sign in sign up
<<
Home , 2014 in Taiwan, Agriculture in Taiwan, Fisheries Agency, Taiwanese Hokkien, Zai Yu

University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository

Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations

2017 Selling Fish across the Strait: Taiwanese Aquaculture, Trade Governance, and Sustainability

Cheng, Siu Kei

Cheng, S. K. (2017). Selling Fish across the Strait: Taiwanese Aquaculture, Trade Governance, and Sustainability (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27747 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/4062 doctoral thesis

University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Selling Fish across the Strait: Taiwanese Aquaculture, Trade Governance, and Sustainability

by

Siu Kei Cheng

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN ANTHROPOLOGY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 2017

© Siu Kei Cheng 2017

Abstract

This research examines how Taiwanese fish farmers have globalized their farmed seafood and pursued sustainable aquaculture since 1968, the year that succeeded in artificially propagating tiger prawns ( Penaeus monodon ). My key question is whether and how the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)—a bilateral free trade agreement signed by Taiwan and in 2010—affects Taiwanese fish farmers. In this agreement, China made concessions by eliminating tariffs on the enlisted Taiwanese seafood products, focusing primarily on grouper (Ephinephelus ) and milkfish ( Chanos chanos ). My analysis is based on an integrated approach that combines political ecology and governance. I argue that although the ECFA fuelled cross-strait economic cooperation between 2011 and 2015, exporting seafood to China was not the only strategy Taiwanese fish farmers used to respond to globalization and to pursue sustainable aquaculture. In fact, even before the ECFA was signed, Taiwanese fish farmers had enhanced their environmental management and food safety practices. They continuously developed new categories and marketed their seafood in diverse markets, including Taiwan’s domestic market. The ECFA had five significant impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture: First, Taiwanese fish farmers and business people could now use both normal and petty trade routes to export seafood to China, which they decided on by calculating their costs and benefits. Second, China’s policies

and strategies, such as sponsoring a five-year milkfish trade contract in Taiwan and establishing a domestic anti-corruption policy, affected the export volume and farm-gate price of Taiwanese milkfish and grouper. Third, the Taiwanese government further strengthened its regulation of the seafood transport and food safety aspects of Taiwanese aquaculture. Fourth, Taiwanese fish farmers who sustained their businesses by selling seafood to the domestic market or other export markets were less influenced by the ECFA than other fish farmers who exported most of their products (such as grouper) to China between 2011 and 2015. Taiwanese fish farmers responded to the changing seafood trade policies and global food safety concerns by strengthening the existing markets, exploring new markets, selecting seafood species, processing the raw fish into other products, and developing more ecological farming practices.

ii

Preface

This thesis is original and independent work by the author, Cheng, Siu Kei. The research is covered by Ethics Certificate number REB13-1021, issued by Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board. Portions of Section V of Chapter Four include data presented in Cheng (2016) published by Asia Pacific Viewpoint .

iii

Acknowledgements

This dissertation could not have been completed without the generous help from a number of people and institutions. First and foremost, my long, though undisclosed, list of enthusiastic and knowledgeable Taiwanese interlocutors provided me with their unconditional care and teaching during each of my stays in Taiwan. They made me determined to complete this dissertation. Without losing my identity as a researcher, I am incredibly fortunate to become friends with many Taiwanese, as well as a family member of my host family, an apprentice of fish farming, and a well-received community member in Simu and Budai . I also want to thank all the institutions and companies mentioned in this dissertation. The Jianan Cultural Association is one of many institutions that provided rich information and a network for me to learn about Taiwan’s and society. Our great conversations were accompanied by starry nights and sea breezes, along with delicious local seafood and fruit, and the wonderful and beer. The associates of various communities and institutions made me always feel that south and southwest Taiwan, especially the beautiful , was my home. Without a doubt, my interlocutors are genuine experts on Taiwanese aquaculture and many other fields. Many faculty members at the University of Calgary deserve thanks. Dr. Josephine Smart, my dissertation supervisor, gave me honest and constructive advice on how I can grow as a professional researcher and scholar. Drs. Alan Smart and Chui-ling Tam, the other supervisory committee members, broadened and deepened my exposure to various theories and methodologies beyond anthropology. My thesis committee always encouraged me to complete this research project, contribute to knowledge, and create social and policy impacts. Other faculty members in the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, including but not limited to Drs. Saulesh Yessonova, Christopher Holdsworth, Charles Mather, Linda Fedigan, Cesar Appentiik, Sabrina Paric, and Naotaka Hayashi, guided me as I went through each challenge in this doctoral program. Dr. Mary Pavelka, Dr. Pascale Sicotte, and the department’s administrative officers provide tremendously useful advice and assistance. From other departments and universities, Drs. Byron Miller, David Wright, Shaobao Guo, Joseph

iv

Bosco, and Shelley Alexander played important roles as instructors and examiners, providing me with critical comments to strengthen the quality of this dissertation. A number of scholars generously made time for me to discuss my ideas, proposals, dissertation, presentations, and publications: Drs. Andrea Ballestero, Francesca Bray, Yuk-wah Chan, Chien-yuan , Li-hsuan Cheng, Ju-chen Chen, Nancy Chen, Sidney Cheung, Siu-woo Cheung, Jennifer Greenburg, Amy Hauser, Sana Ho, Kuo-hsin Hsieh, Yueh-shuen Hsueh, Shu- mei , Yu Huang, Shaw- Jung, Jakob Klein, Kun-hui Ku, Andre Laliberte, I-chiu Liao, Yi-chieh , Chi-wei , Mike Liu, Tik-sang Liu, Xiao-hua Liu, Jiang-xiong Ma, Mei-ling Pang, Bill Pitchard, Karen Sykes, Stephanie Scott, Scott Simon, Charles Shong, Ping-ceng Tseng, Peter Vandergeest, Robert Weller, Wing-ho Wong, Shuenn-der Yu, and Willa Zhen. I owe them all great debts and hope to repay their generosity by becoming a passionate public intellectual, just as they themselves are. I am dedicated to a long list of peers all over the world, who never lost their faith in me. To name some of them: Megan Alyward, Adam Benfer, McKenzie Bergstrom, Angel Chan, Ray Chan, Tracy Chan, Chia-hsiang Chen, Kelly Chapeskie, Christopher Cheng, Ken Cheuk, Kragen Chien, Angela Crotte, Natashe Dekker, Colin Dubreuil, Matthew Esau, Julie Finlay, Stephanie Fox, Kayla Hartwell, Carmen Ho, Jeremy Hogan, Sheila Holmes, Theresa Holmes, Ting-cun Kuo, Kim Edwards, Camille Lam, Siu-kit Lam, Carl Lau, Hoi-lung Lau, Christopher Laurent, Lucia Liu, Frances Lo, Loretta Lou, Matt Ma, Xiao Ma, Tatenta Mambo, Ana Morales, Monica Myers, Chuen-yan Ng, Megan Ng, Raymond Poon, Amy Rudkoski, Eddie Schmitt, Jenny Shaw, Ping Shu, Adarlard Tang, Loretta Tam, Lauren Tognela, Cara Tremain, Tiffany Tsai, Arvid Van , Josie Vayro, Jason Wei, Catherine , Matt West, Sophie Wu, Ying-qing Wu, Miche Xu, Zhidan Yan, and Ray Yeung. Vincent Cheung, Xavier Lau, Wai-lun Ho, Kingston Keung, Kenneth Ng, David Yau, and Andy Yuen provided tremendous support to my family during my absence from home. I owe so much to you all. Serving as a core committee member of the North American Association has been the fondest part of my life as a doctoral student. I can only name a few but not all of my fantastic collaborators and friends in this helpful community of junior and promising scholars: Yu-hui Chang, Insky Chen, Spencer Chen, Fang-yu Chen, Ru-yun Chiang, Ching-fang Hsu, Szu- yun Hsu, Phin-tsi Ki, Dr. Chris Liang, Meng-shin Liu, Yi-zhen Lo, Kevin Luo, Chi-ting Peng,

v

Dr. Puma Shen, Dr. Derek Sheridan, Hsin-wei (Ya-lan) Tseng, Dr. Elu Tu, Feng-en Tu, Austin Wang, Lawrence Yang, Hsin-hung Yeh, Dr. Laura Wen, Chieh-ju Wu, Dr. Dominic Yang, and Yvonne Yo. We had two wonderful seafood tours in my fieldsite, where I proudly showed everyone “what the authentic Taiwan is.” As a program committee co-chair, I am honoured to have worked with the organizing committee of the 12th annual assembly of Canadian Association for Food Studies, especially Margaret Bancerz, Dr. Kathleen Kevany, and Dr. Fiona Yeudall, who showed me the kindness of Canadian food scholars. We successfully held this important meeting for Canadian food studies and policy in 2017. This research project was generously supported by the Graduate Research Scholarship offered by the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Calgary; and the Research Grant for Foreign Scholars in Chinese Studies offered by the Center for Chinese Studies, National Central Library (ROC). During my fieldwork, I was affiliated with the Institute of Anthropology, National Tsing Hua University, and the Graduate Institute of Anthropology, National Chi Nan University. I wholeheartedly thank everyone at these institutions who provided me with help. At the University of Calgary, the Student Success Centre and its writing support services provide me with strong training on professional and writing skills. The writing tutors and mentors, especially Donna-Lee Wybert, Chris Fuller, Amber Hedges, and Miche Xu, patiently read and gave feedback on innumerous drafts of my dissertation. The Taylor Family Digital Library, International Student Centre, Teaching and Learning Centre, and Career Centre at the University of Calgary provided invaluable support to my study and professional development. I would also like to thank two professional editors for their careful and thoughtful edit of this dissertation: Donna-Lee Wybert and William Barnett. My stay in Calgary was initially in the house of Doug Horsley and then later with Ada Wong’s family. The CUHK Alumni Association in Calgary welcomed me first as a newcomer and then as an active member. In , , , Chiayi City, Edmonton, Toronto, and Minneapolis, I was hosted by Peggy Wu, George Chou, Ching-fang Hsu, Yu-hui Chang, Amy Tsai, Peipei Lee, Raymond Poon, and two additional anonymous families. Their hospitality is unforgettable. Gramme Chan, Ting-on Chan, Herman Ng, Vincent So, Antony

vi

Wang, Eliza Wong, Max Wong, Paul Wong, Shan Wong, and Toi-ling Wong also provided much support to me in Calgary. I am consistently inspired by the agricultural and organic food community in , an impressive group of people documented in my master’s thesis, and who later became my mentors and friends. They are the first group of people who accepted my presence as an anthropology student. Throughout the years, they endlessly shared their thoughts and experiences with me. Their fascinating stories of cultural exchanges with the Taiwanese inspired me to conduct this research project. I cannot wait to rejoin their force and to contribute to Hong Kong agriculture. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all food producers the world over. They sustain our human cultures and societies. Every time I make my hands dirty on farms, I consolidate my belief that food producers deserve all our respect, anytime and anywhere. Last but not least, my family and family-in-law tremendously supported my dream pursuit. Their life experiences continue to be ongoing sources of inspiration for me. With many tears and smiles, Jaremi Lam, Tiffany, and Wallaby have unfailingly accompanied me through this journey, despite our geographic separation for over five years.

vii

For Wai-ling Cheung and Wah-ping Cheng, for teaching me to love seafood no matter how bony the fish. They always make the best seafood in the world at home.

In memory of Drs. Tracey and Po-chan Chen, who both recently passed away— two passionate archaeologists who leave behind an immense heritage of research, education, and public engagement.

viii

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Preface ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv Table of Contents ...... ix List of Tables ...... xi List of Figures and Illustrations ...... xiii Glossary ...... xvi List of Names, Abbreviations, Measurements, and Species ...... xxvii INTRODUCTION ...... 1 I. Research Summary, Central Argument, and Significance ...... 1 II. Historical Background ...... 4 III. Research Objectives and Questions ...... 20 IV. Entering the Field ...... 21 V. Fieldsite Basics, Sampling, and Positionality ...... 23 VI. Research Methods ...... 30 VII. Chapter Organization ...... 33 CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ...... 35 I. The Globalization of Food ...... 35 II. Questioning Neoliberalism: Cross-strait Relationships and the ECFA as an Example ...... 39 III. Critiques of Sustainability and Food Safety ...... 43 IV. Historical and Ethnographic Studies on Taiwan’s Economy and Environment .....48 V. Studying Taiwanese Aquaculture ...... 52 VI. Summary ...... 58 CHAPTER TWO: AQUACULTURE RESTRUCTURING AND TRACEABILITY .60 I. Aquaculture Kingdom: From its Rise to Crises of Sustainability ...... 65 II. Aquaculture Restructuring and Governance ...... 71 III. Interactions Between Veterinarians and Fish Farmers ...... 78 IV. Localizing a Traceability System ...... 82 V. Three Categories of Aquaculture in Taiwan ...... 89 VI. Conclusion ...... 97 CHAPTER THREE: MILKFISH–SHRIMP POLYCULTURE IN SOUTHWEST TAIWAN ...... 101 I. The Changing Brackish-water Aquaculture in Southwest Taiwan ...... 103 II. Pond Management During Annual Production Cycles ...... 119 III. Technologies in Intensive Aquaculture ...... 130 IV. Fish Farmers’ Perspectives: Farm Economics and Fishing Communities ...... 139 V. Conclusion ...... 146 CHAPTER FOUR: MILKFISH DISTRIBUTION, PRIMARY PROCESSING, AND FISH FARMERS’ NEW STRATEGIES ...... 149 I. The Milkfish Supply Chain ...... 150 II. The Emergence of Regional Networks of Simu Distributors ...... 158

ix

III. Milkfish Harvesting and Distribution ...... 165 IV. Primary Processing, the Buffer Stock Program, and the Village Economy ...... 172 V. Government-Sponsored Seafood Promotional Programs ...... 187 VI. Conclusion ...... 198 CHAPTER FIVE: SELLING MILKFISH TO CHINA ...... 201 I. Cross-strait Relationships from 1949 to the ECFA ...... 203 II. Trade Routes for Exporting Taiwanese Milkfish to China After 2010 ...... 216 III. Two New Milkfish Businesses in Southwest Taiwan Under the ECFA ...... 218 IV. Engaging in the Cross-strait Milkfish Trade: The Perspectives of Milkfish Processors ...... 230 V. Taiwanese Culinary Culture and Milkfish Consumption in China ...... 237 VI. Conclusion: Opportunities and Frictions Across the Strait ...... 243 CHAPTER SIX: FISH FARMERS IN SOUTHWEST TAIWAN UNDER THE ECFA ...... 246 I. The SFC’s Contracted Fish Farmers ...... 248 II. Non-Contracted Milkfish Farmers in Simu ...... 252 III. Local Job and Business Opportunities ...... 274 IV. Conclusion ...... 277 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GROUPER SECTOR UNDER THE ECFA ...... 279 I. History of Grouper Farming and Trade ...... 284 II. Grouper Production ...... 294 III. ECFA and the Legalization of Grouper Seaborne Transport ...... 307 IV. Attempts at Market Diversification ...... 314 V. Debating Sustainability of Taiwanese Aquaculture ...... 322 VI. Conclusion: The Future of Sustainable Aquaculture in Taiwan ...... 331 CONCLUSION ...... 334 I. Global–local Dynamics of Taiwanese Sustainable Aquaculture ...... 336 II. The Political Ecology of Sustainability Governance ...... 338 III. The State–Society Interaction in ECFA ...... 342 IV. Trade Governance and the ECFA’s Impacts ...... 343 V. Policy Implications ...... 347 REFERENCES ...... 350 APPENDIX: LYRICS OF FATHER’S MILKFISH (IN ) ...... 389 APPENDIX: COPYRIGHT FORMS

x

List of Tables

Table 1.1. A comparison of aquaculture production between Taiwan and other countries...... 9

Table 1.2. Categories and number of interviewees (total: 186)...... 27

Table 1.3. Factors affecting sustainable aquaculture ...... 32

Table 2.1. The production value and volume of Taiwan’s tiger prawn sector (1981–1989)...... 66

Table 2.2. Common features of the three categories of aquaculture in Taiwan according to ecological fish farmers...... 90

Table 2.3. Some examples of fish farmers in conventional, non-toxic, and ecological aquaculture in 2014...... 92

Table 3.1a. Area of monoculture and polyculture in inland aquaculture (2003–2015), selected species (milkfish and white-leg shrimp) (unit: hectare)...... 112

Table 3.1b. Area of monoculture and polyculture in inland aquaculture (2003–2015), selected species (grouper and giant freshwater prawn) (unit: hectare)...... 113

Table 3.2. Local knowledge about the relationships between egrets and pond conditions...... 127

Table 3.3. Income Dai-en generated from two ponds of 2.5 jia ...... 141

Table 3.4. Dai-en’s start-up and operational costs for two ponds (2.5 jia )...... 142

Table 4.1. Uses of different parts of milkfish in primary and secondary processing...... 155

Table 4.2. Relationships between average temperature and milkfish production regions...... 162

Table 4.3. Market sizes of milkfish classified by distributors...... 169

Table 4.4. An example of the wholesale prices of milkfish belly...... 174

Table 4.5. Selected agricultural policy goals and highlights of Chiayi County Government in 2014...... 189

Table 5.1a. Tariff reduction arrangements for products under the Early Harvest on the China side...... 210

Table 5.1b. Tariff reduction arrangements for products under the Early Harvest Program on the Taiwan side...... 211

Table 5.2. Seafood product list under the Early Harvest Program on the China side...... 212

xi

Table 5.3. Details of the SFC–Qinggong Co. trade contract (2011–2015)...... 223

Table 5.4. Taiwanese milkfish exports to China and China’s ranking as a Taiwanese milkfish importer...... 225

Table 5.5. Cases of P&F plants (n=9) and plants (n=2)...... 231

Table 6.1. Comparison of average production values (TWD/kg) of milkfish in three counties. 254

Table 6.2. Values (in US millions) of Taiwanese seafood exports to China under the ECFA. .. 259

Table 6.3. Farm size and average number of labourers in a sample of fish farmers who farmed milkfish in 2014...... 260

Table 6.4. Fish/seafood varieties farmed by a sample of fish farmers who farmed milkfish in 2014...... 260

Table 6.5. Categories of mullet roe in farm-gate transactions...... 270

Table 6.6. Access of fish farmers to off-farm sources of income in southwest Taiwan...... 275

Table 7.1. Informants recruited from the Taiwanese grouper sector (n=28)...... 281

Table 7.2. Production volume and value of the major farmed fish in Taiwan in 2014...... 286

Table 7.3. Grouper market size...... 291

Table 7.4. Prices of grouper products from Mr. Chang’s fish farm...... 320

Table 7.5a. Recommendation for farmed seafood...... 326

Table 7.5b. Farmed seafood that consumers are recommended to think twice about before consuming...... 326

Table 7.5c. Seafood that is not recommended for consumption (selected seafood which can be farmed in Taiwan)...... 327

xii

List of Figures and Illustrations

Charts

Chart 1.1. food supply as a percentage of global supply (kg/capita) between 1970 and 2012...... 5

Chart 1.2. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan...... 15

Chart 1.3. Changes in the unification–independence stances of the Taiwanese...... 16

Chart 2.1. Production volume and value of inland Taiwanese aquaculture between 1959 and 2014...... 67

Chart 2.2. The structure of Taiwanese aquaculture prior to 1992...... 72

Chart 2.3. The structure of Taiwanese aquaculture after 1992...... 74

Chart 3.1. Quantities of farmed tiger prawn and white-leg shrimp in Taiwan (1975–2015). .... 108

Chart 3.2. Values of farmed tiger prawn and white-leg shrimp in Taiwan (1975–2015)...... 108

Chart 4.1. Supply chain of milkfish in 2014...... 152

Chart 4.2. Milkfish export value (1996–2013)...... 156

Chart 4.3. Average prices and transaction volume of milkfish auctioned in Fish Market in 2014...... 163

Chart 4.4. Transaction volumes and average prices of milkfish in fish markets (2000–2015). . 178

Chart 5.1. Taiwan’s trade with China between 1989 and 2015...... 206

Chart 5.2. Taiwanese milkfish export values (1996-2013)...... 213

Chart 5.3. Milkfish transaction in urban fish markets (2000–2015; same as chart 4.3)...... 215

Chart 5.4. Production volume of milkfish in Taiwan (1992–2014)...... 215

Chart 7.1a. Grouper production volume in East and (1984–2014)...... 289

Chart 7.1b. Grouper production value in East and Southeast Asia (1984–2014)...... 290

Chart 7.2. The grouper supply chain in Taiwan...... 295

Chart 7.3a. Export volumes of Taiwanese groupers...... 303

Chart 7.3b. Export values of Taiwanese groupers...... 304

xiii

Chart 7.3c. Grouper fry production in Taiwan...... 305

Chart 7.3d. Area of inland grouper ponds in Taiwan...... 306

Figure

Figure 3.1. Dai-en’s positioning of aerators in his fish pond, following another farmer’s

advice…………………………………………………………………………………..…133

Photo

Photo 2.1. Half-flooded tombs after land subsidence...... 70

Photo 2.2. A label of a TAP product...... 85

Photo 2.3. Po-fang’s pond surrounded by vegetation. He does not use herbicide to kill the vegetation...... 95

Photo 3.1a. Milkfish ponds in Taiwan in 1927...... 104

Photo 3.1b. Simu (right) and fish ponds (including those on the left and right side of the central road) in 2014...... 105

Photo 3.3. An automatic feeder (front) and a fish farm worker spraying feed around the pond. 111

Photo 3.4. Milkfish feed pellet inside an automatic feeder...... 111

Photo 3.5a-k. An annual cycle of intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture in Simu...... 124

Photo 3.6. Paddlewheel aerators...... 131

Photo 3.7. Two functioning paddlewheel aerators...... 132

Photo 3.8. An impeller aerator...... 132

Photo 3.9a & b. Tsán-a and the shrimp trapped inside...... 135

Photo 3.10. Phototrophic Bacteria used in fish ponds...... 137

Photo 4.1a-l. Milkfish distributors’ harvest and transport procedures...... 168

Photo 4.2. Milkfish bellies...... 175

Photo 4.3. Milkfish bellies in packages...... 175

xiv

Photo 6.1. Major areas of hard clam, grouper, and mullet farming in Simu and the adjacent village...... 258

Photo 6.2 A giant grouper...... 261

Photo 6.3. A milkfish (top) and a mullet (bottom)...... 266

Photo 6.4a & b. Cutting open the abdomen and taking out the roe from a mullet...... 269

Photo 6.5. Mullet roe in irregular shapes...... 269

Photo 6.6. Mullet roe products in a national contest...... 272

Photo 7.1. Giant grouper slices, fish paste (made from other fish), and mushroom prepared for a hotpot in a banquet...... 287

Photo 7.2a. -spotted grouper...... 292

Photo 7.2b. Tiger GG...... 292

Photo 7.2c. Giant grouper (top-right)...... 293

Photo 7.3. 1-inch grouper fry...... 298

Photo 7.4a. Collecting live food...... 299

Photo 7.4b. Live food (red) in a net...... 299

Photo 7.5. Minced wild-caught fish used as grouper feed...... 323

Map

Map 1.1. Location of Taiwan and townships studied in this research...... 14

Map 1.2. Locations of Budai in Chiayi County (yellow) and Xuejia in City (blue) ...... 25

Map 4.1. Simu’s location and milkfish production areas in Chiayi County and Tainan City. ... 159

Map 4.2. Milkfish Distribution in Taiwan...... 161

Map 5.1. The ...... 204

Map 5.2. Overlapping boundaries of the SFC’s trade contracts and election constituencies. .... 221

Map 7.1. The coastal area of south and southwest Taiwan where grouper farming is located. . 283

xv

Glossary

I use the hanyu (漢語拼音) transliteration system for Mandarin. For the Hokkien , my reference is the online dictionary designed by the Ministry of Education (教育 部), 1 Republic of China (Taiwan) (n.d.). I adopt the hái-kháu (Hokkien: 海口)2 accent for . The rural Taiwanese use Taiwanese Hokkien and Mandarin interchangeably in daily conversations. Whenever my informants introduced me a term first in Hokkien, I kept that presentation in the main content to maintain the originality. Otherwise, I put the Mandarin pinyin (hereafter: Chi.) of the terms first, before giving (as appropriate) the Chinese character, Hokkien character, Taiwanese Hokkien Romanization (hereafter: Hok.), scientific name (hereafter: sci.), and English translation, in order, within brackets following the terms.

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) aba de shimuyu 阿爸的虱目魚 Father’s Milkfish (a song) bafen 八分 ~1 catty 3 (1,250 catties/ 1,000 milkfish) baichang 白鯧 orbfish bailusi 白鷺絲 egret baixia 白蝦; Hokkien: white-leg shrimp pe̍ h-hê-á 白蝦仔 banyou 半油 a category of grey mullet roe baoben 保本 to cover the operating cost baoxue 剝削 exploitation bingxia 冰蝦 ice-chilled shrimp bu huasuan, 不划算，沒有人 “It is not profitable and no one meiyou ren 想走 would do such business.” xiangzou bu queding 不確定 I am not sure

11 Chi.: jiao-yu-bu. 22 Chi.: hai-kou. xvi

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) buzhidao 不知道; Hokkien: I do not know m̄ -tsai-iánn 毋知影 caoyu 草魚 crass carp caoxia 草蝦; Hokkien: tiger prawn tsháu-hê-á 草蝦仔 changuanxue 產官學合作 collaboration between hezuo government, industry, and academics chanxiaoban 產銷班 a production and marketing group chanxiao luli 產銷履歷 Traceable Agricultural Product chengxiaoren 承銷人 underwriter 稱魚 to weigh fish chiyu buzhi yangyu Hokkien: 呷魚毌 Idiom: those eating fish do not tsi a̍ h-hî m̄ -tsai- de xinku 知影養魚的艱苦 know the hardship of fish farmers iánn tshī-hî e kan-khóo choutuwei 臭土味; Hokkien: muddy flavour tshàu-thàu-phê 臭頭皮 chuzhuangkuang 出狀況 to fail to function properly chuntian houmu 春天後母面 an idiom: spring is like the face of tshun-thinn āu- mian the step-mother; the weather bú-bīn conditions are unpredictable chuji xinxian chuli 初級新鮮處理及 a primary process & freezing plant ji lengdongchang 冷凍場 da 大 big: a category of grey mullet roe dapan 大盤 a distributor selling fish from fish ponds to fish markets daren 達人 expert daigong 代工 to subcontract danshui 淡水 freshwater tānn-tsuí dan 單 odd: a category of grey mullet roe danshui yuwen 淡水魚塭 freshwater fish ponds tānn-tsuí hî-ùn danya 彈牙; Hokkien: chewy nńg “Q” 軟 Q diceng xiaxian 地層下陷防治執 Land Subsidence Mitigation fangzhi zhihang 行方案 Program fangan dianshichengjin 點石成金 the Midas touch dianyu 電魚 use electricity to stun fish

xvii

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) dongwu yongyao 動物用藥殘留標 Standards for Veterinary Drug canliu biaozhun 準規定 Residue Limits in Foods guiding dongwu 動物用藥品使用 Veterinary Drugs Control Act yongyaopin 守則 shiyong shouze dongyuan kanluan 動員戡亂時期臨 Temporary Articles for the Period shiqi linshi 時條款 of Mobilization for the tiaokuan Suppression of the Communist Rebellion du 毒 poisonous erliao shengwu 餌料生物 live food for fish larvae fang siliao 放飼料 feeding; putting the feed into the ponds fangyang 放養 stocking fish and shrimp fen 分 a unit of area hun fenyu 分魚 to sort fish according to size fengnianxia 豐年蝦 Artemia fuji 扶乩 planchette writing futou 浮頭 floating head; suffocation fuzhisuanjia 腐殖酸鉀 humic acid fuwu maoyi 服務貿易協定 Service Pact of ECFA xieding gongchandang 共產黨 Chinese Communist Party gonghuoren 供貨人 seafood supplier gongtong yunxiao 共同運銷 joint distribution gongtong yunxiao 共同運銷單 a pass authorizing entry and dan supplying fish to fish markets gongzuoyu 工作魚 fish as labour/ a labour fish guanghejun 光合菌 Phototrophic Bacteria guanxi 關係 social relationships with instrumental purposes guotaiban 國台辦 Taiwan Strait Affairs Office of the State Council in China haikou 海口; Hokkien: a Hokkien accent used by coastal hái-kháu population in Budai Township heike 黑殼 shrimp larvae (later stage) oo-khak henzei 很賊 Calculating hongcaibingdu 虹彩病毒 Iridovirus

xviii

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) hongjin 紅筋 shrimp larvae âng-kin hongxun 紅蟳 mud crab hsinyung 信用 social obligations; credits huayen 華人 Chinese people huanjing 環境 environment huanjing youshan 環境友善 eco-friendly huanroulu 換肉率 the conversion rate huixiang 會香會好吃 to become tasty and smell good huihaochi huizishou 繪子手 an executioner huoxingtan 活性炭 activated carbon huopin maoyi 貨品貿易協定 Goods Trade Pact of the ECFA xieding huoxia 活蝦 live shrimp huoguo 火鍋 hotpot or sabu-sabu jihua shengchan 計劃生產 planned production jiweijiu liaofa 雞尾酒療法 a veterinary drug cocktail jiyueshi yangzhi 集約式養殖 intensive fish farming jia 甲 a unit of area jia 假 fake jiachu jibing 家畜疾病防治所 Disease Control Center fangzhisuo jiandan er fuza 簡單而複雜 simple but complex jiao 醮 a religious festival in popular tsiàu Chinese religion jiaofanya 交販丫 to sell milkfish to middlemen jiaoyubu 教育部 Ministry of Education jieqi 節氣 a solar term jin 斤 catty kin jinchang 金鯧; 黃臘鰺 snubnose pompano jinqin fanzhi 近親繁殖 to inbreed jinsheling 禁奢令 the luxury item spending ban—an anti-corruption policy measure in China jingzhi nongye 精緻農業 Taiwan’s official translation of “premium agriculture” jiufen 九分 ~1 catty 2 taels (1,100 catties/ 1,000 milkfish)

xix

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) jiuwu jizhi 九五機制 95 mechanism (the buffer stock scheme) jun 菌 probiotics kantianchifan 看天吃飯; an idiom: the amount of [in khó-thinn tsi a̍ h- Hokkien: 看天呷 your bowl] depends on the sky pn̄ g 飯 kougan 口感 the original taste and texture of food kuashiji nongye 跨世紀農業建設 Program of Agricultural jianshe fangan 方案 Development in the New Millennium 國民黨 Nationalist Party lanluzao 藍綠藻 blue-green algae laonong jintie 老農津貼 pension for old farmers laotianye 老天爺; Hokkien: Heavenly Grandfather thinn-kong 天公 li 鯉魚 Carp lidao jianshe tiaoli 離島建設條例 Offshore Islands Development Act lifayuan 立法院 the Legislative Council of Taiwan lianqiujun 鏈球菌 streptococcosis lianwu 蓮霧 wax apple liang 兩 liangan jingji 兩岸經濟合作架 Economic Cooperation hezuo jiagou xieyi 構協議 Framework Agreement (ECFA) linsuanyan 磷酸鹽 Phosphate longdan shiban 龍膽石斑 giant grouper longhuban 龍虎斑 tiger GG longxucai 龍鬚菜 blackmoss lujiugaiwan 路就改彎 to make a sudden shift of policy lunchong 輪蟲 rotifer luan 亂 chaotic mahjong 麻將 a Chinese game played by four players maiban 買辦 a broker for China’s unificationist business strategies maikong maikong 買空賣空 purchase of a product by a distributor for a quick sale, to minimize the cost of storage

xx

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) maitai 賣台 to betray Taiwan meiyuji 梅雨季 the “plum rain” season mei zuanqian 沒賺錢 to make no profit mianzi 面子 face Minjindang 民進黨 Democratic Progressive Party nianyu 鯰魚 catfish nongchanpin pifa 農產品批發市場 Regulations for Management of shichang guanli 管理辦法 Agricultural Product Wholesales banfa Market nongchanpin 農產品生產及認 Agricultural Production and shengchan ji 證管理法 Certification Act renzheng guanlifa nongcun sheng 農村再生計畫 Rural Regeneration Program jihua nongyu 弄魚 a common practice among local lāng-hî distributors to reduce the muddy flavour of milkfish harvest nongweihui 農委會 nukashijunzheng 奴卡氏菌症 Nocardia seriolae paiyu 拍魚 to sample fish for harvesting phah-hî purposes pao yewu 跑業務 to work as a salesman visiting customers regularly pushaoman 蒲燒鰻 kabayaki eel (seasoned and barbecued eel) qiazhe women bozi 掐著我們脖子走 to strangle zou qianpingshi 淺坪式養殖 shallow-water-pond fish farming yangzhi qingchi 清池 to drain a pond qianyu 牽魚; Hokkien: fish harvesting lîng-hî 拎魚 qizuo 契作 a trade contract qianban 青斑 orange-spotted grouper qingming 清明 tomb-sweeping day rangli 讓利 to make a concession raozulei 橈足類 copepods renrenzaige 任人宰割 being controlled by others (e.g., middlemen)

xxi

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) ribenman 日本鰻 Japanese eel rusuanganjun 乳酸桿菌 lactobacillus casei sanzhong 三中 three categories under the Chinese unificationist tactic sanzhong yiqing 三中一青 China’s soft power to attract the political support of small-medium enterprises, lower to middle classes, and residents in central and south Taiwan shaxia 沙蝦 greasyback shrimp shaichi 曬池 pond drying shenjingbingdu 神經病毒 Nervous Necrosis Virus (NNV) shenshuishi 深水式養殖 deep-water fish farming yangzhi shengchandi 生產地魚市場 a production zone fish market yushichang shengtai 生態 eco-friendly shengtai yangzhi 生態養殖 ecological aquaculture sheng-yu-pian 生魚片 sashimi or raw fish shiban 石斑 grouper tsi o̍ h-pan shiban chanzhi 石斑產值倍增計 Program of Doubling the beizeng jihua 畫 Production Value of Grouper shichang bushi zai 市場不是在我們 “The market is controlled by us women shoushang 手上 (fish farmers).” shimuyu 虱目魚 Milkfish sha-ba-hi shipin weisheng 食品衛生管理法 Food Sanitation Management Act guanli fa shiwu ji yaopin 食物及藥品管理 Taiwan Food and Drug guanli shu 署 Administration shuichan dongwu 水產動物用藥品 Regulatory Guidelines of Aquatic yongyaopin 使用規範 Animal Drugs shiyong guifan shuichan shiyan 水產試驗所 Research Institute suo

xxii

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) shuiqingwuyu 水清無魚 a local idiom: fish disappear when tsuí-tshing-bô-hî water is clear taiguoxia 泰國蝦 giant river prawn Taishang 台商 Taiwanese business people Taiwan diqu 臺灣地區漁船航 Regulation of Taiwanese Fishing yuchuan hanghang 行至大陸地區許 Vessels Sailing to zhi dalu diqu xuke 可及管理辦法 ji guanli banfa te 特 24 to 26 milkfish per box teda 特大 19 to 21 milkfish per box 天 the sky tianqi 天氣 weather thinn-khì tiaoshou 糶手 an auctioneer tongzhan 統戰 China’s unificationist strategy tuiguang 推廣 marketing tufalangang 土法煉鋼 local methods xiqing wenhua 喜慶文化 festive cultures in Chinese societies xizao 矽藻 diatom xian 縣 County xianshui 鹹水 saltwater kiâm-tsuí xiandanshui 鹹淡水 brackish water xianshui yuwen 鹹水魚塭 saltwater fish pond kiâm-tsuí hî-ùn xiao 小 small: a category of grey mullet roe xiaoe maoyi 小額貿易 Petty Trade xiaofeidi 消費地漁市場 seafood wholesale markets at yushichang cities xiaopan 小盤 retailers xiaosantong 小三通 Mini-Three Links policy xinxian 新鮮 fresh xiushidianfen 修飾澱粉 modified food starch wanggong 網工 a harvest worker wanghe 王爺 a fishermen’s deity, portrayed in images as generals or princes weiminfuwu 為民服務 to serve people weishu 尾數 15, 16, or 17 milkfish per box (depending on fish sizes)

xxiii

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) weiyu 餵魚 feeding wenha 文蛤 hard clam wenpeng 溫棚 greenhouse wudu 無毒 non-toxic wufen 五分 ~2 catties (2,000 catties/ 1,000 milkfish) wuguoyu 吳郭魚 Tilapia wuxuxia 五鬚蝦 oriental shrimp wuyu 烏魚 grey mullet yabaoganjun 芽孢桿菌 Bacillus sp . yang 養 enrich yangdeduo 養得多賠得多 “The more you raise, the more you peideduo lose.” yangshui 養水 water enrichment ióng-tsuí yangyu xian 養魚先養水，養 a local idiom: before farming fish, ióng-hî sian yangshui, yangshui 水先養土 one must nurture the to ióngtsuí, ióng- xian yangtu maintain a favourable aquatic tsuí sian ióng- environment thóo yangzhi wangguo 養殖王國 Aquaculture Kingdom yangzhi xiehui 養殖協會 a fish farmer association yangzhi yuye 養殖漁業 aquaculture; fish farming yangzhi yuye 養殖漁業登記證 the aquaculture voluntary dengjizheng registration system yangzhi yuye fudao 養殖漁業輔導方 Aquaculture Supervision Program fangan 案 yiban 一般 conventional (aquaculture) yiban sansha 一盤散沙 a sheet of loose sand yiqing 一青 the category of young Taiwanese under China’s unificationist tactic yiwofeng 一窩蜂 to jump the bandwagon. Literally, “a swarm of bees” (fish farmers quickly turn to one fish species to maximize their profit within a short period of time) yinshui 引水 to flood a pond yingfu yixia 應付一下 to brush it over yongxu 永續 sustainability yongxu jingying 永續經營 sustainable business

xxiv

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) yongyao 用藥 to use veterinary drugs and antibiotics youji 有機 organic you liangxin 有良心 to have business ethics youliang 優良 premium yuchuan yunban 漁船運搬養殖活 Regulation of Live Farmed Fish yangzhi huoyu 魚管理辦法 Carrier Management guanli banfa yufan 魚販 a fish distributor in south Taiwan yuhang 魚行 a fish distributor in southwest Taiwan yuhui 漁會 a fishermen association yuhuifa 漁會法 Fishermen Association Act yushanwei 魚膻味; Hokkien: an unpleasant odour of fish blood tshuì-tshia 臭車 and guts yuyeshu 漁業署 Fisheries Agency yuandatou 冤大頭 a scapegoat zaoshouqingdan 早收清單 Early Harvest Program zaoshuise 造水色 to make a desirable water colour tsō-tsuí-sik zei 賊 calculating/cunning zengzhishui 增值稅 value-added tax zhanya 罾丫 a tool to observe feeding tsán-a zhangkong 掌控 control zhaodao ziji de 找到自己的出路 to find one’s way/future chulu zhengchang fazhan 正常發展 to develop in a proper way zhengchang maoyi 正常貿易 the normal trade route to China zhengchi 整池 soil turn over zhijianzongju 質檢總局進出口 General Administration of Quality jinchukou shipin 食品安全局 Supervision, Inspection, and anquan ju Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China zhizuo yici de 只做一次的生意 a once-and-for-all business shengyi zhong 中 32 to 33 milkfish per box zhongdi jieceng 中低階層 the lower middle class zhonghua minzu 中華民族 Chinese nation

xxv

Hanyu Pinyin Chinese English Translation Taiwanese (Chi.) Character Hokkien Romanization (Hok.) zhongjie 仲介; Hokkien: a broker kâu-á 猴丫 zhongnanbu 中南部民眾 residents in central and south minzhong Taiwan zhongpan 中盤 a wholesaler zhongxiaoqiye 中小企業 a small-medium enterprise zhuxihao 主席好 “Welcome! Chairperson!” zhuangxiang 裝箱 to pack fish into boxes zichanzixiao 自產自銷 the phenomenon of producers marketing their own products zuo 做 do/work zuo shishi 做實事 to perform more actual deeds zuozuoyangzi 做做樣子 to pretend to be nice

xxvi

List of Names, Abbreviations, Measurements, and Species

People, Places, and Regulations The * denotes that the name is a pseudonym used to conceal the identities of my informants and fieldsites. For surnames, I have opted to use Taiwan’s official translation guide, instead of pinyin . A hyphen is usually used in Taiwanese first names for English publications, a tradition I adopted when making up pseudonyms for my informants.

Name/Title Chinese Character Agricultural Production and Certification Act 農產品生產及認證管理法 Aquaculture Supervision Program 養殖漁業輔導方案 aquaculture voluntary registration system 養殖漁業登記證 Ah-ai* 阿愛 Ah-ba* 阿巴 Ah-chia* 阿佳 Ah-da* 阿達 Ah-feng* 阿豐 Ah-fu* 阿富 Ah-hong* 阿虹 Ah-hua* 阿華 Ah-huang* 阿黃 Ah-kuo* 阿郭 Ah-liang* 阿亮 Ah-lu* 阿陸 Ah-lung* 阿隆 Ah-mei* 阿美 Ah-neng* 阿能 Ah-pei* 阿佩 Ah-po* 阿保 Ah-qing* 阿青 Ah-shan* 阿珊 Ah-shin* 阿善 Ah-shing* 阿盛 Ah-shou* 阿守 Ah-tian* 阿田 Ah-wang* 阿王 Ah-wen* 阿溫

xxvii

Ah-wu* 阿吳 Ah-xin* 阿新 Ah-ying* 阿應 Ah-yuan* 阿原 Beiman 北門鄉 Budai 布袋鎮 Chang* 張 Chen* 陳 Chi-sung* 志松 Chi-wei* 志偉 Chia-chun* 佳珍 Chiayi 嘉義 Ching-yi* 菁怡 Chiu* 邱 Chung-ping* 宗平 Chiayi County 嘉義縣 Chiayi County Fish Farmer Association 嘉義縣養殖漁業協會 Chiayi County Fishermen Association 嘉義縣漁會 Chiayi County Rural Regeneration Project* 嘉義縣農村再生計劃 Council of Agriculture 農業委員會 (農委會) Dai-en* 大恩 * 鄧 Dong* 董 Early Harvest Program 早收清單 Fang* 方 Fisheries Agency 漁業署 Fishermen Association Act 漁會法 Food Sanitation Management Act 食品衛生管理法 福建 General Administration of Quality Supervision, 質檢總局進出口食品安全局 Inspection, and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China Goods Trade Pact 貨品貿易協定 廣東 Heilongjiang 黑龍江 Hong Kong 香港 Hsu* 許 Jianan Cultural Association* 嘉南文化協會 Jiangjun 將軍鄉 Jung* 容

xxviii

Kaohsiung 高雄 金門 Ku* 顧 Land Subsidence Mitigation Program 地層下陷防治執行方案 Li* 李 Li-an* 力安 Lin* 林 Livestock Disease Control Center 家畜疾病防治所 Lu* 陸 Luo* 羅 Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 Matzu 馬祖 Mini-Three Links 小三通 Offshore Islands Development Act 離島建設條例 Pei-han* 佩閒 Peng* 彭 Petty Trade 小額貿易 Pingtung 屏東 Po-fang* 泊方 Program of Agricultural Development in the New 跨世紀農業建設方案 Millennium Program of Doubling the Production Value of 石斑產值倍增計畫 Grouper Qinggong Co.* 慶功集團 Regulations for Management of Agricultural 農產品批發市場管理辦法 Product Wholesales Market Regulation of Live Farmed Fish Carrier 漁船運搬養殖活魚管理辦法 Management Regulation of Taiwanese Fishing Vessels Sailing to 臺灣地區漁船航行至大陸地區許可及 Mainland China 管理辦法 Regulatory Guidelines of Aquatic Animal Drugs 水產動物用藥品使用規範 Rural Regeneration Program 農村再生計畫 Service Trade Pact 服務貿易協定 Shen* 沈 Shu-peng* 舒朋 Simu* 思慕村 Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in 動物用藥殘留標準規定 Foods Su* 蘇 Taichung 台中 Tainan 台南

xxix

Taipei 台北 Taiwan Food and Drug Administration 食物及藥品管理署 Taiwan Strait 台灣海峽 Taiwan Strait Affairs Office 國台辦 Tao* 陶 Temporary Articles for the Period of Mobilization 動員戡亂時期臨時條款 for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion Tsai* 蔡 Tseng* 曾 Tu* 杜 Tung* 童 Veterinary Drugs Control Act 動物用藥品使用守則 Wang* 王 Weng* 翁 Wu* 吳 Xi Jinping 習近平 Xiao-cheng 小鄭 Xiu* 蕭 Xue-chai* 學仔 Xuejia 學甲鎮 Yanshui 鹽水鎮 Yi-wen* 義聞 Yongan * 永安鄉 Yu* 余 Yunlin 雲林 Zhao 趙 Zi-yi* 子儀 Zushui* 足水

xxx

Abbreviations Titles with * are pseudonyms.

Full Titles Abbreviations Anno Domini AD Before Christ Era BCE bilateral free trade agreement BFTA

Bureau of Animal and Plant Inspection and Quarantine BAPIQ Charoen Pokphand CP Chinese Communist Party CCP Council of Agriculture COA Chiayi County Rural Regeneration Project* CRRP Democratic Progressive Party ( Minjindang ) DPP Early Mortality Syndrome EMS Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement ECFA Environmental Non-governmental Organization ENGO Food and Agriculture Organization FAO free trade agreement FTA Frozen Seafood Trade Association* FST General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and AQSIQ Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT Good Aquaculture Practice GAP GDP Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Points HACCP International Organization for Standardization ISO Jianan Cultural Association* JNCA Joint Commission on Rural Construction JCRC Marine Stewardship Certification MSC Monodon-type Baculovirus MPV National Cheng-chi University NCCU Nationalist Party ( Kuomingtang ) KMT Nervous Necrosis Virus NNV non-governmental organization NGO North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA People’s Republic of China PRC primary processing and freezing plants P&F plants production and marketing groups P&M groups Program of Doubling the Production Value of Grouper PDPVG Real Gross Domestic Product Real GDP Regulatory Guidelines of Aquatic Animal Drugs RGAAD Regulation of Live Farmed Fish Carrier Management RLFFCM

xxxi

Regulation of Taiwanese Fishing Vessels Sailing to Mainland RTFVTMC China Republic of China ROC Rural Regeneration Program RRP sanitary and phytosanitary measures SPS Star Fish Company* SFC Taiwan Agenda 21 Agenda 21 Taiwan Good Aquaculture Practices TGAP Traceable Agricultural Product TAP value-added tax VAT Veterinary Drugs Control Act VDCA White-spot Syndrome Virus WSSV WTO

Measurements

Unit Symbol (if applicable) Conversion (if applicable) American dollar USD USD1 = NTD30 (in 2014) centimetre Cm 1m = 100 cm Degree Celsius ˚C fens 1 jia = 10 fen feet Ft 1ft = 12” gram G hectare Ha inch ” 1 inch = 2.54 cm jia 1 jia = 0.97 ha jin (catty) 1 jin = 600 g kilogram Kg 1kg = 1000 g M 1m = 3.28 ft metric tonne 1tonne = 1000 kg New Taiwanese dollar NTD NTD1 = USD0.033 (in 2014) percent % parts-per-thousand Ppt Renminbi RMB RMB1= NTD4.8 (in 2014) tael 1 jin = 16 taels

xxxii

Aquatic Animals and Plants Names are based on A Guide Book of Common Economic Aquatic Animals and Plants in Taiwan (Shao et al. 2015).

Common name ; pinyin Scientific name (sci.) abalone 九孔; jiu-kong Halitotis diversicolor basa 鯰魚; nian-yu Pangasius bocourti blackmoss 龍鬚菜; long-xu- Gracilaria lemaneiformis blue-green algae 藍綠藻; lan-lu-zao Cyanobacteria brown-marble groupers 虎斑; hu-ban Ephinephelus fuscoguttatus carp 鯉; li Cyprinidae common orient clam/ hard clam 文蛤; wen-ha Meretrix lusoria grass carp 草魚; cao yu Ctenopharyngodon idella grey mullet 烏魚; wu-yu Mugil cephalus greasyback shrimp/ sand shrimp 沙蝦; sha-xia Metapenaeus ensis diatom 矽藻; xi-zao Bacillariohyceael giant grouper 龍膽石斑; long-dan-shi-ban Epinephelus lanceolatus giant river prawn 泰國蝦; tai-guo-xia Macrobrachium rosenbergii grouper 石斑; shi-ban Epinephelus humpback grouper 老鼠斑; lao-shu-ban Cromiileptes altivelis Japanese eel 日本鰻; ri-ben-man Anguilla japonica Japanese seabass 七星鱸; -xing-lu Lateolbex japonicas milkfish 虱目鱼; shi-mu-yu Chano chanos mud crab 紅蟳; hong-xun Scylla serrata orange-spotted grouper 青班; qing-ban Epinephelus coioides orbfish 白鯧; bai-chang Ephippus orbis oriental prawn 五鬚蝦 Exopalaemon orientis Portuguese oyster 牡蠣; mu-li or 蚵; ke Crassostrea angulata sixfinger treadfin 午仔魚; wu-zai-yu Polydactylus sexfilis snubnose pompano 黃臘鰺; huang-la-shen or 金 Trachinotus blochii 鯧; jin-chang Tiger GG; Sabah Garoupa 龍虎斑; long-hu-ban or 沙巴 Epinephelus fuscoguttatus 龍膽; sha-ba-long-dan x Epinephelus lanceolatus tiger prawn; grass prawn 草蝦; cao-xia or 老虎蝦; Penaeus monodon lao-hu-xia tilapia 吳郭魚; wu-guo-yu Oreochromis white-leg shrimp; white shrimp 白蝦; bai-xia Penaeus vannamei

xxxiii

INTRODUCTION

I. Research Summary, Central Argument, and Significance

[Father] said his milkfish contain no muddy flavour and have good market value. . .

Despite their delicacy, his milkfish are disliked by people afraid of their bones. . .

Feed is expensive and the economy is bad; fishermen associations make policies ineffective. . .

He moaned to the Empress of Heaven about the typhoons and the floods. . . Ignoring others’ warnings, he rode the motorcycle to the fish ponds. . .

He could see the flood; the fish were everywhere [outside of the pond]; they opened their mouths like they were asking him to give up on them and just go home. . .

He dreamed of the milkfish.

̶ A Hokkien song, “Father’s Milkfish” ( 阿爸的虱目魚)3

Yi-wen and Ah-po, the leading figures of the Jianan Cultural Association (JNCA), showed me this song while we were singing karaoke on a fish farm. We visited this farm after a dinner gathering of a team of people marketing local seafood to urban consumers. With us were the fish farm owner, an ecological fish farmer named Po-fang, and a planner working on a government-sponsored rural regeneration project in Budai Township (see chapter four). The karaoke system kept the fish farm owner entertained when he stayed overnight to take care of the fish during the growing season. “Father’s Milkfish” indicates that various environmental, political, cultural, and social factors affect the livelihoods of fish farmers. This song highlights the current situation of Taiwanese aquaculture. Fish farmers use their farming techniques to sustain their livelihoods. Climatic and environmental factors cause uncertainty about the amount

3 Chi .: aba de shimuyu . In 2012, the song won the best lyricist award in Taiwan’s . 1

of harvest they can achieve in each farming cycle. Consumer tastes, operational costs, and fish health are key to the profit they can make. My research examines how Taiwanese fish farmers have globalized their farmed seafood and pursued sustainable aquaculture ( 養殖漁業; fish farming) 4 since 1968, the year that Taiwan succeeded in artificially propagating tiger prawns (草蝦). 5 The term “sustainable aquaculture” is a contested one, engendering multiple meanings and practices at various levels. The global seafood trade has created political, economic, social, and cultural impacts on fish farmers. This dissertation draws on Taiwanese fish farmers’ aquaculture practices and seafood trade policies to discuss the historical changes in Taiwanese aquaculture. The global–local dynamics that affect Taiwanese aquaculture include sustainability governance (e.g., traceability and eco-certification), environmental governance (e.g., aquaculture restructuring and veterinary drug regulations), trade governance (e.g., free trade agreements [FTAs] and various regulations on trading seafood), global consumers’ food safety awareness, animal diseases, and the trend among producers towards branding and marketing their products. This research scrutinizes whether and how the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement ( 兩岸經濟合作架構協議; hereafter ECFA), 6 which is a bilateral free trade agreement (BFTA) signed by Taiwan and China in 2010, affects Taiwanese fish farmers. The ECFA’s Early Harvest Program ( 早收清單)7 eliminated tariffs on items traded between Taiwan and China by 2013. The program resulted in tariff-free Taiwanese seafood exports to the Chinese market. Taiwan and China agreed to continue with Taiwan’s trade measure that imposes tariffs on Chinese seafood products. Over 800 agricultural and seafood items from China are still banned from entering Taiwan. After the Early Harvest Program started in 2011, China eliminated tariffs on the listed Taiwanese seafood products, including but not limited to grouper ( 石斑)8 and milkfish ( 虱目魚)9—those sectors will be discussed in this dissertation. Taiwanese fish farmers’

4 Chi.: yangzhi yuye. 5 Chi.: caoxia ; Hok.: tsháu-hê ; sci.: Penaeus monodon. 6 Chi.: liangan jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi . 7 Chi.: zaoshou qingdan . 8 Chi.: shiban ; Hok.: tsio̍ h-pan ; sci.: Ephinephelus. 9 Chi.: shimuyu ; Hok.: sha-ba-he ; sci.: Chanos chanos. 2

diverse production and marketing strategies include complying with regulations for veterinary drug use, obtaining traceability, selecting fish species for farming, practising polyculture, diversifying markets, and branding. Chapters two through four of this dissertation provide readers with ethnographic data on the history of Taiwanese aquaculture, farming practices, and the social and economic relationships between fish farmers and other stakeholders in the sector. In chapters five through seven, I use the cases of milkfish and grouper farmers to illustrate the experiences of Taiwanese fish farmers under the ECFA. Before the ECFA was signed, Taiwanese fish farmers had enhanced their environmental management and food safety practices. They had developed new categories and started marketing their seafood in diverse markets. Avoiding overreliance on the Chinese market, Taiwanese fish farmers also realized the importance of both domestic and international markets. I argue that although the ECFA can fuel cross-strait economic cooperation, exporting seafood to China is not the only strategy that Taiwanese fish farmers used to respond to globalization and to pursue sustainable aquaculture. The case study of the ECFA is significant because it shows that government intervention continued even after Taiwan and China implemented the free trade agreement. In the Taiwanese experience, trade liberalization—one form of neoliberalism that encourages free market competition—has actually gone hand in hand with state intervention and other practices in Taiwanese aquaculture. These practices include market diversification and sustainable farming practices, as well as cooperation and competition among local community members embedded in their social networks. The Taiwanese fish farmers and seafood business people have benefited from globalization and trade liberalization due to the existence of multiple markets. However, they have also faced problems of environmental degradation, issues of food safety, and the decline of competitiveness in the global market. In response, they have attempted to increase the quality of their seafood. The global discourses and practices of sustainability and food safety have therefore been localized in Taiwan. The fish farmers have developed more eco-friendly aquaculture practices and produced safe seafood to simultaneously adapt to the local environment and to respond to the global market system. My findings highlight state–society interaction in the governance processes that apply to Taiwanese aquaculture. Fish farmers, government officials, marine biologists, veterinarians, and

3

business people have participated in the restructuring of aquaculture since the 1990s. They target ecological practices, food safety, traceability, and market diversification. Both successful and unsuccessful experiences exist, and so do collaborations and tensions. My analysis is based on an integrated approach that combines political ecology and governance. I scrutinize how the Taiwanese government adopts free trade as a policy principle in response to globalization. I also explore how state–market–society interactions affect local livelihoods and the environment. Finally, I examine the policy impacts on and responses of stakeholders in Taiwanese aquaculture.

II. Historical Background

Global Fisheries, Aquaculture, and the Seafood Trade

Between 1976 and 2006, the global seafood trade grew threefold in value, from USD28.3 billion to USD86.4 billion (Asche and Smith 2009: 7; after inflation). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (hereafter FAO; 2014), 10 seafood (excluding aquatic plants) contributed 16.7% of the animal protein for human intake in 2010 (ibid.: 4). Total world fisheries production (including capture and aquaculture) came to 148.1 million tonnes in 2010 (ibid.). Between 1962 and 2012, the volume of trade in live, fresh, chilled, frozen, cured, prepared, and preserved seafood rose from less than 40 million tonnes (live weight) to over 120 million tonnes (ibid.: 42). However, the growth of fish capture to the global per capita food supply has decelerated since the 1970s (ibid.: 68). Scholars, environmental groups, and governments have warned about the crisis of overfishing. For example, the United Nations estimated that 52% of marine fish stocks, which were monitored by the FAO, were fully exploited and 17% were overexploited by 2002 (FAO 2009). 11 The sustainable seafood movement has emerged “to improve ocean health and sustainability” (Seaweb 2006;12 see also Fish Base, Taiwan 2014). 13 On the supply side, aquaculture has become the alternative to fishing

10 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf . 11 Source: http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf. 12 Source: http://www.seaweb.org/about.php. 13 Source: http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php. 4

by accounting for nearly half of the fishery food supply in 2012 (FAO 2014: 66; 14 Chart 1.1). 15 In 2014, global aquaculture production volume was 101 million tonnes and the total value grew to USD167 billion (FAO 2016). 16 Taiwanese aquaculture produced 339,608 tonnes of seafood (0.3% of global aquaculture; Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014). The total value was USD1.41 billion (0.8% of global aquaculture; ibid.). Taiwan imported 487,649 tonnes of seafood (both wild-caught and farmed) valued at USD1.35 billion (ibid). It exported 794,509 tonnes of seafood valued at USD1.87 billion (ibid.). Taiwanese fisheries (including aquaculture) generate a seafood trade surplus, of which the average surplus value was USD672 million between 2010 and 2014 (Council of Agriculture 2015b; hereafter COA). 17

Chart 1.1. Fishery food supply as a percentage of global supply (kg/capita) between 1970 and 2012. Source: Adapted from FAO 2014: 66. 18

14 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. 15 China took a 61.7% share of the farmed seafood produced globally, and was simultaneously the third biggest seafood importer in 2012 (FAO 2014). Although China might have over-reported its figures, Delgado et al. (2003: 17) noted the FAO had “taken into account the possibility of inaccuracies.” For FAO 2014, see http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf . 16 Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en. 17 Source: http://coa.cpc.org.tw/edu/WebPage/FCKeditorUpload/ea7979ca-8cf6-443f-af3a-71e4a5bbc941/01- %E6%B0%B4%E7%94%A2%E5%A4%96%E9%8A%B7%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E8%88%87%E6%A1%8 8%E4%BE%8B%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9_%E9%99%B3%E5%BB%BA%E4%BD%91%E7%B0%A1%E4%B B%BB%E6%8A%80%E6%AD%A3.pdf . 18 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf . 5

In 1988, the FAO (2006) 19 defined aquaculture as the farming of aquatic organisms, including fish, mollusks, crustaceans, and aquatic plants. Farming implies some form of intervention in the rearing process to enhance production, such as regular stocking, feeding, protection from predators, etc. Farming also implies individual or corporate ownership of the stock being cultivated. For statistical purposes, aquatic organisms which are harvested by an individual or corporate body which has owned them throughout their rearing period contribute to aquaculture, while aquatic organisms which are exploitable by the public as common property resources, with or without appropriate licences, are the harvest of fisheries.

For at least three millennia, human beings have domesticated aquatic organisms for food (Nash 2011: 12–13). During the nineteenth century, “modern aquaculture” emerged with the activities of egg-taking, hatching, and fish fry transport in several countries (ibid.: 51–68). Aquaculture became a global phenomenon thanks to the expanding seafood market and the international pro-poor policy (Asian Development 2004; 20 Islam 2014; Stonich et al. 1997). In the 2000s, more than 357 million people were making their livelihoods from aquaculture (FAO 2012: 91). 21 An online report in The Economist (2003) used the term “Blue Revolution” to denote equivalence to the Green Revolution in agriculture, which suggests that modern aquaculture involves “technically specialised conditions and a great deal of knowledge about the habits and life cycle of each fish species.” 22 It can stabilize the supply of various fish varieties, especially those with improved traits through breeding. The idea of a Blue Revolution implicates the global forces that change local landscapes and daily lives to meet market demand for seafood as well as countries’ needs for foreign currency to develop their economies in a capitalist logic. Over the past four decades, some countries have made aquaculture part of their national strategies for exporting high-value seafood in exchange foreign currency (Asche and Smith 2009: 9). In Honduras, fishermen became shrimp farmers after state agencies and transnational corporations turned mangrove swamps into fish ponds in the 1980s (Stonich et al. 1997). Similarly, the Vietnamese government and its

19 Source: http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6941e/x6941e04.htm. 20 Source: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/35940/files/technology-fish-farms-tha.pdf. 21 Source: http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e.pdf . 22 Source: http://www.economist.com/node/1974103. 6

reforestation program allowed inhabitants to practise shrimp aquaculture in forest and mangrove areas (Omoto and Scott 2016). In Thailand, Charoen Pokphand (CP), the largest Asian agro- industrial conglomerate, initially developed its corporate organizational aquaculture to turn small-scale shrimp farmers into contract farmers (Goss et al. 2000). Salmon mariculture, which is located in temperate regions such as Norway, , Tasmania, and Chile, involved state– corporate collaborations undertaken to establish standard procedures, from breeding to grow-out, to control salmon quality (Lien 2015). The expanding global aquaculture sector caused environmental issues, such as the exploitation of fish meal sourced from the ocean, excessive effluent and drug usage, the destruction of mangroves, and fish escaping to become invasive species (Naylor et al. 2000: 1020–21). The FAO (2011 [1995]) 23 adopted the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (hereafter: the Code) in 1995, advising its member countries to establish effective procedures specific to aquaculture to undertake appropriate environmental assessment and monitoring with the aim of minimizing adverse ecological changes and related economic and social consequences resulting from water extraction, , discharge of effluents, use of drugs and chemicals, and other aquaculture activities. (ibid.: 53)

The technology that the seafood trade relies on has changed over time. Early forms of preserving seafood included curing and drying. In the 19 th century, a wide array of technologies, including canning, processing, and freezing, enhanced the geographical mobility of fish products (Martin 2012: 6–12). As early as the 1950s, oxygen-supply devices were also available for the international live seafood trade. 24 Nowadays, high-value seafood is transported mainly in live, chilled, or frozen forms, except for a few dried items such as shark fin. In the context of international trade, countries have used tariff systems to protect their fisheries sectors. Since the early 1990s, under the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—and its replacement by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995—member countries have negotiated FTAs to reduce tariffs on agricultural products (Burfisher 2003). Under the WTO mechanism, countries may impose other trade barriers,

23 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-v9878e/index.html. 24 A feed plant researcher: interviewed April 3, 2015. 7

including “sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures” (Asche and Smith 2009: 35). Diverse food cultures as well as illegal and unreported activities affect the international seafood trade (Bestor 2004; Pramod et al. 2014). These factors in turn influence fisheries policies and local farming practices in terms of species selection, stocking quantity, and seafood quality. Therefore, aquaculture and the global seafood trade are interwoven through political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological factors.

Taiwanese Aquaculture

Taiwan has farmed various kinds of seafood for both domestic and international markets. Freshwater carp (鯉)25 ponds existed in Taiwan as early as the 18 th century, as the carp fry were imported from China (Tseng 2012). By the 19 th century, fish farmers had developed brackish- water aquaculture systems and domesticated milkfish for urban consumption (ibid). 26 After the Second World War, Taiwan introduced tilapia ( 吳郭魚)27 from to enhance its (Hu 2004). The fish farmers adopted intensive monoculture of live Japanese eels (日本 鰻)28 and tiger prawns; during the 1980s, Taiwan was the top exporter of these seafoods to (COA 2012a; Lee et al. 2003). Once it gained the reputation of being the “Aquaculture Kingdom” ( 養殖王國), 29 Taiwan began to provide international aid to the Global South by transferring know-how regarding its profit-oriented intensive monoculture (Brock 2015). 30 Taiwanese aquaculture, however, experienced a downturn in the late 1980s. The externalities of intensive monoculture, such as land subsidence and widespread viral infection, led to a degraded environment and the collapse of the tiger prawn sector. In the 1990s, Taiwan

25 Chi.: li ; sci.: Cyprinidae. 26 Freshwater aquaculture in Chinese dietary culture can be traced to 475 BCE (Nash 2011: 13), supplying seafood for subsistence and commercial activities. Tseng (2012) has shown that the development of Taiwanese aquaculture followed its own particular path. Due to international trade, colonialism, and development, Taiwan encountered the globalization of seafood at least four centuries ago. Dutch traders probably introduced milkfish from Batavia in the 17 th century, although aboriginals might have domesticated the fry they caught along the coast of Taiwan even earlier. As well, Chinese settlers in Taiwan succeeded in localizing milkfish as a commodity; they constructed dikes and practised inland polyculture of milkfish and shrimp. 27 Chi.: wuguoyu ; sci .: Oreochromis. 28 Chi.: ribenman ; sci.: Anguilla japonica. 29 Chi.: yangzhi wangguo. 30 Source: http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=234062&ctNode=2198&mp=9. 8

found itself outcompeted by rapidly growing aquaculture economies with respect to production volume (Table 1.1). For instance, China increased its share of the Japanese eel market from 3.5% (1985) to 73.39% (1999) (Lee et al. 2003: 116), replacing Taiwan as the top supplier. Some countries strengthened their competitiveness by enhancing both the quantity and average values of their seafood (Table 1.1). In addition to its shrinking proportion of production volume to the global seafood market, Taiwanese aquaculture faced a decreasing fish farming population—the numbers in 2014 (90,000) were down 14% from 2005 (almost 105,000) (Fisheries Agency 2014a: 30). Preparing to enter the WTO in 2002, the Taiwanese government had encouraged its aquaculture sector to enhance the quality of the seafood produced to strengthen its competitiveness in both international and domestic markets (Lee et al. 2003; Ran 2007). Thus, various economic, social, and ecological factors caused Taiwan to produce high-value farmed seafood rather than simply attempting to increase production volumes.

Table 1.1. A comparison of aquaculture production between Taiwan and other countries. Country Production Production Average value Average value volume in volume in (USD (USD 1984 (tonnes) 2014 (tonnes) thousands) thousands) /tonnes in 1984 /tonnes in 2014 Bangladesh 117,025 1,956,925 1.208 2.480 China 3,830,077 58,797,258 0.768 1.290 India 572,000 4,884,021 0.837 2.205 Taiwan 245,080 340,567 2.479 4.022 Thailand 111,932 934,758 0.968 2.820 Vietnam 119,000 3,411,391 1.477 2.103 Source: FAO 2016. 31

31 Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en. 9

Taiwan’s sectoral restructuring from 1992 until nowadays targeted sustainability, food safety, and traceability (i.e., traceable production, processing, and distribution processes). Regulations and promotion of food safety and traceability fostered new organizations and groups of fish farmers and traders. The central government’s Council of Agriculture ( 農委會; COA) 32 proposed a three-way collaboration between the government, the aquaculture sector, and academics ( 產官學合作)33 to sustain the aquaculture sector (COA 2002). 34 Workshops, certifications, and programs were made available to bring the aquaculture sector into compliance with food safety regulations and trade standards set by importing countries and Taiwan itself. Taiwan’s version of sustainable aquaculture then involved transforming the sector from quantity- oriented production to a quality-oriented product emphasis, which also included consideration of social and environmental costs (ibid.). The sector was subject to various regulations and certification systems that aimed to increase the safety of Taiwanese farmed seafood (Fisheries Agency 2014a). Marine biologists and consumer co-ops suggested that consumers select sustainable seafood to reduce damage to marine and land resources (Shao and Liao 2015). 35 Thus, over time, sustainability and food safety became new ecological and social values. Fish farmers introduced these values to their farming and marketing practices. Traceability, more sustainable farming practices, and the marketing of frozen seafood products are detailed in this dissertation. Taiwan is one of many countries that attempts to achieve sustainable aquaculture with reference to the Code. Since the early 1990s, various government policies and programs in Taiwan have addressed land, water, and farming problems caused by aquaculture. These programs were part of the restructuring of Taiwanese aquaculture. The programs have led to the establishment of new fish farmer organizations, changed the practices of traditional fishermen associations, and contributed to fish farmers’ new perceptions and practices. These new practices have been incorporated into the description of sustainable aquaculture in Taiwan’s official

32 Chi.: nongweihui. 33 Chi.: changuanxue hezuo. 34 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=4076. 35 Source: http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php. Since the 1990s, the government has encouraged less- intensive aquaculture practices to reduce underground water extraction and alleviate land subsidence (Williams and Chang 2008). 10

Agenda 21, which promotes the country’s sustainable development. Agenda 21 assumes that sustainable aquaculture in Taiwan is simultenously an economic activity and a practice of water resource management. It proposes that the Taiwanese government should establish aquaculture production areas, offer assistance for developing freshwater and seawater aquaculture, improve water supply and drainage systems, reduce water and soil pollution, pursue harmony between industrial development and the water and soil environment, and prevent land subsidence. 36

The sectoral restructuring of Taiwanese aquaculture towards sustainability is an example of state-market-society-environment interaction. The Taiwanese government has reoriented its initial mode of governance in stressing economic growth to responding to environmental degradation. It has also tried to avoid the collapse of the fishing economy and communities. Taiwanese fish farmers need to adapt to the changing regulations of their export markets. If they fail to meet the food safety standards, they lose their international markets, and the domestic market is not large enough to accommodate all of the products. Without this adaptation to the needs of the export market, the price of farmed seafood will keep plunging. Therefore, both the government and fish farmers moved towards more sustainable practices almost at the same time since the 1990s. Taiwanese aquaculture involves local practices that respond to the global system. As food safety is linked to pond management and the surrounding environment, import countries rely on the laboratory reports of any chemical, drug, and antibiotic residues to determine whether food products can enter their countries or not. At the local level, environmental management is therefore key to making trade possible. The international standards and regulations then apply to the domestic market too, because fish farmers may not have decided which market to sell their products to until harvesting begins. These interlocked relationships within Taiwanese aquaculture are a product of global–local dynamics.

36 Source: National Council for Sustainable Development Network (2010: 32). Source: http://nsdn.epa.gov.tw/NSDN/en/agenda/index.htm . 11

Cross-strait Relationships, the ECFA, and Seafood Export to China

Map 1.1 shows the location of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Cross-strait seafood trading has existed for at least five centuries (Cao 2006 [1979]). After the Nationalist Party ( 國民黨; hereafter KMT) 37 lost the civil war in 1949 and retreated to Taiwan Island, two “Chinas” co- existed (i.e., the PRC and the ROC), 38 which severely disrupted their mutual communication for four decades. The Taiwan Strait, which is about 150 km wide (Courtenay 2011), became both a natural and political boundary between China and Taiwan. The term “cross-strait relationship” indicates political, economic, and social interactions between China and Taiwan. Taiwan’s diplomatic relations became marginalized in the 1970s, as indicated by the loss of official ties with other countries such as the . When the United Nations recognized the PRC (China) in 1976, the ROC (Taiwan) withdrew its membership “rather than accept a proposal of dual representation” (Pan 2012: 38) of “China.” After 1979, the year when the United States switched from recognizing the ROC to recognizing the PRC, the Chinese government began to adopt a range of reconciliatory policies to relax. . . [the cross-strait] relations and put forward a series of flexible proposals to Taipei (Taiwan), while at the same time continuing to exert political and military pressure on the island as a deterrence against its possible move toward independence. (Cai 2011: 3)

Starting in 1987, the KMT government allowed Taiwanese residents to visit their relatives in China. In 1991, it abandoned the “Temporary Articles for the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” (動員戡亂時期臨時條款), 39 which brought an end to the KMT’s plan to retake mainland China. The cross-strait issue thus shifted to whether China under the ruling Chinese Communist Party ( 共產黨; hereafter CCP) 40 would one day take over Taiwan in the name of unification. After 1992, at the national level, a Taiwanese identity began to rise (green line in Chart 1.2), and by 2005 had replaced dual identity (i.e., being both Taiwanese and Chinese) as the major form of self-identification (purple line in Chart 1.2). One-

37 Chi.: Kuomingtang . 38 PRC stands for the People’s Republic of China in mainland China; ROC stands for the Republic of China in Taiwan. 39 Chi.: dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan. 40 Chi.: gongchandang . 12

third of the population supported the “maintain status quo and decide at later date” option regarding unification (black line in Chart 1.3). The status quo indicates that Taiwan is de facto a country, but it has not been officially recognized by most of the world due to China’s intervention. After six decades of separation, the cross-strait relationship now hinges on whether, when, and how Taiwan will become part of China, or whether it will become truly independent.

13

Fujian Province

Southwest Taiwan Xuejia Township

Budai Township (including Simu)

Yongan Township

South Taiwan

Map 1.1. Location of Taiwan and townships studied in this research.

Source: Nations Online Project 2012. 41

41 http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/taiwan-map.htm. 14

Chart 1.2. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan. Source: Extracted from Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution (2016a). 42

42 Source: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166. 15

Chart 1.3. Changes in the unification–independence stances of the Taiwanese. Source: Extracted from Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution (2016b). 43

In the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwanese fishermen purchased cheaper Chinese catch to supply the booming domestic market ( Fisherman Magazine 1984: 19). While China viewed such transactions as a form of legal and domestic trade, Taiwan officially regarded it as smuggling. The Taiwanese government’s position was that the CCP had “a conspiracy of unification. . . which is devilish” (ibid.). Taiwan opened its market to some Chinese food imports in the 1990s. A press release from the Fisheries Agency ( 漁業署; 1999), 44 Taiwan’s fisheries department, described cross-strait smuggling as a behaviour that “harms the health of our citizens because the

43 Source: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167. 44 Chi.: yuyeshu. Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/mobile/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=827&chk=1426dd02-0785- 4d96-9a58-2a102fc3dfbd¶m=pn%3d113. 16

smuggled food items are not inspected.” Claiming to protect local fisheries and consumers’ health, in 2002 the Taiwanese government officially banned 830 Chinese agricultural and seafood items, when both countries entered the WTO (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2016a). 45 During the 1990s, China’s rapid economic growth resulted in a consumer market that encouraged the Taiwanese to smuggle seafood and other products to China. As a result, each government chose to apply its own rules rather than adhere to international agreements to regulate the seaborne trade across the Taiwan Strait. For example, in 2001, Taiwan implemented the Mini-Three Links policy ( 小三通).46 It included postal shipping, transportation, and “Petty Trade” ( 小額貿易)47 via the sea route, which is still available nowadays. Under Petty Trade rules, each load of cargo that is transported from Taiwan to China can only contain goods valued at less than USD100,000; such cargo must be delivered via Kinmen and Matsu (outlying islands governed by Taiwan) to Fujian Province in China (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2015). 48 In 2007, the Taiwanese government implemented the Regulation of Live Farmed Fish Carrier Management (漁船運搬養殖活魚管理辦法)49 to legalize live fish carriers (Fisheries Agency 2013a). 50 This allowed registered vessels to transport live farmed fish (such as groupers) from seven Taiwanese fishing ports to Hong Kong (from 2007) and China (from 2010). Cross-strait economic relationships have grown closer. By 2008, China had become Taiwan’s largest trading partner (Sun 2011: 66). In 2006, the improving relationships and negotiations between the CCP and the KMT supported a new cross-strait economic relationship, especially for Taiwanese agricultural products entering China. Chinese provincial and city governments began to enter short-term trade contracts for Taiwanese fruits (Jiao 2015). Exports for political purposes were called China’s rangli (讓利), which means “to make concessions” (ibid.: 140). Instead of unifying Taiwan through the use of force, China deployed “soft co-optive

45 Source: https://fbfh.trade.gov.tw/rich/text/fhj/asp/downloadMW0.asp. 46 Chi.: xiaosantong. 47 Chi.: xiaoe maoyi. 48 Source: http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=746&pid=457950&dl_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt _Keyword=&Pageid=0. 49 Chi.: yuchuan yunban yangzhi huoyu guanli banfa. 50 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsCentralFisheries/content.aspx?id=24&chk=c8603084-b5f4-4f2a-a92f- cff3cb115c5b¶m=pn%3D2%26yy%3D%26mm%3D. 17

power” (Nye 1990: 167) to attract Taiwanese support through an “economic lure” (Friedman 2007: 53). The CCP mobilized certain Taiwanese groups to become China’s brokers ( 買辦), 51 to foster its rangli (concession) tactic. According to news reports and commentaries, Taiwanese business people , farmers and fishermen associations, and local politicians who had cross-strait networks acted as brokers to develop cross-strait agro-food trade ( Commonwealth Magazine 2011; Jiao 2015). Through their connections, Chinese cities and enterprises purchased Taiwanese , wax apples, milkfish balls, and other agricultural products. The ECFA negotiations followed the development of the cross-strait agro-food trade. As part of his 2008 election campaign, the KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, proposed that the ECFA facilitates “a peaceful Taiwan Strait” ( The Economist 2014). 52 Ma won the election in 2008 (he was re-elected in 2012) and implemented the ECFA, which followed the WTO framework: [Taiwan and China] have agreed, in line with the basic principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in consideration of the economic conditions of [China and Taiwan]. . . [to] gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment for each other. (WTO n.d.) 53

Both Taiwan and China expected to negotiate additional trade pacts within a decade; in fact, by 2013 they first activated an Early Harvest Program, listing 539 Chinese items and 267 Taiwanese items for which tariffs were eliminated. 54 As Lin (2016: 29) commented, The ECFA is in line with World Trade Organization rules in spirit, but not in practice. It is a bilateral agreement signed and negotiated by two parties that do not recognize each other as states. Lacking an arbitration mechanism above the two governments, the ECFA is highly political.

