Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy Rebecca R. MOORE* Abstract Key Words NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept identifies NATO, strategic concept, partnership cooperative security as one of “three essential policy, Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic core tasks” to be achieved in part “through a Partnership Council, Mediterranean wide network of partner relationships with Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. countries and organizations around the globe”. To facilitate the construction of this broader Introduction network of partners, the Alliance adopted a new partnership policy in April 2011, designed Meeting in Berlin in April 2011, to facilitate “more efficient and flexible” NATO foreign ministers adopted a new partnership arrangements. The policy offers a partnership policy designed to facilitate number of new tools to foster the cooperative “more efficient and flexible” partnership security efforts deemed so critical under the arrangements with NATO’s growing new strategic concept and permits potential and increasingly diverse assortment of and existing partners an opportunity to shape partners. The new policy served to fulfill their own relationships with NATO. In so doing, however, it moves the Alliance toward a pledge taken at the Lisbon summit in less differentiation between partners and fails 2010 to enhance NATO’s partnerships to clarify the role of like-minded partners in further by “develop[ing] political preserving and extending the liberal security dialogue and practical cooperation with order that NATO’s initial partnerships were any nations and relevant organisations designed to enlarge. across the globe that share [the Allies’] interest in peaceful international 1 * Rebecca R. Moore is Professor of Political relations.” Although NATO has since Science at Concordia College in Moorhead, the early 1990s maintained multiple Minnesota. She is the author of NATO’s New partnership frameworks (e.g. Partnership Mission, (Praeger Security International, 2007) and co-editor with Gülnur Aybet of, NATO for Peace (PfP) Euro- Atlantic Partnership in Search of a Vision, (Georgetown University Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Press, 2010) Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul 55 PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012, Volume XVII, Number 1, pp. 55-74. Rebecca R. Moore Cooperation Initiative (ICI)), the 2010 namely, the Mediterranean Dialogue, Strategic Concept issued at Lisbon makes which dated back to 1994 and the partnership a key component of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, created new strategy, by identifying “cooperative in 2004. NATO’s ability to engage security” as one of “three essential core these states in dialogue under the new tasks” to be achieved in part “through policy affirmed the importance of the a wide network of partner relationships Berlin agreement and the flexibility that with countries and organisations around it offered for engaging partners across the globe”.2 This heightened emphasis existing frameworks. on partnership reflected a growing At the same time, however, the Arab realization that partners are essential to Spring movements of 2011 highlighted addressing the increasingly global security one of the key challenges that has plagued challenges NATO currently confronts, many of NATO’s partnership efforts; as well as the emergence of a broad namely, that of undemocratic partners consensus within the Alliance that both whose domestic political practices are existing and prospective partnerships deeply at odd with the liberal democratic must become more functional. Indeed, values that NATO has pledged to the new policy was designed, not only to defend and which remain at the core of facilitate greater dialogue among partners its identity. Although the partnership outside and across existing partnership policy adopted in Berlin affirms that a frameworks; it also opens to all partners commitment to the values of “individual opportunities for practical cooperation liberty, democracy, human rights and with NATO that may previously have the rule of law” remains “fundamental” been available in only one of NATO’s to NATO’s partnership initiatives, the partnership structures. reality is that many of NATO’s existing Somewhat unexpectedly, NATO as well as potential partners, in the found itself with an opportunity to Middle East and beyond, are not liberal implement the new policy even before democracies. Indeed, non-democratic its final approval by NATO foreign partners have proved problematic in the ministers in April 2011. On March past, including in Central Asia where 27, 2011, just prior to the Berlin the success of NATO’s International meeting, NATO had agreed to assume Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has responsibility for Operation Unified depended to a considerable degree on Protector in Libya, a mission that regional partners which- despite their necessitated immediate dialogue with participation in NATO’s Partnership for regional actors participating in two Peace and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation of NATO’s partnership frameworks; Council- remain repressive authoritarian 56 Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy regimes. As NATO continues to reach adversaries to establish diplomatic out to an increasingly diverse group of liaisons to NATO and later established partners under the new policy, it will be institutional frameworks for dialogue forced to wrestle with the reality that and military cooperation in the form of many of those NATO has deemed it PfP and the North Atlantic Cooperation necessary to engage- such as China, for Council (NACC), which later became example- are not enthusiastic supporters the EAPC. At the time of their inception, of the liberal security order that NATO these institutions were designed to has sought to enlarge since the early serve largely as political instruments 1990s. for encouraging the growth of liberal Ultimately, the issue that NATO democratic values beyond NATO’s has yet to resolve revolves around the borders and building a new, integrated fundamental purpose of its partnerships. and democratic Europe. Although PfP While the 2010 Strategic Concept began as a means of engaging the states identifies cooperative security as a core of Central and Eastern Europe, short task to be fulfilled in part through the of permitting them full entry into the broadening and deepening of NATO’s Alliance, once the enlargement decision partnerships, cooperation cannot be had been taken, it quickly became clear an end in and of itself. Rather, NATO that both PfP and the EACP would serve will first have to clarify the longer-term as instruments for assisting prospective function that partnerships are intended members in implementing the liberal to serve. Indeed, to some degree, democratic practices expected of NATO disagreements within the Alliance in members. Moreover, active participation recent years over the form and function in PfP and EAPC activities became an of NATO’s partnerships reflect an important consideration in membership absence of consensus regarding NATO’s decisions. core function, including the extent to which its focus should be global rather With Macedonia, Bosnia, than regional in nature. Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia still in the pipeline The Beginnings of as possible NATO members, Partnership partnership remains an important tool for completing The scope and function of NATO’s the unfinished process of partnerships has changed enormously European integration and since the early 1990s when the Allies partnership. first invited their former Warsaw Pact 57 Rebecca R. Moore With Macedonia, Bosnia, observed at the time, the Alliance Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia still in would have to shift from a “geographic” the pipeline as possible NATO members, to “functional” approach if it was to partnership remains an important tool respond effectively to new challenges.4 for completing the unfinished process of Accordingly, NATO’s partnerships also European integration and partnership. took on a new dimension. Although Indeed, while all of these states are PfP/ partnership would remain an important EAPC members, NATO maintains tool in the European integration project, special partnership arrangements with it also came to be understood as a both Georgia and Ukraine in the form means by which NATO could “project the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine stability” outside of Europe, in part Commissions, created in part to assist by encouraging partners- both those these states in fulfilling their membership with and those without membership aspirations. Ukraine’s interest in NATO, aspirations- to contribute in some however, has faded under the current capacity to NATO’s military missions in regime, and Georgia is also unlikely to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even Iraq. This accede to NATO anytime soon, given new partnership function overlapped concerns about antagonizing Russia, with the earlier integrative mission in so which NATO also counts as a partner far as prospective member states were put through the vehicle of the NATO-Russia on notice that they would be evaluated Council (NRC).3 in part based on their demonstrated ability to act as security producers and not simply as consumers of NATO The Impact of September 11 assistance. From NATO’s perspective, partnership was no longer simply about The focus of NATO’s partnership what NATO could do for partners but initiatives has also shifted since the rather what partners could do to enhance September 11 terrorist attacks in the security in the Euro-Atlantic area. United States. Indeed, NATO’s efforts