Democratic Values and Democratic Support in East Asia

Kuan-chen Lee [email protected] Postdoctoral fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica

Judy Chia-yin Wei [email protected] Postdoctoral fellow, Center for East Asia Democratic Studies, National University

Stan Hok-Wui Wong [email protected] Assistant Professor, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Polytechnic University

Karl Ho [email protected] Associate Professor, School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas

Harold D. Clarke [email protected] Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas

Introduction

In East Asia, 2014 was an epochal year for transformation of social, economic and political orders. Students in Taiwan and Hong Kong each led a large scale social movement in 2014 that not only caught international attention, but also profoundly influenced domestic politics afterwards. According to literature of political socialization, it is widely assumed that the occurrences of such a huge event will produce period effects which bring socio-political attitudinal changes for all citizens, or at least, cohort effects, which affect political views for a group of people who has experienced the event in its formative years. While existing studies have accumulated fruitful knowledge in the socio-political structure of the student-led movement, the profiles of the supporters in each movement, as well as the causes and consequences of the student demonstrations in the elections (Ho, 2015; Hawang, 2016; Hsiao and Wan, 2017; Stan, forthcoming; Ho et al., forthcoming), relatively few studies pay attention to the link between democratic legitimacy and student activism. Nor do they assess the impact of the student movements on public attitudes towards democracy. Without an impact evaluation, we do not know too much about what have been changed after the student-led movements. Do the student movements have any effects on public attitudes towards democracy? If so, do these movements enhance or undermine commitment to democracy? How do we explain the impacts of student demonstration on democracy if a contradictory effect is found? To fill this gap, we develop a research strategy that utilizes two waves of survey from four societies, i.e., Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and , conducted by Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) to compare the before-and-after changes in democratic attitudes for the group that student movement occurred to the before-and-after changes in outcomes for the group that student movement did not happen. The results show that student protests have an effect on cultivating intrinsic democratic values but have a negative effect on popular support for democracy, in comparison to societies where no student movement occurred. Additional analyses on the validity of the results also confirm our findings. We argue that the positive effect on democratic values is associated with the fact that the student movement is driven by a common desire of more attachment to democratic principles, in turn strengthening citizens’ commitment to liberal democratic values. On the other hand, however, the growing skepticism about democracy as a preferred political system is attributable to polarized public opinion on the occupation movement and a deep-rooted traditional social setting that downgrades the current political system to a flawed democracy particularly when student activism is costly. 1

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: we first briefly describe the Sunflower and the Umbrella movements and discuss the similarities and differences between them. We then review existing studies with regard to possible effects of student- led movements. Next, we describe the data, outline our research design, and report the results of the empirical analyses. Further explanations and interpretations of the findings are followed by a section of discussion. Finally, the conclusion summarizes our assessment of the effects of student movements and discusses implications for democratic legitimacy in East Asian societies.

Political Consequences of the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements

This section discusses the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. The first two parts briefly elaborate the two movements: why and how it took place and ended. The next is the distinction of the two movements. The last is the mutual characteristics of them. The Sunflower Movement took place on March 18, 2014, in Taiwan. It arose from the legislative efforts of Taiwan’s ruling party, /KMT in favor of the Cross- Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with . In a March 17 committee session in Legislature in which the bill was being reviewed, KMT legislator Ching-Chung Chang arbitrarily announced that the review process had ended and the bill would be sent to a plenary session in 30 seconds. The process was regarded as controversial, legally questionable, and not transparent (Rowen, 2015). On March 18, student political groups including the Black Island Youth Front, the Anti-Media Monopoly Youth Alliance, and the Democratic Front Against Under Table Cross-Strait Trade in Service Agreement occupied the building of Legislature Chamber. Over the next few days, more and more students came to the legislative building to participate sit-ins. In addition, there were sit- ins around KMT’s headquarters on March 22 to 23 and occupation of the on March 23. On March 30, around 500,000 students attended a demonstration and protest in front of the Office of the President. As times went by, some counterforces showed up. A public opinion poll conducted on April 3 by TVBS Poll Center indicated that only 26% of the respondents still supported the continual occupation of the . Eventually the government agreed with students’ appeal-the legalization of legislation to monitor future cross-strait agreement, and the students withdrew from the Legislature Yuan on April 10. The Sunflower Movement lasted for 24 days and ended on April 10 (Hsiao and Wan, 2018). The 2014 Umbrella/Occupy Central Movement in Hong Kong lasted for 79 days 2 that is longer than the Sunflower Movement. It had attracted global concern around the issue of the democratization of Hong Kong. The Umbrella Movement mainly appeals for genuine universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive. Although the decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) regarding the method of electing the Chief Executive in 2017 seemed to be the driver of the protests, the long- term conflict between Hong Kong residents and the Chinese government is also an important factor.1 That conflict is mainly about whether democracy in Hong Kong should exist (Biao, 2015). On September 22, the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) started to boycott classes for one week to protest against NPC’s decision. The rallies gathered in front of the Government Headquarters (GH) in Central. In addition to HKFS, the Occupy Central, which had been planned one year ago, joined the protest rallies. The planned Occupy Central movement evolved into the unplanned Umbrella Movement eventually (Lee, 2015). The movement started from September 26 to December 15 in 2014. Protesters mainly occupied key roads and places, such as Admiralty, Central, Causeway Bay, Wanchai, Mongkok, Yau Ma Tei, and Tsim Sha Tsui. On Sep. 28, the police used pepper spray and fired tear gas to disperse protesters. There were almost 100 people injured and 89 people arrested (Lee, So, Leung, 2015; Hsiao and Wan, 2018). Like Sunflower movement, there were some counterforces such as pro-establishment camp protesting against the Umbrella Movement. The Umbrella Movement ended on December 15 when the police evicted the last sites of occupation. Although both Sunflower and Umbrella Movements were initiated by students and protesters are mainly students and the youth, there are some differences between them. The most important three differences are issues, objectives, and achievements. Sunflower Movement mainly centers on economic issues (CSSTA) while Umbrella Movement focuses on issue of political reform (the method of selecting the Chief Executive). The objectives of Sunflower Movement are the legal and open process of legislation of future cross-strait agreement and allow the opposition party to participate in the legislation process; the objectives of Umbrella Movement is the petition for ‘genuine universal

