National Council of Resistance of Iran

National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office 1747 Pen·nsylvariia Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006; Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax 202-330-5346; [email protected]; twitter: @ncrius

NCRI-US: Iranian Resistance Builds Case for Terror Listing of Revolutionary Guards

February 15, 2017

The U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran [NCRI-US) held a press conference t_o sh"are details of the Islamic Revolution·ary Guard Corps' (IRGC) terrorist training bases in Iran.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, Dep.uty D.i.rector of th:e NCRI-US, explained that the intelligence had come from the NCRJ's lllain con:Stitu,ent group, the Peopl.e's Moja:hedin Organization of Iran (MEK), which had previously exp

The unearthed. informati.on c:On<:e.tning the traini.ng facilities indicates a rise of recruitment of foreign nationals, an expap.s.i,on that bas be:O,n explicitly endorse:

Current!)', the Quds Force, an operation d.ivisi,on of ll)e I.RGC, is designated by the US Govemment urider executive z order 13224 as an en~ty engaged jn te.rrorisin, b_ut the IRGC itself is not. The NCR! pointe.d out that there i~ ~ c!i.stin:C.ti0Q be.tween. the I_RGC and the Quds ForC:e, either in organization and operations, the Iranian constittllilln or ...._ nationjtl budget. E g 5' f_f)...... Jafarzadeh showed maps and details, inclu(!ing cornrn;md.e,s' na.mes, of 14 terrorist training ceritei's in Iran. 1fu, ";; ;:;~ main headquarter, known as Irna,rn AH Garrison, is whereterrori.s.t traini.ng is pr~vided to foreJgn nati_onals .. Hj, al.so::;::-., included specifics on the types of training given to the rne.rc~n.aries from around'll)e world, :: ~ :;0 ...... ,, The conference emphasized the iRGC's deep involveme_nt in eafh of the "three pillars" upon whi~h the regh€:js ~! power rests: the suppression of dissent inside Iran, the export of its Islamic revolution through terrorism and msional ,,; military operations, and the amplification of the Iranian miiitary threat through the pursuit of WMDs.

IRG.C's connection to the international terrorist network was also discussed. Trainees were ''dispatched to various .countries in the Persian Gulf area, Asia, Africa, and Latin Am~rica." : ·

The NC_R.I saicl m~tll'es J.i.ke designating the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FfO) would decrease the HkeHhood of s_i_mil_a:r i_ncide.n.ts i.n the WO:st,.and woul_d strike a blow against the Iranian theocracy.

I.Q h.is writt~n sta~ment, Jafarzadeh conclu_ded: "If the day comes when the Tehran regime stops its export of te.rroris:m and reHgim1s fascism:; arid if it _reins i.Ii the Revolutionary G_uards Corps, mandating it only to protect Iran from within Iran's borders; and if it lets go of its hostility towards the United States and drops its 'anti-imperialist' slogans: that day the mullahs' regime will collapse." ' ·

These materials are being distributed by the National Council ofResistance ofJrCln-U.S. Represenltitiv"e Office. AddiJiorial information is on file with the Department ofJuitic,e, W~ingt0n, D.C. · • National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006; Tel: 202°747°7847; Fax 202-330-5346; info@ncrius,org; twitter: @ncrius

Press Release Contac\: Ali Safavi 202-747-7~47 For Immediate Release February 28, 2017 Media Advisory · Iran's Revol~µo~ary Guard ~pands Financial Empire, Funds Terror

Experts to Discuss the Topic and Forthcoming Report

As Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) expands its-financial empire, its engagement in terrorism and destabilizing role in the region re.main unmatched by any modern state ent_ity. On March 8, 2017, from 10:30 am to 12:00, the National Council for the Res_istance of Iran-U.S. Represen,tat_ive Office (NCRI-US) will host a panel of leading · subject-matter experts to discuss the IRGC's growing influence,and global opt:ions to mitigate the threat. •• z A report prepared by the NCRI-US, detailing how the Iranian economy ha_s been takeq;;gver u, 0 by the Supreme Leader and the IRGC, and how the profits are being funneled into tenwist ;:::; networks, wiil also be. made public. · E: z:: C, ...._ 1 C::o Moderator: -J Zrn~~:::: A.dam Ereli, former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain and former Spokesman, Department of State-o u:, :::i::

Panelists:. --- . ' ''' '' ' ' -=w Wil_li_lµJl A. Ni~e, Adju_nct sch_olar at the Cente_r for Science and Int"f"iiltional Security and a ~ member of the Council of Foreign Relations. Michael Pregent, Adjunct fellciw, The Hudson Institute; Adjunct Lecturer, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. · · ,• . · Edward G. Stafford (ret.), Career Foreign Service Officer, Politicat-MilitaryAffairs,the State Depart_111e_nt Alireza Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director, NCR.l's Wash_ington Office.

Wednesday, March 8, 2017, 10:30 AM-12:00 PM 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125 Washington, DC 20006

RSVP required: [email protected]

These materials are being distribute(/ by the National C,.ouncil ofResistance ofIran-U.S. IJ._epresenlative Office. Additional i,ifonnation is Oll.file with the Department ofJu.slice: WOShington. b.C. · ~ ..

National Council of Resistance of Iran us Representative Office

1747 Pennsylvania Ave .. , NW, Suite 1125, W,!!shington, DC 20006; Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax 202-330-5346; [email protected];.. . twitter: @ncrius

PRESS CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 2017; 10:30 AI\II

Contact: Ali Safavi T. 202-747-7487;·C. 571,224-5682 RSVP: www.everitbrite.com/e/33817130949

STATUS OF THE IRANIAN REGIME'S NUCLEAR BOMB MAKING APPARATUS DETAILS TO BE REVEALED .

