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The Mujahedin-E Khalq in Iraq: a Policy Conundrum THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq A Policy Conundrum Jeremiah Goulka, Lydia Hansell, Elizabeth Wilke, Judith Larson Sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq : a policy conundrum / Jeremiah Goulka ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4701-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq (Iran) 2. Terrorism—Government policy— United States. 3. War on Terrorism, 2001–—Moral and ethical aspects. 4. Terrorists—Iran. 5. Terrorists—Iraq. I. Goulka, Jeremiah E. HV6432.M845 2009 363.32509567—dc22 2009027955 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo of the Mujahedin-e Khalq flag (left) and Iranian flag (pre-1980) at Camp Ashraf, courtesy of Jeremiah Goulka. © Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This monograph presents the results of one of several studies performed for Multi-National Force–Iraq, Task Force 134 (Detainee Operations) (TF-134), to provide analytical tools and insights intended to help future field commanders and policymakers design and perform deten- tion operations in irregular military environments. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), coalition forces faced an unusual detainee issue centering on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK), an exiled Iranian cult dissident group that Saddam Hussein had invited into Iraq to fight on his behalf during the Iran-Iraq War. The United States designated the MeK a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 and a belligerent enemy force in OIF in 2003. Shortly after the invasion, coalition forces accepted a cease-fire from the MeK, disarmed the group, and consolidated its members at one of the MeK’s camps. In 2007, Major General Douglas M. Stone, U.S. Marine Corps, who at the time commanded detainee operations in Iraq, asked RAND to provide a rigorous analysis of the circumstances surrounding coalition protection of the MeK. This work should be of interest to policymak- ers, military commanders, or researchers who are involved with the assessment or planning of detainee operations, as well as to Iraqi gov- ernment officials and commanders with responsibility for their govern- ment’s policies concerning the MeK and similar groups. This mono- graph reflects the research that RAND conducted between October 2007 and January 2009, both in Iraq and in the United States. This research was sponsored by TF-134 and conducted within the Inter- national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National iii iv The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413- 1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figure .............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv CHapTER ONE The Mujahedin-e Khalq: A U.S. Policy Conundrum ...................... 1 Who Are the MeK? ................................................................ 2 The MeK During Operation Iraqi Freedom .................................... 4 The Complicated Situation at Camp Ashraf .................................... 6 Research Questions ................................................................ 6 Research Approach ................................................................. 7 Organization of This Monograph ................................................ 8 CHapTER TWO The MeK During Operation Iraqi Freedom ................................. 9 A MeK Cease-Fire but Not a Surrender .......................................10 Consolidation of the MeK at Camp Ashraf ....................................12 First Tasks at Camp Ashraf ....................................................12 Determining the MeK’s Legal Status .........................................13 The Iraqi Governing Council’s Resolution to Expel the MeK from Iraq .............................................................................18 The MeK as Protected Persons ...................................................18 v vi The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum CHapTER THREE Options for Relocating the MeK ..............................................25 Option 1: Reestablishing the MeK in Iraq ................................... 26 Option 2: Resettling the MeK in Third Countries .......................... 27 Resettling Current MeK Members .......................................... 27 Resettling Former MeK Members ............................................29 Option 3: Repatriating the MeK to Iran ...................................... 30 CHapTER FouR Unexpected Challenges, Unintended Consequences, and Lessons Learned.............................................................35 OIF Planners Did Not Adequately Define a Military Mission Regarding the MeK ..........................................................35 Coalition Forces Were Not Prepared to Deal with an Unfamiliar Culture or the MeK’s Atypical Characteristics ...........................37 The MeK as a Cult ............................................................. 38 The MeK as Skilled Manipulators of Public Opinion ......................39 The MeK Has Not Been Treated as a Terrorist Organization .............. 40 Coalition Forces Did Not Establish a Dominant Role at Camp Ashraf................................................................. 42 The MeK Was Allowed Considerable Freedom of Movement
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