1 The decision of the NPCSC claims that the chief executive should be the one ‘who loves the country and loves Hong Kong.’ This means that China only allows candidates it prefers in the nomination committee to stand in the popular election. In this sense, pro-China/establishment candidates are more likely than pro- democracy candidates to get nominated for the Chief Executive candidacy (Lee, 2015;Wei, 2017). In addition advocating for the democratic election of the Chief Executive, the movement also appealed for the abolition of functional constituencies and the implementation of universal suffrage in Legislative Council elections. Please refer to Article 45 and Annex I of the Basic Law for the method of selection of the Chief Executive (http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html) and Xinhua News Agency, “Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HKSAR Chief Selection”, August 31, 2014. 3 suffrage’ of the Chief Executive. Finally, most of pundits and commentators argue that the Sunflower Movement succeeded because the government responded to protestors’ appeals while the Umbrella Movement was considered a failure (Chan, 2014:578; Hsiao and Wan, 2018). Despite the differences between two movements, they have some mutual characteristics. As mentioned in the last paragraph, the initiators are students and proponents are students and young people. Moreover, the two movements mainly used social media to mobilize students and young people (Liao, Chen, Wu, and Hwan, 2014; Rowen, 2015). Although purposes of the two movements are different, they are somewhat associated with democratic values and China impact (Hsiao and Wan, 2018). The objective of the Sunflower Movement is to pursue a legitimate, equal, and open process of legislation of cross-strait agreement. The arbitrary process of the CSSTA legislation is not only legally controversial but also considered democratic retrogression. The objective of the Sunflower Movement is to pursue genuine universal suffrage. The method of electing the Chief Executive made by NPCSC, which excludes the pro- democratic candidates, is regarded not really democratic. The objective Umbrella movement “demanded a democratic devolution from an authoritarian regime.”(Ibid.) In regard with the China impact, both of the movements were protests against China (Ibid.). Although the Sunflower movement resulted from the controversial legislation of CSSTA, the movement reflected people’s attitudes toward China. People who opposed the CSSTA were more likely to support for the movement. They thought CSSTA would benefit China more than Taiwan. The slogan “Anti-CSSTA” during the Sunflower movement could demonstrate this. As to the Umbrella Movement, although Beijing alleged Hong Kong policy-“one country, two systems” principle since the British handover of 1997, the political reform has been heavily dominated by China. The “August 31st Decision” made by NPCSC invoked the dissatisfaction of Hong Kong people and triggered the Umbrella Movement. Pro-democracy academics and politicians had planned Occupy Central since 2013, and protests of HKFS enabled the planned Occupy Central to become unplanned Umbrella Movement (Lee, 2015). In this sense, pro-democracy people were more likely to support the Umbrella Movement. In all, the surveys substantiate that those who had negative impression of China were more likely to support the two movements (Hsiao and Wan, 2018). In this vein, both of the movements contain two essential elements: China factor and democracy. Although the unexpected occupy movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong have attracted scholarly attention across multiple disciplines, most works focus on the dynamics of the student movements, such as how social media mobilize supports, the 4 demographics of the participants, and the causes of the protest. Relatively few studies, however, evaluate the influence of the student-led movements; and they are mostly concentrated on certain manifest topics. For instance, Wu (2014) discusses how ‘China factors’ shape the two movements, which in turn influence Taiwan and Hong Kong’s relations with China. Kwan (2016) finds a rise of civic identity in both societies after the student protests. Ho (2017) analyzes the political participation of the activists and discloses similarities and differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Hawang (2016) focuses on the street democratic deliberation activities during the Sunflower movement and concludes that student activism stimulates civil awareness.