Washingtcm, DC, April 18 - Through information received from the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK) network within Iran, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has obtained critical and reliable intelligence on the latest status of the Iranian regime's nuclear bomb-making apparatus. ~ ~ The U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI-.:::::; c::, US)* will hold a press conference on Friday, April 21, 2017, a_t 10:30 am atthe Willai g Room, the Willard lnterContinental Hotel (1401 Pennsylvaryia_ Ave NW, Washingt~ c::;;; DC), to unveil the details including locations, satellite imagery, .arid key pl_ayers invoted. ~Pi' . . . . :Ji: r_,r_;, l'IICRI has exposed some of the most signif'ica_nt parts of Tehrari'I? nuclear weaponf program over the years, including Natanz uranium enrichment•and Arak heavy wacar sites (August 2002), Kalaye Electric centrifuge assembly and'testing fac_ility (February 2003), Lashkar Ab;ad laser enrichment and Lavizan-Shian sites (May 2003), Forde un9erground enrichment site (DecembE;Jr 4005), and Organizatioo of Defensive Innovation and Research, SPND (July 2011).

###

These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of fran-U.S.' R_epresentative Office. Additional inforrnaiion is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006; Tel: 202°747,7847; Fax 202-330-5346; [email protected]; twitter: @ncrius

Press Release Contact: Ali Safa:vi 202-747-7847 For Immediate Release February 9, 2017

It) M MEDIA ADVISORY

~vealing IRGC's Terrorist Training Camps for Foreign Fighters inside Iran for c:.!> ==, the Export of Terrorism cc: [email protected], Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran will hold a press cofiference to reveal for the first time information on the Islamic Revolutionary Gua_rd_s Corps (IRGC) command headquarters for terrorist training of foreign me_rcenaries a_nd a number of training centers in different parts of Iran.

The conference will be held at the NCR! office in Washington, DC at 10:30 am, Tuesday, Februaiy14, 2017.

The names of most senior IRGC commanders directly involved in military and terrorist training of these foreign mercenaries as well as locations (with satellite imagery) and details will be made public. -

Tuesday, February 14, 2017; 10:30 a.m. 1747 Pelinsylva:n:ia Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 2_00_06

rsvp required; [email protected]; (202)-747-7847

###

These materials are being disiribllled by the National Council Of RtSiiliinCi ofIian-_U-S. Re"preS'eritative OffiCe. Additional iTlformfJtiOn is on file w/tii"the Department o/JustiCe, Wtirhington, b.C. · · National Council of Resistance of Iran US aeprese11tative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave,, NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006; Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax 202-330-5346; [email protected]; twitter: @ncriils '.,

APRIL 21, 2017 Even after the JCPOA, Activities Stiil fo Motion at SPND, Responsible for Manufacturing a Nuclear Weapon

Revelations about i>archin Research Academy, the new main lo.cation for "Center for Researc_~ and E_xpansion of Technologies on Explosions and Impact (METFAZ)"

Reliable information obtained by the network of the People's Mojahedin Organization oflran (M_E_K) inside the country shows that the "nerve center" of the Iranian regime's nuclear weapons project, responsible for desigwng the bomb, has been continuing its work. Following th_e Joint Comprehensive Pl_aIJ. of Action (JCPOA), known as the nuclear deal reached r,; in 2015, not only has the unit remained in place and its activities have not subsided, but it~now g cleat that.in some fields its activities have even expanded. ~ f,; c:: :,_/') In this information, a new location tied to the nuclear we_apons project, which has been kepn ~~ secret until now and away from the Internatioilal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspe_ctorfrlas ::.

Situation of the engineering unit for nuel_ea_r weapons The engineering unit for nuclear weapons progrlllll iilside tlie Iranian regime is called the Organization o{Defen:sive Innovation and Research (Sazmgn-e Paz_houheshhaye Novin-e Deja '1), known by its Persian acronym S:PND. The organization is comprised of 7 subdivisions, each of which carrying out a certain portion of nuclear weapons research. Following several months of focused investigations and research conducted from inside the c\erit:al regi):Ile including from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Defense Ministry, and SPND and following the compilation of reports on all the seven subdivisions of SPND, it has been determined that all ofSPND's subdivisions continue their work on the same

1 '. . ',

scale as prior to the 2015 nuclear deal. They are carrying out their research in various fields related to the manufacturing of a nuclear weapon. In some of these fields, new initiatives have also been'undertaken in order to keep the real objectives of the research a secret and to cover up the real activities. Toe results of the investigations by the Iranian Resistance are based on onsite observations and reports compiled by dozens of sources affili_a_ted with the MEK network inside the regime, including within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Defense Ministry, and SPND.. .

The National Council of Resistance of Iran first revealed the exist~i'l:ce ofSPND in July 2011 in Washington, DC. 1 Three years later, SPND was designated by the U.~; Department of State on 2 August 29, 2014, under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382. ·

The latest on SPND Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, also known as Dr. Hassan Mohseni, is the key individual in the regime's nuclear weapons program. He is a veteran IRGC brigadier general and continues to head SPND. 3 Sh_1_ce the impkin1e11tation of the l11tl!st changes within SPND during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, this organization has been placed under the direct.supervision ofBrig .. Gen .. Hosseib. Dehqan, Rouhani's Defense Minister. 4 All ofSPND's personnel and experts are continuing their activities and there have been no changes to the s1;rt,1cture of the org@izat_ion. (SPND chllrt eil(:losed) .

1 Opposition: Iran consolidates nuclear bomb effort, The Associated Press, July 22, 201 I; https://sg.ne\vs.yahoo.com/opposition-iran-corisolidates-n uclear-bomb-effort-171214204 .html

2 Ad_ditiol).;tl S_anctions I_rnposed by the Department of State TargetiJ).g Ir;mian Proliferators, Department of State, August 29, 20 I 4; https://2009-20I7.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/23 ,n 59.htm

3 Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi is a meinber of the Islamic Revolutionary Giiatd Corps (IRGC) and the main figure for the regime's nuclear weapons development program. He attended the third North Korean riiicleat test in February 2013 as an obs_erver. Although the International Atomi_c Energy Agency (IAEA) has on multiple occasions requested an interview with him, the Iranian regime has refused. Due to his involvement in the regime's n_uclear weapons program, h_is narn_e was l_i_sted arnong other sanctions individuals on the UN Security Council's Resolution 174'7 in March 2007.