Lin’s argument about the ECFA being “highly political” (ibid.) highlights that both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments tackled the cross-strait economic relationship carefully, because it could affect whether Taiwan would be part of China in the future. Both had already participated

51 Chi.: maiban. 52 Source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president . 53 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA%20Text.pdf . 54 Other trade pacts of the ECFA include a service trade pact, a goods trade pact, and a conflict resolution mechanism. 18

in the growing trend of BFTAs to promote economic development; a cross-strait FTA could further encourage trade between them. Since the two governments do not officially recognize each other, they delayed the negotiation and establishment of the arbitration mechanism to avoid any conflicts that harmed their relationships at the national level. They first designed the Early Harvest Program as China’s concession to Taiwan in terms of agricultural and seafood trade. For the KMT-led Taiwanese government, this was the way to gain political support from the voters without conceding Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty to China. The Chinese government showed its generosity, expecting that Taiwanese residents would one day return this “gift” by supporting cross-strait unification under Chinese rule. The Taiwanese government saw the ECFA as an achievement for the fisheries sector because it involved the elimination of tariffs on Taiwanese agricultural and seafood products. Under this circumstance, Taiwanese agro-food exports to China increased fourfold from 2010 (USD55 million) to 2013 (USD202 million) (COA 2000). 55 Taiwanese government used grouper trade as a successful example of economic development caused by the ECFA, stressing that local fish farmers benefited economically from the ECFA (Liberty Times 2014). 56 . Furthermore, it claimed that Taiwan could sign more FTAs to enhance the competitiveness of Taiwanese fish farmers, an action China previously blocked as it had sufficient international influence to do so (National Policy Foundation 2010). 57 After the ECFA, Taiwan signed a BTFA with New Zealand in 2012. 58 The implementation of the ECFA aroused political concerns. Liao (2013) conducted a survey of 1,073 residents (including farmers) in south Taiwan in February 2012 and found that a majority of the residents supported the signing of the ECFA (>53%). They agreed that the ECFA could economically benefit south Taiwan (73%), but acknowledged that it could negatively affect Taiwan’s political status in cross-strait relationships (66%). This survey showed that a majority of farmers hoped to sustain their livelihoods by selling more seafood to China, but they

55 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=2291. 56 Source: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1167124. 57 Source: http://www.npf.org.tw/2/7761. 58 Capling (2008: 38–39) argues that the increasing use of BTFAs as a diplomatic strategy has hindered regional and multilateral economic cooperation, because they also produce new tensions between countries. The number of BFTAs in the Asia-Pacific region rose from fewer than 30 in 2000 to 132 in 2013 (Asia Regional Integration Center 2013). Source: https://aric.adb.org/blog/free-trade-agreements-ftas-in-asia-and-the-pacific. 19

did not want to disrupt the peaceful status quo for Taiwan. Their major concern about the long- term consequences of the ECFA was that it would contribute to unification under China’s rule. Opponents of the ECFA believe that it adversely affects Taiwan’s autonomy. Hsu (2011: 210) questions why the Taiwanese government needed to sign the ECFA “in a rush.” Other critics point to Taiwan’s economic reliance on China (Tung and Chu 2016). Concerning the threat to national security and other negative impacts of trade liberalization, ECFA opponents are worried about the resulting political closeness to China (Blanchard and Hickey 2012; News & Market 2014). 59 After the Sunflower Movement erupted in March 2014, the controversy over the ECFA extended to the potential impacts of trade liberalization on Taiwan, such as the widening income inequality resulting from the potential increase of Chinese migrant workers in Taiwan, who might take over local people’s jobs (Yong-hsin Ho 2014). 60 In addition, Chinese agricultural items might be exported to Taiwan without restriction in future; this would lead to the collapse of Taiwan’ rural economy. The prospects of deteriorating livelihoods could turn peasants away from supporting closer cross-strait relationships (Lin 2016: 191–192).

III. Research Objectives and Questions

My study examines the governance over and sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture. Seafood production and trade are interlinked with the sustainability of the global aquaculture sector. Sustainability addresses better quality of life for people in the ecological, economic, and social dimensions (Cavagnaro and Curiel 2012: 236). Taiwanese fish farmers have intensified production to contribute to the aquaculture sector and improve their livelihoods since the 1970s. They gradually diversified their markets and changed their pond management styles. These changes are important to the sustainability of the sector. To explain these changing practices, my research focuses on the policies and institutions relevant to fish farmers who develop their production and marketing strategies. In addition, the practices and perspectives of other

59 Source: http://www.newsmarket.com.tw/blog/48706/. 60 The Sunflower Movement was an occupation movement. On March 18, 2014, some protesters, who were mostly undergraduate and graduate university students, occupied the Legislative Yuen (the legislative council in Taipei). They opposed the lack of discussion within the on the EFCA’s Service Trade Pact. The occupation quickly attracted students from different parts of Taiwan to join a mass demonstration against the ECFA and the KMT’s rule. 20

stakeholders along the seafood supply chain, notably business people, are recorded because they play key roles in seafood processing and trade. Fish farmers have been involved in marketing and technology/technique breakthroughs, and all these processes are contextualized within globalization and cross-strait relations. Within this research framework, I investigate whether and how the strategies of fish farmers and business people succeed in international and domestic markets. The key question is whether they see ECFA as a policy that has benefited their businesses. My research considers economic, ecological, political, and social aspects, to evaluate the extent of their business success. My research fulfills two objectives. First, it scrutinizes relationships between the ECFA and Taiwanese fish farmers. Related critiques have focused on China’s concession and the potential consequences of that for Taiwan’s political future; nevertheless, in-depth investigation is required to critique this policy as a “free” trade policy embedded in cross-strait relationships. The extent to which China, a new market, can affect Taiwanese fish farmers should be investigated rather than assumed. My second objective is to unpack the idea and practice of sustainable aquaculture within the Taiwan experience, especially by drawing on evidence collected from fish farmers, government officials, and business people. I assume that examples of success and failure can coexist. My dissertation answers the following research questions: • Has the ECFA influenced the practices, livelihoods, and social relations of Taiwanese fish farmers and, if so, how? • Regarding the ECFA as a particular form of trade liberalization—given China’s elimination of tariffs on seafood—in what ways have Taiwanese fish farmers responded to structural changes in their aquaculture sector, cross-strait relationships, and global and domestic seafood supply chains? • How do Taiwan’s fisheries and trade policies affect the social, economic, and ecological dimensions of sustainable aquaculture in Taiwan?

IV. Entering the Field

I first travelled to Taiwan in 2004 and then joined an anthropological field trip organized by The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2005. After that, Taiwan became my getaway place

21

and a source of inspiration. During my master’s research on the organic food community in Hong Kong, I listened to informants’ stories about their interactions with Taiwanese farmers, agricultural experts, and consumer co-ops. This led me to read about Taiwanese food production, trade, and sustainability. In 2010, the mass media reported that the ECFA was going to take effect. Its impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture became the focus of this dissertation. In July 2010, I briefly visited Po-fang, a 40-year-old male fish farmer in Budai Township, a seaside township of Chiayi County in southwest Taiwan. He and his younger brother practised ecological fish farming to supply milkfish and Japanese eels to a consumer co-op. During the visit, he showed me a pond where eels died and floated. He claimed he had not treated the dying eels with any veterinary drugs. I asked how he could prevent these losses from continuing into the future. He replied, “I do not know. We may just let them die.” I was shocked by this response. I brought similar questions with me to Taiwan during my 2014–15 fieldwork; Po-fang had by then became a celebrated daren (達人; expert) on milkfish–shrimp polyculture in the government, which saw this farming practice as an exemplar of sustainable aquaculture. Throughout my fieldwork, he has remained a generous source of help and advice. In May 2011, I spent four days visiting Budai to extend my local networks and observe a religious festival in Simu village ( 思慕). I was then in touch with Yi-wen and Ah-po of the JNCA.61 One staff member who was a Simu villager introduced me to his mother Ah-shin, a fish farmer. During my visit, I discovered that Simu is the major milkfish production region in the country, and a national milkfish distribution hub. I returned to Simu in the summer of 2012 to conduct a 28-day pilot study. My networks were extended from Ah-shin, Po-fang, and the JNCA to various fish farmers and other stakeholders of Taiwanese aquaculture beyond Budai. Following the supply chains of milkfish and grouper, I approached fish farmers and business people in other counties in south and southwest Taiwan. I visited townships including Xuejia (學 甲) and Yongan (永安) and I studied the impacts of the ECFA on the fish farmers there (Map 1.1).

61 Yi-wen was a journalist and became the BCA’s general secretary in 2008; Ah-po was the BCA’s researcher as well as an editor. The year before, they visited the South China Research Centre in Hong Kong, where I then worked as a research assistant. Although we did not have a chance to meet when they visited Hong Kong, I later wrote a letter to them to explain my research plan for Budai. 22

I conducted a total of 12 months of fieldwork in Taiwan between January 2014 and April 2015. Ah-Shin’s son arranged for me to stay first in a lodge adjacent to some fish ponds and, later, at his house. All the people I met shared their experiences, especially during their daily tea gatherings. Simu villagers quickly became familiar with me as a researcher who wanted to learn everything about aquaculture and their cultures. My local nickname Xiao-cheng ( 小鄭) and my identity as a Hong Kong citizen (one who had also experienced what Hong Kong was like after it returned to Chinese control in 1997) helped me collect data from my informants, since they were keen to compare the relationship of Hong Kong and Taiwan to China.62 The Taiwanese have increasingly used Hong Kong as a reference for the future of Taiwan, in the event that it was eventually unified with China. Therefore, I was able to learn from their perspectives of the cross- strait relationship. This dissertation is a result of these people’s trust and generosity, their willingness to discuss and share their perspectives about Taiwanese culture, politics, and experiences with me.

V. Fieldsite Basics, Sampling, and Positionality

According to the national Agricultural, Forestry, Fishery, and Husbandry Census (Directorate-General of Budget 2010), 63 the total aquaculture area in Taiwan in 2010 was 41,375 hectares (ha); 72.3% of fish farms were located in south and southwest Taiwan. Among 26,846 Taiwanese fish farming households, 88.38% operated on farms of less than 3 ha, and 41.6% of Taiwanese fish farmers practised inland brackish-water aquaculture (ibid.). Fish farmers in this category totalled 34,919 (53% male and 47% female), with 31.4% in the 25–44 year age group; 36% were between 45 and 64 years old (ibid.). The townships I studied had similar structures in 2014 to those reported in as the census of that year. Official statistical data on inland aquaculture showed that 64.6% were full-time fish farmers, while the others held at least one additional job in 2010 (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2010). In 2010, there were 416,209 members of fishermen associations (ibid.). All fishermen,

62 My informants frequently used Hong Kong as an example to compare and contrast with the political and economic situation of Taiwan under China’s unificationist influence. 63 Source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html. 23

fish farmers, and fish pond owners in Taiwan can become association members. Once they joined an association, the government then subsidized 70% of their employment insurance. Fish farmers use the insurance to cover their injuries at their working places. Members who joined fishermen associations before 1999, and were older than 65 years of age, can also receive pensions (老農津貼), 64 which were TWD7,000 per month in 2014. These obvious advantages attracted fish farmers to join fishermen associations. Crop insurance for the loss in yield is unavailable in Taiwan. Four forms of aquaculture can be found in Taiwan: brackish-water ponds, freshwater ponds, oyster cultivation, and offshore mariculture (cage culture). This dissertation focuses on inland brackish-water fish ponds—for which fish farmers can regulate water sources, and thus salinity, depending on the types of fish they farm. The ponds can be either (a) private properties passed through family lines (mostly patrilineal), or (b) transacted (either leased or transferred)— via kinship and friendship networks, in the land market, or through coastal land rented to fish farmers by the government. 65 I also discuss a case study of inland freshwater milkfish farming in Xuejia, 11 km from Budai and inside Tainan City (Formerly Tainan County; Map 1.2).

64 Chi.: laonong jintie. 65 Budai residents told me that they can transfer the right to use the reclaimed land for fish farming, although the government retains ownership of it. 24

Map 1.2. Locations of Budai in Chiayi County (yellow) and Xuejia in Tainan City (blue) Source: National Land Surveying and Mapping Center 2015. 66 Modified by the author.

66 Source: http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671 C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTT ON=false&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword=TW-07- 301000100G-614001 . 25

Partnerships, corporations, and cooperatives constituted 3% of the total fisheries population in 2010 (Directorate-General of Budget 2010). 67 The organization and management of fish farms take many forms. Most fish farmers run their farms as family businesses, which means they typically carry out farming routines alone or with family members. The fish farmers make individual or family decisions, but they also discuss their plans and needs with neighbours, friends, and relatives. Farmland owners who live in urban areas employ fish farmers to manage the ponds or rent out the ponds to them. Urban dwellers become fish farmers by renting or buying fish ponds to produce seafood. Other people in different parts of the supply chain focus variously on breeding, hatching, harvesting, distribution, processing, and logistics. Statistics in 2013 revealed that approximately 2,100 fishing households operated 3,300 hectares of fish ponds in Budai (Statistical Bureau 2013). 68 A fish farmers’ annual income was over USD16,000 (ibid.). I chose to stay in Simu because it is a fishing community that thrives on both aquaculture and seafood trade. It is worth noting that during the Japanese Occupation (1895–1945), the colonial government confiscated a portion of the land in Simu for salt production; villagers responded by extending their farming regions to the adjacent Tainan County (now Tainan City). During the time of the “tiger prawn fever” (chapter two), the villagers expanded their prawn cultivation eastwards to acquire freshwater fish ponds, where prawn needed less time to mature. Three Simu milkfish distributors and three primary processers (producing milkfish fillets) handled 70% of the milkfish supplied to domestic markets in Taiwan. Other farmed species included grouper, shrimp, grey mullet ( 烏魚), 69 and hard clams ( 文蛤). 70 In 2014, Simu was a community comprising two administrative villages, with more than 4,000 registered residents. Rural-to-urban migration occurred. There were more male villagers between the ages of 25 to 65 resided in Simu than in other communities in Budai. Women mostly moved out, seeking urban job opportunities, which caused the male fish farmers to seek Chinese or Vietnamese women as their marriage targets. These immigrants became a source of labour for local milkfish primary processing and freezing plants (chapter four).

67 Source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html. 68 Source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html. 69 Chi.: wuyu ; sci.: Mugil cephalus. 70 Chi.: wenha ; sci.: Meretrix lusoria. 26

For this research, I adopted a multi-stakeholder approach to provide perspectives from several categories of informants. Studying the milkfish and grouper supply chains, I recruited informants from among fish farmers, local elites, government officials, business people, consumers, and other aquaculture specialists. By participating in my informants’ daily lives, I played two roles—in my academic field as a researcher, and in the community as a friend of many local people (Kleinman 1980)—which helped me develop relationships with fish clinics, fishermen associations (members include both fishermen and fish farmers), fish farmer associations (members include only fish farmers), and various government offices. Following the farmed fish along and across supply chains, I made connections to other individuals and organizations from southwest (e.g., Xuejia) and south Taiwan (e.g. Yongan ) to Taipei. These contacts helped me attend and record events outside of Budai. My fieldwork covered other parts of Taiwan, such as Xuejia, an inland township in Tainan City that obtained the only milkfish trade contract from China after the Early Harvest Program. I also travelled to south Taiwan and other cities to conduct interviews, and hence gained impressions of other communities to compare with my in-depth ethnographic data on Simu.

Table 1.2. Categories and number of interviewees (total: 186). Category Number of Informed Consents Fish farmer and breeder 55 Businessperson (trader and processer) 28 Aquaculture-related career 19 (e.g., feed salesman, broker, and journalist Government official (state, regional, 16 township, and village level) Marine biologist, other scientist, and 18 certification agency Personnel from different associations and 31 NGOs (for fisheries, aquaculture, environmental protection, and local cultures) Veterinarian 3 Others (e.g., consumer, local historian, 16 marketing expert, tourism expert, and consumer co-op)

27

The total number of interviewees is 186 (Table 1.2); some of my informants took on multiple roles that fit into various categories. I categorized them according to their current jobs or major contributions to my research data. The daily routines of fish farming and processing involve inputs from both men and women. I was usually first introduced to male fish farmers, business people, and government officials. I collected data from women by developing social networks with them in tea gatherings and daily conversations usually after the first interviews with the men. Outside of the fishing communities, I was introduced to both male and female informants in a more balanced manner. In this dissertation, I provide the views of both men and women about Taiwanese aquaculture. As one can hardly guess a person’s gender from their Chinese name. I will specify the gender of a female informant in her first quote. My cultural and professional background provided me with a research experience that would likely be different from a native anthropologist in Taiwan. For example, Simu villagers did not consider me a keen supporter of any political parties (e.g., KMT or DPP) or local factions. It was relatively easy for me to follow the daily lives of people without being suspected of being a spy from the opposite political camp, especially during the time of election campaigns in late 2014. My informants often told me to learn “what the Taiwanese do.” This helped me to record what they showed me as a non-Taiwanese. My holistic approach is useful to analyze why they selected particular things to show me. Owing to the efforts of local historians and anthropologists, local people usually understand what fieldwork means : the collection and recording of historical data, or various other things, to understand local society and culture. I simultaneously benefited from and was limited by my status as a young male researcher (i.e., 30 years old in 2014). In Taiwanese society, men have fewer social taboos than women, especially in local religious rituals. For example, I was invited to join the religious rituals, of which certain responsiblities, such as carrying sedans, were limited to men. This first-hand experience was important for me to be accepted as a community member to some degree. More importantly, my participation was visible to the community members, who considered me as an active learner of their culture. I was given more opportunities to volunteer in fish farms and community activities because of this cultural experience. However, being a male researcher had limitations. Some young women, such as new immigrants from Vietnam, were reluctant to talk to me. I was also aware that their

28

husbands could be unhappy with their personal relationships with other men in the village. This situation limited my opportunities to interview the Vietnamese women who were the major labour force in the milkfish processing plants. Acknowledging that a researcher can never be completely objective, I avoided presenting myself as a person with any particular bias because of my cultural experience. Some informants knew of my organic food research in Hong Kong through daily conversations or my online public record. To avoid leading my informants, I did not highlight my research experience during interviews. I intended to minimize the impact of my own environmental stance on informants’ perceptions of me. I also stated my research goals as clearly as possible. I usually began by collecting basic information, such as how they farm and sell their seafood. Questions on food safety, environmental sustainability, and ECFA were raised usually after my informants started talking about these topics. I soon discovered that this was a good way to follow their thoughts and experiences to obtain the data related to my research. These topics were important to their discussions on food production and livelihoods. In case the informants did not raise these topics, I inquired about their experiences and perspectives near the end of the interviews. I also conducted follow-up interviews to get more in-depth responses from my informants. My informants’s impressions of me could change after our personal relationships developed. For example, I was asked about my position on the future governance of Hong Kong, as well as my views of Taiwan’s economic development, which they thought had been achieved through sacrificing the environment. The Sunflower Movement and Umbrella Movement in 2014, two popular political movements against the Taiwanese and Hong Kong governments respectively, occurred while I was conducting fieldwork in Taiwan. These became focal events for lively discussions about the influence of China. My anthropological training reminded me to ask more questions rather than just sharing my own views. And so I spent most of the time listening to the perspectives of various people about cross-strait relationships, sustainability, government programs, and the history and future of aquaculture. My background as a male and Hong Kong citizen affected my role as an observer. First, it was easier to talk to male informants about their private lives. I realized that this could be a shortcoming because I would be missing the women’s voices in my analysis. Fortunately, I met a few women who were willing to share information about their private life and thoughts. One of

29

them was Ah-shin, a 62-year-old fish farmer and mother. She treated me like her son and talked to me about her thoughts on the village, her friends, and livelihoods when we spent time together at her home without other people. Second, my experiences of environmental and social movements in Hong Kong might have led to think that I had anti-China attitudes. I was worried about the future of Hong Kong democracy and also cross-strait relationships under the influence of China. These are key factors to the peace in Chinese societies and the world. However, I knew that understanding both the pro-China and anti-China perspectives were important. In the field, I tried to be more objective as a researcher to balance my sources of data. I included among my case studies the Star Fish Company (SFC; mentioned in chapter five), which was accused of betraying Taiwan and pleasing China. I found the situation to be more complicated than the assumption that the Taiwanese are either pro-China or anti-China. Business opportunities, cultural identities, and other factors affected their actions towards China’s strategies. This field experience was helpful to my discussion on the impacts of ECFA on Taiwanese fish farmers.

VI. Research Methods

I conducted both ethnographic and archival research for this project. These resources complement one another to generate an in-depth account of historical changes in Taiwanese aquaculture, global–local dynamics, and structure–agency interactions. Gezon (2005: 137) stresses that ethnographers should “identify global connections in local sites through the examination of micro-interactions among actors who derive their authority from both local and extralocal sources.” She further argues for exploring how multiple forms of political powers across scales “generate and enact agency” (2006: 148). My pilot study and ethnographic fieldwork were based in Budai, where I recorded a production cycle of milkfish–shrimp cultivation. Participant observation occurred through participation in farming routines, harvesting, seminars, events, gatherings, stocking censuses, and other community activities. These helped me understand Taiwanese aquaculture and the global seafood supply chain. I also collected archival data to complement my ethnographic materials. In Taiwan, the available documents include government reports, statistics, and publications covering aquaculture science, magazines, and newspapers.

30

The major content of the interviews included life stories and fish farming practices as well as perspectives on various fisheries policies and the ECFA, local politics, food habits, and other kinds of cultures and knowledge. I “stud[ied] up” (Nader 1972: 284) to interview governmental officials, including three top-ranked officials from the Fisheries Agency. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews took place during tea gatherings, daily farming activities, and seafood promotions in Taiwan, each lasting from 15 to 180 minutes. Formal and semi-structured interviews with government officials, NGO personnel, and seafood traders lasted approximately one hour each. A few informants were interviewed multiple times. My interviews were conducted mainly in Mandarin but some conversations and aquaculture terms were also recorded in Taiwanese Hokkien (the local language). I used both Mandarin and Hokkien in daily conversations, as do my informants, who mix both languages. This dissertation uses pseudonyms to conceal the identities of my informants, organizations, and the village I studied (Simu). I translated the quotations from interviewees and news clippings from Chinese to English. My data analysis relies on the triangulation of my ethnographic and archival data, demonstrating both etic (from me as an outsider) and emic (from various stakeholders as insiders) perspectives. It reaches a certain degree of objectivity with evidence, without ignoring the subjective perspectives of my informants in the policy process (Geertz 1974; Yanow 2011). I analyze the impacts of the ECFA on Taiwanese aquaculture and sustainability via various categories of factors (Table 1.3). These categories consist of a range of socioeconomic, ecological, and biotechnical factors that affect the degree of sustainability, such as fish farmers’ classifications of aquaculture environment and interpretations of policy. This table was my reference for designing interview questions. In the following chapters, I demonstrate what my informants shared about their diverse perspectives and experiences to analyze their daily practices along both temporal and spatial dimensions (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). I also documented the historical changes of Taiwanese aquaculture. I provide examples of how diverse fish farmers and other stakeholders express agency in the state–society and through human– environment interactions. Spatially speaking, I examine how the Taiwanese globalize and localize their food to compete in seafood trade. FTAs, sustainability, and food safety, which transcend national boundaries, are factors that affect the success of Taiwanese seafood sector.

31

Table 1.3. Factors affecting sustainable aquaculture . Socioeconomic factors Ecological factors Biotechnical factors 1) Social acceptability 1) Impact of aquaculture on 1) Species • Stakeholders: fisherman/ environment • herbivore/ omnivore/ fishermen association/ • Micro (farm level): pH carnivore aquaculture specialist/ local value/ temperature/ government/ non- oxygen level/ salinity 2) Systems governmental organization/ level/ algae composition • extensive/ semi- seafood wholesaler/ retailer/ • Macro level: land and intensive/ intensive trade association/ consumer water use conflicts/ • monoculture/ • Coastal activities: effluent discharge/ polyculture ecotourism/ capture chemical residues/ * Note: Biotechnical fisheries/ industrial activities exotic species/ factors can affect biodiversity environmental carrying 2) Economic viability– capacity and socio- Individual / household net 2) Impact of environment economic viability income over time on aquaculture • stocking density/ stocking • adverse externalities ratio in case of polyculture/ from other economic stocking and harvest activities, such as schedule/ feed and feeding/ industrial production water flow and exchange rate/ chemical usage/ waste management/ market price/ domestic trade policy/ international trade agreement

3) Non-monetary exchange • gift • mutual help Source: Adapted from Shang and Tisdell 1997: 129–32. Additional points are borrowed from Wiber et al. 2012.

32

VII. Chapter Organization

I organize the chapters of this dissertation in a way that demonstrates how Taiwanese fish farmers developed their strategies for production, distribution, processing, and marketing to sustain their livelihoods and the environment before and during ECFA implementation. In chapter one, I provide my literature review and outline the theoretical frameworks for the later chapters. Chapters two through four describe continuity and changes in Taiwanese aquaculture beginning in 1968. Readers are provided with a broad picture of how Taiwanese fish farmers and business people experience globalization, participate in supply chains, and practise various pond management methods. Chapters five through seven focus on the impacts of ECFA on Taiwanese aquaculture and the responses of fish farmers and business people. I explore how cross-strait relations affect their practices and daily lives. Chapter two discusses changes in fish farmers’ practices in Taiwanese aquaculture between 1968 and 2014. The artificial propagation of shrimp and marine fish facilitated intensive monoculture of high-value varieties. The profit-oriented practice of “jumping the bandwagon” ( 一窩蜂; literally, a swarm of bees)71 resulted in animal disease, food safety episodes, overproduction, declining producers’ rural livelihoods, and land subsidence. Starting in 1992, the Taiwanese government initiated restructuring programs that included fish farmers and other actors, such as veterinarians, in the sustainability governance of aquaculture to facilitate seafood trade, environmental responsibility, food safety, and traceability. By 2014, the official traceability systems and bottom-up fish farmers’ strategies resulted in three categories of aquaculture―conventional, non-toxic, and ecological aquaculture. Chapter three uses milkfish–shrimp polyculture as an example to discuss changing practices and human–environment relationships in Taiwanese aquaculture. By interacting with fish pond systems, fish farmers integrate local and scientific knowledge to achieve environmental sustainability and food safety. The intensive polyculture contributes to the livelihoods and rural lifestyles of fish farmers. Chapter four examines producers’ relationships with business people, including distributors, exporters, and primary processing and freezing plant

71 Chi.: yiwofeng. 33

owners. The Taiwanese milkfish supply chain is affected by economic organizations, policies, and regional variations in milkfish production. Governments at various levels organize programs and events to increase fish farmers’ incomes. I further explain why fish farmers started to market their own seafood products. Chapter five uses a trade contract and a fish ball company as examples to discuss political, cultural, economic, and ecological factors that affect milkfish trade governance under the ECFA between 2011 and 2015. Government officials and fish farmers expected they would educate Chinese consumers to accept a milkfish culture. However, before that could happen, collaboration between local politicians and the Chinese government in the form of trade contracts had begun and then failed. Other milkfish business people, including Simu villagers, used the normal trade route and/or the Petty Trade to explore the Chinese markets. I recorded a failure of one newly-established fish ball company to discuss various factors that affect the popularity of milkfish in China. Chapter six sheds light on the ECFA’s impacts on milkfish farmers in southwest Taiwan, who had diversified their sources of income by farming multiple fish species. The contracted fish farmers who participated in the trade contract supplying milkfish to China were more affected by the ECFA than the Simu fish farmers. In fact, the Simu fish farmers did not benefit from the cross-strait milkfish trade. Their attempts of grouper farming were not successful due to the lack of environmental conditions and techniques. The price of groupers also dropped in 2013. Simu fish farmers showed their resiliency by farming other high-value species. Specifically, they generated more income by farming shrimp, mullet roe, and hard clam. They and their families were also involved in various businesses and jobs to sustain their livelihoods In chapter seven, I further illustrate how the formalized cross-strait farmed grouper trade has affected the interpretations of and practices in sustainable aquaculture. Unlike milkfish, Taiwanese live grouper had become a popular delicacy in China before the ECFA took effect. However, despite the Taiwanese government’s stimulation of growth in the grouper sector, China’s own anti-corruption policy reduced the transaction prices for Taiwanese grouper and harmed the sustainability of the sector. To further discuss the relationship between high-value farmed seafood and sustainability, I provide multiple perspectives on market diversification, marine resource management, and grouper farming.

34

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This chapter provides a literature review of Taiwanese experiences with globalization, cross-strait relations, and sustainability. I discuss how various scholars study global food supply chains and economic development. Studies on Taiwan show the country’s distinctive economic and social systems. I explain why my research uses the theoretical frameworks of trade governance and political ecology to analyze the interrelationships between aquaculture, seafood trade, and sustainability. My approach aims to contribute to the scholarship of aquaculture, cross- strait relations, and social change of Taiwan.

I. The Globalization of Food

Globalization of food has a long history. Trans-border commodity movements occurred before the spread of capitalism across the world in the 16 th century (Cao 2006[1979]; Mintz 1982; Wolf 1982). Cao (2006[1979]) found that the seafood trade across the Taiwan Strait was active as early as the (AD 960–1279). Historical evidence shows that the controlled the trade route between Taiwan and other countries during the mid-17 th century (Cao 2006[1979]: 54–55). Friedman and McMichael (1989) argue that state policies affect global food supply chains. For example, American aid to less developed countries (including Taiwan; see the example of Liu 2011 in section III) in the 20th century accelerated the globalization of food, with national governments redistributing the imported American food to their citizens. In fact, food production in many countries has been integrated into “nationally- organized economies” (Friedman and McMichael 1989: 112). Important to note here is another stakeholder in the food sector—the transnational agro-food corporations, which set up their production lines and explore markets in different countries (ibid.). Social scientists have diverse views on the linkage between globalization and capitalism. For example, Harvey (1989: 104–106) argues that capitalists “redouble their efforts to create new needs in others” and facilitate the global division of labour to accumulate capital. They extract profits through economic activities across locales and countries. The improvement of communication, transport, and information technologies results in “time-space compression”

35

(ibid.: 147). This enhances capitalists’ abilities to “spread [their] decisions immediately over an ever wider and variegated space” to maximize their profits. In response to this, Gudeman (2005) contends that there is no universal model of the economy and globalization. His ethnographic research on sugar cane farming in Panama shows that farmers interact with the global trade systems when they select which crops to grow, to export, or to sell to the domestic markets (1978). Thus, anthropologists studying food producers consider the influence of global trade systems; they also acknowledge that how local communities respond to the global systems is not a uniform process (ibid.). Globalization occurs “from below” (Appadurai 2000: 19), as when grassroots organizations create transnational networks to resist the power of transnational corporations and trade systems. Through such actions they can cause different outcomes of globalization (ibid.). Rees and Smart (2001: 2) suggest that globalization “is the result of integration and disintegration as … transnational processes coalesce with local structures, and the economy, politics, culture and ideology of one country penetrate and are transformed by others.” They argue that globalization causes both homogeneity and heterogeneity in local lives: Both heterogeneity and homogeneity seem to be outcomes of what we label globalization, but we can’t say that heterogeneity is the product of resistance to homogeneity. Homogeneity may be the outcome of inexorable market forces, but it may also be the result of individual and local decisions, of political movements like those for human rights. Heterogeneity may be the result of local resistance and appropriation, but it may also be a logical outcome of market force. It is not chaos, but ordered struggle: not one globality, but multiple globalities. (ibid.: 14)

Inda and Rosaldo (2008: 6) add that globalization involves “complex mobilities and uneven interconnectedness.” In other , people have differentiated experiences with globalization (Heyman 2013). Ethnographic examples have shed light on these outcomes. For example, Lien (2015) explained that technology, business management, animal behaviours, and farming practices in Norwegian aquaculture have standardized the taste of salmon for the global market. Local farming practices are diverse, based on environmental conditions and fish farmers’ interactions with salmon. Tsing (2005: 1) further suggests that some factors may become “frictions,” which slow or even prevent globalization projects from creating a universal world. She studied the co-existence of forest conservation and illegal plantations in Indonesia. She

36

found that universal standards of conversation do not stop profit-seeking practices through which business people accumulate capital. Tsing termed this situation the “contradiction between capital and governance”: Governance requires rationalization, clarity, and order. Capital, in contrast, thrives where opportunities are just emerging. The exceptional profits that allow a firm or corporate sector to get ahead are made where bureaucratic visibility is not yet firmly in place. In the deregulation zones where government is at the end of its tether, capital can operate with the hyperefficiency of theft. (ibid.: 44-45)

Ethnographic studies shed light on the complexities of global food supply chains. Mintz (1982) uses the political economy approach to explore the interactions between producers, consumers, and the state in global food trade. Between the 17 th and 20 th centuries, the British Empire operated Caribbean sugar cane plantations for their domestic market, first for the upper class and later by popularizing sugar consumption among the working class. The expansion of sugar cane plantations in the Caribbean made sugar a cheap commodity, so that it became an affordable food for workers. Mintz’s study characterizes the global food trade as a process through which local daily lives, national policies, and international relations interact. Appadurai (1986) and Kopytoff (1986) theorize that objects have social lives, including the phase where they become commodities with exchange value. Appadurai defines demand as “a function of a variety of social practices and classifications, rather than a mysterious emanation of human needs” (1986: 29). Thus, the values of commodities can be different in various societies and at various times. Carrier (1995) further elaborates that a commodity contains a public meaning but also satisfies private desires. Studying the flow of commodities illuminates how various societies and individuals manage their social relations and how they classify products. Bestor (2001; 2004) exemplifies this process with his study of the global seafood trade. He argues that Japanese seafood cultures have re-directed the global flow of the food trade. His ethnography suggests that the Japanese Tsukiji market and other marketplaces can “reflect and generate cultural and social life in wider structures of social life” (2004: 14). The Japanese demand for seafood varieties, quality, and transaction methods affect fishermen’s practices across the world (Bestor 2000). A fish caught in the United States is categorized as an export item—destined for the Japanese market, if it exhibits the texture, colour, and fat content that reflects Japanese standards.

37

Scholarly work reveals political, historical, and social factors that shape how commodities are traded. Freidberg (2004) explains that former colonial linkages affect current transnational sourcing by grocery businesses in Britain and France. Their linkages to former colonies in Africa result in particular trade routes for . These particular networks affect food production in Burkina Faso and Zambia, because they need to follow the food safety standards of these European markets. Tsing (2015) exemplifies how the social aspect of food globalization affects the flow of a commodity. For instance, Japanese traders choose to buy particular sizes of matsutake, a high-value mushroom collected all over the world, as gifts to maintain their friendships with long-term customers (ibid.). Such examples demonstrate that people generate profits and maintain useful social networks in food trade. They trade commodities by taking both “noncapitalist and capitalist value systems” into account (ibid.: 63). The global food trade is therefore more complex than a simple commodity exchange in a free market. Interactions between producers, distributors, and consumers affect and are affected by globalization processes. Their practices in the market are embedded in social systems and cultures. Ethnographic studies have documented how the Taiwanese have adapted to the world economy by changing their family and economic organizations. Hu (1983) links the adaptation of the Taiwanese families to industrialization and the associated rural–urban migration in the 1960s and 1970s. In another case study, Hsieh (2003) finds that Taiwanese tea farmers incorporated their cosmology, skills, knowledge, and labour into their tea farming practices. They did not simplify labour processes by merely equating working with money. The local term zuo (做), which translates as “do” or “work,” calls on broader skills and knowledge, such as the farmers’ observation on climatic conditions (ibid.: 76–77); they also develop techniques to harvest and ferment tea leaves to produce tea products that have the smell and taste accepted by the market. Their cultural practices in production are interlocked with the market values of their tea products and also their cosmology about work. The Taiwanese do not have the identical experience of capitalism. Their interpretations of capital and labour are embedded in social relations and cultural perceptions.

38

II. Questioning Neoliberalism: Cross-strait Relationships and the ECFA as an Example

Harvey (2005) defines that neoliberalism encourages market liberalization through free trade and market mechanisms. Ideally, neoliberalism elevates “the primacy of the private sector” (Greenhouse 2010:1) by deregulating the public sector and eliminating market distortions, such as tariffs. Since 1980, policy-makers in the less developed countries, have changed their preferences to economic liberalization in a “rush” to advocate “freer” trade (Milner 1999: 92). Simultaneously, structural adjustment programs and free trade agreements (FTAs) opened markets in countries such as Bolivia and Mexico (Connell 2010; Draper and Schultz 20008). Other scholars, who question the real effects of neoliberalism on countries, suggest that trade liberalization as a force undermines state power, but that market forces do not dominate trade processes. The scholarly critiques follow prior arguments against the ideal of the “invisible hand of free market” in capitalism. Polanyi (1977: ii) describes the free market as a social construction within the context of particular historical developments. Phillips (2006: 39) points out that scholarly debates on commodity trading and globalization rest on how structural forces transform local sectors, especially after the emergence of the “freer flow of goods across national borders.” Nevertheless, state intervention still exists in trade. Duval-Diop and Grimes (2005) provided an example of competition between Vietnamese and American basa ( 鯰魚)72 farmers and traders for the American market through the American government’s intervention. Duval- Diop and Grimes find that protectionism co-exists with free trade. In practice, countries modify the neoliberal model to maintain their ruling power and thus create uneven outcomes that affect people’s daily lives to varying degrees (Phillips 1998). In effect, neoliberalism is thus “neither a theory nor a neutral policy” (ibid.: xvi). Ong (2006: 3) argues that neoliberalism reshapes relationships between the governing and the governed by simultaneously “optimizing” the governing technology and creating exceptions. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001: 8) note that neoliberalism produces people’s “experiential contradictions.” Nonini (2008: 152), for example, suggests that the so-called “neoliberal” restructuring of the Chinese economy since the 1990s (or even earlier) has actually involved a hybrid form of

72 Chi.: nianyu ; sci.: Pangasius boccourti. 39

governance. In China, global neoliberal discourses (which China has encountered since joining the WTO) and China’s market socialism are integrated into governance processes at the local, regional, and national levels. The majority of Chinese “manage to get through daily life” by using their guanxi networks that include local cadres or managers of state-owned enterprises and private firms; 73 in turn, the state redirects resources via these networks (ibid.: 165). Taiwanese have similar experiences, in that economic liberalization and state intervention coexist there. Clark and Clark (2016) observe that Taiwan began liberalizing its protectionist trade system in the 1960s. After the land reform of the 1950s and the subsequent American aid, the Taiwanese agricultural sector grew and diversified its products from rice and sugar to a variety of cash crops (including fish and livestock). Facing saturation of the domestic market in the early 1960s, the government took steps to shift to an export-oriented economy. Tariffs on the import of components and raw materials were reduced. Light industries in both urban and rural areas used these materials to make products for export. The Taiwanese government also encouraged foreign investment and domestic private enterprise. By the 1980s, small and medium-sized enterprises had become important contributors to Taiwan’s economic growth. In the 1980s, industrial upgrading to heavy and high-tech industries further facilitated the growth of the economy. Clark and Clark argue that the long period of economic success was due to the flexibility that government officials adopted in their policy-making (ibid.: 132–133). Since opening its market in the 1960s, the Taiwanese government has used the country’s comparative advantages at various point in time to sustain its economic development (ibid.: 138). Tsai (2001) has a different view of when and how economic liberalization began affecting Taiwan’s economy under the government’s policy reorientation. He suggests that the Taiwanese government reoriented its policy and strategy to market liberalization only after economic growth slowed in the late 1980s. The United States, its major trading partner then, forced Taiwan to appreciate its currency and open its market to American imports (ibid.). In the 1990s, the Taiwanese government embraced regional and global economic integration to boost

73 According to Smart (1993), guanxi can be seen as skillful mobilization of social relationship. For example, people exchange gifts and favours “in pursuit of both diffuse social ends and calculated instrumental ends” (Yang 1989: 35). 40

economic growth (Tsai 2012). It participated in institutions promoting free trade, such as the WTO, and began signing bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs). The policy orientation in Taiwan towards trade liberalization has encountered both supportive and discouraging forces. A key example is the closer economic relationship between Taiwan and China since the 1980s, which developed despite ongoing political tensions and conflicts. The Taiwanese government relaxed its travel regulations in 1987 to allow its citizens to visit their Chinese relatives. Taiwan’s relatively higher labour costs and tighter environmental regulations resulted in growing Taiwanese investment in China. Further, the growing Chinese market has become a new destination for Taiwan’s commodities (Liou 2011). In terms of trade, Taiwan’s export to China (including Hong Kong) rose from 8% (1980) to 39.4% (2012), reaching USD118.7 billion. Taiwan’s trade surplus was USD75 billion. Chen (2014) pointed out that the “ Taishang ” ( 台商)—Taiwanese business people who invest and spend most of their time in China―have developed a production chain between Taiwan and China. Materials and semi- finished goods used for assembling and processing products accounts for 70% of Taiwanese exports to China. The Taisheng then sold the end products on the global market. The continuous growth of cross-strait trade and the Taiwanese government’s pursuit of trade liberalization facilitated the cross-strait FTA. The ECFA is categorized as a BFTA by the WTO. China’s rising economic impact on Taiwan and the Taiwanese government’s preference for trade liberalization facilitated ECFA negotiations in 2010. Economically, the two countries signed the ECFA to “gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment” (WTO n.d.). 74 With the Early Harvest Program, there would be negotiations on trade in services, trade in goods, and the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism. In 2014, immediately after the Legislative Yuan ( 立法院; the legislative council of Taiwan) 75 passed the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement without an item-by-item review, opponents organized an occupation of the legislative building. The subsequent 24-day-long Sunflower Movement caused Taiwan and China to pause their ECFA negotiations. Therefore, until mid-2016, only the Early Harvest Program was implemented.

74 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA%20Text.pdf . 75 Chi.: lifayuan . 41

In practice, the ECFA is embedded in cross-strait relationships rather than simply matching the ideals of free trade. Taiwan used both trade liberalization and protectionism to take advantage of closer cross-strait relationships (Liou 2011). Some scholars have provided insights on the potential impacts of the ECFA on food producers. For instance, Hsieh (2011) argues that once Taiwan normalized its economic ties with China, it could promote FTAs with other countries without Chinese opposition. Taiwan’s trade liberalization satisfied pro-trade business people and exporters, but the government also adopted measures to protect local farmers. Chen (2012: 109) stresses that the growing economic ties between China and Taiwan represent a “balance-of-power” dynamic. The ties are unequal and fragmented; China is currently a world power and it diplomatically marginalizes Taiwan. However, ironically the ties are balanced, as shown by Taiwan’s current independence from Chinese rule (ibid.). Taiwan uses its particular status to take advantage of economic growth in China, as is evident in the ECFA’s measures pertaining to local farmers. Some scholars counter-argue that the cross-strait ties and tensions could undermine Taiwan’s economy. Among them is Hsu (2011), who argues for market diversification rather than relying on the ECFA. His position is that if China gave up its concession regarding the tariff elimination for agricultural products in the near future, it could require Taiwan to open its market to Chinese agro-food products. Cheaper Chinese imports would undermine Taiwanese food producers’ livelihoods. Lin’s (2013; 2016) quantitative research has identified some of the impacts of these closer economic ties on Taiwan’s agricultural and fisheries sectors. Specifically, he used national election survey data from 2010 through 2013 to show that farmers became less supportive of cross-strait economic integration (2016). Lin argues that farmers were relatively geographically immobile, and hence received fewer benefits from transnational capital generated by the ECFA (ibid.). He highlights class as a key factor, together with national identity, as affecting Taiwanese support of the ECFA. Weller (2001) studied the impacts of globalization and closer economic cross-strait relationships on local Taiwanese communities, focusing on the sudden popularity of ghost

42

temples (in contrast to god temples) among the Taiwanese in the late 1980s. 76 Traditionally, religious temples in Taiwan are centred on gods, whose upright acts make them popular. Weller argues that the ghost temples, which “emphasized the departure from community and conventional morality” (ibid.: 221), became popular because worshippers enjoy good fortune in gambling and cross-strait investments. Their worship represented a Taiwanese “celebration of capitalist greed” (ibid.: 236). God temples, in contrast, became places where local politicians show the community “the seriousness of their promises” (ibid.). This ethnographic example delineates the diverse strategies rural Taiwanese have devised to adapt to the changing economic structure in their country, due to the influences of globalization and cross-strait relationships. Following this approach to understand the practices of Taiwanese fish farmers in these influences, I focus on the policy implementation of ECFA and its impacts on the daily practices of fish farmers. I examine how they interact with other stakeholders, such as business people and aquaculture specialists to explore global and domestic markets.

III. Critiques of Sustainability and Food Safety

Sustainable development has become a popular concept since the 1960s. Rachel Carson’s (1962) influential work Silent Spring first critiqued the widespread use of pesticides, inspiring environmental movements in the West and later at the global level. Responding to the global awareness of environmental issues, the United Nations adopted the notion of sustainable development in 1987, defined in the following terms: Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits―not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization. . . but technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth. (The World Commission on Environment and Development, United Nations 1987: 16)

76 Weller (2001: 223) explains that “[m]ost gods, like ghosts, are the spirits of dead people. But unlike ghosts, gods are known for their upright acts before or after death, or both.” The positive images of gods and their temples made them more popular than ghosts in the past. 43

Three decades later, the United Nations (2010) admitted that this definition of sustainable development was too narrow, pointing out that the separation of the economy from the environment is the major shortcoming in this definition. 77 Moreover, it premised growth in a way that not only makes sustainable development projects unable to challenge capitalism, but also reduces complex societies to mere economies (Johnston 2006). Furthermore, the 1987 definition overstresses inter-generational equality since the need for intra-generational efforts increasingly draws attention to scholars and policy-makers (Zuindeau 2007). To broaden the scope of sustainable development, the United Nations has helped countries strengthen other attributes of sustainability (e.g., justice, gender equality, knowledge sharing, health, etc.; United Nations Development Group 2006). 78 Further critiques of sustainable development shed light on power dynamics. Kearney (1996: 105) contends that although “appropriate” technology may mix modern and traditional methods to enhance environmental sustainability and local livelihoods, such technology is linked to the political economy and power relationships between social institutions. In Taiwan, in terms of groundwater usage, selecting fish species that require less frequent refreshing of pond water can be an appropriate technology (Ding 2013). However, Chang (2014) notes that the unchecked industrial activities that over-extract groundwater may be a key factor in undermining rural livelihoods. Therefore, one appropriate technology may not solve all social and environmental problems. In other countries such as Colombia (Escobar 2008), government-sponsored sustainable development projects have even reinforced existing power imbalances because of their top-down characteristics. Escobar argues that the state’s introduction of shrimp farming projects to mangrove regions was “a poor alternative” (ibid.: 85) because it reduced the total productivity of the ecosystem in terms of energy. The indigenous people there were dissatisfied with the commodification of mangrove swamps to supply farmed shrimp to the global market. They resisted the projects and emphasized their version of sustainability as protecting their territorial rights and livelihoods (ibid.: 146–147). Tam (2015) suggests that local participation in sustainable development programs can fail for various reasons, such as different perceptions and

77 Source: http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/gsp/docs/GSP1- 6_Background%20on%20Sustainable%20Devt.pdf. 78 Source: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/. 44

time management strategies among the local people and policy implementers. In addition, physical and sociocultural challenges, such as poor road conditions and government-community relations, undermine local people’s participation (ibid.). By adopting the concept of “sustainability” to examine the intertwined relationships between local culture, livelihoods, and ecosystems, scholars have broadened the scope of sustainable development research (Cavagnaro and Curiel 2012; Lélé 1991). In practice, sustainability is an outcome of “multiple socioeconomic, institutional, and ecological drivers interacting at local to global scales” (Armitage and Tam 2007: 40). Examining the global–local dynamics involved in pursuing sustainability, Gezon (2006) notes that the material needs and perspectives of local people should be considered in any sustainable development project. Other ethnographies have also demonstrated what sustainability means to local people, and what their strategies are (Crate 2006; Loring et al. 2015; Netting 1993). Liu (2011) adds that food security and food culture are shaped by multiple factors, including the political economy of the food trade. He studies American aid in the 1960s, which increased Taiwan’s import of wheat from America. Because of the need to export the surplus American wheat to less developed countries, the U.S. government used its aid institution in Taiwan, the Joint Commission on Rural Construction (JCRC), to promote wheat consumption in Taiwan. Activities and educational programs designed to promote the nutritional values of wheat affected Taiwanese food choices. Taiwanese adapted by shifting to the consumption of noodles made from wheat. Food security, thus, is related to politico-economy, society, and culture in this case study. Social scientists have paid attention to rising public concerns for food safety, an increasingly pressing issue affecting food sustainability and trade. Chou and Hsu (2015) study Taiwanese food safety scares. They find that the Taiwanese government prioritizes economic growth over food safety transparency. As of the mid-2000s, the Taiwanese public faced a controversy over the import of American and Canadian beef products. Chou and Hsu argue that the Taiwanese government used scientific evidence selectively to support the imports (ibid.). If the government were to allow the imports, free trade negotiations with these countries would be easier to initiate. Members of the public who were uncertain of the safety of these products, which could have contained ractopamine, opposed the imports and protested against the government’s trade policies. Chou and Hsu support more transparent governance processes to

45

enable the Taiwanese to discuss the potential impacts of food trade and food safety (ibid.). In other research, Smart and Smart (2011) discuss “slow science,” such as the science of animal disease, used as non-tariff measures in international trade. They suggest that such “slow science” does not necessarily reduce the mobility of food in global trade, but on some occasions “preserves” that mobility: When acceleration is considered to be a boon to humanity, such as during the prime of modernization projects, constraints on mobility are considered to be irrational or the efforts of local elites to maintain their illegitimate power over their populations. When acceleration comes to be seen as a threat to cultural survival, environmental integrity, or the quality of everyday life, politics based on locality and new social movements are perceived as saviours attempting to put the genie of science back in the bottle. . . . Although slow science may begin by warning against mobilities, it does not always end by reducing mobility. Instead, it is likely to result in technologies that attempt to preserve mobility through the detection, eradication, or effective response to the accompanying threats. (ibid.: 546–547)

Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 30) argue that the cultural understanding of danger is not modern. Instead, cultures have diverse definitions of danger (ibid.). Food taboos and pollution are socially constructed and “morally loaded” (ibid.: 36). They are embedded in the cultural system of “mutual accountability” (ibid.: 40). Ethnographic studies show that food safety issues, understood as a public risk, can be a cultural outcome of mutual distrust, due to the physical distance between producers and consumers (Klein 2015). At the state level, such mutual distrust has placed a “regulatory burden” on the Chinese government, because it needed to allocate resources to policy measures that rebuilt the trust (Chen 2014). The trust issue is linked to trans- border trade and its governance. Chan (2016) uses her study of organic farming in Hong Kong to reveal the distrust of Hong Kong farmers and consumers regarding Chinese food imports. This distrust reflects political tensions between the Hong Kong population and the Chinese in recent decades because of the increase in cross-border interactions and the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Food safety involves governance, human–environmental interactions, and also ethical practices of multiple stakeholders. In addition to possible man-made food safety episodes, the food trade itself can spread infectious diseases (Smart and Smart 2016). To avert this, countries have established mechanisms to prevent the spread of foodborne diseases across national borders

46

via trade. One type of non-tariff trade restriction concerns food safety and sanitary measures, which may foster or tighten global food flows (Kjærnes et al. 2007). For instance, in the 2000s, Canada and Australia came into conflict over the potential spread of animal disease carried by Canadian salmon to the local Australian fish farming industry (Lien 2009). Such demand for food safety has resulted in new local practices of veterinary drug dosages in aquaculture. In response, fish farmers decreased the amounts of drugs applied to fish to fulfill the food safety expectations of consumers (Mansfield 2011). Fish farmers have less power to control other factors, however, such as industrial pollution or agricultural sewage (ibid.; Huang 2010). Global aquaculture governance has incorporated food safety standards and certification to promote environmentally sustainable practices (Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2013). Such regulation exists in the form of sustainability governance, which includes eco-certification, traceability, and other certification systems that aim to modify food producers’ practices. Social scientists have identified two approaches to the study of sustainability governance (Béné 2005; Islam 2014). The first is the “better management practice” approach, which highlights the technical aspect of systems that change food producers’ practices. This approach emphasizes problems that can be solved in pond management. Another is the “political ecology” approach, which highlights power relationships between governance institutions (e.g., the state, and private and non- governmental agencies) and food producers in production, certification, and marketing processes (e.g., Ponte 2007). This approach stresses the social and political factors that affect pond management decisions. At the global level, unequal relationships between countries may lead the less developed countries to adopt pond management practices that meet the standards of “better management practice” imposed by the more developed countries which are the markets (Bagumir et al. 2009). The question is how the less developed countries can meet the standards, and the consequences this may have on the local food producers. The previously discussed research and approaches imply that food sustainability is complex. To study Taiwanese aquaculture, the seafood trade, and sustainability, my research adopts a holistic approach to consider factors that may affect the aquaculture sector. Both the “better management practice” approach and the “political ecology” approach offer insights into the practices of fish farmers, who have responded to the changing global food supply chains and government policies. The effect of neoliberalism on Taiwan is questioned rather than assumed. I

47

investigate fish farmers’ interactions with the Taiwanese government to study the actual impacts of the ECFA.

IV. Historical and Ethnographic Studies on Taiwan’s Economy and Environment

Taiwan has engaged in the globalization of food for at least four centuries. For example, the Dutch East India Company controlled trade routes in the Asia-Pacific region, including those stopping at Taiwan, during the mid-17 th century (Cao 2006[1979]). In the 19 th century, tea became Taiwan’s most globalized product (Lin 1994). As a Japanese colony (1895–1945), Taiwan was introduced to new technology, infrastructure, and systems that improved the productivity of its agriculture and fisheries. Ka (1998) finds that Japanese demand for sugar from Taiwan led to the replacement of the subsistence rice sector by export-oriented sugar plantations in many part of Taiwan. This political economy affected social and economic organizations. Taiwan’s Real Gross Domestic Product (real GDP) grew five-fold between 1952 and 1972, while the economic structure also changed (Ho 1978). On the one hand, manufacturing enjoyed faster annual growth in real GDP of 19.8% between 1967 and 1973, compared with 11.2% between 1958 and 1967. On the other hand, the annual growth of real GDP in agriculture slowed from 4.9% to 1% over the same period. Gold (1986: 3) notes that Taiwanese development created an economic “miracle” in the 1970s in that Taiwanese exports and imports maintained double-digit growth between 1966 and 1981 (except for 1975). Despite the declining influence of the agricultural sector, the aquaculture sector grew from 1970 onwards, thanks to the export of Japanese eels and tiger prawns to Japan (Lee et al. 2003). Political scientist Rigger (2011: 41) comments that “Taiwan is a small country, but it plays an outsized role [as one of the top 15 trading nations] in the global economy.” Social scientists have offered two explanations of Taiwan’s economic miracle. Gold (1986) argues that Taiwan’s economic development benefited from the dominant ideology of capitalism, which was embraced by the ruling KMT party members. They maintained a relatively stable political system favourable to the accumulation of wealth. In contrast to Gold’s structural approach, Gates (1996: 221) argues that petty capitalists also contributed to the economic development of Taiwan. Petty capitalists are individuals or households who “regularly operate in the ambiguous boundaries between capital and labour, cooperation and exploitation,

48

family and economy, tradition and modernity, friend and competitors” (Smart and Smart 2005: 1). According to Gates (1996: 221), Taiwan’s land reform in the 1950s resulted in “the owner- operator segment of the petty-capitalist class.” During the land reform, the Taiwanese government compensated land owners by giving them shares of state-owned enterprises. They therefore had the capital to invest in their new businesses. The Taiwanese sustain their business with multiple goals rather than only through capital accumulation. Harrell (1985: 224) argues that the Taiwanese work ethic includes a “family- centered economic goal.” Seeking long-term family prosperity affects their economic decisions in work and businesses. Thus, the Taiwanese develop social networks at local and global scales to sustain their businesses. For example, Taiwanese traders develop their business networks through “credit” ( 信用), 79 which shows a business person’s “trustworthiness, his willingness and ability to meet his business and financial obligations” (De Glopper 1972: 304). In the eel- exporting sector, exporters and suppliers have developed mutual trust by paying in a timely manner and maintaining a high-quality eel supply for Japan (Simon 2003). Another example is found in Li’s (2016) study of the sock-making economy in rural Taiwan. The factories there are subcontracted by transnational corporations (e.g., Nike) to make socks for the global market. The global competition in sock production has resulted in an unequal relationship between transnational corporations and Taiwanese sock factories. The latter are being exploited in terms of the lower profits they received from contracts (ibid.: 258). Li finds that the entrepreneurs’ strategies to sustain their businesses in the face of these low profits were diverse. One strategy involved establishing and maintaining respectful relationships with labourers so that the labourers were willing to work overtime. The entrepreneurs did not maximize their profits, paying reasonable salaries to these labourers. The next generation of labourers chose to join this workforce. The labour relationships were therefore reproduced in a particular way to overcome the problems brought by exploitation on the part of the transnational corporations that subcontracted orders to the Taiwanese sock factories. Taiwanese environmental movements began in the 1970s with the establishment of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs; Weller 2006: 107). A corresponding

79 Chi.: hsinyung. 49

factor was that Taiwan’s economic development had led to nationwide environmental degradation, including land subsidence, pollution, and loss of biodiversity (Williams and Chang 2008). The democratization of Taiwan’s political and social systems in the 1980s also facilitated the growth of environmental protests against pollution (Tang and Tang 1997). These grassroots movements emerged with the introduction of Western environmental values among the rising middle and educated classes in Taiwan (Hsiao 2005). Weller (2006) argues that Japan also became Taiwan’s policy model for environmental management. The globalization of environmental consciousness, therefore, consists of multiple processes, beyond just the domination of Western influences. In the Taiwan context, by joining environmental movements, rural Taiwanese have reconstructed “nature” by seeing the local environment as both a site for commodity production and as their national roots (Huang 2013). Despite their participation in bottom-up environmental movements, the Taiwanese people are often marginalized in the top-down governance process. Hsiao (2005: 52) points out that environmental groups have found themselves “at odds with” the government. Environmental governance under either the KMT or the Democratic Progressive Party ( 民進黨; hereafter DPP) 80 was influenced by “the growth machine and hegemony of politico-economic coalitions” (Tang and Tang 2004: 175). Developers and governments often pay lip service to environmental protection and to the improvement of rural livelihoods (Grano 2015). For instance, by officially adopting Agenda 21 (hereafter: Agenda 21), the Taiwanese government emphasized the sustainable future of Taiwan at economic, environmental, and social levels. 81 In terms of coastal resource management, Agenda 21 promotes the revision of laws and regulations to enhance environmental protection, and establishes aquaculture production areas that reduce water and soil pollution. However, Ming-sho Ho (2014) notes that both the KMT and the DPP supported the expansion of the petrochemical industry. It directly degraded the coastal environment and undermined fish farmers’ livelihoods (Grano 2015). To broaden their claims from monetary compensation to other concerns (e.g., health), fish farmers collaborated with environmental activists to protest petrochemical development in Taiwan (ibid.).

80 Chi.: minjindang . 81 Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2004. 50

Top-down and bottom-up forces involved in environmental governance coexist in Taiwanese aquaculture. In their review of Taiwanese aquaculture, Chen and Qiu (2014: 160) argue that the governance of Taiwanese aquaculture was first unregulated and then hierarchical: Taiwan’s aquaculture experienced an unbridled expansion in the 1970s–1980s, then a declining phase in the 1990s, followed by steady growth from the 2000s until now. This long and bumpy journey was deeply influenced by the shift of management mode from laissez-faire in the early 1960s–1980s, to increasingly enhanced management in the 1990s until now. This enhanced management is characterized by a mixture of hierarchical and market governance. The shift in management mode also made Taiwan’s aquaculture undergo structural and technical changes; consequently, it has expanded, intensified and diversified. In fact, for aquaculture to fulfill the promises of ecological, social and economic sustainability, this shift of management mode is necessary.

This summary of Taiwanese aquaculture shows that environmental and trade governance are interlinked with each other. It also pinpoints that the development of Taiwanese aquaculture once sacrificed the environment, and hence negatively affected the local economy. The most important point that informs my research is the point about the shift away from an economic model that overstressed economic growth to the one that emphasizes sustainability. In this dissertation, I will further discuss the extent to which pond management is enhanced and how this process benefits fish farmers. Chiu and Qiu propose that the future of sustainable aquaculture requires the participation of local people and their collaboration with policy-makers and recipients in governance processes (ibid.). Based on the above-mentioned historical and ethnographic studies, I provide various stakeholders’ perspectives and experiences to reconstruct this “long and bumpy journey” of Taiwanese aquaculture. In addition, this dissertation analyzes how this journey is an outcome of global–local dynamics. My study contributes to the literature of aquaculture and global–local dynamics by examining the success of Taiwan in using aquaculture to improve rural livelihoods. At the same time, the stakeholders’ perspectives and practices of sustainability and food safety have to be investigated within the context of globalization and also cross-strait relationships. Through this investigation, I broaden the scope of this study on Taiwanese aquaculture to include Taiwan’s state policies and diplomacy between China and Taiwan. My study provides perspectives of multiple stakeholders, such as fish farmers, business people, and government officials, to evaluate the governance of the aquaculture sector. I add the government’s and peoples’ strategies

51

in the global seafood trade to examine how and why the modes of governance changed over the years.

V. Studying Taiwanese Aquaculture

My research investigates the historical development of Taiwanese aquaculture. Taiwanese coastal fishing is a profit-oriented activity organized among families and non-kin shareholders (Wang 1967), and anthropologists have examined changing Taiwanese fishing societies under the previously mentioned economic transformation. Diamond (1969) documented the daily lives of fishing communities in southwest Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s. She noticed that in coastal fishing villages “many households own fish ponds and derive a major or secondary portion of their income from them. . . . The industry was already well established when the Japanese arrived” (ibid.: 16). Most fish farmers managing inland fish ponds currently have no fishing vessels or experience working on the sea. In the 1970s, peasants with landed properties, including rice and sugar cane farmers, became fish farmers. Furthermore, people with non-agricultural job experience began participating in aquaculture as fish farmers and business people (Hsueh 2016; Simon 2003). On the one hand, Taiwanese fish farmers and business people interacted with the global market, particularly Japan, to export Taiwanese farmed seafood. On the other hand, they joined fishermen associations and other organizations to participate in local politics and respond to environmental incidents (Jacobs 2008; Grano 2015). The daily lives of fish farmers and seafood business people are inseparable from their communities. In addition to the government’s rules, local communities have developed their own social systems to manage natural resources. For example, local temples assigned fishermen’s rights to catch glass eels (Chuang 1970). Fishermen and fishing companies use their accumulated wealth from fishing and aquaculture to sponsor temples to organize communal activities (Hsieh 2009). They have maintained their local identity and social relationships by participating in local festivals and rituals (ibid). Various factors in aquaculture development affect human–environment interactions in other countries. Policy and governance influence the availability and forms of input, such as labour conditions (Islam 2014), vaccines (Lien 2015), and land (Stonich et al. 1997). The intensity of fish stock is another factor in sustainability. In their statistical research on the global

52

seafood trade and fish farming intensity, Longo et al. (2013) contend that the prospect of economic growth has stimulated the expansion of the intensive aquaculture of high-value seafood. However, the practice without proper management “will likely increase ecological degradation” (ibid.: 303). Environmental factors (e.g., pollution and typhoons) undermine the performance of fish farming and local livelihoods (Sheriff et al. 2008). Past studies have shown that aquaculture governance may fail to benefit local people. In less developed countries, the pro-development countries have included aquaculture in their poverty reduction policies (Geheb and Binns 1997; Hall 2003; Stonich 1995; Stonich et al. 1997). However, many people question who benefits and “what costs fall to whom” (Béné et al. 2016: 187). For instance, Pradhan and Flaherty (2007) showed that Indian aquaculture as a capital-intensive sector failed to create sufficient job opportunities for local communities, and it caused financial burdens to local pond investors. The issues are more complicated when non- state actors are involved. Corporations from outside needed to adjust to geographical variations and individual fish farmers’ strategies (Vandergeest et al. 1999). Local conflicts may lead NGOs to fail to incorporate aquaculture in their community projects that sustain livelihood security (Tam 2006). Informed by these examples, my research investigates Taiwanese fish farmers’ experiences with the global market and governance processes. I apply two theoretical frameworks, trade governance and political ecology, to investigate Taiwanese aquaculture and the Taiwanese seafood trade.

Theoretical Framework #1: Trade Governance

To explain my choice of governance as a theoretical framework, I first discuss the strengths and limitations of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. It is a popular analytical tool with which to study power and policy. Foucault (1991) adopts a method of “genealogy” to study how a particular kind of knowledge is formed. He denies truth as a fact, but uses discourse analysis of the formation and transformation of power and knowledge. His approach to governmentality, which he calls “the art of government” (1991: 89), presents the state’s power as everywhere in individuals’ daily lives. Government is understood to employ diverse forces, techniques, and devices to regulate social actions (Rose 1996). Coulter and Schumann (2012: 4) emphasize that government is “shaped by social relations, economic structures, and historical

53

processes.” The making and implementation of government policies reflect the cultural beliefs of bureaucrats in particular periods of time (ibid.: 7). Governance institutions are “numerous social structures and processes that influence how decisions are made, rules enforced, conflicts resolved and projects funded, monitored, and evaluated” (Islam 2014: 154). In the Taiwanese food sector, multiple governance institutions, such as the Taiwanese government and certification agencies, interact with fish farmers and seafood business people. Consistent with this framework, Ferguson and Gupta (2002) point out that global institutions disseminate their power to local societies. These complex governing processes thus “produce spatial and scalar hierarchies” (ibid.: 995) among international organizations, states, and the grassroots people. Governmentality is limited insofar as it assumes government’s power to successfully achieve the goals of the state. However, government projects may fail to meet such goals (Smart and Smart 2012). In his seminal work Seeing Like a State , Scott (1999: 12) attributes such failure to the state’s “construction and narrowing of vision,” which causes it to ignore the subjectivity of the governed. Other case studies have demonstrated the agency of the governed (Scott 2009; Wolford 2010). For example, lobstermen use both local and scientific knowledge to interact with other actors in the policy processes (Acheson 2003). Li (2007b) argues that governmentality concerns the form of power rather than an expression of absolute power, which is likely to exist with violence. The form of power affects relationships between the governing and the governed. Acknowledging the strengths and shortcomings of governmentality, I will adopt the framework of governance to broaden the scope for studying policy. Governance is both a practice and a theoretical framework. Theoretically, governance frames the relationships between the state and non-state actors by accepting the possibilities of harmony, disagreements, tension, and conflict (Grano 2015). Rather than assuming the government’s power to steer and self-steer (Dunsire 1993), ethnographers examine how both top-down and bottom-up approaches affect “what actually happens on the ground” (Smart and Smart 2012: 71). This research orientation sheds light on how private corporations, NGOs, and global institutions interact with the state, and occasionally act beyond it (Lemke 2011). By tracing how they facilitate or slow food production and trade, previous studies have shown that actors drive social change by using distinct, and sometimes contradictory, strategies (Islam 2014; Lien 2009).

54

I adopt governance as a framework within which to explore the ECFA as a free trade policy for Taiwan within the cross-strait context. “Studying through” the policy process requires researchers to examine how “a new governing discourse emerges and becomes institutionalized” (Wright and Renhold 2011: 87–88). Free trade is one example of such a discourse, which emphasizes the enhancement of fish farmers’ livelihoods through market competition where tariffs are reduced. Nevertheless, non-state actors may have alternative interpretations of and responses to free trade. In exploring how “the up and down are intertwined” (Yanow 2011: 307), scholars have adopted a multi-stakeholder approach to study the phases of governance: specifically, development, implementation, and enforcement (Schut et al. 2014). My research focuses on the ECFA implementation in Taiwan to explore its processes and outcomes.

Theoretical Framework #2: Political Ecology

Another framework I use in this research is political ecology, which serves as an analytical tool rather than as a single theory to explain human–nature relationships (Peet and Watts 1996). Biersack (2006) argues that political ecology currently covers both macro-level political–economic analysis and micro-level investigation of human–nature relationships. Ford (2013) suggests that political ecology can help us examine globalization, free trade, and sustainability. She reviewed the European Union’s trade governance and argues that it needs to add consideration of sustainability to form a holistic policy approach. In the current governance approach focusing on environmental economics, environmental problems are defined as externalities and market failures (ibid.: 586). Ford suggests taking another perspective, a political ecology approach, to understand the contradiction between the trade policy (based on neoliberal liberalization) and the people whose environment and livelihoods are being affected by the policy (ibid.: 589). This review informs my research by showing the possibility of examining local livelihood strategies, trade policies, and sustainability altogether. It explores how the government and other stakeholders tackle the social, economic, and ecological problems caused by the globalization of food and trade liberalization. Anthropologists have long attempted to theorize culture together with its relationships with the environment. For instance, White (1943) contended that the degree of cultural development can be measured by an equation: technology times energy use efficiency. Steward

55

(1955) suggested multilinear cultural evolution instead of one path of cultural development. Using cross-cultural comparison, Steward argued that various “culture cores” arrange their economic activities to adapt to their environments (ibid.: 37–38). The degree of technology affects the development of each cultural core towards higher levels of complexity, of which the highest level is the national level (ibid.). The ideas of energy flows and cultural adaptation to the environment are still relevant to analyses of how communities manage their natural resources in cultural development. Rappaport (1984 [1968]), a cultural ecologist, studied human adaptation to the environment, emphasizing both material and symbolic cultures. He demonstrated, in the case of Papua New Guinea, how people use ritual processes to regulate the production of food and to domesticate animals to maintain a balanced ecosystem. While Rappaport’s study focused on the local use of resources for subsistence, other cultural ecologists, such as Redfield (1960), documented how agrarian communities respond to market systems and the changing uses of natural resources. State-society interactions also affect how natural resources are managed. Acheson (2003) emphasizes that top-down management policies led to the failure of federal fisheries management system in the eastern seaboard state of Maine in the United States. In the 1970s, the federal system was centralized and neglected local social and ecological conditions. The Maine lobster sector was in conflict with the federal government, because its original state jurisdiction was abandoned. These fishermen argued that the original jurisdiction was more effective in marine resource conservation than the centralized federal system. While cultural ecologists study how balanced systems are maintained, political economists emphasize the politics in environmental management (Greenberg and Park 1994; Wolf 1972). Similarly, geographers and anthropologists conduct research on environmental degradation under changing political and economic systems (Befu 1980; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Greenberg 2006; Watts 1983). In Nigeria, Watts (1983) documented that the rapid oil- funded industrialization took over their land for food production in the 1970s. This caused peasants’ deteriorating food security and the subsequent riots. Peet and Watts (1996: 6–9) suggested adding the perspectives and practices of civil society in explorations of the dynamics of environmental politics (ibid.: 10–11).

56

Political ecologists analyze how the state and market power interact with local people in natural resource management. For example, Peluso (1992) contends that international trade in natural resources in Indonesia led to the deterioration of the livelihoods of local groups using the same resources. The state not only strengthened its ruling power through forestry management, it also created tension and conflict at the local level (ibid.: 11). Monoculture and the outlawing of unauthorized users’ subsistence practices created a local peasant resistance movement, resulting in conflicts and physical violence (ibid.: 12–15). Peluso argues that “peasant resistance to state control of the forests derives from the progressive criminalization of customary rights of forest access and use” (ibid.: 236). The emergence of state-defined “illegal” activities caused grassroots resistance against state violence, both in physical or symbolic forms (Peluso and Watts 2001: 6, 23). Following the development of political ecology as an analytical lens, Gezon and Paulson (2005) provided a more updated definition of political ecology as the understanding of the historical processes of how humans appropriate, contest, and manipulate their environments. The dichotomy between material and symbolic aspects of nature is therefore blurred (Biersack 2006: 13). The diverse scope of political ecology encompasses the study of how cultural meanings and power shape social access to natural resources and means of livelihood: Embracing the material environment as socially and culturally constructed does not deny or even downplay its actual materiality. Instead, it provides an analytical lens through which to understand how social processes contribute to empirically observable landscape contours, resource fluctuations, and social differences in access to power, prestige, and wealth. . . . Seeing nature as constructed takes away the analytical inevitability of landscapes and raises questions of how, when, and by whom (and at the expense of whom) landscapes came to be. (Gezon 2006: 11)

Political ecologists have extended their research scope to include environmental events (e.g., disasters) and nonhuman actors. Vayda and Walters (1999: 169) propose the event ecology approach, which focuses on the causes and effects of an environmental event, rather than prioritizing politics as the key cause and effect. Meltzoff (1995) offers a different analytic example, using a comparable idea; she focuses instead on the bio-social relationships. Specifically, she looks at gender marginalization, observing that this does not happen to women shellfishers in Illa, Spain, who own the gender-specific zone in which they collect clams for sale.

57

This is because they control family income and the means of production (ibid.: 22–24). The hierarchy on which professional and amateur woman shellfishers coexist reflects the disparity characterizing their knowledge of tidal conditions. This example shows that various factors forge closer woman–clam relationships, particularly the requirement of having simple tools for clam collection supports women’s role in this business. Lukasik and Alexander (2011) stress that the traits of nonhuman actuants, such as coyotes in their case study, are linked to their biologically relevant seasons (e.g. breeding and pup-rearing) and spatial uses (together with or separated from human). Descola (2013: 15) further explores bio-social relationships in food cultures by examining how Amazonian hunters interact with their game and prey socially: They avoid waste, kill cleanly, and end with rituals when disposing of animal remains. This social group dissolves any clear-cut boundary between nature and culture (ibid.: 41–43). Human-environmental relations are related to fish farmers’ farm economics. Vandergeest et al. (1999) observed that in Thailand, the expanding shrimp farming sector in the 1990s was subject to shrimp disease and mangrove destruction. Smallholder fish farmers and large corporations faced the uncertainties of shrimp disease. Vandergeest et al. (1999) conclude that the smallholders had more incentives to develop more effective management methods than the workers in large corporations did. These smallholder farmers developed pond water management techniques to avoid going into great debt. Anthropologist Lien (2015) recorded how Norwegian salmon farmers use the leppefisk , a local fish that eats sea lice, to reduce the impact of sea lice on their salmon. Lien argues that the aquaculture system is the “heterogeneous assemblage consisting of matter and materials both dead and alive, both human and nonhuman, and that the distinctions are not always clear-cut, or even relevant” (ibid. 59). By using the leppefisk , the salmon farmers minimize the impacts of sea lice and the loss of salmon.

VI. Summary

This literature review has informed my integrated approach to governance and political ecology in this study. Taiwanese aquaculture comprises people from various backgrounds who have complex identities and experiences with the globalization of food. Political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological factors affect Taiwanese aquaculture. Taiwanese fish farmers interact with local and national governments, global and domestic markets, traders, communities

58

and organizations, the environment, and also China. Thus, the fish farmers’ responses to the ECFA are the outcomes of structure–agency, state–society, and human–environment interactions. I study the daily lives of fish farmers before and after the advent of closer economic relationships between Taiwan and China, as Taiwan is pursuing sustainable development. Instead of assuming the absolute power of governance institutions, I study how policy implementers and recipients interact and the nature of human–environment relations in Taiwanese aquaculture. My study on the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture was informed by the literature on the co-existence of state intervention, economic liberalization, and Taiwanese responses to globalization. This research orientation underscores three major aspects of my investigation. First, my study examines how global and neoliberal forces produce uniform or uneven influences on fish farmers and seafood business people. Second, the study examines the possibility of restructuring social and economic organizations at the local level. I pursue this by exploring community members’ life experiences and describing their decisions in their daily lives. Third, my research scrutinizes whether and how the Taiwanese economic system is distinct from the ideals of neoliberalism. The daily lives of fish farmers and seafood business people provide real life examples about how they respond to changes in the market, government policies, and the environment.

59

CHAPTER TWO: AQUACULTURE RESTRUCTURING AND TRACEABILITY

Since the last decade, global fisheries have stopped growing, but aquaculture has been expanding to satisfy the increasing global demand for seafood. Taiwan has limited land and water resources to expand its sector. Operating 40,000 hectares of fish farms, the Taiwanese fish farmers have improved their technology and skills to produce high-value seafood for the market. 82

I came across Mr. Deng, a top-level official of the Fisheries Agency, at a promotional event for Taiwanese certified traceable seafood in Taipei. This event took place in a boardroom of a five-star hotel, showcasing 20 items to mass media. In my follow-up interview with him, Mr. Deng recalled the aquaculture restructuring that began in 1992 and led to the development of seafood traceability in Taiwan in the mid-2000s. The government aimed to change fish farmers’ practices to enhance food safety and sustainability. The products could compete with others in international and domestic markets. Within this context, traceability became an official strategy for turning Taiwanese seafood into high-value products. They organized promotional events to encourage domestic and international markets to consume these more expensive products. This chapter illustrates the governance of restructuring and traceability in Taiwanese aquaculture. The sector localized traceability and eco-certification, two examples of sustainability governance. Bush at el. (2015: 11) defines sustainability governance as a process through which various actors participate in the governing of sustainability. In this process, “non- firm actors, such as consumers, NGOs and government institutions, structural flows of information that are taken up in the norms and practices of firms” and create impacts on supply chains (ibid.). The Chinese translation of traceability in Taiwan is “chanxiao luli ” ( 產銷履歷), which means the “résumé” ( luli ) of the “production” ( chan ) and “distribution” ( xiao ) of an agricultural product (including seafood). The résumé is a collection of records in production, processing, and distribution that is provided by food producers, processors, and retailers to increase consumer confidence in the products. The résumé confirms that the products meet food safety standards, such as those pertaining to veterinary drugs and antibiotics. According to the

82 Mr. Deng, a top-level official of the Fishery Agency: interview, February 10, 2015. 60

official website of Taiwan’s traceability system (Taiwanese Traceable Agricultural Products 2016), 83 Taiwan has developed local standards, such as Taiwan Good Aquaculture Practices (hereafter: TGAP), with reference to the European Union’s Good Aquaculture Practices. TGAP is complementary to the traceability system to change fish farming practices: TGAP is established to lower the risk in production, and to enhance food safety, environmental sustainability, and the health of producers and workers. Traceability stresses the responsibilities of the various stakeholders in production, processing, and distribution. If food safety incidents occur, [the government] can trace who is responsible and can remove the contaminated production in a timely manner. This can minimize the negative effects on consumers and the producers who meet all standards. (Taiwanese Traceable Agricultural Products 2016) 84

In Taiwan, aquaculture restructuring is a governance process that involves regulation of land use, new organizations of fish farmers, and the government’s attempts to influence fish farmers’ practices. The restructuring resulted in zoning and the introduction of new standards of food safety and sustainability, such as TGAP. I explain how and why the restructuring occurred, and then describe how fish farmers, marine biologists, and veterinarians interacted to enhance food safety and adopt the new seafood traceability system. The intersection of fish farmers’ practices and international standards led to the reorientation of Taiwanese trade policy from quantity-oriented aquaculture practices to encouraging both quality and quantity. I argue that Taiwanese fish farmers’ environmental subjectivity has been shaped in this process. However, the official traceability system has its limitation in terms of shaping fish farmers’ actions. While an increasing number of fish farmers joined the system to enhance food safety, some also became ecological fish farmers to achieve environmental sustainability beyond the official standards of traceability. Their practices influenced veterinarians to change their pond management discourse from emphasizing the treatment of fish disease to its prevention. The fish farmers selling certified traceable seafood developed personal networks to strengthen consumer trust in their seafood, so that its value would increase in a branding process. The fish farmers interacted with various actors of aquaculture, including veterinarians and consumers, to contribute to the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture.