Data, Measurement, and Method

This study uses data from the third and fourth wave of Asian Barometer Survey (hereafter referred to as ABS, Wave 3 or Wave 4) to examine the impacts of the student-led movements on public attitudes toward democracy in East Asia societies. The ABS is a comparative democratization survey project that targets public opinion on issues such as political values, democracy, and governance through face-to-face interviews in a nationwide representative sample across East Asia. The ABS Wave 3 was carried out in 13 countries/societies (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, China, Mongolia, The Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia) between 2010 and 2012, whereas the fourth wave of ABS covered 14 countries/societies (Myanmar added) and was conducted between 2014 and 2016.2 In 2014, students in Taiwan and Hong Kong each led a large scale social movement that not only garnered international attention, but also profoundly influenced domestic politics afterwards. Our research design, therefore, considers Taiwan and Hong Kong as the treatment group in which citizens in each society unexpectedly received a treatment — large scale student movements — between the two waves of the survey. On the other hand, South Korea and Singapore are chosen to be the baseline for the following reasons: First, there was no such social movement in South Korea and Singapore between survey waves.3 Secondly, since our study focuses on democratic values and support for democracy, we selected countries that have similar levels of democracy as Taiwan and Hong Kong have. Taiwan shares certain commonalties with South Korea in

2 For more details about the survey countries and timetable, please refer to http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/survey-timetable. 3 Although in South Korea a series of protests against President Park Geun-hye have occurred from late 2016 to early 2017 and finally caused the impeachment of President Park, these events and demonstrations happened after the wave 4 ABS survey, rather than in between wave 3 and wave 4. 5 democratization as well as development, whereas both Hong Kong and Singapore are similar in terms of size and population and are partly free countries/territories (Freedom House 2018). In other words, the case selection criteria follow the logic of Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) comparing very similar cases, but we included other countries for placebo tests nevertheless. The countries/societies and their fieldwork time used in this study are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Survey Country and Time Table Before Student Movement After Student Movement Countries/Societies ABS Wave 3 ABS Wave 4 (1) Treated group Taiwan January-February 2010 June-November 2014 Hong Kong September-November 2012 February-April 2016 (2) Control group South Korea May 2011 October-December 2015 Singapore April-August 2010 October-December 2014 (3) Placebo tests China July-October 2011 December 2014-June 2016 Vietnam September-October 2010 September-October 2015 Cambodia February-March 2012 September-October 2015 Source: Asian Barometer Survey.

The dependent variable is support for democracy, and this concept is further divided into two dimensions: intrinsic and instrumental (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Christiano, 2013; Huhe and Tang, 2017). Intrinsic views of support for democracy emphasize some property and values of the democratic process. Instrumental views show that democracy is precious due to the belief that it tends to produce better outcomes in comparison to other regime types. In this study, nine survey items, which are related to political equality, freedom of expression, separation of power, and government leadership, are used to probe the intrinsic support for democracy. Each item consists of a statement and the respondents are asked to indicate whether they agree or not on a four-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix for survey questionnaire and coding scheme). On the other hand, the instrumental support for democracy is measured by four indicators including preference for democracy, efficacy of democracy, suitability of democracy, and the priority between democracy and economic development. After recoding, factor scores are computed for each type of democratic support using principal 6 component factor analysis. The higher values represent stronger support for democracy. This study aims to compare the before-and-after changes in democratic support for the group that student movement occurred to the before-and-after changes in outcomes for the group that student movement did not happen. To capture these changes, we create a wave dummy variable with 0 equal to the survey time point before the incidence of student movements (wave 3) and 1 equal to the time point after the movements (wave 4). In addition, a treatment dummy variable is constructed which equals 1 for those societies which experienced large scale student movements, i.e. Taiwan and Hong Kong, and equals 0 for those who did not, i.e. South Korea and Singapore. Accordingly, we might possibly compare the changes in belief about democracy for individuals living in societies affected by student movements to changes in belief about democracy in societies where such an event does not exist. Four variables — sociotropic economic evaluation, pocketbook economic evaluation, traditionalism, and party identification — play an important role in shaping attitudes toward democracy and should be controlled in the model. Regarding soicotropic economic evaluations, the respondents are asked to rate the overall economic condition of their country today on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). The variable of pocketbook evaluation is measured by an item that invites the respondents to assess the economic situation of their family today ranging from very bad to very good. Social traditionalism is tapped by a battery of questions designed to measure the extent to which the respondents adhere to traditional social norms in dealing with family-related, interpersonal-related, and work-related relationships. In total, nine items are utilized to generate a factor score. Higher values indicate more obedience to traditionalism. Lastly, respondents’ party affiliation is recoded to two dummy variables: liberal (1=identifying with liberal or progressive parties; 0=otherwise) or conservative (1=affiliated with conservative parties; 0=otherwise). Besides the variables described above, public attitudes towards democracy are expected to be associated with certain demographics according to modernization theory. Hence, we include gender (1 = male; 0 = female), level of education (from 1 = low to 10 = high with a Mean of 6.49 and a SD of 2.36), age (from 18 to 96 with a Mean of 45.6 and a SD of 16.14), employment (1 = employed; 0 = otherwise), level of household income (from 1 = low to 5 = high with a Mean of 2.68 and a SD of 1.31), satisfaction with income (from 1 = not enough to 3 = covers well with a Mean of 2 and a SD of 0.7). All summary statistics of the variables are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in This Study 7