4 Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehqan has been Rouhani's Defense Minister since,2013. He was the second comm_ander of the IRGC air force in the regime and acted as the Deputy Defense Minister during the seventh and eighth presidential administrations. ·

2 .. ;. . The organization's headquarters is located at "Nour (Light) Building,"5 .which is situated near the h~dqU¥te.rs of the Defense Miajstry on L311gl!Ji Avenue in Tehran. (Satellite imagery enclosed) One ofFakhriza

Si~ation at two key SPND organs, expansion of activities at METFAZ Two of the seven subdivisions ofSPND play the most significant roles: The first, Center for Research and Expansion ofTechnologies,on Explosions and Impact (METF AZ) works on the trigger an

The Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies for Explosion and.Impact The unit responsible for conducting research and bU1lding a trigger .fdr a nuclear weapcin is cailed the Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies for Explosion and Impact (Markave Tahghighat va Tose 'e Fanavari-e Enfejar va Zarbeh), known by its Farsi acronym as METF AZ. The director of this unit is currently an engineer named Mohammaa Ferdowsi, who has been workipg at 1:he Defe11se Ministry s_ince 1986 anKhojir military road leading to the Parchin military industrial site, and adjacent to Sanjarian Village. (Sateilite imagery enclosed) However, the most rece_nt investigation reveals that METF AZ conducts its main activities in ano1:her loc:1tion, which has thus far remained a secret and away from the IAEA.

. . . 5 Nour Building: The building hoils_es the headquarters of SPND, and its existe:nfe was first rev~a_l_ed by the Iranian Resistance in October 2013. The building is situated near the regime's Defense Ministry at Langari A venue in North Tehran. ' · .. 6 Mohammad Ferdowsi has been working at the Office of Scientific Re~~h and Technological Deve_l_opment of the Defe11se Indus.tries Organization since 19.86. Ferdowsi is an expert in the field of highsimpact explosives at Malek Ashtar University. The committee, which includes high-explosive eJ:(perts, works at _Mal_ek Ashtar Univers_ity and professional units of the D~fense Ministry.

7 Khojir site is located in eastern Tehran near Jajroud River. There are two missile industry complexes within this.site: Hemma:t and Bakeri. These a:re the main locations for the manufacturing of the regime's bal_listic missiles. Both of these industrial complexes include several factories and manufacturing units, which are located in tll1111els and underground facilities.

3 The "Research Academy": METFAZ's secret location The new intelligence reveals the existence of a new location, whicq is''identified in SPND's internal coinniunications with the codename "Research Academy" (Pazhouheshkadeh). The Research Academy, in the internal coinniunications of SPND, is al$o referred to as "Research/' (Tahghighat). This location has become the main center for METF.AZ's tests and other activities. Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, in order to avoid blowing the cove_r on METF AZ' s activities, a large portion of the activities· conducted at METF AZ in Sanjarian, as well as the personnel working at the s_ite, were tran_sforred to the Research Academy situated within Parchin. The move resulted in the subsiding of activities at the Sanjarian site. The Irariiari regime has done its utmost to keep the Research.Academy, which is ari importarit site, a secret from the eyes of international organizations. The reason for the move was based on the conclusion reached by regime officials that the probability for the IAEA to get access to Parchin in t,he :future is extremely low, whi_ch means that the site is an optiipal. location for shielding the regime's activities in this regard. ' The Research Academy is located wit,hin the Parc:hi_n site, whic:h is a large l)lilitary district about 30 rtuies so.uth eastern Tehran, controlled by the Defense Ministry. There are 12 military anq missile complexes in Parchin. The Defense Ministry cails each one:' of these industrial units a "Plan" (Tarh). Specifically, they are codenamed Plan 1, Plari 2 ... Plan 12. The METFAZ center is situated at Plan 6 of the Parchin military industries and is called t_he Chemical Plan of Zei_nodqip. The geographi1:al area of the unit (pl_an) is about 500 acres. It is completely fenced in and fully protected. In order to conceal the true nature of its a1:tivities, the Research Academy co11ducts its research and activities under the cover of conventional research and tests related to Plan 6. Plan 6, known as Zeinoddin Industries, is a part of chemical industries of Parchincom:plex. Directions to Plari 6 ofParchi.n, which houses METFAZ's Research f,.cademy, is as follows: The end of Babai highway, Khojir0 Parchin military road, after the tunnel on the southern side of Mamlo Dam. Entering into Parchin from the IRGC (Pasdaran) entrance, Plan 6 is located on the left side. (Satellite imagery enclosed) Based on the newly-obtained information, it became clear that the plan to identify a back-up location for METF AZ's Sanjarian site was set in motion in 2005 by then-Deputy Defense Miirister Brig. Gen. Ali Hosseinistash. 8 In early 2005, work to build tunnels to accommodate the a_ctivit_ies ofMETF AZ began at Plan 6 at Parchin.

. t_

·,

8 Brig. Gen. Ali Hosseini-tash at the time headed, The "Center for Preparedness of Advanced New Defense Technologies, the organ which at the time was responsible to lead t)ie regime's nuclear weapons project and was later changed into SPND.

4 Pars Garrila,, an established company within the regime's miiitary industries, built the tunnels. 9 The CEO of the company is currently Mojtaba Qanbari. One of the managers directly involved in the building of SPND tunnels in Plan 6 district of Parchin was an engineer named Abbas Rashidpour. An employee of Pars Garma, Rashidpour was the manager of the METFAZ, Plan 6 project. The construction ~roject took four years to complete. The facilities were handed over to the main client, SPND_, METFAZ, section, in 2009.

Over the past two years, the bulk ofMETF AZ,'s activities including those at Sanjarian.site have been transferred to Plan 6 in Zeinoddin industries at Parchin. They _have various silos and factories at the site. The Research Academy is locateci at t:he hellrt .of Plan 6. Employees and personnel at the site enter and exit the facilitie·s through the "Gate of Plan 6.'' However, the Research Academy itself is completely independent and closed off~

It is worth noting that the chamber related to high explosives with respect to the regime's nuckar projects and specifically the high-explosive trigger, is run by METFAZ, which ran the.activities re.lated to tests with the help of Ukrainian experts. The location of tli~ high explosive chamber and preliminary te~ for explosions, which was razed during 2013 and 2014, is at the southern part of the Research Academy at a distance of aro.und 700 meters.