83 Source: http://taft.coa.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4&CtNode=296&role=C . 84 Ibid. 61

Growing global concerns over the environmental, economic, and social consequences of aquaculture have facilitated diverse practices. More actors have been involved in sustainability governance in aquaculture, such as eco-certification initiatives. Foley and Havice (2016: 24) point out that these initiatives contain “both territorial and transnational attributes.” One such program is the application of international certification standards in integrated mangrove–shrimp farming in Nam Can, Vietnam (Omoto and Scott 2016). In 2001, a German-based organic standard setter, a Swiss supermarket chain, the Vietnamese government, and a Vietnamese seafood export association first governed an organic shrimp export program. They marketed Vietnamese fish farmers’ certified shrimp products. Omoto and Scott note that this case was an outcome of public and private governance that followed international certification standards (ibid.: 126). It was a result of multi-stakeholder governance of local aquaculture that responded to changing demand in the global seafood value chain. Burgeoning global and local consumer-driven campaigns have linked environmental sustainability and food safety to global commodity networks in multiple ways. The development of regulations from the public and private sectors affects the governance of seafood networks, whether the seafood is sold to domestic or international markets. However, tensions and conflicts arise when practices within commodity networks are transformed. Baird and Quastel (2011) provide an example of dolphin-safe tuna fishing certification. They show that the application of the American version of “universal standards” (ibid.: 339) may not fit local situations, such as the Thai people’s need to fish for their livelihoods. Research on aquaculture has paid attention to how food producers interact with the governance tools of sustainability and food safety (Hatanaka 2010; Vandergeest 2007; Vandergeest et al. 2015). Local practices are interlinked with the demand for quality in the commodity chains. Such demand for food safety has also resulted in the changing practices of veterinary drug dosage in aquaculture. Fish farmers are asked to reduce drug use to fulfill the food safety expectations of consumers (Mansfield 2011). Therefore, aquaculture “does not just make more fish, but also makes different fish” (ibid.: 430; emphasis in the original text) compared with catching fish. Mansfield suggests that scholars assess how various factors and processes, such as food safety concerns, affect fish farmers’ practices, instead of focusing only on healthy seafood as the outcome (ibid.).

62

Vandergeest (2007) points out that multiple actors interact with each other at the local level, where eco-certification is applied to aquaculture sectors. The governance of aquaculture to encourage eco-certification involves multiple actors and a localization process. In Thailand, certification became gradually effective in regulating fish farmers’ behaviours at the local level because it allowed fish farmers to participate in the process (ibid.). Fish farmers incorporated certification standards into their local practices of common resource management. This prevented the certification institutions from separating environmental and technical standards from social standards. Hatanaka (2010: 242) argues that these systems are not “culturally neutral mechanism[s] that can be immediately implemented across the world.” In the localization process, local knowledge may be ignored. Kusumawati et al. (2013) use their case of Indonesian aquaculture to emphasize that regulatory networks in aquaculture practices can be ineffective when they bypass certain actors, such as the patrons who are active in production and trade. The result is that the actors are not aware that their behaviours are being regulated. Governmentality is an analytical lens through which to examine the relationships between the governing and the governed. Foucault’s (1991: 89) notion of “the art of government” suggests that government employs various tactics to arrange its relations with people and maintain its power. Foucault (1995: 26) argues that government “calculate[s], organize[s], [and] technically [thinks] out” programs that shape individual behaviours. A critique of governmentality is that government may not achieve all of its goals. For example, Coulter and Schumann (2012: 10) argue the government has “structural, institutional, and symbolic” power formally and informally, but its power is never guaranteed. Other institutions may interact with the government to perform governmentality. For example, the World Bank’s experts translated violence associated with natural resource extraction in Indonesia as a technical problem (Li 2007a: 262); the experts’ technical suggestions for maintaining peace and order led to a strong state presence in the area (ibid.: 264). Studying governance with the analytical tool of governmentality, thus, is an investigation of the historical processes that affect power relationships. Governmentality is used in works that employ environmentality (combining environment and governmentality) that examines how government affects people’s environmental subjectivity, which includes people’s consciousness and behaviours. For example, Agrawal

63

(2005) illustrates the government’s use of forestry statistics in Kumaon, India to transform villagers from dissidents to followers of the rules of accessing resources in forests. Other scholars argue that Agrawal uses a more structural approach to explain structure–agency interactions in forest management. They apply environmentality to study various local communities, highlighting the “critical consciousness of individuals” among the governed (Valdivia 2015: 474). Seki (2009) notes that Filipino fishermen diversified their fishing strategies to maintain their livelihoods after the government imposed coastal resource protection measures, including a ban on trawling. The fishermen exercised their agency by re-arranging their relationships with nature that are embedded in their local socio-environmental conditions. Segi (2013) added that the Filipino fishermen chose what rules to follow depending on their local conditions, after the government regulated their behaviours with marine protection rules. Knowledge transfer occurs when veterinarians instruct fish farmers on the use of veterinary drugs in Taiwan, affecting how the fish farmers practise environmental management. The Taiwanese government and other governing institutions, such as eco-certification agencies and consumers’ organizations, have adopted the Regulatory Guidelines of Aquatic Animal Drugs (水產動物用藥品使用規範: hereafter the RGAAD) 85 to regulate fish farmers’ behaviours related to the use of veterinary drugs. Veterinarians played a role by developing social relations with fish farmers to transfer knowledge about veterinary drugs. I interpret the governance of Taiwanese aquaculture regarding the use of veterinary drugs as a version of environmentality in virtue of the fact that veterinarians changed fish farmers’ behaviours. My findings echo the arguments of Seki and Segi: fish farmers exercised their agency in responding to the regulations of veterinary drug uses and eco-certification. Taiwanese fish farmers developed diverse forms of aquaculture, including ecological aquaculture that abandons the use of veterinary drugs. The governance of aquaculture in southwest Taiwan thus involves an interactive process rather than top-down knowledge transfer between veterinarians and fish farmers. This chapter is organized in the following sequence. I first document the development and decline of Taiwanese aquaculture. Section II focuses on the aquaculture restructuring and its outcomes. Section III highlights interactions between veterinarians and fish farmers at the local

85 Chi.: shuichan dongwu yong yaopin shiyong guifan . 64

level. Section IV explains how traceability systems were localized in Taiwan. The last section illustrates the practices and perspectives of fish farmers from three categories. I show how fish farmers exercise agency and influence veterinarians in the teaching of aquaculture practices.

I. Aquaculture Kingdom: From its Rise to Crises of Sustainability

Taiwan once called itself the “Aquaculture Kingdom” ( China Times 1994), which highlighted its advanced technology and competitiveness in global aquaculture. Fish farming in Taiwan could be traced to the 17 th century (Tseng 2012). In the mid-20 th century, Taiwanese fish farmers benefited from Taiwan’s export-oriented strategy as well as technological breakthroughs to increase their production volume. They then faced sectoral decline due to environmental degradation and bad management. This caused a crisis in Taiwanese aquaculture and resulted in the restructuring. Global forces have influenced the development of Taiwanese aquaculture. The Taiwanese practise mainly inland aquaculture, in two forms. Most ponds in coastal areas access seawater directly from the sea and also brackish water. These are the brackish-water ponds, called “saltwater fish ponds” ( 鹹水魚塭)86 among the Taiwanese. They refer to “freshwater fish ponds” ( 淡水魚塭)87 as those located in areas farther inland, which access only fresh water. Inland aquaculture became export-oriented in 1967. 88 Fish farmers used the freshwater ponds to farm Japanese eels, after Japanese traders discovered that Taiwan had a more favourable climate and a richer source of (baby) glass eels than Japan. The Taiwanese traders mostly exported live eels to Japan. They even organized themselves and formed a corporate governance structure, which included setting drug residue standards and operating inspection centres on drug and antibiotic use to ensure the quality of their exports. Between 1969 and 1980, the production volume of Japanese eels in Taiwan grew from 1,571 tonnes to 55,837 tonnes. 89 In the 1960s, Taiwanese marine biologists received donations from the Rockefeller Foundation based in the

86 Chi.: xianshui yu wen; Hok.: kiâm-tsuí hî-ùn. 87 Chi.: danshui yuwen ; Hok.: tānn-tsuí hî-ùn. 88 Source: Taiwan Eel Farming Industry Development Foundation 2000. http://www.eel.org.tw/modules/tadnews/page.php?nsn=21 . 89 Ibid. 65

United States to develop their aquaculture technology, especially shrimp propagation (Hsueh 2010). Marine biologists from official extension stations played a key role in transferring this technology to fish farmers. They approached fish farmers in person on fish farms and during workshops. In 1968, biologists developed the technique of artificial tiger prawn propagation (Lin and Hsiao 2008). Artificial propagation is a human intervention strategy in which fertilized eggs are collected from broodstock in controlled conditions, “with or without hormone treatment.” 90 The ability to create a stable supply of shrimp larvae facilitated intensive prawn farming. Between 1981 and 1987, Taiwan experienced rapid growth in the tiger prawn sector (Table 2.1), which in turn accelerated the growth of Taiwanese aquaculture, generating more than USD5 billion annually since 1981 (Chart 2.1).

Table 2.1. The production value and volume of Taiwan’s tiger prawn sector (1981–1989). Year Value Volume (Thousand (Tonnes) TWD) 1981 1,268,596 4,213 1982 2,599,434 7,422 1983 3,540,571 10,084

1984 3,142,696 12,057 1985 N/A 1986 10,924,324 45,817 1987 11,508,323 80,279 1988 4,769,570 31,171 1989 2,966,922 16,982 Note: The author was unable to access the 1985 statistical report. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

90 Source: FAO n.d. http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/ac742e/AC742E04.htm#ch4 . 66

350000 1200000

300000 1000000 250000 800000 200000 600000 150000 Tonnes 400000

100000 USD Thousand 50000 200000

0 0

1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Year

Quantity (Metric tonnes) Value (thousand USD)

Chart 2.1. Production volume and value of inland Taiwanese aquaculture between 1959 and 2014. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

The prawn farmers converted paddy rice farms to freshwater ponds, where euryhaline creatures, including tiger prawns, can grow more rapidly than in brackish-water ponds. 91 Fish farmers used aerators and feed pellets to intensify production and maximize production volume. They extracted groundwater to add fresh water to ponds to accelerate the growth of the prawns. According to Wang and Huang (2010), a prawn farmer could earn TWD2.4 million annually per ha in the 1980s, 12 times the annual income of a high school teacher. The success of Taiwanese aquaculture in eel and tiger prawn farming and trade led the Taiwanese (as noted above) to refer to themselves as the “Aquaculture Kingdom” (Hsueh 2010). Despite their high income, fish farmers found that the pond environment quickly became depleted. In 1988, a widespread pathogenic infection led to a plunge in production volume (Liao and Chien 1996; Chart 2.1). Bad pond management included discharging sewage into water channels and along the coast, causing

91 Euryhaline fish and shrimp can grow more rapidly under the lower osmotic pressure of less salty water. 67

wild tiger prawns, the original source of broodstock, to be infected by the viruses. The extraction of groundwater was one of the factors causing land subsidence in coastal Taiwan. Prawn farming productivity has never recovered. The sector declined rapidly after 1988. Chart 2.1 shows the growth in production volume in the early 1990s together with a sharp fall in production value. This drop occurred because of the higher value of tiger prawn compared with other farmed seafood (except for Japanese eels). After the rapid decline of the prawn sector, fish farmers turned to milkfish and seabass, but overproduction in the mid-1990s caused market values to decline. In the 1990s and early 2000s, fish farmers sought to farm other high-value seafood varieties, such as Japanese seabass ( 七星鱸)92 and abalone ( 九孔),93 but their production volumes dropped due to diseases. After the early 2000s, high production volumes and low production values resulted from an increase in grouper farming. Sales of Taiwanese groupers to China, their major market, were officially recorded only beginning in 2009. Taiwanese fish farmers propagated and farmed marine finfish to rejuvenate the aquaculture sector. A local fish hatchery first propagated milkfish for commercial purposes in 1983 (Hsueh and Tseng 2006; Liao et al. 2010). 94 Fish farmers switched from prawn farming to intensive milkfish farming. They deepened their ponds to accommodate a larger volume of water. This increased the number of fish stock fourfold, compared to extensive milkfish farming in the past. 95 This dramatic increase in milkfish production supplied the domestic market but led to overproduction and hence the decline in fish prices. Later, fish farmers turned to over 70 kinds of marine animals and plants that could be propagated (Fisheries Research Institute 2011). Marine aquaculture species are valued more highly than most freshwater species (among the exceptions are Japanese eels and giant river prawn 泰國蝦). 96 The cost of larvae and fry

92 Chi.: qixinglu ; sci.: Lateolbex japonicas. 93 Chi.: jiukong ; sci.: Halitotis diversicolor. 94 Marine biologists and fish farmers succeeded in artificially propagating freshwater carp such as grass carp ( 草魚; Chi .: caoyu ; sci.: Ctenopharyngodon idella ) in 1964 (Hsueh and Tseng 2006; Hsueh 2016). 95 Pond depth was between 30 and 40 cm in extensive farming. In intensive fish farming, the depth of milkfish ponds in southwest Taiwan is usually between 1.5 and 2 m. Such a pond can stock 7,000 milkfish per jia (甲; 1 jia = 0.97 ha). Its maximum production volume per jia has grown from two tonnes to at least eight tonnes (Liao 1989: 44). In south Taiwan, fish farmers even dug five-metre ponds to increase the intensity of fish stocks to 25,000 per jia . 96 Chi.: taiguoxia ; sci.: Macrobrachium rosenbergii . 68

decreased. For example, 1 kg of sea bass eggs cost TWD270,000 in the 1990s, but the price for the same amount had dropped to TWD5,000 in 2014. 97 Fish farmers’ bad management undermined the economic and environmental sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture. Although intensive farming of marine finfish became dominant, Taiwanese fish farmers faced three problems: overproduction, bad pond management, and limited available land for expansion. Fish farmers used the Chinese term “yiwofeng ” ( 一窩 蜂; jumping on the bandwagon; see also Hsueh 2010: 148) to refer to a vicious cycle they have collectively experienced. When fish farmers know that one kind of marine fish can be propagated, they practise intensive monoculture to maximize production as quickly as possible. The fish farmers usually benefit from high market prices in the first two or three years. Subsequently, market prices slump because international and domestic markets expand more slowly than production volume grows. To mention another form of bad anagement, improper sewage disposal—through which farmers pollute the water sources for each other’s ponds— leads to widespread outbreaks of fish diseases that cause additional financial loss. Fish farmers use veterinary drugs and antibiotics to treat the sick fish, but later they find it less effective, because the diseases develop resistance to the drugs. Fish farmers then leave the health problems for a particular fish species unsolved and switch to farming another high-value fish. The same ecological and economic problems occur again. The vicious cycle makes Taiwanese aquaculture unsustainable.

97 Mr. Lu, a fish farmer: interview, August 29, 2014. 69

Photo 2.1. Half-flooded tombs after land subsidence. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

The Taiwanese government turned a blind eye to the environmental impacts of the rapid growth of the aquaculture sector during the 1980s. According to Dr. Chiu, a marine biologist who worked in an extension station in that period of time, the government had no plans for the sector before the unexpected expansion of freshwater ponds. 98 Because fish farmers economically benefited from the sectoral growth, the government enforced regulations of natural resources loosely. 99 Subsequently, it discovered that aquaculture, together with industrial activities and agriculture, overextracted groundwater and caused land subsidence in coastal areas (Hsu et al. 2015; Photo 2.1). In southwest Taiwan, land subsided at least 1.5 m between 1975 and 2012 (ibid.: 8204). This intensified the impacts of flooding and further undermined the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture. The history of Taiwanese aquaculture development before the sectoral restructuring in 1992 shows that export-oriented aquaculture caused ecological and economic problems in local fishing communities. Taiwanese fish farmers obtained advanced technology to increase production. Bad pond management demonstrated that fish farmers’ practice of intensification

98 Dr. Chiu, a marine biologist: interview, April 17, 2015. 99 Ibid. 70

was not adapted well to the local environment. The infrastructure in the fish farms was insufficient to support intensification. The strong economic incentives of tiger prawn farming prevented fish farmers from developing ecologically sustainable practices. The decline of the tiger prawn sector signalled to fish farmers that their practices would be less sustainable than the extensive aquaculture that the Taiwanese had practised for centuries.

II. Aquaculture Restructuring and Governance

The Taiwanese government began restructuring the aquaculture sector in 1992 to solve three major problems: land subsidence, overproduction, and fish farmers’ improper use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. The Taiwanese government initiated the 1992 Aquaculture Supervision Program ( 養殖漁業輔導方案)100 to establish aquaculture zones and new fish farmers’ organizations. In 1996, it implemented the Land Subsidence Mitigation Program ( 地層 下陷防治執行方案)101 to combat unsustainable fish farming activities, which converted farmland to fish ponds that used groundwater as the major source of pond water. As I show in this section, the two programs fulfilled the government’s objective of enhancing the environmental sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture, but the outcomes were uneven. The programs, as part of the governance of land and water resources, regulated fish farmers’ practices and their environmental consciousness.

100 Chi.: yangzhi yuye fudao fangan. 101 Chi.: diceng xiaxian fangzhi zhihang fangan. 71

Chart 2.2. The structure of Taiwanese aquaculture prior to 1992. Source: Author’s field data.

Chart 2.2 shows the administrative structure of Taiwanese aquaculture prior to the Aquaculture Supervision Program. The Fisheries Research Institute (水產試驗所)102 operated seven extension stations, which focused on scientific research on topics including artificial propagation and fish diseases. The Fisheries Agency was the central department responsible for formulating and implementing fisheries policies. At the county and local levels, there were fisheries departments implementing fisheries policies. The fisheries departments supervised

102 Chi.: shuichan shiyansuo . 72

fishermen associations ( 漁會),103 which were civil organizations that served fishermen and fish farmers. The Fishermen Association Act ( 漁會法)104 was enacted in 1929 (Fisheries Agency 2016b). 105 It allowed fishermen and fish farmers to form local and regional fishermen associations (that merged later to become county-based associations). Any fisherman (owning or working on fishing boats) and fish farmers (owning or leasing fish ponds) could join the fishermen associations. According to the Act, these associations shall safeguard fishermen’s rights and interests, enhance fishermen’s knowledge and skills, increase fishermen’s profits from production, improve fishermen’s livelihood, promote the modernization of fisheries, and develop fisheries. (ibid.)

The restructuring included the establishment of new fish farmer associations. Fishermen associations were the only legal fishermen’s civil associations prior to 1992 due to martial law in Taiwan (which ended in 1987), which previously limited the development of civil associations. Elections took place every four years allowing members to choose their representatives. Local factions undermined the effectiveness of government policies. The government sought to establish new fish farmers’ organizations during the aquaculture restructuring in 1992.

103 Chi.: yuhui. Most countries call similar associations “fishermen’s associations.” In Taiwan, the official translation of yuhui is “fishermen association.” I adopt the Taiwanese translation in the dissertation. 104 Chi.: yuhuifa. 105 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/en/LegalsActs/content.aspx?id=3&chk=e6760d67-d794-41ed-ab5a- c3a3449e34b4¶m . 73

Chart 2.3. The structure of Taiwanese aquaculture after 1992. Source: Author’s field data.

Chart 2.3 shows the structure of Taiwanese aquaculture after 1992. The Aquaculture Supervision Program divided fish farming regions into new zones. The Fisheries Agency used zoning to limit the less sustainable freshwater fish farms, which have poor access to water sources. Forty-two aquaculture production zones, covering 12,256 ha, were established by 1996 (COA 2012a: 126), with 33.7% of Taiwanese inland aquaculture area included in the zoning system. Most zones were located in seaside townships where brackish water was accessible. In all, 1,443 ha of fish ponds are defined as freshwater ponds that use water from freshwater resources such as . Some county governments do not allow fish ponds outside of the aquaculture production zones to apply for the aquaculture voluntary registration system ( 養殖漁

74

業登記證).106 This registration system, which was first established in 1978, certified the eligibility of a fish pond owner or tenant to apply for relief during disasters. The ineligible fish farmers cannot be subsidized by the government to purchase energy-saving facilities, such as aerators (Fisheries Agency 2013b). 107 A fish farmer registers in the government system by showing a land contract, a certificate of use of water resources (issued by the government), and a map or aerial photo of his or her fish farm. It is a voluntary registration program through which the government encourages fish farmers to become part of its governance of land and water resources used for aquaculture. Before 1992, fish farmers preferred having wells to extract groundwater, but these are illegal practices. The illegal groundwater extraction led them to be excluded from the registration system.108 The zoning in the Aquaculture Supervision Program aimed to encourage more fish farmers to be regulated and follow the laws and rules. Before the 1980s, the government paid little attention to how fish farmers converted land to fish ponds. Some paddy rice lands, especially those accessible to rich groundwater resources, were converted to eel or tiger prawn ponds. Fish farmers dug wells to extract fresh water, but the resulting overextraction of groundwater caused land subsidence. Typhoons and floods caused nationwide fish loss and hence lower production volume in 2009. The Taiwanese government had promoted mariculture, which is the offshore farming of aquatic organisms, but Taiwan lacked ideal locations that would minimize the impact of typhoons on fish cages (COA 2012a). The government used aquaculture zoning to reduce the area of these unregistered fish ponds and hence the land subsidence. The Land Subsidence Mitigation Program discouraged fish farmers from using groundwater. The program included the building of seawater pumping stations to reduce demand for groundwater. It encouraged the farming of marine species in brackish-water ponds instead of freshwater ponds. The program also included designs of pond systems in which water circulation is feasible. The annual volume of groundwater extracted in Taiwan decreased from 2.4 billion cubic feet in 1991 to 1.04 billion cubic feet in 2012 (ibid.). 109 Taiwanese

106 Chi.: yangzhi yuye dengjizheng . I found no official record of the number of fish farmers who were included in the aquaculture production zone or voluntary registration system. 107 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/ForumsGuest/content.aspx?id=20107671&chk=bdcff294-ebed-4675-bf30- 824c0107715b . 108 Dr. Chiu, a marine biologist: interview, April 17, 2015. 109 The decline of industrial and agricultural activities also reduced demand for groundwater. 75

aquaculture is currently focused more narrowly on marine species. The governance of the aquaculture zone has regulated the use of water and land resources. Fish farmers added such policy factors to their selection of species that had been affected by economic and ecological factors before the 1990s. Aquaculture zoning provided an opportunity for new fish farmers’ organizations to emerge. Mr. Tseng, a former top-level official of the Fisheries Agency, was in charge of the aquaculture restructuring. He recalled that he originally invited fishermen associations to extend their supervisory service to the aquaculture zones, but their responses were negative. 110 This was probably because fishermen associations then focused more on the work and workers related to catching fish. Mr. Tseng then encouraged fish farmers to establish their own fish farmer associations ( 養殖協會).111 These new civil associations helped the government supervise fish farmers, and later also helped fish farmers adopt traceability. 112 Beginning in 1992, fish farmers could join fishermen associations and/or fish farmer associations. The fishermen associations thus became more involved in fish farmers’ practices. The functions of the fishermen associations and fish farmer associations are currently similar, including the organization of workshops to disseminate aquaculture knowledge. The associations also help fish farmers form their own production and marketing groups (P&M groups; for more see chapter four) and obtain subsidies from the government. A fish farmer would join an association according to its visions and achievements. Some associations are controlled by local factions and fish farmers in opposing factions do not join them. Fish farmer associations manage aquaculture production zones. They helped fish farmers directly negotiate with the government to improve the production environment with their aquaculture production zones. The fish farmer associations apply for government infrastructure projects for redesigning roads, redirecting water channels, and building seawater pumping stations. However, Mr. Tseng admitted that the government had limited capacity to satisfy their requests:

110 Mr. Tseng, a top-level official of the Fisheries Agency: interview, March 9, 2015. 111 Chi.: yangzhi xiehui. 112 In the early 2000s, fishermen associations were reformed to strengthen their service to fish farmers, including helping them join the traceability system. During my fieldwork, both fishermen associations and fish farmer associations had similar functions. 76

We do not have the budget to invest in all aquaculture zones; we have to prioritize to build the infrastructure in some zones . . . [especially where the people could] fight for the funding . . . [or when] everyone is willing to let us work on it. The government also has to build the infrastructure slowly because most fish farms are always in operation. 113

The Fisheries Agency failed to solve the problem of overproduction in its aquaculture restructuring program. It originally attempted to use an annual stocking census to find a way to prevent overproduction. A fish farmer joining the aquaculture voluntary registration system could participate in the census. He or she would then be eligible for the official disaster relief programs that year. The relief programs would cover part of the fish farmers’ financial losses. 114 The Fisheries Agency aimed to provide incentives for census participation. In turn, the statistical data could help officials react in advance of overproduction. However, the Fisheries Agency still tolerated fish farmers who operated unregistered fish ponds and did not participate in the census. The registered fish farmers might also exaggerate their stocking information to get more relief following disasters. Some fish farmers argued that the statistical information from the census was insufficient to help them avoid overproduction. The Taiwanese government was unable to change the stocking behaviours of fish farmers through the collection of fish-stocking data. The Fisheries Agency published the reports on a yearly basis (2015b), 115 but could not intervene to prevent the fish farmers from stocking any potentially overproduced species. An official told me that the government needed to follow free market principles. 116 Moreover, if it asked a fish farmer to stop stocking a particular species, the fish farmer might complain about why it chose him or her instead of others. As a result, Taiwanese fish farmers continued to face the risk of overproduction. Two factors made the stocking census, as a governance tool, fail to function as the government expected. First, the linkage between the stocking census and the disaster relief programs provided fish farmers with economic incentives to exaggerate their stocking numbers. Natural disasters are unpredictable and fish farmers had experienced losses during past disasters.

113 Mr. Tseng, a top-level official of the Fisheries Agency: interview, March 9, 2015. 114 Harvest insurance is unavailable in Taiwan. 115 Source: https://www.fa.gov.tw/upload/264/2015010713382370472.pdf. 116 Mr. Zhao, an official in the Chiayi County government: interview, April 17, 2015. 77

They used the opportunity to report higher stocking numbers to protect themselves. Second, the stocking census did not aim to account for market demand. It was also impossible to estimate how market demand would vary with production cycles. Fish farmers, who experienced declining market values and hence declining farm-gate prices (this is the price that distributors or exporters offer to pay to purchase the harvest from their ponds), blamed the stocking census and regarded it as a useless tool for regulating the market. The government conducted the census without the intention to intervene in the market, but the fish farmers blamed it for using the wrong method to help them.

III. Interactions Between Veterinarians and Fish Farmers

Taiwanese fish farmers’ improper use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics in the twentieth century caused food safety problems, which put the market value of aquaculture products at risk. The Council of Agriculture (COA) is the central authority that makes and implements policies to regulate fish farmers’ behaviours. The Veterinary Drugs Control Act ( 動物用藥品使用守則; hereafter VDCA), 117 which was passed in 1971, regulates which veterinary drugs and antibiotics could be used in aquaculture. 118 According to the Act, fish farmers must obtain prescriptions from veterinarians to legally purchase drugs and antibiotics for aquaculture use. The VDCA was promulgated in 1971 and amended four times between 2002 and 2013. The Act defines “veterinary drugs” as the following: “1. Serum, preventive inoculum, diagnostics and other medicines with the efficacy of veterinary biological products exclusively for preventing, diagnosing and treating animal diseases; 2. Antibiotics exclusively for preventing or treating animal diseases; or 3. Medicines other than those under the previous two sub-paragraphs (the above two points) exclusively for preventing or treating animal disease or enhancing or regulating the physiological functions of animals.” 119

117 Chi.: dongwuyong yaopin shiyong shouze. 118 Source: Laws and Regulation Database, Republic of China (Taiwan) n.d.a. http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=M0130015 . 119 Ibid. 78

Since 2002, the VDCA has included the RGAAD, which lists the types of veterinary drugs that can be applied to particular aquatic animals in fish ponds to minimize the possibility of illegal or excessive drug residues found in fish products. The RGAAD has specified the uses of veterinary drugs, with detailed information on the names, dosages, and withdrawal periods of drugs applicable to particular species. Seafood processing and retailing are regulated by the Food Sanitation Management Act ( 食品衛生管理法), 120 which was enacted in 1975 and revised in 2014. It included the Standards for Veterinary Drug Residue Limits in Foods ( 動物用藥殘留標 準規定), 121 promulgated in 2005 and revised 23 times by 2015. The standards documented the limits of various drug residues to be detected in food. According to Dr. Chen, a veterinarian specializing in fish diseases, fish farmers focused on profit-making instead of the environment before the early 1990s, ignoring scientific knowledge pertaining to food safety in their daily pond management practices. They used whatever they considered effective among their “local methods” ( 土法煉鋼)122 to treat fish diseases. 123 Packages of illegal drugs under the VDCA would not properly show the ingredients; therefore, fish farmers could easily misuse these disallowed products. The government later required that descriptions of veterinary drugs and antibiotics included in advertisements be identical to what were registered. 124 The government outsourced the inspection testing of seafood in supermarkets and fish markets to university laboratories. However, illegal drug residues were occasionally found in fish ponds and seafood. For example, cases of groupers contaminated with malachite green, which was banned in Taiwanese aquaculture, caused a public scare in 2005 (Liberty Times 2005b). 125 The total market value of grouper dropped from TWD3 billion in 2004 to less than TWD1.8 billion in 2006 (Lin et al. 2014). The Taiwanese government assigned veterinarians to local communities to educate fish farmers about how to properly use veterinary drugs in the late 1990s. The government strengthened the service for veterinarians at the local level by introducing free fish clinics to

120 Chi.: shipin weisheng guanli fa . 121 Chi.: dongwu yongyao canliu biaozhun guiding . 122 Chi.: tufalangang. 123 Dr. Chen, a veterinarian: interview, March 17, 2015. 124 An aquaculture magazine editor: interview, February 12, 2015. 125 Source: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/34417 . 79

aquaculture zones. The government aimed at improving fish farmers’ knowledge of food safety and improving their practices under the VDCA. Veterinarians were assigned to aquaculture production zones to educate fish farmers about how to properly use various veterinary drugs and antibiotics. Their goal was for fish farmers to wait until drug withdrawal periods had passed before selling fish. In 1999 and 2008, the Livestock Disease Control Center ( 家畜疾病防治 所)126 of the Chiayi County government established two fish clinics. In 2014, six veterinarians rotated between stations of the two fish clinics in Chiayi County, which were opened during alternate weekday mornings. The veterinarians offered two major services: pond water testing and fish diagnosis. Fish farmers brought in samples of pond water to be tested for ammonia, nitrites, and pH value. The veterinarians might extract scales, gills, and eye lenses for microscope investigation. They would show the magnified images of these fish parts on a screen and discuss the possible fish diseases and symptoms with fish farmers. They might also bring the fish samples back to their labs for further diagnosis. They provided prescriptions after identifying the fish diseases. Veterinarians educated fish farmers through personal communication and publications. First, the veterinarians helped fish farmers change their habits in the use of drugs and antibiotics in aquaculture in face-to-face interactions. For instance, a veterinarian asked a fish farmer to bring the spoon that she used to add veterinary drugs to the fish clinic so that they could help her understand “how many spoons” made an accurate dose. Second, the veterinarians gave periodic lectures on topics related to fish disease at fishermen and fish farmer associations. They published and distributed monthly newsletters and handbooks, which were related to recent regional outbreaks of fish diseases. The veterinarians provided these references to inform Taiwanese fish farmers when discussing pond management with each other. They began to incorporate scientific reasoning into their local knowledge when they observed fish behaviour and spotted fish disease: The government runs the fish clinic in our community every weekday. If the fish farmers find that their fish stop eating, they will bring the sample [to the fish clinic] for diagnosis [to check if a fish disease breaks out]. If everyone’s fish stop eating, they would know that a climatic factor [rather than diseases] may have

126 Chi.: jiachu jibing fangzhisuo. 80

affected their fish behaviour. Therefore, they do not use veterinary drugs randomly. 127

Whether to use veterinary drugs or not depends on producers’ responses to consumer concerns and the pond environment: Producer–consumer interactions are important. If consumers do not care whether the fish have drug residue or not, the producers can use veterinary drugs to increase production volume. If consumers do not want any drug residue in the fish, the producers need to stop using any drugs. The newer generations of fish farmers use more probiotics than drugs now. This is a good sign. 128

Fish farmers’ environmental subjectivity was being altered by both government and consumer demands so that they would minimize the use of veterinary drugs in pond management. Their changing practices are shown in the approach to pond management that emphasizes maintaining water quality and preventing disease outbreaks: We sanitize the pond bottom whenever it is clear. Unlike milkfish farming, which has a production cycle and pond sanitization can occur in winter, we expose the pond bottom anytime it is ready. It is the most difficult thing to learn how to keep fish alive. Fish can die anytime. We use veterinary drugs when they are sick. We use probiotics to maintain good water quality. We learn fish farming in many ways. What is important is that we digest what we learn. If we use drugs too frequently, the drugs may be ineffective during the time of disease outbreak. We learned that prevention is more important than treatment.129

These interactions between fish farmers and veterinarians can be seen as an application of environmentality to Taiwanese aquaculture. The government used the fish clinics to educate fish farmers and enhance food safety. The veterinarians played a role in shaping fish farmers’ environmental subjectivity in the governance of aquaculture restructuring. This process changed fish farmers’ pond management practices, including their use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. Additionally, the government and the veterinarians provided fish clinic services to all fish farmers, who might represent a range of political parties, factions, and fish farming backgrounds. Bosco (1992; 1994) and Jacobs (2008) have documented local factions’ influence on food

127 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, August 26, 2014. 128 Mr. Deng, a top-level official of the Fishery Agency, interview, February 10, 2015. 129 Ah-wu, a fish farmer: interview, January 6, 2015. 81

producers. In the aquaculture restructuring process, local factions continued to affect local leadership in fishing associations and fish farmer associations. The presence of veterinarians, as professionals who came to local communities to provide technical services, was relatively free of the influence of local factions. The veterinarians made it clear that their services were open to all fish farmers. Even fish farmers operating unregistered farms could use the services. I suggest that the veterinarians adopted an “apolitical” (Ferguson 1994) role in delivering the government’s program, which aimed to regulate fish farmers’ behaviours in pond management, to local communities. The existence of veterinarians at the local level strengthened fish farmers’ environmental consciousness, because they realized that their farming practices were related to food safety, which had become a public concern at the national and global levels. My interviewees reported that the cases of improperly used veterinary drugs and antibiotics decreased .

IV. Localizing a Traceability System

The globalization of seafood has offered opportunities and challenges to Taiwanese fish farmers. They increased their income by supplying seafood to international markets, especially in the Global North, beginning in the 1950s. However, these markets increasingly tightened their food safety regulations, and detained Taiwanese seafood several times due to the presence of drug residues ( Fish World 2003: 61–62). In terms of quantity, quality, and price, Taiwanese fish farmers faced intense competition with less developed countries that exported cheaper products in greater volumes. As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Mr. Deng said that Taiwan had limited land and water resources with which to expand the production volume of Taiwanese aquaculture products. The government thus supported the sector’s shift to producing high-quality seafood that was safe and traceable to compete with other countries. In the 2000s, traceability systems were localized. Sustainability governance, including traceability, can be seen as another form of environmentality that guides fish farmers’ practices in becoming transparent to consumers. The government and certification agencies select which aspect of production is to be transparent. Fish farmers follow the guidelines to make their seafood traceable. The Taiwanese government has promoted high-quality seafood production in response to trade liberalization. The Fisheries Agency implemented the Program of Agricultural

82

Development in the New Millennium ( 跨世紀農業建設方案)130 between 1997 and 2000. It promoted “premium agriculture” ( 精緻農業; COA 2009b), 131 which also included aquaculture, to help rural Taiwanese mitigate the effects of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO. In other words, the changing policy orientation aimed at enhancing food quality so that Taiwanese fish farmers could remain competitive in international and domestic markets. Food quality standards included safety, flavour, texture, and freshness. The stress on food safety resulted in a traceability system, which involved a certification and labelling process. The government promoted this system to create price differentiation; the premise was that traceable Taiwanese seafood is trustworthy and safe, and hence should offer high-value products. Taiwan’s seafood traceability system emerged after excessive veterinary drug and antibiotic residues were detected in Taiwanese products. After the European Union detained some problematic Taiwanese tilapia in 2003 ( United Daily 2003b), the Taiwanese government first introduced Good Aquaculture Practices (GAP), which was originally a set of European standards designed to improve fish farming practices (Global G.A.P. n.d.). In principle, GAP helps producers comply with Europe-wide accepted criteria for food safety, sustainable production methods, worker and animal welfare, and responsible use of water, compound feed and plant propagation materials. 132

The Taiwanese government established the TGAP program, with reference to GAP, to modify fish farming practices and to develop records related to food safety and pond management. The principles of TGAP include keeping fish healthy and products unpolluted in pursuit of the government’s main goal of enhancing food safety. Aquaculture products are then eligible to be exported to the European Union. The major criteria applied in TGAP cover healthy fish fry, water quality, use and storage of inputs (e.g., feed, drugs, and gears), pond management, harvest, package, logistics, and distribution. Fish farmers need to use and record prescriptions given by veterinarians according to the VDCA. They need to be part of the aquaculture voluntary registration system to join TGAP, which requires them to have proper sources of water other

130 Chi.: kuashiji nongye jianshe fangan. 131 Chi.: jingzhi nongye. Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=19572 . 132 Source: http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-producers/aquaculture. 83

than groundwater. In the early period of the TGAP program, the government assigned marine biologists to supervise participating fish farmers to improve their farming practices and to develop traceable farm records of the sources, usage, and withdrawal periods of the veterinary drugs used. TGAP participants viewed the program as if “nothing was changed after all” because they received no extra income despite their new practices. 133 These fish farmers still sold their fish to local distributors and exporters, who had no incentive to pay more for their harvest because no price differentiation existed in the markets. These traders could not make more profits by selling TGAP-certified products when domestic consumers did not know the differences between mainstream products and the the TGAP-certified ones. The traders had no intention of raising the farm-gate prices offered to the fish farmers. The TGAP system was thus a new requirement to enter the export market (i.e., Europe) instead of a value-adding tool. A limited number of fish farmers joined the TGAP certification to become eligible for exporting milkfish to Europe, where the demand for Taiwanese milkfish was low. The majority of fish farmers, however, had no motivation to join the certification. They continued to sell their fish to local distributors. Rising public concerns over food safety, which was a major result of the drug residue incident with grouper in 2005, facilitated further development of traceability in Taiwan. In 2007, the Council of Agriculture enforced the Agricultural Production and Certification Act ( 農產品生 產及認證管理法)134 with the goal of “protect[ing] the health of citizens and the rights of consumers.” 135 It set up a traceability system which was called Traceable Agricultural Products ( 產銷履歷; hereafter TAP). 136 TAP adopts TGAP standards and includes certification and labelling, targeting mainly the domestic market. In 2014, the Taiwan Accreditation Foundation accredited six third-party agencies to certify aquaculture products following the TAF ISO Guide

133 A fish farmer: interview, March 24, 2014. 134 Chi.: nongchanpin shengchan ji renzheng guanlifa. Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=18830 . 135 Source: Laws and Regulations Database, Republic of China (Taiwan) n.d.b. http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=M0060072 . 136 Chi.: chanxiao luli. 84

65:1996.137 Accredited third-party agencies certify the agricultural products and assign a label with a barcode to each lot of the TAP-certified products (Photo 2.2). Consumers can scan the barcode and trace the inputs, outputs, and dates of harvests of any given lot of fish on an online system.

Photo 2.2. A label of a TAP product. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Fish farmers can apply for an account in an online data logging system owned by the Fisheries Agency. 138 They need to enter their production records from the past three months, including 1) basic farm information; 2) inputs, processing (if any), and outputs; 3) inspection records of residues; and 4) information about selling products to any wholesale or retail units. 139 The fish farmers can then choose a certification agency. After both parties sign a contract, the agency carries out the inspection and auditing procedures. If the seafood products pass these procedures, they can be certified as TAP products. The fish farmers can print out labels from the online system. The labels include a barcode assigned to each lot of the TAP-certified products (Photo 2.2). Consumers can scan the barcode and trace the inputs, outputs, and dates of harvests

137 Four certification agencies are operated under universities. TAF ISO Guide 65:1996 accredited the certification agencies to certify aquaculture products. TAF ISO/IEC 17065:2012 accredited the certification agencies to certify processed aquaculture products. 138 Taiwanese Traceable Agriculture Product (2016). Source: http://59.127.164.106/breedn30/ . 139 Source: Laws and Regulations Database, Republic of China (Taiwan) n.d.b. http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=M0060072 . 85

of a particular lot of fish on the products’ webpages. As of 2014, certification agencies accredited with TAF ISO/IEC 17065:2012 can certify processed seafood products. Previously, these certification agencies dealt only with unprocessed food. Marine biologists from the certification agencies became the gatekeepers for fish farmers applying for TAP certification. Aside from private companies, four universities’ aquaculture departments operated third-party certification agencies. Aside from private companies, four universities’ aquaculture departments operated third-party certification agencies. The universities assigned professors―marine biologists specializing in aquaculture―to be the general secretaries of the agencies. Each certification agency has a committee responsible for assessing applications for certification. In one certification agency, the committee members include government officials, academics, specialists from the aquaculture sector, and consumers. Dr. Chiu, the marine biologist, explained that fish farmers trusted universities as fairer service providers in certification processes, when compared with private companies. 140 Fish farmers reported that they appreciated the work of both private companies and universities. The marine biologists supplemented TAP system governance to modify fish farmers’ behaviours regarding food safety. Taiwanese aquaculture actors sought to facilitate collaboration between fish farmers, the government, and academia ( 產官學合作). 141 During the 1970s, the government subsidized various fish farmer associations and fishermen associations to invite marine scientists, veterinarians, and other aquaculture specialists to organize workshops for fish farmers. The official extension stations reached fish farmers to transfer their research outcomes. A few fish farmers allowed marine biologists to collect data from their farms. In the 2000s, TGAP-certified fish farms often accepted students of these marine biologists for internships. After 2007, the certification agencies became the new institutions involving marine biologists. Dr. Tu, a marine biologist and a general-secretary of one certification agency, described himself as responsible for ensuring that Taiwanese seafood products could be exported as “trustworthy items.” 142 From his perspective, TAP made fish farmers’ practices “transparent” to consumers. He stressed that fish farmers needed to be ethical to produce seafood that would

140 Dr. Chiu, a marine biologist: interview, April 17, 2015. 141 Chi.: changuanxue hezuo. 142 Dr. Tu, a marine biologist: interview, June 9, 2014. 86

pass the lab tests. Fish farmers fulfilled their moral obligations to consumers by controlling their drug and antibiotic usage in aquaculture. Dr. Tu, therefore, operated the certification agency to provide scientific evidence, such as lab reports, to show that the certified fish farmers were ethical. In the past, marine biologists in extension stations mainly transferred aquaculture knowledge and skills to fish farmers. Dr. Tu and others who operate the certification agencies added one more role, which was gatekeeper of the traceability system. They as professionals use lab and inspection reports to provide consumers, including the marine biologists themselves, with scientific proof of the food safety of certified seafood. These certified products are also traceable to producers and processors. Fish farmer associations and fishermen associations were the institutions that the Taiwanese government used to adopt traceability and modify fish farmers’ behaviours. For example, two leaders of the Chiayi County Fish Farmer Association designed the template for farm records for TAP participants to record their inputs and outputs. The association distributed posters and leaflets that promoted traceability and the proper use of veterinary drugs. It provided space for a fish clinic and organized regular seminars, inviting marine biologists and veterinarians to teach fish farmers how to meet TAP standards. Taiwanese fish farmers changed their practices after the government’s policy reorientation from food quantity to quality. In 2014, however, only 650 out of 37,797 units of Taiwanese fish farmers had joined TAP (Fisheries Agency 2014a: 34). 143 The government’s intention in regulating Taiwanese farmed seafood as traceable products under TAP was largely unrealized. Chen and Qiu (2014) pointed out that these certified products remained a minority of products on the market. At the national level, TAP-certified products were promoted by the government and fish farmers’ associations in markets such as supermarkets. However, fish markets, which distribute seafood to retailers, do not differentiate TAP-certified products from others. The certification means increased costs rather than increased market prices for fish farmers. The majority of fish farmers were not TAP-certified, but the shift towards food safety

143 The Fisheries Agency subsidized certified fish farmers for two-thirds of the cost of certification to help them join TAP. In 2015, it subsidized TWD50,000 for each first-time certified fish farmers and TWD17,000 for certified fish farmers who renewed their certificates (Fisheries Agency 2015a). Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/Announce/content.aspx?id=238&chk=282cf438-5aed-4151-9813-f2871adce049 . 87

and reduced veterinary drug use through regulatory mechanisms provided them with opportunities to interact with veterinarians. Two clauses of TGAP (which was later adopted by TAP) are related to the use of veterinary drugs: “1) Fish farmers should apply veterinary drugs prescribed by veterinarians to the fish which are diagnosed with any fish diseases. The fish farmers should have detailed records of the fish diseases and symptoms. They should also record the names, frequency, and dosages of the drugs used to treat the diseases. 2) Fish farmers should comply with regulations of aquatic animal drugs in the VDCA. Fish farmers should use the veterinary drugs under the supervision of veterinarians.” 144

In the governance of Taiwanese aquaculture, veterinarians play a role at the local level to diagnose fish diseases, provide prescriptions, and educate fish farmers in the use of veterinary drugs. Whether they participate in the certification systems or not, Taiwanese fish farmers apply this knowledge of drug use, such as the withdrawal period, to prevent their products from being found in lab tests to have drug residues over the limits. These lab tests are currently carried out in fish markets; samples in other retail outlets would be tested as well. If a distributor’s supplies contain fish that are over the limits of drug residues, the authorities will trace the sources and possibly find which fish farmers supplied the products. Veterinarians’ presence in local communities helps fish farmers comply with the VDCA and the RGAAD. Whether certification would increase fish farmers’ incomes is a key factor in the decision to participate in TAP or not. For example, Mr. Lu, who joined both TGAP and TAP, diversified his markets by exporting his seabass to Japan and by selling them to organic food stores. Traceability provides evidence to him that demonstrates his ethics. He stressed that “I produce high-quality food for the market so that consumers have an option. I am thus an ethical fish farmer who respects their consumer rights [of food safety].” 145 Other fish farmers have changed their practices. For example, Ah-hua, a fish farmer, did not join the TAP program because he sold nearly all of his harvest to local distributors. Even though branding was unnecessary, he still stressed food safety to fulfill his moral obligation to family members and friends, who might

144 Source: Laws and Regulation Database, Republic of China (Taiwan) n.d.a. http://law.coa.gov.tw/GLRSnewsout/LawContentHistory.aspx?id=FL028200 . 145 Mr. Lu, a fish farmer: interview, August 29, 2014. 88

eventually eat his seafood. He stopped the random use of veterinary drugs or antibiotics. Taiwanese fish farmers have become environmentally conscious in their pond management to enhance food safety, with traceability as additional proof of their improved practices.

V. Three Categories of Aquaculture in Taiwan

Table 2.2 shows that Taiwanese fish farmers exercise agency in selecting strategies for fish farming. Some of them go beyond what traceability and the VDCA require. For example, they abandon veterinary drugs as a sign that they contribute to environmental sustainability in the long term. They have also categorized the aquaculture practices in Taiwan as conventional (一 般),146 “non-toxic” ( 無毒), 147 and ecological (生態)148 aquaculture. However, I found that this is only one kind of categorization. Conventional fish farmers usually consider themselves as producing non-toxic seafood products because their practices comply with regulations. They choose not to obtain the TAP certification. The blurred boundaries across the categories of conventional and non-toxic aquaculture show that the farmers themselves do not find such sophisticated categorization useful to their businesses. This is because their products are mostly sold in the wholesale fish markets, where they cannot create any price differentiation by claiming a product non-toxic or even ecological. These categories are thus not universal in Taiwanese aquaculture. All fish farmers want to show that they are ethical producers in compliance with the VDCA. Some fish farmers highlight their non-toxic or eco-friendly products in the alternative markets, because they need to create differentiations to attract the consumers to pay higher prices for their products. The categorization is an outcome of the use of sustainable aquaculture practices for marketing and branding at the time when alternative markets exist in Taiwan.

146 Chi.: yiban. 147 Chi.: wudu. 148 Chi.: shengtai. 89

Table 2.2. Common features of the three categories of aquaculture in Taiwan according to ecological fish farmers.

Features Conventional Non-toxic (premium) Ecological Input Feed; antibiotics; Feed; antibiotics; drugs; Feed; aerators; (examples) drugs; aerators; aerators; probiotics; some probiotics; enzymes; herbicides avoid using herbicides avoid use of herbicides Stock High High, potentially reduced Usually the lowest intensity among these categories Source of Mostly legal sources Legal sources Legal sources water (may use groundwater outside of aquaculture production zones) Biodiversity Monoculture or Monoculture or poly- Polyculture is dominant; polyculture culture; some may create a mixed ecosystem mixed ecosystems containing herbivores, containing herbivores, carnivores, and carnivores, omnivores omnivores Fish disease Apply drugs and Apply drugs and Avoid using drugs and prevention antibiotics following antibiotics following the antibiotics; apply the guidelines of guidelines of veterinarians probiotics and enzymes veterinarians and and regulations regulations Branding No Use TAP as a brand in Use TAP and other supermarkets and networks (e.g. consumer alternative markets co-op) for marketing Markets Mainstream Mixture of export, fish Home delivery and distribution and export markets, home delivery, alternative markets; and alternative markets one case of export is recorded TAP Eligible but not obtain Eligible and most of them Eligible and most of it obtain it for marketing them obtain it for marketing. Emphasize differences from non- toxic aquaculture Source: Author’s field data.

90

In the first category fall the conventional fish farmers whom I have described in the last section. They follow the VDCA to produce seafood which is sold to mainstream wholesale fish markets for distribution. Their seafood is not branded under their own names. TAP certification is useless to them because they do not market their seafood. They apply veterinary drugs to treat ill fish to avoid financial losses: All aquatic animals may get sick. Some diseases are curable with veterinary drugs. Some are not. We go to the fish clinics for fish diagnosis. Using veterinary drugs is a matter of experience. You can follow the prescription given by the veterinarians. You need to observe the water quality, algae composition, and water colour. The basic principle is that you do not use any drugs disallowed in the regulations. 149

The second category of Taiwanese fish farmers claim that they practise wudu (non-toxic) aquaculture by regulating the use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics (Table 2.2 and 2.3). In 2004, the Taiwanese began to use this term to describe farmers who used chemicals in a proper way so that no residue would affect the health of consumers ( United Daily 2004). Fish farmers could claim their products to be non-toxic if they used legal veterinary drugs and antibiotics and also followed the drug withdrawal periods: We bring samples of sick fish to the fish clinic for diagnosis. The groupers exported to China are inspected. Our P&M group members have obtained TAP (traceability). The county government comes irregularly to collect grouper samples for inspection. In 2005, we were adversely affected by the black sheep in Pingtung who used malachite green in grouper farming. No one in our township used it. . . . Fish farmers are very careful now when using veterinary drugs. We have the idea about drug withdrawal periods. More fish farmers also use probiotics to improve water quality. 150

149 Ah-tien, a TAP-certified fish farmer, interview: March 14, 2015. 150 Ah-ba, a TAP-certified fish farmer, interview: March 4, 2015. 91

Table 2.3. Some examples of fish farmers in conventional, non-toxic, and ecological aquaculture in 2014.

Category Example Observation and interview data (2014-2015) Conventional Ah-shin She farmed milkfish and shrimp. No veterinary drugs or antibiotics aquaculture (woman) were used. She did not try to obtain TGAP or TAP certification. (sample size: She sold the harvest to distributors. 38) Ah-fu He farmed milkfish, mullet, and white-leg shrimp. He used veterinary drugs to treat diseases that affect mullet. He sold the harvest to distributors. No marketing activities were recorded. He did not obtain TGAP or TAP certification. Zi-yi He farmed milkfish, giant grouper, and white-leg shrimp. He did not obtain TGAP or TAP certification. He sold most of the harvest to distributors and the rest to urban consumers by home delivery. Non-toxic Ah-ba They were grouper farmers. They used fish clinic services and aquaculture and his applied veterinary drugs when the groupers were in poor health. (sample size: wife They sold most of their groupers to exporters for the Chinese 8) market. They obtained TAP certification and sold some of their groupers to processors that market certified frozen products. Ah-wu He was a grouper farmer who stressed prevention of fish disease by using probiotics to enhance pond water quality. He used veterinary drugs when the groupers were sick. He sold the groupers to exporters for the Chinese market. He sold some of his groupers to processors that market TAP-certified frozen products. Ah-mei They farmed milkfish, carp, and shrimp. They sold the harvests to and her distributors. They obtained TAP certification. Ah-mei marketed husband their products on Facebook and sold them via home delivery. Ecological Ah-da He was a milkfish and shrimp farmer. He did not use veterinary aquaculture drugs. He branded his own products by running a local restaurant (sample size: that highlights TAP certification and milkfish cuisine. He 9) processed milkfish products such as dumplings and boneless milkfish by himself. He sold the products via home delivery to urban consumers and one chain supermarket. Chia- They were shrimp farmers. They obtained TGAP and TAP chun and certification. Their products were sold as traceable frozen shrimp her directly to consumers. They branded their shrimp by participating husband in a marketing program of the Chiayi County government. Ms. Tao Her family ran a grouper farm. They sold groupers to exporters for the Chinese market. They obtained TAP certification and promoted their brand of frozen grouper in chain supermarkets. Source: Author’s field data.

92

Fish farmers claim that their TAP-certified fish products are non-toxic products. At the national level, the government uses the term youliang (優良; premium) instead of “non-toxic” to emphasize the quality of TAP-certified products. It avoids demonizing non-certified products from those of the conventional fish farmers, which can also be non-toxic (if they comply with the drug residue withdrawal period). In terms of pond management, farmers practising non-toxic farming typically lower their stock intensity and prefer using probiotics to antibiotics. The major difference between conventional and non-toxic farming lies in marketing strategy. Fish farmers claiming to practise non-toxic farming brand their products under their names and emphasize traceability (Table 2.3). They diversify their markets beyond local distribution to other potential markets, such as supermarkets that sell TAP-certified products and home delivery to consumers. Their marketing practices provide an example that has influenced some conventional farmers, who also sell a small portion of their products directly to consumers (Zi-yi’s case). Traceability, as a basic standard, does not guarantee that producers earn more if they further improve their practices to enhance environmental sustainability after being certified. In their study of the Marine Stewardship Certification (MSC), Bush et al. (2013: 291–292) found that fishermen could apply for and obtain the certification once they reached the minimum standard. After the fishermen met minimum standards, they would not be required to further improve their practices. There was “no labelled differentiation” (ibid.: 292) to add market value to their products with better practices. Consequently, the certified fishermen have no incentive to further enhance environmental sustainability. I mention this example to show that traceability and certification have limitations. Some Taiwanese fish farmers recognized that TAP had similar limitations, and they chose to practise ecological aquaculture, which applied standards that were more rigorous than those of the traceability system. Their practice further enhanced environmental sustainability and increased the value of their products. TAP-certified fish farmers developed their personal networks with consumers to solve a problem similar to that of the MSC. The following case shows that the third category is ecological fish farmers: 9 out of 55 informants claimed that they have practised shengtai yangzhi (生態養殖; ecological aquaculture) to further enhance environmental sustainability and create differentiation from non-toxic aquaculture beyond the TAP system. Ecological aquaculture eschews the use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. The TGAP and TAP systems emphasized food safety and so fish farmers’

93

practices focused mainly on whether there were residues of drugs, antibiotics, or heavy metals in the harvest. 151 Fish farmers practising non-toxic aquaculture sought to prevent fish disease. The longitudinal consequences of these inputs, such as how they affect the productivity of the ponds, were less valued in the traceability system. Ecological fish farmers practise polyculture and decrease intensity to establish a balanced ecosystem. Po-fang, an ecological fish farmer, defined ecological aquaculture in these terms: Ecological aquaculture lowers the intensity of fish stock. A pond is like a classroom; if there are few students, the possibility of disease spread gets lower. I also practise polyculture to stock various types of species to help circulate the nutrients in the pond. Preventing the nutrients from accumulating at one spot can avoid any disease outbreak . . . non-toxic farming means you can use drugs when you follow the drug withdrawal periods and regulations. However, no one knows what is added and left after the drug withdrawal period, especially when people now use a veterinary drug cocktail (雞尾酒療法). 152 Nowadays, the advanced technology can detect a minimal amount of a drug. If it happened, I would have no excuse in front of our consumers. . . . Therefore, I use no drugs so that the apparatus can detect nothing. 153

Po-fang designed a pond system to let fish consume all of the nutrients he supplies to minimize disease outbreaks. He stopped using herbicides, which was a common practice among Taiwanese fish farmers, including non-toxic ones, to conveniently control the growth of weeds on the of ponds in fish farms (Photo 2.3). Instead, he placed grass carp in the ponds to feed on the grass. In the same ponds, he farmed milkfish with shrimp, which consumed the feed left by the former. The milkfish ate algae and hence lowered the possibility of eutrophication. Po- fang put in a small amount of groupers to eat the sick fish and shrimp. If the fish and shrimp were ill, he “just let them die.” The groupers ate the dead bodies so that the latter would not deteriorate the water quality. Po-fang applied no veterinary drugs or antibiotics in this situation, and hence minimized the possibility of lab test failures. Ecological fish farmers argued that such balanced pond systems, instead of the regulated use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics, led to environmental sustainability.

151 Heavy metal residues may be found in areas where industrial activities take place. 152 Chi.: jiweijiu liaofa. 153 Po-fang, a fish farmer: interview, March 24, 2014. 94

Photo 2.3. Po-fang’s pond surrounded by vegetation. He does not use herbicide to kill the vegetation. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Taiwanese fish farmers use the terms huanjing youshan (環境友善; eco-friendly) and youji (有 機; organic) to describe their ecological seafood, but they violate the law if they label the products as organic food. This is because the enacted 2007 regulation of “organic food” excluded seafood (except aquatic plants) (COA 2007). Ecological fish farmers’ products are identical to the non-toxic products as traceable seafood under the TAP. Ecological fish farmers, such as Po- fang, used the term “ecological aquaculture” on their labels to distinguish their practice from non-toxic fish farming. They also discovered two problems with the traceability systems in Taiwan. First, although TAP standards require fish farmers to facilitate long-term environmental sustainability, ecological fish farmers preferred preventing disease outbreaks and environmental degradation to using drugs as treatment, which is the common strategy in conventional and non- toxic aquaculture. For example, practising ecological grouper farming, the Tao family aimed to maintain a good environment for groupers to be healthy; veterinary drugs are therefore not used: The older generations of fish farmers think that using drugs is the only way to save the sick fish. A vicious cycle exists because they keep using the drugs and

95

use even more when a pathogen resists the drugs. We want to create a sustainable environment. We insist on not using any drugs. We use probiotics. The cost is higher but our aquaculture is more sustainable in the long run. Fish farmers should sell the fish that they think that they can eat without any harm. 154

Second, after several food safety incidents, including the adulterated oil incidents in 2013 and 2014 that involved some food processing corporations that had obtained food safety certifications, Po-fang argued that the official certification system was insufficient to ensure consumer trust in ecological or non-toxic food products: There are too many labels and certifications in Taiwan; even the official ones could become untrustworthy. If an outbreak of excessive drug residue harmed the reputation of the TAP, I would not be able to explain it to my own customers. 155

Po-fang responded to the second shortcoming of the traceability system by developing consumers’ personal trust in the domestic market. He possessed a TAP certificate but seldom put the labels on his products. Instead, he printed another label co-designed with a consumer co-op for the products supplied to it. The label included his explanation of the principles of ecological farming. He also invited co-op consumers to pay periodic visits so that he could interact with his consumers. He argued that Taiwan lacked consumer education regarding fish farming practices. He did this on his farm to help consumers understand his practices and to understand the relationships between long-term environmental sustainability and food safety. Consumers could avoid mutual misunderstandings with Po-fang by building personal trust and communication rather than relying on a TAP label. Ecological fish farmers used this method to justify charging higher prices for their products in Taiwan. Actors involved in aquaculture governance, such as veterinarians, observed the ecological fish farmers’ practices that went beyond what the traceability system requires. For example, veterinarians in Chiayi County integrated Po-fang’s ideas about ecological aquaculture into their education content when they delivered their talks on aquaculture knowledge and food safety. The veterinarians stressed that fish farmers should prevent rather than treat fish diseases. Preparing for a healthy pond environment became the major educational discourse of veterinarians. In his

154 Ms. Tao, a marketing manager of a fish farm: interview, March 16, 2015. 155 Po-fang, a fish farmer: interview, March 24, 2014. 96

publication on fish health in aquaculture, Hsieh (2014: 20), who was a renowned veterinarian in Taiwan, emphasized that good environmental conditions can deter fish disease from breaking out. These changing fish farming practices are the outcomes of interactions between the top- down restructuring and traceability and the bottom-up practice of ecological aquaculture. The interactions between fish farmers and veterinarians illustrate that environmentality as an analytical tool cannot fully explain how Taiwanese aquaculture has changed since 1992. Governmentality, the major concept related to this tool, overstressed the dissemination of power from governing institutions to local communities. The concept is useful in this chapter for exploring how the government intended to modify fish farmers’ practices to encourage more sustainable practices. Using Li’s (2007b) term, the Taiwanese government’s “will to improve” is documented. Agents, such as veterinarians and marine biologists, played key roles in fishing communities and certification agencies to develop networks for sustainability governance. In this process, environmentality is a useful tool for examining how these agents influence fish farmers’ pond management practices to meet drug residue standards in their seafood. The development of pond management methods, however, was an outcome of fish farmers’ integrating ideas and practices into their choices when determining how to meet the standards. More importantly, fish farmers practised pond management that can exceed the requirements. They were motivated by potential markets that preferred “non-toxic” and “ecological” seafood. In other words, consumers’ preferences along the supply chain provided fish farmers with incentives to participate in sustainability governance. The government, as an official said, was “left behind by the ecological farmers in terms of contributing to a more sustainable Earth.” 156

VI. Conclusion

I have delineated the development of the regulations, institutions, and strategies involved in the governance of Taiwanese aquaculture. The technique of artificial propagation of marine finfish in Taiwan caused both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, a stable supply of fish fry facilitated the rapid growth of Taiwanese aquaculture. On the other hand, fish farmers fell into a vicious cycle, yiwofeng, which resulted in fluctuating unit prices and food

156 Mr. Zhao, a Chiayi County government official; interview, March 8, 2014. 97

safety problems. Environmental degradation, such as land subsidence, also occurred to reduce sustainability. The former Aquaculture Kingdom faced economic and ecological crises. The Taiwanese government restructured the sector to create a more sustainable form of production. It established aquaculture zones and helped fish farmers organize themselves. It also introduced traceability to add value to Taiwanese products that compete with those from other countries in global and domestic markets. The case of Taiwanese aquaculture shows the emerging forms of governing practices that enhance sustainability and food safety in the seafood supply chains. The Taiwanese government used the aquaculture restructuring and traceability system to enhance food safety, improve the environment, and strengthen the competitiveness of Taiwanese seafood. It set up new institutions and introduced new services to shape fish farmers’ environmental subjectivity, including their consciousness and pond management behaviours. Marine biologists and veterinarians became more influential in shaping fish farmers’ environmental subjectivity and enhancing food safety. The new traceability system was the government’s tool to ensure that fish farmers meet international food standards. However, it had limited capacity to enhance environmental sustainability. Some fish farmers practised their own ecological fish farming to respond to the shortcomings of the traceability systems in economic and ecological terms. Their behaviours inspired veterinarians to promote a form of environmental management that highlights fish disease prevention. Bush and Oosverteer (2007: 385) note that “the control and management over . . . [the] resources [of fishermen and shrimp farmers], . . . collectively termed governance, has also expanded to include networks of state and non-state actors at multiple spatial and political scales, from local to global.” The target of enhancing sustainability at ecological, economic, and social levels has been incorporated in such governance in Taiwan. My case contributes to the current scholarly literature that emphasizes how actors interact to shape the practices of environmental management and traceability. Specifically, the practices of individual fish farmers form a bottom-up approach to modifying the discourses and practices of other actors, such as veterinarians, in sustainability governance. The interactions produce diverse methods for achieving environmental sustainability and food safety in aquaculture. Regulatory practices can be complementary to fish farmers’ agency in further enhancing environmental management. I

98

argue that local variations of sustainability governance, especially those caused by the bottom-up forces of fish farmers, facilitated the localization of traceability in Taiwanese aquaculture. Taiwanese fish farmers categorize their practices as conventional, “non-toxic,” and ecological aquaculture based on their perspectives and uses of veterinary drugs, and also their efforts to market their products. Conventional fish farmers, who constitute the majority, follow regulations pertaining to veterinary drug use to supply seafood to mainstream distribution systems. Some fish farmers joined the traceability certification program and marketed their products as “non- toxic” seafood to bolster consumers’ trust in their brands and the food safety of their products. Ecological fish farmers, who by law cannot claim to be “organic fish famers”, have stopped using veterinary drugs. They market their products by strengthening their reach to domestic consumers who are scared by food safety incidents in Taiwan and the world. This chapter has presented the case of Taiwanese aquaculture to delineate a trend towards sustainability governance of aquaculture and the development of traceability. Myriad actors interact to enhance environmental sustainability related to pond management. The new practices fit the traceability system, which targets food quality. The interactions of multiple actors in aquaculture, including fish farmers, veterinarians, marine biologists, and the state, led to diverse methods to enhance environmental sustainability and food safety in aquaculture. In Taiwanese aquaculture, the existence of ecological fish farmers, who insist on avoiding veterinary drugs, shows that fish farmers express their agency through their farm management choices. Although the market is too small to support their behaviour, their insistence illustrates an alternative way to balance economy and ecology that may lead to a more sustainable aquaculture. Both ecological and economic sustainability are key in keeping the ecological fish farmers’ businesses alive. The outcomes of localizing traceability as a form of sustainability governance in aquaculture vary in fish farmers’ experiences. Such enhanced management does not enable fish farmers to use traceability as a value-adding tool. The example of Po-fang has illustrated that ecological fish farmers have explored alternative markets by developing their own networks with consumers. Both non-toxic and ecological fish farmers have diversified their markets to add value to their products. The added monetary value and further enhancement of environmental management techniques, by facilitating the food chain in the ponds, have provided incentives to do more than what TGAP and TAP require. Local variations in sustainability governance,

99

especially those caused by the bottom-up forces of fish farmers, exist in Taiwan when global traceability intersects with the historical development of Taiwanese aquaculture restructuring.

100

CHAPTER THREE: MILKFISH–SHRIMP POLYCULTURE IN SOUTHWEST

TAIWAN

This chapter focuses on intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture and the local knowledge of fish farmers in Taiwan. I examine fish farmers’ pond management and their daily lives in southwest Taiwan. My data show that Taiwanese fish farmers have used their local knowledge of milkfish–shrimp polyculture to sustain the production of white-leg shrimp, a foreign species that became a high-value seafood product in the context of global–local dynamics. The farmers practise intensive polyculture to enhance the shrimp’s survival rate and to diversify their sources of income. They sustain their rural livelihoods and lifestyle, which are affected by modernization and globalization. The case studies in this chapter show how Taiwanese fish farmers localize white-leg shrimp production with their milkfish production to join the global economy without industrializing their aquaculture under the control of transnational corporations. By doing so, they maintain the power to make individual economic decisions in a smallholder economy without being dominated by large-scale businesses or transnational corporations. This case study delineates the interactions between and among seafood supply chains, food production, and fish farmers’ daily lives. Shrimp farming has been a development strategy at the global level since the 1970s. The average annual growth rate of the global shrimp sector has been 8.9% since then (Paul and Vogl 2012: 995). Tiger prawn and white-leg shrimp (白蝦)157 “comprise around 80% of the total farmed shrimp production” in 2008 (Bush et al. 2010: 15). Political ecologists have documented the environmental and social impacts of exported-oriented shrimp farming in the Global South. Governments, development agencies, and corporations help fish farmers intensify production to satisfy global market demand. Mangrove forests are converted to shrimp ponds. These practices often cause environmental degradation and social injustice (Paul and Vogl 2012; Stonich et al. 1997). Disease outbreaks undermine the development of shrimp sectors. Early Mortality Syndrome (EMS) depleted the global shrimp supply and hence the increase in market prices in

157 Chi. baixia ; sci.: Penaeus vannamei. 101

2012 and 2013 (FAO 2014: 58). 158 Scholars, such as Bush et.al (2010: 20), suggest investigating shrimp aquaculture as a “complex social–ecological system,” exploring how producers manage environmental factors to strengthen the capacity of shrimp to “coexist with the pathogen.” One possible solution that scientists found is fish farmers practising is polyculture, which provides ecological and economic benefits to local communities. Wang and Lu (2016: 2364) define polyculture as a practice of keeping more than two species “differing in behaviour, habits and ecological requirements . . . [to] effectively increase production in the same pond.” Fish farmers have practised polyculture in some countires, such as China, “in past millennia” (Nash 2011: 14). Fish farmers have used polyculture to maintain brackish-water pond environments. Cruz et al. (2008) report that Filipino fish farmers raise tilapia and white-leg shrimp in the same ponds. Tilapia maintains the plankton composition in the ponds and stabilizes water quality; such a pond environment helps prevent the outbreak of white-spot disease, which threatens the production of shrimp (ibid.). Polyculture is also practised as a form of livelihood diversification. In Indonesia, milkfish–shrimp polyculture provides “both food security and export earnings” (Troell 2009: 60); fish farmers grow shrimp for the international market and milkfish for the domestic market. In chapter two, I delineated the development of Taiwanese aquaculture as affected by trade, food safety, and sustainability. This chapter further explores how and why Simu fish farmers, based in southwest Taiwan, adopt and modify their polyculture practices to respond to the globalization of seafood. The case of milkfish–shrimp polyculture in southwest Taiwan illustrates how and why fish farmers select a particular type of pond management. I use Simu village as an example to examine the social, economic, and political factors that affect the fish farmers’ decisions. I present the perspectives and practices of Simu fish farmers (sample size: 33). Their experiences with milkfish–shrimp polyculture reflect historical changes in this farming practice. I also explain why Simu fish farmers made their choice to use milkfish–shrimp polyculture as their basic means of livelihood. Their diversification of farming practices, jobs, and business will be discussed in chapters four and six.

158 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. 102

This chapter is organized in the following sequence. Simu fish farmers localize and farm a foreign shrimp species―white-leg shrimp―together with milkfish in the same ponds. The fish farmers integrate intensive milkfish–shrimp farming into their “traditional” annual production cycles. They observe and respond to climatic, soil, and water conditions as well as the behaviours of the fish and shrimp. They use various technologies and techniques to farm fish and shrimp. Their decision to live in rural Taiwan as fish farmers is a choice to sustain livelihoods and the rural lifestyle, and to fulfill family obligations.

I. The Changing Brackish-water Aquaculture in Southwest Taiwan

Historical Changes in Aquaculture Practices in Southwest Taiwan Taiwanese fish farmers have selected various species in their polyculture throughout history. Historian Tseng (2012) describes how the milkfish aquaculture sector was developed and commercialized in southwest Taiwan during the late 17 th century. Along the coastline of southwest Taiwan, rich people invested in the sector and employed labour to construct brackish- water fish ponds. Local people became tenant fish farmers or bought ponds to practise milkfish farming (ibid.). Over hundreds of years, more ponds were constructed after the river mouths had silted up. 159 Fish farmers formed new villages close to their fish ponds (including Simu, which is located in southwest Taiwan; see Photo 3.1a and 3.1b). Tseng emphasizes that the development of extensive milkfish farming had satisfied domestic demand from urban areas in Taiwan (ibid.: 40). Milkfish was high value and was consumed by urban elites. Fish farmers farmed milkfish with tiger prawn in a form of polyculture. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture is currently a major practice in southwest Taiwan, but there are no extensive milkfish ponds. Fish farmers practise intensive polyculture and replace tiger prawn with white-leg shrimp, a foreign species, to adapt to the need to address environmental problems. They use milkfish, the value of which dropped after the success of artificial propagation, to increase the production volume of white-leg shrimp. Although extensive milkfish–prawn polyculture was a tradition in Simu before the tiger prawn fever (1981–88), its

159 The older ponds are mostly inland ponds and their sources of brackish water might finally disappear. These ponds might then become freshwater ponds for carp farming (Tseng 2012). 103

practices had already been changing. One change is a shift from the use of chemicals to organic inputs. For example, Ah-shin, a fish farmer, kept an edited volume called Fish Farming (Deng 1979)—which came from the leading Taiwanese marine biologists of the last 1970s—as her reference when she first learned milkfish farming. The chapter about milkfish suggested using insecticides to kill unwanted worms in the milkfish farm. After the aquaculture restructuring in 1992, marine biologists and veterinarians stressed the ecological functions of pond preparation and organic substances such as tea-seed cake. Another change was that Taiwanese fish farmers have now shifted to intensive farming. They integrated intensive aquaculture into their “traditional” annual production cycles and polyculture practices. The third change is that the fish farmers now pay for harvest workers to come once per production cycle to harvest all the fish in a pond. In contrast to the three harvest times of extensive farming, fish farmers now sell the fish after they reach the market size of one catty.

Photo 3.1a. Milkfish ponds in Taiwan in 1927. Source: Database of Taiwanese Old Photos, National Taiwan University, 2007. 160 higher (coastal)<<<<< salinity >>>>> lower (inland)

160 Source: http://photo.lib.ntu.edu.tw/pic/db/detail.jsp?dtd_id=32&id=17807&3&pk=seq&showlevel=2 . 104

Photo 3.1b. Simu (right) and fish ponds (including those on the left and right side of the central road) in 2017. Note: Simu fish farmers rented some ponds from surrounding villages (e.g., the left of this photo). The ponds were smaller than those in 1980. Aerators (white dots in the ponds) could be found in most fish ponds. Source: ©Google Earth 2017, Chiayi County, Taiwan.

Since the 1960s, rural–urban migration and modernization have changed the landscape and social life of rural communities in Taiwan, including those along the southwest coast. Huang (2013) recorded that rural–urban migration, together with mechanization, has undermined the social organization of rural agricultural villages since the 1970s. In addition, traditional rice farming faced a huge decline, dropping from 770,000 ha in 1988 to 258,000 ha in 2005, especially as the government lacked effective policies to strengthen the rice farmers’ competitiveness after Taiwan entered the WTO (ibid.: 22–23). Fishing communities, which were generally more affluent than farming communities, also faced rural decline. Budai Township, where Simu village is located, is a coastal township in Chiayi County. Budai faced a major landscape change between the 1980s and 2000s. Adjacent to brackish-water fish ponds, there were 517 ha of salt pans in 1997 (Kuo and Wang 2013). During the 1980s, the state-owned Taiwan Salt company adopted mechanization, which involved clearing the mangrove forest. By the early 2000s, the company stopped operating the salt pans and imported salt from Australia.

105

The abandoned salt pans, which are all national property, became wetlands which attracted migrant birds. Petrochemical companies once planned to set up their plants on this land, but local environmentalists succeeded in stopping this plan (Hsieh and Ho 2011; also interview in 2015). 161 A change in county government leadership and new policies of the Fisheries Agency reoriented the development of the abandoned saltpans from the petrochemical industry to tourism. Developing coastal tourism through agrotourism and ecotourism has been encouraged by the Fisheries Agency, which has included tourism as one of its key policies to help fishing communities adapt to the potential impacts of Taiwan’s WTO membership (COA 2001). 162 However, local fish farmers generally did not convert their businesses to tourism. In Chiayi County, there were four recreational fish farms in 2013. 163 Fourteen of 1,316 rafts were licensed for recreational purposes. Fish farmers continued with the production of seafood for the market as their major livelihood strategy.

The New White-leg Shrimp Farming Until the 1970s, Taiwanese fish farmers practised extensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture in brackish-water ponds. The local term for extensive aquaculture is qianpingshi yangzhi (淺坪 式養殖), which means fish farming in shallow-water ponds. There were three major features of extensive farming in these ponds. First, a pond was usually at least 10 jia in area and at most 40 cm deep (Liao and Leaño 2010b: 133). Ah-shan, a fish farmer in his seventies, recalled that fish farmers typically stocked 2,000 milkfish in one annual production cycle; the total number of fish stock was approximately 6,000 per jia .164 Second, benthic algae grew in the ponds and became milkfish’s major source of food. Fish farmers also fed the milkfish with rice bran and peanut cake. Third, milkfish fry and shrimp larvae were wild-caught. They purchased milkfish fry from middlemen, who collected them from fishermen who caught them on the coast. Fish farmers caught the larvae of tiger prawn in dikes after rainfall and then raised them in

161 A local historian and environmental activist: interview, February 22, 2015. 162 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=3979 . 163 Internal document, collected from Chiayi County government: March 24, 2014. 164 Ah-shan, a fish farmer: interview, July 22, 2014. 106

milkfish ponds. Other crustacean species, such as greasyback shrimp (沙蝦)165 and mud crabs (紅蟳), 166 were farmed as additional sources of income. In the 1980s, tiger prawn was the most popular species among Taiwanese fish farmers. They practised monoculture to maximize production. Viral diseases such as Monodon-type Baculovirus (MPV) and White-spot Syndrome Virus (WSSV) caused low yields and economic losses in global shrimp production (Paul and Vogl 2012). The Taiwanese tiger prawn sector declined after 1988 because of bad pond management and subsequent disease outbreaks (Chart 3.1 and 3.2). According to Wang (2001), some fish farmers in southwest Taiwan practised polyculture of milkfish and tiger prawn in the late 1980s to rejuvenate the tiger prawn sector. Milkfish eat algae that destabilize water quality if they proliferate. The fish farmers used milkfish to control the algal growth. Wang notes that fish farmers in the 1990s generally believed that “polyculture is closer to the natural environment” (ibid.: 100) The degraded environment prevented the rejuvenation of the tiger prawn sector. White-leg shrimp, originally from Latin America, were introduced to Taiwan in the mid-1990s. 167 Fish farmers replaced tiger prawn with white-leg shrimp. They selected it to replace tiger prawn as the major penaeid shrimp because of its adaptation to local pond environments, its high market value, and an established supply chain in Taiwan that provides a cheap source of shrimp larvae. Disease outbreaks in shrimp farming were less serious afterwards. White-leg shrimp became the most heavily farmed marine shrimp in Taiwan beginning in 2001 (Chart 3.1).

