, Gli Italian Interests and NATO: From Missions toTrenches? 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