E_xt;rei,ie protec_t_ive i,ieasures to avoid le~king of information oil Research Academy

I_n order to avoid the leaking of intel_ligence and information on the Research Academy of Zeinod,din, the location is under heavy surveillance and control by the IRGC Int.elligence's protection service. The conimande_r of the intelligence protection of this section is Brig. Oen. Mostafa Siri, who is also SPND's head of intelligence protection. Siri has been a Defense Ministry iQ.telligence protection official since 1999. Since the protection of inteHigence on SPND is extremely sensitive for the Defense Ministry, for the past several years, Siri has been appointed as the head of the intelligenc:e protection unit ofSPND. He has recruited a number of trusted allies, including several of his relatives, to work in METFAZ, a:nd SpND in~lligence protectioi;i units. .

9 The Pars Garma Construction and Industrial Company, which is known.siipply as Pars Garma is an engineering and construction company affiliated with the Defense Ministry. It was set up duri.ng the Sha:h's regime. Currently, itis carrying out projects such as building tunn~ls and engineering designs for the Defense Ministry. The address of the company's office is: No. 46, Erfa11i Street, offManZJITi.eh Exit of Sadr highway, Tehran. ·•

5 Revela.tions regarding a number of METFAZ personnel and ex(>erts Tile NCRI has verified the identities of 15 METFAZ personnel.

Na:me-- - [

Mohammad · Head of Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies for . Ferdowsi (e~_eer) Explosion.and Impact (METFAZ), Research Academy at Plan 6 IRGC Brig, Ge1:1. C~r of tht: inteU_igenpt: protectjon unit of SPND Slld Research · Mostafa Siri Academy ofZein:oddin :Oavarzaru Head of Health and sirl'eiy ofMETFAZ ... at PI~ if(Zein:oddin) MassoudSeiliq1 Expertwqrijng atresearch arm ofME'.I'FAZ Divani

- ➔ •• ,•.. ' ,. '• • .c• Alireza Molal. : Expert working at research arm of ME.TF AZ Heydari Expert working at research-~ of METFAZ Khosravi Expert wo~king at research arm ofMETFAZ

. . - Ali Mahdipour Expert working at construction sectio~),f METF AZ Em:rani Reza Ebrnbjroi . Expert wo'{:fiug at c:C,ilstructlort section of:METFAZ Mojtaba Expert worldng l!ct the tt:st_iiig center of Ml'ITF AZ Dadashnezhad Khosrow Kashen METFAZ expert .. Zare

-- '-''-'·~- . ...: -- ., . ------~- .__ -·.·-.,. - Karimi METFAZ administrative and financial manager Ajini · Works at th~ central office of intelligence protection for METF AZ . . - ·. - Expert working at Research Academy at.Plan 6 Zeinoddin :_···-M.ohammadi S~uri • ••••• .-.... a ' • • -• Alireza Souri •. Expert woridng at Research Academy at Plan 6-Zeinoddin l . - - -- - .

6 FakharMoqadda:m Group The Fakhar Moqaddam Group works on physics research for SPND. This group is continuing all of its activities at full capacity. 10 The group has an office at the Nour Building and all.Other office at the Mojdeh site. 11 The head of the group is Mohsen Foroughizadeh Moqaddam, who works out of the Nour Building. One ofthe test centers of the Fakhar Moqaddam Group is'located near the Notir Building. One of the experts of the Group is Eliasi, the coordinator of joint research for SPND 12 and Malek Ashtar University. - One of the other experts is Arezovaji, who is a scientific and new t_ec_hnologii:s liaison for Fakhar Moqaddam. One oftll,e S_PND expertswho heads the gas identification and illumination program is an individual named Hashemi.

Other activeSPND centers in current circumsta.nce_s According to the new information, in addition to the above-mentioned sites; SPND org@i_Zlltion has a:n extensive number of secret locations. Some of its test centers aresituateli within Tehran's city boundaries. Other sections ate located in the outskirts ofTehr~. The orgaiiization also has centers located in the outskirts ofKaraj.

10 The Fakhar Moqaddam Group: SPND has 7 subdivisions organized baseci on their sphere of work. The group tied to physics research is the "Center for Preparedness of Advaricea N_ew Defense Tec_h_nologies," known by the codename Fakhar Moqaddam Group. Research on uranium :enrichment and other neutron relat_ed tt!sting happens by this group. The Group consists of several subunits, offices and test labs.

11 The Mojdeh Site (Lavizan 2): After the Shian Lavizan site, which was the previous location for the regi_n1e's.nuc_l_ear activities, was exposed by tJ:ie Iranian Resistance in May 2003, the regime was forced to completely raze the site and transfer some of the equipment and activities to the Mojdeh site (Mojdeh Avenue located in northeastern Tehran). The Mojdeh site was previously·a part of the regime's arilmuilition industries and was acquired by the Defense Ministry and assigned to the regime's military- nuclear activities. '

12 Malek Ashtar University is affiliated with the regime's Defense Ministry. The regime's military personnel and experts study various courses and programs at this university. The univers_ity has close contacts with SPND.

7 The imperative for inspecting the military-n_uclear centers of SPNP The SPND organization has a significant number of secret centers. In the past, the Il1llliaIJ. Resistance has exposed 15 sites and front companies tied to SPND including the following: - The Nour Bmlding located at Langari Avenue in northern TeHran. It is considered to be the headquarters of SPND. - The Mojdeh site in Pasdaran Avenue, Mojdeh Avenue. It used to be the headquarters of SPND ii). the past, but some of its activit_ies were hiter relocated out of the site. - METF AZ site located at Sanjarian village near Jajroud Riyer. - Research Academy located at Plan 6 ofParchin. - Khojir site where a portion of activities related to the manufacturing of riuclear warheads in "Noµri ~ndustries" are carried out at the location, codenained 8500. In order to unclersta:ncl the regime's secret and illicit activities, it is critical that the IAEA inspect and monitpr not only the Research Academy, but also a_U other sites related to SPND. This will help shed light on the scope of the regime's secret military and nuclear activit_ies. By claiming that military sites are out of scop:e for the IAEA' s investigation, inspection and monitoring, the Iranian regime has effectively created a protective slneld for its nuclear weapons program. There have been no serious inspections of the regime's rniij.tary sites so far. Major General Hassan Firouzabad.i, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs.of Staff, said in an interview with the s~te-run Tasnim News Agency in November 2016 that the regime has not allowed inspections of military sites. Failure to access key e_xperts ir:ivolved in tI:te nuclear weapons program, including Mohsen Fakhrizad.eh, has prevented the IAEA from grasping the true n:ature of the nucle_ar program.