165 Chi.: shaxia ; sci.: Metapenaeus ensis. 166 Chi: hongxun ; sci.: Scylla serrata. 167 A shrimp broodstock broker: interview, March 13, 2015. 107

0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 Tonnes 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Year Quantity of white-leg shrimp Quantity of tiger prawn

Chart 3.1. Quantities of farmed tiger prawn and white-leg shrimp in Taiwan (1975– 2015). Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

12 10 8 6 4

TWD billion 2 0 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Year

value of white-leg shrimp value of tiger prawn

Chart 3.2. Values of farmed tiger prawn and white-leg shrimp in Taiwan (1975– 2015). Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

108

The Growth of Intensive Polyculture Intensive aquaculture in Taiwan is called either jiyueshi yangzhi (集約式養殖; intensive fish farming) or shenshuishi yangzhi (深水式養殖; deep-water fish farming). The intensity of stock varies depending on the species and pond locations. The optimal scale is calculated to include minimal disease outbreaks and maximum output. Fish farmers find the optimal scale of polyculture in a pond by gradually decreasing intensity and adjusting the proportion of the species stocked. This takes at least three farming cycles. Po-fang, in contrast, first decreased intensity to 30% of his original volume of stock. Within five years, he gradually increased the volume of stock to the optimal scale. In 2014, Simu fish farmers stocked approximately 7,000 milkfish and one million shrimp (about 0.5 million each time with a one-month interval) in one- jia ponds to a depth of 1.5 m. Some fish ponds in south Taiwan could be as deep as 5 m to keep more than 20,000 milkfish. The milkfish fry and shrimp larvae come from hatcheries which carry out propagation. The bottoms of deep-water ponds do not provide ideal conditions for benthic algae to grow. The high quantity of milkfish increases the labour costs of manual feeding. Fish farmers apply aerators, automatic feeders, and feed pellets to practise intensive aquaculture. Artificial propagation involved in Taiwanese milkfish–shrimp polyculture is an example of the global–local dynamics of aquaculture. Milkfish have been raised in Taiwan for four centuries and are highly localized in aquaculture. Taiwan imported Filipino milkfish fry to satisfy high demand in the early and mid-20 th century. After the breakthrough of artificial propagation of milkfish in 1983, Taiwan has had two sources of milkfish fry―local hatcheries in south Taiwan and hatcheries in Indonesia. There are larvae-rearing farms in southwest Taiwan to keep the larvae until they grow to one or two inches. Fish farmers can also buy fish fry from ponds that keep the fry until they reach 3–4 inches, 5–6 inches, or 7–8 inches. Some fish farmers directly purchase one-inch fry for stocking. White-leg shrimp originates in Latin America. Hatcheries keep some farmed shrimp until they become sexually mature as broodstock. The artificial propagation of white-leg shrimp is identical to that of tiger prawn, which the white-leg shrimp succeeded in 1968. Hatcheries supply post-larvae, which are called âng-kin (紅筋)168 in Hokkien because of their red appearance, to rearing stations where the post-larvae are kept for

168 Chi. hongjin . 109

two weeks until they grow to oo-khak (黑殼)169 which are black. The rearing station owners regulate water salinity to make oo-khak adapt to particular degrees of salinity. This is an important transitional period for oo-khak to adapt to grow-out ponds in particular degrees of salinity. Milkfish farmers tell the owners the pond water salinity before then buy oo-khak for stocking. The newly stocked oo-khak in grow-out ponds are first fed with enzymes. When they start growing more rapidly, fish farmers feed them and milkfish with milkfish feed pellet. Together with the use of automatic feeders and the practice of digging deeper ponds in the 1970s and 1980s, most of the inland ponds in Taiwan are now deep-water ponds (at least 1m in depth). These changes allowed fish farmers to practise intensive farming to increase the production volume per hectare. Intensive inland aquaculture requires aerators in ponds to maintain an adequate oxygen supply. During the 1960s, Taiwanese eel farmers introduced paddlewheel aerators from Japan. Since the late 1970s, aerators have become an essential input for Taiwanese aquaculture due to the conversion from shallow-water to deep-water ponds (Wang 2001). The use of automatic feeders and feed involves fish farmers’ practical knowledge (Photo 3.3 and 3.4). A researcher who worked for a feed manufacturing plant shared his experience in promoting the new milkfish feed pellets in the mid-1970s: I was the first one to develop the milkfish feed pellets. . . . I had tested feeding the milkfish and achieved the feed conversion rate of 1:1.2. I rented a pond to show them my result. I dug the pond to the depth of 1.5 m. The depth of pond water reached 1.2 m. I stocked 7,000 fish and used the automatic feeder to shoot the feed pellets. The fish farmers nearby came to see how I fed the fish. They were surprised that the fish kept eating the feed. 170

When fish farmers witnessed the success of automatic feeders, these machines became widely utilized in Taiwanese aquaculture. Fish feed manufacturing plants design various formulas for feed pellets, balancing the proportions of oil, protein, mineral, and vitamins that support particular stages of fish growth. The feed pellets vary in diameter, shape, and density.

169 Chi. heike . 170 A researcher working for a feed manufacturing plant, interview, April 3, 2015. 110

Photo 3.3. An automatic feeder (front) and a fish farm worker spraying feed around the pond. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Photo 3.4. Milkfish feed pellet inside an automatic feeder. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

111

Table 3.1a. Area of monoculture and polyculture in inland aquaculture (2003–2015), selected species (milkfish and white-leg shrimp) (unit: hectare).

Mono- Poly- Mono- Poly- culture culture Mono- Poly- culture culture (Total (Total culture culture (white-leg (white-leg Year area) area) (milkfish) (milkfish) shrimp) shrimp) 2003 21,099.19 20,479.07 5,191.29 4,787.22 1,724.12 1,449.49 2004 21,904.13 16,225.93 5,878.57 2,805.03 1,601.93 996.34 2005 21,275.60 16,193.57 5,667.71 3,194.92 1,742.38 990.04 2006 20,869.20 17,308.85 5,393.86 3,603.71 1,471.49 861.84 2007 19,552 18,115.97 5,406.76 3,435.82 1,367.58 938.32 2008 20,691.84 18,970.42 5,333.17 3,791.50 1,355.78 1,184.46 2009 14,117.95 11,065.89 4,372.37 4,696.15 999.02 1,366.43 2010 13,142.96 10,932.20 4,665.89 5,274.27 634.65 1,637.92 2011 14,114.53 23,164 3,788.32 7,153.75 557.84 1,976.60 2012 12,641.81 23,292.89 2,616.29 8,821.57 430.95 935.32 2013 15,565.81 18,598.07 4,139.92 5,689.96 574.97 1,064.84 2014 17,604.42 15,422.17 3,956.02 5,909.56 928.31 859.53 2015 15,863.50 16,529.41 3,738.16 6,124.02 523.22 1,055.34 Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

112

Table 3.1b. Area of monoculture and polyculture in inland aquaculture (2003– 2015), selected species (grouper and giant freshwater prawn) (unit: hectare).

Monoculture Polyculture (giant (giant freshwater freshwater Monoculture Polyculture Year prawn) prawn) (grouper) (grouper) 2003 2,359.37 50 870.35 294.25 2004 2,311.01 94 1,467.30 73.16 2005 2,103.06 19.05 1,357.89 42.44 2006 2,145.62 106.92 1,477.83 40.84 2007 1,825.83 124.3 1,423.72 130.59 2008 1,948.20 38.80 1,431.87 104.84 2009 1,540.45 42.47 1,559.89 120.89 2010 1,496.21 54.8 1,942.10 96.97 2011 1,391.81 166.28 2,014.94 109.24 2012 1,541.12 19.25 2,002.34 309.46 2013 1,642.14 11.63 2,128.65 86.38 2014 1,506.74 43.35 1,962.87 64.69 2015 1,406.59 64.31 1,898.25 60.21 Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

The practice of polyculture is not limited to Simu. It has become a nationwide practice with varying combinations of species. Tables 3.1a and 3.1b show the trends in monoculture and polyculture in Taiwanese inland aquaculture between 2003 and 2015. Table 3.1a indicates that the total area of polyculture slightly exceeded that of monoculture beginning in 2011 (except for 2014). As of 2010, polyculture became the major practice for milkfish and white-leg shrimp farming. As I have shown, milkfish–shrimp polyculture was popularized for a better pond environment and production. Table 3.1b shows that monoculture of grouper and giant freshwater prawn remained a dominant practice over polyculture. Five factors affect Taiwanese fish farmers’ decisions regarding polyculture combinations. First, they must understand the traits of the species. Intensive monoculture is practised in south

113

and southwest Taiwan. Grouper farming is mostly intensive monoculture because of their carnivorous traits. Fish farmers can keep both carnivores and herbivores in the same pond. The mixed farming of carnivores (which eat sick and dead fish) and herbivores (which consume algae) can facilitate pond management. In this situation, the ratio between carnivores and herbivores is key to the output. If there are too many carnivores and they are not fed properly, other fish and shrimp will be eaten. The second factor is climatic conditions. Farmed fish species in Taiwan can be categorized as tropical or subtropical fish. South Taiwan has a tropical climate and higher average temperatures than southwest Taiwan. Fish farmers in south Taiwan farm mainly tropical fish. In southwest Taiwan, fish farmers farm both subtropical and tropical fish, but they sell tropical fish before winter comes. Overwintered tropical fish may die when cold fronts affect southwest Taiwan. Micro-climates also influence fish farmers’ selections. For example, some places in south Taiwan are colder than other areas because of the hilly landscape, which makes the places more heavily affected by the northeast monsoon. Fish farmers can farm subtropical fish such as mullet there. The polyculture of fish species is therefore subject to the categorization of subtropical and tropical fish and the micro-climate of fish farms. Third, pond salinity affects fish farmers’ choices. Inland fish ponds in Taiwan are categorized as freshwater (淡水),171 brackish-water ( 鹹淡水),172 and salty-water ( 鹹水)173 ponds. brackish-water ponds are considered freshwater ponds because their access to seawater is very limited—only when the high tides bring brackish water to the ponds. Fish farmers know whether their ponds are higher or lower in salinity. This is especially important to fish fry and shrimp larvae. For example, white-leg shrimp larvae and mud crab need seawater to survive. Freshwater ponds and less saline brackish-water ponds are not good environments for them to survive in. During later growing periods, shrimp and some marine fish such as milkfish can be kept in less salty or even freshwater ponds. They are euryhaline and so tolerate a wide range of salinity after the larval stage. They can grow rapidly in low salinity.

171 Chi.: danshui . 172 Chi.: xiandanshui . 173 Chi.: xianshui . 114

Fourth, fish farmers choose to farm various fish and shrimp species based on farm-gate prices. They stock a species if they believe that a profitable farm-gate price will be available at the time of harvest. In 2013, eel production in Chiayi County declined because the wild-caught glass eel (which cannot be propagated) were as expensive as TWD150 each, compared with TWD0.325 for one milkfish fry. The high cost of glass eel was due to strong demand from Japan and also competition between Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese fishermen catching the glass eels (News&Market 2013). 174 Eel monoculture became “gambling” (賭), 175 as fish farmers call it, which would incur losses if farm-gate prices were lower than expected two years later (when the eels grew to market size). Fish farmers in Chiayi County switched to Taiwan tilapia or seabass monoculture. In some cases of carp–milkfish–shrimp polyculture, fish farmers were concerned with how to raise the value of carp, which was a low-value freshwater fish with the ecologically valuable function of eating grass (to reduce labour costs and the use of herbicides).

Milkfish as a “Work” Fish Simu fish farmers use polyculture to protect the environment while maximizing profit. They integrate local knowledge into polyculture to find the optimal form of pond environment to maintain the health of the aquatic species. By doing so, they stabilize the production volume and gain enough income for investment during the next production cycle. Their selection of fish and shrimp species reflects their business decisions, environmental concerns, and local knowledge of multi-species interactions. One example is their continuation of farming milkfish, which they use as both a potential product to sell and as a gongzuoyu (工作魚; “work” fish). This category, including milkfish and other fish in different pond systems, means a co-cultured fish with traits that enhance the pond environment in support of the production of other high-value species. 176 In 2014, Taiwanese milkfish were sold mainly on the domestic market and 16.9% were exported (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014). Milkfish export began after overproduction occurred in the early 1990s. Three standard sizes of milkfish were produced for export: 300–500 g, 500–800 g, and 800 g or above. Simu fish farmers stock milkfish and shrimp in April.

174 Source: https://www.newsmarket.com.tw/blog/26002/ . 175 Chi.: du . 176 Other examples of “work” fish in Taiwan include grass crap, grouper, and tilapia. 115

Milkfish take at least three months to grow to market size (1 catty in the domestic market). 177 The harvest season starts in July and ends in November. Fish farmers pay harvest workers to harvest all milkfish at any day during this period of time (milkfish distribution is detailed in chapter four). Nearly all of the Taiwanese white-leg shrimp are sold on the domestic market. Their price is closely related to the global market because Taiwan also imports white-leg shrimp. In 2014, Taiwan imported 37,573,103 kg of shrimp and exported 2,035,793 kg of shrimp (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014). Simu fish farmers use a cage to catch the shrimp two times per day. They sell the shrimp to dealers, who collect the shrimp for local distributors, who in turn, sell the shrimp to wholesalers in urban areas. Fish farmers start to sell the shrimp when they grow to the standard of 40/50, meaning about 40–50 shrimps per catty. The larger the shrimp (e.g., 20/30), the more expensive it is. Five dealers are Simu villagers who charged TWD5 per catty of shrimp, no matter the size of the harvest. Four cases are family businesses run by couples. One case involves two brothers working together. The dealers collect two kinds of shrimp. One is live shrimp ( 活蝦);178 the dealers drive their trucks with oxygen supplies to collect the shrimp. Another is ice-chilled shrimp ( 冰蝦); 179 fish farmers use their motorcycles to deliver the shrimp to a station set up by the dealers in the villages, or they wait for the dealers to drive their trucks to their farms. Simu fish farmers diversify their sources of income by practising milkfish–shrimp polyculture. Simu fish farmers have three major reasons for farming white-leg shrimp with milkfish. First, this form of milkfish–shrimp polyculture requires lower input costs than monoculture of most marine finfish, such as groupers. Milkfish feed, which could be used to feed the shrimp, was TWD450 (30 kg), whereas the price of grouper feed was TWD1,350 (20 kg) in 2014. Second, the survival rate of milkfish in Taiwanese aquaculture could reach more than 90% because it had no detrimental diseases (Lee 1984: 187). Simu fish farmers estimated that the survival rate of white-leg shrimp was 10% in intensive monoculture. The polyculture of the shrimp and milkfish could increase the survival rate of the shrimp to 20%, while the survival rate

177 1 catty=600 g. 178 Chi: huoxia . 179 Chi.: bingxia . 116

of milkfish did not drop. Therefore, farming milkfish and white-leg shrimp together was beneficial to production. Third, fish farmers in southwest Taiwan had fewer high-value marine finfish choices for farming when compared with their counterparts in south Taiwan. Some of these high-value fish needed more than one year to grow to marketable sizes, but they could not survive the winters in southwest Taiwan. Shrimp are relatively persistent in winter. Milkfish farmers sell their milkfish by the end of autumn, while they often keep some shrimp in early winter for sale when the total supply decreases. Taiwanese aquaculture was less affected by the recent viral disease, which reduced global white-leg shrimp production, compared with other countries. EMS, a newly emerging shrimp disease, was first found in China in 2009 and then spread to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Latin America (Zorriehzahra and Banaederakhshan 2015). Between 2013 and 2014, it caused high mortality rates of white-leg shrimp monoculture in Southeast Asia and Latin America. The global production shortfall resulted in a market price that rose from US 9.7 cents per pound in September 2012 to US8.08 cents per pound in April 2014 (IndexMundi 2016). 180 The changing global shrimp supply caused fluctuations in wholesale prices and farm-gate prices (the prices that a fish farmer receives) in Taiwan (Chuang 2005). There are three major factors affecting shrimp prices. First, fish farmers’ incentives to produce shrimp are related to the costs of production and transportation. Second, climatic conditions can favour or undermine the supply and so the price (Liberty Times 2015). 181 Third, disease attacks negatively affect production. In 2014, the first case of EMS was reported in East Taiwan (United Daily 2014a). However, no major outbreak occurred. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture, which diversifies fish farmers’ incomes and increases output of the white-leg shrimp, continued to be practised in southwest Taiwan. Simu fish farmers pointed out that polyculture is the major reason they were spared from the global shrimp disease outbreaks. They emphasized the ecological value of milkfish. In addition to the economic function, fish farmers now call milkfish gongzuoyu. In cases other than milkfish–shrimp polyculture, fish farmers add about 500 milkfish to grow-out ponds with mullet (normally one to two jia ) and those with hard clams (or common oriental clams; 文蛤). They

180 Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=shrimp&months=180 . 181 Source: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/1495120 . 117

found the mullets to be healthier and needing fewer veterinary drugs in a polyculture that includes milkfish. In clam farming, which requires a shallow water level (30–40 cm), milkfish, as a “herbivore,” 182 can consume the excessive algae that blocks the sunlight from reaching the clams (an essential element for their growth). By doing so, the milkfish cuts the labour costs for clam farmers to achieve algae clearance. It is worth noting that the farmers improve the pond environment by using fewer drugs and antibiotics. The cultural meaning of milkfish has changed from that of a high-value product to a product providing both income and ecological functions. 183 The selection of milkfish as a “work” fish in intensive aquaculture reflects the particular historical development of polyculture in southwest Taiwan. Milkfish was once a high-value commodity. The technological breakthrough of artificial propagation and the effective techniques of milkfish farming that fish farmers use, which are locally adapted, caused overproduction and hence reduced milkfish’s market value. Milkfish, however, continued to be an important species for farming. Its ecological value was re-discovered by fish farmers when they faced the possibility of shrimp disease outbreaks. The introduced white-leg shrimp was co- cultured with milkfish. Milkfish as a “work” fish in Simu have two major phases of life. First, they are raised to maintain pond conditions to facilitate the growth of shrimp. Second, they grow up simultaneously to generate income for fish farmers. Some fish also perform an alternative social function if they are not sold on the market. They become gifts that strengthen fish farmers’ social networks in the community. Simu fish farmers’ selection of milkfish arises from trial-and-error farm experiences. These include the failure of tiger prawn farming, the shift from monoculture to polyculture, and the changing use of water resources due to the farmers’ increasing environmental consciousness.

182 Liao and Leaño (2010b: 131) define milkfish scientifically as omnivores. The local fish farmers regard milkfish as “herbivores” based on their observation of the fish’s algae consumption. 183 The work milkfish serves an additional social purpose. Milkfish grow bigger than normal market sizes in these co-cultural ponds where farm mullets or clams have also been grown for more than a year. Simu fish farmers usually share the harvested milkfish as gifts to maintain social relationships. Ah-shin, my host and a fish farmer, shared some milkfish in harvest with harvest workers in addition to paying their wages. Milkfish grown in the highly salinated clam ponds are a delicacy among the fish farmers, similar to wild-caught marine fish. In Chinese food culture, saltwater fish is tastier than freshwater fish due to the absence of a muddy flavour and the presence of better texture. In Taiwanese brackish-water aquaculture, the degree of salinity defines whether a fish is a saltwater or a freshwater species. Saltywater milkfish as a gift is useful for maintaining good relationships with neighbours and fellow fish farmers, who in turn can offer help with day-to-day farm routines. Therefore, although the market value of milkfish has decreased over the years, fish farmers stress its use value in ecological and social terms. 118

Local knowledge of polyculture has been used to make aquaculture profitable and also environmentally responsible. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture has thus been determined to be more environmentally friendly in comparison with intensive tiger prawn monoculture. Although fish farmers lost the profit margin that they had gained in the 1980s, their conversion to milkfish- shrimp polyculture cut their labour cost, diversified their sources of income, and improved the environment. The fish farmers still, therefore, had motivation to practise aquaculture on a full- time or part-time basis. This trend has made aquaculture sustainable in southwest Taiwan across ecological, economic, and social dimensions.

II. Pond Management During Annual Production Cycles

Simu fish farmers emphasize good pond management that maintains the health of fish and shrimp. By maintaining a normal growth rate in their fish and shrimp, the fish farmers meet their expected production volume at the end of each production cycle. The dead and living algae, fish, and shrimp are part of the pond system. Fish farmers “enrich” (養)184 a pond’s nutrients and manage the balance of various nonhuman actuants. Their practices adapt to climatic, soil, and water conditions, which keep changing over the course of annual production cycles. In the case of milkfish–shrimp polyculture in Taiwan, Taiwanese fish farmers regulate water quality by interacting with rain, pond water, oxygen, fish, shrimp, algae, etc. This is a selective process which requires them to use their knowledge, skills, and experience to manage their fish ponds. Those beneficial to fish and shrimp growth are favoured. Unwanted predators are eliminated. Simu fish farmers practise annual milkfish–shrimp farming cycles to maintain a good pond environment. The cycles are similar to those observed during the time of extensive farming. A cycle includes draining (清池),185 soil turn over (整池),186 pond drying (曬池),187 flooding (引

184 Chi.: yang . 185 Chi.: qingchi . 186 Chi.: zhengchi . 187 Chi.: shaichi . 119

水),188 enriching water (養水), 189 stocking (放養),190 feeding (餵魚),191 and harvesting (牽魚)192 (Photo 3.5a-k). Pond preparation and enriching the pond water are vital to providing fish and shrimp with a good environment in which to grow up.

Major tasks Periods Pictures a) Draining December to February— fish farmers decide when and how long they drain and dry the pond. Some fish farmers pay for bulldozers to turn over the soil once every three to five years.

b) Soil turn over

188 Chi.: yinshui . 189 Chi.: yangshui ; Hok.: ióng-tsuí. 190 Chi.: fangyang . 191 Chi.: weiyu . It is also called fangsiliao (放飼料; putting the feed into the ponds). 192 Chi.: qianyu ; Hok.: lîng-hî. 120

c) Pond drying

d) Flooding Every March to April, seawater or brackish water is introduced to the pond. There are two practices of weeding: some fish farmers use herbicide to kill weeds on the banks to make farm patrol easy; others cut the weeds manually and use milkfish or crab later, which eat weeds that grow in ponds. e) Enriching March to April—fish water farmers use tea-seed cake and tobacco dust to kill predators such as tilapia, in the water. The fish farmers then nurture algae with the decomposed organic matter. The white bubble disappears after algae consume the organic matter

121

and grow. The water turns deep green. f) Stocking April to May—fish farmers stock the fish and shrimp. They buy the larvae and fry from hatcheries via brokers. Some of them overwinter the fish (from June to the next year) in one pond and redistribute the fish to other ponds in April. Overwinter fish ponds are mostly located next to g) Overwinter houses, which serve fish division as windbreakers.

122

h) Feeding Everyday practice in shrimp larvae April until the shrimp with yeast are big enough to eat feed.

i) Patrolling and Everyday practice feeding milkfish from April to and shrimp with November: feed pellets Automatic feeders (at the back) are used to minimize labour costs.

) Bi-daily From June to shrimp December, fish harvesting with farmers collect a shrimp trap shrimp two times per day. Shrimp enter the trap during high tides. Brokers come to collect the shrimp. The daily harvesting of the shrimp when they reach the acceptable market size is done to avoid the potential loss of profit. Although

123

larger-sized shrimp can be sold at higher prices, sick shrimp can only be sold, at most, at half its original price. Dead shrimp cannot be sold. Fish farmers keep selling the live shrimp to secure some income from shrimp during the production season of milkfish. k) Milkfish Any day from July to harvesting (once November; most in a production harvest workers are cycle) men, but there is no gender restriction. They are paid by fish farmers to harvest the milkfish once a year.

Photo 3.5a-k. An annual cycle of intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture in Simu. Source: Author’s field data and photographs (2014).

In southwest Taiwan, fish farmers follow a piece of folk wisdom that originated in extensive fish farming (yangyu xian yangshui, yangshui xian yangtu 養魚先養水，養水先養 土)193 to practise intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture. This saying means that one should enrich the soil and water to create a favourable pond environment before raising fish. Scientists refer to this process as “pond preparation” (Liao and Leaño 2010a: 148). Pond preparation was

193 Hok.: ióng-hî sian ióng-tsuí, ióng-tsuí sian ióng-thóo. 124

part of the annual production cycle when Simu fish farmers practised extensive milkfish–prawn polyculture. The process includes draining, soil turn over, pond drying, flooding, and enriching water (Photo 3.5 a-e). The fish farmers use the same pond preparation steps in their intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture. Simu fish farmers undertake pond preparation between December and March. They drain the pond and catch the remaining shrimp after harvesting milkfish in November.194 The pond bottom has accumulated ammonia and nitrate as a result of unconsumed feed, dead algae, and animal excretion. The fish farmers use the ultraviolet sunlight to dry and disinfect the pond bottom. It takes six to eight weeks for the soil’s noxious odour to disappear and the surface of the pond bottom to crack into sections of soil (Photo 3.5c). The fish farmers then apply lime dust to increase the soil’s pH value to prevent acidification of the soil. 195 The next steps after pond preparation include flooding and fertilization. In early March, the fish farmers introduce water into their ponds until the water level reaches one metre. Tilapia, oriental prawn (五鬚蝦), 196 and other predators of shrimp larvae may exist in the ponds. The fish farmers use tea-seed cake and tobacco dust to kill these predators. The organic matter provides nutrients needed for the growth of microalgae, such as blue-green algae (藍綠藻). 197 The fish farmers call this procedure “enriching the pond water” (養水) or “creating the desired colour of pond water” (造水色). 198 They share a local idiom shuiqingwuyu (水清無魚)199 which means “fish disappear when water is clear.” The fish farmers need to stabilize the algae composition, signalled by the colour of pond water, to maintain a suitable pond environment for milkfish and shrimp. In this procedure, fish farmers keep turning the aerators off and on to regulate algal growth. A deep green colour indicates an ideal pond environment for milkfish–shrimp polyculture.

194 Fish farmers use a trap to harvest their shrimp twice a day in the harvest season (from June to December). The shrimp enter the trap when they swim around the pond. 195 According to Taiwan’s Fisheries Research Institute (2016), the best pH value for milkfish to growth is between 7.5 and 9.5. Source: http://www.tfrin.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=159383&ctNode=1225&mp=3 . 196 Chi.: wuxuxia ; sci.: Exopalaemon orientis . 197 Chi.: lanluzao ; sci.: Cyanobacteria. 198 Chi.: zao shuise ; Hok.: tsō-tsuí-sik . 199 Hok.: tsuí-tshing-bô-hî. 125

Simu fish farmers refer to a local proverb, kantianchifan (看天吃飯),200 which means “how much rice one can eat depends on the sky,” to indicate the uncertainties of aquaculture. Their use of the verb “see” (看), however, is insufficient to describe their interaction with the pond environment. Simu fish farmers observe and respond to changing weather and water conditions. The Chinese term “tian ” (天; sky) carries a double meaning for Simu fish farmers. It can be “deities” (老天爺)201 who decide the fortune of Simu fish farmers. The “tian ” can also mean weather (天氣). 202 The fish farmers follow annual production cycles that reference some of the 24 solar terms (節氣), 203 which are the general references to agricultural, fishing, and aquaculture activities in China and Taiwan. Each solar term reflects a climatic pattern that lasts for two weeks, but there are local variations of climatic conditions all over Taiwan depending on latitude. The fish farmers use their own past farming experiences along with the solar terms to anticipate average temperatures and rainfall during a particular period of time. For example, they stock milkfish around Tomb-Sweeping Day (清明節; April 4, 5 or 6) 204 because that is the time when temperatures are high enough for animals and plants to grow. However, the solar terms are not always applicable to local weather conditions. Fish farmers also pay attention to weather forecasts to make decisions about pond management. During the major growing period for fish and shrimp (from April to November), Simu fish farmers patrol their farms on a regular basis to observe water quality and the health of the fish and shrimp. They patrol at least four times every day, usually at 5 a.m., 10 a.m., 4 p.m., and one or two times at night. During their farm patrols, Simu fish farmers stand next to the ponds to observe any changes in the colour of the pond water or the appetites of the fish. Because the dorsal fins of milkfish are exposed above the water surface when they eat, the fish farmers can estimate the number of milkfish that gather in front of the automatic feeder. They also watch how active the fish are when they eat. Some fish farmers observe the behaviours of birds, such as

200 Hok.: khó-thinn-tsia̍ h-pn̄ g. 201 Chi.: laotianye. 202 Chi.: tianqi; Hok.: thinn-khì. 203 Chi.: jieqi. 204 Chi.: qingmingjie . 126

egrets (白鷺絲),205 around their ponds to get an idea of the health conditions of the fish and shrimp (Table 3.2). 206

Table 3.2. Local knowledge about the relationships between egrets and pond conditions.

Egrets’ behaviours Pond conditions

Absence of egrets Fish and shrimp are healthy

Diving Spiral Individual fish or shrimp are sick and their mobility decreases One bird appears and wanders A few fish and shrimp are sick and stay close to pond edges Two or three birds stand on the Many fish and shrimp are sick and stay pond edges close to pond edges

A group of birds appear and stay Many sick fish and shrimp become food for together without fighting each the birds other Source: Author’s field data (2014).

When Simu farmers patrol their farms in the evenings, they focus on the oxygen content of the pond water. At night, all aqua-creatures in the pond, including algae, consume oxygen. If the content of dissolved oxygen goes down, fish and shrimp may suffocate. The most dangerous time is between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m., when dissolved oxygen is low and milkfish and shrimp may come to the surface of the pond to breathe. This is a phenomenon called “floating head” (浮 頭). 207 Unless the fish farmers respond instantly, all fish and shrimp may die within an hour. Simu fish farmers patrol their ponds at around 5 a.m. every day to check whether “floating head” occurs. In summer, the high water temperatures and growing fish and shrimp (which consume

205 Chi.: bailusi. Sci.: Ardea alba . 206 Some fish farmers use firecrackers and nets to expel them. As predators of fish and shrimp, the birds can be killed and hung on the farm to deter other birds. 207 Chi.: futou. 127

more oxygen) often lead to unstable water conditions. These increase the possibility of “floating head.” A few fish farmers stay overnight in huts on their fish farms so that they can react to any sudden changes in the pond environment. Simu fish farmers expect consecutive rainy days to decrease the salinity of pond water. Such a decrease in salinity accelerates the growth of milkfish and shrimp. 208 A shorter growing period can save the total cost of feeding and operating aerators. Simu fish farmers cannot extract groundwater because their ponds are located in areas affected by land subsidence. Therefore, they rely on rain water to lower the salinity of the pond water. The first rain added into the pond is the “plum rain” in spring (梅雨季). 209 Plum rain falls in the first consecutive days of rain that usually arrive in southwest Taiwan in May. However, Ah-shin taught me a Hokkien idiom tshun- thinn āu-bú-bīn (春天後母臉; spring is like the face of the step-mother), 210 meaning that spring weather is unpredictable and so is the amount and frequency of plum rain. In 2014, the plum rain lasted for two days around Simu; fish farmers found the growth of their fish and shrimp were slower than they expected. Because they could not use groundwater, they could only wait for more rainfall. Since the pond water quality changes every day, Simu fish farmers observe it closely. Hsieh (2014: 144) points out that pond water quality is determined by variables such as ammonia, nitrates, pH value, dissolved oxygen, and temperature. Simu fish farmers carry out daily observations of pond water colour as it indicates water quality. Some test the pH value, ammonia level, and nitrite level of the pond water. This is an additional step in observing water quality, which directly affects the health conditions of the fish and shrimp. Changing weather conditions require fish farmers to respond by adding inputs such as lime dust into the ponds. From June to August in 2014, rainfall was lower than expected in Simu. Fish farmers were afraid that any sudden rainfall, which might be short and heavy, would dramatically change the water quality. This was because such a rainfall would be more acidic than usual rainfalls. The pH value of pond water would be altered. They applied lime dust or calcium carbonate around the pond

208 According to Alava (1998: 234), “this is probably related to the habitat preference through development—wild fry (18–21 days old) cease their pelagic mode of life and start to enter estuarine or freshwater environment.” 209 Chi.: meiyuji. 210 Chi .: chuntian houmu mian. 128

banks to prepare for such sudden rainfall. During the rain, these materials dissolved and then entered the ponds to increase the pH value of the pond water. The fish farmers applied lime dust again after the rain. They did so to regulate the pH value and enhance the pond water quality. If pond water turns yellow-brown, diatoms (矽藻), 211 a kind of algae, may have proliferated and resulted in a decrease in the amount of dissolved oxygen. This may cause the fish and shrimp to suffocate. Dai-en, a fish farmer, found one of his ponds had turned yellow- brown. His fish and shrimp ate less than they normally did. Another fish farmer taught him to improve the water quality by applying improvement agents, such as humic acid (腐殖酸鉀)212 and activated carbon (活性炭), 213 to regulate the pH value of the pond. The agents reduced the amount of ammonia and nitrates and accelerated the decomposition process. The blue-green algae could then grow and turn the colour of pond water back to deep green. Dai-en was also advised to stop feeding for a few days so that his fish and shrimp could recuperate. In the end, he succeeded in saving their lives and harvested them in October and November. The annual milkfish–shrimp polyculture production cycle illustrates how Taiwanese fish farmers practise polyculture to interact with the environment. Fish and shrimp are hard to observe under water. Fish farmers thus develop their knowledge and techniques to manage the pond environment to facilitate the growth of the fish and shrimp. Fish farmers maintain favourable pond conditions to make a profit and an assemblage is formed via pond management. Sustainable aquaculture at the local level is thus a matter of profit-oriented environmental management. In other words, Taiwanese fish farmers are motivated by the possible profit margin to practise milkfish–shrimp polyculture. They manage the pond environment and use milkfish as “work” fish to sustain their livelihoods. The practices of Taiwanese fish farmers illustrate how the sector reflects and responds to past experience with overexploitation of natural resources in rural Taiwan. Land subsidence has, for example, changed fish farmers’ practices to rely less heavily on groundwater. In turn, they need to be more resilient to macro-level and micro-level climate conditions. Some fish farmers spare a pond of rainwater mixed with seawater. In case the

211 Chi .: xizao ; sci.: bacillariohyceael. 212 Chi.: fuzhisuanjia . 213 Chi.: huoxingtan . 129

water quality of a fish pond deteriorates, they can exchange the cleaner water without having to find other freshwater sources. Simu fish farmers, based on their experience, regulate the impacts of rainwater, which come in more unpredictable patterns. The management of pond water is therefore important to keep the fish and shrimp healthy. Subsequently, fish farmers minimize their use of chemicals and veterinary drugs. The preventive approach is an outcome of fish farmers’ interactions with the environment and their natural resource management under the influence of the history of Taiwanese aquaculture. The use of intensive milkfish-shrimp polyculture and increasing food safety concerns are matched to make milkfish and shrimp meet public demand and food safety regulations. The meaning and practice of using “work” fish in aquaculture has been popularized. The annual production cycle is part of the reinvented tradition. For example, the number of harvest times have changed. In extensive farming, milkfish were harvested three to four times within a year; one harvest is carried out in intensive farming. The major reason that fish farmers practise the annual production cycle is pond preparation. They find it is an important step to maintain the health of milkfish and shrimp. The organic matter they use (i.e., tea-seed cake, the decomposed fish and shrimp, and algae) to facilitate a balanced pond system is linked to food safety, which is a growing trend in Taiwanese aquaculture. The selection of this pond management method reflects the fish farmers’ response to consumer demand, legal regulations (e.g., the Veterinary Drug Control Act [VDCA] and its associated drug residue inspection), climatic conditions, and their local history of fish farming practices. The local practices interact with national and global concerns over food safety.

III. Technologies in Intensive Aquaculture In southwest Taiwan, fish farmers practise intensive polyculture by incorporating technologies into pond management. With the adoption of aerators, feed, and probiotics with their techniques, they are mainstreaming a prevention approach instead of a treatment approach. The first two examples below illustrate mainstream technologies that fish farmers used with their techniques to facilitate Taiwanese aquaculture intensification during and after the 1980s. Fish farmers develop techniques not only to maintain pond environments favourable to the growth and health of the fish and shrimp, but also to maximize output. The third example is probiotics,

130

which recently gained popularity among fish farmers as a preventive measure after food safety incidents alerted fish farmers to be aware of drug residues in their seafood.

Aerators The number of aerators fish farmers use varies with the fish species they raise; five is the average in a milkfish–shrimp pond that is smaller than two jia . Fish farmers estimate the cost and efficiency of the aerators by controlling for the time, number, duration, and frequency with which they are used (Photo 3.6 to 3.8). For instance, Dai-en, a fish farmer, turned on two aerators during the daytime, but three after sunset to satisfy the increasing demand for oxygen during the production seasons of the milkfish and shrimp (April to October).

Photo 3.6. Paddlewheel aerators. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

131

Photo 3.7. Two functioning paddlewheel aerators. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Photo 3.8. An impeller aerator. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

132

Simu fish farmers need to correctly position the aerators in their ponds. One afternoon, a fish farmer passed by and pointed out that Dai-en had positioned his paddlewheel aerators at the wrong locations. He suggested that Dai-en place one paddlewheel aerator at each of the four corners and one impeller aerator at the centre (Figure 3.1). The impeller aerator was as powerful as two of the others and created a strong up-down current. When they are placed in correct positions, the impeller and paddlewheel aerators, when used together, accelerate the evaporation of ammonia or nitrates.

Figure 3.1. Dai-en’s positioning of aerators in his fish pond, following another farmer’s advice. Source: Author’s field data (2014).

133

Fish farmers rely on mutual help and telecommunications technology to ensure that aerators are working properly at nights. For instance, a power shutdown occurred on a summer evening during my time in Simu. Within ten minutes, Dai-en and a number of farmers motorcycled to the fish ponds to check whether the aerators had stopped functioning, which could cause the level of dissolved oxygen in the pond water to drop. This could lead the fish and shrimp to suffocate. When I asked how they knew about the power shutdown, a few fish farmers told me about an alarm system connected to their smartphones. When power shutdowns occur, they call their close relatives and friends, who did not install that system if they do not have a smartphone. Mutual help and technology work hand in hand to minimize the risks. Observations are acquired skills of fish farmers. Ah-yuan, now in his sixties, used to observe the fish and shrimp at night by listening and walking. He gently walked onto the bank of the pond and then stomped and scared the fish; if a school of fish was already suffocating, they would swim away together and make a “shuuup” sound. His wife Ah-hui, who was a daughter of a salt worker, learned fish farming from her father-in-law. At first, she did not notice that a “floating head” event is a signal of an emergency situation in milkfish farming. She kept learning how to observe fish interactions with the pond environment after she became a fish farmer.

Automatic Feeders and Formulated Feed Simu fish farmers use the feed conversion rate (FCR) (換肉率)214 to estimate how much to feed their milkfish. A milkfish can grow to one catty (斤)215 after consuming 1.2 kg of feed. Before harvest, fish farmers calculate the number of bags of feed consumed to estimate the average fish size at harvest time. However, the actual outcome can vary due to the quality of protein used in the feed and the appetite of the fish. For example, when the temperature drops below 15˚C, milkfish stop eating and so any feed put into the pond will go to waste. Fish farmers use their automatic feeders to shoot feed pellets into the water eight hours each day in the summer, the major growing period of the year. If the feed is unconsumed and spoiled at the bottom of the pond, it will generate ammonia and nitrates that deteriorate water

214 Chi.: huanroulu. 215 Chi.: jin ; Hok.: kin. 134

quality, which could subsequently harm fish health. During feedings, Simu fish farmers have three major ways to observe the amount of feed consumed. First, they watch the size of the school of milkfish that eat the feed. They compare the appetite of the fish the previous day. Second, they watch the length of the air bubbles in water produced by the aerators. The longer the bubbles, the more protein is dissolved in the water, indicating that not all the feed is being consumed. Third, they put some feed on a tool called tsán-a in Hokkien (罾仔), 216 a square trap- like piece of net that can sink to the pond edge (Photo 3.9a and 3.9b) and attract shrimp. They regularly raise the tsán-a to observe the health of shrimp, which come to consume the feed. In addition, a few fish farmers occasionally use testers to keep track of the ammonia and nitrate levels. They can then respond to the effects of the toxic substances by changing the quantity of feed. Individual fish farmers have their own feeding practices. For example, one fish farmer let his fish get only 70% full in terms of daily feed consumption. He wanted to keep the fish swimming to consume algae so that they could build up a firmer flesh texture. Dai-en walked along the pond bank and threw feed into areas where feeders were unavailable. He wanted the smaller fish to consume feed without competing with the bigger fish in front of the feeders.

Photo 3.9a & b. Tsán-a and the shrimp trapped inside. Source: Author’s photographs (2014).

216 Chi.: zhanya. 135

Veterinary Drugs, Antibiotics, and Probiotics The VDCA was amended and promulgated in 2008. It included updated regulations of the uses of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. While milkfish had been regulated since 2008, white-leg shrimp were not included in the amended regulations until 2011. Fish farmers could use oxolinic acid (an antibiotic), oxytetracycline (an antibiotic), and trichlorfonto (an insecticide) to treat the vibrio and parasites for milkfish. They could also use oxolinic acid or oxytetracycline on white-leg shrimp. They needed to follow the dosage and methods documented by the regulations. I recorded no cases of fish farmers using veterinary drugs and antibiotics in milkfish– shrimp polyculture in Simu in 2014. Simu fish farmers did not bring milkfish or shrimp samples to fish clinics for diagnosis. When I asked them how they treated the ill fish and shrimp, they told me that milkfish rarely got sick and had a high survival rate. They let the shrimp die if they are sick because antibiotics are not useful. In Simu, pond preparation and “enriching water” are believed to be the best methods for minimizing the use of veterinary drugs and antibiotics in milkfish–shrimp polyculture. This practice is not completely applicable to other forms of aquaculture. In fish clinics near Simu, fish farmers brought grouper, sea bass, and mullet for fish disease diagnosis. They also discussed with veterinarians the outcomes of applying the drugs prescribed to their fish earlier. Taiwanese fish farmers have learned that biological control agents, including probiotics, facilitate the decomposition process in a pond. Marine biologists explained that antibiotics have “become less effective to human beings and aqua-creatures due to past overuse and residue that [has] strengthened the resistance of virus[es] and bacteria” (Wang 2014: 8). The common types of aquatic probiotics that my informants used in 2014 included Phototrophic Bacteria (光合 菌), 217 Bacillus sp . (芽孢桿菌), 218 and Lactobacillus casei (乳酸桿菌). 219 The fish farmers who practised non-toxic or ecological fish farming replace veterinary drugs and antibiotics with probiotics. Ah-lu, who was a Simu fish farmer, used Phototrophic Bacteria “to stabilize the

217 Chi.: guanghejun . 218 Chi .: yabaoganjun. 219 Chi.: rusuanganjun. 136

water quality” 220 (Photo 3.10). Some fish farmers learned from marine biologists about how to make probiotics to save input costs, which in turn increased their usage. Ah-lu was one of them. He emphasized that he used probiotics based on the principle of minimizing the use of antibiotics: “I will let my sick fish die rather than use antibiotics to treat fish diseases.” 221 Probiotics prevent fish diseases by strengthening fish’s body mechanisms such as their digestive systems. Po-fang, the ecological fish farmer in southwest Taiwan, shared a similar view: Viruses and germs exist in nature. If the environment is bad, they will attack fish and shrimp. The pond environment can change many times within a day; if I improve the environment, fish and shrimp will be healthy enough to fight the viruses and germs. Even if they are sick, they will recover sooner [in a good environment]. 222

Photo 3.10. Phototrophic Bacteria used in fish ponds. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

220 Ah-lu, a fish farmer: interview, January 29, 2014. 221 Ibid.: August 22, 2014. 222 Po-fang, a fish farmer: interview, March 24, 2014. 137

Discussion: Fish Farmers’ Changing Perspectives of Veterinary Drugs The changing perspectives on using drugs, antibiotics, and probiotics are related to the heightened consciousness of food safety and fish farmer’s experiences in pond management. In Taiwan, using veterinary drugs and antibiotics, or yongyao (用藥), aroused some consumers’ suspicions. Restaurant owners or processors post inspection reports and certificates online or on their shop walls to show customers that their foods are safe. Fish farmers have increasingly adopted a similar practice. My observation is that Taiwanese consumers were generally unfamiliar with the scientific terms and dosages of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. Hearing about fish farmers using them made the consumers suspect the food safety of farmed seafood, because drugs and antibiotics are artificial or chemical. Probiotics, or jun (菌), signals natural elements added to fish ponds. The dichotomies between natural/artificial, probiotics/antibiotics, and prevention/treatment exist in Taiwanese aquaculture. Non-toxic and ecological fish farmers use probiotics and stress that their practices are more “natural” in this context. This is also a kind of classification formed under the influence of food safety crises in Taiwan. As chapter two reported, the three types of pond management―conventional, non-toxic, and ecological aquaculture―represent new trends in aquaculture in response to the regulatory standards pertaining to veterinary drugs and consumer demand for food safety. Interactions between producers and consumers on food safety have affected the classifications applied to aquaculture. Ah-shin, a fish farmer and a mother, linked this climatic limitation to the safety and quality of the milkfish she produced. She was confident that her milkfish was a safe food because she carried out pond preparation every winter, which was necessary because of the weather. She stated that pond preparation maintained a good environment for the milkfish so that she did not need to use veterinary drugs, and hence her milkfish were “organic.” In contrast, the favourable temperature in south Taiwan discouraged fish farmers there from practising pond preparation. Fish farmers there do not practise the annual production cycle as Simu fish farmers do. Rather, they stock and harvest milkfish twice within a year. Ah-shin said, “My daughter (who married and moved to south Taiwan) is afraid of the possible drug residue in milkfish there. So, she asks me to send her fish.” 223 Food safety

223 Ah-shin, a fish farmer. Interview: April 4, 2014. 138

concerns are present everywhere in Taiwan. Urban consumers look for trustworthy food and turn to their family networks. Ah-shin’s experience of connecting “drugs” to food safety and family members’ health was found in other stories of fish farmers. They believe a fish farmer is ethical when she eats her own farmed seafood without question. In contrast, if a businessperson is reluctant to eat her own commodity, its safety is questionable. The annual production cycle of milkfish–shrimp polyculture requires minimal inputs of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. Pond management makes the milkfish and shrimp grow healthily. Simu fish farmers believe their practices meet consumer demand for food safety. The technology and techniques adapted by Simu fish farmers discussed in this section demonstrate that techniques, ethics, and social relations are interlinked in Taiwanese aquaculture.

IV. Fish Farmers’ Perspectives: Farm Economics and Fishing Communities

Why is fish farming the dominant form of economic activity in fishing communities such as Simu? I draw on my ethnographic data to explain how fish farmers’ daily lives are related to milkfish–shrimp polyculture and globalization. Profitable milkfish–shrimp polyculture enables fish farmers to stay in the rural community and maintain social relations with other community members. They support their aging family members on behalf of their urban siblings. Milkfish– shrimp polyculture has provided livelihoods for Simu villagers. Most Simu fish farmers consider that milkfish sales cover their operational costs (保本); 224 their profits come from the sale of the shrimp. Fish farmer Li-an disagreed with this view. He said milkfish had become a “scapegoat” ( 冤大頭)225 whenever fish farmers failed to make any profit from the occasionally low productivity of the ponds. Li-an explained that both milkfish and shrimp require the labour and materials inputs when they share a pond environment. From Li-an’s perspective, both milkfish and shrimp could generate a profit if they grew to market size. Depending on the proportion of milkfish and shrimp outputs, both Simu fish farmers and Li-an could be right. Table 3.3 shows Dai-en’s balance sheet in his first year of milkfish–shrimp polyculture in 2014. He found that milkfish brought more gross profits than shrimp, and the

224 Chi.: baoben. 225 Chi.: yuandatou. 139

profits generated from milkfish alone covered his start-up and operational costs (Table 3.4). Dai- en earned TWD59,236 per jia from shrimp in the 2014 production cycle. In comparison, another fish farmer Zi-yi, shared shrimp sales records that showed that he earned TWD145,017 per jia from shrimp (total income from shrimp: TWD580,067; his farm size was about 4 jia ). This suggests that for some farmers who can produce large quantities of market-size shrimp, their profits came from selling the shrimp. This comparison also reveals that shrimp farming provided economic motivation for Simu fish farmers, but milkfish—whose survival rate is more predictable—offer a stable source of income. In many cases, fish farmers used part of their income to reinvest in the same ponds. For fish farmers who failed to maintain the 20% survival rate of shrimp, farming milkfish lowered their economic risk and allowed them to maintain a minimal profit and sustain their livelihoods. The annual income of urban school teachers was TWD269, 000 in 2010 (National Statistics 2016). 226 Ah-shin, who owned the smallest pond in area (less than 3 jia ) in my field records, told me her net profit in 2014 was approximately TWD400,000. More skillful fish farmers with bigger ponds, such as Zi-yi, could earn more per year from the high productivity of shrimp.

226 Source: http://www.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=523&CtUnit=363&BaseDSD=7. 140

Table 3.3. Income Dai-en generated from two ponds of 2.5 jia . Item Income Note (TWD) Shrimp (Harvested between 1,770 Unit price and size varies every day. July 11 and 30) Shrimp (Harvested between 6,392 Unit price and size varies every day; shrimp were August 1 and 22) not collected because of bad water quality between August 23 and 31. Shrimp (Harvested between 29,858 Unit price and size varies every day. September 1 and 30) Shrimp (Harvested between 66,954 Unit price and size varies every day. October 1 and 31) Shrimp (Harvested between 43,115 Dai-en then took a break and started draining the November 3 and 22) pond. He later harvested the rest of the shrimp. The income was unrecorded. Milkfish (Harvested on 446,470 Unit price: NTD37 Per catty November 3) Milkfish (Harvested on About Unrecorded harvest; Dai-en told me the harvest was October) 400,000 valued about NTD400,000. Total income recorded 994,559 Income from crabs and hard clams were unrecorded, but not much for 2014.

Source: Author’s field data (2014).

141

Table 3.4. Dai-en’s start-up and operational costs for two ponds (2.5 jia ). Category Unit Amount Cost Note price (TWD) (TWD) Black cage 250 2 500 Tilapia catching Shrimp cage 1,500 3 4,500 Shrimp catching Gear (gloves, boots, tools) n/a n/a 7,620 n/a Bulldozer and excavator services 176,800 Wire 50,380 Pipes and pumps 35,200 Circuit board components 54,285 Technician’s service 65,222 Car maintenance 6,200 Hard clam seed 1,800 Shrimp larvae Pond #1: 2 70,800 million Pond #2: 1.8 million Milkfish 20,000 46,000 Unknown Crab larvae 6,900 unit prices Aerator (old) 4,000 10 42,650 Paddle replacement cost $2,650 Automatic feeder 7,500 4 30,000 n/a Aerator (new) n/a 2 14,000 Weeding service n/a 1,200 Feed 400 600 240,000 Estimated by author hydrogen peroxide n/a n/a 6,000 n/a Humic acid and activated carbon 1,000 Power for aerators (July to 2,000/ 10 aerators x 100,000 Estimated by November) aerator 5 months author per month Power for aerators (January to n/a n/a 20,000 Non-peak June) season Power for automatic feeder (April n/a n/a n/a n/a to November) Total expenditure NTD981,057 Note: some costs such as depreciation of machines are not counted here. Source: Author’s field data (2014). 142

My informants provided four reasons for their decisions to stay in or return to Simu. First, the rural lifestyle is attractive to some Simu fish farmers. Gallin and Gallin (1982: 224) reported that remigration occurred in Taiwan when village migrants found they could not survive “the intense competition and high costs in the city.” There are cases of remigration and lifelong residency in Simu not only because of urban stress, but also other factors. Simu villagers said that time management was an important reason for them to stay in the village. Those having urban working experiences found urban life to be too stressful. Zi-yi, a fish farmer, preferred the rural lifestyle. After quitting his urban job and returning from Taipei to Simu village in the early 1980s, Zi-yi took over his parents’ fish farm. Compared with his life in the city, milkfish–shrimp polyculture enabled him to enjoy a rural lifestyle; he uses gaps between farm patrols and breaks between production cycles to strengthen his friendship network. He said urban people work too hard. For him, having the time to sit down for tea gatherings is important, a daily pastime that he treasured in Simu. Fish farmers like Zi-yi and Ah-shin used the intervals between patrols to gather with friends, share food, and play the Chinese game mahjong (麻將). They used their disposable leisure time to develop social relations with other community members. When fish farmers harvested their fish, often more than five other villagers volunteered to help. During winter pond preparation, they would even travel together. Second, family factors affect whether fish farmers choose to stay in their villages or not. Simu villagers have experienced rural–urban migration since the 1970s. Large cities such as Taipei and Kaohsiung were the village migrants’ major destinations. Younger generations with higher education levels continued to move out for urban jobs. Yet their absence in the village did not mean that they were disconnected from fish farming. Families originally practising fish farming in Simu remained engaged in aquaculture even when some members migrated to urban areas. This was because aquaculture continued to be a profitable sector from the 1980s onwards. One of the families’ strategies was to keep one brother in the village after the family divided properties (i.e., fish ponds). The rest of the brothers, most of them living in urban areas, leased the ponds to the brother who stayed behind to work as a fish farmer. Ah-wen, the cousin of Ah- lu, was the one who helped his two brothers manage the ponds with a total of 10 jia .227 He chose

227 Ah-wen, a fish farmer: interview, February 17, 2014. 143

to live in Simu even though he is as highly educated as his brothers (all of them gained their bachelor degrees in the 1980s). He did so to “let the family have at least one son in the village.” 228 This is a common strategy in Simu whereby a villager volunteers to stay as a fish farmer and other brothers move to the cities for urban jobs and livings. Most female villagers are married out and work in cities. Being a fish farmer became a social role enabling people, such as Ah-wen, to continue to the use the family’s resources after the division of family property among the brothers. The urban siblings stay connected to their hometowns and help find friends to be consumers to order some of the seafood products from fish farmers like Ah-wen. Cohen’s (1976) classic study recorded the rural Taiwanese strategy of postponing their division of property to maintain a labour force for tobacco planting. Family relations and aquaculture, in Simu’s case, are influenced by job opportunities in Taiwan and also the need for families to care for aging relatives who are less geographically mobile. In the current social structure women typically marry out and younger generations of men (in the 30–50 age group) are more willing to return to or stay in Simu to practise aquaculture. Third, geographical movement between rural townships and urban cities, or between separate rural townships, has become less time consuming and more frequent. Harrell (1981) pointed out that Taiwan had already developed transport networks that connected rural and urban areas by the 1970s. Huang (2016) explains that the Taiwanese government invested in infrastructure to increase communication between rural townships and urban areas. Similarly, local villagers in rural Taiwan extended their social networks in multiple directions (ibid.). The case of Simu shows that migration and geographical movements are two-way rather than one- way. High-speed railways and highways have increased geographical mobility along the west coast of Taiwan. This development affects the rural–urban migration of fish farmers in multiple ways. People who moved to cities were able to maintain good social connections to their rural hometowns. During public holidays and festivals, urban Taiwanese travel up to three hours to visit their hometowns by taking high-speed railways. Moreover, fish farmers’ personal networks with urban consumers are strengthened. Urban relatives and friends order frozen farmed seafood from fish farmers for nostalgia, food safety, and taste. Producer–consumer networks have been

228 Ibid. 144

developed through relatives and friendship networks facilitated by the improved transport and low-temperature supply chain. Most Simu fish farmers are conventional fish farmers, but they diversify their markets through their friendship networks. They can do this without obtaining traceability certification. Third, fish farmers enjoy urban entertainment without losing their rural lifestyle. Cultural practices and social relations have changed under the influence of infrastructure development that compresses the time and space between rural and urban Taiwan. Fourth, the practices of polyculture generate various other job and business opportunities, so that fish farmers can often take up at least one more income-generating activity. These include shrimp dealing, crab dealing, milkfish harvesting, mullet roe cutting, seafood processing (shrimp, milkfish, and others), fish fry brokerage, and various sorts of driving and delivery services. The fish farmers also demand such local services as street vending, banquet services, mechanical services, the services of fishermen associations, etc. These create job opportunities to fish farmers and their family members. My observations suggested that the labour population is unbalanced in terms of gender, although some women picked up aquaculture-related work that requires physical labour. Others work as white collar workers outside of Simu. The presence of milkfish processing employment is now attracting new female immigrant labour, especially Vietnamese women who are married to men in the village. Fish farming is not attractive to everyone. Some villagers are seeking economic opportunities other than fish farming by taking jobs somewhere away from their hometowns, such as to be civil servants or factory workers. There are only two sewing businesses hiring about 20 workers in Simu. Others have closed down. The major job opportunity besides aquaculture-related work is in seafood processing, which is notorious to some non-farming villagers because of the fishy odour and the low- temperature working environment that make them feel uncomfortable. Other full-time job opportunities are not readily available. Ah-shin’s son, for example, experienced urban unemployment and returned to Simu. He was unwilling to become a fish farmer. Staying in the village as a part-time teacher could not cover his expenses. He relied on Ah-shin’s income generated by aquaculture.

145

V. Conclusion

The case of Simu illustrates that fish farmers deploy multiple strategies in selecting and farming seafood varieties for multiple ecological, economic, and social purposes. I use the example of intensive milkfish–shrimp polyculture to demonstrate how the global market interacts with local life and the selection of farmed varieties. Global–local dynamics include interactions between global market demand, domestic demand, and fish farmers’ supply. The high shrimp farm-gate price in Taiwan is caused by shortages in the global supply, as affected by outbreaks of EMS, and high demand in Taiwan, where the population consumes all locally produced shrimp. The history of Taiwanese aquaculture development has benefited the supply chain to produce shrimp. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture as a practice adapting to the local environment incorporates scientific and local knowledge. Fish farmers face uncertainties in climatic conditions and a legacy of overexploitation of natural resources during rural development (i.e., the tiger prawn fever). Their milkfish–shrimp polyculture illustrates their resiliency by changing their farming practices. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture is an example of how local fish farmers apply various technologies to pond management. They prioritize the milkfish and shrimp which bring them income. Globalization have affected the landscape of fishing villages in southwest Taiwan and the daily lives of fish farmers. They reinvented their tradition of milkfish–shrimp polyculture to compete in the global shrimp supply chain. The changing meanings and values of milkfish reflect the close relationships that have developed between culture, ecology, and economy. Simu fish farmers encountered the collapse of the tiger prawn sector, rural–urban migration, and food safety scares in Taiwan. However, their reinvented milkfish–shrimp polyculture has provided opportunities for them to resolve these issues. Aquaculture restructuring, which is the Taiwanese government’s strategy for mitigating the impacts of globalization and environmental degradation, has succeeded in reshaping fish farmers’ behaviours and creating them as environmental subjects. Fish farmers exercise agency by acquiring the necessary local knowledge to make profits and achieve food safety. The global problem of EMS has become a new opportunity for local farmers to enhance their livelihoods by farming healthy and high-value white-leg shrimp.

146

The case of Simu illustrates the fish farmers’ multiple objectives as they select and farm seafood varieties for social, cultural, ecological, and economic purposes. Localized at various times, milkfish and white-leg shrimp became part of the current form of polyculture. In this process, milkfish has been given symbolic and use values that strengthen individual agency and social relationships. The case of milkfish demonstrates that the global market is unable to dominate every part of local life. Despite its shrinking market value, milkfish contributes to the local environment and livelihoods; it also generates social and ecological values that make intensive aquaculture sustainable. Simu fish farmers practise milkfish-shrimp polyculture to respond to the influences of globalization, consumers’ concerns about food safety, and the increasing demand for sustainable aquaculture. The use of milkfish as a work fish maximizes their profits while avoiding environmental degradation. This multi-species interaction among humans, milkfish, shrimp, algae, and other living things in the pond system is not a typical capitalist relationship. Notably, the idea of gongzuoyu (work fish) is not a form of resource extraction only for profit, but rather a way to facilitate sustainability. My case study of Simu shows that interactions between the global shrimp supply chain and local practices of milkfish–shrimp polyculture have contributed positively to the livelihoods of fish farmers in southwest Taiwan. Simu fish farmers have intensified production to generate basic incomes with which they can support their livelihoods. Fish farmers have reported that they return to and stay in fishing communities to fulfill their family obligations, including supporting their older generations’ daily lives and operating fish farming in the ponds they inherited. The filial obligations are fulfilled together as they embrace economic opportunities in their communities. As I have shown, fish farmers generally have more time to socialize with other villagers, which they prefer to the busy and less sociable urban lifestyle. Although Chiayi County is less industrialized and jobs in the petrochemical industry are unavailable, local villagers can still maintain their livelihoods by practising aquaculture. Their networks across communities are complementary to their agency in pond management. In other words, industrialization is not the only way to support rural development. Aquaculture, as the example of milkfish–shrimp polyculture shows, is a sector that has pursued sustainable practices. In turn, aquaculture provides fish farmers with economic and social incentives to continue their rural lives. However, villagers who are not interested in aquaculture either seek job opportunities in the village or

147

outside. These facts show how social and geographical mobility between rural and urban Taiwan occurs in Taiwanese aquaculture. Milkfish–shrimp polyculture is an example of how local fish farmers strategize to respond to rural change. Polyculture is a holistic approach with ecological, economic, and social factors to consider within the larger context of Taiwanese aquaculture. The fish farmers need to calculate the costs and benefits of their inputs; they choose the most useful equipment, feed, and agents. Effective pond management in the annual production cycles allows fish farmers to stay in their villages and enjoy the local lifestyle instead of working at stressful waged jobs in the city. The continuation of rural–urban migration co-exists with the fact that some fish farmers stay in or return from urban areas to fishing villages because milkfish–shrimp polyculture brings them basic income. The fish farmers fulfill their family obligations in their hometowns. They enjoy the rural lifestyle rather than urban life. Sometimes, they simply fail to adapt to urban life and decide to return to their original rural communities. To fish farmers, these “alternatives” are their options that are available due to their landed property, connections to their communities, and their pond management techniques.

148

CHAPTER FOUR: MILKFISH DISTRIBUTION, PRIMARY PROCESSING, AND FISH

FARMERS’ NEW STRATEGIES

This chapter focuses on the distribution, processing, and marketing of the milkfish supply chain in Taiwan in an attempt to examine the fish farmers’ livelihood within a market economy which is socially embedded in personal and community social relationships. The majority of fish farmers sell their products to middlemen, which include distributors, exporters, and the owners of primary processing and freezing plants ( 初級新鮮處理及冷凍場; hereafter P&F plants).229 The example of milkfish distribution between fish farms and wholesale fish markets delineates the importance of mainstream distributions for the livelihoods of Taiwanese fish farmers. Market demand affects the transaction prices in fish markets, which the distributors then use to set the farm-gate prices they pay the fish farmers. P&F plants produce milkfish fillets and frozen products as a value-adding procedure of milkfish for the domestic and international markets. Some fish farmers have recently begun marketing their own products to cut the distributors’ share of their profits. County governments promote local seafood to urban consumers and foreign markets. The consequences of all of these strategies vary, depending on the degree of cooperation, competition, and power relationships between these stakeholders along the supply chain. Food supply chains involve various social relationships between and economic behaviours among producers, suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers. Distribution is one example. Bestor (2004: 37) describes Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish Market as a marketplace where “cultural meanings of cuisine, work, gender, and class identity are formulated.” Fish trade in a wholesale market is governed by rules and institutions (ibid.). There are other routes along food supply chains, such as retailers’ merchandizing food commodities from producers (Friedberg 2004). Food producers may also directly approach consumers to sell their products. Andreatta and Parlier (2010) find that commercial fishermen in North Carolina, in the United States, develop their direct marketing strategies by branding their fish products as fresh and local seafood, to

229 Chi.: chuji xinxian chuli ji lengdong chang . 149

which low-priced international imports cannot compare. These examples indicate that producers, distributors, and consumers continue to establish and maintain their social relationships. This process is not emphasized in capitalist free market logic. Competition and cooperation coexist along supply chains. Research on the historical development of supply chains illuminate the social relationships and cultures that affect business strategies and the forms of products that pass through the supply chains. This chapter is organized in the following sequence. First, I describe the milkfish supply chain in Taiwan. Second, I trace the history of the emergence of Simu distributors and their business activities as affected by the climatic conditions of southwest Taiwan. Third, I reveal the processes involved in milkfish harvesting and distribution. The fourth section focuses on the emergence of P&F plants. The government includes the P&F plants in its governance of the milkfish trade under the impacts of overproduction and the WTO. The government has tried to diversify the markets for milkfish products. It has also set up a new mechanism to solve crises of overproduction. P&F plant owners run their businesses with diverse concerns, such as their ties with other plant owners and the economy embedded in the community. The fifth section describes how the Chiayi County government has used marketing programs to promote local seafood and the local organizations involved. I explain how and why fish farmers have attempted to diversify their markets and reduce their reliance on middlemen. One trend is that the farmers cut out the middlemen by direct marketing, which in turn changes their relationships with the P&F plant owners and consumers. With government subsidies, local NGOs became a new stakeholder in the supply chain for Taiwanese farmed seafood by cooperating with fish farmers to market local seafood.

I. The Milkfish Supply Chain

Taiwanese milkfish is consumed mainly domestically. In 2013, 83.1% of Taiwanese milkfish were sold on the domestic market (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2013). Most are distributed via wholesale fish markets. Two types of fish markets exist in Taiwan. Rural fish markets, called shengchandi yushichang (生產地魚市場), are located at fish ports (most of them outside urban areas) where wild-caught seafood dominates sales. Fishermen associations run the

150

rural fish markets in their respective counties. Farmed seafood products are sent mainly to urban fish markets ( xiaofeidi yushichang ; 消費地漁市場) without passing through rural fish markets. Chart 4.1 shows the milkfish supply chain (after fish harvest) in Taiwan. Urban fish markets are marketplaces where both wild-caught and farmed seafood are auctioned. They are currently run and owned by fishermen associations and city governments. Distributors specializing in particular types of seafood collect and send products to urban fish markets, which are open for seafood transactions six days per week. Milkfish distributors ( 大盤)230 provide products daily to many urban fish markets. One such market is the Taichung Fish Market (2016), 231 which is one of the biggest Taiwanese urban fish markets. At these markets, distributors are called suppliers ( 供貨人), 232 and can be individuals, companies, fishing boats, or fishermen associations practising “ gongtong yunxiao ” ( 共同運銷), a collective form of delivering fish to fish markets; this will be covered in more detail below.

230 Chi.: dapan. 231 Source: http://www.tcfish.com.tw/index.php/underwriter-area/notes-underwriter-license-application . 232 Chi.: gonghuoren . 151

Chart 4.1. Supply chain of milkfish in 2014. Source: Author’s field data and organization (2014).

The transactions within rural and urban fish markets are managed by the Regulations for Management of Agricultural Product Wholesales Market ( 農產品批發市場管理辦法; COA 2009a). 233 Transactions in fish markets are completed under a regulatory framework, with four major players associated with these transactions. The first participants are the suppliers who send farmed seafood to the fish markets on a daily basis. As suppliers, they are not required to show up during the transactions inside the fish markets. They hire drivers to send harvests to fish markets. The transactions require the second participant group, who are the auctioneers. They are called tiao-shou (糶手). Underwriters ( 承銷人),234 or consignees, are the third set of players, who participate in the transactions as buyers in the fish markets. They need to pay a fee to obtain licences issued by the fish markets. Underwriters can be either wholesalers (中盤)235 or retailers

233 Chi.: nongchanpin pifa shichang guanli banfa. The regulations were first enforced in 1982, and the latest revision occurred in 2009. Source: http://law.coa.gov.tw/GLRSnewsout/EngLawContent.aspx?Type=C&id=25 . 234 Chi.: chengxiaoren . 235 Chi.: zhongpan. 152

(小盤). 236 Most are wholesalers who sell the products to retailers (who do not need to go to the fish markets). Retailers, the fourth player, run restaurants or are vendors in wet markets where the seafood and fish are sold. In Taiwan, vendors specializing in milkfish dishes can be found in most cities and towns.

There are three transaction methods in the fish markets: 1. Auctions . Suppliers send milkfish to urban fish markets. The auctions occur from 2 a.m. to dawn. Auctioneers conduct the competitive auctions, where underwriters compete with each other by bidding for the products. In each auction inside the Taichung Fish Market, the fish market charges the supplier and underwriter each 1.55% of the fish price as an administration fee. Auctioneers estimate the value of each box of fish and set the price. Each transaction takes 10–20 seconds to complete. An auctioneer uses finger bidding (Bestor 2004: 191)―hand signals― and shouts to let underwriters know the updated bids (from high to low), until an underwriter shows his or her stamp to the auctionner. This action indicates the underwriter agrees to purchase that box of fish at the price the auctioneer just shouted out. After the underwriter buys enough boxes of fish, she leaves the fish market. This is when the underwriter transitions to a wholesaler who in turn sells the fish to retailers in other towns and cities. Alternatively, some underwriters are themselves retailers. Currently, four fish markets have replaced auctioneers with computer systems to run the auctions. 2. Negotiating prices. Suppliers ask the fish market’s personnel to be their representatives to negotiate the prices of boxes of seafood with underwriters. Transactions are completed after suppliers agree on a price for a box of seafood. Since suppliers rely on the fish market’s personnel to sell the products at a profitable price level, they maintain good relationships with these personnel. 3. Direct purchase or consignment. 237 This type of transaction occurs when market personnel “join with suppliers to mark the selling price of the product; the demanders

236 Chi.: xiaopan. 237 COA 2009a. Source: http://law.coa.gov.tw/GLRSnewsout/EngLawContent.aspx?Type=C&id=25 . 153

purchase products as the prices marked.” 238 No negotiation occurs. The underwriters decide whether to accept the price.

Milkfish sold in urban fish markets are mostly ice-chilled. I did not see any frozen whole fish during my visits. In the late 1980s, P&F plants produced milkfish fillets (bellies), which they send, as ice-chilled products, to urban fish markets. There is another route through which the milkfish distributors and plant owners can reach domestic consumers without using the urban fish markets: They can supply milkfish products directly to supermarkets, milkfish vendors, restaurants, and fishmongers in wet markets (where the retailing of perishable and non- perishable products occurs in local communities in urban regions). After cutting the bellies, P&F plants sell other parts of the milkfish to processing plants that specialize in making fish balls, sausages, and floss (Table 4.1). 239 The processed products are available in supermarkets, fish retail vendors, restaurants, and wet markets. The fish heads and bones are sent to local feed plants for feed manufacturing. Some fish heads are sold to feed groupers or in wet markets. Retailers sell whole fish, bellies, heads, intestines, and fish balls as major products. Some vendors and restaurants specialize in milkfish dishes, with soup, rice, porridge, or noodles. They do not sell other fish or meat.

238 Ibid. 239 Each plant uses a unique formula to make these products so that theirs will taste different from those of their competitors. Fish pastes are added to minced pork to be ground into sausage. Fish pastes can also be used to make fish balls. In the past, potato or starch was used as a binder. Nowadays, modified food starch ( 修飾澱 粉; Chi.: xiushi dianfen ) and phosphate ( 磷酸鹽; Chi.: linsuanyan ) are added to the paste to give it a more chewy texture ( 彈牙; Chi.: danya ; Hok.: nńg “Q”). These ingredients must be used in accordance with regulations. Both fish sausages and balls are seasoned with spices, , sugar, salt, and lard. Fish floss is a kind of dried, boneless, and seasoned snack with a fluffy texture. 154

Table 4.1. Uses of different parts of milkfish in primary and secondary processing. Product Processing venue Processing method Major market Belly P&F plants Filleting by human Mainly northern labour Taiwan Intestines and P&F plants Manually removing Milkfish vendors in head from fish body cavity; south and southwest the intestines are kept Taiwan (for human fresh. consumption?) Deboned P&F plants Fermenting the fish and Northern Taiwan whole fish specializing in then manually picking this product out the bones Frozen whole P&F plants Freezing Export (e.g., the fish specializing in United States, Saudi export Arabia, China, etc.) Fish ball and Fish ball plants Using machines to Wet markets, hot pot sausage and sausage process the fish meat restaurants, barbecue plants with other ingredients. restaurants, and vendors Others: P&F plants, Using machines to Supermarkets in dumpling and milkfish ball process the fish meat Taiwan or export floss plants, food with other ingredients. processing plants The dumplings are frozen. The floss is dried. Source: Adapted from Chao 2010: 172; modified with author’s field data (2014–2015).

There are three major kinds of business people who act as middlemen to whom fish farmers sell their milkfish: local distributors, P&F plants targeting the domestic market (P&F plants), and P&F plants targeting the export market (hereafter: exporters). The overproduction of milkfish caused its value to drop in the early 1990s. As the domestic market was saturated, the Taiwanese government encouraged the export of milkfish. Taiwanese milkfish became an export item in the mid-1990s. The United States was the major receiver of Taiwanese milkfish exports (Chart 4.2), consuming 35% of the export volume of 15,790,081 kg in 2013. According to a milkfish exporter, the milkfish exports satisfied mainly Indonesian and Filipino consumers in the United States and Saudi Arabia. 240 Over the past two decades, exported-oriented P&F plants,

240 Mr. Luo, a milkfish trader: interview, October 8, 2014. 155

specializing in frozen whole milkfish or filleting the bony milkfish into boneless products, were set up in southwest and south Taiwan. They also freeze whole fish for exports. These exporters purchased the entire harvest from farmers. The fish farmers receive a lower farm-gate price than that offered by local distributors and P&F plants targeting domestic markets. Fish farmers can choose to whom they sell the milkfish without a signed contract at the beginning of the farming season. I observed that fish farmers accepted this lower offer when they knew that their fish needed to be harvested as soon as possible due to health conditions. This would happen when the water quality deteriorated or cold fronts lowered the temperature. All middlemen would pay, at most, half of the farm-gate price for the dying milkfish. Comparatively, fish farmers needed a shorter time to wait for exporters than local distributors to come to harvest their milkfish. In case they found their fish were in distress, they sold the milkfish to the exporters to shorten the waiting time until harvesting.

12000000 10000000 8000000 6000000 4000000

Thousand USD Thousand 2000000 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

China Saudi Arabia USA Canada

Chart 4.2. Milkfish export value (1996–2013). Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (various years).241

241 Source: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/ . 156

The existence of export markets has provided milkfish farmers with an alternative to the domestic market. The distributors based in Simu and exporters are competitors. Their co- existence gives fish farmers two options to choose from, though buying from an export market or domestic market depends on the conditions of the fish and not on contractual relationships. Middlemen buy milkfish at farms. Farm-gate prices determine fish farmers’ income generated from a milkfish harvest. The milkfish are transported to fish markets for auctions, price negotiations, or consignment. Auction is the most common transaction format in the fish markets. The daily changes in fish market prices affect the farm-gate prices. The emergence of international markets provides business opportunities for exporters. The three standard sizes of milkfish export—300–500 g, 500–800 g, and 800 g or above—are slightly different from the standard size of milkfish that are distributed locally (i.e., more than 600g). The farm-gate price of milkfish harvest for export is TWD1-2 per catty lower than that for the domestic market. Exporters avoid direct competition with local distributors when they purchase milkfish. The former buy milkfish that are considered inferior by insiders―those needed to be harvested as soon as possible because of futou (floating heads) in the summer or dying from cold in the winter. Fish farmers view selling milkfish to exporters as a way of avoiding loss of investment in emergency situations. They use their techniques to maintain the good health of their fish, but they cannot control all environmental factors. In cases involving poor fish health, they sell the fish to exporters at lower farm-gate prices to obtain minimum profits, or to minimize their losses. The market system for milkfish is more complex than a classic free market mechanism. Environmental factors, producer–middleman interactions, and middlemen’s strategies at successive stages along the supply chain affect the farm-gate price and wholesale price in each transaction. All middlemen purchase freshwater and salty-water milkfish. There is no market differentiation between the two kinds of milkfish, although freshwater milkfish are more likely to contain muddy flavour; insiders and some consumers dislike the muddy flavour and prefer salty- water milkfish. However, some salty-water milkfish can contain muddy flavour if the pond environment is unfavourable. The supply chain for massive consumption of milkfish forgoes some characteristics that insiders consider as factors affecting fish quality. The muddy flavour is one such case. Sorting milkfish with and without muddy flavour, which is a subjective matter of personal taste, is too costly for middlemen to do. In the mainstream market, the middlemen treat

157

freshwater and salty-water milkfish as the same product. Underwriters observe, touch, and feel the freshness and fatness of the milkfish to decide if they want to buy or not. These features are easier to observe than flavour. Consumer demands for fresh, fat, but also reasonably priced fish affect how middlemen select milkfish in fish markets. These factors also influence fish farmers’ production practices, such as using feed that can enrich the body fat of milkfish. The milkfish supply chain is therefore an intersection of market demand and local practices.

II. The Emergence of Regional Networks of Simu Distributors

From the 1950s to the 1960s, fishermen associations designed and implemented the gongtong yunxiao program for farmed fish which are important to the domestic market, including milkfish, tilapia, and grass carp. In this program, the fishermen associations organized transportation (mainly trucks) to help fish farmers supply their milkfish directly to urban fish markets (Hsu 1970). The fishermen associations aimed to lower fish farmers’ costs by cutting out the middlemen’s service, but they failed to do so. According to Hsu (ibid.), the fishermen associations were inefficient in organizing transportation and negotiating good prices at the fish markets. A few fish farmers took this as an opportunity to become milkfish distributors to replace the services of the fishermen associations. By 1970, local distributors rather than fishermen associations carried out gongtong yunxiao (ibid). The distributors bought milkfish from fish farmers at fish farms and then sold them to urban fish markets. As a result, the fishermen associations no longer offered the service of sending milkfish to fish markets. They issued gongtong yunxiaodan (共同運銷單) to the distributors, a pass authorizing them to enter the fish markets. The fishermen associations shared 0.005% of the total transaction value. Simu has developed into the main hub of milkfish distribution in Taiwan. Three Simu distributors controlled milkfish distribution from Chiayi County and Beta to the fish markets in central and northern Taiwan. Fish markets allowed fish farmers with licences issued by fishermen associations to supply seafood to the markets. The distributors were originally fish farmers who were eligible to carry out gongtong yuanxiao . The fisherman status allows the distributors to have their sales tax waived by the Taiwanese government. Neither the government nor fish markets control the quantity of produce the distributors send to the fish markets (Yuan 1990)—distributors currently decide on the amount and sizes of fish they send to fish markets on

158

a daily basis. The farm-gate prices they set for fish farmers follow the average auction prices. The costs of distribution include harvesting, transport, the use of ice, wages, and administration fees charged by fishermen associations and fish markets (Yuan 1990). The distributors make profits if the total value of milkfish auctioned is greater than these costs and the total payments to fish farmers.

Map 4.1. Simu’s location and milkfish production areas in Chiayi County and Tainan City (Formerly Tainan County). Source: National Land Surveying and Mapping Center (2015). 242 Modified by the author.

242 Source: http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671 C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTT ON=false&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword=TW-07- 301000100G-614001 . 159

Three milkfish distributors are located in Simu, in Chiayi County, next to Tainan City (Map 4.1). Both counties are major areas of milkfish production in southwest Taiwan. Simu milkfish distributors as well as the P&F plants which were established inside and surrounding Simu in the late 1980s claim to control about 70% of domestic milkfish distribution in Taiwan (see further discussion in section IV). In the 1960s, three Simu distributors supplied milkfish to surrounding towns and central Taiwan. Ah-wang, a milkfish distributor with forty years of experience, explained that the distributers first provided gongtong yunxiao on weekends only, when the fishermen associations were closed. Later, these distributors also operated during weekdays, so that eventually they completely took over the distribution service for fish farmers. Six milkfish distributors were based in Simu in the 1980s. 243 Since the early 1990s, three male distributors have been in business. The distances between urban markets and rural production areas give rise to the distribution services. The distributors replace the less efficient fishermen associations to carry out distribution. The existence of distributors in Simu created job opportunities for truck drivers, harvest workers, icehouse workers, and accounting staff.