Var. Var. label Obs Mean S.D. Min. Max. LDV Factor score of liberal democratic values 8,631 0 0.99 -3.26 2.84 SD Factor score of support for democracy 8,258 0 0.99 -2.18 1.43 treat Receiving treatment (student movement) 10,119 0.56 0.50 0 1 time Before and after the treatment 10,119 0.51 0.50 0 1 stecotoday Sociotropic economic evaluation 10,025 2.69 1.01 1 5 faecotoday Pocketbook economic evaluation 10,042 3.01 0.82 1 5 TSV Factor score of traditionalism 8,546 -0.01 0.98 -3.85 3.17 pid1 Affiliated with liberal/progressive party 10,119 0.16 0.37 0 1 pid2 Affiliated with conservative party 10,119 0.29 0.46 0 1 male Respondents’ gender 10,119 0.49 0.49 0 1 age Respondents’ age 10,089 45.61 16.14 18 96 edu_level Respondents’ level of education 10,096 6.49 2.35 1 10 employed Whether the respondents are employed 10,119 0.61 0.49 0 1 income_lev Level of household income 8,617 2.68 1.31 1 5 sat_income Subjective satisfaction with the income 9,485 2.00 0.70 1 3 Source: Asian Barometer Survey.

To assess the impact of the student movement on public attitudes toward democracy, this study employs a method of difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. Conceptually, as Gertler et al. (2011, 95) simply put, DID estimates “the counterfactual for the change in outcome for the treatment group by calculating the change in outcome for the comparison group.” A key aspect of DID is that it facilitates the casual inference analysis of an intervention when experimental data are not available. DID methods has been widely used in economics, as well as in political science, to evaluate the impact of a program or a policy (Blundell et al., 2004, Card and Krueger, 1994, Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004). Estimating DID treatment effects requires at least two points of time, one baseline (t = 0) and one follow-up (t = 1). In addition, the basic DID framework also relies on the availability of two groups – a treated group on which the treatment is imposed (Zi = 1) and a control group on which the treatment is not imposed (Zi = 0). The treatment indicator in the DID setting calls for absence of any intervention for either the treated or control group (Di, t = 0 | Zi = 1, 0), and it also requires the intervention to be received for the treated in the follow-up (Di, t=1 = 1 | Zi = 1). So, for a given outcome variable, Yit, the DID treatment effect is estimated via the difference in the outcome variable for the treated and control groups before and after intervention. It can be written as follow: 8

DID = {%('()*+ | .()*+ = 1, 1( = 1) − %('()*+ | .()*+ = 0, 1( = 0)} −

{%('()*6 | .()*6 = 0, 1( = 1) − %('()*6 | .()*6 = 0, 1( = 0)} (1)

The expected values in equation (1) can be easily understood and estimated through a linear regression model with an interaction term. This basic DID model can be shown as follow:

'( = 76 + 7+9:;<=>( + 7?@;:A@:>( + 7B9:;<=>( × @;:A@:>( + :( (2)

In equation (2), '( is the outcome variable for each unit; 9:;<=>( is a dummy variable with 0 equal to the baseline and 1 equal to the follow-up; @;:A@:>( is also a binary variable indicating the treatment status with 0 equal to the control ad 1 equal to the treated. Following Villa’s (2016, 56) explanation, the expected values in (1) can be D obtained from the coefficients in the regression model, where 76 is the mean outcome of D D the control group at the baseline; 76 + 7+ indicates the mean outcome of the control D group in the follow-up; 7? is the single difference between the treated and the control D D groups at the baseline; 76 + 7? represents the mean outcome of the treated group at the D D D D baseline; 76 + 7+ + 7? + 7B is the mean outcome of the treated group in the follow-up; D finally, 7B is the DID estimation. Through combing with propensity score matching techniques, the method of DID can be extended to repeated cross-sectional data (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; 1998; Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin, 1995). In addition, like all regression models, it allows including control covariates and conducting balancing-test analysis. In this paper, we employ a STATA user-written command diff developed by Villa (2016) to evaluate the impact of the student movement on public attitudes towards democracy.

Results

The empirical part presents estimates of the impact of the student movements on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. We begin with a graphical analysis, which provides a visual illustration of the changes for the treated and the comparison groups before and after the 2014 student movement. Then, we report the estimates obtained from a method that combines difference-in-differences (DID) with propensity score matching (PSM), which is especially useful in dealing with repeated cross-sectional data. Finally, this section is 9

ended by checking the validity of DID estimation using a fake outcome and a fake treatment. Figure 1 plots the trends in the scores of LDV for the treated and control societies in the left panel, and the trends in the levels of SD in the right panel. The red vertical lines in the middle indicate the event of student movements occurred in 2014. The blue lines represent the averaged scores of democratic related attitudes for the treatment societies, which are Taiwan and Hong Long. The orange lines stand for the scores of attitudes towards democracy for the control societies, i.e. South Korea and Singapore. As can be seen in Figure 1 (a), there is an upward shift in LDV after the student movements in the treated societies, whereas the level of LDV is declining in the control societies. As a result, it seems clear that the differences in LDV between the treatment and control groups is getting larger after the student movement. Regarding citizens’ attitudes towards support for democracy, Figure 1 (b), by contrast, reveals a downward trend of public support for democracy in the treatment societies where large scale of student movement happened in 2014. So, compared to the time point before the movement, the gap in democratic support between the treated and baseline groups becomes larger in the follow up survey. Overall, Figure 1 depicts a different story of the impact of the student movement on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. The next section examines student movement effects using DID regression.