What To Do Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the Nat_ional Council ofResi_sta:nce oflran, has stated time and again, including on November 24, 2013 immediately following the initial agreement of PS+ 1 with the clerical regime, that if the world powers had acted steadfastly, without economic and political considerations, they could have totally coritairied the r,egime' s bomb-making apparatus in that round of negotiations. She had warned: Total implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, in particular total stop of enrichment,'accepting the Additional Protocol, and free and unhindered access of the IAEA inspectors to all suspected centers and facHities, are necessary in order for the regime to give up its drive to acquire nuclear weapons. President Trump has pointed out the deficiencies of the JCPOA and the dangers it poses. Secretary Tillerson said the JCPOA "represents tll,e same failed approach to the past," which "fails to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.'' In iight of the above and in order to prevent the world from dealing_ with a nuclear-armed fundamentalist regime in Iran, the following steps are indispensable:

8 ·• I. As several U.N. Security Council resolutions stated, Iran's uranium enrichment program needs to be ended completely; the nuclear enrichment program has only one objective and that is to obtain the fissile material needed for the Bomb. 2. The weaponization program must be totally dismantled. There is no reason to maintain SPND, and all its subordinate organizations, including METFAZ. They have no peaceful, energy use whatsoever @d, their only fiuiction is to facjlitate the development of the nuclear bomb. 3. Ex_erting airtight control over all the aspects of the regime's nucle_ar program and permanent, unhindered and imme:diate tlccess to an sites, above-m~_ntioileld locati_oils, and iiccess to, and interviews with, the key nuclear experts, including Mohasen Fakhrizadeh and his subordinates must be conducted immedlately. ·

4. All the outsta:ndlrig questions regarding the Possible Military Dimension (PMD) of the nuclear program need to be followed up to expose the full scope of the nuclear weapons program oflran.

These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of lran-U.S. Representative Office. Additional information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington. D.C.

9 ORGANIZATIOJl,IAL· CHAR:r O_F THE ORGANIZATION' OF DEFE;NSlVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH IN CHARGE OF MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR BOMB SAZMAN•E PAZHOUHESHHAYE NOVl!'ll•E DEFA'I (SPND)

0efense Minister

. IRGC' Brig. Gen. Hosseln Dehghan

Dir_ector,- Organization'of ·oefensive:lniiovation and Rese·arch,(SPND) IRGC:Brlg .. Gen. MohsimFakhnzadeh Mahabadl

Aref Ball Lashak I

Center for Research and 'center for Preparedness and ., Center for Industrial . I .r !Expansion of technologies Advanced MOllem Production andlResearch for Explosion and•lmpact; TechnoloSY, Pseudonym: ~udonym, MmAZ Fakhar Moqaddam Group 1 All Mehdlpouromrani// - - Mohammad Ferdowsl Mohsen Foroughlzadt!h "1oqaddam

lxpertiSe: I Expertise: Expertise: Expertise: Expertise: Metallurgy Expeftise: Expertise: l High Explosives Chemical Material Mechanics Electronics Area of Work: Nuclear. Physics Laser Material Area of,Work: Area·of W.ork: Area of Woi"k: Production of Area Of WOik: Area:af,work: Area·of-Work: To Prepare Shaping Manufacturing BOdy of.Warhead Work on Detonators for Missile Fuel and Laser Interior. Parts of & other Enriched Warhead:and Nuclear Other Chemical Research the.Warhead Metallurgical Uranium Body [ Weaporis Materials Parts._ New and Old Locations ofSPND

New location revealed by NCRI in 2013

11 Sanjaria11 Village East of Tehran

Location of METF AZ near Sanjarian Village

12 METFAZ Center Near Sanjarian Village in Khojir Area, Tehran

13 Patchin Military Complex at South East Tehran

14 Pl3n 6 in Parchin Area

15 METFAZ's Research Academy at Plan 6 of Parcbin

16 Imagery of Plan 6 area:i in Parchin, where Research Academy (Pazhouheshkadeh) is at the heart of it

These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of lran-U.S. Representative Office.

Addltlonal- . information. is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

, . 17 National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006; Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax202,330-5346; [email protected]; twitter: @ncrius

Revelations Regarding IRGC's Terrorist Trai11i11g Ca.rp.ps for Foreign Fighters Inside Ir~n for the Export of Terrorism

February 14, 2017

T~e foll()wing information has been gathered and documented by the social network of the People's Moja_hediA Orgai:,.ization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) inside Iran. The revel_afic:i11s are made public by the National Council of Resistance of Iran - US Represen1:a1:ive Office.

Accordw.g to cletail_ed reports from inside the clerical regime, the Islamic Revolutio_nary Guard Corps (IRGC) has created a large dir.ectorate in its e¥raterritorial a_rm, the Quds Force, in order to expand its training of foreign merceI1,11ries ll.S part of the regime's strategy to step up its meddling abroad, "" inclt1-ding i11 SYI"ia, Iraq, Yenien, Bahrain, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The ove~aul ;g has occu,rred wit~ t~e blessing ofSupreme Leader Ali Khainenei, who accordi~to a~ senior adviser to tll,e I_RGC com_mancler-in-chief and the directorate's former c.> '.(' commagder, IRGC Brigadier Gene_ral I_(hosrow Orouj, persQnally applauded ita'..i §::;:;=; creati_oil duri:rci,g a recent visit to the Quds Force. · .,, =i£, :x ~ : :_; The intelligence reports, gathered over several months by various sources oftlie !; PMOI's network from inside different units of the IRGC, especially the Quds $}ce, :;..::o indicate that this directorate has dozens of training camps across iran. The camps have been divided based on the nationality of the trainees·and the type oftraining. Both terrorist training and also military training for miiiti~s are provided, eilabli:Q.g them to better infiltrate and advance the regime's regional objectives.