Climatic Factors and Regional Cooperation Between Distributors Two clusters of milkfish distributors exist in Taiwan, one in Simu Village and one in Kaohsiung and Pingtung Counties. The Simu distributors harvest the fish during the daytime (usually 11 a.m.); their trucks deliver the fish to various consumer fish markets by 2 a.m., the time when auctions begin. This enables Simu distributors ( yuhang ; 漁行) to control domestic milkfish distribution from the southwest to northern Taiwan (Map 4.2). In Kaohsiung and Pingtung Counties, the local distributors ( yufan ; 魚販) there harvest milkfish at 7 p.m. and deliver the fish to local consumers in south Taiwan by 2 a.m. Consumers prefer their milkfish very fresh. Ah-feng, a distributor in south Taiwan, mentioned that “the intestines of the milkfish sent to north Taiwan are hardly fresh enough. Our evening harvest can keep the inner organs fresh. If you ice-chill a milkfish, its intestine will not be delicious.” 244 The milkfish vendors open for business at about 4 a.m., and my field record on March 7, 2015 showed that the milkfish

243 Ah-tian, a retired staff of the Country Alpha Fishermen Association: interview, July 22, 2014. 244 Ah-feng, a milkfish distributor: interview, March 5, 2015. 160

intestine soup was sold out at 5 a.m. when I entered a local vendor in Kaohsiung. Yufan in south Taiwan benefits from the short distance between farms and markets in Kaohsiung and Pingtung. They also use baskets instead of polyfoam boxes, which is significant because milkfish in baskets are covered by ice—but they are not ice-chilled and hardened in ice water like those in polyfoam boxes. Thus, in the food culture in south Taiwan, the milkfish body and the inner organs in baskets are considered fresher. Dishes using these inner organs are popular. The yufan maintain their competiveness in the market by controlling the freshness and texture of the fish.

Map 4.2. Milkfish Distribution in Taiwan. Source: National Land Surveying and Mapping Center 2015. 245 Modified by the author.

By the 1980s, Simu distributors carried out milkfish harvesting in southwest Taiwan but they faced a problem insofar as they had little to harvest in winter. In the past, the two clusters of milkfish distributors worked independently due to the differing climatic conditions between

245 Source: http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671 C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTT ON=false&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword=TW-07- 301000100G-614001 . 161

southwest and south Taiwan. In southwest Taiwan, the average temperatures during December to February are lower than in south Taiwan (Table 4.2). At temperatures less than 15˚C, milkfish stop eating. They might even die below 10˚C. Depending on the depth of the pond, the water temperature is 2–3˚C lower, making winter a harder time for milkfish to survive. Distributors collect milkfish in southwest Taiwan between July and December. In south Taiwan, it is less risky for fish farmers to keep their milkfish over the winters because the average temperatures are higher. The climatic differences allow the fish farmers in south Taiwan, which is warmer in winter, to sell their fish all year, especially between December and June.

Table 4.2. Relationships between average temperature and milkfish production regions. Month Average Average Major temperature temperature production (˚C) in Chiayi (˚C) in region County (Year Kaohsiung 1981-2010) County (Year 1981-2010) January 16.5 19.3 South February 17.3 20.3 South March 19.7 22.6 South April 23.0 25.4 South May 25.8 27.5 South June 27.8 28.5 South July 28.6 29.2 Southwest August 28.2 28.7 Southwest September 27.0 28.1 Southwest October 24.5 26.7 Southwest November 21.3 24.0 Southwest December 17.1 20.6 South Source: Central Weather Bureau (n.d.) and author’s field data about the major production seasons (2014). 246

246 Source: http://www.cwb.gov.tw/V7/climate/monthlyMean/Taiwan_tx.htm. 162

Chart 4.3 shows the changing average prices of milkfish auctioned in Taichung Fish Market in 2014 (total days: 296). These price fluctuations affected the farm-gate prices. In early July 2014, fish farmers received TWD68.33/kg (TWD41/catty) when they sold the milkfish to distributors. However, most of the fish farmers sold their milkfish from August to early November when the farm-gate price was TWD61.67/kg (TWD37/catty). Generally speaking, this period is the peak harvest season of milkfish in southwest Taiwan. The price is therefore lower. Between January and April, the price goes up and only the milkfish farmers in south Taiwan have fish to sell thanks to the more favourable climatic conditions. Between May and July, some fish farmers in south Taiwan may sell another harvest of milkfish. Fish farmers in southwest Taiwan may receive a good price in July. This is because if their milkfish grow to market size fast enough, the fish farmers can take advantage of the low overall supply of milkfish in Taiwan in July.

12000 160 10000 140 120 8000 100 6000 80 4000 60 Volume (kg) Volume

40 TWD/kg 2000 20 0 0

Year Transaction volume Average price

Chart 4.3. Average prices and transaction volume of milkfish auctioned in Taichung Fish Market in 2014. Source: COA (2016). 247

247 Source: http://m.coa.gov.tw/outside/AquaticTrans/Search.aspx . 163

Simu milkfish distributors currently distribute milkfish from both southwest Taiwan and south Taiwan to the fish markets. The boundary across southwest Taiwan and south Taiwan for milkfish harvesting became blurred in the 1980s. Ah-wang recalled that the older distributors in southwest and south Taiwan were more territorial in the past. 248 Nowadays, distributors from both regions cooperate in terms of harvesting milkfish in the two regions to enhance their flexibility. Ah-wang claimed that what led to this cooperation was his effort to reach an oral agreement with distributors in south Taiwan in the 1980s: henceforth, in the production season (July to November) in southwest Taiwan, Simu distributors focused on harvesting the surrounding area, but they also allowed their counterparts from south Taiwan to come and harvest milkfish. To accomplish these reciprocal obligations, the distributors in south Taiwan allowed Simu distributors to harvest milkfish in south Taiwan between December and June. This arrangement became a norm that enhanced the flexibility of all milkfish distributors in sourcing fish over the year. Moreover, they exchanged milkfish of various sizes to fulfill the expectations of their respective customers. The distributors have cooperated to stabilize their supply of various types of milkfish products to their buyers. The new arrangement of their harvesting activities has helped solve the problems caused by their seasonal milkfish supply shortage in some fish markets, which had occurred in the 1960s (Hsu 1970). Milkfish aquaculture in Taiwan since the 1990s has been part of the global market. The fish farmers’ decisions in selling their milkfish to local distributors or exporters are affected by the health conditions of their milkfish and the waiting time involved for the harvesting arrangement. Exporters lowered the cost of purchasing milkfish by arranging for the harvest more quickly than local distributors, which has led some fish farmers to accept lower farm-gate prices due to the threat of poor fish health. Climatic conditions have made fish farmers in southwest Taiwan more flexible than their counterparts in south Taiwan. When cold fronts occur, milkfish in southwest Taiwan are more likely to die. The fish farmers there cannot wait very long for a harvest arrangement to be carried out. The milkfish supply chain therefore involves a

248 Ah-wang, a milkfish distributor: interview, January 15, 2015. 164

complex relationship between middlemen and fish farmers that shows the powerful influence of global–local dynamics and climatic conditions.

III. Milkfish Harvesting and Distribution

Distributors organize the harvesting and distribution of milkfish on a daily basis (Photos 4.1a-l). After the fish reach market size (i.e., at least one catty), a fish farmer contacts the distributor for harvest. The distributor or his manager, who is in charge of the harvesting procedures, then visits the farm to sample a fish to check its size and confirm that the belly is fat, which is more desired in the domestic market. The distributor also cooks and tastes the sample to check if it contains a muddy flavour (臭土味)249 —which is to be avoided—another major indicator of fish quality in the milkfish sector. According to a fish farmer, the muddy flavour is a body odour and taste caused by soil and algae composition in the pond. 250 If the pond water is more alkaline (such as sea water), the muddy flavour of the fish can be reduced or eliminated. In Taiwan, milkfish with the muddy flavour can create an unappealing culinary experience for seafood lovers. If the distributor finds muddy flavour from a sample, the fish farmer will need to improve the pond environment to eliminate the flavour. If no muddy flavour is found, the distributor can schedule the fish harvest, which ranges from three days to three weeks later. The distributor confirms the actual harvest date with the fish farmer one or two days before they come to collect it. 251

249 Chi.: choutuwei. 250 Chi-sung, a fish farmer: interview, February 28, 2015. 251 Chapter five will have further discussion on this muddy flavour and the milkfish trade. 165

Step Description Photo a) Sampling fish Distributor’s manager comes to (拍魚)252 sample a fish to estimate average fish size. The distributor then boils the fish head to taste whether muddy flavour exists).

b) nongyu ( 弄魚)253 On the day of harvest, a harvest worker comes to scare the fish, to clear its potential muddy flavour.

c) Setting fish net Harvest workers set up nets for catching and collecting fish.

d) Netting fish Harvest workers catch and collect the fish.

252 Chi.: paiyu ; Hok.: phah- hî. 253 Hok. : lāng-hî. 166

e) Mild Electrocution ( To facilitate sorting and weighing, 電魚)254 harvest workers stun the fish.

f) Moving fish to an ad Harvest workers use a crane to hoc workstation at the transfer fish from the pond to a site of harvest workstation.

g) Sorting fish (分 Distributors’ employees sort the fish 魚)255 according to size. Those less than one catty will receive primary processing.

h) Weighing fish ( 稱 The recorded total weight of this 魚)256 fish will be used to calculate the payment to fish farmers.

i) Packing fish into Each box contains 34 catties of ice- boxes ( 裝箱)257 chilled whole fish.

254 Chi.: dianyu . 255 Chi.: fenyu . 256 Chi.: chengyu. 257 Chi.: zhuangxiang. 167

j) Sending boxes of Distributor’s drivers deliver the whole fish and fillets harvested fish to various fish to urban fish markets markets the day of the harvest, before auctions start.

k) Auction At around 2 a.m., auctions start at fish markets.

l) Price negotiation Buyers negotiate fish prices with distributors’ representatives (fish market personnel).

Photo 4.1a-l. Milkfish distributors’ harvest and transport procedures. Source: Authors’ field data and photographs (2014).

Division of Labour in Milkfish Harvesting Two teams work together for each milkfish harvest. 258 The harvest team ( 網工)259 comes first at 9 a.m. to nongyu (弄魚), scaring the fish to make them excrete and eliminate their muddy flavour. Seven more harvest workers, including a crane driver, arrive at the pond by 11 a.m. to set the net and start catching the fish. Within four hours, the workers harvest twice, each time catching approximately 5,000 catties of milkfish. Another team, comprising a truck driver and four workers, reach the fish pond before the first catch is done. They pour pond water and ice into a temporary canvas pool. When buckets of fish are poured into the iced water, three workers

258 Ah-wen, a fish farmer and harvest worker: interview, February 17, 2014. 259 Chi.: wanggong. 168

sort every fish according to size. The harvest workers help weigh the fish and put 34 catties of fish into each polyform box. After the truck driver adds ice and seawater into the box, he puts on a lid and seals the box. The driver writes down the size of the fish on the lid and moves the box onto the truck. After all harvested milkfish are put into the boxes, the driver returns to Simu. The distributor and his manager will then make final decisions regarding the volume and sizes of milkfish being sent to various fish markets (Table 4.3). When the distributor arrives at fish markets later in the night, he unloads the boxes according to the distributor’s order for the size and volume of fish.

Table 4.3. Market sizes of milkfish classified by distributors. Terms Quantity of fish per box (34 catties) teda (特大) 19 to 21 fish per box te (特) 24 to 26 fish per box zhong (中) 32 to 33 fish per box weishu (尾數) 15, 16, or 17 fish per box (depending on fish sizes; bigger than teda ) wufen (五分) ~2 catties (2,000 catties/ 1,000 fish) bafen (八分) ~1 catty 3 taels 260 (1,250 catties/1,000 fish)

jiufen (九分) ~1 catty 2 taels (1,100 catties/1,000 fish) Source: Author’s field data (2014).

Simu fish farmers work at wage jobs during fish harvesting and distribution. The harvest workers’ wage is TWD1,000 for one pond, no matter how many times they harvest it. The crane drivers receive TWD1,000 more because they provide the crane service and their own net. Although the harvest workers are paid by the fish farmers, the distributors assign their work. At around 5 a.m., the distributor calls the teams to inform them as to which pond their teams should go that day. Harvest workers, such as Ah-wen, call the distributor their “boss” because their jobs

260 1 catty = 16 taels ( 兩; Chi.: liang ). 169

are given by the distributor. The distributor pays the wages of another team of workers, including the workers sorting the fish, as well as for the truck driver. It is worth noting that the truck driver owns his truck and is financially responsible for its maintenance. The distributor pays a truck driver TWD12,000 each time, if the harvesting takes place around Simu. If he has to drive to south Taiwan, he is paid TWD13,000. The extra TWD1,000 is a subsidy for the gas. However, the cost of gas for one trip from south Taiwan to all fish markets (as far as Taipei in north Taiwan) was TWD4,300 according to my field record. 261 The incomes the drivers earn in peak harvest seasons cover these extra costs in low harvest seasons when they need to go to south Taiwan. Most workers sorting fish are female, who receive TWD1,000 each time. When Simu fish farmers work during the day as wage labourers, their family members carry out the farming routines for them, such as shrimp harvesting.

Distributors’ Decision-making Processes Simu distributors currently use three sources of information to make their decisions regarding the actual date of harvest, the farm-gate price, and the volume and sizes of milkfish they need: 1. Distributors check the average auctioned price of milkfish of varying sizes at the three biggest urban fish markets in Taiwan. The data are updated online by the fish markets, which report to the Council of Agriculture (COA 2016). 262 2. Distributors collect opinions from the fish markets. For instance, Ah-wang asked his truck driver to stay overnight near the Taichung Fish Market, one of the biggest fish markets, to observe the auctions. He then reported back to Ah-wang about the auction processes, which reflected information that the prices did not show. The information included how enthusiastic the underwriters were as well as who bid on the particular sizes of milkfish and other products in the auction. 263 3. Distributors know the estimated volume of milkfish in each pond based on the information the fish farmers reported earlier. They consider this information and estimate the amount of

261 Field note, delivering milkfish from Simu to Taipei, May 2, 2014. 262 Source: http://m.coa.gov.tw/outside/AquaticTrans/Search.aspx . 263 Field note: Taichung Fish Market, June 5, 2014. 170

fish they need for the next few days. At 5 a.m., the distributors make final decisions about assigning harvest workers to the ponds, so that they can harvest enough fish at the right sizes. In case the actual volume exceeds the estimated volume, the distributors need to decide whether to send the extra milkfish to the fish markets, which may be auctioned at lower prices, or to store them in freezers. The auction prices inform the distributors to determine the harvest volume the next day.

According to Ah-wang, milkfish distributors need to have enough cash flow to pay fish farmers’ harvests in a timely manner (e.g., between three days and two weeks in Simu). 264 Ah- feng, the distributor in south Taiwan, further explained that I need TWD600,000 every day to harvest 12,000 catties [of milkfish]. Some buyers [in the fish market] pay me after two weeks, meaning that I need TWD10 million as liquid flow. Xinyong (信用; credit) is the way we conduct the business. 265 We pay for the fish farmers within 10 days. In Simu, they pay within 3 days. In the grouper sector, fish farmers will not receive payment for two months

For example, Taichung Fish Market requires underwriters to pay at least one-third of the total price of seafood products they auction each day. On the fifth day of every month, the underwriters need to clear all the debt. Within this period of time, the distributors may need to use their cash flow to run their businesses. Although the distributors can store unsold fish in local icehouses or freezers, they prefer to sell the fish as soon as possible to keep their cash flowing. In corresponding fashion, the distributors would lose control of their cash flow if the buyers in the urban fish market were to delay their payments. Simu distributors conduct their business as “ maikong maikong, ” ( 買空賣空), which means that the distributors buy a product for quick sale to minimize the cost of storage. They earn their profits by providing services to fish farmers, wholesalers, and retailers. Thus, their ideal form of operation is selling all the harvested milkfish on the same day. Bestor (2004: 181) describes the Tsukiji market in Japan as a system of “bulking and breaking,” meaning that

264 Ah-wang, a milkfish distributor: interview, January 15, 2015. 265 Ah-feng, a milkfish distributor: interview, March 5, 2015. 171

brokers assemble various types and quantities of fish catches from individual producers and then match market demand by dividing the products through auctions. In Taiwanese aquaculture, the distributors play such a role, but they specialize in one type of fish, such as milkfish. By practising maikongmaikong , the distributors supply milkfish from rural areas to urban markets. They must manage the business risk of the lack of cash flow and seasonal fluctuations in production. They harvest fish farmers’ milkfish across the two production regions to stabilize their supply to the markets. Milkfish farmers rely on their service to sell their milkfish on the domestic market. The strategy of maikong maikong maintains the freshness of milkfish, so fish farmers and distributors are competitive in the fish markets. The price of milkfish there is affected significantly by the freshness of milkfish at the time of a transaction. In Simu, milkfish harvesting and distribution create job opportunities that enable fish farmers to diversify their sources of income. The harvest workers, workers sorting fish, and truck drivers are all involved in a supply chain for milkfish. Simu’s local economy is supported by this supply chain.

IV. Primary Processing, the Buffer Stock Program, and the Village Economy

This section assesses the impacts of the globalization of milkfish and the addition of processing in the supply chain on fish farmers’ livelihoods. The overproduction of milkfish and the entry of Taiwan into the WTO have affected the milkfish processing policy in Taiwan. As a result of the aquaculture restructuring, the milkfish sector was reorganized. Fish farmers were encouraged to set up their own groups and processing businesses. The policy reorientation was designed to add value to milkfish and increase fish farmers’ incomes. The village economy of Simu shows that the market economy and the social relationships within the Taiwanese fishery communities are mutually embedded.

Primary Processing and Freezing Plant Owners Starting with the aquaculture restructuring in 1992, the Taiwanese government supervised fish farmers through Production and Marketing Groups ( 產銷班; P&M groups). 266

266 Chi.: chanxiaoban . 172

Ten or more fish farmers, operating a total of at least 10 ha of fish ponds, can form their own P&M groups, which they register through their fishermen’s organizations. The government encourages fish farmers to act collectively to strengthen their competitiveness. In 2014, each P&M group paid TWD50,000 to their fishermen association as a supervision fee. The groups can apply for government subsidies to purchase equipment, organize seminars that provide updated information about the supply chain, introduce new aquaculture knowledge, and develop products and brands for marketing. Mr. Tseng, the retired top-level official of the Fisheries Agency, described this policy as originally striving for “planned production” ( 計劃生產)267 so as to enhance the competitiveness and bargaining power of fish farmers: Most households run less than 1.5 ha of fish farms. The small scale and high cost make it hard for them to compete [with other countries]. Through aquaculture restructuring, the government tried to lower their operational cost and reorganize the production, distribution, and marketing [of farmed seafood]. . . . If fish farmers can organize groups among themselves, with concerted effort they can become more competitive when ordering feed [to lower the cost] and when negotiating farm-gate prices with distributors. 268

The Taiwanese government also encouraged the P&M groups in the milkfish sector to establish their own P&F plants, which filleted milkfish (i.e., fish bellies). The government proposed that value-added processing and frozen seafood could help milkfish farmers survive trade liberalization. The term “primary processing” includes scaling, cutting, and gutting. The P&F plants are equipped with freezers for the cold storage of milkfish and associated products. In the early 1990s, two Simu distributors and six local business people (from Simu and other villages) set up eight P&F plants, located in and adjacent to Simu. They supplied mainly frozen milkfish belly to urban Taiwan. The plant owners employed workers (20–50, depending on the scale of business) to fulfill orders for milkfish bellies. This product satisfied consumer demand mainly in northern Taiwan―those who find it unappealing to eat a whole fish, which contains 222 bones. The P&F plants supplied various sizes of milkfish bellies, and also “boneless” ones (i.e., a belly without fish fins), to urban fish markets and other buyers (Photo 4.2 and 4.3). The P&F

267 Chi.: jihua shengchan. 268 Mr. Tseng, a retired top-level official of the Fisheries Agency: interview, March 9, 2015. 173

plants also sold fish heads and skins to fishmongers and vendors for soup making, while secondary processing plants, which specialize in fish balls, sausages, and floss, purchased the bony meat for processing (Table 4.4). Fish heads and bones can also be sold to feed plants to use as animal protein in fish feed. Therefore, every part of the milkfish is used for profits in the supply chain.

Table 4.4. An example of the wholesale prices of milkfish belly. Item (piece/pack) Quantity (pieces Weight (g) Unit price of fillet)/box (TWD)/pack Extra-large 50 250–270 55 Large (5 pieces/pack) 100 (20 packs) 200–220 48 Large (1 piece/pack) 100 200–220 49 Medium (5 pieces/pack) 100 150–170 Unknown Medium (1 piece/pack) 100 150–170 Unknown Small (10 pieces/pack) 150 120–130 28 Extra-large & boneless (1 piece/pack) 70 180–190 73 Large & boneless (1 piece/pack) 100 150–170 60 Medium & boneless (1 piece/pack) 100 120–130 53 Small & boneless (1 piece/pack) 100 100–120 46 Seasoned & barbecued (1 piece/pack) 50 150 53 Boneless seasoned & barbecued 50 125 63 (1 piece/pack) Source: Author’s field data collected from a P&F plant (2014).

174

Photo 4.2. Milkfish bellies. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Photo 4.3. Milkfish bellies in packages. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

175

The P&M groups have not used any “planned production” of the sort that Mr. Tseng mentioned. In practice, these groups had no obligation to purchase feed collectively, let alone prioritize the handling of members’ harvests. P&F plant owners operated the businesses for profit and organized their P&M groups to make the most of two additional advantages. First, the plant owners, by using the status of the P&M group leaders, could receive subsidies of up to one- third of the cost of purchasing processing and freezing equipment and facilities. Second, business taxes were waived on P&F plants when they were managed by fishermen’s P&M groups. These plant owners also organize harvesting activities, from sources not limited to their P&M group members, and send their milkfish to urban fish markets or sell the fish directly to their customers. In the remaining part of this section, I use plant owners to represent all P&F plant owners, including two distributors who have expanded their businesses to primary processing. They are competitors of each other in the market of milkfish fillets. As of the 1990s, there are two forms of investors in milkfish P&F plants in Taiwan―private businesses and P&M groups. Private businesses can be set up by anyone. P&M groups are limited to Taiwanese nationals with fisherman status. A fish farmer owning or leasing fish ponds can obtain the status of a fisherman. After fish farmers form a P&M group, they are eligible for government subsidies and consultations with fish farmer organizations, fishermen associations, or county governments. The Taiwanese government organizes fish farmers in this way to promote processing and marketing. It highlights fairness by helping groups instead of particular individuals. Some fish farmers seize opportunities to become business people. They organize other fish farmers as their P&M group members in a loose way to access the extra resources which are unavailable for private businesses. P&M groups do not need to pay profit taxes and most of their P&F plants were built on reclaimed fish ponds. The P&F plants are less polluting than industrial factories. P&F plants thus co-existed with fish farms without local resistance. The major problems in milkfish marketing were overproduction and low fish prices. The official policy of promoting processed milkfish products is to add value to milkfish.

Buffer Stock Program (95 Mechanism) The buffer stock program for farmed seafood is an official response to the price drops attributed by the government to milkfish overproduction, rather than the influx of cheap seafood

176

due to trade liberalization. Before Taiwan entered the WTO in 2002, the Taiwanese government did not subsidize the milkfish sector. Milkfish was once a high-value product that was in high demand on the domestic market. When overproduction occurred in the 1990s, the government used promotional events to encourage domestic consumption. The promotional events included milkfish cooking demonstrations in cities and one-day events selling milkfish at a discount. I found no research that investigated whether the promotional events were effective in promoting the sale of milkfish in the market. My informants usually evaluated such events by saying whether the farm-gate price increased after the event. They expressed that such events did not affect the farm-gate price. The aquaculture sector considered the farm-gate price as a good indicator in reflecting the market demand and supply, because the Taiwanese government operates on a free market principle, which does not distort the market. The Fisheries Agency cannot subsidize the milkfish sector because it would violate the WTO rules (United Daily 2003a). The fisheries sector was worried that the influx of cheaper imports after Taiwan became a WTO member would destroy the sector. However, Mr. Tseng and his colleagues in the Fisheries Agency found the outcome to be that the fisheries sector adapted to the new arrangement: “After Taiwan had been a WTO member for a few years, we found that no serious problems occurred. We still imposed tariffs on some agricultural and seafood products.”269 Chart 4.4 shows that milkfish price fluctuations occurred after 2000, including a plunge in November 2005 (ibid.). The government was unable to influence fish farmers’ stocking decisions despite its efforts to make the prices in the fish markets more transparent. As chapter two documented, the official stocking census failed to provide accurate information for fish farmers to make stocking decisions that avoid overproduction. Fish farmers exaggerated the quantity of their stock to get more relief funds in the event of disasters.

269 Mr. Tseng, a retired top-level official of the Fisheries Agency: interview, March 9, 2015. In 2015, Taiwan imposed an average of 19.1% in tariffs on its seafood imports (COA 2015b). Taiwan also banned 830 Chinese agricultural and seafood items from entering Taiwan. Source: http://coa.cpc.org.tw/edu/WebPage/FCKeditorUpload/ea7979ca-8cf6-443f-af3a-71e4a5bbc941/01- %E6%B0%B4%E7%94%A2%E5%A4%96%E9%8A%B7%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E8%88%87%E6%A1%8 8%E4%BE%8B%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9_%E9%99%B3%E5%BB%BA%E4%BD%91%E7%B0%A1%E4%B B%BB%E6%8A%80%E6%AD%A3.pdf. 177

Chart 4.4. Transaction volumes and average prices of milkfish in fish markets (2000–2015). Source: Adapted from Fisheries Agency (2016c). 270 Labels translated and modified by the author.

In 2004, the Fisheries Agency adopted the buffer stock program, also called the “95 mechanism,” 271 to provide indirect support to the milkfish sector (COA 2004). 272 The Taiwanese government sponsored local fishermen associations that were to carry out the program when the average transaction price for any farmed seafood variety in the urban fish market—including milkfish—dropped to 95% of the production cost (Chen et al. 2010: 180). The cost was estimated by the government based on the average product cost over the previous five years (deducting the highest and the lowest costs before calculations). 273 P&F plants seldom kept a lot of stock, because they wanted to have enough cash flow to pay the fish farmers. However, the buffer stock program provides a security of guaranteed return, and so they were more willing to keep more stock. Thus, this made the buffer stock program beneficial to the P&F plants.

270 Source: http://efish.fa.gov.tw/efish/statistics/trendchart.htm . 271 Chi.: jiuwu jizhi. 272 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=8334 . 273 In 2007, the benchmark production cost was TWD57/kg (Fisheries Agency 2012). Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsRuleFisheries/content.aspx?id=306&chk=158ade43-e3aa-4b9e-9653- cbc7ecd64100¶m=pn%3d4%26kind%3d%e9%a4%8a%e6%ae%96%e5%88%86%e7%9b%ae . 178

The milkfish farmers did not benefit directly from the buffer stock program in terms of increases in fish-gate prices. The fishermen associations in southwest Taiwan carried out the buffer stock program twice in 2005 and 2006. The Fisheries Agency sponsored them to purchase the oversupplied amount. The fishermen associations actually subsidized P&F plants (their P&M members) to purchase the milkfish. For example, the transaction price of milkfish in fish markets dropped to TWD43.8/kg (TWD26.3/catty) in 2005 ( Liberty Times 2005a). 274 The Fisheries Agency allowed a few fishermen associations to pay TWD16.67/kg (TWD10/catty) for P&F plants to purchase milkfish (ibid.). In other words, fish farmers did not share the subsidies. They still needed to sell their fish at low prices if the fish needed to be harvested. In times of cold fronts, the health of fish may be in bad conditions. Fish farmers need to sell them even if the price is low. The buffer stock program was a policy measure that indirectly sponsored the P&F plants to regulate milkfish supplies. The P&F plants could stock frozen fillets for sale at a later date. They could do it when the supply dropped and the market price increased. During my interviews in 2015 with government officials who operate at the central and county levels, they justified the buffer stock scheme by linking it to environmental and economic abnormality; they also wanted to avoid violating the WTO ruling: If the wholesale price seriously drops, we will subsidize fish farmers to pay the companies or exporters for the extra fee of an “early” harvest. We do so to support the producers and distributors to overcome the imbalance in the market (i.e., overproduction). 275

Under the WTO framework, a national government cannot directly subsidize the companies. Our subsidy now . . . let me frame it this way . . . is on the production side. We arrange it as a subsidy during times of imbalance between production and distribution. It is difficult to explain, but you can understand that we do not want other countries perceiving that we directly subsidize the producers and so create unfairness in trade. 276

The Taiwanese government planned to reorganize fish farmers as P&M groups and let them run P&F plants to add value to milkfish and prevent fish farmers from losing their investment during

274 Source : http://old.ltn.com.tw/2005/new/nov/26/today-south5.htm 275 Mr. Deng, the top-level government official: interview, February 10, 2015. 276 Mr. Chou, a county government official: interview, April 17 2015. 179

times of overproduction. From the fish farmers’ perspective, the government’s plan failed because the fish farmers did not obtain reasonable farm-gate prices. The increase in milkfish farm-gate prices is key to enhancing fish farmers’ livelihoods from milkfish production. The buffer stock program did not directly increase farm-gate prices during the overproduction. The climatic conditions usually made fish farmers sell their fish even at low prices. The buffer stock program did not achieve this goal. Fish farmers still faced the economic and ecological risks of farming milkfish. They reported that the P&F plant owners took advantage of the buffer stock program; the government treated the plant owners better than fish farmers. This created the fish farmers’ tension with the plant owners and the government. However, the fish farmers were unable to change the structure of the supply chain, which was sufficient to sell their milkfish to the market. They continued to suffer in times of overproduction or cold front.

Village Economy and Social Relationships: i) Harvesting and “Exploitation” Simu village offers an example of how business people and fish farmers maintain social relationships in the fishing villages in southwest Taiwan. The distributors and P&F plant owners, as part of the village economy, provide job opportunities to fish farmers and their family members. These business people contributed to the village by donating money to religious festivals. For these events, they paid the fees for the entertainment (e.g., puppet shows). They also financially contributed to the building of public facilities such as columbarium and temple offices. In Simu and Budai, milkfish business people became more influential in local communities by being elected as representatives in fishermen associations or as township legislators. Fish farmers were major candidates for village magistrate positions (also called village heads). Party politics existed, but business people could choose which candidate and party they would support each time before elections. I visited one dinner attended by a DPP member who tried to persuade a KMT member (a businessperson) to provide support. This was because business people could donate money and also mobilize villagers to vote for particular candidates.

180

Fish farmers in Simu and other villages used the word for “exploitation” ( 剝削)277 to describe the middlemen’s control of the timing and price setting on their harvest. For example, Chia-chun, a female fish farmer, reported that “my father-in-law became an alcoholic because distributors did not give him reasonable farm-gate prices; he was upset and drank a lot. He refused to teach me and his son even though we became fish farmers. We learned from neighbours.” 278 Fish farmers are particularly upset with middlemen, when the latter slash the farm-gate price because the farmers’ milkfish are in bad conditions. Fish farmers in southwest Taiwan perceived that they are in an inferior position when negotiating with middlemen over the timing of their milkfish harvests. The distributors can decide when to call for a harvest and they can change their decisions to suit their own needs. When I asked fish farmers such as Zi-yi about when the harvest would be arranged in September, the typical reply was “I do not know” ( 不知 道)279 or “I am not sure” ( 不確定). 280 On September 28, Zi-yi was suddenly called by a Simu distributor to hold the harvest that was planned for early the next morning. Any delay of the harvest means a higher risk of losing healthy fish due to disease and mortality. This situation meant that the final farm-gate price was unpredictable for Zi-yi, since it was the distributor who decided when to harvest. Dai-en, a young fish farmer, told me that his planned harvest had been delayed several times. On October 23, after the distributor’s manager came to collect the milkfish sample for tasting, Dai-en told me that he had waited for two weeks. He suspected that the distributor wanted to keep him on the waitlist until the farm-gate price dropped.281 The lower the farm-gate price, the more a distributor can earn from a harvest. If Dai-en kept waiting, the fish would stop eating and contain less body fat, resulting in a lower volume of harvested fish and, subsequently, less income. Simu fish farmers cultivate social relationships and use their personal networks to put them in a better position when negotiating with distributors. Ah-shin, for example, knew who was a friend of a particular distributor. When she wanted to negotiate the harvest time, she asked

277 Chi.: baoxue . 278 Chia-chun, a fish farmer: interview January 5, 2015. 279 Chi.: buzhidao ; Hok.: m̄ -tsai-iánn. 280 Chi.: buqueding. 281 Fieldnote: A fish farm, September 29, 2014. 181

this person to go and talk to the distributor in person. She also makes friends with some distributors. I noted that Simu fish farmers treat their workers in the harvests as friends, if they are not relatives. They prepare all meals, snacks, and drinks during the harvest. This attention to social relationships also plays a role when the local distributors come to the farm and the fish farmers must negotiate the farm-gate price. For example, if the price was TWD40 per catty yesterday and TWD39 today, fish farmers with better relations with the distributors, or those who treat the workers well, could possibly ask for TWD40 as the price for the milkfish harvest. The distributors are relatives or friends with the workers. Knowing the fish farmers take care of the workers, the distributors were more likely to look on this request for a better price more favourably. Fish farmers’ social networks with middlemen keep changing in Simu. For example, Ah- liang was a local distributor. Zi-yi, as a relative (and a friend, he said) of Ah-liang, asked for harvesting his fish just in time when his fish were at risk of death due to poor health. Ah-liang rearranged his original schedule with other fish farmers to harvest Zi-yi’s fish. This meant that Zi-yi, then, did not need to sell the fish to exporters, and also earned more than if he had to sell the fish for export. However, Ah-liang passed away in the mid-2000s, and his grandson, Mr. Su, took over the business. Zi-yi found it was harder to ask Mr. Su for this same favour because his personal relationship with Mr. Su was not as strong as the one he had had with Ah-liang. This shift in relationship typified the difference in generations: Ah-liang was reputed to help fish farmers in this way. Comparatively, younger generations of P&F plant owners found themselves struggling to develop similar social relations with fish farmers of older generations, in the midst of running their businesses well. This was because they had spent part of their life living outside of the community, which resulted in less intimate social relationships with other villagers. This example demonstrates how the fish farmers viewed personal relationships as a factor in choosing a distributor to do business with. P&F plant owners had their own particular business and social concerns. The Simu P&F plant owners claim that the free market mechanism (meaning the law of supply and demand) mainly determines the transaction price. However, they understand that the situation is more complex than the price mechanism. Milkfish products can vary in size and in the ways they are used. For example, Chi-wei, a young plant manager and the son of an owner, observed that

182

during winter, when milkfish prices rose, fish vendors in cities used half of a belly in a batch of soup without cutting the price of the soup. Moreover, Chi-wei’s customers ordered smaller sized milkfish bellies in winter so that the total cost could drop. The P&F plant owners have to estimate the amount and size of milkfish demanded in urban areas accurately to keep the price of milkfish up at the urban fish markets. If they estimate inaccurately too many times because they do not consider all factors, their businesses would likely fail. Ah-lung, another plant owner, considers himself lacking individual power to modify wholesale and farm-gate prices. He reported that “if I give a customer in an urban fish market a special discount, I will receive a number of phone calls from other distributors and P&F plant owners expressing their dissatisfaction with this business practice.” 282 The plant owners also know the farm-gate prices the others set because the farm-gate price is never a secret in fishing villages such as Simu. Chi-wei found that all distributors and P&F plant owners refused to collaborate to control the market. 283 The distributors and P&F plant owners considered themselves competitors to each other in the wholesale fish markets. In Simu, they set up their milkfish development association under the coordination of a local politician and Chi-wei. However, the association was not functioning between 2012 and 2015 due to conflicts of economic interest. They preferred to run their businesses individually, except for cooperating in the exchange of milkfish of different sizes to satisfy their customers’ needs. They are, in fact, both collaborators and competitors. Despite operating private milkfish businesses, the P&F plant owners also contribute to the stability of Simu’s economy. Mrs. Fang, a plant owner, told me that she liked to offer stable jobs and working environments to local villagers. 284 She declined all orders from China. She took orders from Taiwanese companies that could be easily renewed after each transaction so that they guaranteed ongoing work for the villagers. One example she used was that of the supply of frozen seafood to the military service, which was a long-term contract that she could keep as long as she met the required food standards. One time I saw her receive some guests from China. The Chiayi County Fishermen Association brought them to Mr. Fang’s plant where they might

282 Ah-lung, a P&F plant owner, interview, January 15, 2015. 283 Chi-wei, a P&F plant manager, interview, January 6, 2015. 284 Mrs. Fang, a P&F plant owner: interview, April 5, 2015. 183

place orders for her products later (see chapter five for Taiwan’s milkfish trade with China). After the Chinese left, I asked Mrs. Fang if she was going to take any orders from them. She expressed concern about the potential orders from China. 285 The orders would be larger than those in Taiwan because of the larger market size in China. However, she was worried that if the orders were not renewed for any reasons after she expanded her business scale, she would lose her investment and her labourers would be unemployed. She heard that the Chinese business people were “calculating” ( 很賊). 286 Doing business with the Chinese was risky from her perspective. She felt obligated to keep her workers employed until they retired.

Village Economy: Social Relationships, Religion, and Community Leadership Gates (1996: 225) noted that much of the “petty capitalist’s” relationships with their hired workers “remains to be learned,” because the relationships may or may not be exploitative in certain contexts. Religious and communal activities are thus important events to understand how these business people cultivate social relationships with other people in Taiwan (Gates 1996). I found that milkfish distribution in Simu demonstrates this issue well. The perspectives of the P&F plant owners (including the distributors) illustrated that their calculations in their business dealings involved social and cultural factors. Thus, they must develop their relationships with fish farmers and community members that go beyond mere labour exploitation. One of the ways these relationships unfold is that local elites, seafood business people, and fish farmers spend part of their profits supporting the popular religion. In addition to a labour relationship, they establish and maintain more personalized social connections with individuals in other working classes (e.g., their P&F plant workers and harvest workers) and other fish farmers. Simu villagers, for instance, are the major donors, organizers, and participants of their community activities and development. This is due in part to many of the seafood business people living in Simu as villagers. They donate, for example, to the building and maintenance of local facilities. They lead the organization of communal and religious activities.

285 Ibid. 286 Chi.: henzei . Mrs. Fang, a P&F plant owner: interview, April 5, 2015. 184

Three kinds of institutions provide community services to villages ―religious (temples and a church), political (community development associations) and professional (fishermen associations). Simu community is formed by two administrative villages, so there are two village heads and two community development associations. One fishermen association exists in each Taiwanese county. A branch of the county-level fishermen association was located in Simu. The local political systems and the county-level fishermen association change their leaders via regular elections. Typically, seafood business people and fish farmers were the major candidates in the elections. As well, the Presbyterian church has an elected board of representatives. In 2014, most of them were fish farmers, with a few in other forms of employment (see Chapter six). Unlike the system of the major temple, the church allows women to join the board. The community development associations, the church, and the fishermen association organize extra- curricular classes and other activities for villagers to spend their leisure time. In political affairs, the church has relatively little influence. It is the community development associations and the fishermen association that use activities to attract supporters for particular factions, political parties, and future candidates in local elections of village heads and township aldermen. Seafood business people in Simu participate in the organization and activities of the major village temple, one of the three communal temples. The village temple is run by eight zhu (柱；same as 角頭; jiaotou ; local surname groups), which represents the eight clans and lineages in Simu. Every three years, each zhu performs rituals by throwing divine blocks (i.e., moonblocks) to determine who will be the representative of their zhu in the temple. Generally, they believe that their deities decide who becomes the representative by allowing that individual to have the highest number of consecutive divine answers (a combination of yin and yang ). The eight representatives, all men, are assisted by a general-secretary and two staffers to manage the temple. They also select the new temple head. Villagers who believed they could not contribute time or much money to support temple events were more reluctant to become candidates. However, a few seafood business people with more resources would typically join the temple management for at least one term to demonstrate their commitment to community services. The jiao festival, one communal and religious festival held every 12 years, required much more money to cover the costs of paying ritual specialists and offerings. Seafood business people usually joined the organizing committee for this event

185

and donated money. It seemed that this volunteering tendency influenced the next generation, as the next group of organizers were those younger men who chose to spend most of their time in the village. These community activities are part of a web of interwoven activities that demonstrate the interrelated roles played by fish farmers and seafood business people within the community. For example, organizing temple activities is an opportunity for Simu villagers to take leadership in community services without having to become full-time politicians. Further, they gain a social reputation by donating money or spending time on religious institutions that provide entertainment for the whole village. Some richer seafood business people are willing to burn more paper money. They please the deities to protect their families and the village; they simultaneously tell other villagers about their financial situation. In other aspects of community events, the villagers cooperate without stressing each other’s wealth or class statuses. They join the same parade to ask deities to purify the community. Their negotiation with deities for protection and offerings are usually for communal purposes. This section has delineated how the market economy and social relationships are mutually embedded in the milkfish sector. Simu villagers engaging in this sector include fish farmers and seafood business people. The problem of milkfish overproduction has decreased the average price of milkfish in recent decades. The business people economically benefited from government programs, including the subsidies to P&M groups and the buffer stock program, and the control of milkfish harvest. Fish farmers with less economic and social influence tend to be more reluctant to become leaders. They also believe that they are exploited by the seafood business people during milkfish harvest arrangements. The business people justify these harvesting arrangements, arguing that they face business risks when they arrange fish farmers’ harvests to fish markets where fish taste is a factor affecting the price. The business people consider themselves as community members who contribute to the community with their investment in P&F plants, donations to local facilities, and leadership in religious activities. The relationships between fish farmers and business people are simultaneously in cooperation (especially during communal and religious activities) and in tension during harvest arrangements. Among the business people, competition seems to be more dominant than cooperation. Individual business people attempted to form a new organization to

186

unite the force among all milkfish distributors and P&F plant owners. If they could effectively operate the organization to market the products from Simu, they would have taken control of milkfish distribution and sales in Taiwan. However, most business people preferred to be passive players in the organization. This is because they would take the market share of another business person whose business failed. The village economy of Simu shows the co-existing influences of market economy and social relationships of fishery communities in Taiwan. Various stakeholders in the community have their own understandings and practices to sustain their livelihood and businesses under global-local dynamics.

V. Government-Sponsored Seafood Promotional Programs

Taiwanese state and county government officials emphasize that Taiwan has free market mechanisms for seafood trade: “If the market price is higher than the guaranteed price given by the trade contract, fish farmers prefer the former.” 287 However, state intervention co-exists with the county government’s efforts to strengthen the local aquaculture sectors. Since the aquaculture restructuring in the 1990s, the national government has financially supported county governments to improve local infrastructures and carry out programs to promote farmed seafood. The emergence of non-toxic and ecological aquaculture in Chiayi County has influenced the county government’s strategies for sustaining the aquaculture sector. In this section, I draw on examples from the Chiayi County government in 2014 to investigate how these programs affect fish farmers’ marketing of their products.

Branding Seafood in Chiayi County Mr. Zhao, a county government official in the fisheries department, explained the direction of the government’s policy: Because our county government has a limited budget, our mayor put the resources into events promoting food safety and developing local brands. . . . It is hard for us to intervene in international trade. . . . It requires a stable amount of production. In other countries, 100 corporations farm the same product. They provide stable quantity and quality. Traders are willing to do business with them. In Chiayi County, traders need to develop business relationships with 3,000 fish farmers

287 Mr. Yu, a top-level government official: interview, June 10, 2014. 187

[because nearly all fish farmers are smallholder farmers with a small volume of seafood production]. . . . The fish farmers in Chiayi County are just a sheet of loose sand ( 一盤散沙). 288 Let me use the example of New Zealand’s kiwi marketing to explain. They set up one company to standardize the production and marketing strategies. They succeeded in selling their kiwi all over the world. In Taiwan, this kind of company is absent. No one can stand up and take the lead. That’s why I am afraid of overproduction, which occurs frequently. You cannot stop people from farming something [to make a better strategy]. 289

In the wake of food scandal outbreaks, a new social trend has emerged in which Taiwanese consumers pledge to search for trustworthy and safe food items. County governments have also begun to link food safety issues with local food promotions ( United Daily 2011b). These new trends have provided fresh opportunities for Chiayi County to revitalize its rural economy by encouraging rural agrotourism and ecotourism that allow urban consumers to visit rural areas to taste local food and explore local environment and traditions. Moreover, the government aimed to strengthen fish farmers’ marketing strategies by uniting them to collectively brand the products in Chiayi County. Marketing agro-food products, which were promoted as safe, became important in its policy implementation. For example, in 2014 the policy goals and highlights of the Chiayi County Government in agriculture (including fisheries and aquaculture), which were related to inland aquaculture, are included in Table 4.5.

288 Chi.: yipan sansha . 289 Mr. Zhao, a Chiayi County government official: interview, April 17, 2015. 188

Table 4.5. Selected agricultural policy goals and highlights of Chiayi County Government in 2014. Policy goal Highlights #1 Food distribution and 1. Supervision of agricultural organizations and groups marketing 2. Regulating the volume of production and distribution #2 Fisheries 5. Projects for improving the environment for aquaculture infrastructure and production, such as building dikes and public facilities in management aquaculture zones #3 Inland aquaculture 1. Stocking census and fish farming registration management 2. Statistics of production and fish price 3. Supervision and education to enhance fish farmers’ skills #4 Food safety 1. Inspection of seafood products before they are delivered to the markets 2. Inspection of feed 3. Certification #5 Marketing 1. Organizing milkfish marketing events to enhance the reputation of the milkfish sector in Chiayi County; assisting stakeholders seeking to develop their brands and expand their markets. The goal is to benefit the local economy. 2. Organizing mullet roe contest and marketing events 3. Organizing cultural events to promote other fisheries activities #6 Strengthen the safety 1. Random inspection to prevent drug residue of feed 2. Promoting management compliance with regulations #7 Marketing agricultural 1. Participating in food expos in other countries products in Taiwan 2. Organizing activities to market products in the domestic and foreign countries market to enhance the reputation of Chiayi County products #8 Rural regeneration 1. Supervision of communities to implement projects project #9 Developing 1. Reorganize existing resources, including landscapes and agrotourism infrastructures, and strengthen related organizations with education, study tours, and marketing Source: Author’s field data.

The fisheries department of Chiayi County Government supervised the aquaculture sector in the county to expand production facilities and promote farmed seafood in international and domestic markets. Since 2009, the national government has tried to improve infrastructure and facilities in the grouper sector at the national level. The purpose was to increase production of Taiwanese grouper, the market for which was mainly in China. In Chiayi County, the Program of

189

Doubling the Production Value of Grouper ( 石斑產值倍增計畫; PDPVG) 290 was implemented at the local level to fit the national government’s policy complementary to the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program that includes the tariff elimination of grouper exports to China. There were four P&M groups specializing in grouper production, especially fish fry breeding and nurseries. They could apply for subsidies to purchase equipment, such as freezers, to store their feed for the fish fry. Except for the PDPVG related to grouper, the projects carried out by the Chiayi County Government did not directly respond to the opportunities provided by the ECFA. Instead, the county government aimed to promote high-value products that Chiayi County specializes in— such as mullet roe (#5 in Table 4.5)—in both international (i.e., Japan) and domestic high-end markets. It had noticed the new trend of non-toxic and ecological aquaculture within the county, and thus used the resources from the national government, such as the rural regeneration projects (#8), to help these fish farmers strengthen their reach to the domestic alternative market. The ECFA policy is therefore less relevant than these official strategies at the county level. The Chiayi County government tried to help promote local seafood products in 2014: Some seafood products are good in quality, [produced in a way that is] different from those from the traditional intensive farming which is less friendly to the ecosystem [e.g. non-toxic and ecological fish farming discussed in chapter two]. [These more eco-friendly practices] are still a minority, but our citizens will demand more of these products in the future. . . . The fish farmers may no longer want only to maximize quantity, but also practice food safety. [They realize that] . . . if the fish pond is highly intensive, the fish may get sick. . . . The right direction [for our aquaculture sector] is how we love the Earth in the future. . . . They need to find ways to sell the seafood at a price that consumers can afford. 291

To promote high-quality seafood, the Chiayi County government held various annual events. For example, it organized a contest to promote local brands of mullet roe. It invited judges including a chef and a marine biologist to select the best mullet roe according to appearance, flavour, texture, and taste. Winners were invited to join the national contest organized by the Fisheries Agency. Mr. Li, a contest participant, believed that this kind of program would help him market his brand of mullet roe:

290 Chi.: shiban chanzhi beizeng jihua . 291 Ibid., August 8, 2014. 190

We have marketed our products since the first day of our mullet farming. Our friends knew that we sell mullet roe and helped us develop consumer networks. The county government also has projects to promote our products. We enter mullet roe contests and participate in promotional programs such as Chiayi County’s best souvenirs. We have media exposure and some supervision on these occasions. 292

Products such as mullet roe, which is exported to Japan, were items that the Chiayi County government promoted in international food expos in foreign markets. Milkfish, which is consumed mainly in the domestic market, was promoted to urban areas within Taiwan. An example of promoting the local milkfish sector is a milkfish-featured banquet. To encourage consumers to buy milkfish, especially those from Chiayi County, the county government held an annual milkfish-featured banquet beginning in 2010. The milkfish distributors and P&F plants in Simu supplied milkfish used in the banquet with over 100 tables. The county government hoped to promote Simu and Budai as the nationally known brands when the Taiwanese want to consume milkfish. In reality, the banquet became an occasion for Simu villagers to invite their relatives and friends to come for a gathering. The Simu distributors and P&F plants continued to supply milkfish and milkfish bellies mainly to the traditional market. Whether their branding was successful was questionable.

Setting up new P&M groups and direct marketing of frozen seafood

Simu villagers, who previously relied only on distributors to sell their milkfish and shrimp, developed their own strategy of “producers marketing their own products” ( 自產自銷; Fisheries Extension 2011: 21). 293 This phrasing was used by Hsu (1970), who described how fish farmers could sell their fish directly to urban fish markets. In the contemporary milkfish supply chain, the meaning of this phrasing has changed. It has come to mean a practice in which fish farmers directly market their products to their customers without the services of distributors. For example, Ah-Wen, a fish farmer, told me that his married sister who lived in a city organized collective orders among her neighbours and friends for his shrimp. On a hot day, August 23, he

292 Mr. Li, a mullet farmer and processor: interview, January 10, 2015. 293 Chi.: zichanzixiao. 191

selected some bigger shrimp, not to sell to distributors, but to freeze immediately after his daily harvest. 294 Within two days, a courier delivered the shrimp to the homes of his customers. After only a short interval in which the product was kept at a low temperature, his customers could “eat the fresh shrimp and enjoy its sweet taste and firm texture at home, like what they can do by coming to my fish farm. I also raise the shrimp for family use so that I do not use drugs.” 295 Through these private sales, Ah-wen increased his income from his shrimp by receiving TWD50 more per catty than he would get if he was paid by the distributors. Although the distributors still purchased most of Ah-wen’s harvest, the markets for farmed seafood have become more diversified. Other fish farmers such as Zi-yi sent a small amount of ice-chilled milkfish to urban areas when his customers knew he harvested his fish. Producers’ marketing of their own products constitutes a business strategy that builds on personal networks between fish farmers and their customers and freezing technologies. Ecological fish farmers who adopt traceability, TAP, use the strategy of “producers marketing their own products” and stop supplying the urban fish markets. They market their products directly to consumers. Po-fang, the ecological fish farmer, aimed to raise the market price of his fish products without the influence of distributors. He argued that distribution via middlemen is unfair to fish farmers, for two reasons. First, distributors set the farm-gate prices and timing for harvesting. Second, consumers know too little about seafood; they do not respect fish farmers enough or know how to enjoy seafood. He claimed that “producers need to work hard to reach the consumers.” 296 In the urban setting, organic food stores have demanded traceable seafood since the 2000s. When they source seafood products, they either directly find ecological fish farmers with TAP certificates or they contact seafood companies specializing in TAP-certified seafood sources. The stores then charge the slotting allowance, 297 ranging from

294 The practice of intensive aquaculture requires that Taiwanese fish farmers harvest milkfish in a pond once in a farming cycle by employing harvest workers to net the fish. In contrast to this, fish farmers use cages to catch shrimp in the ponds, by themselves, every day during the farming cycle. 295 Ah-wen, a fish farmer: interview, August 22, 2014. 296 Po-fang, a fish farmer: interview March 24, 2015 297 According to the Business Dictionary (2016), a “slotting allowance” can be defined as the sum “paid by a vendor or manufacturer to a retail chain or establishment for (1) making room for a product on its store shelves, (2) making room for the product in its warehouse, (3) entering the product data in its inventory system, and (4) programming its computers to recognize the product’s bar code.” Source: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/slotting- fee.html . 192

17% to 30% of the product price. Ecological fish farmers have opportunities to establish contracts with these stores. The slotting allowance adds to the cost for ecological fish farmers seeking alternative markets. They reported that they were in debt for more than five years. They insisted on keeping their businesses to enhance ecological and social sustainability. However, they were worried that their businesses might not be sustainable in the near future. This new alternative market facilitated cooperation between fish farmers and P&F plants. There are several ways to harvest farmed seafood from fish ponds. Fish farmers harvest shrimp twice every day during the production seasons, packaging and freezing the shrimp to sell. Fish farmers still pay harvest workers to harvest all of the milkfish from their ponds once in a production cycle. They are unable to handle all of the harvest, such as filleting, before they perish. These fish farmers have to subcontract the primary processing and freezing procedures to the P&F plants. In recent years, few fish farmers invested in primary processing and freezing facilities on their farms. The Fisheries Agency (2016a) updated the guidelines of Taiwan Good Aquaculture Practices (TGAP) in 2014 to make such practices are in compliance with food safety standards. 298 The relationships between fish farmers, distributors, and P&F plant owners are changing under the fish farmers’ participation in primary processing, freezing, and marketing their seafood products. Fish farmers who carried out primary processing found that they spent more time on tasks other than merely fish farming. Distributors’ major contribution to the milkfish sector was to save on time and labour costs by distributing and marketing their products. They charged the fish farmers for this service. In the new trend towards producers marketing their own products, fish farmers and P&F plants can cooperate in terms of primary processing and freezing. This cooperation helps fish farmers find other markets. The fish farmers develop new relationships with organic food stores, consumer co-ops, and seafood companies sourcing TAP-certified products. The bottom-up force of fish farmers marketing processed and frozen seafood has affected the government policy, as shown by the changing TGAO guidelines. The state–society

298 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsRuleFisheries/content.aspx?id=513&chk=c992e221-45f6-406e-973c- a24e8f111b39¶m=pn%3D1. 193

interactions in milkfish processing and marketing have modified both the governance of seafood trade and fish farmers’ practices.

Collaboration in Marketing Two other departments in the Chiayi County Government which engaged in the promotion of seafood products were the Tourism Department and the Rural Development Department. The tourism department has selected seafood products each year, such as Mr. Li’s mullet roe, as “the best souvenir in Chiayi County” to promote tourism and local food consumption. It also subcontracted a project (worth TWD0.68 million) to a marketing company from Taipei to help seven ecological fish farmers improve their facilities, develop online marketing strategies, and develop cuisines to promote agrotourism. The Taiwanese government initiated rural regeneration programs ( 農村再生計畫; RRPs) 299 in 2009. The RRPs aim to rejuvenate rural communities, which have experienced economic and social problems such as aging populations, labour shortages, aging facilities, and other problems. Villages applied for funding to improve infrastructure, create new job opportunities, and market their commodities. The rural development department supervised a rural regeneration project that markets agro-food commodities to urban Taiwan in 2013. The Chiayi County government was officially granted a Chiayi County Rural Regeneration Project (CRRP) funding by the national government to increase its capacity for promoting and marketing the food products of its coastal communities. The first phase of the CRRP aimed to integrate rural resources, including food, natural sites, and village landscapes, to develop rural tourism and promote local economic development. The county government expected that the project would gather potential products under one regional brand umbrella, which could then be further marketed in the second phase in 2014 and 2015. Local NGOs and environmental activists have begun to take food production seriously and view local production and consumption as an important part of the process required to preserve the environment, sustain rural livelihoods, and maintain local traditions (Huang 2013). The Jianan Cultural Association (JNCA) based in Budai was one of the two county-registered

299 Chi.: nongcun zaisheng jihua. 194

NGOs selected to implement the rural regeneration project. 300 These NGOs were connected to 15 eco-friendly farms, five eco-tour guides, seven catering services, five food souvenir sellers, and six lodge owners. With this funding, they designed activities to improve local food producers’ skills, such as cooking, marketing, packaging, promoting local lodge businesses, and tour operations. These activities would enhance direct contact between consumers and food producers and weaken the domination of distributors. The JNCA subsequently introduced similar rural tours to the CRRP it operated (Cheng 2016). During the two-day journey, visitors were able to experience both day and night in the township for a fee of TWD4,000, which would be shared by the producers providing services. On the first day, the visitors first joined a wetland tour guided by a local fish farmer who had converted his fish farm for tourism and educational purposes. Visitors learned about the environmental history of the wetland and collected blackmoss ( 龍鬚菜)301 as a souvenir. After an on-site lunch of seafood noodle soup, they caught up with a fish market auction, at which they learned about the fish auction process. Thereafter, they were transported to the JNCA’s saltpan to learn about the decline of the salt industry and the revival of local salt production in recent years. As part of the project’s environmental education, visitors also played games using mud and salt water. The JNCA designed a dinner on the saltpan, offering dishes prepared with local food ingredients and earlier purchases from the fish market. The farmers then served the dishes on the saltpan, where visitors could enjoy the sunset and a starry night. After spending the night in a lodge situated adjacent to the fish ponds and an estuary where water birds were visible, the visitors began the second day with buns and soymilk purchased from the village for breakfast; this was characterized as “the breakfast of fish farmers.” They then cycled along a route featuring the past mechanization of saltpans, oyster and hard clam cultivation, and the loss of mangroves in the coastal region. After a two-hour site visit to the ecological fish farmer Po-fang’s farm, followed by lunch, the visitors attended a workshop featuring local traditional music. This workshop was provided by a retired saltpan worker who organized the orchestra with a sponsorship from the county government.

300 Another NGO was established by a retired staffer in a farming association. Because of financial pressures, a few farmers’ and fishing associations in Taiwan have re-oriented to market local food products. 301 Chi.: longxucai ; sci.: Gracilaria lemaneiformis. 195

The CRRP mobilized public resources to assist food producers, including fish farmers, to explore new markets by reaching out to urban customers. The tour, supported by public funding, reinforced the effort that had already been put in place by environmental groups and local history workers prior to the implementation of the projects. They selectively produced a version of agricultural knowledge and individual experiences to create “food culture shock” (Gross 2014: 21) for visitors who had little experience in rural communities. The actual outcome of the tours, however, failed to meet the expectations of the return migrant farmers, in terms of increased sales of their products. The CRRP was only a short-term project (the mini-tours lasted for just five months during the first phase) with limited funding; this made it difficult to maintain an attractive and low-cost tour program. Once the funding ceased, the JNCA and local collaborators had to increase the tour fee to strike a balance. For example, the fee for joining the activities in Po-fang’s farm during the CRRP was TWD250; but this was raised to TWD650 after the end of the program. When the CRRP officially ended in June 2014, only five mini-tours in total had been organized, three of which served only members of the urban online shopping platform. Two farmers told me that the CRRP “seemed to have achieved little.” 302 The farmers found that their personal networks—developed through virtual platforms such as Facebook or through friendship networks—which they had cultivated for several years, offered a more reliable source of customers than the mini-tours. The short-lived CRRP failed to turn tourists into long-term customers. To develop a regional brand and a more personalized producer–consumer relationship necessitated larger-scale support of the government. Thus, the JNCA suggested that the government needed to consider all environmental, cultural, social, and economic factors in the second phase to formulate a detailed plan by which to promote the regional brand. It was also important for the project to put in greater effort in terms of nurturing closer social relationships between producers and consumers and encouraging consumption (Lien 2004: 61–62). This example matched project goals #4, #5, #8, and #9 in the county government’s policy goals (Table 4.5). The participation of the JNCA in seafood promotion was relatively recent, since 2012, when it started to collaborate with Ah-hong, a milkfish ball production plant owner

302 Fieldnote, internal meeting of JNCA: October 2, 2014. 196

on the milkfish promotional event. Ah-hong was the chairperson of the JNCA. The JNCA commercialized its salt products and also used the government CRRP project to develop a platform on which local food producers could market their products. As Yi-wen said, it is a platform that “sells good-quality products at a good value.” 303 However, the participants struggled with the number of customers that the CRRP can create. Similarly, the promotional projects organized by the Chiayi County government, Ah-hong, and the JNCA did not bring an immediate boost in the form of long-term customers. Another organization joining the CRRP was led by Fang-ying, a retired staffer from a farmers association. She stressed “ tuiguang ” ( 推 廣; marketing), meaning “push” and “spread” in Chinese, 304 meaning that she wanted to push the fish farmers to market their own products. She used the organization as a brand to market the seafood products in distinctive sets for urban consumers. By developing new brands and market platforms, these local cultural associations tried to replace the middlemen to help fish farmers market their products. However, this created insiders and outsiders on the projects, and some participants may have been less satisfied with the project outcome. Local cultural association personnel might experience new tensions and conflicts with fish farmers. Fish farmers may not earn more by marketing their own products in comparison with selling fish to distributors. They incur extra labour costs to communicate with buyers. If they sell products to co-ops or organic food stores, the slotting fee is another cost they need to include in their businesses. Some fish farmers such as Po-fang have facilities for primary processing and freezing of the products. These extra costs make for a higher market price for their products, which is not necessarily more profitable than selling their products on the traditional market. The ecological fish farmers in the CRRP, who insisted on not selling any milkfish or shrimp to local distributors, found themselves in debt after 5–10 years of investment. Collaboration among fish farmers who market their own products is a new development in Taiwanese aquaculture. Market diversification has not persuaded fish farmers to totally change the structure of the milkfish sector. The new social organization that includes local NGOs as stakeholders in the marketing program in the CRRP shows the changing strategies of fish farmers in Taiwan. The economic

303 Ibid. 304 Fang-ying, interview: January 5, 2015. 197

consequences of RRPs for the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture depend on whether the fish farmers can develop a new market that supports their strategy. The programs of Chiayi County promote local seafood in the domestic and international market. The Chiayi County government relied less on the Chinese market. This is because fish farmers in the county specialized in producing seafood varieties, such as milkfish and mullet roe, which are not yet popular in the Chinese market. The Chiayi County government found strengthening their fish farmers’ reach to the existing markets (e.g., Japan and the domestic market) to be better strategy.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter I have documented the historical development of milkfish distribution. There are three major points. First, the market mechanism for milkfish distribution is embedded in the domestic supply chain, without strong organizations that can support fish farmers’ livelihoods. Second, the fish farmers understand that the current distribution system may not benefit them. They need alternative ways to sell their products. Third, climatic conditions can affect fish farmers’ incomes. The emerging strategy of “producers marketing their own products” indicates that a frozen seafood supply chain without a middleman has changed the structure of Taiwanese aquaculture. The distributors sustain their business by using business strategies, overcoming regional climatic limitations, and establishing translocal networks. The emergence of the P&F plants also provides opportunities for distributors and other business people to generate profits. Embedded in local communities, distribution and primary processing contribute to the local economy by providing stable jobs and supporting the milkfish sector. The religious organization and activities provide opportunities for more affluent people to develop their reputation and serve the community. The community identity is part of the reason why some business people consider local people’s livelihoods when they operate the P&F plants and employed local villagers. Competitions remain intense among distributors and P&F plant owners. Fish farmers consider seafood business people as their community leaders, but they are unhappy about being exploited by these people during milkfish transactions. Significantly, government policy measures intended to support fish farmers (e.g., the buffer stock program) are ineffective from the farmers’ perspective. Thus, to overcome their

198

inferior position in the milkfish supply chain, the farmers exercise agency by exploring new markets, which directly connect them to urban consumers. They also differentiate their products from those distributed to fish markets. The distributors, plant owners, and fish farmers develop various relations along the milkfish supply chain. They establish contractual relationships with P&F plant owners. The fish farmers do so by practising their direct marketing strategy, while subcontracting their primary processing and freezing procedures to the plant owners. I argue that fish farmers have been involved in production, distribution, and, more recently, marketing because they seek to develop diverse strategies in mainstream and alternative markets. The mainstream market includes fish markets, restaurants, hotels, fish vendors, chain supermarkets, and export to various international markets. Alternative markets include home delivery, organic food stores, online platforms promoting Taiwanese TAP-certified food to domestic consumers, farmers’ markets, and chain supermarkets which sell TAP-certified seafood. In Taiwanese aquaculture, distributors have taken advantage of fisheries policies to make profits. They have extended their regional networks to overcome climatic constraints on milkfish production ad harvest. The emergence of P&F plants shows that the Taiwanese government’s policy orientation towards high-value seafood has affected the marketing practices of fish farmers. The fish farmers develop alternative markets to directly sell seafood to consumers to avoid the reliance on middlemen. Fish farmers, county governments, and other new stakeholders, such as local NGOs, are following the trend towards marketing local seafood in domestic and international markets. Alternative markets currently cannot replace the mainstream market to provide a stable livelihood for fish farmers. The Taiwanese government and its county governments have made efforts to promote Taiwanese seafood in both domestic and international markets. County governments have attempted to build up their regional brands and fame. In the case of Chiayi County, it is not China, but Japan and the domestic market that provide the demand. Fish farmers have also targeted exploring alternative markets to cut out the middlemen’s share of their profits. On some occasions, fish farmers and processors collaborate to explore alternative markets. The current strategy is branding for both the international and domestic markets. However, branding cannot benefit fish farmers unless they find enough consumers who are willing to regularly buy their products at higher prices. This means that the sustainability of the milkfish sector still requires

199

more intensive marketing efforts to attract regular customers. So, branding helps consumers understand the producers’ vision and practices of eco-friendly aquaculture. However, producers need to accommodate the consumer demands for food quality and other services to maintain a long-term relationship. Taiwanese fish farmers who directly sell their products to customers face two major challenges. First, compared to fish farmers who sell fish to middlemen, these fish farmers take extra time and labour to promote their products, communicate with consumers, and arrange product delivery. Second, their reputation of food safety enhancement and environmental sustainability was insufficient to turn potential consumers into regular customers. The government introduced the CRRP in 2014 to help the fish farmers respond to these challenges. The CRRP sponsored local NGOs, such as the JNCA, to invite experts to train the fish farmers on their business skills. The JNCA also promoted the fish farmers’ seafood by organizing tours to their fish farms. In so doing, the fish farmers personally interacted with the visitors and created opportunities for the visitors to learn about the fish farm products. However, very few of these visitors became regular customers after the tours. To attract more regular customers, the fish farmers took initiatives to understand the consumers’ needs by communicating with them through phones and social media. The CRRP, which lasted only 5 months, provided an opportunity for the fish farmers to evaluate and improve their business strategies.

200

CHAPTER FIVE: SELLING MILKFISH TO CHINA

This chapter examines the impacts of the ECFA on the cross-strait milkfish trade. More specifically, I focus on two case studies of Taiwanese businesses exporting Taiwanese milkfish products to China. The ECFA, a bilateral free trade agreement (BFTA) signed in 2010, removed China’s tariffs on two kinds of Taiwanese milkfish products (whole fish and fillets). I argue that while the ECFA removed the tariffs and stimulated an increase in the export volume of these products, the Taiwanese experienced “frictions” (Tsing 2005) which dampened the rising popularity of milkfish in the Chinese market. The frictions included differences in culinary culture between the Chinese and the Taiwanese as well as other non-tariff trade barriers. Bestor (2000: 56) shows that globalization is not simply “cultural influence flowing from West to East.” Globalization can move in all directions, such as the spread of sushi consumption from Japan to the United States. Bestor finds that the globalization of the tuna trade has drawn new attention from consumers, governments, and environmental groups around the world (ibid.: 57–59). New regulations concerning the conservation of the bluefin tuna at the global level run counter to the “gold-rush mentality” of the fishermen (ibid.: 58). The capture and trade in tuna therefore involve “the complex interplay between industry and culture” (ibid.: 52). The state continues to influence the impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a form of trade governance. Greenberg (2006) shows that, in the 1970s, the Mexican government encouraged the expansion of shrimping to generate foreign exchange to pay off its foreign debts. State policies led in part to the commoditization and exploitation of marine resources. Mexico’s participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 intensified the globalization of shrimp prices, which “are fairly insensitive to local conditions” (ibid.: 147). In many cases, state’s need to pay off foreign debts and to export its natural resources led to local practices of resource exploitation. Local people may have diverse responses to the globalization of food that are tied to their social relations and livelihoods. Gezon (1999) shows how the Antankarana people in Madagascar reacted to a foreign shrimping company’s attempt to develop aquaculture in their territory. The Antankarana had a long history of tensions with outsiders, especially the rival Merina ethnic group. The Antankarana had engaged in shrimping and selling their harvest to a

201

foreign company since the 1970s. The company failed to complete its plan of establishing shrimp ponds. Gezon (ibid.) reveals a diversity of perspectives among the Antankarana to explain the failure. Some community members embraced the economic opportunity to enhance their livelihoods, but they were subordinated to the local royal family. The latter claimed that the spirits disliked foreigners, who would bring many Merina people into their territory with the proposed aquaculture project. Therefore, the royal family and ritual specialists opposed the plan. Gezon (ibid.) concludes that local boundaries and individual experiences coexist with globalization and social systems; the Antankarana responded to globalization and human– environment relations through their “ethnic politics and . . . symbolic instruments” (Gezon 1999: 66). This example shows the importance of history, agency, and social systems in one’s understanding of globalization. Tsing’s (2005) metaphor of “friction” helps demonstrate the movement, and sometimes the slowing, of the cross-strait milkfish trade. She uses this metaphor to study political, economic, and cultural factors shaping tensions across the timber trade and local environmental conservation in Indonesia. The global interaction of the timber trade produces unexpected outcomes. For example, Tsing (ibid.: 13) finds that “conservation inspires [transnational] collaborations among scientists, business, forest dwellers, state regulators, the public, and nonhumans. . . . There is no reason to assume that collaborators share common goals. . . . Collaborations create new interests and identities, but not to everyone’s benefit.” She argues that globalization includes projects that deploy the rhetoric of the universal even as they shape its meanings to their particular processes of proliferation, scale-making, generalization, cosmopolitanism, or collaboration. . . . This means grounding one’s analysis of global connection not in abstract principles of power and knowledge but rather in concrete engagements. (ibid.: 267)

Such “concrete engagements” can be extended to the situation in Taiwan under the ECFA. In principle, FTAs point to the removal of trade barriers. Evidence as shown in the above-mentioned ethnographic studies has stressed the importance of examining whether and how a free trade policy impacts local communities and food producers because the outcomes of trade and development are diverse and often contrary to expectations. I focus on the milkfish

202

sector to consider how political, economic, and cultural factors can become elements that generate both opportunity and friction within the ECFA context. In this chapter, the cross-strait milkfish trade is examined as part of the globalization of Taiwanese milkfish. Taiwanese milkfish are most exported to North America and the . China removed tariffs on particular kinds of Taiwanese milkfish products. This created opportunities for businesses to explore the Chinese market. I use two case studies, the trade contract of the Star Fish Company (SFC) in Xuejia township, and the Zu-shui ( 足水) milkfish ball plant in Simu village, to compare the companies’ experience with trade governance of Taiwanese milkfish. I study how the ECFA affected the businesses strategies of the SFC and Zu- shui and evaluate the degrees of success of these companies.

I. Cross-strait Relationships from 1949 to the ECFA

The term “cross-strait relationship” refers to interactions between China and Taiwan. Their changing relations after 1949 resulted in multiple trade routes available for the seafood trade, including the ECFA, signed in 2010. The Taiwanese government signed the ECFA to help Taiwan increase its trade surplus with China. Taiwan needs to strengthen its competitiveness in the global market. In addition to responding to the need for its own economic growth, the Chinese government intended to develop a closer relationship with the Taiwanese to attract their support for future unification. The ECFA signalled a closer cross-strait economic relationship and the dynamics of cross-strait unification. The KMT lost the civil war to the CCP and evacuated mainland China to occupy Taiwan in 1949. 305 Official communications between China and Taiwan ceased for four decades. The 150-kilometres-wide Taiwan Strait became both a natural and political boundary between China and Taiwan (Map 5.1). Significantly, several outlying Taiwanese islands (i.e., Kinmen and Matsu) are much closer to China’s Fujian Province than to Taiwan.

305 The Republic of China (ROC) resumed its rule over Taiwan in 1945. 203

Map 5.1. The Taiwan Strait. Credit of map construction to George Chou. Modified by the author.

After relocating to Taiwan, the KMT government planned to retake China. Two key incidents led the KMT to give up its plan. First, the United Nations switched from recognizing Taipei to recognizing Beijing in 1971 (Copper 2013). Second, the United States shifted its official diplomatic relationship from Taiwan to mainland China in 1978 (ibid.). Since then, Taiwan has developed as a de facto country. It has remained officially unrecognized by most of the world due to China’s intervention in its diplomatic relations. In 2016, 22 countries maintained official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). 306 This marginal situation has prevented Taiwan from negotiating FTAs with most countries. Non-official contacts between Chinese and Taiwanese citizens became more relaxed in the 1980s. In 1978, the Chinese government adopted “a range of reconciliatory policies to relax .

306 Source: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=0757912EB2F1C601&sms=26470E539B6FA395/ . 204

. . [the cross-strait] relations . . . [but exerted] political and military pressures on the island [Taiwan] as a deterrence against its possible move toward independence” (Cai 2011: 3). In 1987, the Taiwanese government allowed its citizens to visit China. This resulted in a wave of Taiwanese investment there (Simon 2005). This formal cross-strait trade grew steadily (Chart 5.1), except in 2009 when the trade was undermined by the global financial crisis (Chen and Li 2010: 289). Trade volume fluctuated after 2011 as China’s economic growth slowed (Liu 2016: 236-237). The Taiwanese government abandoned the “Temporary Articles for the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” (動員戡亂時期臨時條款)307 in 1991 to end the KMT’s official plan to retake mainland China. China and Taiwan still do not legally recognize each other as countries. However, communications at “official” levels have gradually resumed since 1992. Both countries have appointed their own “semi-official” organizations, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (China) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (Taiwan), to negotiate economic and social issues. The outcomes have been recognized by both governments. Taiwan’s political status remains a sensitive topic to be officially addressed. After six decades of separation, cross-strait relations now hinge on whether, when, and how Taiwan might become part of China, or whether it might become independent.