Figure 1. Changes in Attitudes towards Democracy for the Treatment and Control Groups

(a) Trends in Liberal Democratic Values (b) Trends in Public Support for Democracy .2 .2 .1 .1

2014 SUNFLOWER MOVEMENT & 2014 SUNFLOWER MOVEMENT & 0 UMBRELLA MOVEMENT 0 UMBRELLA MOVEMENT -.1 -.1 Democractic Support Factor Factor Score Support Democractic Liberal Democratic Value Factor Value Score Democratic Liberal -.2 -.2 Before After Before After Time Time

Treatment: TW HK Control: SK SG Treatment: TW HK Control: SK SG

Note: ABS wave 3: 2010-2012, wave 4: 2014-2016 Note: ABS wave 3: 2010-2012, wave 4: 2014-2016

We use a method that combines DID and PSM to estimate the impact of student movement on public attitudes towards democracy. The results for the effect of student 10 movement on citizens’ liberal democratic values and support for democracy are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. The tables also report the results of balancing tests that check whether our treatment societies (Taiwan and Hong Kong) and control societies (South Korea and Singapore) are comparable, i.e. whether the receive of student movement treatment is assigned randomly. In both Tables, Column (a) reports the results from full sample; column (b) divides the sample into three age groups; column (c), on the other hand, presents a party identification breakdown. All estimates are from regressions that incorporate Kernel propensity score matching technique and a set of covariates such as gender, age, level of education, level of income, satisfaction with income, economic evaluations, social traditionalism and party affiliation. For the attitudes towards liberal democratic values, the DID estimation in column (a) suggests a significant positive treatment effect, meaning the student movements result in an increase of LDV by 0.154. In other words, compared to societies where student movement does not exist, citizens’ attachment to democratic values is growing among Taiwan and Hong Kong. Indeed, student protesters in both society differed in their goals, though fought for procedure justice as well as an open and accountable government. Their demands are in line with a universal desire to commit to fundamental to democratic principles and values. As a result, it is no surprise that Sunflower Movement and Umbrella Movement have a positive effect on citizens’ democratic values. In column (b), we break down the results of the DID estimates by age groups. As can be seen from the table, the effect of student movements on LDV is positively significant in the samples of age between 18-34 and 35-54. These results are consistent with our expectation that the treatment effect is stronger for young citizens, because they were the main participants in the movements. Besides age breakdowns, we also collapse the DID estimates by respondents’ partisanship. The results again suggest some heterogeneity among party identifiers. For those who lean to liberal parties and who are not affiliated to any political parties, the treatment effect is significantly positive, suggesting a stronger level of commitment to democratic values after the student movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong; however, such effect is trivial and insignificant for those who identify with conservative (or ruling) political parties.

Table 3. Student Movement Effect on Liberal Democratic Values Kernel Propensity Score Diff-in-Diff Estimation: Treatment Group (TW & HK) vs. Control Group (SK & SG) (a) (b) (c) Full Sample Age Breakdowns Party Affiliation Breakdowns

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All 18-34 35-54 >= 55 Liberal Indep. Cons. Protest Effects Diff in LDV .154 *** .218 ** .180 ** -.103 .499 *** .147 ** -.005 (.049) (.089) (.070) (.091) (.111) (.070) (.078) Balance Tests Male .010 .013 .040 -.058 * -.002 .020 .015 Edu_level -.124 .052 .255 ** -.334 * -.072 -.210 * .096 Age 2.444 *** 2.158 ** 4.014 *** .006 Employed -.018 .027 .018 -.033 .011 -.048 * .010 Income_lev .015 .030 .114 * .001 -.077 -.015 .106 Stecotoday -.067 * -.088 -.069 -.037 -.121 -.109 ** -.039 faecotoday .021 .048 .046 -.054 -.019 -.025 .078 sat_income -.022 -.008 .031 -.064 -.061 -.042 -.006 TSV .037 .020 .002 .020 .066 .013 .023 Liberal .004 .024 .010 .000 Conserv. .000 .033 -.003 -.078 **

Number of obs. 6713 1997 2888 1758 1236 3251 2192 Note: The entries are the estimated differences between the treated and control group in the scores of Liberal Democratic Values listed in the first column. All estimates are from regressions that include a set of covariates: male, age (not in age breakdown), level of education, level of income, satisfaction with income, sociotropic economic evaluation, pocketbook economic evaluation, social traditionalism, party identification (not in party breakdown). Kernel propensity score matching is performed over the same covariates using probit regression. The balancing test perform a t-test of the difference in means of the covariates between the control and treated groups when the period equals 0. *** = significant at 0.01 level. ** = significant at 0.05 level. * = significant at 0.1 level. Source: Asian Barometer Survey.