Every month, hundreds of forces from Iraq, SYI"ia, Yemen,,Afghanistan and Lebanon -- countries where the regime is involved in frontline combat -- receive milita_ry training and are subsequently dispatched to wage t,errorism and war. Snial_ler groµps are a_lso ~rained in other countries in order to conduct terrorist acts and operations. Sinc:e.2012, the eJ_d;en_t ()ftr11ini11g of foreign mercenaries in IRGC conttolled camps of the Quds Force has increased.

1 •. For operations in countries where there is no open warfare - including Persian Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait - terrorists cells are trained instead.

General Information: The Quds Force Training Directorate (group) forms an imp1,1rtant part of the terrorist Quds Force.Iii. internal IRGC communications, the codename of the Quds Force Training Directorate is 12,000. The headquarters is)ocated at the Imam Ali military base, at kilometer 20 of the Tehran-Karaj highway; Ardestani Boulevard, close to the end of Saravan Street. The site is comprised of a large complex housing sevet"al IRGC garrisons; the Imam Al1 Garrison is situated in the southeastern quadrant. The area of the Imam Ali Garrison alone is about- IO hectares (350m x, 330m), abo.ut 25 acres. The logistics section of the Imam Ali Garrison is located irt another part of this complex, the so-called Mostafa Khorp.eini Garrison, and has a separate entrance and exit.

The Iranian resistance has so far identified 14 training centers belonging to the directorate.

Organization and Command: The commander of the Quds training directorate is a veteran Quds commander who reports directly to Quds Force Commander, Qassem Soleimani. The group's commander until 2015 - and for several years - was Brigadier General Rahimi. Before Rahimi, IRGC Brigadier General Khosrow Orouj held the position. Previously, Orouj was the IRGC commander in Lebanon, where he had a close relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Ile participated in the 33,day war in Lebanon and was a friend of !mad

Mughniyeh, a senior member of Islamic IRG.C Brigadier General Khosrow Orouj Jihad and Hezbollah.

In an interview in November 2016, Orouj said: "I was in charge oftrai_ning forthe Quds Force, and later took charge of training of the Quds Special Forces, work_ing with them round-the,clock, going back and forth to I,eba_no.11, .,. Whe11 Kh,amei:iei visited the Quds Force, the only unit that he applauded wa,s that same training unit." His remar~s 1.1-nderscore ~.amenei's close relationship vvith this terrorist traini11gin_itiatives, as wen as Khamenei's reliance on the IRGC to advance the regime's agenda and objectives.

2 , ,, Brigadier General Sayyed Shafi Shafiee had been Deputy Coriunander of the traini.ng directorate starting. from 2014. Prior to that, he was stationed in Syria. He was transferred back to Syria .in 2016. He was lillled in combat in the Khan Tuman area around Aleppo in May 2016.

One ofthe senior Quds Force commanders runs the training directorate, i:rieai:ii:rig that he is exclusively assigned to managing its affairs. Brigadier Genei'al Sen,ed Shafi Shafiee hilled near Aleppo i'n May 20i6 The Inspection commander is Mass1h Mohammadi. The Intelligence Protection commander is IRGC Colonel Bakhtiari.

Training Process Imam Ali. .Gattison: In addi.tion to housing the .headquarters of the training directorate, the Imam Ali Garrison is one of its main traimllg centers. There ate· two types of training: Basic and primacy training, which is short-term, usually only about 45 days, because the objective of this regimen, especially for Syrian mercenaries, is to use them in military actions similar to those of the IRGC Bassij force.

There is also full military training with specialized courses for those. who a.re hi.red by the Quds Force on a permanent basis. Terrorist training courses ate given as well. These take about 9 and sometimes up to 12 months to complete.

• Terrorist training In addition to the forces who are trained for military action as part of the regime's overall meddling iil the region, terrorist U:nits of the Quds Force ate also tramed in .separate a.rid secret units and ate dispatched to various countries in the Bersian Gulf a.tea, Asi.a, Africa, and Latm America. Inclividuals who ate trained for terrorist opefatlons ate kept separately and in isolation. They have a separate suite inside Imam Ali Garr1.son that has a capacity to hold be.tween io to 10.0 people. In most cases, terrorist training is given to teams of two people who.a.re not in contact with other units of two.

In recent years, the IRGC has brought back a number of its'agents from Latin America, i.ncludingVene:iuela, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivi.a., to the Imam.Ali Ganison for training, leaving them in the hands

3 Trai_ning at Imam Ali Garrison: All those forces who are supposed to be trained, initially undergo a body building boot camp for one week. The body building group is a training section whose commander is an IRGC comi:naµder named Mciwlaee. Subsequently, specialized training is given in other train1rig ceriters of the Quds Force_. Upon completion of this period, all forces return once again to the Imai:n Ali GiµTison, where a final exam and confirmation process is administered. In effect, the final recruiting is performed at this garrison. .. Di_fferent sections of the training directorate in Imam Ali Garrison

L Specialized training for heavy weaponry: The commander of this section, which is identified by codename 320, is Colonel Ali Mohammad. It has 3 sub sections_: drones, rockets, heavy weapons and heavy weapons maintenance. 2. Missile laull.ch training: This course has two sections, theoretical and pra_ctical. Thi:! theoretical training portion is carr~ed out with the help of simulato_rs. After completion of the primary course, forces go to Semnan base to receive practical training for firing missiles, ,. 3. Marine train.i_ng 4. Paratrooper training 5. VIP Security training (a_lso known as "Protocol"). The commander of this section is Colonel Rain_ky, who is from Amol in northern Iran. .. - Composition of Trainee Units In recent years, the largest contingent trained in Imain Ali Garrison came from Syria, and. at some points may involve up to 230 trainees per session. In addition, the Quds Iraqi forces (Shia militias) go to this garrison to receive missile training. Mercenaries from other countries, such as Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain, also receive training at this base.