307 Chi.: dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan . 205

100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000

US$ Millions 20,000 0

Year

Export to China (including re-export) Import from China (including re-import) Chart 5.1. Taiwan’s trade with China between 1989 and 2015. Source: Foreign Trade Bureau (various years). 308

The dynamics of cross-strait relations have resulted in specific trade governance and practices applying to the Taiwan Strait. From the perspective of the Taiwanese government, fish boats “smuggled” goods across the Taiwan Strait (Fisherman Magazine 1982). The Chinese government, which saw the “smuggling” as a form of domestic trade, allowed Chinese fishermen to sell fish to Taiwanese fish farmers, who then sold the products back to Taiwan. The cost of buying Chinese fish was lower than the cost of catching fish. In the 1990s, Taiwanese fishermen experienced declining prices for their seafood products, such as oysters, due to the smuggling (United Daily 1999). In the 2000s, Chinese citizens could afford to buy more seafood, increasing the volume of Taiwanese seafood smuggled to Fujian Province, the closest province to Taiwan. 309 China and Taiwan developed a new form of trade governance to respond to the economic and social interactions between Fujian and its neighbouring islands, Kinmen and Matsu. In 1991, China proposed the Mini-Three Links policy ( 小三通)310 to facilitate postal service,

308 Source: http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=1375. 309 Mr. Tseng, a retired top-level official: interview, March 9, 2015. 310 Chi.: xiaosantong . 206

transportation, and trade. In 2001, Taiwan implemented its own version of the “Mini-Three Links” policy, which was included in its Offshore Islands Development Act (離島建設條例).311 The policy included postal service, transportation, and what was called the “Petty Trade” (小額 貿易).312 While the Taiwanese can visit Fujian via Kinmen and Matsu by ferry, Chinese tourists can join group visits to Kinmen, Matsu, and for day tours (Classic Kinmen Travel 2016). 313 Postal service between China and Taiwan was made available as well. Taiwan accepted the Petty Trade as a legal border trade practice, allowing ships to carry cargo from Kinmen and Matsu to Fujian (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2015). 314 Each cargo load could contain goods valued at less than USD100,000. Some frozen seafood products were exported from Taiwan to China via the Petty Trade. The cross-strait seaborne trade is governed differently by the Chinese and Taiwanese and their definitions of “smuggling” and “Mini-Three Links” are different. The Taiwanese government legally requires all Chinese imports to have customs clearance. In the perspective of the Taiwanese government, there is no Petty Trade from China to Taiwan. In other words, all seaborne exports from China to Taiwan without customs clearance are smuggled goods in Taiwan’s official definition.315 For China, all seaborne exports to Taiwan are part of its domestic trade. Taiwanese exports entering China may follow either the Petty Trade or the normal trade route ( 正常貿易). 316 In cases of Petty Trade, the Chinese customs require no de facto customs clearance. In normal trade, customs clearance is required. Taiwanese agro-food traders took advantage of the Petty Trade and the growing agro- food trade to explore the Chinese market. The cross-strait agro-food trade was gradually opened after both China and Taiwan’s entry into the WTO, in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In 2002,

311 Chi.: lidao jianshe tiaoli . Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China (2016). Source: http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030121 . 312 Chi.: xiaoe maoyi. 313 Source: http://kinmen.travel/chinese/CP.aspx?sn=545 . 314 Source: http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=746&pid=457950&dl_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt _Keyword=&Pageid=0 . 315 Mr. Deng, a top-level government official: interview, February 10, 2015. According to the Fujian Government, in 2014 Chinese seafood export trade to Taiwan via Petty Trade was valued at USD0.17 billion, contributing 99.8% of Chinese exports via Petty Trade. Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=758703 . 316 Chi.: zhengchang maoyi . 207

Taiwan allowed 19% more Chinese agricultural categories to be exported to Taiwan than in 2001 (Tung 2006). Simultaneously, the Taiwanese government implemented an import ban on 830 Chinese agricultural categories. Taiwan violated the WTO ruling to protect its agricultural and fisheries sectors. China did not use the WTO’s arbitration mechanism to force Taiwan to remove the ban (ibid.). The Petty Trade was another route through which agro-food traders exported products to China. According to the Fujian Provincial Government (2005;317 2010; 318 2012; 319 2015), 320 the Petty Trade route grew steadily from USD18 million in 2005 to USD180 million in 2012. 321 Between January and March 2015, Taiwanese seafood products valued at USD17 million were exported to China via the Petty Trade (Fujian Government 2015). 322 Beginning in 2006, through ice-breaking and negotiations between the CCP and the KMT—which at that time was the opposition party—Taiwan developed new cross-strait economic ties for Taiwanese agricultural products to be sold to China. Chinese provincial and city government officials began to visit Taiwan. They ordered Taiwanese fruits as a show of friendliness to the Taiwanese (Jiao 2015: 138–141). China deployed soft power to attract Taiwanese support. Nye (1990: 168) defines soft power as “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own.” One such strategy in the cross-strait context is China’s “economic lure” (Friedman 2007: 53). Allowing exports from Taiwan to China with political motivation is called China’s rangli (讓利), which means “to make concessions” (Jiao 2015: 140). The Chinese government mobilized certain Taiwanese groups to become its brokers ( 買辦)323 to foster its rangli tactic in the agro-food trade. According to news reports and commentaries, the brokers could be Taiwanese business people , farmer and fishermen associations, or local politicians (e.g., Commonwealth Magazine 2011). Through their connections, Chinese government officials at the city and provincial levels visited Taiwan and

317 Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=14612 . 318 Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=264184 . 319 Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=498438 . 320 Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/xw/ztzl/mty/xwdt/201504/t20150416_925720.htm . 321 The Taiwanese government does not have official statistics of the Petty Trade. 322 Source: http://www.fujian.gov.cn/xw/ztzl/mty/xwdt/201504/t20150416_925720.htm . 323 Chi.: maiban . 208

purchased Taiwanese , wax apples, milkfish balls, and other products. At least six purchase orders for milkfish products were placed between 2010 and 2014 ( United Daily 2010a; 2011a; 2011b; 2013; 2014b). The official purchase orders of Taiwanese agro-food products were part of the policy the of the State Council in China ( 國台辦; hereafter the Taiwan Affairs Office), 324 the central Chinese government office handling Taiwanese affairs, announced in May 2009 ( Taisheng Magazine 2009). 325 The policy emphasized the need to “put economic issues at the front and develop mutual trust . . . to solve all other cross-strait issues step by step.” 326 The development of the ECFA and its Early Harvest Program, together with China’s use of soft power and its rangli tactic, provided further opportunities for Taiwan to export seafood to China at lower costs. As part of his election campaign in 2008, the KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, proposed using the ECFA to facilitate Taiwan’s economic development with more future free trade agreements with other countries ( United Daily 2010b). He pursued “a peaceful Taiwan Strait” ( The Economist 2014) .327 Mr. Ma won the election and held the office from 2008 to 2016. China and Taiwan began to negotiate a BFTA and signed the ECFA in 2010 (Liou 2011). China and Taiwan avoided the issue of sovereignty when they signed the ECFA. The Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits and the Straits Exchange Foundation signed the ECFA, which followed the WTO framework: [Taiwan and China] have agreed, in line with the basic principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in consideration of the economic conditions of [China and Taiwan] . . . [to] gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment for each other. (WTO n.d.) 328

The ECFA seemingly fit the neoliberal logic that encourages the elimination of trade barriers by minimizing state influence. The two governments expected to negotiate various trade pacts regarding services, investments, and goods within a decade of the signing. They ultimately

324 Chi.: guotaiban. 325 Source: http://www.chinabiz.org.tw/News/GetJournalShow?pid=162&cat_id=174&gid=40&id=606 . 326 The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council in China (2009). Source: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201101/t20110106_1679304.htm . 327 Source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president. 328 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA%20Text.pdf . 209

would establish an arbitration mechanism. In 2010, they implemented an Early Harvest Program (早收清單)329 to make an instant impact on trade in some goods. The ECFA is not neoliberal in practice because both Chinese and Taiwanese governments intervened the arrangements of tariff elimination. The program listed 539 items from which China would gradually or instantly remove tariffs beginning in 2013 (Table 5.1a). Taiwan would apply the same measures to 267 items (Table 5.1b). China agreed to open its markets to Taiwanese agricultural and seafood products, while the Taiwanese government continued to impose tariffs and restrictions on Chinese agro-food items. The Taiwanese agro-food trade officially recorded the first trade surplus (USD17,084,000) in 2013 (COA 2015a). 330 The Taiwanese government described this situation as China’s rangli , which fit Taiwan’s economic interests, but alerted the agro-food sector that trade terms with China and other countries may not be as favourable in the future: I heard about some people asking if we can require China to lower the tariff and VATs on other fish products. It is a matter of trade negotiation. The Early Harvest Program of the ECFA is like China’s rangli . The best timing has passed [so that it is difficult to require China to lower the tariffs on other fish products]. What Taiwan should do is to think of how to negotiate. When we ask for tariff reduction, China is also thinking of which Chinese products should enjoy Taiwan’s tariff reduction. 331

Table 5.1a. Tariff reduction arrangements for products under the Early Harvest on the China side.

Import tariff Agreement tariff rate in 2009 June 2012 2013 2010– 2011 0–5% 0 0 0 5–15% 5 0 0 More than 15% 10 5 0

Source: Adopted from WTO (n.d.). 332

329 Chi.: zaoshouqingdan . 330 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2503049 . 331 Mr. Deng uses the term rang-li . Source: Meeting minutes collected from a fishermen association, June 11, 2014. 332 Source: http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA%20Text.pdf 210

Table 5.1b. Tariff reduction arrangements for products under the Early Harvest Program on the Taiwan side. Import Tariff Agreement Tariff Rate in 2009 June 2012 2013 2010– 2011 0–2.5% 0 0 0 5–7.5% 2.5 0 0 More than 7.5% 5 2.5 0

Source: Adopted from WTO (n.d.). 333

To the Taiwanese government, a benefit of signing the ECFA was potentially increasing the number of Taiwan’s BFTAs. Before the ECFA, Taiwan had signed BFTAs with Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. 334 After the ECFA, Taiwan signed BFTAs with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013. 335 Taiwan is in trade talks with Japan. 336 Mr. Deng contended that the ECFA signalled a green light for other countries to become open to negotiating BFTAs with Taiwan: The signing of the ECFA helps us [to sign a BFTA] with other countries. In the past, other countries did not negotiate [BFTAs] with us because of the issue of the One China principle [strong Chinese intervention]. Taiwan and China have already signed the ECFA. Other countries no longer have any reasons to reject their negotiations [of BFTAs] with Taiwan. 337

The Early Harvest Program included five kinds of fish products. In the official document, the goods include all unprocessed seafood products (Table 5.2). The Taiwanese government presented the impacts of the program on aquaculture to the public by using four major examples of farmed seafood: grouper, mullet, milkfish, and soft turtle eggs (Fisheries Agency 2014b). 338

333 Ibid. 334 Bureau of Foreign Trade (2016b). Source: http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=764 . 335 Ibid. 336 Ibid. 337 Mr. Deng, top-level official of the Fisheries Agency: interview, February 10, 2015. 338 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1101&chk=5f8a26a7-ccd6-4db5-9ad1- e9df49559ea1 . 211

Processed milkfish products, such as fish balls and floss, continued to be tariff-laden after the Early Harvest Program was implemented.

Table 5.2. Seafood product list under the Early Harvest Program on the China side. Description of goods Import Year of Major examples used by (NES: not elsewhere tariff in tariff the Taiwanese specified) 2009 (%) Elimination government in press in China releases Live fish, NES 10.5 2012 Grouper Fresh or chilled fish, 12 2012 Mullet; Sixfinger NES Treadfin ( 午仔魚)339 Frozen fish, NES 10 2012 Milkfish Other frozen fillets 10 2012 Milkfish Other edible products of 20 2013 Soft turtle egg animal origin, NES Source: Adopted from WTO (n.d.); Modified by author with reference to the Fisheries Agency (2014b). 340

Further trade liberalization and trade agreement negotiations slowed in 2014 after mass protests occurred against the progress of the ECFA. In March 2014, the Sunflower Movement in Taipei demonstrated its opposition to neoliberalism, as evident in free trade, and also to China’s political and economic infiltration of Taiwan. Students, scholars, and other opponents joining this movement argued that trade liberalization and neoliberalism would intensify the increasing difficulty of securing the livelihoods of the middle and working classes (Yong-hsin Ho 2014). They suspected that China would use the ECFA as a political tool to increase Taiwan’s economic reliance on China (Schubert 2016). This would make it difficult for Taiwan to resist China’s soft power in its effort to realize its unification plan. The movement interrupted the cross-strait negotiations over the Service Trade Pact ( 服務貿易協定),341 originally the next step towards

339 Chi.: wuzaiyu ; Sci.: Polydactylus sexfilis . 340 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1101&chk=5f8a26a7-ccd6-4db5-9ad1- e9df49559ea1 . 341 Chi.: fuwu maoyi xieding . 212

completing the ECFA after the Early Harvest Program. 342 In 2016, the originally scheduled negotiations over the Goods Trade Pact ( 貨品貿易協定)343 were put on hold. In the case of milkfish, processed products such as milkfish balls—originally an item which would be on the list for tariff reduction in the Goods Trade Pact—that were still tariff-laden have remained so. Supporters of the ECFA and further cross-strait economic cooperation contended that the opponents undermined the benefits of the ECFA for the Taiwanese economy (e.g., National Policy Foundation 2013). 344 Social movements opposing the ECFA had created friction that interrupted the trade negotiations.

12000 10000 8000 6000 4000

USD thousand USD 2000 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

China Saudi Arabia USA Canada

Chart 5.2. Taiwanese milkfish export values (1996-2013). Note: In 2002, Taiwan exported milkfish valued at USD26,700,000 to China. Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (various years). 345

342 The service trade pact negotiation would involve how China and Taiwan open their markets for investment and labour to each other. 343 Chi.: huopin maoyi xieding. 344 Source: http://www.npf.org.tw/1/12764 . 345 Source: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/. 213

Chart 5.2 shows the increase in the export volume of Taiwanese milkfish to China after the implementation of the ECFA Early Harvest Program. According to the Fisheries Agency’s statistical data (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014), the consequence of this increase is that In the past three years, the average transaction volume of milkfish in the domestic wholesale markets is 9,444 tonnes. The growth is steady. The average farm-gate price in 2014 was TWD95.3/kg, higher than TWD77.5/kg in 2010, before the implementation of the ECFA. The milkfish farmers generally benefited from the increase in the price. (Fisheries Agency 2014b) 346

The government used an incorrect indicator to convince milkfish farmers that they benefited from the ECFA. The fish farmers reported that the farm-gate price fluctuated. Comparing chart 5.3 with the quote from the government, I contend that the average price of milkfish in wholesale markets actually fluctuated in relation to transaction volumes. The increase in total exports of milkfish, as shown in chart 5.2, was one reason for the decreasing trend in total transactions in domestic fish markets. Chart 5.4 shows that the annual production volume also fluctuated. There are two implications. First, the ECFA did not increase transactions or farm-gate prices for Taiwanese milkfish when a long time span is studied. Second, my ethnographic data contradicts the government’s perspective; fish farmers experienced fluctuating farm-gate prices rather than steadily increasing prices after the ECFA was implemented. Fish farmers’ experience of the ECFA was less positive than what the government presented. 347 To understand the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese milkfish farmers, I draw on the experiences of fish farmers and business people in this chapter and also chapter six.

346 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1101&chk=5f8a26a7-ccd6-4db5-9ad1- e9df49559ea1 . 347 The responses of milkfish farmers in southwest Taiwan to the ECFA will be investigated in chapter 6. 214

Chart 5.3. Milkfish transaction in urban fish markets (2000–2015; same as chart 4.3). Source: Adapted from Fisheries Agency (2016c). 348 Labels translated and modified by the author.

90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 Tonnes 30000 20000 10000 0 19921994199619982000200220042006200820102012 Year

Chart 5.4. Production volume of milkfish in Taiwan (1992–2014). Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various year).

348 Source: http://efish.fa.gov.tw/efish/statistics/trendchart.htm . 215

II. Trade Routes for Exporting Taiwanese Milkfish to China After 2010

I focus on milkfish business people, including traders, distributors, and P&F plant owners, in this section. I discuss the trade routes that Taiwanese milkfish business people used when they exported milkfish to China. I then use the rest of this chapter to examine their experiences, perspectives, and evaluations of the cross-strait milkfish trade. The Taiwanese aquaculture sector practises cross-strait trade via the Petty Trade and the normal trade. Items imported under these two programs are tariff-free. China imposes a 17% value-added tax ( 增值稅; VAT) 349 on all traded items, including those via the normal trade under the ECFA’s Early Harvest List. The VAT on exporting goods to Taiwan is 5%. In both cases, the VAT is applied to all nations and redemption is possible only when importers re-export the final products. Non-tariff restrictions, such as “the food safety and animal and plant health measure (sanitary and phytosanitary or SPS)” as the WTO (2009) 350 defines them, are included in the cross-strait seafood trade. According to the Foreign Trade Bureau of Taiwan (2016), all food exports to China under Petty Trade and the Early Harvest Program should include the following procedures: 351 1. Submission of food labels and packages to the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China; 質檢總局進 出口食品安全局; AQSIQ) 352 for approval; this process may take 15 days to complete. 2. Submission of samples to the Council of Agriculture (COA) to carry out export inspection and certification. 3. Provision of certificates to customs brokers to help clear customs; this process may take 10 days to complete. 4. Shipping products to China; exporters receive the proofs of tariff and VAT payments. 5. Inspections carried out by AQSIQ officials carry when products enter China.

349 Chi.: zengzhishui. 350 Source: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm . 351 Source: http://info.taiwantrade.com/CH/resources/MAIN/TC/S0/promo/food/food.html 352 Chi.: zhijian zongju jin chukou shipin anquan ju . 216

In practice, the Petty Trade works quite differently. Li-an, the manager of the Zu-shui fish ball plant (section III), described the Petty Trade route as “the agreed form of smuggling [between China and Taiwan]; the Chinese side does not impose tariffs or obtain inspection certificates on products. This unofficial policy encourages the Taiwanese to do their business via this route. In the normal trade, one needs to obtain inspection certificates and clear customs.” 353 Li-an’s description of the Petty Trade was different from the official definition and online information, which shows that products sold via the Petty Trade need to be inspected and the related tariff needs to be paid under the Chinese customs’ governance (GINIFAB 2006). 354 The business people who exported milkfish to China via the Petty Trade, in practice, could avoid the tariff (before the ECFA) and the VAT. 355 A P&F plant owner in Kaohsiung, who used the Petty Trade for export, reported that his products were not inspected by the Chinese authorities (i.e., AQSIQ). 356 The milkfish business people had similar experiences. They knew that Taiwanese products entering China via the Petty Trade could not be distributed to supermarkets unless they obtained inspection certificates for export from the Bureau of Animal and Plant Inspection and Quarantine (2016; 動植物防疫檢疫 局;357 BAPIQ) 358 in Taiwan. These export certificates confirm that the products are in good condition under China’s guidelines for 1) drug residues, therapeutics, antibiotics, and food additives; and 2) hygiene and sanitary conditions at the processing plants (BAPIQ 2012).359 To the milkfish business people who had developed consumer networks with Taiwanese in China, being unable to sell their products to supermarkets was inconsequential. Milkfish is regularly consumed in families in south and southwest Taiwan. A meal with milkfish “can assuage the Taiwanese business people’s homesickness,” 360 said Mr. Xiu. He ran a restaurant in

353 Li-an, the manager of Zushui fish ball plant: interview, April 24, 2014. 354 Source: http://www.ginifab.com/forwarder/freight_fruit.html. 355 Chi-sung, a seafood businessman: interview, February 28, 2015. 356 Ah-neng, a P&F plant owner: Interview, April 2, 2015. 357 Chi.: dongzhiwu fangyi jianyi ju . 358 Source: https://www.baphiq.gov.tw/view.php?catid=12510 359 Source: http://coa.cpc.org.tw/edu/WebPage/FCKeditorUpload/10e73331-0346-4648-9d9a- 8b4bb1d209ee/1_%E7%95%9C%E7%A6%BD%E7%94%A2%E5%93%81%E5%87%BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%AA %A2%E7%96%AB%E6%B5%81%E7%A8%8B%E5%8F%8A%E7%9B%B8%E9%97%9C%E8%A6%8F%E5% AE%9A-%E9%AB%98%E6%B0%B8%E9%9D%92%E6%8A%80%E5%A3%AB.pdf . 360 Mr. Xiu, manager of a P&F plant: interview, April 29, 2014. 217

Fujian and sold the milkfish bellies produced by his boss, a Simu P&F plant owner. The products were exported to China via the Petty Trade. He claimed the safety of his products would not be affected by the possibility that “the Chinese government might not inspect the products”: 361 Our milkfish are frozen right after the harvest. I can know whether the fish is fresh or not by seeing, smelling, and tasting the fish. Even if you buy a fish in the traditional markets, you can check the freshness of the milkfish. 362

The milkfish business people decided which trade route they would take by considering the costs of paying for the inspections, the VAT, and, formerly, the tariffs. Chi-sung, a fish farmer and businessperson, told me that “the cross-strait trade is chaotic (亂). 363 . . .Your costs are different depending on which routes you use [and so your product prices are unstable].” 364 Another interviewee from a fishermen association commented that the cross-strait trade was “simple but complex ( 簡單而複雜).” 365 These comments suggest that milkfish business people have many options for exporting their products to China. They can choose either the normal trade or the Petty Trade, or even use both. The costs involved and the possible markets are factors affecting their decisions. If they target the national market, the AQSIQ’s inspection gives their products access to supermarkets. If they target the Taiwanese population in China (especially Fujian), the Petty Trade lowers their costs (e.g., the VAT) and they reach consumers via their social and business networks. The business people’s strategies affect their perspectives on the VAT and the AQSIQ’s inspection as frictions or opportunities.

III. Two New Milkfish Businesses in Southwest Taiwan Under the ECFA

In this section, I focus on the diverse impacts of the ECFA on the milkfish sector and its “concrete engagements” of globalization through the business people’s experiences. Two new companies targeted the Chinese markets and sold milkfish products to China after the ECFA was implemented. The first case study involves a company established in 2009 which entered into a

361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 Chi.: luan . 364 Chi-sung, seafood trader: interview, February 28, 2015. 365 Chi.: jiandan er fuza . Mr. Tung, the general secretary of a fishermen association: interview, June 11, 2014. 218

trade contact to supply milkfish to the Chinese market. This company contracted with selected local farmers to produce milkfish for export. The second case study involves a fish ball production plant established in 2013. Like other local fish ball producers, this plant buys milkfish meat from the P&F plants without knowing who is farming the fish. This fish ball production plant was established as a P&M group to qualify for a government subsidy.

Case 1: The Star Fish Company (SFC) The SFC signed a cross-strait milkfish trade contract with a Chinese seafood company following the ECFA implementation. The SFC was a private company established in Xuejia Township, an inland township in southwest Taiwan. Two local politicians, who were former chairpersons of the township representative council, were the director and the secretary of the SFC, respectively. Three staff members were responsible for fish harvesting and three clerks carried out administrative duties. The SFC received the first purchase order for milkfish balls from a Chinese city government in 2009 and then brokered a deal with a Shanghai-based state- owned seafood enterprise called Qinggong Co. ( 慶功集團) in 2010. The Office of Taiwan Affairs connected them to each other and they signed a five-year milkfish trade contract in 2011. The trade contact served an exclusive group of Taiwanese fish farmers. Eligible fish farmers were those who had household registrations in Xuejia, or those who operated fish ponds which were all partly inside Xuejia. Fish farmers in other locations were excluded. In 2011, the SFC gave 100 quotas to eligible fish farmers. The trade contract was renewed annually between the SFC and fish farmers. In the following years, the other eligible farmers replaced those who withdrew from the trade contract. The SFC ran a lottery to select fish farmers for replacement. According to the deal, the SFC would export 300 tonnes of frozen milkfish to China under the ECFA in 2011. The volume increased to 360 tonnes in 2012. The trade contract was called “ qizuo ” ( 契作) in Chinese and included a guaranteed purchase price. The SFC arranged for the harvesting, freezing, and export of the contracted fish farmers’ milkfish. The contracted fish farmers control their stocking and feeding inputs as well as other aspects of production. Between July and December, the fish farmers sold the milkfish to the SFC to reach the quota of 15,000 or 30,000 catties. The minimum size of the milkfish was 600g. Milkfish between 500g and 600g were purchased by the SFC at the farm-gate price generally offered by milkfish

219

exporters for market-size fish at the time. Fish farmers sold these fish (which just meet the export standard) when they were in distress and needed to be harvested as soon as possible. The SFC helped them to find markets, such as processing them to become fish balls or floss. Two townships and Xuejia formed a new election constituency as a result of administrative reform in 2010. The townships became districts and the township mayoral election was cancelled. Inside the newly formed municipality, Xuejia, Beiman and Jiangjun merged to form a single election constituency (Map 5.2). The voters whose household registrations belonged to this constituency could elect three aldermen as their representatives. Fish farmers with household registrations within the election constituency were eligible to join the trade contract between the SFC and Qinggong Co. as long as all or parts of their farms are located inside Xuejia. The SFC–Qinggong Co. trade contact functioned as a tool for Mr. Weng and his political allies to attract votes in local elections. 366 This was illustrated by the 2014 alderman election campaigns that Mr. Weng helped organize to support Mr. Wu, one of the SFC founders. Mr. Weng was an experienced political actor, having been a local representative in the township and a local convener for the 2008 KMT presidential election campaign. He had no experience in milkfish farming or trade before setting up the SFC. He mobilized the contracted fish farmers to endorse candidates he supported in various elections. For example, during the 2014 alderman election, Mr. Weng organized a press conference to announce that the farmers collectively endorsed Mr. Wu, who was also the former Xuejia mayor and later an alderman. The gate to Mr. Wu’s campaign office was painted with a scene of milkfish harvesting. The public address system at his office repeated his contributions to the local agricultural and aquaculture sectors, including the trade contract. His supporters posted media reports inside the office about how he helped fish farmers after the ECFA policy was implemented. Mr. Wu was re-elected as the alderman. Thus, Mr. Wu, as a former mayor, and Mr. Weng, his ally, used the SFC and the trade contract to maintain their political capital after the administrative reform in Taiwan.

366 Kragen Chien: personal communication (2014). 220

Map 5.2. Overlapping boundaries of the SFC’s trade contracts and election constituencies. Source: National Land Surveying and Mapping Center 2015. 367 Modified by the author.

The media reported that the SFC–Qinggong Co. trade contract was part of China’s rangli . Mr. Weng was suspected of having “betrayed Taiwan” ( 賣台)368 and supported China’s unificationist strategy (統戰) ( Liberal Times 2015). 369 Mr. Weng counter-argued that the trade contract and its guaranteed purchase price helped fish farmers in Tainan City, who frequently suffered from economic loss caused by fish death due to cold weather. 370 Mr. Weng criticized the Taiwanese government for being too ineffective to help fish farmers: “Instead of our heads of

367 Source: http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671 C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTT ON=false&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword=TW-07- 301000100G-614001 . 368 Chi.: maitai . 369 Chi.: tongzhan . 370 Mr. Weng, director of the SFC: interview, April 3, 2014. 221

Fisheries Agency [in Taiwan], the Chinese officials from the Taiwan Strait Affairs Office visited the fish farmers.” 371 Mr. Weng highlighted his former political experience and current position in the SFC as “serving the people” ( 為民服務), 372 including the enhancement of fish farmers’ livelihoods: Before the ECFA, [fish farmers] were controlled by the middlemen ( 任人宰 割). 373 They were exploited for a long time. They currently do not need to obey the middlemen ( 看人臉色). 374 What they have to do is to farm the fish. We will purchase the fish. The SFC as an exporter set the target to open the Chinese market for the sake of fish farmers’ livelihoods. A participant in the trade contract told me that a distributor asked him to delay the harvest because his fish contained a muddy flavour, but actually the fish did not [taste this way]. The distributor [actually] wanted to wait for the wholesale price to drop, so they could earn more by setting a much lower price. Finally, the cold front came and the fish farmers’ fish died. . . . The P&F plant owners are the “executioners” ( 繪子手), 375 given the knife by the Taiwanese government, because the P&F plants . . . [can purchase cheaper milkfish by] obtain[ing] government subsidies [in the 95 mechanism/buffer stock program].376

In 2010, the Chinese officials agreed to accept the fish farmers’ “request for the trade contract, which could bring higher income to them.”377 Mr. Weng argued that the Chinese and Taiwanese are both of Chinese descent ( 中華民族)378 and therefore should help each other. He organized the contracted fish farmers to reciprocate by donating money to several natural disaster relief efforts in China. During the trade contract negotiations, senior Chinese provincial and national officials visited Xuejia. Mr. Weng mobilized local communities to organize welcoming events to demonstrate their goodwill towards the officials. Terms such as “serving the people” and “Chinese descent,” were frequently used by the Communists in China to justify their rule in China. Mr. Weng’s adoption of these terms indicated that he preferred an intimate

371 Ibid. 372 Chi.: weiminfuwu. 373 Chi.: renrenzaige . 374 Chi.: kanren lianse . 375 Chi.: huizishou . 376 Mr. Weng, director of the SFC: interview, April 3, 2014. 377 Ibid. 378 Chi.: zhonghua minzu 222

cross-strait economic and social relationship. He acted very much like a broker between China and Taiwan in both trade and cultural exchange. From the perspective of Mr. Weng, this trade contract became the “only” way for fish farmers, who were exploited by distributors and ignored by Taiwanese government officials, to sustain their farming operations and seek better politicians to change the current situation. He succeeded in attracting an increasing number of fish farmers to ask to join the trade contract. He then mobilized these fish farmers in local elections. He also maintained his political influence at the local, or even regional, levels. This process thus politicized the trade contract of milkfish between China and Taiwan within the local communities in Tainan City. The ECFA thus became politically influential to the local politics. The milkfish trade contract, in turn, became a tool for China to construct a promising future for closer cross-strait relationships. After the first year, a growing number of eligible fish farmers joined the waitlist for the trade contract for subsequent years. The total volume set by the trade contract grew from 300 tonnes in 2011 to 360 tonnes in 2012. The SFC assigned half of the quota to new participants, who won annual draws of lots. This resulted in an increasing number of contracted farmers (Table 5.3). The SFC did not have its own P&F plant. In 2014, it subcontracted three milkfish P&F plants to freeze whole fish. These P&F plants were equipped with quick-freezing facilities. One of them was located in Xuejia. Workers washed the harvest and moved it into a cold room for quick freezing at -30˚C. The next day, the frozen fish were packed into boxes and stored in a freezer at -18˚C. The SFC sold whole fish to Qinggong Co.

Table 5.3. Details of the SFC–Qinggong Co. trade c ontract (2011–2015).

Year Guaranteed Volume Number of price (tonnes) contracted (TWD/catty) farmers 2011 45 300 100 2012 45 360 ~150 2013 42.5 360 ~170 2014 41 360 ~170 2015 40 360 n/a Source: Author’s field data (2014–15).

223

Between 2011 and 2013, the SFC gave TWD300,000 to each contracted farmer in April as an advance payment. After exporting the harvest to China, the SFC received the full payment from Qinggong Co. and transferred the money to the fish farmers afterwards. The SFC earned TWD2/catty in each deal. Qinggong Co., resold the products in China. The drops in the guaranteed purchase price from Qinggong Co. for fish farmers’ harvests reflected the poor sales performance of milkfish in China. In 2014, Qinggong Co. terminated the trade contract. The SFC found a private Chinese enterprise to replace Qinggong Co. to continue the trade contract. Mr. Weng found that the Chinese enterprise often delayed the payments to the SFC, leading him to visit China frequently to follow up. The SFC delayed its payment for the harvests to the contracted farmers in 2014. Although the SFC found another Chinese corporation to replace Qinggong Co., this new business partner set the guaranteed price at TWD40/catty. The SFC then gave up half of its own profit (i.e., TWD2/catty), which was TWD1/catty, to keep up with the guaranteed price at TWD41 per catty for the contracted fish farmers. According to Taiwan’s official statistical records, the total volume and value of milkfish (including frozen whole fish and fillet) exported to China increased after the Early Harvest Program was implemented (Table 5.4). 379 Mr. Weng insisted that the ECFA benefited the milkfish farmers. The SFC was the trailblazer of marketing milkfish in China: Before the ECFA, milkfish exportation relied on the Petty Trade. The products were not sold to supermarkets. That’s why the market was not expanded. The ECFA eliminated the tariffs on milkfish and it became competitive. They [the Chinese] foresee a good market. The ECFA is good to the milkfish sector. . . . The Chinese people would not have interest in consuming milkfish, which was alien to them. The tariff elimination of the milkfish drew their attention [due to the decrease in the price]. We [Taiwanese fish farmers] have the technology to farm high-quality milkfish that the Chinese cannot do. We are competitive. 380

However, the statistical data are insufficient for explaining how well the cross-strait milkfish trade performed. As I describe later, milkfish did not perform well as a commodity inside China, and thus created losses for Qinggong Co. which marketed the milkfish purchased from the SFC.

379 Bureau of Foreign Trade, various years. 380 Mr. Weng, director of the SFC: interview, April 3, 2014. 224

Table 5.4. Taiwanese milkfish exports to China and China’s ranking as a Taiwanese milkfish importer.

Total Rank Rank volume Total amount (in terms (in terms of Year (kg) of value (USD) of value) volume) 2010 24,692 57,208 30 24 2011 23,951 195,506 18 25 2012 54,502 472,657 11 15 2013 97,734 880,218 10 13 Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

In 2014, Mr. Weng was dissatisfied with milkfish sales in China: “each milkfish was not easily sold; a milkfish valued at RMB18 was on sale at RMB10.” 381 As sections IV and V show, the Taiwanese milkfish business people reasoned that milkfish products faced strong market competition with other available seafood products in China. Because the trade statistics show that the recorded milkfish export volume was lower than the SFC’s claimed export volume (Tables 5.3 and 5.4), some business people I interviewed suspected that some of the contracted fish farmers’ harvests were actually consumed inside Taiwan. 382 The trade contract excluded fish farmers from Simu (Map 5.1), whose household registrations were in Budai instead of the election constituency of Mr. Wu. Despite their milkfish farming in Beiman, they were ineligible to participate in the trade contract. Mr. Peng, the general-secretary of the Chiayi County Fishermen Association, which served Simu milkfish farmers, commented that the SFC was bound to Tainan City and China’s rangli did not benefit his members: About 30 % of the fish ponds in a community in Beiman belong to fish farmers from Chiayi County. The SFC did not make contracts with these fish farmers because their household registrations are within Chiayi County. The SFC trade contract affects less than 10% of Taiwanese fish farmers. The SFC could not buy all the milkfish. China would say we are helping [the fish farmers], but the trade

381 Ibid. 382 Kragen Chien: personal communication (2014). 225

contract just covers one region. The contracted farmers’ fish are sold to the CCP. 383

Mr. Peng claimed that “the fish farmers asked me to find a solution [to help them enjoy the benefits of the Early Harvest Program].” 384 He added that he had approached Chinese officials to make similar arrangements regarding the milkfish trade contract. Nevertheless, his proposal was declined because China used Xuejia as a cover, “pretend[ing] to be nice” ( 做做樣子)385 instead of actually providing a benefit for all Taiwanese fish farmers. 386 Mr. Yu, a Taiwanese government official, pointed out that the SFC’s trade contract was a “business practice that involves a small amount of milkfish compared to the total production.” 387 Other milkfish exporters were unable to get a trade contract with China similar to what the SFC did for its contracted fish farmers. The SFC’s connection with the contracted milkfish farmers in Xuejia, or more broadly Tainan City, can be seen as a response to the complex relationships between fish farmers in southwest Taiwan, the less favourable climatic conditions for milkfish farming, and the market system in which middlemen were relatively more powerful than fish farmers. The SFC’s example, however, could not be transferred to Chiayi County, another major milkfish production region, because of China’s influence and local election politics in southwest Taiwan. The Taiwan Affair’s Office from China influenced which company could develop the trade contract with the Qinggong Co. Local elections were interlinked to the cross-strait affairs. The SFC benefited from the trade contract to start their exports to China. There was no second case after the ECFA was signed. China’s rangli strategy selectively provided opportunities to some Taiwanese fish farmers and business people. The guaranteed purchase price, which was higher than the ordinary farm-gate price, decreased, suggesting that the Qinggong Co. was affected by the lack of profits from selling milkfish in the Chinese market. The trade contract was terminated due to the political economy of the milkfish trade. Managing

383 Mr. Peng, general secretary of Chiayi County Fishermen Association: interview, April 14, 2015. 384 Ibid. 385 Chi.: zuozuo yangzi. 386 Ibid. 387 Mr. Yu, top-level national government official: interview, June 10, 2014. 226

the process through which milkfish can become a popular product in China is the issue that the SFC needs to face.

Case #2 Zushui Milkfish Ball Plant Mr. Peng, the general-secretary of the Chiayi County Fishermen Association, observed that “the trade contract benefited 10% of Taiwanese milkfish farmers only. They do not handle the others. China helps one area and then says they are helping [all]. The fish farmers thus asked me on behalf of the fishermen association to find a solution.” 388 Mr. Peng formed a business partnership with Ah-yuan, another local elite who was a Simu fish farmer and businessperson, and established a fish ball processing plant in 2013, targeting the Chinese market. Hearing of the unpopularity of bony whole milkfish in China (see the next section), Mr. Peng and Ah-yuan sold milkfish balls to China. These processed products were excluded from the Early Harvest Program, but were expected to be included in the Trade Pact of Goods (which would not be negotiated until 2016). Under the name Zushui P&M Group, they obtained government subsidies to purchase the machines for fish ball production to establish the newest milkfish ball processing plant inside Simu. Zushui sourced their milkfish from local P&F plants. Fish farmers would not know if their milkfish were exported to China. They were paid the same farm-gate price as that for local distribution. Ah-yuan and his wife, Ah-hui, were both leading elites in the Chiayi County Fishermen Association. They had invested in various businesses within Simu, such as kindergartens, in recent decades. Ah-yuan established the fish ball business and intended to hand it over to the family’s second child, Li-an. This decision led them to sacrifice their own political careers, because they reallocated their capital, originally used for running the township mayor and alderman elections in 2014, to start up the business. Li-an’s wife and sister-in-law were the clerks. Three Simu villagers were employed to make fish balls. Mr. Peng’s son was the staff member in China who explored markets. Ah-yuan and Ah-hui also participated in various business activities, such as attending food expos in Taiwan and China to promote their fish ball products.

388 Mr. Peng, general-secretary of the Chiayi County Fishermen Association: interview, April 14, 2015 227

Zushui planned to establish its business to generate profits in China over the long run. Li- an compared Zushui’s business strategy with that of the SFC: The trade contract is a once-and-for-all business (只做一次的生意). 389 They [the people who are involved in the trade contract] are using the Chinese policy to make profits. They sell the milkfish to China and the Chinese government officials pay the bill. None of them think of how to sustain market growth [in milkfish]. . . . In Taiwan, the price of milkfish increases when demand grows. The price drops when demand drops. . . . The Chinese market is a market. One’s business success depends on how one sells his products. . . . The Chinese have no experience eating milkfish. Milkfish is not a well-known commodity in China. It takes some time to observe if milkfish is something the Chinese like to eat. 390

To enter the Chinese market, Zushui aimed to use the normal trade to sell their high-quality fish balls in terms of safety and taste. As a P&M group, Zushui paid TWD20,000 as a consultation fee to the Chiayi County Fishermen Association. The fishermen association assigned a staffer to help the fish ball plant obtain ISO22000 and HACCP certificates, which reflected international hygiene and sanitation standards. 391 Zushui employed an experienced master of fish ball making to teach Li-an, the general manager of Zushui. A fish ball produced by Zushui cost two times more than an ordinary one. Ah-yuan claimed that Zushui’s products “are healthier and tastier with no preservatives, and contain more fish meat content.” 392 Li-an targeted using the normal trade route to sell their products to supermarket chains. He expected the tariff on fish balls to be removed soon under the ECFA. The procedures involved in the normal trade required different certifications (issued by that BAPIQ) that Zushui had obtained (i.e., HACCP and ISO22000). Li-an attended several workshops offered by Taiwanese authorities to clarify the procedures for the normal trade. The first container of frozen milkfish balls was shipped to China in 2013 under normal trade procedures. Zushui adopted the brand name of the fishermen association to heighten consumers’

389 Chi.: zhizuo yici de shengyi . 390 Li-an, the general manager of Zushui: interview, April 24, 2014. 391 The Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Points (HACCP) and the International Organization for Standardization 22000 (ISO22000) are two major modules of the international system for maintaining hygiene and sanitary conditions in food processing plants. They became the basic requirements for plants seeking to produce Taiwanese seafood products for export in the 1990s. 392 Li-an, the manager of Zushui: interview, June 29, 2014. 228

confidence in their products. The fishermen association also arranged for its staffers to follow Li- an to attend an international food exposition in Shanghai in July 2013. They recalled that visitors enjoyed tasting the free milkfish balls, but they put in very few purchase orders. Subsequently, to save money, Li-an decided not to attend the same exposition in 2014. In mid-2014, Ah-yuan and Li-an repeatedly told me that they needed to re-orient their business to markets other than China. In June, I volunteered to help promote fish balls with them in an international food exposition held in Taipei city, offering myself as a useful translator when Li-an exchanged ideas and market information with several merchandisers from Hong Kong and the Middle East. Nevertheless, due to the higher prices of its milkfish balls, Zushui found few potential customers (because they were looking for cheaper products) who actually placed orders after the food exposition. To improve his business network, Li-an purchased a refrigerated truck to “ paoyewu ” ( 跑業務; visit customers), visiting potential customers inside Taiwan. In China, Mr. Peng’s son found that the volume of orders was below his expectations. Zushui was competing with various local companies to sell fish balls in China. Incurring consecutive losses for more than a year, Ah-yuan’s capital was running short. Between May and October 2014, Li- an and Ah-yuan reported several times that they were dissatisfied with the sales of their milkfish balls in China. Ah-yuan used his religious networks to sustain his business and avoid closing down. Actively engaging in temple affairs for years, he and his family sought religious power to bless their business. In addition to their regular donations to a major wanghe (王爺) temple in southwest Taiwan, Ah-yuan volunteered as a ritual representative during its jiao (醮) festival in November 2014. During the rituals, Jiao festival representatives needed to offer fresh, chilled, and frozen seafood to pacify ghosts. A few major ritual representatives also demonstrated their wealth with the elaborate offerings. Zushui seized the opportunity to supply frozen fish balls and fish paste as offerings. To Ah-yuan, the jiao festival constituted a ritualistic and networking occasion that might revive his milkfish ball business. Li-an followed this direction to seek business opportunities in other temple events across Taiwan. Finally, they decided to withdraw from the Chinese market. Ah-yuan and Mr. Peng were fish farmers who became elites in the fishermen association and used their past successful investments in seafood businesses to accumulate capital for further

229

investment in other businesses. They set up Zushui as fish ball production plant run by their P&M group. They did not intend to change the structure of the milkfish supply chain, as reflected by its milkfish sourcing strategy. They used government subsidies (by paying the fishermen association for consultancy) to purchase facilities, and hence strengthened its ability as a private business. Compared with the SFC, Zushui was a more typical way for fish farmers and processors in Taiwanese aquaculture to develop their businesses. Zushui’s experience in transnational business in China, given the prospect of a new market under the ECFA, was worth investigating. When P&M groups succeed and survive in the domestic milkfish supply chain (chapter four), how can these groups and private companies benefit from marketing their milkfish products in international markets? What factors affect their cost–benefit calculations after a BFTA is signed? In the rest of this chapter, I turn to milkfish processors, who are defined as any milkfish business people having a processing plant to explore their perspectives on doing good business at the cross-strait level.

IV. Engaging in the Cross-strait Milkfish Trade: The Perspectives of Milkfish Processors The milkfish processors offered diverse responses to the ECFA, including their views on doing business with the Chinese and in China, and their perspectives on the cross-strait milkfish trade. I use a sample of nine P&F plant owners (and managers) and two fish ball plant owners to illustrate their perspectives on the ECFA, the SFC’s trade contract, and the possibility of doing business with the Chinese (Table 5.5). I also added two top-level officials’ comments to show the policy dimension. During my interviews, their comments typically first addressed the SFC’s trade contract, probably because of its popularity as an example of the ECFA’s treatment in the media, and then the ECFA. These data show that the ECFA impacted the milkfish supply chain in southwest Taiwan mainly with the presence of the trade contract. Outside of the trade contract, it was less explicit for the milkfish processors to associate any changes in the relationships between fish farmers and milkfish processors with the ECFA.

230

Table 5.5. Cases of P&F plants (n=9) and fish ball plants (n=2). Case Cases Types of plant Types of Number Other business number products of staff A1 Mrs. Fang P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets, >50 n/a group) tilapia fillets, oysters, frozen shrimp, and other frozen seafood A2 Mr. Xiu P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets n/a Restaurant in (employer) group) China A3 Chi-wei P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets >30 A feed plant (male) group) A4 Ah-wang P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets n/a Milkfish and his group) distributor daughter A5 Mr. Su P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets ~20 Milkfish and his group) distributor; wife mullet and milkfish farmer; mullet roe broker A6 Mr. Lin P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets ~20 n/a group) A7 Ah-ying P&F plant (P&M Milkfish fillets ~20 Investment in (male) group) Indonesia for seafood trade A8 Mr. Luo P&F plant Milkfish fillets, >50 n/a (private milkfish company, dumplings, exporter) Frozen whole fish A9 Ah-hong Fish ball plant Milkfish balls, n/a Mullet and (male) and (private mullet roe milkfish farmer his wife company) A10 Mr. Peng, Fish ball plant Milkfish balls; 7 Milkfish and Ah-yuan, (P&M group) squid balls; shrimp farmer Li-an milkfish fish paste (male) and his wife A11 Chi-sung P&F plant (a fish Milkfish fillets, n/a Seabass farmer (male) farmer tilapia, seabass association) Source: Author’s field data (2014 & 2015).

231

The milkfish processors’ perspectives on the ECFA can be summarized below. Four people (A2, A8, A10, A11) have sold products to China. A2, A8, and A11 used the Petty Trade route. A11 operated Zushui and sold products to China via normal trade. Other people are focused on the domestic supply of milkfish products. During my interviews, A1 and A3 mentioned their concerns with Chinese business practices. A1 diversified the products the plant handled to sustain the business instead of trying to take a single huge order from the Chinese (e.g., the SFC’s trade contract). Similarly, A8 was aware of the possibility of losing orders from the China side if China’s rangli tactic suddenly ended. Other people were more concerned about the performance of milkfish in the market, including its sales in the face of competition, and the impacts of the SFC’s market strategy of promoting milkfish (see section V). They are less willing to extend their business to China. Except for A11, other businesses had operated before the ECFA was signed. Their established market share and networks might affect their intention to explore the Chinese market. One example could be A2, who had used the Petty Trade to test the Chinese market since 2009. According to Wang et al. (2015), China’s unificationist agenda had been extended to three social categories ( 三中)393 by 2014: small-medium enterprises ( 中小企業), 394 middle-lower class residents ( 中低階層), 395 and residents in central and south Taiwan ( 中南部民眾). 396 By providing business opportunities and making concessions, China utilized its soft power to attract the political support of these constituencies. China’s concession on the agro-food trade as part of its unificationist strategy drew attention to both supporters and opponents of the ECFA. The Sunflower Movement was followed by the Taiwanese government’s promise to suspend its ECFA Service Trade Pact negotiation. China then began to target the “young Taiwanese” (一青 )397 as part of its policy for addressing the unfriendly sentiments of Taiwan’s younger generations towards its free trade and unificationist agendas ( Apple Daily 2015). It adopted the

393 Chi.: sanzhong. 394 Chi.: zhongxiaoqiye. 395 Chi.: zhongdijieceng. 396 Chi.: zhongnanbu minzhong . 397 Chi.: yiqing . 232

collective strategy of sanzhong yiqing (三中一青) to attract the political support of these four social groups. Mr. Luo (A8), who operated a P&F plant, which was subcontracted by the SFC to freeze milkfish, also exported milkfish products under his own brand to China via the Petty Trade route. He considered himself a target of the sanzhong yiqing strategy: They [the Chinese government] target those grassroots [politicians], such as neighbourhood magistrates, mayors, and aldermen. . . . These people will say some good words to praise how good China is. . . . They [China] buy everything from you [Taiwan], such as grapefruit and our milkfish. They [China] spend money supporting your small-medium enterprises and local sectors. Now, you can see [China’s] goal [of unification] is very explicit. 398

Mr. Luo was cautious about the effects of cross-strait politics on his business, while he believed that the challenge could create an opportunity for him to make a “sustainable business” ( 永續經 營): 399 Fish prices fluctuate. . . . Would I dare to sign a contract on a purchase order of 2,000 tonnes of milkfish export, if I knew the price of milkfish could rise and drop around 10 dollars per catty during the four months of production season? . . . I do not want to do such high-risk business [a trade contract]. I accept the order of outsourcing ( 代工)400 [for the trade contract] because it is a lower risk. . . . Getting the outsourcing order of freezing milkfish for the SFC, I can employ 10 additional individuals to generate more profit . . . [because I have set up another production line], I can handle more orders for my own exports and other companies’ outsourcing may also come. . . . The only risk to me is that I may not receive all the payment [from the SFC and China]. . . . China is a place . . . [where] its ruler can make a sudden shift of policy ( 路就改彎). 401 Everyone is aware of this possibility.402

Mr. Luo emphasized the business risk of handling the “huge order” (i.e., the trade contract), which demanded “a lot of cash flow” to pay for fish farmers’ harvests. The Chinese companies might delay their payments. 403 This situation was unfavourable to small-medium

398 Mr. Luo, a P&F plant manager: interview, October 8, 2014. 399 Chi.: yongxu jingying. 400 Chi.: daigong. 401 Chi.: lujiugaiwan . 402 Mr. Luo, a P&F plant manager: interview, October 8, 2014. 403 Ibid. 233

enterprises like his when operating under the milkfish trade contract. Instead, Mr. Luo preferred becoming a contractor with the SFC to freeze the milkfish for the trade contract. By setting up a new production line from the revenues he generated with the SFC contract, he prepared for future business opportunities with other countries. This was a way of expanding his business instead of narrowing it primarily to China. The SFC brought Chinese government officials to visit southwest Taiwan, including Budai Township, to explore items other than milkfish to be sold to China. Mr. Weng, the director of the SFC, supported the ECFA and the cross-strait milkfish trade as a free market competition: I support Taiwan signing the Service Trade Pact of the ECFA. The DPP claimed the ECFA would lead men to be unemployed and women to be single, because men had to go to Heilongjian [黑龍江; a province in Northeast China] for their military service. It is not the fact. We can compete with everyone in a free market. The Taiwanese have not trusted the Chinese for a long time. [I believe that] we need a market and consumers can have [free] choice.404

In my observations I did not see Simu milkfish processors share Mr. Weng’s enthusiasm. Mr. Peng of the Chiayi County Fishermen Association and Ah-yuan, a co-founder of Zu-shui (A10), experienced the failure of Zushui in marketing its products in China. One day when I was interviewing him, two representatives of the SFC came to arrange for receiving a group of Chinese officials the next day. During the brief discussion, Mr. Peng insisted on using only the LED notice board to welcome these visitors, instead of hanging big banners like the SFC did. The next day when I arrived, most staffers of the fishing association did not expect the visit from Chinese officials. Li-an, the general manager of the Zushui fish ball plant, received only a single last-minute call to participate in the reception. During the two-hour tour, a staffer of the fishing association first gave a PowerPoint presentation in the hall inside the building, focusing on the structure of the fishing association and the major species of fish farmed in Chiayi County. During the presentation, some of the Chinese officials walked out of the hall to take pictures. Without raising any questions, the visitors moved to Mrs. Fang’s P&F plant (A1) supervised by the fishing association, where Zushui also rented space to make fish balls. Li-an declined to let the visitors enter his plant,

404 Mr. Weng, the director of the SFC: interview, April 3, 2014. 234

hinting that the machines had not run for some time. Mrs. Fang showed the visitors how her workers cut and freeze tilapia. Within ten minutes, the visitors left for a fishing wharf to catch the sunset and a seafood dinner. After seeing them off, Mrs. Fang whispered to me, encapsulating the negative impression of local processors towards the Chinese officials: The Chinese frequently come without placing any purchase orders afterward. I am just here to entertain them. Even if they placed an order, the amount would be too big for me to handle. There is no point to ruin our daily routine for [an unpredictable and] large order. 405

Simu processors mentioned the difference in business cultures between China and Taiwan. In Taiwan, credit ( 信用)406 is important for maintaining social and business relationships. Business networks are developed through credit, a concept comprising a business partner’s “trustworthiness, his willingness and ability to meet his business and financial obligations” (De Glopper 1972: 304). Therefore, processors use social credit and leverage to build connections with others in a specific trade environment (ibid.: 324–326). However, Simu processors were afraid of being cheated by Chinese business people. Mrs. Fang, another P&F plant owner, claimed that the Chinese were “cunning” (賊); 407 she preferred not to take the risk of doing business with the Chinese and then lose her business and harm the workers’ livelihoods. Chi-wei, the young P&F plant manager (chapter four), considered that the Chinese could sign a contract and then run away without leaving any correct contact information: “In Taiwan, we have xinyong and will pay on time; the Chinese always postpone their payments.” 408 The milkfish processors, who always highlight the milkfish trade as a free market, calculated their benefits and costs if they were involved in international trade. Mr. Su (A5), one processor who owned his P&F plant, said: [Chinese consumers] wanted cheap commodities. . . . Shipping to China costs a lot. If you are selling a milkfish belly for TWD50 per piece, you need TWD100 to cover the shipping cost. It is not profitable and no one would do such business ( 不 划算，沒有人想走). 409 It is not so profitable to export milkfish. The only way

405 Chi.: Mrs. Fang, a P&F plant owner: conversation, April 15, 2015. 406 Chi.: xingyong. 407 Chi.: zei. 408 Chi-wei, a P&F plant manager: interview, January 6, 2015. 409 Chi.: bu huasuan, meiyou ren xiangzou . 235

one should do is to improve the quality of milkfish to increase sales in the domestic market . . . the ECFA is useless. . . . Taiwan is a small market and we try to sell the products to other countries . . . but it requires quality. The Japanese products are good in quality and many people want to buy them. China produces a lot of low-quality products but no one wants to buy them. 410

One P&F plant owner (A2) stopped using the Petty Trade to sell milkfish products to China. Mr. Xiu, who helped his boss sell milkfish fillets in China, said, “the trade contract under the ECFA was carried out by Qinggong Co., but the whole fish did not sell well [in China]. It is a matter of taste. There are variations in taste among the Chinese. Whole fish is not good because the inner guts kept in the fish would deteriorate and negatively affect the freshness of the fish.” 411 His boss was considering no longer marketing milkfish in China in April 2014. Mr. Xiu foresaw that the business would continue to create financial losses for his boss. In April 2015, his boss updated me that he no longer used the Petty Trade to sell milkfish to China. Other business people deployed a range of strategies to sell their milkfish. One plant owner sold fish products to China from Indonesia. Ah-ying (A7), a P&F plant owner who set up a new seafood processing plant in Indonesia with a new partner from south Taiwan, found the ECFA’s tariff elimination was not the most beneficial trade route for his business: China has a huge market where you can sell anything found elsewhere [and make money]. We are now selling sardines from Indonesia to Shandong [a province in Northeast China]. [The local plants] use the sardines to produce fish paste, which the Shandong people like to cook in hot pots. They are not used to eating milkfish. We sell Indonesian milkfish to Taiwan. . . . We do not sell Taiwanese milkfish to China. Even though there is the ECFA and tariff elimination, the overall costs [i.e., labour, shipping, and others] of selling fish to China from Taiwan are more expensive than that from Indonesia.412

The milkfish distributors and P&F plants did not change their practices in the milkfish supply chain when the ECFA’s Early Harvest program was implemented. The lack of growth in milkfish sales in China discouraged them from exploring the Chinese market, especially when they considered that doing business with the Chinese or marketing milkfish in China was risky to

410 Mr. Su, a milkfish distributor and P&F plant owner: interview, April 13, 2015. 411 Mr. Xiu, the manager of a P&F plant: interview, April 29, 2014. 412 Ah-ying, a P&F plant owner: interview, February 28, 2015. 236

their current business operations. The SFC’s trade contract became an exception in this supply chain. As will be discussed in chapter six, the contracted farmers considered the influence of the trade contract when they planned to stock fish and shrimp. They also had other considerations, such as the availability of other high-value species, the risks they could take, their own fish farming skills, and the efforts they would exert to explore other markets. The experiences of milkfish business people in China showed that free trade agreements reduce some of the costs of Taiwanese exports. Consumer demand for milkfish, however, fluctuates based on Chinese preferences for seafood, the availability of and competition with other products, and marketing strategies. Mintz (1982) linked sugar cane production in the Caribbean and the expansion of sugar consumption from the upper to the working classes. Milkfish business people such as Li-an and Ah-yuan marked milkfish balls as a high-value product, but they later realized that fish balls were not an item that people wanted to use to show their willingness to consume high-value food. Fish balls were common in many Chinese communities, especially among the working classes. Whether milkfish balls can become popular in China may rest on its relations to both culinary cultures and the targeted classes of consumers. Subsequently, the marketing strategy would influence businesses such as Zushui to reconsider their formula for making fish balls and the costs involved.

V. Taiwanese Culinary Culture and Milkfish Consumption in China

I collected two explanations for the failure of milkfish sales in China from the SFC, the government, traders, and other experts in the aquaculture sector. First, milkfish is uncommon in Chinese dietary cultures. “The Chinese do not eat milkfish; I only had Taiwanese customers order it,” said Mr. Xiu, the Taiwanese seafood trader specializing in the milkfish business via the Petty Trade. 413 Mr. Tseng, the retired top-ranked official, commented that the SFC “proposed a wrong strategy” by exporting milkfish to China “too early”:

The political influence under the cross-strait relationship accelerated the formal milkfish trade, but this politically driven behaviour actually slowed the growth of milkfish sales in China. [I knew that] a few Chinese government officials visited south Taiwan as a gesture of caring about Taiwanese fish farmers. It is hard to

413 Mr. Xiu, a seafood businessperson: interview, April 29, 2014. 237

market milkfish in China, because the Chinese do not eat milkfish. It depends on how one promotes milkfish and teaches the Chinese to eat it. Before the trade contract came into effect in 2010 (actually in 2011), I advised the local politicians and business people to first teach the Chinese consumers how to eat milkfish. They could slowly expand the market from Taiwanese business people there to the local Chinese. Unfortunately, they refused to take my advice and decided to export milkfish to China [immediately]. They want the support from the fish farmers. . . . The effect was less satisfactory than expected. In the end, they found it difficult to promote milkfish consumption in China. 414

Mr. Tseng’s comment encapsulates the officials’ and traders’ perspectives on the SFC’s failure to develop a milkfish market in China. China’s political influence in Xuejia “accelerated” the marketing process—so that the SFC exported and promoted milkfish in China simultaneously rather than carefully assessing the potential markets first. Their marketing efforts therefore affected the first general impression of Chinese consumers of milkfish. In 2011, the SFC first exported only whole fish to China and received poor feedback. The strategy of exporting the whole fish was not effective, given the varieties of milkfish products available in Taiwan. For Mr. Tseng and the milkfish processors I interviewed, exporting whole fish was a bad business strategy. Milkfish contains 222 bones and some consumers would not like to eat it as a whole fish. As Mr. Fang argued, the first promoted product should have been the fillets—the boneless milkfish belly: Our government did not work it [selling milkfish to China] out in a good way. If the boneless milkfish were sold [to Chinese consumers], the consumers would accept milkfish. Now everyone is afraid of eating milkfish. This is not correct. . . . Xuejia [the SFC] did the wrong thing. If this year there was no trade contract, I can predict that the price of milkfish will drop dramatically. The contracted farmers had purchased fish fry and kept them over the last winter. It is now the time of stocking [April], but the farm-gate price in south Taiwan was only TWD42-3 per catty.” 415

Second, many of the milkfish traders I interviewed criticized Mr. Weng, an outsider to milkfish farming and trade before he set up the SFC, as unfamiliar with the quality of the product, such as the taste of milkfish. Most of the contracted farmers practised freshwater

414 Mr. Tseng, a retired top-ranked official: interview, March 19, 2015. 415 Mrs. Fang, a P&F plant owner: interview, April 8, 2015. 238

milkfish farming due to geographical limitations, but it is generally agreed in the aquaculture sector that this produces less tasty fish. The aquaculture experts and fish farmers from other areas argued that Xuejia was an imperfect source of milkfish for impressing the Chinese, because milkfish from there “all contain the notorious muddy flavour.” According to Chi-sung, the muddy flavour was a body odour and taste of the fish caused by the soil and algae composition in the pond. If the water is more alkaline (like sea water), the muddy flavour can be reduced or eliminated. 416 In Taiwan, milkfish with the muddy flavour can create an unappealing culinary experience for seafood lovers, who consider the flavour a sign of low quality. Fish farms in Xuejia are freshwater ponds, where the milkfish have a higher likelihood of taking on this muddy flavour, so Chinese consumers’ first impressions of milkfish were unfavourable due to the flavour. Therefore, the SFC lowered the economic and culinary value of milkfish in the Chinese market. The SFC later paid more attention to fish quality by insisting that contracted fish farmers maintain good pond conditions by sanitizing pond bottoms before each production. However, like other exporters, the SFC did not adopt nongyu (弄魚), a common practice in fish harvesting among local distributors, to reduce the muddy flavour of the milkfish harvest for the domestic market. Milkfish exporters skip nongyu by arguing that freezing covers up the muddy flavour. They also claim that consumers in the Middle East, the second-largest consumers of Taiwanese milkfish exports, have become familiar with tilapia and other freshwater fish containing the muddy flavour. The SFC found coastal Chinese consumers to be just as sensitive to the muddy flavour as the Taiwanese. It responded by introducing the processed fish floss, which is a kind of dried, boneless, and seasoned snack with a fluffy texture, to China. However, this processed product was burdened by tariffs. In sum, the taste factor indicates that the milkfish trade was more complicated than Mr. Weng , the local-politician-turned-businessperson, expected when he first engaged in the cross-strait milkfish trade.

416 Ibid. 239

According to Ah-huang, an SFC staff member and himself an experienced feed salesperson, 417 controlling the inputs would have been a better strategy than the trade contract, which was Mr. Weng’s entrepreneurial decision: I told Mr. Weng that we were [running the company] on bad conditions. We should sell saltwater milkfish instead of freshwater ones. [As an experienced feed salesman], I could find high-quality feed to supply to the contracted farmers. The fish would become tasty and smell good ( 會香會好吃) and so consumers would want to buy them again. However, Mr. Weng said it was so difficult to control [the fish farmers’ input and quality in such contract farming]. Actually, everything is difficult when you start a business; what you need to do is to run the business and let the fish farmers get accustomed to our practices. We would have enhanced the quality of the fish [exported to China]. It would have made a huge difference. 418

Ah-huang’s suggestion was an insider’s view of milkfish production. In the domestic wholesale market, price rather than taste affects the sales of the milkfish. Similar to the debate on freshwater and saltwater milkfish (chapters three and four), fish farmers in southwest Taiwan emphasized the taste of milkfish. However, when the saltwater milkfish was sent to the market, its local distinctiveness was ignored. When the processors explained how they view the failure of milkfish marketing in China, quality was a major issue: Some Chinese people came to order milkfish; they did not care about the freshness. They wanted cheap fish balls and bellies. This resulted in some low- quality milkfish [to be sold in China]. The Chinese consumers had bad impressions of milkfish. 419

They sold the whole fish to China. It was not a good strategy and the sales were bad. The trade contractors also purchased the milkfish, no matter if they had muddy flavour or not, to China. The unstable quality made the trade contractors face difficulties. 420

To some informants, quality is relevant to price only when consumers know how to eat the milkfish. This perspective links food culture, price, and quality together and leads to a discussion of whether government policy is sufficient to promote milkfish in China:

417 Chi.: hui xiang hui haochi . 418 Ah-huang, a staff member of the SFC: interview, April 13, 2015. 419 Ah-tang, a fish ball plant owner: interview, May 8, 2014. 420 Mr. Lin, a P &F plant owner: interview, January 10, 2014. 240

They [the Chinese in Fujian] like to eat whole fish. Milkfish belly is the most delicious part and other flesh can be processed. A belly is sold at the same price as a whole fish. The Taiwanese prefer to buy the bellies. The Chinese consider the belly too expensive. . . . They also think that milkfish balls are too expensive. In Fujian, the local people like to eat their local fish balls. Our milkfish balls are more expensive because of transport and other costs. The local people think that we set the price too high. In fact, the Chinese do not like eating milkfish. The Taiwanese enjoy eating it. 421

Chi-sung (A11), a fish farmer, trader, and leader of the Chiayi County Fish Farmer’s Association, shared his experience in marketing milkfish in China for his cooperative formed by members of fish farmer’s associations all over Taiwan: Our cooperative (from Taiwan) runs a shop in Shanghai to sell our members’ fish products. The shop is located inside a mall owned by the Qinggong Co. When it developed the trade contract with the SFC, it asked if I could help. I decided not to participate in this trade contract because it involved personal interests [of the SFC]. I would have helped them if the trade contract was initiated by [Taiwanese] government officials. The Qinggong Co. was not satisfied with its loss of money in this business. No matter who buys milkfish from Taiwan, the Taiwanese government should teach the Chinese how to eat it. It is not simply a matter of selling milkfish. Milkfish is special and the Taiwanese government should promote the culture of eating milkfish by telling people the history of milkfish and the recipes. Business people would not spend money promoting the culture. The trade contract is a private business and therefore the government does not help the promotion of the SFC’s milkfish. 422

When asked whether the Taiwanese government should allocate public resources to promote milkfish consumption in China, Mr. Deng replied that fish consumption is a matter of habit. There are many kinds of fish. People do tend not to eat fish that are unfamiliar to them. The [Chinese] do not know milkfish well and it contains many bones. These are factors that negatively affect the promotion of milkfish [in China]. . . . This is not to say that we have to force people to eat milkfish to survive. If people have demand for grouper [instead of milkfish], it is fine to [satisfy their demand]…423

421 Mr. Xiu, the manager of a P&F plant: interview, April 29, 2014. 422 Chi-sung, a fish farmer and seafood trader: interview, February 28, 2015. 423 Mr. Deng, a top-level government official: interview, February 10, 2015. 241

In discussing the Zushui example, I have illuminated other factors, such as the socioeconomic classes of Chinese consumers, that affected the popularity of milkfish products in China. In light of discussions explaining to insiders in Taiwanese aquaculture why milkfish is not popular in China, I argue that the government and business people should take the perspectives of Chinese consumers into account before and during their marketing of milkfish in China. Market research on the Chinese consumers’ milkfish consumption is currently absent. The perspectives of fish farmers and traders in Taiwan on what make delicious milkfish may not be aligned with the Chinese consumers’ taste and cooking preferences. Based on the trade performance of Taiwanese milkfish in China, the Taiwanese fish farmers and traders believe that the Chinese consumers prefer other seafood products to milkfish. Seafood cultures can be different across and within countries. Following the trade experiences with Middle Eastern countries, the traders consider that foreign consumers and retailers do not take into account muddy flavour as a seafood quality issue. Consumers living in coastal China have their own seafood preferences. After the first few years of ECFA implementation, the Taiwanese business people discovered that coastal Chinese cities do not accept milkfish as a high-value fish. This limitation meant that exporting milkfish to China was not as profitable as it was selling it to other countries. The SFC attempted to market milkfish in inland Chinese cities, where freshwater fish consumption is more common. However, transportation and marketing costs can be higher. Cross-strait milkfish trade is therefore not as profitable as the SFC previously thought. The Taiwanese milkfish sector find that it is wrong to promote freshwater milkfish from Xuejia in China. Consumers’s impression on Taiwanese milkfish is bad. Even if the better quality and saltywater milkfish are exported, Chinese consumers may not know how to distinguish them from other milkfish or seafood products. These uncertainties have made it difficult for milkfish exports to survive in the Chinese market. The government, business people, and academics could take responsibility to collaborate to find out what the consumers need. They had similar experiences with eel exports to Japan in the 1970s. This history is a good lesson to learn, when the three parties put more emphasis on the culture and economy of the milkfish trade than the politics involved.

242

VI. Conclusion: Opportunities and Frictions Across the Strait

In this chapter I have explained the impacts of the ECFA on milkfish business people in southwest Taiwan. By adopting the perspective of balancing opportunities and frictions interacting with the globalization of food, I have shown that the ECFA removed tariffs on Taiwanese seafood items to be exported to China. This was an opportunity for the Taiwanese to expand their market to China. The food safety certifications required by the Chinese government, as a form of non-tariff restriction, may actually provide opportunities to business people to market their products in supermarket chains. Seeing trade governance as simultaneously generating opportunities and frictions would be a productive way of examining the impacts of free trade agreements on the globalization of food. Market competition and individual business strategies may accelerate or slow the growth in popularity of milkfish products in China. Before the ECFA, some milkfish business people had recognized the challenge of competition from other seafood products in the Chinese market. They also knew that the market prices of their milkfish products might not be competitive. The ECFA removed the tariffs on milkfish for whole fish and fillets, but processed products such as fish balls and floss were still tariff-laden. When the milkfish business people considered exploring the Chinese market, they considered the cultural factors, costs, and benefits of setting a price that would attract Chinese consumers. Cultural factors, such as xinyong and culinary habits, complicate the expansion of the milkfish sector to other countries. The normal trade route, before and after the ECFA, featured stricter non-tariff food safety and sanitation restrictions. Milkfish business people faced another friction in trying to sell their products in supermarket chains. The cases of SFC’s trade contract and Zushui’s fish ball business indicate that the ECFA’s impacts might bring short-term benefits to the milkfish sector in southwest Taiwan, but targeted local business strategies were important for sustaining the businesses and expanding milkfish sales in the Chinese market over the long term. Local perspectives on quality, taste, and consumption habits in Taiwan may be insufficient for enabling milkfish business people to improve the sales performance of milkfish in China. Understanding whether and how public and private collaborations in the Taiwanese aquaculture sector can become more effective when competing in Chinese and global markets requires Taiwanese

243

business people, governmental officials, and other stakeholders to explore the consumers’ perspectives. The export-oriented strategy has guided the development of Taiwanese aquaculture since the 1960s. Turning a domestically-consumed fish—milkfish—to an export product, has been a goal since the early 1990s. Unfortunately, the process of commercializing it in the Chinese market was unsatisfactory. Globalization is often considered as economically sound and without friction. Using Tsing’s term of friction, I found that economic liberalization, once a major driving force to boost Taiwan’s economy, was less successful when it came to milkfish trade under the cross-strait relations. Frictions include cultural, economic, political, and policy factors. Cultural factors, such as the rejection of a muddy flavour, affected the acceptance of milkfish as a new product to the Chinese. The coastal Chinese market, which is now open to Taiwanese milkfish without a tariff, is not yet ready for this bony fish which tastes different from other marine fish. The SFC’s marketing strategies using the idea of Chinese-ness do not work in the cross- strait milkfish trade. The Chinese government used ECFA to provide economic incentives to Taiwanese fish farmers to win their political support for future unification. However, culinary cultures prevented the success of the milkfish trade contract; hence, the fish farmers’ political support to cross-strait unification did not appear as expected. Food cultures are diverse across regions where “Chinese” societies exist. As the example of Zushui shows, product price is another factor affecting seafood consumption. Although producers want to add value to milkfish balls by changing the formula and ingredients, consumers may not consider this an increase in quality. In fact, the Chinese consumers did not prefer to buy Zushui’s milkfish balls which were more expensive than local fish balls available in the market. Taiwanese milkfish faces competition from Chinese seafood products and other imported products. Without a long-term understanding of the Chinese market, business people documented in this chapter failed to sell their products. The closer cross-strait relationships have created market opportunities. These should not be exaggerated as the only opportunity for Taiwanese aquaculture to develop. Since 2008, President Ma has argued that a BFTA with China would make Taiwanese milkfish trade better. Before this promise was realized, Taiwanese seafood business people had already understood

244

that the ECFA was less promising than President Ma said. They were disillusioned by the trade- with-China-is-always-beneficial discourse, finding it unrealistic. They therefore changed their business strategies to stop losing money. Multiple policies regulate the export of milkfish to China, and as a result the costs of milkfish for export are not uniform. These are examples of the specific and contextual trade aspects affecting the globalization of seafood. Opportunities and frictions coexist. Globalization includes trade relationships with various markets. In some contexts, the domestic market can become business people’s major destination for their products. Taiwanese business people have demonstrated their willingness to explore other economic opportunities.

245

CHAPTER SIX: FISH FARMERS IN SOUTHWEST TAIWAN UNDER THE ECFA

This chapter examines the ECFA’s impacts on fish farmers’ livelihood strategies in southwest Taiwan. Their farming practices were affected by the ECFA to varying degrees. Their experiences with the ECFA were embedded in the local economy and environment. They used a range of resources to sustain their livelihoods after the ECFA was implemented. In chapter five, I delineated two trade routes that were made available for Taiwanese milkfish export to China after the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program was implemented. These trade routes included the normal trade and the Petty Trade. Between 2011 and 2015, the trade contract of the Star Fish Company (SFC) under the normal trade allowed each contracted milkfish farmer to sell at most 30,000 catties of his or her milkfish harvest to the SFC at a guaranteed purchase price. The SFC was a private business which limited the number of contracted fish farmers to fewer than 200. In 2014, 5,432 households in Taiwan farmed milkfish (Stocking Census n.d.). 424 This meant that the SFC’s trade contract included no more than 3.7% of Taiwanese milkfish farmers. The Taiwanese were permitted to export milkfish to China via either of the above-mentioned trade options. No evidence suggests that either of these two routes directly increased milkfish farm-gate prices offered to non-contracted fish farmers in southwest Taiwan within this period of time. In this chapter I discuss the contracted fish farmers’ responses to the trade contract and the current milkfish supply chain. I explain how and why the fish farmers farmed more seafood varieties, such as grey mullet, groupers, and white-leg shrimp, than milkfish in southwest Taiwan. I describe how some Simu fish farmers engaged in the local economy to diversify their sources of income. The fish farmers made farming and marketing decisions to respond not only to the ECFA but also to local conditions and the diverse markets for their seafood products. Acheson (1988) investigated fishermen’s practices regarding business opportunities and risks in response to the market. The fishermen used various methods to survive in the market. In his example of lobstermen in Maine in the United States., Acheson found that lobstermen with

424 Source: http://fadopen.fa.gov.tw/fadopen/service/qrySpeciesSummaryYearlyReport.action . The stocking census conducted by the Fisheries Agency uses “household” instead of “fish farmer” as the basic unit. The number of milkfish farmers should be more than 5,709 people. 246

particular lobster-trap-placement skills may earn one-fourth more income than others (ibid.:105). Some lobstermen diversify their catch to scallop and shrimp in other seasons as an adaptive strategy (ibid.: 107–108). Each shift from lobstering to other kinds of fishing is affected by particular factors, and thus each lobsterman follows his own career path (ibid.: 113–114). The lobstermen share the goal of increasing profit margins; they achieve this goal with diverse strategies. Political ecology provides an analytical lens through which to understand the practices of fish farmers with the deconstruction of the dichotomy between the global and the local. Political ecologists have examined the dynamics of human–nature relationships rather than simply human adaptation to the environment (Watts 2015). They have studied such dynamics by examining how broader political and economic processes are interwoven with the changing geophysical properties of a place (Gezon 2006). One such process is the globalization of food. For example, Grossman (1998: 175) highlights that the “contrasting political–economic contexts of producing and marketing local food crops and exporting have been essential forces influencing changing patterns of land use.” In St. Vincent, an eastern Caribbean Island, Grossman (1998) found that planting bananas for the export market had imposed time constraints on farmers, because the plants had varying growth rates. This situation intensified the workload for the farmers and increased demand for labour. In turn, the number of labourers who could be hired for local food crop production decreased. The land available for food crop production became geographically marginalized when farmers grew more banana plants in areas that they could most easily access. The resulting decrease in local food crop production explains why farmers consumed more and more food imports. This example has two implications: 1) farmers’ practices interact with both export commodities and local foods; 2) understanding diverse farming practices, which may occur simultaneously, can improve understanding of the impacts of food trade. In this chapter, I show how fish farmers in southwest Taiwan practise aquaculture in diverse forms not only to adapt to environmental conditions but also to respond to demand in multiple markets. Their practices are linked to the political and economic forces produced by the ECFA and the market systems. The exercise of human agency described in this chapter is “neither determined by social structures, nor entirely voluntaristic” (Gezon 2006: 15). The

247

strength of the ECFA’s impacts on fish farmers in southwest Taiwan is related to the availability of resources (e.g., fish species that are suitable to be farmed in particular environments), fish farmers’ production strategies, and other factors such as local job and business opportunities. My data show that the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program resulted in varying degrees of impact on four categories of fish farmers in Xuejia and Simu: 1. The SFC’s contracted fish farmers were affected to a greater extent. 2. Non-contracted fish farmers capable of farming grouper could take advantage of the ECFA policy, but some of them failed to make sufficient profits. 3. Some fish farmers chose to farm grey mullet for the international and domestic markets—although the Early Harvest Program included mullet (whole fish), the fish farmers earned their profits from mullet roe, for which tariffs were not reduced. 4. Other fish farmers who were technically or financially unable to invest in the grouper or mullet sector may be least affected by the ECFA.

I. The SFC’s Contracted Fish Farmers

The contracted fish farmers sold part of their milkfish harvest to the SFC at a guaranteed purchase price. In 2011, the SFC estimated milkfish production costs at TWD35/catty, while setting the trade contract’s guaranteed purchase price at TWD45/catty (Wang and Hsieh 2014: 59). Ah-kuo, a full-time fish farmer, owned 3 jia of fish farms in 2014. He had four ponds in total; each pond was stocked with 20,000 milkfish and one million shrimp. He joined the trade contract in 2011 because he was dissatisfied with the fluctuating farm-gate price of milkfish in the domestic market, which was lower than the SFC’s guaranteed price. 425 In 2014, the guaranteed price dropped to TWD41/catty, which was still higher than Ah-kuo’s estimated production cost (TWD38/catty). The changing practices under the SFC’s trade contract affected Ah-kuo’s strategy for selling his milkfish. Between 2011 and 2013, the SFC made an advance payment of TWD300,000, which was part of the payment for the quota of 30,000 catties, to Ah-kuo at the

425 Ah-kuo, a fish farmer: interview, October 28, 2014. 248

beginning of each farming season. This made Ah-kuo more financially secure. After he harvested the fish and received the remaining payment from the SFC on time (two weeks), he cleared his debts for feed. However, in late 2014, he was worried about the delayed harvest payment from the SFC, which delayed the payment because the new Chinese buyer postponed payment on its exports. Ah-kuo changed his strategy of selling his milkfish that were excluded from the trade contract. In the past, he first sold 30,000 catties of milkfish to SFC. He waited until the end of the harvest seasons, when the supply decreased, and sold 50,000 catties of milkfish to local distributors at a higher farm-gate price. In 2014, the SFC’s postponed payment deprived him of money to pay for feed. He wanted to sell the uncontracted milkfish as soon as possible. He found that he needed to queue for the local distributors to buy his milkfish during the peak harvest season. He chose to sell the milkfish to exporters to avoid emergency situations that might cause the milkfish to die. This action reduced his profit because exporters paid TWD2 less than the local distributors did. Chung-ping, another SFC-contracted fish farmer operating more than 10 jia of fish ponds, claimed that the SFC’s trade contract protected him from the “exploitation” of local distributors and exporters. 1 He believed the exploitation occurred in the form of slashed farm- gate prices when fish were feeling distressed and unwell. The exploitation caused intense financial and psychological pressure for a decade of running the farm: I once thought that aquaculture would be easy to me as a former urban professional, but I found myself lacking the professional knowledge and skills. My ponds always failed to function properly ( 出狀況)426 . . . the distributors slashed the farm-gate price to TWD20 per catty to purchase my dying fish. I could not sleep well during the production seasons because I was in great debt. 427

He became an SFC-contracted farmer in 2011 because of the high guaranteed purchase price and the SFC’s arrangement that favoured the contracted farmers. When emergency harvests of suffocating fish were needed, the SFC purchased the fish at the price that the milkfish exporters would pay for the fish under normal conditions. Chung-ping thus found that the SFC helped him

426 Chi.: chu zhuangkuang. 427 Chung-ping, a fish farmer: interview, April 20, 2015. 249

reduce his losses. 428 He considered that the SFC’s arrangement helped the contracted fish farmers resist the unfavourable arrangements offered by the distributors: Milkfish farmers’ profit margin should not be controlled ( 掌控)429 by distributors. The merit of the SFC’s trade contract is its high price. . . . Besides, [the SFC’s arrangement of harvesting fish in emergency conditions] made the distributors unable to slash the price as much as they wanted. . . . 430

The trade contract became uncertain in 2015 and affected Chung-ping’s production plan. To prepare for the possible termination of the SFC’s trade contract in 2015 (which occurred in 2016), he farmed grey mullet for the first time (more on mullet farming in section III): If there is the trade contract, I will be willing to farm more milkfish. I have quite a big farm size with more than 10 jia of ponds. One small bit of help [i.e., the trade contract] is important to me. I cannot farm many [high-value] varieties [in freshwater ponds]. This year, I started to farm some grey mullet. It takes me two or three years to know whether I will earn or lose money. 431

Ah-shou, operating 3 jia of fish ponds, found that the guaranteed purchase price for milkfish helped him face the uncertainty of aquaculture. As discussed in chapter three, fish farmers could experience an unexpectedly poor shrimp harvest in any given year. Ah-shou participated in the trade contact beginning in 2011. He explained that the SFC’s guaranteed purchase price for milkfish helped him maintain a profit in 2014, despite the poorer shrimp harvest compared with the previous year: Fish farming is hard. It is good to earn more. Last year (2014), my shrimp harvest was not good. I earned more profit from milkfish. . . . . The pond intensity was more or less the same [in these years after I became a contracted farmer]. If there were too many fish and shrimp in the pond, they would not have enough space to grow. . . . I used the same farming method with or without the trade contract. . . . The trade contract is helpful to fish farmers because there is a contract [for the fixed milkfish price]. Other middlemen only come when I can harvest the fish [and the farm-gate price is not known until the day of harvest]. . . . I do not know whether or not the politics influences the trade contract. I do my work—farming the fish—as a fish farmer. 432

428 Ibid. 429 Chi.: zhangkong . 430 Chung-ping, a fish farmer: interview, April 20, 2015. 431 Ibid. 432 Ah-shou, a fish farmer: interview, April 20, 2015. 250

Opposition to the SFC’s trade contract existed in Tainan City. Some eligible fish farmers did not join the trade contract. Among them was Ah-der, who said that “even though there is the trade contract, fish farmers are typically making no profit ( 沒賺錢). 433 Life is the same. The trade contract . . . is a way the brokers (買辦) use China’s money to attract votes [in local elections].” 434 As the contracted fish farmers reported, they participated in the trade contract because the guaranteed purchase price, despite decreasing year by year, was above production costs. Chung-ping said, “Mr. Weng [the SFC’s director] had business ethics ( 有良心)435 . . . I do not know if he has any political ambitions. If any politicians want our votes, they need to help us.” 436 Chung-ping described his relationship with the Chinese buyers under the trade contract as a buyer–seller relationship. He emphasized the economic rather than the political interactions between the Taiwanese fish farmers and the Chinese buyers. When Chinese officials visited Xuejia, “they were potential buyers and, hence, our guests; we would not treat our guests impolitely.” 437 Ah-kuo claimed to be “the first one to raise my hand and agree to join events organized for the Chinese officials.” 438 My observation matched what these fish farmers said. One time, a group of Chinese officials made a half-day trip to Xuejia, including visiting a fish farm where they enjoyed milkfish ball soup and then visited the fish ponds. Under the SFC’s arrangement, the fish farmers were sitting around on the farm, waiting to take a group photo with the visitors. They stayed there at the farm until their “guests” left, which was after less than 30 minutes. As Ah-kuo said, the fish farmers were “ yingfu yixia ” ( 應付一下), which means they were indifferent but still wanted to offer a gesture of hospitality to the Chinese officials. 439 The SFC’s trade contract increased profits from milkfish for the above-interviewed contracted farmers. Four factors affected the farmers’ decisions regarding the trade contract. First, the price factor was important to their participation. The fish farmers compared farm-gate

433 Chi.: mei zuanqian . Source: Ah-der, a fish farmer: interview, March 1, 2015. 434 Ibid. 435 Chi.: you liangxin . 436 Chung-ping, a fish farmer: interview, April 20, 2015. 437 Ibid. 438 Ah-kuo, a fish farmer: interview, October 28, 2014. 439 Ibid. 251

prices they got from local distributors, exporters, and the SFC’s trade contract. The guaranteed purchase price offered by the SFC increased their profits. Second, the environmental factor limited the seafood species that the contracted fish farmers could keep. The freshwater environment made them unable to keep marine species that are more profitable, such as groupers. They needed to harvest milkfish by the end of autumn. If milkfish became distressed in local pond environments, the fish farmers might face the slashed farm-gate price offered by local distributors and exporters. The third and social factor, which is the SFC’s harvest arrangement, modified the fish farmers’ calculations of the costs and benefits that were affected by the economic and environmental factors in the supply chain. The SFC’s arrangement for harvesting if there were a milkfish health emergency made the fish farmers feel that the trade is fairer than that with local distributors and exporters. They found the SFC was more helpful. Fourth, although the fish farmers placed lower priority on the political factor in their decision making, it made short-term and long-term impacts on their businesses. The SFC was able to pay more than other middlemen in terms of farm-gate prices because of the agreement with its Chinese partners under the influence of the Taiwan Affairs Office. The SFC’s trade contact, which was terminated in 2016, showed that such privileges created only short-term additional profits for the contracted fish farmers. The termination of the trade contract made the fish farmers rethink what kinds of strategies they should deploy to achieve the long-term sustainability of their businesses.