So far, we find evidence that student-led collective actions happened in Taiwan and Hong Kong strengthen the belief in democratic values. Does it have the same impact on public preferences for a democratic system? We answer this question by presenting the before-and-after changes in the score of SD for treatment group and control group in Table 5. In contrast to the findings of democratic values, the DID estimation suggests a significant negative effect on SD (-.110 in column a). It suggests that after the burst of student protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan, citizens in the treatment condition become less supportive of democratic system in comparison to those who reside in a society without any student protest. This result is further scrutinized by age breakdowns and party breakdowns. In the age breakdowns, we find that the student movement in Taiwan and Hong Kong has a negative effect for the middle-aged and senior citizens, but not for the youth. For the middle-aged citizens, student movement decreases their democratic support by about 0.136 points. This negative impact is even stronger for the elderly in 12

Taiwan and Hong Kong (-.241). Moreover, when we divide our sample according to respondents’ party affiliation, the results indicate that the negative impact of student protests mainly concentrates upon independent voters, resulting in a decline in support for democracy. To sum up, the empirical evidence so far suggests an entirely different effect of the student movement. The events of Sunflower Movement and Umbrella Movement have a effect on cultivating the commitment to democratic values, but on the other hand, these movement erode the belief that democracy is the best game in town.

Table 4. Student Movement Effect on Support for Democracy Kernel Propensity Score Diff-in-Diff Estimation: Treatment Group (TW & HK) vs. Control Group (SK & SG) (a) (b) (c) Full Sample Age Breakdowns Party Affiliation Breakdowns All 18-34 35-54 >= 55 Liberal Indep. Cons. Protest Effects Diff in SD -.110 ** .038 -.136 * -.241 ** .060 -.284 *** -.109 (.049) (.086) (.078) (.099) (.110) (.072) (.086) Balance Tests Male .014 .017 .038 -.042 .006 .024 .027 Edu_level -.074 .043 .281 *** -.206 .031 -.132 .034 Age 1.911 *** 1.625 3.197 *** .209 Employed -.011 .030 .006 -.020 .013 -.035 .012 Income_lev .031 .033 .129 * .043 .008 .001 .081 Stecotoday -.064 * -.078 -.074 -.020 -.125 -.125 ** -.019 faecotoday .040 .053 .041 -.021 .026 -.018 .089 * sat_income -.010 -.002 .036 -.037 -.039 -.027 .000 LDV .004 .010 .080 .005 -.093 .017 -.012 TSV .031 .021 .021 -.012 .017 .014 .159 Liberal .009 .025 .015 -.002 Conserv. .007 .038 -.002 -.063 *

Number of obs. 6072 1823 2634 1563 1134 2871 2046 Note: The entries are the estimated differences between the treated and control group in the scores of Support for Democracy listed in the first column. All estimates are from regressions that include a set of covariates: male, age (not in age breakdown), level of education, level of income, satisfaction with income, sociotropic economic evaluation, pocketbook economic evaluation, liberal democratic values, social traditionalism, party identification (not in party breakdown). Kernel propensity score matching is performed over the same covariates using probit regression. The balancing test perform a t-test of the difference in means of the covariates between the control and treated groups when the period equals 0. *** = significant at 0.01 level. ** = significant at 0.05 level. * = significant at 0.1 level. Source: Asian Barometer Survey.

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Given only two points of time, it is difficult to assess the common trend assumption underlying DID method. However, we test the validity of our results using a series of so called ‘placebo’ test, through which additional DID estimations are performed using a fake outcome, a fake treatment, as well as a different comparison group. In the fake outcome setting, the original dependent variables (LDV & SD) are intentionally replaced by the number of people that respondents contact in a week. Because we know that the student movement does not have an impact on it, the DID estimation should find an insignificant effect, even though the treatment and control societies are kept constant. The result in the first row of Table 5 confirms our expectation. The before-and-after difference in contacting people for the treatment group is only 0.002 higher than control group, and the estimate is statistically insignificant. So, even though the treatment of student movement is strong and almost everyone involve in this sociopolitical event, it has no effect on people’s daily life, such as the averaged number of people being contacted in a week. Next, we turn our validity check to DID estimations using a fake treatment group, i.e. a group that was not affected by a large-scale student movement. Fortunately, the ABS dataset covers some countries that are not free, and such scale of student movement happened in Taiwan and Hong Kong is basically prohibited and never happened under an authoritarian government. So, in the setting of fake treatment, we compare changes in LDV and SD for a fake treated (China, Vietnam, and Cambodia) to the original comparison group (South Korea and Singapore). In the second row of Table 5, the DID estimations are statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is a zero impact of student movement when comparing the fake treatment to the control societies. This test again supports our previous findings that student movement has some impacts on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. Furthermore, the validity of the student movement effect is checked by a different comparison group. Here, we replace the comparison societies with China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The last row in Table 5 finds a significantly positive treatment effect on LDV as well as a significantly negatively treatment effect on SD, which are consistent with the results shown in Table 3 and 4. Through a series of tests, we think that the impact of student movement on Taiwanese and Hongkonger’s attitudes towards democracy is solid and robust.

Table 5. Validity Tests of the Student Movement Effect Treatment Group Control Group DID Estimations Num. of people (1) Fake Outcome contacted in a week

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Taiwan, Hong Kong South Korea, Singapore .002(.052) (2) Fake Treatment: no student movements LDV SD China, Vietnam, Cambodia South Korea, Singapore -.023(.039) -.006(.041) (3) Different Comparison Groups LDV SD Taiwan, Hong Kong China, Vietnam, Cambodia .340(.035) *** -.095(.044) ** Note: Propensity score matching and all the same covariates (except party affiliation) are included in the DID estimations. *** = significant at 0.01 level. ** = significant at 0.05 level. * = significant at 0.1 level. Source: Asian Barometer Survey.