Subsequent to the increased meddling of the Iranian regime in Syria, the number of training courses in Imain Ali Garrison h_as inc_reased. Some of the mullahs from Qoni's Al-Mustafa Com_mll.nity were also t_rained in the garrison and subsequently sent to Syria. A la_rge number ofpeople from Bahrain also took training courses here.

In" addition.. ---. . to Ima_. - m Ali Garrison, the Iranian resistance has identified the -following trai1_1jng centers belonging to the IRGC:

Imam Ali Academy in Tajrisll, Tehran - Theoretical Training IRGC mercenaries are first sent to t:his ce_11ter to learn theoretical courses promoting fundamentalism and terrorism, and subsequentfy sent to other centers for practical training. This site was previously the headquarters of the Quds Force training directorate and used for practical terrorist training. However, after it was

4 _/

exposed, it was divided into two parts, with one being transferred to the Imam Ali Garrison (mentioned above) a:nd the other to Baadindeh Center in Varamin (mentioned below). The address for Imam Ali Academy is: ;\lborz Street in Tajrish, Saad Abad district in Northern Tehran, North of Saad. Abad Palace.

Baadindeh Center in Varamin- Urban Training Urban wB.!'fare and guerilla training, including riding motorcycles for terrorist operations, is provided at this ce11ter. Driving courses and various vehicle m_aneuver_i_ng courses are also provided. One of these exercises is related to freeing hostages, and is carried OlJ.t i11_side bui)dings designated for learning and training. The comID.ander of t;his ce11ter is an IltGC comm11.nder named Ebrahimi. The center is lpc:ated 30 km south ofYaral_llin in the Siah KplJ,h region. This center is considered to be iil a protected I_ltGC area in th~ vicinity of a null).ber of secret IRGC sites. A portipn of the Qucls tra_iniilg directorate was transferred to this area aft~r relocation from the fm:mer location of the lll).am Ali Garrison (in northern Tajrish). The site is codenained 950. Tl:ris sectio_n of the directorate primarily focuses on the provision oftei:rorist and u_rb_an guerrilla warfare training.

Malek Ashtar Camp in Amol - Survival TrainJ11g One of the Quds Force training centers is situated in OscoU: M_ahal;Leh ill ¾n,ol on the way towards Imamzadeh Hashem, in Mazandaran Province. Here, trainees undergo cpurses on how to survive under harsh conditions in the wilclerness.

Semnan Center - Practical Missile Training Training on firing missiles, including Katyusha rockets, Falagh missiles, and others, is provided at this center to Quds Force agents who first complete theoretical training sessions using simulators at Imam Ali Garrison_. For instance, ·a number of Iraqi forces went to this base in 2014 to learn how to use various types of missiles, including KatyU:shas. Semnan is the regime's main missiles center, and is the location of the recent IRGC missile tests. This week, it als_o paraded its missiles at the site. ·

Mashhad Center - Focus on Trai11ing Afghan Forces . At this training center i11 Mashhad (nortb,eastern Iran), identj.fied by the code 4000, forces mostly made up of Afgha;n_s are trained in groups of 300. This center has c:ontacts with the A;nsar Coros of the Qu_ds Force; which is responsible for eastern. Ira11 a11d Afghanistan.

Pazouki Garrison - Focus on Afgll,a1_1 Forces to be Dispatched to Syria This Quds Force garrison is located in Varamin (sol!,theastem Telrral].) near Jalilabad village. ·111 each training session, 200 Afghans ar~·trained for deployment to Syria. Infantry training includes: Kalashnikovs, machine guns, mortars, tactics, sniper, among others. All instructors are from the Iranian Revolutionary G'!,ard Coros (IRGC) and the Quds Force. After completion of the military training, trainees are assigned to the Fatimiyouri division. Each week( 200 to 300 fighters are 5 sent to Syria. The garrison is located beside the IRGC Jalilabad base, and is aspin off. Seyyed Mostafa Hosseini, a Quds Force commander, ctJ.mmands the Pazouki Ga_rrisoil. .

Lowshan Gattison - Special Training ; This garrison is located near the city ofManjil bordering the·city ofl",,owslian. The IRGC operates a large training base in this region called tlte Imam Khomeini base. A portion ofthe base has been provided to the Quds Force .. ·

Chamran Garrison - Focus on.Afghan Forces for Dispatch to Syria This garrison is located 5 kin froi:n Jalilabad Garrison in the town of Pishwa i_n southeastern Tehran. At least 100 people take part in each training sessioil, most of whom are Afghans residing in Iran and are trained for deployment to Syria. The commander of the Chamrail Garrison is Colonel Hosseini Moqaddam. Individµals receive sniper, mortar, and tactical training at this location.

Telecabin Axis ~ Commando Training This center is an active training center of the QUds Force.in northern Tehran. It !}as contacts with the location codenamed 950 (mentioned above), and specializes in providing commando training.

A.badan - Diving and Marine Training At this location in southern Iran, diving and i:narine training is provided.

Ahw11._z - Marine Training AJso in Southern Iran, marine training is provided at this location

Qeshm Axis - Marine Training Courses Also in Southern Iran, Qeshm Axis provides marine training.

Shahriar Garrison This garrison is one of the training centers of the Quds Force located in southwestern Tehran. It serves as the rendezvous point for Afghan mercenaries before being deployed to Syria from the cities ofQoi:n, Tehran and Delijan. Currently, 2,000 Afghans are sent to Syria from this site every week. Each group stays for as long as two months in Syria, after which they are replaced by the i;iext contingent. An officer of the QUds Force by the name of Khavari is in ch!lrge of sending troops to Syria from Shahriar Garrison. •

++++++++++

The l_ocations described above are a representative sample of only a portion of the,\ IRGC sites provid_ed to the Quds Force, and which are tied to meddling activities 6°f the IRGC in other couiltries of the region in recent years. The IRGC operates dozens

6 of other similar bases and camps, especially located n:ear the lnin-Iraq frontier, to enable it to interfere in Iraqi affairs. They have n:ot been mentioned in this report.