II. Non-Contracted Milkfish Farmers in Simu

The majority of Taiwanese milkfish farmers are excluded from the SFC’s trade contract. To examine the ECFA’s impacts on the non-contracted fish farmers, I draw on the perspectives and experiences of Simu milkfish farmers. Before and after the Early Harvest Program, these farmers used various strategies in seafood production to sustain their livelihoods. They formulated their strategies by considering fish pond conditions, their budgets, and their techniques. Successes and failures occurred. The ECFA had varying effects on Simu fish farmers.

252

Milkfish–shrimp Polyculture Simu milkfish farmers were ineligible for the milkfish trade contract. The ECFA’s influence on their milkfish–shrimp polyculture, which is their basic form of aquaculture, was less direct in comparison with its effects on the SFC’s contracted fish farmers. Simu fish farmers continued to “ jiao fanya ” ( 交販丫), which means they sold the milkfish to any local distributors or P&F plants. If the distributors were to postpone the harvests and the milkfish were suffering health emergencies, Simu fish farmers resorted to exporters and accepted the lower farm-gate prices. In 2014, I observed six milkfish harvests in Simu. All harvests were purchased by local distributors and P&F plants. In one case, the P&F plant sent all of the milkfish to a canning factory outside of Chiayi County to produce canned milkfish. 440 In all cases, the distributors or the P&F plant owners offered a farm-gate price for the milkfish. The fish farmers had neither the intention nor the power to influence decisions about the markets on which their milkfish would be sold. They did not know and would not follow up to see which kinds of products their milkfish would be used to make. Simu fish farmers chose to transact with middlemen by considering the farm-gate price and the time they needed to wait for a middleman to buy their milkfish harvests. To the fish farmers, the higher farm-gate price was the one set for the domestic supply chain compared with that offered by exporters (which was TWD2-3/catty lower). The Simu fish farmers sold their milkfish to exporters, mainly for the North American and Middle Eastern markets, when they did not want to wait for the local distributors to buy their milkfish when they were in poor health. Some P&F plants or fish ball plants (e.g., Zushui) exported milkfish products to China. They sourced milkfish without notifying fish farmers about the destination of the fish. On these occasions, Simu fish farmers did not know whether their harvests were exported to China. Table 6.1 shows fluctuations in average production values of milkfish in three major milkfish farming counties in Taiwan. There was no trend featuring continuously rising prices for milkfish in these counties between 2011 and 2015. As I have discussed in previous chapters, changes in farm-gate prices and market prices (in the domestic market) interact with the supply

440 In 2014, milkfish canning was not recorded in official statistics. My informants said it was a small industry with little influence on milkfish distribution. 253

of and demand for milkfish in a particular period of time, seasonal limitations (especially for fish farmers in Counties Alpha and Beta), and the personal strategies of fish farmers (e.g., harvesting the market-size milkfish in early July, when the farm-gate price is high). The ECFA did not guarantee a higher farm-gate price than the price that prevailed before the Early Harvest Program was implemented. The SFC’s trade contract was an exceptional case. Other middlemen did not offer a guaranteed price. The fluctuating production values in various counties showed that a fixed guaranteed price do not benefit the middlemen, because they source milkfish from regions where they can offer a lower price at particular period of time. Some milkfish farmers take the environmental risks and harvest milkfish early or late in the harvest season. If they succeed in avoiding the death of milkfish and sell them when there is strong demand from the middlemen, they are offered the higher farm-gate price than the guaranteed price. The absence of the guaranteed price before the SFC’s trade contract, thus, was an outcome of the choices made by both the middlemen and the fish farmers.

Table 6.1. Comparison of average production values (TWD/kg) of milkfish in three counties. 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Chiayi County 67.69 70.45 87.90 72.57 64.43 62.90 56.26

Tainan City 60.66 58.96 79.52 62.82 71.39 78.32 70.88

Kaohsiung City 64.81 66.44 66.26 69.45 81.32 73.46 65.25 in South Taiwan

Taiwan 64.05 64.75 75.60 67.42 74.81 73.67 65.47 Taiwan (total 40,834 35,690 58,898 71,607 65,692 69,148 53,551 production tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes volume)

Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

254

In Chiayi County, fish farmers’ perspectives on how the ECFA could increase the farm- gate price of milkfish were similar to those of the milkfish business people. Most fish farmers had no experience in trading milkfish to the Chinese. There were two sources of information about the Chinese markets. First, the mass media reported the poor sales performance of milkfish in China (e.g., Commonwealth Magazine 2013). 441 Second, Simu fish farmers were informed by the business people during their social interactions in tea gatherings. The fish farmers developed their perspectives with no actual experience with selling milkfish inside China. Ah-lu, a Simu fish farmer, contended that Chinese consumers did not enjoy milkfish: Milkfish is included in the ECFA; the Chinese demand for milkfish is unstable. . . . The Chinese are afraid of the milkfish bones. The processed products are not so attractive. . . . The Taiwanese business people [investing in China] are the major consumers. It is hard to sell several million tonnes [of milkfish] within China at the same time. 442

Ah-qing, another Simu fish farmer and a village magistrate, reported that the Taiwan Affairs Office (China) visited Simu in 2012, but it did not match Simu with the Qinggong Co. for a milkfish trade contract. The Taiwan Affairs Office picked up Xuejia and the SFC as their partner in the milkfish trade contact. The non-contracted fish farmers argued that the impact of such a selective trade contract on them was negligible. Ah-qing commented that, “even if Taiwanese milkfish is exported to China, the quantity is too small to affect fish farmers’ production.” 443 Cultural and economic factors affected the scale of the trade contract. Po-fang, a fish farmer from Budai Township, said that “the quantity of milkfish in the SFC’s trade contract was too small [to affect the whole sector]. The Chinese consumers do not know how to appreciate milkfish and so the demand is small.” 444 The fish farmers were aware of the costs of exporting milkfish to China. The value-added tax (VAT) added to milkfish products in the normal trade route under the ECFA was a new item of cost to exporters, who had used the Petty Trade previously. 445 Exporters selling milkfish products to China did not raise farm-gate prices

441 Source: http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5047873 . 442 Ah-lu, a fish farmer: interview, January 26, 2014. 443 Ah-qing, a fish farmer: interview, July 23, 2012. 444 Po-fang, a fish farmer: interview, April 6, 2014. 445 A retired township government official and leader of a fish farmer’s association: interview, March 7, 2015. 255

between 2011 and 2015. The fish farmers knew that the new Chinese market failed to increase demand for their milkfish. Some fish farmers supported the ECFA because they benefited from rising demand for shrimp in Taiwan. Ah-shin and Zi-yi, two fish farmers, claimed that closer cross-strait economic relationships benefited their milkfish–shrimp polyculture. 446 Zi-yi explained that more Chinese tourists visited Taiwan because of the better cross-strait relations. The shrimp price kept rising in 2013 due partly to increasing demand from the growing number of Chinese tourists, who preferred including shrimp in their meals. 447 Zi-yi claimed that he farmed more white-leg shrimp because of rising demand from Chinese tourists. 448 He was satisfied with the shrimp price during the harvest season in November: Last year I harvested 9,000 catties of shrimp in total. Up to now (in November), I had harvested 7,000 catties this year. . . . My annual expenditure is around TWD200,000. My profit from milkfish and shrimp farming is TWD0.8-0.9 million each year. . . . The supply is dropping [due to the end of the harvest season] and I will keep my shrimp in the ponds. They will grow bigger and become more expensive . . . I can wait because I only need to stock new fish and shrimp next year. 449

Ah-shin, who farmed milkfish and shrimp, reported that the market price of oysters in the market rose from TWD80–100/catty to TWD150/catty in the previous year; the price of hard clams increased from TWD26/catty to TWD38/catty. 450 She attributed these rising seafood prices to the increasing number of Chinese tourists in Taiwan. Ah-shin has no savings to invest in hard clam and oyster farming. She practised milkfish–shrimp polyculture and enjoyed the increasing shrimp prices. She claimed to benefit from the tourism due to the closer cross-strait economic relations. My interviewees in Chiayi County did not believe that the Early Harvest Program benefited their milkfish farm-gate prices. They concluded that the Chinese market was not an ideal market for them to explore. Food cultures differed between China and Taiwan. Milkfish

446 Zi-yi and Ah-shin, fish farmers: conversation, April 1, 2014. 447 Zi-yi, a fish farmer: conversation, April 8, 2014. 448 Ibid., April 10, 2014. 449 Ibid., November 8, 2014. 450 Zi-yi and Ah-shin, fish farmers: conversation, April 1, 2014. 256

was not yet accepted in China. The closer cross-strait relationships influenced the practice of polyculture because fish farmers sought more profits from shrimp. Shrimp as a more global product was in demand among both Taiwanese consumers and Chinese tourists. The function of milkfish as “labour fish” increased the survival rate of white-leg shrimp under polyculture. The Taiwanese produced a high volume of milkfish targeted to the domestic market. When they needed to export milkfish, they faced the problem of making it a popular seafood in China and other countries. Facing competition from other seafood products in China, milkfish traders used the ineffective strategy of presenting milkfish as a high-value commodity. The weak sales kept the farm-gate prices for exports lower than those set by local distributors. Comparing the export and domestic markets, Taiwanese fish farmers chose to supply milkfish to the latter.

Diversification of Fish Species and Products According to the 2010 census, 40.6% of the fish ponds in Chiayi County practise monoculture and 54.2% practise polyculture. 451 Simu fish farmers practised milkfish–shrimp polyculture and used some ponds to farm other high-value species, including grouper (monoculture), grey mullet (polyculture), mud crabs (polyculture), and hard clams (polyculture). Photo 6.1 shows that Simu fish farmers farmed a variety of species. This could be done with or without milkfish as the “labour fish.” If they had sufficient money to invest, fish farmers included any of the above-mentioned high-value species. Other factors affecting their decisions included the salinity of the pond water, the size of the ponds, the potential profits at the time of harvest, and labour costs. For example, a pond for hard clam farming must be at least 3 jia with a depth of less than 1 m. Such a pond is less favourable to intensive farming practices needed to raise grouper, grey mullet, or shrimp. Hard clam farmers keep about 500 milkfish per pond to lower their labour costs, because the milkfish consume the algae that block the sunlight from reaching the hard clams on the pond bottom. Without milkfish, the hard clam farmers need to clear the algae manually or by using algaecide in their daily routines. In grouper ponds,

451 Directorate-General of Budget (2010). Source: http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html 257

monoculture is practised because otherwise the grouper would eat all the milkfish or shrimp. The depth of the ponds is about 2 m, which suits grouper as benthic predators.

Photo 6.1. Major areas of hard clam, grouper, and mullet farming in Simu and the adjacent village. Note: Fish farmers practise milkfish–shrimp polyculture in other fish ponds. They add mud crabs in more saline ponds (close to the west coast). Source: Map data © Google Earth 2017, Chiayi County, Taiwan; modified by the author.

Under the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program, live, fresh, and ice-chilled seafood are exported to China without tariffs. After negotiating with the Chinese government, the Council of Agriculture highlighted live grouper, fresh or ice-chilled grey mullet, and frozen milkfish (whole fish or fillets) as the major species that could benefit Taiwanese fish farmers. Table 6.2 shows the export value of these items. Live grouper contributed most of the export value. The mullet trade was zero. Mullet roe, which was considered a processed product, was excluded from the Early Harvest Program. However, mullet roe production still benefited Simu fish farmers because of the high price of salt-dried mullet roe in the Taiwanese and Japanese markets.

258

Table 6.2. Values (in US millions) of Taiwanese seafood exports to China under the ECFA. 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Live grouper 42.07 102.05 127.92 123.29 155.47 122.32 Fresh or ice-chilled mullet 0 0 0 0 0 0 Frozen milkfish fillets 0 0.04 0.43 0.62 n/a n/a Frozen milkfish (whole fish) 0.07 2.44 2.76 3.80 n/a n/a Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (various years). 452

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that my informants in coastal southwest Taiwan, who are milkfish farmers, have farmed grouper and grey mullet. Mullet farming is more popular than grouper farming. Mullet is a subtropical species while grouper is a tropical species. Simu fish farmers preferred farming mullet, which benefit from a lower risk of death in winter, when the temperature drops to 10˚C. The farm sizes and number of labourers have no correlations with the selection of grouper farming. Rather, some Simu fish farmers keep grouper if their farms access seawater. The prospect of increasing the farm-gate price for grouper under the ECFA changed fish farmers’ practices. They used at least one pond to farm grouper. In daily routines, they patrolled both milkfish and grouper ponds. During harvests, they paid harvest workers to come. Grouper farming was not an option for the SFC’s contracted fish farmers, whose farms were located in areas where highly saline water is hard to access. Mullet farming could take place in both freshwater and salty-water ponds. Mullet farming techniques were important in enabling the fish farmers to derive profits from mullet roe. Some Simu fish farmers obtained the technique of mullet roe production, which induced them to farm grey mullet to diversify their incomes. Interviewees reported that Simu villagers had farmed grey mullet for mullet roe for more than two decades. The farmers’ acquisition of the technique of mullet roe production or grouper farming became key to the fish farmers’ decisions as to whether to farm these species, which required them to invest more money than was needed for milkfish–shrimp polyculture.

452 Source: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSC3030F/FSC3030F . 259

Table 6.3. Farm size and average number of labourers in a sample of fish farmers who farmed milkfish in 2014. (n= 31 in southwest Taiwan; 19 of them are living in Simu) Farm size Average Number of Number of fish Number of fish (jia ) number fish farmers who have farmers who have of farmers experience in mullet experience in grouper labourers farming (in addition farming (in addition to milkfish and white- to milkfish and leg shrimp) white-leg shrimp) 1– 5 1.34 22 9 5 6–15 1.75 6 2 0 15–30 2.83 3 2 2 Note: I use 0.5 as the number of part-time labourers (those who have other jobs but help in their leisure time). Source: Author’s field data.

Table 6.4. Fish/seafood varieties farmed by a sample of fish farmers who farmed milkfish in 2014. (n= 31 in southwest Taiwan; 19 of them are living in Simu) Farmed variety (any year Number of Fish between 2012 and 2014) farmers Milkfish 31 Grouper 7 Mullet 11 White-leg shrimp 31 Source: Author’s field data.

260

Grouper Farming Fish farmers in southwest Taiwan had two decades of experience with grouper farming. 453 In 2014, there were 6,129.57 ha of fish ponds in Chiayi County. According to information collected from the Chiayi County government, grouper farming occupied 169.65 ha (156.82 ha for monoculture) in the county, in comparison with 2381.51 ha of milkfish farms (and 2,261.8 ha in polyculture). 454 Their selection of grouper species was related to market size and logistical arrangements controlled by exporters. Nearly all exporters are based in south Taiwan. To maximize the quantity transported from a fish farm to south Taiwan for export, they required fish farmers to sell them over 40,000 orange-spotted grouper ( 青斑)455 each time. If a grouper farmer keeps fewer than this number, he or she needs to wait for exporters to purchase the grouper when the exporters buy groupers from other farms. The grouper may then grow oversized. The market size of orange-spotted groupers for China, the major market, was 0.6–1 kg in 2014. Simu fish farmers kept giant grouper ( 龍膽石斑; photo 6.2), 456 the market sizes of which could be at least 25 catties. They waited until exporters came to buy the giant groupers.

Photo 6.2 A giant grouper. Source: Author’s photograph (2015).

453 Chapter 7 will focus on the grouper supply chain and its relationships with the ECFA. 454 Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (2014). 455 Chi.: qingban ; sci.: Epinephelus coioides . 456 Chi.: longdan shiban ; sci.: Epinephelus lanceolatus . 261

Simu fish farmers feed giant groupers with milkfish heads to save costs. In Taiwan, grouper farmers prefer feeding fish instead of pellets to the grouper for the feed conversion rate and flavour. Simu fish farmers bought milkfish heads from local P&F plants, which asked for TWD10/catty. The cost was lower than that involved in using wild-caught mackerel to feed giant grouper, as grouper farmers in south Taiwan did. The cost of mackerel was TWD30/kg (TWD18/catty). Before the ECFA was signed in 2010, the farm-gate price for giant grouper offered by exporters had reached TWD400/catty. Between 2011 and 2012, the price dropped to TWD250/catty, which was still attractive to fish farmers. The high price attracted a few Simu fish farmers to start farming giant grouper. They found that the farm-gate price for grouper dropped from 2013 levels. This drop in price caused three out of five of my informants to stop farming groupers, including Ah-lu: In the first two years of the implementation of the ECFA, the price [of giant grouper] was stable. In the third year (2013), the price dropped dramatically. . . . The Taiwanese government said that the profit margin of farming giant grouper was good. At the end, fish farmers need to take care of themselves. . . . The Chinese do not guarantee the price [for grouper]. In the first two years, one catty of giant grouper can be sold at TWD250/catty. It was TWD180 per catty now. If one farms other kinds of grouper, the farm-gate price has decreased by TWD30/catty [in average]. . . . The Taiwanese government claimed that the price of grouper would be very good after the ECFA was implemented. We farmed the grouper and the price dropped after two years. Our government just let us face this situation. . . . The Chinese offered us a good time on purpose during the first two years of the ECFA and then kept the price low. 457

One day in March 2014, I was watching news reports on the Sunflower Movement, the anti- ECFA rally, with Ah-qing, the milkfish farmer who farmed giant grouper from 2012. He told me that “Ma Ying-jeou cheats me. He said grouper could bring fish farmers more profits.” 458 These fish farmers were attracted by the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program to farm groupers. The Taiwanese government under President Ma’s administration linked the ECFA to the promise of better livelihoods for fish farmers. Grouper’s high value was the major evidence of this linkage.

457 Ibid. 458 Fish farmer: conversation, March 20, 2014. 262

However, declining farm-gate prices for grouper species, as the fish farmers experienced, lowered their confidence in the government and the ECFA. They no longer saw grouper farming as the major means to sustain their livelihoods. Lack of skill and experience was another factor that discouraged Simu fish farmers from continuing to farm grouper. Grouper was relatively a new farmed variety to Simu fish farmers, who found that their technique was not good enough to maintain profits generated from farming grouper over consecutive seasons. The long time periods needed to farm giant groupers prevented them from making profits from milkfish–shrimp polyculture, which was an alternative and more stable source of income. For example, Zi-yi converted one of his five ponds from milkfish–shrimp polyculture to giant grouper monoculture between 2010 and early 2014. He bought 6,000 giant grouper fry (TWD30 each), but only 30 survived into January 2014. He lost TWD0.2 million. He considered himself “inexperienced” in grouper farming. 459 He sold all of the giant grouper to friends and relatives, who paid visits to Simu before the Chinese New Year in 2014. He resumed farming milkfish and shrimp in that pond. Grouper is more prone to fish disease than milkfish, especially at the fry stage. For example, grouper fry are environmentally sensitive to such an extent that farmers do not welcome outsiders to visit their indoor nursery facilities lest they introduce a disease. Over the past two decades, some people in Simu and its adjacent village became specialized in grouper hatching and fry nurseries. These two practices required specialized skills, experience, and luck, because the fry would die suddenly if there was an outbreak of Nervous Necrosis Virus ( 神經病 毒)460 or Iridovirus ( 虹彩病毒). 461 In 2012, Ah-yuan, later the owner of Zu-shui, took back one pond that he had previously leased out. He invested in building an indoor grouper fry nursery and passed it to his two sons, including Li-an (later Zu-shui’s general manager). However, their technique and luck were not good enough. They failed to keep the fry healthy enough to reach 2 inches in length. They could not sell enough fry to the grow-out ponds to make a profit. They had closed down this business by 2014 and farmed white-leg shrimp in two other ponds instead.

459 Zi-yi, a fish farmer: conversation, April 8, 2014. 460 Chi.: shenjing bingdu . 461 Chi.: hongcai bingdu. 263

Both cost–benefit calculations and environmental factors affected whether a Simu fish farmer kept farming giant grouper. Ah-chia explained the extra risks of farming grouper in Simu: We do not have enough ponds to regularly move the orange-spotted groupers from one pond to another [to keep the grouper living in a good-quality water environment and maintain their health], unlike what the fish farmers in Pingtung [South Taiwan] do. It would cost us too much to divide all ponds [larger than 1 jia ] into a number of smaller ponds [like the 0.2 jia ponds in Pingtung]. 462

Ah-chia was correct that the number of ponds affected grouper farmers’ operations. This created risks for giant grouper farmers in Simu. For example, Dai-en rented one pond to farm giant grouper in 2013. The farm-gate price kept dropping after that and he was waiting to sell the giant grouper at high prices. In mid-2014, he noticed that the pond water quality deteriorated, but he had no other ponds available to which he could move the groupers to give them a better living environment. In February 2015, more than a hundred giant grouper died accidentally and could not be sold. He suffered financial losses that his profits from milkfish and shrimp farming (documented in chapter three) could not cover. Three markets for Taiwanese groupers include the domestic market, international market, and local recreational farms. Although exporting to China is the major practice in the Taiwanese grouper sector, Ah-chia developed his market strategy to sell giant grouper to recreational fish farms: I keep more than one thousand giant grouper. I sold 200 to the recreational fish farms last week. There are different requirements when exporters [to China] and these recreational fish farms purchase giant grouper. The former needs the grouper to be farmed in brackish-water ponds with salinity as high as 25 ppt (close to seawater salinity: 35 ppt). 463 However, the feed conversion rate of giant grouper is generally lower in this environment [and so the production cost is higher]. I prefer salinity of less than 10 ppt. . . . The grouper grow faster and are less prone to diseases. If I sell the giant grouper to the recreational fish farms, they are fine with all sizes, such as five catties, ten catties, and twenty catties. They purchase the groupers if they have no skin diseases. They prefer that groupers be kept in ponds that have a middle range of salinity (for grouper that are both healthy and lack a muddy flavour) [just like mine]. If exporters set the farm-gate price at TWD180/catty, the recreational fish farms will purchase the

462 Ah-chia, a fish farmer: interview, November 20, 2014. 463 The salinity measuring unit is ppt (parts-per-thousand). The average ocean salinity is 35 ppt ( Narragansett Bay Commission 2009). Source: http://omp.gso.uri.edu/ompweb/doee/science/physical/chsal1.htm . 264

same fish at TWD170/catty. They know that the exporters want only giant grouper that weight over 25 catties. The recreational fish farms buy all sizes of the fish. . . . I have some friends in Pingtung who could sell the orange-spotted grouper online by themselves if the grouper exceed the market size. They freeze the fish for sale. We cannot do so because we are too poor to afford to pay P&F plants to process and freeze the fish. . . . I cannot take the risk of losing all my money if I take the wrong step [of selling frozen grouper to no one]. 464

Simu fish farmers commonly agree that grouper farmers in south Taiwan have a better environment (i.e., a tropical climate) and easier access to the market (because exporters are based there). Simu fish farmers practised milkfish–shrimp polyculture for their basic income. The ECFA attracted some of them to practise grouper farming, but this brought only short-term benefits for their livelihoods. The failure of grouper farming, however, did not cause the collapse of the local economy. Simu fish farmers were resilient; they resumed milkfish–shrimp polyculture in the same ponds in which they abandoned grouper farming. They generated new income in the next production cycle of milkfish–shrimp polyculture. Their resilience is supported by their polyculture techniques and the high value of shrimp when grouper farm-gate prices dropped.

Grey Mullet Farming

Compared with grouper, which is a tropical fish, grey mullet as a subtropical species was considered a high-value variety that was more suitable to being farmed in southwest Taiwan. This gave an additional profitable choice to fish farmers, who produced mullet roe. Ah-chia practised polyculture with grey mullet, milkfish, and white-leg shrimp, while also practising monoculture with giant grouper to diversify his income. Ten fish farmers specializing in grey mullet, milkfish, and white-leg shrimp polyculture did not farm grouper. Most of the processed mullet roe is sold to Japan or inside Taiwan (Chang and Chu 2003). Simu fish farmers wanted the mullet roe, the most valuable part of the mullet, instead of the whole fish that was included in the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program. The fish bodies were sold as cheaply as TWD10 per catty as food for the national army. The fish farmers making most of their profits from mullet, shrimp,

464 Ah-chia, a fish farmer: interview, November 20, 2014. 265

and milkfish were much less affected by the ECFA in comparison with Simu farmers practising grouper farming and the SFC’s contracted fish farmers. Mullet roe processing has taken place in Taiwan for at least four centuries (Cao 2006[1979]). In the past three decades, grey mullet (photo 6.3) became one of the fish species to be farmed in increasing numbers in Simu. Although Taiwanese marine biologists announced the success of the artificial propagation of grey mullet in 1976 (Lin & Hsiao 2008), Simu fish farmers stocked wild-caught mullet fry, which are heartier than the propagated fry. Some Simu fish farmers had learned the technique of using feed to turn the proportion of female fry from 60% to 90%. They did so to maximize the amount of mullet roe to be taken from the fish bodies at the end of the production cycle (2–3 years). Ah-chia commented that “the returns on investment of grey mullet and giant grouper are actually close to each other.” 465 According to information collected from the Chiayi County government, 209.8ha in the county were used for mullet farming in 2012. 466

Photo 6.3. A milkfish (top) and a mullet (bottom). Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

465 Ah-chia, a fish farmer: interview, November 20, 2014. 466 Source: internal document collected from the Chiayi County Government, August 1, 2012. 266

Simu fish farmers have acquired the techniques involved in selecting mullet species that produce marketable roe. According to Ah-fu, a Simu fish farmer with two decades of mullet farming experience, there are six kinds of mullet fry available in Taiwan and three of them “do not have roe” after growing up in nature. 467 The other three kinds of mullet can produce roe as a commodity. 468 Two varieties are called tuā-pok (大鉑) and siáu-pok (小鉑) in Hokkien. They become sexually mature after two years and the body size can reach two catties. The other variety is tuā-kim-lân (大金鱗), which become sexually mature after four years. The farmed mullet can be harvested beginning in mid-November. Every mullet farmer has an exact date that he or she thinks is the right time to harvest the mullet. If the fish farmers miss the harvest season, the mullet release the eggs and their ovaries become small and non-marketable. The fish farmers will need to wait another year to harvest the mullet. Simu fish farmers use feed to control the quality and quantity of mullet roe in the farming process. Each mullet fry cost TWD1–2 in 2014. Fish farmers raise varying combinations of species. Ah-fu stocked 6,000–8,000 mullet and 1,000 milkfish per jia in 2014. By comparison, another fish farmer stocked 2,000 mullet, 6,000 milkfish, and one million shrimp per jia . Fish farmers feed the mullet with feed pellets, which may vary in quality, ranging from TWD300 to TWD1000 per pack (30kg). Most mullet farmers buy fish fry in January, when the fry are available along Taiwan’s coast, and keep them in one pond. They pay harvest workers to help distribute the one-year-old fry to other ponds, where the fry will grow until the harvest. The distribution takes place in winter before the fish farmers become busy with milkfish–shrimp polyculture in other ponds. After the distribution, the fish farmers started feeding pellets containing hormones for three months to ensure that 90% of the mullet become female. They then change to another type of feed to provide nutrients to encourage the mullet to produce eggs. The mullet production cycle lasts between two and five years, depending on the kind of mullet that is farmed. Simu fish farmers prefer harvesting mullet at the end of the second or third year. The longer they keep the mullet, the higher the risk they face because they must keep investing in a pond before making a profit. The farming methods associated with the use of

467 Ah-fu, a fish farmer: interview, February 19, 2014. 468 Ibid. 267

veterinary additives and food safety affect fish farmers’ mullet-keeping practices. In Chiayi County, some fish farmers, especially ecological fish farmers, farm mullet fry only until they are one year old and sell them to other mullet farmers. They explain that they do not want to use feed that includes hormones, which as mentioned above is a common practice for changing the sex of mullet to female at the beginning of the second year of farming. The fish farmers producing mullet roe argued that the hormones are added in the early growth stage of the mullet. By the time they produce the roe, the withdrawal period has passed. The timing of the harvest is important because a mullet farmer will lose nearly all of his or her investment if the harvested mullet contain no sexually mature roe. Experience and observation are important. Ah-fu described how he observed that as the roe mature in the fish’s bodies, “the mullet eat the algae and the water turns milky. The mullet swim in circles [whirling].” 469 Other fish farmers would catch two fish and check to see whether there was enough roe to harvest. If they found the roe sacs were not large enough, they would keep the mullet until the end of the third year of the production cycle. Only if they could harvest the roe would they make a profit. Ah-fu said mullet farming is a business “with high cost”: one two-year production cycle cost him TWD1.6 million. His profit from selling mullet roe in 2014 was TWD1.7 million. 470 He used half of his profits to reinvest in the next year of mullet farming. The fish farmers feed the mullet with the hormone-containing feed between February and June of the second year of the production cycle. From mid-November on, the harvest can occur and the fish farmers pay harvest workers to harvest the fish. In Simu, there were two locations that they rented out for transactions in 2014. A broker was responsible for contacting buyers to buy the harvested mullet roe from fish farmers. The buyers are the processors who make the mullet roe products. The broker received 2% of the transaction as profit. The fish farmers paid for workers to extract the roe from the mullet (Photos 6.4a and 6.4b). The workers sort the mullet roe sacs by size into baskets. In 2014, the farm-gate price of mullet roe that weighed 5 taels (1 catty = 16 taels) was $780/catty. 471 Both the fish farmers and the buyers keep their eyes on the mullet roe to make sure they are put in the right baskets. They remove irregularly shaped roe

469 Ah-fu, a fish farmer: interview, April 14, 2015. 470 Ibid. 471 A transaction of fresh mullet roe, field note: November 17, 2014. 268

(photo 6.5). An ideal roe sac needs to comprise two parts and form a “pear” shape, as photo 6.3b shows. Table 6.5 shows the categories of the mullet roe based on these standards.

Photo 6.4a & b. Cutting open the abdomen and taking out the roe from a mullet. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

Photo 6.5. Mullet roe in irregular shapes. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

269

Table 6.5. Categories of mullet roe in farm-gate transactions. Category Features 單 (odd) 472 Irregular shape; the look of the final product will be unattractive 大 (big) 473 The best quality and in “pear” shape; same colour (golden) everywhere 小 (small) 474 Too small; served in local restaurants 半油 (banyou ; The worst; the colour is uneven; too soft in “half oil”) texture Source: Author’s field data on 20 November 2014.

In the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program, ice-chilled and frozen mullet are included as one item for tariff elimination. However, in Taiwan, the fish farmers wanted the roe. The mullet, after their roe are taken out, were sold to P&F plants at TWD10/catty. Mrs. Fang, a Simu P&F plant owner, sold mullet to the Taiwanese military and restaurants in Hong Kong. Ah-fu reported that some mullet are processed as fish floss and sold in the United States. The ECFA’s tariff elimination thus has no direct relation to Simu fish farmers’ production of mullet or mullet roe. No secondary data are available indicating the volume of Taiwanese mullet roe exported to China. News reports showed that the volume of Taiwanese mullet roe available was small in 2015: “The Taiwanese middlemen are not enthusiastic to market the mullet roe in China because their sales in Taiwan are very good. Up to now, traders may merchandise some mullet roe to China for sale. . . . XXX (an official) from the Council of Agriculture (Taiwan) invited the Chinese to visit Taiwan and bring them back home as souvenirs” ( China Times 2015). 475 The processors source globally to make mullet roe products for the market. They source mullet roe from Taiwanese fish farmers and traders who collect wild-caught mullet from Brazil, the U.S., China, Argentina, and Taiwan. There are two major methods for processing roe— machine-drying and sun-drying. According to Mr. Li, a mullet farmer and processor, in Counties

472 Chi.: dan . 473 Chi.: da . 474 Chi.: xiao . 475 Source: http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150214001040-260301 . 270

Alpha and Beta the long dry winter allows processors to use the sun-drying method. 476 They first use moulds to shape the roe. Salt is added to the roe for preservation and seasoning. The roe are stored in a freezer during the weeks of processing (the number of weekdays depends on the weather). During the day, the roe are exposed to the sun and turned over to accelerate the drying process. In the evening, the processors use rocks or weights to compress the roe to squeeze out water. The technique of processing mullet roe enhances the saltiness, flavour, and chewiness of the final product. Nearly all mullet roe products are vacuum-packed before they are sent to markets (Photo 6.5). They can be found in supermarkets, souvenir shops, or online platforms. In 2014, 62 tonnes of mullet roe were processed in Taiwan and the value was TWD102,711,000 (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014). In Taiwan, high-quality mullet roe make gifts welcomed by friends, relatives, and business partners. In night markets, cheaper mullet roe is diced and sold together with diced turnips or apples as snacks. To promote locally farmed mullet roe products as high-value gifts and commodities, the Taiwanese government has organized annual national contests since 2009 (Photo 6.6). Mullet farmers and processors compete with processors who source globally. The mullet roe supply chain is therefore another case showing global–local dynamics at work in Taiwanese aquaculture.

476 Mr. Li, a mullet farmer and processor: interview, January 10, 2015. 271

Photo 6.6. Mullet roe products in a national contest. Source: Author’s photograph (2014).

There are two major risks involved in mullet farming. First, Simu fish farmers expect the increasing production volume of mullet roe in Taiwan to lead to a dropping price in the short term. “Every decade, the production volume [of mullet roe] will reach a peak and the price will fall. It takes three years for recovery. During the eighth or ninth year, I start stocking new mullet until the eleventh year. I use this method to regulate my output and maintain a profit,” 477 Ah-fu said. Fish farmers also found fish diseases in mullet, especially when they practised mullet monoculture: “I practise the polyculture of mullet with milkfish to help mullet get rid of the sea lice. I stock some shrimp too. I do not farm crabs because the veterinary drugs applied to mullet would kill crabs.” 478 Fish farmers observed the pond and fish conditions to determine if they needed any treatment. They did not so avoid the overuse of veterinary drugs and antibiotics. Ah- chia described the conditions of two ponds of grey mullet: Some mullet are infected by Nocardia seriolae (奴卡氏菌症), 479 which caused a high mortality rate. This year, I feel unlucky that I observed the outbreak in two ponds. In the past, I would take the samples to the fish clinic for diagnosis. I have

477 Ah-fu, a fish farmer: interview, April 14, 2015. 478 Ibid., February 19, 2014. 479 Chi.: nukashi junzheng . 272

the experience now. I do not need to bring the samples to the fish clinic. If the mullet have the symptoms [in which their backbones are bent] for two days, they may just suffocate. If they have it for a longer period, they are infected by the disease. 480

Some fish farmers were less positive about the use of veterinary drugs. In 2014, Ah-lu farmed milkfish, white-leg shrimp, and grey mullet in three ponds (about 4 jia ). In August, his grey mullet, which were then in the second year of farming, were infected by Streptococcosis (鏈球 菌). 481 He said, the “drug is a solution for an emergency situation. I prefer to let them die if they need to. I have used probiotics to stabilize the water quality.” 482 Not all Simu fish farmers can farm grey mullet. Zi-yi and Ah-shin tried mullet farming but they failed. They grumbled that “some fish farmers just let you fail and tell you the technique afterwards.” The loss of their investment caused them to stop farming grey mullet, leaving them to earn a profit mainly from shrimp and milkfish. In comparison with their practice regarding milkfish–shrimp polyculture farming, Simu fish farmers might keep some mullet farming secrets. This might be a personal strategy to hurt competitors to keep the price of mullet roe high. To Simu fish farmers, farming a species with which they are familiar, knowing its traits and favourite environmental conditions, helps their businesses be profitable: I do not farm grouper. I have the technique to harvest my mullet around November 11, when the mullet roe is big enough. I farm milkfish, grey mullet, and white-leg shrimp. In this area, grey mullet, hard clams, and grouper are high- value species. I do not farm grouper because I do not dare to do so. I farmed grey mullet for two decades and I am doing well so I do not want to change species. Grouper farming is actually easier. Farming grey mullet involves a higher [reliance on] technique. People say it involves 70% luck and 30% technique. I say 70% technique. I use half of my profits to invest in the next cycle of farming. 483

These examples of grouper and mullet farming suggest that Simu fish farmers have developed individual practices in aquaculture to adapt to environmental conditions, their preferred operational scales, and the available varieties in their fish pond environment. Their

480 Ah-chia, a fish farmer: interview, April 10, 2015. 481 Chi.: lianqiujun . 482 Ah-lu, a fish farmer: interview, August 23, 2014. 483 Ah-fu, a fish farmer: interview, April 14, 2015. 273

choices are not related to only one single market (China) for a seafood variety. The fish farmers take the global market for various seafood varieties into account. They need experience, skill, and good fortune to generate a profit from any new species. Without the influence of the SFC’s contract or the significant rise in the milkfish farm-gate price after the ECFA was implemented, some Simu fish farmers have responded to the ECFA by farming giant grouper, but its farm-gate price dropped from 2013 to a level that fish farmers consider to be unprofitable. Others have generated more profit from shrimp or mullet roe, which have maintained high values over the years. Individual Simu fish farmers succeeded in making a profit by producing mullet roe, while some failed. The ECFA’s Early Harvest Program did not directly impact the mullet sector in terms of price or trade volume.

III. Local Job and Business Opportunities

Other than selling milkfish, grouper, or grey mullet, some of which may be exported to China, the fish farmers in southwest Taiwan had various sources of income to support their livelihoods (Table 6.6). All of them used automatic feed dispensers and rode mopeds to patrol their farms. These technologies shortened the time needed for pond management, enabling them to take on off-farm jobs to increase their incomes. Off-farm jobs in southwest Taiwan include those related to the aquaculture sector or the local economy that support people’s daily lives. These jobs or business opportunities include processing, catering, government administration, aquaculture equipment, harvesting, driving, brokering, etc. They practise milkfish–shrimp polyculture together with other jobs or businesses to diversify their sources of income and support their rural quality of life.

274

Table 6.6. Access of fish farmers to off-farm sources of income in southwest Taiwan. (N= 31 in southwest Taiwan; 19 of them are living in Simu) Number of off- Number of farm sources of fish income farmers 0 13 1 17 2 1 Source: Author’s field data.

In Budai, I heard that fish farmers preferred their rural life with its lower cost of living and decent income from aquaculture. Ah-hua said, “the ECFA does not affect my life. I enjoy staying in the village, hiking and playing tennis. . . . I earn enough to sustain this lifestyle, by selling milkfish to local distributors and the wet market as well as selling frozen shrimp online [TWD250/catty].” 484 He developed a personal strategy for selling milkfish at higher prices. Milkfish is a fish that he farmed to cover the production cost of a pond. He farmed shrimp to make a profit. He also caught some milkfish when they were smaller and sold them in the local wet market. They could be sold at TWD80/catty “because their flesh had better texture and was more delicious.” 485 His wife was a vendor who sold milkfish in a local wet market. They developed a local consumer network that was extended to customers’ relatives in urban areas. They used courier services to deliver frozen shrimp to these customers. Off-farm jobs are available in Budai. Among them is administration at the local level. Fish farmers can run in local elections to become village magistrates. More educated fish farmers can join the civil service or fishermen associations. Because they work inside the Budai Township and minimize their commute time, they can look after the fish ponds outside of working hours. A female fish farmer who was twice elected village magistrate emphasized the diverse opportunities in aquaculture:

484 Ah-hua, a fish farmer: interview, April 16, 2014. 485 Ibid. 275

My deceased husband passed 10.5 jia in Beiman to my sons. There are eight ponds and we stock 7,000 milkfish annually in each. We stock 5–6 million shrimp in total in these ponds. We keep 80,000–100,000 milkfish over the winter [which is a practice that saves the cost of buying fish fry of 6–8 inches during the prime milkfish stocking time in April]. I help them to manage the ponds. My sons are also shrimp dealers. I use my time after fish farming to serve the community. 486

Being a village magistrate earned her an extra source of stable income while she could contribute to the community by keeping it functioning, for example by maintaining street lights and improving the living environment. Simu villagers created sources of income within their community. Ah-shin, a widower living with his son, who was unwilling to become a fish farmer, rented out two ponds in Tainan City to a hard clam farmer. She was 62 years old and decided to commute a shorter distance every day for pond management. She rented two ponds closer to her house to farm white-leg shrimp and milkfish. She opened her living room to neighbours to play mahjong and got some income from this business. She was a worker in a local catering service specializing in banquets within the community during religious festivals (which occur at least once a month) and weddings. Other fish farmers’ spouses run small businesses in the village. These businesses provided them with flexible working hours to help maintain fish farm routines. The potential for creating income sources offered opportunities to villagers who were less skillful in fish farming to stay in the village and earn a living. Ah-ai, the sister of Ah-shin, lost her investment in fish farming because her technique was not good. She became a shrimp dealer and used her profit to invest in one pond rented by the hard clam farmer (who was the tenant of Ah-shin), when he wanted to expand his operational scale. She could share part of the profits made by the farmer from that particular pond. Ah-ai also developed a business with her son, selling frozen shrimp and milkfish products purchased from other P&F and fish ball plants. They use courier services to deliver the products from Simu to other areas in Taiwan. Such non-farm economic activities allow milkfish farmers to support their livelihoods and rural lifestyle. If they had not mastered the technique of farming mullet or grouper, or did not want to take the risk, they could practise basic milkfish–shrimp polyculture and engage in the

486 Ah-qing, a fish farmer and village magistrate: interview, April 1, 2014. 276

local economy. I argue that the impacts of the ECFA on these non-contracted Simu fish farmers are weaker than those on the contracted fish farmers. I observed that they used various opportunities to generate income to support their livelihoods, on which the ECFA created no direct impacts. The Taiwanese government highlighted the positive impacts of the ECFA on Taiwanese aquaculture. In actual practice, Taiwanese fish farmers sustained their aquaculture with diverse strategies that benefited from political, economic, ecological, and social conditions. The ECFA as a single free trade policy does not determine the success or failure of fish farmers’ businesses.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter examined the ECFA’s impacts on milkfish farmers. The farm-gate price of the milkfish is important to these fish farmers. In the SFC’s trade contract, the contracted farmers earned more from their assigned quotas and the guaranteed purchase price. They were affected by political influence from cross-strait relations and local election politics that could end the trade contract. Most non-contracted fish farmers continued to sell their fish to either local distributors or exporters. There was no evidence that the supply chain had changed under the ECFA or led to changes in the farm-gate price for milkfish. A few of my informants were able to sell grouper at increasing prices, which was made possible under the ECFA tariff removal. Some had learned the technique of farming grey mullet to produce mullet roe before the ECFA was signed. The case study of Simu shows that fish farmers understand that trade liberalization is risky and they have prepared multiple strategies for the setbacks in this process. Besides the government programs mentioned in chapter four, the community provides resources for them to become more economically stable. The fish farmers attempted to take advantage of trade liberalization (i.e., the ECFA in this case) and simultaneously diversify their sources of income. In this way, they prevented the loss of livelihood in case of negative impacts from the trade liberalization. They not only selected various seafood products as alternatives to milkfish export, but they also created various business and job opportunities that were not in conflict with fish farming. As well, they learned different farming knowledge and skills so that they could include other types of fish in their production. These multiple strategies have enhanced the resiliency of

277

Taiwanese fish farmers. Their acquisition of scientific, local, and market knowledge, as stated in the previous chapters, is key to their farm operations and responses to the global and domestic markets.

278

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GROUPER SECTOR UNDER THE ECFA

This chapter examines the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture by investigating the cross-strait trade in and market diversification of Taiwanese grouper. I present the perspectives of grouper farmers and other stakeholders (i.e., brokers, exporters, P&F plant owners, government officials, and scientists) on the ECFA Early Harvest Program. I also investigate the relationship between the grouper trade and environmental sustainability. Taiwanese fish farmers, government officials, and business people (exporters and P&F plant owners) have explored how to balance the natural resources used to produce groupers and other farmed seafood; Taiwanese aquaculture is intertwined with the ecosystem, trade, and fish farmers’ livelihoods. Diverse production and marketing practices have emerged in Taiwan to achieve aquaculture sustainability. Anthropologists have richly documented the globalization of high-value seafood, such as reef fish, salmon, lobster, and bluefin tuna, in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., Bestor 2004; Fabinyi 2016; Fabinyi et al. 2012; Lien 2015). Growing demand for seafood on the part of Chinese consumers has generated a range of impacts on export countries. Fabinyi at el. (2012) found, for example, that coastal livelihoods in Southeast Asia have relied on commercial fisheries, which has subsequently led to overfishing. Clam and lobster imports from North America to China were monitored by Chinese authorities, reflecting tightened food safety regulations after a series of incidents in China (Fabinyi 2016). Political factors have also complicated countries’ trade relations with China. Fabinyi and Liu (2016) noted that the anti-corruption campaign that started in China in late 2012 included a crackdown on government officials’ consumption of luxury seafood with public funding; this campaign changed foreign traders’ practices to select less- expensive alternatives for China. Fabinyi and Liu stressed that governance and consumers’ preferences are interrelated factors which affect the seafood trade and hence global business strategies (ibid.). I extend the above discussion to the cross-strait trade in grouper, the most heavily exported farmed seafood from Taiwan to China, to explore the strategies of Taiwanese fish farmers and business people. Ethnographic studies on the Taiwanese experience with neoliberalism have examined individual agency in light of changing political, economic, and social relations (Huang and Chen

279

2016). Huang (2016: 1) argues that Taiwan has experienced neoliberalism in the form of accelerated flows of capital and technology since the late 1970s, as evidenced by Taiwan’s participation in global supply chains and rapid development of technology and infrastructure, which breaks down communities as relatively closed systems. Local communities have been reconstructed and community members have adopted various identities simultaneously. Global capitalism intervenes in every part of the daily lives of the Taiwanese. Other studies have shown that Taiwanese identities have become fluid and linked to global–local dynamics (Chuang 2016; Li 2016). In addition, personal networks are not limited to local communities, but also cross geographical boundaries (ibid.). In his study of the sock industry in a rural community in Taiwan, Li (2016: 262–263) argues that local people have become entrepreneurs who maximize their profits by competing in the global market with their acquired knowledge and skills. Some report mixed experiences with global capitalism as workers or entrepreneurs at different stages of their lives. Their social and geographical mobility has affected their understanding of cultural, political, and economic practices at the local level (ibid.). Following this discussion, I suggest further exploring how sustainability and neoliberalism are intertwined to affect the Taiwanese in their daily lives. In what ways has the ECFA affected Taiwanese grouper farmers and the sustainability, including the ecological dimensions, of Taiwanese aquaculture? To what extent is the ECFA, as a free trade policy and example of neoliberalism, practised in the Taiwanese context? This chapter includes ethnographic data collected from 23 grouper farmers, three brokers, one P&F plant owner, and one exporter (Table 7.1). I followed the supply chain and various grouper promotion activities in Taiwan to recruit the informants. The stakeholders in the grouper farming sector are located in several communities so I trace their networks instead of focusing on one single community. I conducted interviews in south and southwest Taiwan (Map 7.1) to investigate the geographical specialization of the supply chain. My observations included on- farm fish fry and adult fish transactions, sailors uploading groupers to live fish carriers, feeding in grouper fry-rearing and grow-out ponds, and other grouper promotional activities.

280

Table 7.1. Informants recruited from the Taiwanese grouper sector (n=28).

Sample Gender of Location Size Number of extra Other interviewee (ha) labour job/business Breeding Male Pingtung < 5 1 (his wife) Sixfinger #1 County threadfin breeding Breeding Male Pingtung < 5 3 (employees) Grouper grow- #2 County out Hatching Male Chiayi < 5 0 Glass eel #1 County catching (winter) Hatching Male Chiayi < 5 1 (his wife; Advertising #2 County interviewed together) Hatching Male Chiayi < 5 2 (his father and n/a #3 County mother) Hatching Male Chiayi < 5 0 Former manager #4 County 2-inch fry Male Chiayi < 5 0 Former bank rearing #1 County staff 2-inch fry Male Chiayi < 5 1 (his brother) Shrimp farmers; rearing #2 County fish ball business 2-inch fry Male Chiayi < 5 2 (his son and a male Retired teacher rearing #3 County business partner) Grow-out Male Kaohsiung < 5 1 (his wife; Retired #1 City interviewed together) policeman Grow-out Male Kaohsiung < 5 1 (his wife who has a Technician in a #2 City job in the township petrochemical government; plant interviewed together) Grow-out Female Kaohsiung < 5 2 (her husband and n/a #3 City son; the son was interviewed with them) Grow-out Female Tainan City 6–15 2 (her husband who Hard-shell clam #4 was interviewed with farming her; her son who had his grouper farm) Grow-out Male Tainan City 6–15 2 (his business One textile #5 partners) factory owner and one retired teacher Grow-out Male Kaohsiung 16– > 10 (employees, Offshore fishing #6 City 30 including 2 female accountants and other

281

male fish farmers and marketing staffers) Grow-out Female Pingtung 16– > 10 (her father, two Fishing net #7 County 30 brothers, and other business, cage employees) culture of yellowfin seabream ( 黃鰭 鯛)487 Grow-out Male Chiayi 6–15 1 (his wife is n/a #8 County responsible for marketing) Grow-out Male Chiayi < 5 0 n/a #9 County Grow-out Male Chiayi < 5 1 (his father) Milkfish and #10 County shrimp farming Grow-out Male Chiayi < 5 0 Milkfish, shrimp, #11 County grey mullet farming Grow-out Male Chiayi < 5 0 Milkfish and #12 County shrimp farming Grow-out Male Chiayi 16– 1 (his father-in-law) Milkfish, shrimp, #13 County 30 grey mullet farming Grow-out Male Chiayi 16– 2 (his wife who was Milkfish, shrimp, #14 County 30 interviewed with him; grey mullet a male worker) farming Broker #1 Male Tainan City < 5 0 Grouper breeder Broker #2 Female Kaohsiung n/a n/a Shrimp larvae City and broodstock broker Broker #3 Male n/a n/a n/a Teacher P&F plant Male Kaohsiung n/a 2 female accounts; Retired owner #1 City unknown number of government workers official Exporter #1 Male Tainan City n/a >5 male sailors; 1 n/a female accountant Note: Grow-outs #10–14 are fish farmers in Chiayi County. Some of their perspectives were presented in chapter 6. Source: Author’s field data.

487 Chi.: huangqidiao ; sci: Acanthopagrus latus . 282

Map 7.1. The coastal area of south and southwest Taiwan where grouper farming is located. Source: National Land Surveying and Mapping Center (2015). 488

Taiwanese grouper farmers are usually specialized in, at most, two stages of the farming process. The stages include breeding, hatching, 2-inch fry rearing, and grow-out pond cultivation. Some kinds of groupers, such as giant grouper, need one more stage of rearing before they are moved to the grow-out ponds. These stages were created because of factors such as operational cost, technique, and business risk. Most informants specialize in serving one stage of the supply chain and employ fewer than five labourers. Grow-outs #6 and #7 have registered companies and employed marketing managers to explore markets for frozen groupers in addition to their sale of live groupers to middlemen. I estimate that these companies’ investments are

488 Source: http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671 C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTT ON=false&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword=TW-07- 301000100G-614001 . 283

larger than those of the other grow-out pond owners who sold only live groupers. The extra costs of the frozen grouper businesses include subcontracting primary processing and freezing to P&F plants, branding, and attending food expositions. Grow-outs #6 and #7 have larger fish farms and the owners originally worked in businesses related to offshore fishing, which offered them capital to invest in the grouper sector. I argue that the Taiwanese grouper sector responds to the presence of neoliberalism, in the form of free trade under the ECFA, by operating a complex supply chain to maintain the health of groupers from broodstock to market-size live fish; by diversifying their markets with the adoption of freezing technology; and by pursuing sustainable aquaculture, the meaning of which varies by stakeholder group. Local communities and stakeholders’ translocal and transnational networks coexist to support the grouper supply chain to compete in the global seafood market. Grouper farmers face fluctuating farm-gate prices due to changing cross-strait trade relations, related policies and governance, and premature efforts at market diversification. This chapter is organized in the following sequence. Section I traces the development of Taiwanese grouper farming between the 1970s and 2010. Section II focuses on the practices and organization of the grouper supply chain. Section III illustrates how grouper farmers have experienced the ECFA Early Harvest Program, which has been interrelated with the Taiwanese government’s post-flooding sectoral rejuvenation and China’s domestic anti-corruption policy. Section IV presents three cases of frozen grouper marketing to illustrate the new trends towards market diversification, food safety, and sustainability. The fifth section discusses the use of marine resources in grouper farming to explore the future of sustainable aquaculture in Taiwan.

I. History of Grouper Farming and Trade

Scientists have identified 26 grouper species which inhabit Taiwan (Shao et. al 2015). According to a seafood consumption guide (The Fish Database of Taiwan 2014), 489 wild-caught grouper consumption is currently unsustainable for the following reasons: 1) global grouper populations have declined rapidly due to overfishing; 2) a long period of time is needed to rejuvenate the stock; 3) the grouper is a predator, so declining populations will negatively affect

489 Source: http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php . 284

the food web; 4) current fishing methods destroy the grouper’s habitats. Dr. Shen, a marine biologist, commented on Taiwanese grouper consumption: The Taiwanese think wild-caught groupers are more delicious and nutritious [than farmed groupers]. The price of wild-caught groupers is three times higher. . . . Such a mentality is wrong. Fish consumption should not highlight only food safety, hygiene, and taste. Conservation is also important. 490

Marine biologists, such as Liu (2007), suggests that grouper farming is simultaneously a solution to overfishing and a practice that enhances fishermen’s livelihoods. Inland grouper farming began in in south Taiwan during the 1970s. Artificial propagation of groupers had succeeded in Taiwan by the late 1980s. Inland grouper farming has developed much faster than cage culture. The Taiwanese farmed 94.5% of grouper in inland brackish-water ponds in 2014 (Fisheries Agency 2014a). Grouper has become a popular product in south Taiwan due to its high market value and the favourable climatic conditions in that region. Tropical marine fish (e.g., grouper) have higher market value than subtropical and/or freshwater fish (e.g., tilapia) in Chinese societies. South Taiwan has more favourable climatic conditions for farming tropical fish. Grouper farming is located in the coastal area with access to seawater. Fish farmers became familiar with groupers’ traits and improved their techniques. For example, after experiencing the decline of tiger prawn farming in the 1980s, Yongan fish farmers converted their tiger prawn ponds into grouper ponds in the 1990s. They learned the ideal pond size which faciliated pond management: The best size of a grouper pond is 2 fen (1 jia = 10 fen ). It is smaller than a tiger prawn pond (3 fen ) or a milkfish pond (at least 5 fen ). Groupers are lazy to move. If a grouper pond is bigger than 2 fen , some groupers will stay too far away from their feed and eat less than the others. The faster-growing groupers eat small ones. We learned to improve our technique of grouper farming. 491

Taiwanese fish farmers practise grouper monoculture because groupers are predators of other fish in the same pond, and their high values. Yongan fish farmers farm 8,000 orange-spotted groupers (青斑) or 2,000 giant groupers in a 1-fen fish pond. They regard their practices as less intensive than those in south to Kaohsiung County. Pingtung County has higher

490 Dr. Shen, a marine biologist: interview, February 6, 2015. 491 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 285

average temperatures and better sources of fresh water, which they add to the ponds to accelerate groupers’ growth. The more favourable farming environment allows fish farmers there to stock 15,000 orange-spotted groupers in 1-fen fish ponds. In 2014, 6,064 Taiwanese households operated 2,311 hectares of grouper ponds and cages (Lin et al. 2014: 12–13). The grouper sector had the highest total value compared with other major farmed species sectors (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014; Table 7.2). Taiwan exported 70% of farmed grouper, including 79.66% to China and 20.2% to Hong Kong. Japan, the third “major” importer, consumed only 0.2% of Taiwanese exported grouper.

Table 7.2. Production volume and value of the major farmed fish in Taiwan in 2014.

Species Production Total value volume (Thousand (tonnes) TWD) Grouper 25,681 8,453,902 Milkfish 69,134 5,092,683 Tilapia 69,726 3,785,237 Eel 1,903 1,473,002 Seabass 11,582 1,312,016 Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (2014).

My informants reported that Hong Kong, as the major market for Taiwanese grouper by the 1990s, was replaced by China at the turn of the new century. The grouper taste is widely accepted in coastal cities, as evidenced by its use in banquets; when served, the fish is also used to display hospitality. Ms. Tao, the marketing manager of grow-out#7, explained Chinese grouper cultures: The Chinese festive cultures ( 喜慶文化)492 include eating groupers. A dish of grouper in a banquet gives both of the hosts and guests face ( 面子). 493 Grouper is high-value fish which cannot be replaced by other fish species. The demand for groupers is extremely high in south China. 494

492 Chi.: xiqing wenhua . 493 Chi.: mianzi . 494 Ms. Tao, a marketing manager: interview, March 16, 2015. 286

My field data echoed Ms. Tao’s observation. The Taiwanese seldom consume grouper at home. They include either a dish of steamed grouper (whole fish) or a hotpot of giant grouper slices in banquet offerings (photo 7.1). In Hong Kong and south China, steamed groupers are frequently found at banquets. Family dinners occasionally include a dish of steamed grouper. The cross- strait grouper trade is thus characterized by its symbolic meaning in Chinese dietary cultures. The economic development of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan from the 1970s onwards has led to increasing demand for groupers in these markets.

Photo 7.1. Giant grouper slices, fish paste (made from other fish), and mushroom prepared for a hotpot in a banquet. Source: Author’s photo (2014).

287

The FAO’s (2016) statistics shows that, since the inclusion of its figures in 2003, China has achieved the highest production volume in groupers (Chart 7.1a). 495 It still imports Taiwanese groupers thanks to the more favourable tropical climatic conditions of south Taiwan. Winter is the peak season for exporting Taiwanese grouper to China, when Hainan, Guangdong, and Fujian Provinces in China (the major production regions) stop supplying grouper to the market. Under low-temperature conditions, groupers farmed in these provinces take in less food and lose its fat. This has created a business opportunity for the Taiwanese. Taiwan’s peak season for export lasts four months, between China’s National Day holidays (October 1 and the following week of public holidays) and the Lunar New Year festival (which usually takes place in February). 496 South Taiwan has a tropical climate; its winter temperature is higher than in all Chinese provinces. The grouper can keep their fat and are ready for the market. Chart 7.1b shows that the Taiwanese grouper sector has created the highest production value compared with its counterparts. Groupers stop eating and are kept in a crowded and unpleasant environment on live fish carriers. They start losing body fat. The shorter transport time (20 hours) between China and Taiwan minimizes the impact of transport on Taiwanese groupers. Taiwanese grouper farmers argued that they leverage their geographical advantage to remain competitive in live grouper exports to China: In winter, Taiwan can export groupers to China and Hong Kong. Malaysia can produce and export their groupers all around the year, but it takes four or five days to ship the groupers to Hong Kong. Groupers can survive such a long journey in summer, but they may die in winter because the temperature in Hong Kong is much lower. 497

Before harvest, Taiwanese fish farmers used their techniques to keep groupers healthy and lively. According to Ah-ba (grow-out#1), Fish farmers stop feeding their groupers two days before the scheduled harvest. If a grouper vomited on the boat [when being shipped to China], all of the groupers would die [because of the deteriorated water quality]. We keep exchanging pond water when the harvest workers are harvesting the groupers. The new seawater

495 Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en. 496 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, August 26, 2014. 497 Shu-peng (breeding#2), a grouper breeder and farmer: interview, March 15, 2015. 288

entering the pond will keep the groupers looking more lively. They still look good even after reaching China. 498

100000 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000

Tonnes 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

Year

China Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia

Chart 7.1a. Grouper production volume in East and Southeast Asia (1984–2014). Note: The data include areolate grouper, black grouper, brown-marbled grouper, giant grouper, greasy grouper, Hong Kong grouper, humpback grouper, Malabar grouper, orange-spotted grouper, spotted coralgrouper, and other groupers (marked as “not enough information” in the record). Source: FAO (2016). 499

498 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, August 26, 2014. 499 Source: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en . The data about the Philippines are unavailable. 289

300000

250000

200000

150000

100000 US thousand

50000

0 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Year

China Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia

Chart 7.1b. Grouper production value in East and Southeast Asia (1984–2014). Note: See Chart 7.1a. Source: FAO (2016).500

Cultural factors affect the practice of transporting groupers. For example, giant groupers’ skin colour turns black in dark environments and white when they are frightened. Xue-chai (exporter#1), a grouper exporter, stressed that “Chinese customers like seeing groupers in black skin.” 501 Therefore, fish tanks on boats are covered to keep giant groupers in the dark until they are sold at Chinese ports. Moreover, “groupers’ appearance is the most important selling point in the Chinese market.” 502 Chinese consumers dislike groupers with wounds; sailors thus apply anesthetics to slow down groupers’ motion to reduce friction from rubbing. This practice minimizes groupers’ injuries and wounds. Grouper traders maintain the market value of Taiwanese groupers by keeping their appealing appearances. Table 7.3 shows the specific market sizes for three kinds of groupers exported to Hong Kong and China (Photo 7.2a–c). If the groupers grow oversized, they may lose certain markets.

500 Ibid. 501 Xue-chai, a grouper exporter: interview, January 6, 2015. 502 Ibid. 290

Fish farmers thus select what to farm based on the expected production time and the level of investment they can afford. Orange-spotted grouper and other groupers (e.g., brown-marble grouper; 虎斑503 ) are interchangeable for grow-out pond owners. This is because fish farmers use similar techniques to farm various kinds of groupers. They shift to one species when they expect the farm-gate price to be higher at the time of harvest, usually one year later. Giant groupers have to be kept for two years in grow-out ponds. The fish farmers need to invest more money before they reap any returns. Tiger GG, which was a hybrid that commanded a high market value in 2014, was an alternative for giant grouper farmers if they wanted a quicker return and there were ponds available.

Table 7.3. Grouper market size. Type Farm-gate Market Market Market Market size for price in size for size for size for other countries March 2014 China Hong Taiwan (TWD/catty) Kong Orange- 250 0.6–1kg 1–1.2 kg 2kg Japan: 2.5 kg spotted (ice-chilled) grouper Australia: 3 kg (fillet) Giant 250 (190 in 6–25 kg 10–40kg 10–40kg n/a grouper April 2015) Tiger GG 200 0.6–1kg 0.6–1kg n/a n/a (龍虎 斑)504 Source: Author’s field data.

503 Chi .: huban ; sci .: Ephinephelus fuscoguttatus. 504 Chi.: longhuban ; sci.: Epinephelus fuscoguttatus x Epinephelus lanceolatus. 291

Photo 7.2a. Orange-spotted grouper. Source: Author’s photo (2015).

Photo 7.2b. Tiger GG. Source: Author’s photo (2015).

292

Photo 7.2c. Giant grouper (top-right). Source: Author’s photo (2014).

Based on the historical development of Taiwanese grouper farming and trade, the Chinese and Hong Kong markets have affected the farm-gate price of Taiwanese groupers and farmers’ selection of grouper species. Their demand for live groupers has created a business opportunity for the Taiwanese grouper sector. The farmers’ local production practices are linked to the global market in terms of the sizes of the various grouper species that are profitable. Fish farmers exercise agency by selecting species that minimize business risks and maximize their returns during a particular period of time. Local communities specialize in grouper farming because of their favourable climatic conditions and access to seawater. As well, grouper farmers use various production inputs to satisfy the global market. Specifically, to better compete in the Chinese market the Taiwanese grouper sector enjoys the advantages of a warmer climate than China, and closer proximity to China than Southeast Asian countries. Their groupers are also culturally accepted by Chinese consumers.

293

II. Grouper Production

The grouper sector has a more complex supply chain than the milkfish sector does. 505 I compare these two supply chains because milkfish is more readily adapted to Taiwan’s farming environment and so its intensification has created fewer environmental problems for fish farmers. In this respect, they need to prevent virus outbreaks among groupers in a particular form of social organization and network. They specialize in a particular growth stage of grouper. They keep grouper for a shorter period of time, learn fewer skill sets, and face lower business risk. They have acquired techniques at particular grouper growing stages to prevent virus outbreaks. Brokers facilitate transactions involving healthy grouper (including eggs and fry). In the milkfish sector, breeders (who are also hatchery owners) own milkfish broodstock and sell larvae (after ~21 days) to brokers. Three brokers in Tainan currently distribute the larvae to Taiwanese fish farmers. Some fish farmers keep them growing until they reach 1–2 inches, 3–4 inches, 5–6 inches, or 7–8 inches in length. Grow-out pond owners buy these fish fry and keep them until they attain market sizes. Milkfish farmers buy milkfish fry at varying lengths each year, based on the price and availability of fish of a particular size at the time they want to stock milkfish. Simu farmers such as Ah-shin stocked milkfish larvae in their grow-out ponds in 2014. The number of production stages for milkfish farming can be minimized to three stages: a breeder, a larvae distributor, and a grow-out fish farmer. The milkfish supply chain is thus less complex than the grouper supply chain.

505 Li-hsuan Cheng: personal communication, 2014 and 2015. 294

Chart 7.2. The grouper supply chain in Taiwan. Source: Author’s field data.

Chart 7.2 shows the grouper supply chain in Taiwan. Fish farmers use particular techniques that correspond to the stages of the grouper supply chain they service. A breeder highlights that “every fish farmer uses their techniques and shares the profits from grouper farming. This is a form of sustainability.” 506 A marine biologist, however, was worried about any potential disease outbreaks in the grouper sector: I wonder if such a complex supply chain is good for Taiwanese aquaculture. Fish farmers can save some costs by specializing in one stage. In case of disease outbreaks . . . we will not know which stage of the supply chain we can find the source of the disease. . . . fish farmers do not know what people at the previous stage have done. These people will not confess even if they have done something wrong. They do not want to lose their business. . . . The scientists cannot trace the origin of the disease outbreak. 507

506 Ah-xin, a hatchery owner: interview, March 14, 2015. 507 A marine biologist from an extension station: interview, June 8, 2014. 295

Grouper farmers typically focus on one particular stage of production to share the business risks. Taiwanese fish farmers regard grouper farming as a highly risky type of aquaculture. Grouper farming involves one of the highest unit prices of fish fry in Taiwan, a longer feeding period, and risks of virus outbreaks, such as Nervous Necrosis Virus (NNV) and Iridovirus (Chou 2007: 130). Grouper eggs may carry the viruses and grouper larvae are highly susceptible (ibid.: 134–135). A disease outbreak may result in mass casualties. A vaccine that was designed to be injected by biologists into individual fish proved ineffective; in the view of the grouper farmers this was because they handled large amounts of eggs and larvae each time. They considered treating the pond environment a more effective method to keep groupers healthy. If a fish farmer raises grouper larvae until they grow to market size, he or she needs multiple techniques to keep them alive. Among my sample of grouper farmers, only grow-outs #5 and #13 started to use vertical integration of a 2-inch fry nursery. They wanted to have “better choice of healthy fish fry.” They invested in the facilities and learned the technique. Grow-out #6 was finding new partners who specialized in the fry nursery. The grouper supply chain in Taiwan remained relatively complex due to fish farmers’ risk-sharing practices.

Production The production and hatching of fertilized grouper eggs are carried out in separate locations. Breeders, who are all based in south Pingtung County where the average temperature is the highest in Taiwan, keep grouper broodstock and supply fertilized eggs to hatcheries. The selection of broodstock and interbreeding of groupers are market-oriented and globalized. The breeders purchase the broodstock of marketable grouper varieties first from Southeast Asia. Over the past decade, they have used locally grown grouper as broodstock because of the local availability and also the restrictions on exporting sexually mature groupers imposed by Southeast Asian countries. The breeders choose particular grouper varieties because they have good growing speed, market sizes, the ability to resist diseases, and good textures and tastes. The breeders hybridize new varieties for the market. For example, in the early 2000s, Shu-peng, a breeder and a fish farmer, claimed to be the first to hybridize the “Tiger GG” in Taiwan:

296

I became a giant grouper breeder in 1985. Some years later virus attacks lowered the survival rate of giant groupers. I started thinking how to improve their resistance to viruses. I hybridized brown-marble groupers with giant groupers. I selected brown-marble grouper for its strength in disease resistance. The limitation [of brown-marble grouper farming] is that brown-marble grouper grows very slowly, especially in winter. Giant groupers have good growth speed [in the third year]. I hybridize them to produce Tiger GG, a new product which contains all the features of these two varieties that are competitive in the market. 508

Hatchery owners operate their hatcheries and larvae-rearing facilities in areas that are easily accessible to seawater, which is the key environmental condition. Grouper hatcheries are located mostly in Chiayi County and Tainan City in southwest Taiwan. Land prices there are lower than those in south Taiwan, and thus outdoor operation is more economical. Most fish farmers operate outdoor hatcheries to save facility costs (the minimum cost of building a basic facility was TWD2 million in the early 2010s). The outdoor hatcheries and larvae-rearing are limited to the hot season, between April and September, when the temperature reaches 23°C or higher (Su et al. 2008: 30). Hatchery owners use buckets to hatch the fertilized eggs. The eggs are poured into a bucket of seawater with an air supply. Within three days, the eggs should be hatched. Fish farmers may lose their investment if the eggs are not hatched. This may happen for low temperatures or unknown reasons. The hatchery owners sell 1-inch fish fry (photo 7.3). They keep grouper larvae in outdoor rearing ponds, which have been sanitized, with the water colour regulated. A fish farmer usually keeps no more than two ponds of grouper larvae at one time, to lower the risk of losing the entire investment due to sudden changes in weather conditions or the spread of viral diseases. The fish larvae need 30–45 days to grow to 1 inch in length. Hatchery owners need a sufficient amount of live food ( 餌料生物; photo 7.4a and 7.4b) 509 to feed the larvae. Live food, such as Artemia (豐年 蝦), 510 can be purchased. Hatchery owners in southwest Taiwan usually nurture rotifers ( 輪虫)511 and copepods ( 橈足類)512 in one of their ponds to save costs. They input dead fish, probiotics,

508 Shu-peng, a grouper breeder and farmer: interview, March 15, 2015. 509 Chi.: erliao shengwu . 510 Chi.: fengnianxia . 511 Chi.: lunchong . 512 Chi.: raozulei . 297

and rice husk to provide nutrients for the live food. An insufficient supply of live food may lead to the death of the grouper larvae/1-inch fry. If a transaction involving 1-inch fry is delayed for several days, a hatchery owner lacks the live food and needs the help of others. The hatcheries are thus close to each other to facilitate this kind of support. Maintaining good social relationships with other fish farmers in the community is important. Lending live food to and borrowing it from other fish farmers saves costs and increases the survival rate of 1-inch fry.

Photo 7.3. 1-inch grouper fry. Source: Author’s photo (2014).

298

Photo 7.4a. Collecting live food. Source: Author’s photo (2014).

Photo 7.4b. Live food (red) in a net. Source: Author’s photo (2014).

299

Hatchery owners are uncertain about the exact volume of larvae that can grow up to one inch before the day of a transaction. They use experience to locate where the larvae are during the daytime. They observe how large a school of larvae gathers. They collect one sample and put it in a beaker to observe its behaviour and condition. If they estimate that the number of larvae in a pond has decreased to an amount that is no longer profitable to keep, the hatchery owners will extract all the water from the pond. They then sanitize the pond and start another farming cycle. They can run through six to eight cycles within the production season so they do not waste time. If they succeed in selling at least one lot of fish fry, they are very likely to make a profit that year. For example, on July 21, 2014, hatching#3 sold about 200,000 fish fry at the price of TWD4/fry. 513 He earned TWD740,000, which covered all of his operating costs that year, including electricity bills for running the aerators and water extraction, pond sanitizing agents (e.g., bleach), and also barn maintenance and other inputs needed to grow live food. The next harvest was his profit. All 2-inch fry nursery stations operate indoors. At this stage, fish farmers do not welcome outsiders to visit their nursery stations because the grouper fry are very sensitive to the environment. Viral disease outbreaks can kill all the grouper fry in any given batch. In 2012, I was able to visit one station operated by Li-an and his brother (2-inch fry rearing #2). Their routine was feeding the grouper fry and moving them from one tank to another. They exchanged the seawater inside each tank after the fry were moved to another tank. They did so to keep the grouper fry living in a tank environment that was less susceptible to pathogens. This reduced the probability of viral disease outbreaks. When they used nets to move the fish fry, they divided the fry of different sizes into separate tanks. This practice prevented larger grouper fry from eating the smaller ones. The routine maximized the survival rate of the grouper fry. The 1-inch fish fry grow to 2 inches after one month and are sold to fish farmers operating grow-out ponds. Grouper grow-out ponds are located mainly in Kaohsiung County and Pingtung County because of their highest average temperatures in Taiwan. Most grouper varieties take one year to reach market size. A giant grouper “takes one year to grow to 1.2 kg. It takes another year to

513 Field note: a fish fry transaction, July 21, 2014. 300

reach 4.8 kg. In the third year, it grows to more than 12kg.”514 In Tainan City, some fish farmers keep 2-inch giant grouper fry outdoors in a fish pond for a year. They sell these fry, reaching at least one catty, to grow-out pond owners. Fish farmers operating the grow-out ponds keep the groupers until they are sold on the market. When fish diseases occur, the fish farmers consult vets in fish clinics and apply veterinary drugs to heal the groupers.

Transactions Within their life cycles, groupers are exchanged between fish farmers in south and southwest Taiwan. The fish farmers observe the groupers’ health conditions when they visit potential sellers’ farms (at successive stages). Buyers and sellers adopt norms to protect themselves from taking losses in the transactions. The scope of farmers’ own business networks is limited. They buy groupers from multiple suppliers (in the last stage) nearly every time because one seller may not have a sufficient supply of healthy groupers. Grouper farmers thus need a larger pool of sellers and buyers (at each succeeding stage) for transactions. Brokers play the key roles of introducing buyers and sellers to each other. The brokers receive 3%–5% of the cost of one bowl of fertilized grouper eggs from breeders. The brokers charge TWD0.03/grouper during transactions involving 1-inch and 2-inch fry, as well as 5% for transactions involving 1- catty giant groupers. They get TWD1-2 for one catty of market-size groupers. Sellers pay the brokers in most cases. Brokers access updated market information along the grouper supply chain. They provide this information to buyers and sellers to match each other for transactions: I follow up my clients’ farming performance, such as where a hatchery owner succeeds in hatching eggs and keeping the fish fry growing to one inch. They have a moral obligation to sell the fry to 2-inch fry farmers through the same broker. I know the potential output of each cycle run by different fish farmers (i.e., breeders, hatchery owners, and 2-inch fry farmers). I know their techniques well. I can match them to each other in transactions. 515

In each transaction, a broker helps the seller and buyer maintain a friendly relationship and a fair process, which means only healthy fish fry are transacted:

514 Mr. Dong (grow-out#6), a retired fishermen association personnel and a fish farmer: interview, March 5, 2015. 515 Mr. Hsu (broker#3), a grouper broker: interview, March 4, 2015. 301

Before the fish fry collection starts, we (the broker, buyer, and seller) observe the water quality, pond conditions, and fish health. If the fish fry swim abnormally, they are too unhealthy to be caught. We estimate the quantity of fish fry surviving in the pond by asking the seller about the amount of live food they fed the fish fry and the pond size. It is possible to have a wrong estimation. The seller pays a truck for fish fry delivery. It has limited room for the fish fry. I always prepare to call one more truck to come, or ask another buyer if s/he wants fish fry. The buyer should not put an excessive amount of fish fry in the truck [because the fish fry will get overstressed and die]. . . . There is no contract but norms. For example, the buyer can cancel the transaction before the truck starts leaving the pond. I go to check the fish fry’s condition after they are put into the truck. I ask if the buyer agrees to leave. 516

Brokers connect fish famers at successive stages along the supply chain to maximize transactions involving healthy groupers. This enables the groupers to be sold at the best values. The complex networks are important to fish farmers, who expect higher farm-gate prices to sustain their businesses: The cost of grouper farming is high. Pond maintenance costs more than TWD300,000. Fish fry, feed, and other equipment (e.g., aerators and power generators) are essential. If you have bought fish fry valued at TWD500,000, you need to spend more than TWD1 million for feed. It takes about two years for you to see a return. I stock just 700 giant groupers. If the farm-gate price is TWD200/catty, I may sell them all and earn TWD2.8 million. I can have more than TWD1 million for the next round of investment. The farm-gate price is decreasing. You can currently find giant groupers in local wet markets. Taiwanese consumers can afford them. 517

Discussion: A Sector Tied to the Chinese Market The Taiwanese grouper sector consistently exports an increasing volume of market-size groupers to China year over year. Charts 7.3a–d show the trend in the grouper farming sector, dating from 2003. Total production volume and value were generally growing, except in 2009 and 2010, because in 2009 seriously damaged the facilities of many fish farms. Between 2003 and 2014, there was no overproduction of grouper fry. As shown in chart 7.3d, the production volume and value of grouper fry changed, following a similar pattern.