Discussion

Based on the analysis in the previous section, we conclude that enthusiastic over democratic values and apathetic to democratic systems are two side effects of the student movements occurred in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In this section, we briefly discuss why student-led occupation movements have a divergent effect on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. Before jumping into our explanation, it is important to clarify that belief in intrinsic values and preference for democracy are different concepts. Chu and Huang (2010) have shown that respondents may be highly committed to liberal-democratic principles, but hold some reservations about democracy as a preferred political system, or vice versa. So, unlike western matured democracies, there is always a gap between the two concepts of democratic legitimacy in Asia. We argue that the opposite effect of student movement can be mainly attributed to a tension, if not an outright contradiction, between ends and means of the student movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In both societies, the student movements arose from a distrust of their respective governments, i.e. the Sunflower movement was immediately caused by the controversial passing of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), while the Umbrella protest resulted from Beijing’s reluctance to implement a genuine universal suffrage. Student protesters in both societies demanded more adherence to democratic principles, such as re-examination of the passed trade agreement and alternative channels for direct political participation in Taiwan and implementing universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in Hong Kong. Moreover, both demonstrations were characterized as civil disobedience movements using non-violence ways to protest against their governments in order to arouse the conscience of the people on the injustice made by their government. In this sense, the Sunflower movement can be considered as defending democracy against the erosion of democracy by the Chinese government, the inequality brought by free trade, the imperial executive, and winner- 15 take-all politics (Jones and Su, 2015). The Umbrella protest be seen as pro-democracy movement either due to defending Hong Kong’s core values like freedom of speech and pursuing fully democratization (Ho 2017). Therefore, The demands of both movements are essentially in accordance with the pillars of democracy. Consequently, it is not surprising that the student movements in both Taiwan and Hong Kong have an impact on stimulating citizens’ democratic values. Why is the student movements’ effect completely different for the attitude towards support for democracy, even though democratic values take root in society? The first reason lies in the fact that the student-led occupy movements, the occupation of the legislative Yuan in Taiwan and the occupation of the central business district in Hong Kong, were illegal and controversial. As argued by Euchner (1996) and Krastev (2014), confrontational politics outside the system although shapes a community’s will on important issues, does not provide ways to implement political reform; the movement, therefore, exacerbates the declining legitimacy and authority of the system. So, in Taiwan and Hong Kong although pursuing more democracy by actions operating on the fringe of the law can inspire the public’s reflection on democracy, it hurts the authority of the government and social order, resulting in a loss of confidence in problem-solving capabilities of a political system like democracy (Wong, forthcoming). Furthermore, it is also because that the occupy movement, in itself, is costly not only for local businesses but for other residents,4 the legitimacy of the movement could shrink dramatically as the occupation takes longer, and it is exactly what had happened in the case of the Umbrella Movement.5 In Taiwan, because the occupation was not located in the CBD area and just lasted for 24 days, it entailed a lower social cost. However, pushing the government to block trade with China could weigh heavily on Taiwan’s sluggish economy. Skepticism about what democracy can deliver was growing during the Sunflower movement. For example, Terry Gou, the chairman of Hon Hai Group, one of the largest hi-tech company in Taiwan, criticized the student movement, arguing that “democracy alone does not provide food for people to eat,” and “social movements were only a waste of social resources that did the nation’s GDP growth no good.”6 According to the survey conducted after the two movements, Hsiao and Wan (2017) show that about half oppose