As it h_as been i;nade clear in the course of investigations of these locations, all of the ceJ1ters a:r;tcl garrisons of the l~GC operated by the Quds Force are dedicated to this force fqr the trai.p.i,n:g of lllercenaries and foreig:r;t fighters. In ~ddition to the Qods Force, other IRGC bra:r;tches, inc;lucling the ground forces, the marines, and the missiles µnit also cont_ribute to the regime's region.al interference, committing their forces, resou;rces a_:r;td w-eapons to e_nsµ;re that terrorist operations are carried out and th_e regillle's plans to aclva_nce its agenda of warmongering and regional expa11siq1:_1_is_lll a_re reahzed. The scope of the IRGC's casualties during the wars in Syria aJ1cl Iraq clearly underscore this point.

Qo(J_s force, l!,ll integral part of the lRG.C

The di~tin:ctioil betwef:ln th.e Islail1_ic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Qods Forc:e is u.;riwa_r:ra_n,ted. The Iralliii.n regime is the source of this separation to wl).i_tewa_sh the at_rocities perpetrated by the IRGC and its role in terrorism and iJ1terventioI1 throughout the Middle East and beyond. • The Qocls Force was formed in 1990. The Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Badr Brigad~ in Iraq a_nd other terrorist entities affiliated with the Iranian regime were set up befqre (he Q9d_s Force was even established. It was the IRGC that was directly respon~ib_le for the c:reation 9fthese terrorist entities. Indeed, the Badr Brigade was originally an:d officia]Jy a military branch of the IRGC's ground forces and took part in different operations.

The Qocls Force i_s part of the IRGC. Neither in the Iranian constitution, nor in the budget, is there any reference to t]:i.e Qods Force as a separate entity.

Tlie Qocls Force is a military entity consisting of IRGC' s units and divisions as well as lllercenary fighters IRGC has trained. In other words, the Qods Force is not an independent and autonomous entity and lacks independent fighting forces. For · ex.ample, those identified as Qods Force units in Syria is in reality a brigade from the IRGC's 19th Fajr Brigade, based in Shiraz. This brigade has been stationed iil Syria for the past two years. Other Qods Force ele:ii:J.erits in Syria are :ii:J.etceriafy forces from other countries.

Currently, the IRGC as a whole is involved in the wars in Syria arid Iraq. The main fighting force is from the IRGC. And the casualties are essentially co:ii:J.iriariders of dgfe_rent l!lGC ground force units, which makes it abundantly clear that the IRGC as a whqle itf? well as i_ts forces in different provinces are involved in wars and ' terrorism in different countries. Silllilady, the IRGC's navy and missile units are

7 also involved. It is the IRGC which funds, trains and arms terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Asa'eb Al Ahl-Haq arid Ka.ta'eb in Iraq.

In essence, the IRGC is the pillar that preserves the ruling religious dictators_llip in Ira.ri, by eriga.girig in domestic repression, external terrorism and nuclear weapons and missile production. As far as the domestic scene is concerned, the IRGC has four tasks: 1) The Ground Forces ha.ve been restructured into provincial forces so that it · could prevent the outbreak of popular uprisings. · 2) It has set up the Khatam al-Anbia Garrison and its affiliated compa11ies to control the nation's economy. _ 3) Through the IRGC's Intelligence Directorate, its Cyb"er Army apd the Bassij, the IRGC controls social networks and arrests social med_ia u_sers. 4) Through its Counter~Intelligence Directorate, the IRGC controls the regime's officials and personnel, and even arrests them.

As regards the nuclear wea.poris program, since 1984, the IRGC has sought to procure or manufacture n:uclea.r weapons through the IRGG s research center. Th~s center later evolved into SPND, which is headed by Brig. Gen. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. The IRGC is working to produce Shahab missiles, which is nuclear warhead capable. It has engaged in repeated tests to this end.

As regards to exporting terrorism and warmongering, the IRGC is involved, in rilil1.tafy and terrorist intervention in regional countries. It organizes terrorist networks and conducts terrorist operations throughout the world .

..,

8 Location of 14 IRGC Terrorist Training Camps Around Iran +

Isfahan South • Khorasari

Kerman

Sistanand Baluchestan SAUOIARABlA

9 Location of 8 IRGC Terrorist Training Camps in Tehran

--- .. ------

10 Imam Ali Garrison IRGC's Main Terrorist Training Camp for F~reign Nationals

•

11 '

Imam Ali Academy IRGC's Theoretical Training Camp for Foreign Nationals

Located north of Saad Abad Palace, Alborz Street in Tajrish, Northern Tehran, IRGC mercenaries are first s¢nt to this center for theoretic:al courses on fundamen:talism and terrorism, and then sent to other centers fot practical training. This site was previously used for practical terrorist training, but after it was expo·sed, practical military and terroris.t training regimens were moved to the Imam Ali Garrison.

12 Lowshan Garrison IRGC's Special Training Camp for Foreign Nationals

IRGC has a garrison near the city of Manjil, near the town of Lowshan; a portion of this garrison is provided to Qods Force for such training purposes.

13 Pazouki Garrison IRGC's Training Camp for Afghan Nationals

At this garrison, in each session, 200 Afghans lire trained for deployment to Syria and assigned to the Fatemiyoiiil Division. Infantry tta:ining includes: Kalashnikovs, machine guns, mortars, tactics, sniper, and others. All instructors are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force.

• Badindeh Garrison · JRGC's Urban Warfare a_nd terrorist Training Camp for Foreign Nationals

Urban warfare and terrorist training, inc_ludi_ng use of motorcycles for terrorist operations, is given. Driving cou.rses a11d va_rious veh_icle-m_aneuvering courses are also given in this CE!nt.er. One ofth_ese E!Xercises is related to freeing hostages, and is carried out inside builciings designated for learning and training. The commander of this center is Ebrahiml.

These ma_terials are be}~i dl§irib)ji~g by Jhl! Nti~i~na_!CounCll ofReslstanCe oflran-U.S. Represtntcitiv~ Office. Additional information is on file with the Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. • 15