4 For instance, during the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong’s retail and tourism industry were highly concerned about their business loss. See http://time.com/3455377/hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-protest- democracy-business-retail/ for more detail. 5 In November 2014, a majority of Hong Hong’s citizens thought the occupiers should retreat completely (https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20141117/18937989). 6 For more details, please refer to http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/05/09/2003589929. 16 the student movements in both Taiwan (46.7%) and Hong Kong (53.2%), suggesting that public support for the movement in each place was polarized. So, given a confronted public opinion like this, it is likely that the student movement would not only attract a backlash against itself, but also a skeptical attitude towards democratic systems. Another possible explanation for the decline of support for democracy is related to so called Confucian values. Previous studies have suggested that Confucianism, which emphasizes values like collective interests and social harmony, is incompatible with liberal democracy and is even considered as an impediment to democratization (Chang, Chu, and Tsai, 2005, Nathan and Chen, 2004, Park and Shin, 2004, Zhai, 2017). In addition, Chu (2016) also finds that regime legitimacy in East Asian countries is composed of some elements originated from Confucian political theory, which puts more emphasis on good governance including maintaining prosperity and stability. The empirical evidence is especially strong in societies that have a Confucian culture legacy. Back to the case of this study, i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. All of them are in general affected by Confucianism to a certain degree. This cultural heritage provides an initial circumstance under which citizens evaluate the impact of the student movement. In other words, compared to societies without any massive demonstrations, the rising social unrest caused by student protests in Taiwan and Hong Kong would result in a decrease in support for democracy, all other things being equal. So, given this common cultural background, we argue that as long as the costs of the student activism increase, it will risk public faith in democracy.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined the impact of student activism on democratic legitimacy. Through comparing four societies in East Asia, results of our analyses substantiate an opposite effect of student movement and show that the student demonstration, on the one hand, enhances liberal democratic values for the public; at the same time, however, reduces the levels of support for democracy on the other. Additionally, as expected, the positive effect of the student movement on intrinsic values is particularly evident among the youth and voters affiliated to liberal/opposition parties; the shrinking effect on support for democracy is manifest among middle-aged adults and the elderly as well as independent voters. Moreover, the results are robust to a series of placebo tests, which all suggest our findings are valid and reliable. The positive effect of student activism on democratic values is likely attributable to the goals of the movement, which ask for democratic principles including attachment to 17 democratic procedures, political equality, and open channels for citizen participation and expression. These initiatives are appealing to the public and compatible to democratic values, which in turn strengthens citizens’ commitment to liberal democratic values. Nonetheless, every coin has two sides. The student protests give rise to public skepticism about whether democracy is always preferable or prior to any other kinds of government. The shrinking support for democracy is probably associated with polarized public opinion on the occupation movement and a deep-rooted traditional social setting that downgrades the current political system to a flawed democracy when student activism is costly. The contradictory effects of student activism improve understanding of democratic legitimacy from the perspective of the citizens. It is worth highlighting that although democracy-driven student movement plants and spreads seeds of democracy, it may erode the faith in democracy in divided society. Despite the fact that our findings cast doubt on the future development of democracy in East Asian societies, a commitment to liberal-democratic principles can be regarded as a buffer against any forms of authoritarianism or functions as “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999; 2011) for democratic transition and consolidation. Therefore, in the long run, the contradictory effects of student activism may not be harmful to the development of democracy. After all, instead of being built in one day, the road to democracy is a trial-and-error process. It is undeniable that being the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, Taiwan’s experience of democracy is valuable. Nevertheless, there is a room for discussion when it comes to the initiative of the New Southbound Policy (NSP) that identifies democracy as an element of Taiwan’s soft power. Based on our findings, the public does not unconditionally accept that democracy is the best form of government even though pro-democracy social movements have happened. Instead, people care more about what democracy can deliver and it is particularly true across East Asia societies.7 For the NSP target countries, the truth is that the members of ASEAN are not only in different stages of economic development, but also have different levels of democratization. Although Taiwan’s experience of democracy is important, pursuing democracy (or democratization) is not a priority for the ruling party, because both the people and the government have desire for “Good Governance”, and the word “democracy” is still quite sensitive to the governments in certain Southeast countries. Hence, the key implication for Taiwan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia should

7 The ABS designed four items to probe public understanding of democracy and found that East Asian tend to interpret democracy in terms of substantial outcomes such as good governance and social equity. http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/meaning-of-democracy. 18 focus on economic cooperation and cultural exchanges rather than relying on the promotion of the experience of democracy. For promoting democracy or alliance building, sometimes the best advertising is no advertising. People in Southeast Asia will long for freedom and democratization if Taiwan’s democracy works well.

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Appendix

Table A1. Survey Questionnaire and Coding Scheme Var. Questionnaire Scale Liberal 1. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions 1. Strongly agree Democratic 2. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in 2. Agree Values society. 3. Disagree 3. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups. 4. Strongly disagree 4. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch. 5. If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. 6. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. 7. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic. 8. When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation. 9. Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries. Support for 1. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? 1= Democracy is always preferable to Democracy any other kind of government; 0 = else. 2. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view? 1 = Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society; 0 = else. 3. If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say “Democracy is somewhat more is more important? important” or “Democracy is definitely more important” = 1; else = 0. 4. Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is 1 = Democracy is completely unsuitable suitable for our country. If “1” means that democracy is completely unsuitable for [name of 10 = Democracy is perfectly suitable country] today and “10” means that it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today? Sociotropic 1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? 1. Very bad economic 2. Bad evaluation 3. Good 4. Very good Pocketbook 1. As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today? 1. Very bad economic 2. Bad evaluation 3. Good

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4. Very good Traditionalism 1. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second. 1. strongly agree 2. In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group’s collective 2. somewhat agree interest. 3. somewhat disagree 3. For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed. 4. strongly disagree 4. Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. 5. When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother. 6. Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher. 7. In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group. 8. Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict. 9. A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him. Party 1. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to? 1. Liberal/opposition party identification 2. Indifference 3. Conservative/ruling party Gender 1. Gender 1= Male; 0 = female Age Using year of birth then convert to actual age Educational What is your highest level of education? 1 = No formal education level 10 = Post-graduate degree Employment Are you currently employed? 1 = employed; 0 = not employed Level of Here is a scale of household [fill in “annual” or “monthly”] incomes. We would like to know in 1. Lowest quintile income what group your household on average is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, dividends and 2. 2nd quintile other incomes that come in before taxes and other deduction. Just give the letter of the group your 3. 3rd quintile household falls into 4. 4th quintile 5. Highest quintile Subjective Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? 1. Not enough satisfaction 2. Just all right with the 3. Covers well income

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