516 Ibid. 517 Ah-pei (grow-out#2), a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 302

Typhoon Morakot created a short-term shortage of grouper fry in 2010. The peak of grouper fry production can be found in 2011, when the export volume of groupers grew thanks to the growth of the Chinese market, which stimulated grouper production in Taiwan.

30,000 25,000 20,000

Tonnes 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

Year

Production volume of market-size grouper Export volume Export volume to China

Chart 7.3a. Export volumes of Taiwanese groupers. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

303

10 8 6 4

BillionNTD 2 0

Year

Value of market-size grouper Export value Export value to China

Chart 7.3b. Export values of Taiwanese groupers. Note: The export value is recorded in USD. I convert the value to TWD. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

The official statistics include data on Taiwanese grouper exports to China only after the legalization of live fish carriers in 2009 (see section III). Charts 7.3a and 7.3b show that a sharp growth trend in export volume of grouper occurred between 2011 and 2013. The legalization of the grouper trade and increasing market prices were the major factors that caused the increase in export volume. The export value grew from 2010 to 2012. From 2013, the export volume declined slightly. My informants reported that the market prices and demand from China dropped. Shen et al. (2014) observed slight growth in the grouper supply in China in winter, thanks to the adoption of greenhouses ( 溫棚), 518 which helped to keep pond temperatures higher. China’s anti-corruption policy, which reduced demand for groupers (see section III), also undermines Taiwanese fish farmers’ motivation to increase production. It is worth noting that the trend in export volume and value to China is aligned with the total production volume and value.

518 Chi.: wenpeng . 304

This indicates that Taiwan was unable to diversify the markets for its groupers. The sector relied mainly on the Chinese market.

1000000 100,000 800000 80,000 600000 60,000

Value 400000 40,000 200000 20,000

0 0 volume Prodution 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Year

Production volume of grouper fry (thousand fry) Value of grouper fry (thousand NTD)

Chart 7.3c. Grouper fry production in Taiwan. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

Chart 7.3c shows a fluctuating trend in fry production. The high prices of market-size groupers and grouper fry in China encouraged fish farmers to increase production. Brokers reported that they exported grouper fry to China and other countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam. Taiwanese-propagated grouper fry are healthy and exhibit good survival rates compared with results in other countries. Marine scientists Shen at el. (2014) pointed out that the production volumes (and so the total value) fluctuated for technical and climatic reasons: inbreeding, increased average temperatures, and increased production costs (such as feed for broodstock), and other countries’ improved breeding techniques. The sharp drop in fry production in 2015 might be a result of these factors.

305

2,500

2,000

1,500 ha 1,000

500

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Year

Chart 7.3d. Area of inland grouper ponds in Taiwan. Source: Fisheries Agency Statistics (various years).

Chart 7.3d shows the trend of the Taiwanese grouper sector. From 2009 to 2012, the area of grouper ponds increased, reflecting the grouper farmers’ resilience after the flood caused by typhoon Morakot. The prospects for the grouper sector encouraged fish farmers to practise grouper farming as well. There are two explanations for the decrease in the farming area after 2013. First, it resulted from the dropping farm-gate price for groupers, as I will show in section III. Second, the intensification of operations at each pond decreased demand for land used for grouper farming. Fish farmers could save some money in land rents. Ah-shing (breeding#1), a breeder, argued that the intensification of grouper farming reflects better techniques used by fish farmers, but this development does not guarantee higher income: Yongan fish farmers earned a lot from groupers in the early period of time, when the unit price of groupers was high. The price keeps dropping. They have to farm more to maintain the [same level of] profit. The area of the ponds increases and fish farmers have better techniques. Originally, they could produce 3,000–5,000 catties of groupers per jia ; currently, they can produce 50,000–60,000 catties per jia . The profit may still keep decreasing. 519

519 Ah-shing, a grouper breeder: interview, March 14, 2015. 306

The grouper supply chain has developed very well in terms of grouper production. From the perspectives of grouper farmers, marketing is important for increasing the farm-gate price and raising their income. They currently need to market groupers via middlemen. Ah-ba, a Yongan fish farmer, explained the limitations on fish farmers’ production and marketing groups (P&M groups), which is the major official measure to help fish farmers become more competitive in the global market: A P&M group should include production and marketing. Our group is good at production. We have a greater problem in marketing. If we market frozen groupers, we need to own freezing facilities and . . . [other investments] to scale, gut, and cut the fish. Live fish transport is a very complex process. As a P&M group, I prefer to organize our fish farmers to act as the gatekeepers of food safety in production. There is no drug residue in our groupers. I joked that we are a production group instead of a P&M group. The group members have to sell the groupers to middlemen. A harvest of 3,000 catties can cost TWD0.7–0.8 million. The amount is high and I will feel much more pressured if I need to get involved in others’ transactions as the leader of the P&M group leader. I do not want to get involved [in other people’s businesses]. 520

Grouper farmers such as Ah-ba are more concerned about marketing than production. Their strong techniques and supply chain have increased production volume. Brokers play a role to ensure healthy groupers at various stages are sold to the next stage. Taiwanese fish farmers maintain the quality of groupers in two ways. First, they establish a complex supply chain to select healthy groupers for transactions. Second, they use pond management techniques to keep the groupers healthy. Overproduction did not occur in the past two decades as reflected by the growing total production volumes and values. Whether their markets can support the high prices groupers fetch is related to the growth of the Chinese markets, as shown in the figures that reflect a rapid growth trend since 2009.

III. ECFA and the Legalization of Grouper Seaborne Transport

This section elaborates why the export volume and value of Taiwanese grouper increased between 2009 and 2014; I discuss declining farm-gate prices and the risk of relying on China as

520 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 307

a single huge market. I consider how legalization of the cross-strait grouper trade, changing government policy, and the ECFA’s implementation affected the fish farmers’ livelihoods and practices. Mostly, Taiwanese fish farmers were worried about their future in grouper farming. They knew that the overreliance on the Chinese market would negatively impact their livelihoods. The cross-strait grouper trade was previously carried out as either seaborne smuggling or legal freight. The Taiwanese government implemented the Regulation of Live Farmed Fish Carrier Management ( 漁船運搬養殖活魚管理辦法; RLFFCM) 521 to legalize the cross-strait live grouper shipping activities. As of 2008, the carriers could legally travel to Hong Kong. In 2010, the Taiwanese government implemented the Regulation of Taiwanese Fishing Vessels Sailing to Mainland China ( 臺灣地區漁船航行至大陸地區許可及管理辦法; RTFVTMC). 522 China opened 11 ports for registered Taiwanese live fish carriers (Fisheries Agency 2013a). 523 The number of ports increased to 23 in 2015 (COA 2015a). 524 Legalizing the live grouper trade created an opportunity for the Fisheries Agency to regulate Taiwanese exporters to practise food safety. The trade records were included in official statistics: “According to the Customs Administration, 136 tonnes of grouper were exported. To supervise the sector to develop in a proper way ( 正常發展), 525 the Council of Agriculture announced the RLFFCM, the export volume immediately increased to 2,000 tonnes . . .” (ibid.). The legalization of the cross-strait grouper trade was not the only policy that affected the Taiwanese grouper sector in recent years. The Taiwanese government implemented two programs directly related to the grouper sector as of 2009: the post-flooding rejuvenation and the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program. In 2009, Typhoon Morakot and its associated floods damaged or destroyed large areas of fish farms in south Taiwan. The government initiated the Program of Doubling the Production Value of Grouper ( 石斑產值倍增計畫; PDPVG) 526 to rejuvenate the

521 Chi.: yuchuan yunban yangzhi huoyu guanli banfa . 522 Chi.: Taiwan diqu yuchuan hanghang zhi dalu diqu xuke ji guanli banfa. 523 Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsCentralFisheries/content.aspx?id=24&chk=c8603084-b5f4-4f2a-a92f- cff3cb115c5b¶m=pn%3D2%26yy%3D%26mm%3D. 524 Source: http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2503049. 525 Chi.: zhengchang fazhan . 526 Chi.: shiban chanzhi beizeng jihua . 308

sector. By setting a target of doubling the production volume over that of 2008 by 2015, the Fisheries Agency provided measures for improving infrastructure, such as seawater extraction, offering low-interest loans, subsidizing equipment (such as freezers) for P&M groups, and promoting the marketing of grouper products in foreign and domestic markets. Frozen grouper marketing and legalizing live fish carriers were included in this program. The ECFA’s Early Harvest Program was announced in 2010. China’s tariffs on live or frozen grouper were removed in 2012. Among the farmed fishes enlisted on the ECFA, the Fisheries Agency treated grouper as a role model for how Taiwan’s free trade policy could boost the rural economy. Official news media, newspapers, and magazines evaluated the effectiveness of the new policies for grouper farming, with headlines including positive impacts such as an increase in grouper exports from 4,160 tonnes (2009) to 7,876 tonnes (2011) to 14,234 tonnes (2013). The value of these exports rose from TWD1.4 billion (2009) to TWD5.02 billion (2013) (China Times 2014; 527 2014). 528 The Fisheries Agency showcased the positive effects of the ECFA on aquaculture to the public by stressing the prospects for grouper farmers targeting the Chinese market who increase production. The volume of exported groupers became an indicator with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the sectoral rejuvenation. Charts 7.3a and 7.3b show the formal records of Taiwanese grouper exports to China from 2010 through 2015. Taiwanese fish farmers increased grouper production and expected to benefit from the growth of the Chinese market. Dr. Shen, the marine biologist, commented that “the PDPVG took a free ride on the ECFA to succeed,” 529 because the two policies were implemented at nearly the same time under President Ma’s vision to economically benefit the grouper sector through closer cross-strait relations. The Fisheries Agency celebrated its accomplishment of doubling the production value of Taiwanese grouper to TWD7.6 billion one year ahead of its plan for 2014. Its commendation of 15 fish farmers, business people, and scientists signified the PDPVG’s success. From the official perspective, the grouper sector found “the Midas touch” ( 點石成金; Fisheries Agency 2014c).530

527 Source: http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20141127000095-260203. 528 Source: http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=109022&ctNode=6009&mp=2. 529 A marine biologist: interview, March 20, 2015. 530 Chi.: dianshichengjin . Source: http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1152&chk=df9c0bd6- 1035-42b8-860e-79f20c52125b . 309

My point is that the growth in production value of the Taiwanese grouper sector did not benefit all Taiwanese grouper farmers, because some experienced the effects of the ECFA and other policies as a drop in the farm-gate price for groupers from 2013 levels. They expected the farm-gate prices to increase after the implementation of the ECFA. Ah-ba’s wife pointed out that the increase occurred, but it did not last long: After Typhoon Morakot and the ECFA’s implementation, the price of fish fry rose to TWD200–300 each. Many people joined the sector and then there was an oversupply. The price dropped to TWD100. It was a shame that the previously high profits are no longer available. The political parties are always in their fights. Those eating fish do not know the hardship of fish farmers (in Hokkien: 呷魚毌 知影養魚的艱苦). 531

Ah-pei, another Yongan fish farmer, highlighted the difficulty facing individual fish farmers seeking to export groupers without middlemen: The P&M groups are not good at marketing groupers. Middlemen know the market better than us. Producers have no way to influence the farm-gate price. It is difficult for us to contact foreign traders. Other countries protect their own sectors. That is why we need FTAs [free trade agreements] to reduce the tariffs. 532

The cross-strait grouper trade under the ECFA is more complex than simple tariff reduction. Other Chinese taxes are applied to Taiwanese exports. Although the ECFA eliminated the tariff on Taiwanese seafood products by reducing it from 10.5 % in 2009 to zero in 2012, the Chinese government continued to charge a 17% value-added tax (VAT) on any legal imports from Taiwan and the rest of the world. The legalization of live fish shipping and normal trade under the ECFA increased grouper exporters’ operational costs because the Chinese authorities levied the VAT. In a meeting attended by representatives of the Fisheries Agency, the national fishermen association, and other fish farmers’ and fishermen’s groups, the Fisheries Agency admitted it was incapable of removing China’s VAT. The ECFA, as a free trade policy, could not change China’s internal tax system.

531 Chi.: chiyu buzhi yangyu de xinku . Hok.: tsia̍ h-hî m̄ -tsai iánn-tshī-hî e kan-khóo. Ah-ba’s wife, a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 532 Ah-pei, a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 310

The fish farmers are well aware of the VAT’s impacts on their businesses. 533 Ah-wu (grow-out#5), a fish farmer, explained: The ECFA has good and bad impacts. It is good because selling groupers to China becomes legal. It is good for the exporters (e.g. Xue-chai). To fish farmers, it does affect us. The exporters did not need to pay the VAT before the ECFA. . . . The ECFA removed the tariffs, but there is the VAT. The cost is transferred to fish farmers. The fish-gate price goes down. 534

The above two quotes encapsulate the situation in which the cross-strait grouper trade interacts with the distribution system at the local level. Taiwanese aquaculture at this level is structured as an unbalanced distribution system between middlemen and fish farmers; the former set the farm- gate price. Fish farmers have relatively less power to influence the farm-gate price. After the legalization of the cross-strait grouper seaborne trade and the ECFA’s implementation, China’s VAT became an external factor that affected how middlemen set up the farm-gate price. The adoption of the free trade policy for cross-strait trade relations did not create a free market; instead, it led to a newly regulated market relationship that is characterized by the cross-strait political economy. The farm-gate price reflects this transformation, which is more complex than the supply–demand equilibrium without trade barriers that neoliberalism suggests. Another factor affecting the Taiwanese grouper sector was China’s domestic policy. In 2013 China’s President Xi Jinping (習近平) announced the jinsheling (禁奢令; luxurious spending ban as an anti-corruption policy measure) to crack down on corruption among Chinese government officials. Chinese government officials were no longer allowed to spend public money holding banquets with expensive dishes, including giant groupers. Xue-chai, the grouper exporter, said the policy “led to the decrease of demand for Taiwanese giant groupers.” 535 The farm-gate price of giant grouper had dropped from TWD400/catty in 2013 to TWD190/catty of giant grouper by early 2015. According to official statistics, the average value of giant grouper dropped from TWD329.8/kg in 2014 to TWD283.8/kg in 2015 (Fisheries Agency Statistics 2014; 2015). Mr. Chang, a giant grouper farmer, experienced the decrease in the farm-gate price:

533 Mr. Dong, a retired fishermen association personnel and a fish farmer: interview, March 5, 2015. 534 Ah-wu, a fish farmer: interview, January 6, 2015. 535 Xue-chai, a grouper exporter: interview, January 9, 2015. 311

The current farm-gate price [for giant grouper] is too low to sustain the business. The more you raise, the more you lose (養得多賠得多). 536 The farm-gate price was once higher than TWD300/catty. It dropped from June 2013 and was under TWD300/catty by the end of that year. Now it was TWD250/catty. We thought the anti-corruption measure was temporary and we could wait. After a year, the farm-gate price was still low. Chinese officials still cannot spend public money on luxurious seafood . . . 537

Shu-peng observed that China is “strangling” Taiwan: Grouper is a high-value seafood. The problem is, where are our markets? [The Taiwanese government] said the sector is now rejuvenated, but where is the market? Taiwan is not the major market. China and Hong Kong are the major markets which are strangling us ( 掐著我們脖子走). 538 One day if China stopped importing our groupers, we would suffer a lot. Hong Kong cannot make its decision [but China makes it for Hong Kong]. Taiwanese fish farmers have good techniques. Taiwan is an island and its market is small. We need international trade. 539

Shu-peng uses the term “strangling” to delineate the huge influence of Chinese markets on the Taiwanese grouper sector. This includes the political implication that China’s ruling of Hong Kong since 1997 has brought “Chinese markets” under the influence of the PRC government. If there is cross-strait political tension, the PRC government may intervene in the grouper trade. The potential blockage may lead to the loss of 99.8% of the foreign market for Taiwanese groupers. I found that grouper farmers understood that the so-called global trade in Taiwanese grouper relied heavily on “a single market” (which actually includes Hong Kong and China) under the influence of the Chinese government. This again illuminated the problem for Taiwanese aquaculture―fish farmers not only need to improve their techniques but they also need to diversify their market. Maximizing outputs was not sustainable for the grouper sector, as shown by the declining trend in production volume and value as of 2013. The Taiwanese grouper sector is closely related to cross-strait relations because of the growing Chinese market and the lack of other markets demanding live Taiwanese groupers. Ah-ba, the fish farmer, highlights the need to explore markets other than China:

536 Chi.: yangdeduo peideduo . 537 Mr. Chang, a fish farmer: interview, August 21, 2014. 538 Chi.: qiazhe women bozi zou . 539 Shu-peng, a grouper breeder and farmer: interview, March 15, 2015. 312

If the Chinese stopped buying our groupers one day for political reasons, we would suffer a lot. Fish farmers are so scared of this possibility. . . . I told the government that we need to diversify our markets. We cannot rely on China. 540

Mr. Jung, a marketing manager of a fishermen association in Kaohsiung County, echoed Ah-ba’s suggestion of exploring more foreign markets. He improved the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the P&F plants of the fishermen association. He established a new brand to promote seafood products (from both wild-caught fisheries and aquaculture) in food expositions, seafood festivals, and government-sponsored national seafood product contests. By increasing sales of their processed products in the domestic market, the fishermen association improved its finances and intervened in its wholesale fish market when overproduction occurred and wholesale prices dropped. The P&F plant purchased the overproduced seafood products and processed them. Mr. Jung’s marketing strategy became a role model for other fishermen associations trying to reform markets to help fish farmers improve their livelihoods. Mr. Jung explained that fish farmers need market diversification to increase their incomes from popular fish species: The Taiwanese look down on the agricultural and fisheries sectors. . . . These sectors are deeply rooted in Taiwan. The IT sector can move to another country. The government does not think agriculture and fisheries can generate high values. If you succeed in exploring more markets, fish farmers can earn more from groupers; there will be more people joining the sector. [The government] does not need to lead the sectoral rejuvenation. People will join and develop the sector. Such a development is sustainable. Currently, Taiwanese aquaculture is in a poor condition. Farming milkfish leads to a loss of money. Farming seabass is more or less the same. Farming grouper? The price is not that good. The fish farmers do not know what to do. I stress that the government needs to lead middlemen and fish farmers to diversify the market. 541

Ms. Tao, the marketing manager of a grouper farm, hoped to export frozen groupers to China, as the farm had done to Hong Kong. She was optimistic about the potential for frozen grouper as opposed to milkfish, which failed to gain popularity in China under the ECFA (chapter five): We hope to sell groupers also to the cities in north China such as Beijing and Tianjin. Selling live fish involves huge transport costs. The groupers would lose their fat and weight in the transport. If we can explore this market [with frozen groupers], we can increase our sales without any constraints. I know the Chinese

540 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, August 26, 2014. 541 Mr. Jung, a marketing manager of a fishermen association: interview, March 9, 2015. 313

have not accepted milkfish yet. It is a bony fish. The Chinese may eat the belly. Their own ways to cook the milkfish belly would affect its original taste and texture ( 口感). 542 It takes time to educate the Chinese about how to cook and appreciate milkfish. Grouper is a fish that every Chinese person knows. 543

The legalization of grouper shipping from Taiwan to China reflected the regulation of the Taiwanese grouper sector. The ECFA set up a free trade framework for Taiwanese grouper to be exported to China. Therefore, the Taiwanese grouper sector grew when it faced two seemingly contradictory forces including the state and the market under the rubric of neoliberalism. The cross-strait grouper trade was interlinked to the cross-strait political economy and dietary cultures. The increases in production and export volume that have occurred have not automatically led to higher incomes for grouper farmers. Farm-gate prices have been affected by market and political forces in China. The anti-corruption measure in China led to changes in giant grouper farming and marketing in Taiwan. The example of Tiger GG shows that Taiwanese fish farmers might choose other kinds of groupers to farm based on farm-gate prices. Grouper farmers and business people were aware of the risk involved in their overreliance on Chinese markets. They learned from the cross-strait grouper trade that satisfying demand on the Chinese market was not enough to support the Taiwanese grouper sector. Political intervention by the Chinese government in China’s domestic market can affect the market performance of Taiwanese grouper. The free market was in fact an outcome of multiple forms of state intervention in terms of regulations and policies affecting fish prices.

IV. Attempts at Market Diversification

Similar to other aquaculture sectors, the Taiwanese grouper sector tried to diversify its markets to maintain the high value of grouper by using freezing technology and traceability practices. The Taiwanese government has promoted “premium” agriculture when Taiwan prepared the agricultural and fisheries sectors to face the possible impacts of Taiwan’s joining the WTO and the globalization of seafood trade (chapter two). Mr. Deng, the national

542 Chi.: kougan . 543 Ms. Tao, a marketing manager: interview, March 16, 2015. 314

government official, reviewed how Taiwan competed with other countries in the global market with its high-value seafood products: Taiwan found its long-term strategy [to compete in the global market] ( 找到自己 的出路). 544 For example, China is the largest tilapia exporter. It exports 0.12 billion tonnes of tilapia every year, which is the total production volume of Taiwanese fisheries. Taiwan exports 70,000 tonnes of tilapia. People have long said Taiwan’s tilapia sector would decline. The fact is that we keep exporting 70,000 tonnes every year. We have developed a market strategy which is different from China’s. We export high-value tilapia to compete in the global market. 545

The example used by Mr. Deng is Taiwanese Tilapia, which is a hybrid of tilapia that grows to at least 2 catties for filleting. The Taiwanese exported frozen fillets of Taiwan Tilapia to Japan, North America, and Europe. The success described by Mr. Deng made frozen tilapia exports a role model for the Taiwanese aquaculture sector. At various events, the Fisheries Agency promoted frozen groupers. Fish farmers thought that selling frozen groupers would help market diversification of the Taiwanese grouper sector: We can supply a lot of groupers but there are no extra markets. . . . The ECFA legalized the activity [shipping groupers to China]. The government no longer cracks down on the exporters’ business [which was previously illegal]. This makes the volume of exports increase. The cost of shipping groupers by air goes down after the tariff is removed. My brother’s daughter is now living in inland China. She can only eat freshwater fish. . . . Selling groupers to the inland Chinese cities may be a good idea. 546

Ms. Ku (broker#2), a grouper broker, who runs a business that sells shrimp larvae and broodstock around the world, was less optimistic regarding the frozen grouper trade. She pointed out that grouper as a commodity is popular only among Asian consumers: Our company focuses on selling shrimp larvae because it has a world market. Grouper fry has an Asian market. The same as shrimp and grouper products. You find that only Asians buy groupers in T & T (an Asian supermarket chain in Canada). In 2010, the global market value of grouper was about USD0.3 billion. The global market value of shrimp was USD80 billion. Shrimp can be frozen and

544 Chi.: zhaodao ziji de chulu . 545 Mr. Deng, a top-level government official: interview, February 10, 2015. 546 Ah-ba, a fish farmer: interview, March 31, 2014. 315

processed. Frozen grouper will lose its flavour [which is what makes it attractive to Asian consumers]. 547

Compared with the tilapia trade, selling groupers to non-Chinese or non-Asian markets is a relatively new strategy in Taiwan. A few fish farmers and business people in the grouper sector pioneered selling frozen groupers to diversify their markets. The following three examples illustrate how marketing frozen groupers occurred in international and domestic markets, and how the ideas and practices of sustainability and food safety became involved. Yong-xu (永續; sustainability) became a catchword among governments, business people, and fish farmers for sustaining the development of the grouper sector. Another concept adopted in producing and marketing grouper was food safety. The government and business people expected to use traceability and food safety practices to increase the value of their products. The above changes in the marketing of high-quality frozen grouper products reflect a process designed to change domestic consumers’ impressions. Another joint effort in market diversification is targeted to the export market. The Taiwanese regarded grouper as a delicacy of the hua-ren (華人; Chinese people) and some East and Southeast Asian people. Marketing was necessary to globalize grouper consumption to match the success of salmon marketing. The Frozen Seafood Trade Association, which had four decades of experience in marketing Taiwanese frozen seafood, began encouraging those in the farmed seafood business to join food expos to market groupers. Members, including the Tao family and Ah-neng, whose experiences were described below, travelled to Boston (in the United States), Japan, and other countries to attend food expos to attract international orders. To promote the frozen seafood, they needed to learn cultural differences and food habits and modify their strategies in food expos. For example, they used grouper slices for shabu shabu (the Japanese term for a hotpot) to draw the attention of the Japanese. While in Boston, frozen fillets were marketed. Between 2012 and 2013, frozen grouper exports rose from 200 kg to 66 tonnes (Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in Boston 2014). 548 This showed that the market diversification effort was not yet successful. The examples

547 Ms. Ku, a grouper broker: interview, March 13, 2015. 548 Source: http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=485888&ctNode=2400&mp=21. 316

presented below show the prospects for and challenges of marketing frozen seafood from Taiwan.

Example #1 The Tao family (grow-out#7) The Tao family’s example illustrates the new trend in the grouper trade and marketing. Mr. Tao invested in a 20-hectare grouper farm to sell live groupers to exporters. After the flood- induced destruction in 2009, his urban-dwelling children returned to help rebuild his grouper business. The three siblings had their division of labour: the eldest son was in charge of marketing the new frozen products to foreign markets; the second daughter was the marketing manager in the domestic market; the youngest son took charge of grouper farming. They set up a company to sell frozen groupers. They subcontracted the gutting, cutting, and freezing to a P&F plant. They used their brand in marketing the products. Ms. Tao, the marketing manager, highlighted food safety and traceability in their promotion of frozen groupers: We sell the frozen groupers at a higher price. We want to teach consumers who prefer live and ice-chilled seafood. Our fish are sent to the P&F plants to be scaled, gutted, and cut within a short period of time. They are frozen right afterward. Their freshness is nearly the same as the live fish. Consumers need to recognize that they do not know where the ice-chilled fish are from. Our fish have their own “identity cards.” We have the traceability labels on every pack of the fish. Consumers have better confidence in our fish. If there is any food safety incident, they know where the fish is from. The investigation can be carried out. We protect our consumers who eat fish because they want to have a healthier lifestyle than the red meat diet. If they still find drug residue issues in seafood products, it is unfair. We want to show our business ethics. 549

The Tao family used the media and promotional activities for branding their products. They appeared in TV programmes to teach viewers how to cook frozen groupers; they collaborated with high-end restaurants to promote Western-style recipes and dishes using grouper as an ingredient. As a member of a business organization called the Frozen Seafood Trade Association (FST), they joined other frozen seafood companies to explore the viability of exporting frozen groupers to high-end markets such as Japan, the United States, and China. The

549 Ms. Tao, a marketing manager of a fish farm: interview, March 16, 2015. 317

Tao family sold their products in department stores in Taiwan. In 2014, they received prizes from the Fisheries Agency in a commendation to reward their effort to market frozen groupers.

Example #2 Ah-neng’s P&F plant (P&F plant#1) In Yongan, Ah-neng, a retired township secretary who set up a grouper P&F plant in 2010, described himself as “a crazy businessman.” 550 This was because he sold frozen groupers, previously suspected by Taiwanese consumers to consist of rotten fish that are frozen in an effort to market them as edible. Outside of the office of Ah-neng, the P&F plant’s wall was painted with seafood-related labels such as “HACCP” and “ISO 22000” that certify the plant’s hygienic and sanitary conditions for food safety purposes. He purchased TAP-certified groupers for primary processing and freezing. Ah-neng grew up in a grouper-farming family and learned fish farming in his childhood. After his retirement, he borrowed and invested more than TWD2 million to start the grouper P&F plant business. He aimed to “add value and maintain the quality of the groupers, while there will be a longer time to sell all the groupers [compared with the sale of live fish].” 551 This strategy lowered the business risk for fish farmers: Fish farmers want to sell their groupers to me because they can do it all over the year. Local middlemen only buy fish one or two days before the major days of banquets (e.g., wedding or festivals). The market size of groupers used in banquets is two catties. If the groupers keep growing when it is not the banquet season, they will be oversized and the middlemen will not want them. Fish farmers can contact me any time when the groupers reach market size. I can harvest and keep them in frozen forms for one to two years. 552

Ah-neng explored the domestic market for frozen groupers. “Our products have no guts and scales. They look hygienic and young consumers want to cook them. They do not want to handle the fish by themselves.” 553 To enhance the consumption of frozen groupers, previously a less popular behaviour in Taiwan, Ah-neng made cold calls to hotels and brought his products in for hotel managers to taste. After two years, he started to gain a strong reputation and was

550 Ah-neng, a P&F plant owner: interview, April 2, 2015. 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid. 553 Ibid. 318

reported on several times by the media. He claimed that “some hotels now prefer to use my products because they can standardize the quality and size of groupers they offer in each banquet.” 554 He argued that his frozen groupers provide better quality than live groupers, for two reasons: 1) the harvested fish is handled and placed in a freezer at -45 ˚C within hours; 2) packing the fish in vacuum-sealed packages can minimize the loss of freshness and flavour in a freezer at -18 ˚C. Therefore, the handling and freezing process keeps the seafood quality unchanged. Ah-neng claimed that the taste and texture of the frozen groupers can be better because their body fat is kept. Live fish kept in hotels for days may stop eating and lose their body fat. The above changes in the public’s impression of frozen grouper show that marketing frozen grouper as a higher quality product requires dedicated marketing and time to persuade consumers to change their practices. Ah-neng highlighted the need for government assistance in this process if Taiwan aims to globalize grouper consumption to reach the level of success of salmon marketing: The Taiwanese government is not proactive enough to promote frozen groupers. I think the government should promote it in the international market. Taiwan has good agricultural and seafood products, but none of them can be as popular as salmon from Norway or kiwi from New Zealand. We produce good products, but we need good marketing strategies. 555

Example #3 Mr. Chang (grow-out#8) Mr. Chang, an ecological grouper farmer, faced declining farm-gate prices from exporters. In 2013, he and his wife set up their brand to market their products. He subcontracted a P&F plant to cut and freeze his giant groupers. He explored new domestic markets, including restaurants, joining food marketing programs at the county levels and using friendship networks. His wife set up a website for online orders. They marketed their products with higher unit prices (Table 7.4). They highlighted traceability, water circulation, the decrease in pond usage intensity (500 giant groupers per ha, in comparison with 3,000–5,000 per ha in Yongan ), and the rejection of veterinary drugs in their product leaflet:

554 Ah-neng, a P&F plant owner: interview, April 2, 2015. 555 Ibid. 319

[I] extract surface water from only three metres deep underground; we always use the recirculated and [naturally] filtered water. [My method] does not cause land subsidence . . . [I feed the groupers with] mackerel from local fishing, which is fresher than other frozen fish. . . . Using no “artificial” feed means that there will not be any problem of additives in the feeding process. [I] do not use veterinary drugs and hence there is no environmental pollution. My fish farm is surrounded by green plants that reduce carbon footprint . . .

Table 7.4. Prices of grouper products from Mr. Chang’s fish farm. Item Price (TWD)/catty (1 catty = 600g) Head 350/catty Dice 350/half catties Chins 500/catty Steak 550/catty Soup 180/2 catties Whole fish 270/catty + 270 delivery fare (under 12 (freshly killed and catties) ice-chilled) Fish package 575/12 catties (head, chin, and steak) Gift pack A 900/3 catties (dice and soup) + 150 delivery fare Gift pack B 1500/4 catties (dice X2, soup, and steak) + 150 delivery fare Gift pack C 2200/3.5 catties (dice X4 and steak) + 150 delivery fare Delivery fare 210/3 to 12 catties or 270/12 to 25 catties Source: Author’s field data.

Mr. Chang evaluated the strategy in August 2014 and said that “I cannot keep just selling the giant grouper one by one. It is too slow.” 556 He later added how he explored various markets: I do not know when I can sell out all the giant groupers if I only market my own products. I sell some giant groupers to restaurants in north Taiwan. The price is TWD240/catty and they pay the logistical cost. I join the queue to sell the groupers to the exporters for the Chinese market. They want smaller sizes, which are 15 to 20 catties. The farm-gate price is currently TWD190/catty. I sell 40,000 catties to the recreational fish farms. Those giant groupers weighing 40–50 catties can be sold to Hong Kong. . . . I no longer stock fish fry, unless the farm-gate price grows. I have no confidence in fish farming now. The market is not in our

556 Mr. Chang, a fish farmer: interview, August 21, 2014. 320

hands ( 市場不是在我們手上). 557 I am not blaming the middlemen. They come to beg you when the market supply is low. That’s how the farm-gate price would go up. Many people have quit the sector. It is a demanding business and we did not earn any profit. 558

He was right to market the giant groupers as soon as possible in terms of risk management. As Ah-wu, a fish farmer, pointed out: You can say that farming giant grouper is a business that faces less the limitation of market sizes. We can keep the giant groupers when the farm-gate price is low. However, the longer we farm the giant groupers, the higher risk we have. They can be healthy for years. When we want to sell them, they can die suddenly. 559

In late 2015, Chiayi County was affected for many consecutive days by a cold front. Mr. Chang lost hundreds of market-size giant groupers because they were too cold.

Discussion The above three examples illustrate that global and domestic consumers need time to incorporate frozen grouper into their consumption practices. The Taiwanese grouper sector is currently facing the risk of losing the Chinese market due to policy changes in China (e.g., the anti-corruption policy). The Tao example illustrates the marketing strategy of highlighting branding and the division of labour in production and marketing. Ah-neng’s case represents the development of the government’s encouragement of P&F plants as a value-adding enhancement of fish products in Taiwan. Mr. Chang’s case reflects the individual strategies of using multiple resources to minimize the effects of mainstream markets on fish farmers’ incomes. Their efforts in frozen grouper marketing represent a response to the ECFA and the globalization of Taiwanese grouper. The ECFA is a free trade policy that sets the framework of the legalized grouper trade with tariff elimination. The farm-gate price, however, is affected by the cross-strait factor and the lack of non-Chinese markets. Whether the Taiwanese grouper sector and the government can explore new market possibilities remains questionable. Market diversification and marketing frozen groupers would

557 Chi.: shichang bushi zai women shoushang . 558 Mr. Chang, a fish farmer: interview, April 15, 2015. 559 Ah-wu, a fish farmer: interview, January 6, 2015. 321

take time. As Mr. Chang said, “the market is not in our hands,” as the farm-gate price was still an issue. In Taiwan, the fish price was not regulated by the government and so fish farmers have to deploy individual strategies to compete in the market. The above three cases highlight the forms of networks that individuals and companies can develop in Taiwanese contexts. These networks are needed resources when the government chooses not to directly intervene regarding the fish price with subsidy programs. In addition to the networks and seafood quality, fish farmers and business people compete in the market pursuing their personal strategies. Failures can occur, as can been seen insofar as, after two years of price decreases, small-scale fish farmers such as Mr. Chang no longer had the capital to keep investing in their businesses. The companies, such as those of the Tao family and Ah-neng, would need to explore international markets to survive and expand to cover the extra marketing costs. The ECFA and changing cross-strait relations stimulated fish farmers and business people to deploy various strategies. Their responses and experiences were interacting with global and local markets and also state policy under the influence of trade liberalization.

V. Debating Sustainability of Taiwanese Aquaculture

Whether the ECFA is good or bad is a matter of how you see the world. If you are thinking about Taiwan alone, the ECFA legalized the cross-strait grouper trade which was illegal. If you think about our global village, is the ECFA beneficial to the conservation of marine resources?560

This last section focuses on the environmental sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture under the ECFA, which Dr. Shen has questioned above. Grouper farming is a representative example of how aquaculture is interrelated to fisheries and marine resource management. When the ECFA and other related policies boosted the development of the grouper sector, how was the sector’s future viewed? I use the discussion of wild fish as grouper feed to present a range of perspectives. I include the practices of fish farmers to explore possible solutions. Grouper farming is currently the most economically valuable sector in Taiwanese aquaculture. The development of grouper farming is controversial, however, in terms of

560 Dr. Shen, a marine biologist: interview, February 6, 2015. 322

environmental sustainability, especially considering the marine resources it consumes. Grouper is a carnivore which consumes animal protein for growth. Taiwanese fish farmers usually feed wild-caught fish to their groupers, especially giant groupers, to enhance their growth rate, texture, and taste. 561 The wild-caught fish include saury, scad, and other fish sold by offshore fishing boats (photo 7.5). Environmentalists are concerned about the marine resource exploitation related to grouper farming. The alternative is feed pellets. The formula of these feed pellets includes fish meal, which is made from low-value fish caught in the ocean. The price of fish meal has soared following the decreasing output of the major sources (such as Peru, Chile, and Australia), driving the input costs for fish farmers up in recent years. Taiwanese environmentalists oppose grouper farming, preferring milkfish and tilapia farming. The formula of the feed pellets used for these major farmed seafood varieties includes mainly soy protein instead of animal protein.

Photo 7.5. Minced wild-caught fish used as grouper feed. Source: Author’s photo (2015).

561 Mr. Dong, a retired fishermen association personnel and a fish farmer: interview, March 5, 2015. 323

The FAO (2014: 162) reported the use of low-value fish in grouper farming: Feed conversion efficiency is poor with the use of low-value fish ranging from 7:1 to 15:1 in average grouper farming practices. Farmed groupers are almost exclusively raised on low-value fish, which means that at least half a million tonnes of fish had gone into grouper production in 2008 and about 4 million tonnes overall. The increasing demand for grouper and other carnivorous marine species will further drive mariculture expansion. Unless farmers shift to formulated feeds, this growth cannot be sustained for the following reasons:

• The increasing harvest of low-value fish to feed farmed fish could negatively affect the ecology of the fishing grounds. • The continuing use of low-value fish could contribute to the deterioration of the environment. • The use of low-value fish as feed may not be economically sustainable. • The ethical issue of feeding fish with fish that could be used for human food is an increasing constraint to market access. (FAO 2014: 162) 562

The FAO pointed out the need to shift to less vulnerable sources of fish for fish meals that are used in formulated feed, to provide scientific evidence for fish farmers to consider the benefits of the feed, and to help small-scale fish farmers access these feed sources (ibid.). Below, I present differing perspectives on the environmental sustainability of the grouper sector. The major point missed by the FAO’s report and Taiwanese government officials is how Taiwanese grouper farmers select the feed for their groupers. There are two schools of thought on the sustainability of grouper farming and the future of Taiwanese aquaculture. The first one, as Mr. Deng acknowledged, adopts a buyer-driven perspective: Fish eating is a matter of habit. . . . We cannot force people to only eat milkfish (herbivores). The world is anthropocentric. The question is how to satisfy human desires for grouper without destroying the environment. . . . There are sustainable environments, sustainable resource uses, and sustainable human demand for fish. There will be a lot of new values and perceptions in the world. 563

Another perspective is more supportive of consumers’ environmental sentiments. Consumer co- ops, environmentally responsible seafood companies, and marine biologists such as Dr. Shen have emerged to promote biodiversity and responsible seafood consumption:

562 Source: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. 563 Mr. Deng, a top-level national government official: interview, February 10, 2015. 324

I conduct a project issuing sustainable seafood guidelines to help consumers develop the right choices. The government does not want to be bad guys before the fishermen because it needs their votes. The government promotes seafood consumption to help the fishermen make more money. President Ma was happy with the grouper sectoral rejuvenation, but he does not understand that grouper farming is not a sustainable one. Groupers consume a lot of low-value fish. 564

President Ma facilitated the ECFA implementation and free trade policy of the Taiwanese government. He was viewed as a follower of neoliberalism in Taiwan. Huang (2016) suggested that Taiwan has been affected by neoliberalism since the 1980s; theoretically, state intervention is minimized and individuals have become entrepreneurs to maximize their economic gains from the liberalized market. Huang argued that Taiwanese local communities have actually transformed in a variety of ways to show the diverse values of individuals, who are not only entrepreneurs but can also be persons who connect with other community members (ibid.). The responses of Dr. Shen to the ECFA and the growth of the grouper sector reflected an additional critique of neoliberalism in Taiwan by including environmental sustainability in the evaluation of the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture. This aspect was invisible in President Ma’s promotion of his free trade policy. As Tables 7.5a–c show, the seafood guide highlights marine resource conservation. The guide recommends the consumption of farmed seafood rather than wild-caught seafood because of the depleted stock of wild fish. The guide does not recommend the consumption of farmed shrimp, salmon, or tuna because the feed contains fish meal or low- value fish. It encourages consumers to buy farmed tilapia and milkfish, which consume feed that contains plant protein instead of fish meal. The guide recommends that consumers buy seafood that primarily consumes protein from organisms at the bottom of the food web (e.g., mollusks).

564 Dr. Shen, a marine biologist: interview, February 6, 2015. 325

Table 7.5a. Recommendation for farmed seafood. Seafood Features that the Features that a seafood may contain seafood fit in Hard clam 1,2,3 1) Feed contains protein Oyster 1,2,3 2) Natural resource is still rich 3) Primarily consume organisms at the Tilapia 1,3 bottom of the food chain Milkfish 1,3 Mullet 1,3 Source: The Fish Database of Taiwan (2014).565

Table 7.5b. Farmed seafood that consumers are recommended to think twice about before consuming.

Seafood Features that the Features that a seafood may contain seafood fit in Shrimp (e.g., Tiger prawn, 1,2,5 1) Feed contains fish meal or trash fish greasyback shrimp, Kuruma 2) Natural resource management is not shrimp, and white-leg shrimp) well developed (if it is wild-caught) Farmed grouper 1 3) Predators in food webs Sixfinger threadfin 1 4) Sedentary fish Yellowfin seabream 1 5) Fishing methods destroy natural habitats, or create by-catch Source: The Fish Database of Taiwan (2014).566

565 Source: http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php . 566 Ibid. 326

Table 7.5c. Seafood that is not recommended for consumption (selected seafood which can be farmed in Taiwan).

Seafood Features that the Features that a seafood may seafood fit in contain Wild-caught grouper 1,2,3,4 1) Overfishing which causes the depletion of stock Wild-caught mullet 1 2) Slow growth rate Japanese eel 1,2,4 3) Predators in food webs 4) Sedentary fish 5) Fishing methods destroy natural habitats or create by-catch Source: The Fish Database of Taiwan (2014).567

One company has branded its seafood products with sustainable sources: Our company aims to provide sustainable seafood to Taiwan. It tries its best to sell herbivores. Groupers need 60% of animal protein in their diet. They consume a lot of fish meal. The company encourages people to eat mollusks such as oysters. 568

The seafood guide is not included in any regulations in Taiwan, but it is worth mentioning because it shows the emerging idea of relating seafood consumption to natural resource management in Taiwan. Some Taiwanese told me that Taiwan, as an island country, knows much about eating seafood but little about protecting the sea. The rise of consumerism in Taiwan and the advent of luxury seafood to show off Taiwanese wealth and power is gradually being contested by environmentalists. They have suggested that Taiwanese consumers learn to choose seafood that is more ecologically sustainable. Such an approach to selection would be cultural. For example, wild-caught orbfish ( 白鯧), 569 which symbolized prosperity in Taiwan, could be sold at market prices above TWD1,000 per catty during the Lunar New Year. In 2014, environmentalists and fish farmer associations promoted farmed snubnose pompano ( 黃臘鰺), 570 which is also called jinchang (金鯧), as a more sustainable fish that can symbolize prosperity

567 Ibid. 568 A staff of a seafood company: interview, June 6, 2014. 569 Chi.: baichang ; sci.: Ephippus orbis. 570 Chi.; huanglashen ; sci.: Trachinotus blochii . 327

(昌). 571 The efforts to illustrate seafood and its symbolism are interlinked to sustainability in Taiwan. Citing the seafood trade free market is insufficient for explaining which fish can rise in value. Cultural factors still affect demand and also how stakeholders try to change the meanings of a given seafood product. Mr. Tsai, the company owner, combines sustainable seafood, education, and marketing in his business: In other countries, you can find businesses that look for natural resources and catch all the fish. They sell out the fish and there is no stock. The businesses become difficult and bear a lot of risk. The businesses gain less and less profit. The cost increases because the natural resources are depleted. . . . I first turned to sustainable seafood when a consumer co-op approached me. I deliberately introduced the idea of sustainable seafood, which is currently similar to the food guide. I build up the framework for this co-op and encourage more ecological aquaculture. I hold to develop a sector following this framework. . . . I operate my business like a social enterprise. 572

The two schools of thought (one exemplified by Mr. Deng and one following the seafood guide) I have presented both link the global scale of marine resource management to the market. The key issue is whether and how producers should satisfy consumers, or whether consumers need to practise ethical consumption to protect the environment. In Taiwan, producers and consumers have interacted to promote more sustainable seafood consumption. What is missing in the above dialogue about grouper farming is how fish farmers make their decisions in choosing feed. Fish farmers employ diverse practices to address the issue of grouper farming’s use of marine resources. Their practices are more strongly affected by the availability of local resources and the cost–benefit calculations. The cost of buying wild-caught fish to feed the groupers is their major consideration: Our production cost is high. I feed the groupers with wild-caught fish. It takes TWD50 to keep the groupers to grow one catty. Other use feed and it costs TWD40 to reach the same goal. One day, a feed salesman told me that someone in Pingtung County increased his order from 20 tonnes per month to 60 tonnes per month. I said “of course! The farm-gate price keeps dropping. Using feed is a way to lower the product costs.” . . . I get used to feeding the groupers with fish. If the farm-gate price was high, I would not have any financial pressure. 573

571 Chi.: chang. In Chinese, 鯧 and 昌 are pronounced the same. 572 Mr. Tsai, a seafood company owner: interview, June 10, 2014. 573 Mr. Chang, a fish farmer: interview, August 21, 2014. 328

Simu fish farmers fed their giant groupers with milkfish heads purchased from local P&F plants. Because the plants were located in the community, milkfish heads were abundant and inexpensive. The fish farmers also fed the groupers with unwanted Mozambique tilapia from fish farms. 574 Some fish farmers put the live tilapia into ponds to attract the groupers, which they described as “lazy” fish, to move and chase their prey. The groupers with more physical exercise could have better texture. Others were skeptical of the potential parasites or diseases the tilapia might bring into the ponds. Therefore, they first froze the tilapia before feeding them to the groupers. The fish farmers who used milkfish heads instead of tilapia consider the former’s better feed conversion rate (FCR). Their practices were the result of their economic considerations, ecological knowledge, community networks, and culinary culture (i.e., taste). In south Taiwan, fish farmers use feed and wild-caught fish to feed groupers. Feed plants compete with each other and encourage fish farmers to use feed by choosing better quality fish meal, which depends on its FCR and odour. Fish farmers are concerned about the cost of feeding and the consequences of using feed or wild-caught fish for the pond environment. This concern is related to the possibility of disease outbreak, the need for veterinary drug usage, and food safety. Water quality is important to pond management. Fish farmers observe groupers’ appetite and decide how much feed or fish they put into the ponds. They minimize the unconsumed feed or fish which would be decomposed on the pond bottom. They shifted to wild-caught fish when the price dropped below the price of feed. To use wild-caught fish, they needed to use a machine to cut the fish into pieces. Some fish farmers employed part-time workers or had family members help in this process. They consider the costs, the quality and quantity of their grouper, and the labour costs of using feed and wild-caught fish in their daily routine. The example of grouper farming illuminates the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture, which involves ecological, economic, and social dimensions that various stakeholders have made great efforts to address. An insightful quote from Mr. Tseng, another top-level government

574 Although fish farmers use teacake to kill the unwanted predators before farming the varieties they want, tilapia continue to be present when water birds drop their catch into some ponds. The tilapias grown inside the ponds, with a low unit price, are usually consumed by fish farmers or used as feed. 329

official, expressed his reflection on the development of Taiwanese fishery policies and extended the discussion on sustainable aquaculture to the socioeconomic dimension: Sustainable resource management is important. We cannot destroy the environment, especially our land and water. Aquaculture releases water (effluent) back to nature. The drugs and fertilizers may affect the environment. I think it is better to consider the agriculture and fisheries together. We are talking about their values. There are three kinds of values: economy, environment, and society. Producing economically high-value seafood may destroy the environment and bring no benefit to society. For example, our tuna sector creates NTD30 billion per year and our oyster sector gets NTD4 billions. We know that the tuna fishery leads to marine resource exploitation and a fishing company employs mostly foreign workers. Oyster cultivation does not need drugs. Oyster can enhance water quality. Many Taiwanese sustain their livelihood by engaging in the oyster sector. Should we invest more in the oyster sector? It is our social and environmental responsibility to think over this issue and do research. 575

Mr. Tseng’s reflection emphasizes that Taiwanese aquaculture should become sustainable along ecological, economic, and social dimensions. Production volume and monetary values are not the only variables that should be used to evaluate the sustainability of the sector. Similar to the tuna catching, whether grouper farming is beneficial to a more sustainable Taiwanese aquaculture is still debatable. The cross-strait relationship complicates the grouper trade. The case of the grouper in cross-strait trade and sustainability demonstrates that policy and practices in Taiwanese aquaculture are linked to political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological factors. Perspectives on the use of wild-caught fish to feed groupers, for instance, involve the taste of groupers and the availability of alternatives (e.g., tilapia and milkfish). Chinese markets that demand delicious groupers thus affect local practices. Cultural, ecological, economic, social, and political factors interact to affect the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture. The discussion on sustainable grouper farming in Taiwan shows that the growing grouper market has increased the use of natural resources from the ocean to feed the farmed groupers. Taiwanese business people have imported a lot of fish meal from other countries to support grouper production. Fish farmers are using low-value fish to enhance the taste and texture of groupers. The development of the Taiwanese grouper sector exploits marine resources. The declining farm-gate prices for

575 Mr. Tseng, a top-level government official: interview, March 19, 2015. 330

groupers, however, alerted the sector that the practices are not economically sustainable. Mr. Tseng’s reflection shows that the socioeconomic contribution of one aquaculture sector to local people can be measured in many ways. Other than the total production and export values, he suggested considering the actual income of fish farmers and the impact of the sector on the environment. I collected diverse perspectives on how sustainable aquaculture can be achieved. Stakeholders have considered various factors when they promote their ideals and practices. These factors include the production processes for various species, the inputs needed, and the possible impacts of selecting particular species on fish farmers.

VI. Conclusion: The Future of Sustainable Aquaculture in Taiwan

This chapter provided a case study of Taiwanese aquaculture to examine the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese fish farmers’ livelihoods. Grouper farmers experienced first the rise and then the fall of the farm-gate price during the ECFA’s first five years of implementation. The stakeholders in the grouper farming sector realized the risk involved in overreliance on the Chinese market and diversified their markets. Selling frozen groupers to other markets became their business strategy. During 2014, as the examples I have presented indicate, the domestic market was the major market for these groupers. They explored the export market by joining associations and government promotional activities in foreign countries. They linked sustainability and food safety to frozen grouper marketing, in contrast to the mainstream practice of live grouper exports to China. The emerging category of frozen grouper illustrates that the Taiwanese grouper sector has integrated elements of globalization, sustainability, food safety, and cross-strait relationships in their production and marketing processes. The ECFA not only boosted grouper exports, but it also resulted in fish farmers’ new practices. The political economy of cross-strait trade was connected to pond management and the supply chains for live and frozen products. The seafood trade is inseparable from dietary cultures. Grouper is much more popular than milkfish in China. The high-value grouper, which symbolizes the wealth of the host in Chinese cultures, is important to the sustainability of the Taiwanese grouper sector. The ECFA Early Harvest Program and a number of new policies under the closer cross-strait relation created more positive effects on the grouper sector in terms of normalizing the formerly illegal transport

331

of live groupers. The sector interacts with the market constructed by Chinese cultures and politics. The growing Chinese market, which reflects economic growth in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan since the mid-twentieth century, has also facilitated the increasing demand for grouper. As a form of luxury consumption in China, offering giant grouper at banquets sponsored by the government budget was banned in 2003. The symbolic meaning of grouper and the subsequent policies in China affected Taiwanese fish farming. The grouper and milkfish cases show that Taiwanese food producers and traders have faced barriers in diversifying their markets. Chapters five through seven discuss five major and interrelated factors that affect the successes of Taiwanese farmed seafood in export markets. First, Taiwan’s production volume was lower than in other countries. While other countries could export larger volumes of seafood to the export market, Taiwan reoriented its strategy to compete on quality. Second, seafood quality is difficult to define and compare in the markets. Consumers know little about the differences between Taiwanese seafood and seafood from other countries. On some occasions, they do not know where the seafood is from. The price factor, on which Taiwanese seafood is outcompeted by other seafood producers such as China and Vietnam, undermines the competitiveness of Taiwanese seafood. Third, the Taiwanese government and business people attempted to promote Taiwanese seafood in export markets, but their strategies of highlighting the quality and Taiwanese/Chinese culinary culture do not always succeed. Even in China, seafood consumption in inland cities is different from consumption in the coastal cities. Whether Taiwanese business people have enough capacity to survive the market and find more than one major market is questionable. Fourth, to fish farmers, farm-gate prices for seafood are related to market demand and also how middlemen set prices on varying occasions. Fish farmers can, however, control the health conditions and quality of their products. Even if they become ecological or non-toxic fish farmers and market their own products, their practices have limited potential in the domestic market. Most of them have weak incentives to participate in sustainability governance. Fifth, the fish farmers’ relatively weak incentives for joining sustainability governance or eco-certification undermine their capacity to expand their markets to those that require eco-certification. The traders rely on several certified fish farmers as suppliers, or Taiwanese seafood remains in competition with those uncertified products from other countries. Taiwanese governments,

332

traders, and fish farmers have not succeeded in creating sufficient market differentiation for Taiwanese seafood. The reorientation of Taiwanese government policy to promote high-quality and hence high-value seafood products has been only partially accomplished. Whether Taiwanese seafood can consistently be sold as high-value seafood is not yet known. Further discussion of the development of grouper farming sheds light on natural resource management. Fish farmers played a role in the sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture by maintaining a profitable sector and a balanced ecosystem. The case of grouper farming shows that inland pond culture is related to the extraction of natural resources nationally and globally. The discussion of fish meal used in feed manufacturing for grouper farming delineates the importance of making and implementing policies that promote sustainable aquaculture. Seafood production includes various inputs that may not be recognized in the final products. More diverse voices from the academic and business sectors have existed in Taiwan to balance profit-making and environmental protection. They have increasingly affected consumer choices and the governance of Taiwanese aquaculture. Government officials have held differing and sometimes contrasting views of sustainability in Taiwanese aquaculture. Further discussion of the ways in which views are compromised to generate a more long-term policy benefiting the grouper sector and other aquaculture sectors is needed.

333

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the ECFA’s major impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture, of which there are several. First, the tariff elimination has decreased transaction costs for Taiwanese seafood exported to China via the normal trade route. This trade route, however, involves the value-added tax that the Petty Trade route does not include. Whether the total transaction cost decreases is uncertain. Seafood business people calculate their costs and benefits and then decide to use one or both of these routes. Second, China’s policies and strategies affected the sales of Taiwanese seafood. The Chinese government sponsored a five-year trade contract on a small portion of Taiwanese milkfish. However, business people experienced poor milkfish sales in China, which exposed differences in culinary cultures and market demand for seafood between China and Taiwan. In contrast, Taiwanese grouper traders found an increased Chinese demand for Taiwanese groupers after the ECFA implementation, even though they had already been previously smuggling groupers to China. However, the anti-corruption policy of China that caused the farm-gate price of giant groupers, and the export volume, to decrease. Third, the Taiwanese government used the ECFA as an opportunity to further strengthen its policy of regulating Taiwanese aquaculture with respect to seafood transport and food safety, as shown by the development of its grouper sector. Fourth, Taiwanese fish farmers, who sustained their businesses by selling seafood to the domestic market or other export markets, were less influenced by the ECFA than the fish farmers who exported most of their products (such as grouper) to China between 2011 and 2015. Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have responded to the ECFA implementation and Taiwan’s fisheries policies in various ways. Over the last three decades, policies, public awareness, and their own personal reflections have helped fish farmers develop three major pond management methods (i.e., conventional, non-toxic, and ecological aquaculture). Business people strengthened the frozen seafood supply chain. They also branded and tried to add value to their products with such qualities as personal trust, food safety, sustainability, taste, and nutritional value. The profits of fish farmers and business people now hinge on environmental conditions, farming techniques, processing, freezing, and transport technologies, marketing strategies, and cultural values associated with seafood products. These factors affect the

334

sustainability of Taiwanese aquaculture. Within five years of the ECFA implementation, fish farmers and business people realized that reliance on the Chinese market was not beneficial. They faced challenges insofar as Chinese consumers have diverging cultural values and expectations of seafood, making successful milkfish sales difficult to achieve. The political aspect of relations with China, such as its anti-corruption policy, negatively affected the demand for Taiwanese giant groupers. As a result, Taiwanese fish farmers and business people diversified their sources of profit in several ways: by exploring other export markets; developing alternative markets in Taiwan, other non-farm jobs and business opportunities; producing different seafood varieties; and selling processed products. Even with these adjustments, Taiwanese aquaculture still faced challenges of sustainability. First, there are trade barriers that affect the businesses’ performance. With the ECFA for example, China’s internal policies (like the value-added tax) are a cost that Taiwanese exports cannot avoid in the Early Harvest Program. Second, some government programs do not meet their goals. The stocking consensus is one case that fails to prevent occasional overproduction. The price fluctuation undermines fish farmers’ motivation to join together to have long-term plans. Comparing their sector to successful examples in the global market such as the Norwegian salmon sector, stakeholders of Taiwanese aquaculture realized their lack of united power to compete with other countries. Third, fish farmers’ exploitation of natural resources has undermined sectoral progress towards sustainability. As the discussion of fish meal has shown, fish farmers in southwest Taiwan have local practices to enhance their environmental sustainability. The existence of regional differences in Taiwan means that fish farmers have to adopt diverse strategies to expand the scale of sustainable practices to the national level. Fourth, political and economic factors under globalization and cross-strait relations generate uncertainties for the future of sustainability in Taiwan. After the Taiwanese government used the ECFA to provide opportunities for Taiwanese fish farmers and business people to explore the Chinese market, cultural, political, and economic factors hindered the market value growth of Taiwanese seafood. This concluding chapter highlights and details the contribution of this study to the understanding of Taiwanese aquaculture. Taiwanese aquaculture has a promising future due to its increasing sustainability: It has shown signs of enhancing the environment, linking

335

ecologically sustainable seafood to fish farmers’ livelihoods and consumers’ choices. Taiwanese governments at various levels provide incentives for fish farmers to enhance their practices. Taiwanese fish farmers and seafood business people exercise agency under the influence of global–local dynamics, food standards, and trade and fisheries policies. They integrate new and old practices to sustain their environment, livelihoods, and lifestyles, and to overcome constraints. They interact with the governance processes to promote sustainable aquaculture and seafood trade.

I. Global–local Dynamics of Taiwanese Sustainable Aquaculture

Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have integrated scientific and local knowledge to enhance techniques of artificial propagation, feeding, veterinary drug usage, and probiotics applications. They also benefit from the technologies of processing, freezing, and transport, which allows them to participate in the domestic and global seafood supply chains. Global capitalism has affected Taiwanese aquaculture and its environment even though transnational corporations seldom invest directly in this sector. For example, ingredients or products in feed and veterinary drugs are sourced internationally to be used locally. The fish farmers in southwest Taiwan practise their milkfish–shrimp polyculture to make intensive farming ecologically sustainable in the local contexts. Their shrimp production earned them good income in 2013 and 2014 so they could survive in global and domestic markets. Global aquaculture faces environmental degradation and the rising demand for food safety across global markets. Taiwan’s aquaculture restructuring has resulted in policies and programs that aim to enhance the quality of Taiwanese seafood so they can successfully compete other countries. Trade and environmental governance that promotes environmental sustainability and food safety are therefore both practices and discourses that emphasize the economic benefits for fish farmers’ livelihoods. Technological breakthroughs and trade liberalization break down some of the trade barriers to accelerate the globalization of Taiwanese farmed seafood. Drug residue inspections and other governance on food safety provide opportunities for business people to sell high-quality seafood to particular countries. These non-tariff trade barriers prevent the trade of seafood that do not meet the requirements of import countries. In most cases,

336

Taiwanese fish farmers meet the standards of veterinary drug residues on seafood and supply their products to import countries. The interrelated policies, and social and cultural factors affect whether and how “high- quality” equals “high-value” in seafood products. Fish farmers and business people have followed more regulations of their seafood production and processing since the 1990s. Some of them have used branding with their eco-certification and personal relations to build up consumers’ trust and confidence in their products. These fish farmers and business people assumed the higher quality of their seafood together with such branding would add additional monetary value to their “non-toxic” or “ecological” products. They found that whether consumers are willing to pay more or not depends on their beliefs about the specific products being safer than others. Taiwanese aquaculture has faced other production and marketing issues with respect to the global supply chain. First, the limited area of available land, especially after the aquaculture restructuring in 1992, crippled Taiwan’s capacity to increase total production area, which is what other seafood producers did. Intensification, which includes the increase of stocking and the deepening of ponds, became the major method for increasing production volume. However, unintended consequences occurred from these methods, such as overproduction and shrimp disease outbreaks. In addition, having no national production plan or transparent market information, fish farmers occasionally overproduced and suffered price fluctuations. Taiwan’s domestic market is too small to supplement the global market in response to Taiwanese fish famers’ increase of production volume. This resulted in overproduction which decreased seafood prices. Further, disease outbreaks undermined the development of the sector. Occasional discovery of excessive drug residues in exports undermined the competitiveness of Taiwanese seafood in the global market. The Taiwanese government, fish farmers, and business people have deployed multiple strategies to increase the sales of Taiwanese seafood products. The Taiwanese national government negotiates free trade agreements and promotes sustainability governance to facilitate trade. Taiwanese fish farmers manage the environment based on their local and scientific knowledge and understanding of global market demand. The example of milkfish–shrimp polyculture has shown their capacity to simultaneously enhance ecological and economic

337

sustainability. Business people, their associations, and county governments facilitate the processing of seafood to provide more options for consumers. They promote the seafood products by teaching consumers how best to prepare and eat them. They explore and diversify markets by looking for new countries that import Taiwanese products (such as the Middle East for milkfish). They process seafood to different products to satisfy market demand (e.g., fish balls). In the domestic market, distribution functions to help fish farmers supply their harvest for mass consumption. Some fish farmers market their own products and explore alternative markets. They add value to high-quality products with supplemental cultural projects, such as agrotourism and similar promotional activities. The history of the globalization of Taiwanese seafood shows that capitalist logics and state intervention coexist in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has implemented policies— from extension, restructuring, veterinary drug regulations, to traceability—to enhance the competiveness of Taiwanese seafood products. Many countries have experienced similar paths as they develop their aquaculture sectors. Taiwan’s experience shows the potential of pursuing sustainability within global trade liberalization. Specifically, local communities utilise diverse strategies in responses to the boom and bust of the sector. These strategies include more eco- friendly practices, diversified sources of income, polyculture, etc. Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have explored both global and domestic markets to sustain their businesses. They have deployed strategies designed to meet new standards, regulations, and market demand. They have been engaged in production, processing, distribution, and marketing, hoping to convert their contributions to food safety and environmental sustainability into monetary value. This is an outcome of food cultures, labour processes, knowledge, marketing, and reflections on human–environment relationships.

II. The Political Ecology of Sustainability Governance

The formation of three categories of aquaculture (conventional, non-toxic, and ecological fish farming) represents fish farmers’ responses to environmental degradation, consumer demand for food safety, and price fluctuations along the supply chain. The farmers’ ability to adapt to policies and governance is a key to fostering a resilient socio-ecological system. Their decisions and practices have been affected by political, economic, cultural, social, and ecological factors.

338

The experiences of Taiwanese fish farmers under the ECFA and fisheries policies illustrate that human–environment interactions are political. Government policies, fisheries extension services, marine scientists, and fish farmers themselves increased production volume and the market value of Taiwanese seafood. The Fisheries Agency introduced environmental regulations and eco- labelling, as well as certification and traceability systems, to make Taiwanese high-value seafood more competitive in the international seafood trade. The term “sustainability governance” refers to the application of governance systems such as eco-certification and traceability to food sectors to encourage more truly sustainable practices. Traceability systems, including Taiwan Good Aquaculture Practices (TGAP) and Traceable Agricultural Products (TAP), offer standards for “better management practices” on the part of Taiwanese fish farmers to enhance food safety and environmental sustainability. Sustainability governance both provides opportunities and introduces frictions in the globalization of Taiwanese seafood. It is noteworthy that changing farming and processing practices transform would-be frictions into opportunities for selling seafood in particular markets. For instance, to avoid having their exports denied or detained, Taiwanese business people meet codes imposed by global food safety standards and systems (e.g., ISO22000 and HACCP). Taiwanese fish farmers follow the guidelines of drug residue withdrawal periods to meet the standards of the markets in which they sell their products. Failing to meet such standards means their incomes will be affected. The fishermen and fish farmer associations work as intermediaries, sponsored by the government, to help fish farmers participate in eco- certification by helping them input records into online systems. Following Schuller (2007), such support functions as a form of “gluing globalization,” as these intermediaries fill in the gaps that once made Taiwanese fish farmers unable or unwilling to earn eco-certification. The presence of these intermediaries helps the fish farmers to join eco-certification and thus explore markets demanding certified seafood. The Taiwanese government, certification agencies, veterinarians, and local intermediaries have provided the technical assistance and guidelines for fish farmers to participate in the eco-certification (i.e., TAP). Chen and Qiu (2014) found that the rate at which Taiwanese fish farmers participate in the eco-certification process was low. My study shows that the primary cause of this low rate of participation arises from the lack of incentives, which in turn is attributable to the failure of

339

market differentiation for traceable and certified products. To distribute to and trade their products in the mainstream market such as fish markets, fish farmers rely on business people (i.e., distributors and P&F plant owners). Even though their products are certified, their sales of the products may not be able to cover their costs of eco-certification. Various qualities of seafood, such as the body fat and freshness, are major factors to determine the prices of seafood in fish markets. Similar factors affect the grouper exports to China in that certified groupers are sold at the same price as the other groupers. However, this does not mean certified products cannot find a market in Taiwan, as supermarkets have increased the amount of eco-labelled seafood. The alternative market, such as organic food stores, aims to sell these products to consumers who agree to buy these products at a higher price compared to seafood sold in the mainstream market. Thus, fish farmers choose to sell their products to different markets or middlemen. Ultimately, the fish farmers’ calculations of costs and benefits inform their decisions to obtain eco-certifications and brand their products as certified ones. In light of the above-mentioned factors, the idea of environmentality falls short as an explanation for how Taiwanese fish farmers became environmentally conscious. The government is only one of few actors that influence fish farmers’ practices in pond management. Records exist indicating how fish farmers have exercised agency and interacted with other stakeholders, such as consumers and business people, to improve their management practices. Since the 1990s, the relationship between sustainability governance in Taiwanese aquaculture and fish farmers has been marked by two types of mutual effects. First, laws, regulations, and certification systems have been developed to strengthen fish farmers’ environmental management, leading to more ecologically sustainable practices such as non-toxic or ecological aquaculture. Second, the development of more ecologically sustainable practices and producers marketing their own products has facilitated the branding of certified farmed seafood. Interactions between fish farmers and sustainability governance in the form of certification are therefore complicated. Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have pursued sustainability by deploying a range of strategies to add value to their seafood in production, processing, and marketing . Fish farmers thus join the eco-certifications because of their market incentives. In more recent years, the Taiwanese government, business people, supermarkets, and fish farmers have put greater

340

effort into differentiating certified products from conventional products. Sustainability governance is linked to marketing and cultural acceptance of certified products. Fish farmers understand that the slow progress they have made is not simply a result of governance, but is also part of the new trend in product branding. Branding, therefore, is a marketing tool that fish farmers and business people use—along with ecolabels, drug residue inspection reports, and their personal reputations—to attract consumers. This process makes sustainable seafood more acceptable to consumers, through highlighting food safety and trust. Unfortunately, certification has increased fish farmers’ investments and labour inputs, but not always in a way that has raised incomes. For example, fish farmers have found that exploring alternative markets that cut off distributors from the mainstream market might not be profitable. For example, the slotting fees in organic food stores can be as expensive as the distributors’ share of fish farmers’ profits. Direct transactions between fish farmers and consumers require extra time and cause labour costs for the fish farmers. In Taiwan, the success of sustainability governance depends on whether fish farmers’ definition of sustainability and the associated practices converge with the goals of the governance institutions. The Taiwanese government has used institutions operated by marine scientists to promote traceability and conduct food safety inspections in production facilities and fish markets. Such a “traceability” discourse is becoming popular because Taiwanese consumers who are increasingly demanding food safety. They are less concerned about sustainability along ecological, economic, and social dimensions. In practice, a traceability system such as the TAP is unlikely to increase the value of seafood products unless consumers find the differentiation meaningful. Po-fang, a fish farmer, argued for bringing consumers into their fish farms to educate them about the connections between food safety and sustainability. Fish farmers’ reputations and consumer trust are linked to the value of seafood in this particular form of social relationship. Fish farmers have used different opportunities to show their consumers that proper handling of seafood in harvest, processing, freezing, and transport help to maintain the freshness of the frozen seafood products.

341

III. The State–Society Interaction in ECFA

The Taiwanese government adopts free trade policies, but it still intervenes in the market and the economy in Taiwan. It uses various associations and programs to boost fish farmers’ production and marketing. For example, in the ECFA negotiations, it maintained the ban on agricultural and seafood imports from China. Although ECFA is regarded by the WTO as a bilateral free trade agreement to reduce trade barriers, Taiwan and China have maintained their state intervention to protect local sectors. The Taiwanese aquaculture sector enjoys tariff reduction of their exports to China, while the Chinese products do not. China’s value-added tax discouraged Taiwanese seafood exports to enter China via the normal trade route. In Taiwan, the government policies and programs that encourage fish farmers to organize themselves, with government subsidies and consultation, coexist with “free market” mechanisms. These practices enable fish farmers to enhance their competitiveness with government resources. The ECFA removed tariffs on Taiwanese seafood exported to the Chinese market, which is one of the targets of the globalization project for Taiwanese aquaculture. This one-way tariff elimination demonstrates the co-existence of protectionism and market mechanisms. Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have experienced the ECFA and offer distinct perspectives on the its impacts on their businesses. Their experiences are influenced by the cross-strait political economy; Rigger (2011: 161) suggested that the ECFA is China’s strategy of “‘buying’ support for unification,” a strategy for which I found little evidence of success in my research. China’s rang-li strategy as a form of state intervention in the ECFA has therefore politicized the cross- strait seafood trade. The major effect was that the cross-strait political economy offered a new trade route without tariff to Taiwanese fish farmers and business people. Closer cross-strait economic relations have opened China as a market and eliminated tariffs on Taiwanese seafood (except the processed products). Cross-strait trade under the ECFA has now become part of Taiwan’s strategy for globalizing its seafood sector. The two existing trade routes, Petty Trade and normal trade, provided opportunities for Taiwanese business people to deploy a range of strategies for exploring the Chinese market. My findings regarding milkfish and grouper sales in China under the ECFA have indicated that cultural factors affect the business performance of Taiwanese fish products in the Chinese market. More importantly, the so-called shared Chinese-ness among the mainland

342

Chinese and the Taiwanese is not universal within the Chinese societies. People like certain seafood products according to the product’s value, personal taste, and perceived social status. For example, trade regulations enabled or limited their business strategies. Cultural factors such as taste and culinary culture (e.g., the adaptation to accept bony whole fish) slowed the development of the milkfish trade. The question of taste was related to the environmental conditions of pond management and how the SFC selected milkfish for export. In another case, the grouper trade was affected by the anti-corruption policy in China. Fish farmers opted to farm Tiger GG as a response to declining prices for giant groupers, partly because Tiger GG maintains the taste and texture of the latter. The Tiger GG also grows at a faster pace than the brown- marbled grouper. This example showed how political factors in China affected Taiwanese fish farmers’ economic decisions and their practices in fish farming. Taiwanese aquaculture illustrates how local communities have adapted to the global forces. Local people have deployed multiple strategies through their networks within and across their communities. After the intensification of farming practices in Simu, milkfish prices dropped in the absence of government measures to protect fish farmers. The buffer stock program, which was intended to help fish farmers when prices dropped without violating the WTO’s principles, benefited P&F plant owners instead of fish farmers. This situation induced fish farmers to change their cultural understanding of milkfish from that of a high-value seafood to that of a “work fish.” This understanding prevailed when shrimp prices were high and milkfish functioned to increase shrimp production volume in polyculture practices. Daily lives in local communities are resilient because local people created and used resources and opportunities to overcome the challenges posed by globalization and free trade. Even when Simu was excluded from the milkfish trade contract, and the sales of milkfish in China was not satisfactory, the fish farmers used their multiple strategies in aquaculture and non-farm work to sustain their livelihoods.

IV. Trade Governance and the ECFA’s Impacts

Closer cross-strait relations have resulted in the application of more than one form of trade governance to Taiwanese aquaculture. For example, the Fisheries Agency has legalized live fish carriers and applied food safety regulations to activities associated with their use. The ECFA has changed the tariff and non-tariff arrangements that apply to Taiwanese seafood. These policy

343

measures have created new legal boundaries in Taiwanese aquaculture. Those complying with China’s food safety regulations are allowed to export their products to China under the ECFA. Business people who previously used Petty Trade did not enjoy the tariff elimination. In the seaborne live fish trade, licences to use live fish carriers are authorized for people who follow the regulations. The example of Taiwan’s ECFA implementation has shown that the advent of neoliberalism and free trade did not eliminate the influence of the state, with the government actively affecting how Taiwanese fish farmers and business people exported their seafood products to China. The Taiwanese Fisheries Agency and Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office used opportunities to regulate the cross-strait seafood trade. The globalization of and trade governance over Taiwanese farmed seafood was thus further advanced under state influence after the ECFA was signed. The grouper export sector, which previously operated under lighter regulations, was more heavily affected by the ECFA in terms of trade governance. Domestic policies in China, such as the anti-corruption campaign, undermined the farm-gate prices of Taiwanese groupers. Taiwanese fish farmers and business people have found that globalization and closer cross-strait relations have provided both opportunities and challenges to their businesses. For instance, they expected the Taiwanese government to help their marketing. Simultaneously, they realized that they needed to find ways to compete in the global system with their seafood products. This situation fostered ongoing discussions about how to restructure seafood supply chains, market high-value products, and adopt sustainable governance to promote Taiwanese seafood. In the short term, Taiwanese milkfish farmers and business people benefited less from the ECFA than their counterparts in the grouper sector did. The Early Harvest Program is limited to live, frozen, and chilled fish; processed seafood is excluded. For business people, this undermined their benefits of the market diversification, since selling processed products is tariff- laden. Further ECFA negotiations were suspended after the Sunflower Movement. The direct impact of this arrangement on Taiwanese aquaculture is that tariffs continue to be imposed on milkfish balls and floss. The cost of exporting these products to China via the normal route was higher than the cost of using the Petty Trade route. Peet and Watts (1996: 11) propose the investigation of “the relations between civil society and the environment” to investigate how and why “the institutional and regulatory spaces” are “encoded, negotiated, and contested.” In

344

Taiwan, the growing momentum of social movements and civil society has influenced government policies in the case of the ECFA. Social movements that oppose free trade with China have also responded to a state that neoliberalized the national economy in the anti-ECFA activists’ perspectives. The pause in negotiations and hence the limited categories of fish products covered by the ECFA affected the range of business people’s marketing strategies and their competitiveness in the Chinese market. For example, the political tensions between China and Taiwan that arose after the Sunflower Movement made it impossible to eliminate tariffs on fish balls and floss. This situation prevented the milkfish sector from enjoying the benefits of the ECFA because those specific products were more likely to be accepted by Chinese consumers than whole fish or fillets. In the short term, Chinese consumers have not adopted Taiwanese culinary culture. The ECFA’s terms were not favourable to the development of the milkfish trade. Over the long term, the ECFA’s Early Harvest Program has provided opportunities but also frictions for Taiwanese business people seeking to succeed in the Chinese market. Tariff elimination, the key measure affecting seafood products under the Early Harvest Program, has decreased the export cost for Taiwanese seafood heading to China. However, calculating the total cost of exporting Taiwanese seafood to China is more complicated. The use of the normal trade route includes the value-added tax (VAT) and non-tariff trade barriers (i.e., food safety certificates) required by China. Business people using the Petty Trade route saw the normal trade route as one impeded by these frictions because of the increased monetary costs (i.e., the VAT) and labour costs. Those starting to export to China saw opportunities to succeed with better quality seafood that meets China’s food safety standards and can be sold in a wider market network (e.g., supermarkets). Taiwanese business people using different trade routes have their own interpretations of and experiences with the ECFA. They are directly affected by the ECFA no matter how they export seafood to China. The Taiwanese government and scholars examining the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese agricultural and fisheries sectors can learn from Taiwanese fish farmers’ experiences—what they actually take from trade is more important than the export volume or value. In Taiwanese aquaculture, fish farmers calculate profits from their harvest by considering farm-gate prices. Taiwanese fish farmers, no matter what they have farmed, have benefited from the ECFA to a

345

lesser extent than they expected before its implementation. For example, the Taiwanese government has claimed that the milkfish and grouper sectors have benefited from the Early Harvest Program based on the official statistics on increasing export volumes and market values. Taiwanese fish farmers learned from experience, though, that farm-gate milkfish prices did not increase after the ECFA’s implementation. Farm-gate grouper prices had risen by 2013 but then dropped, despite the increasing export volume. A limited number of fish farmers benefited from the SFC’s trade contract in the short term; the trade contract was terminated after the end of China’s intervention in 2016. The supply chain in the milkfish and grouper sectors were structured to be interactions between fish farmers and business people exporting products to China. Since business people take a share of the profits from marketing and distribution, ignoring this structural factor will skew the evaluation of the ECFA’s impacts on fish farmers and other stakeholders. Five factors have affected the extent of the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwanese aquaculture. First, cross-strait trade agreement negotiations and the subsequent terms have given Taiwanese fish farmers and business people very different experiences. Second, the business and political networks of Taiwanese business people determine their marketing strategies for the Chinese market. Third, cultural differences between the Taiwanese and the Chinese have resulted in differentiated demand for the quantity and quality of seafood products. Fourth, environmental conditions have made some fish farming activities more beneficial than others in Taiwan. Fifth, state intervention has continued, following the ECFA’s implementation. The Taiwanese government has continued to govern Taiwanese aquaculture by introducing certification systems that strengthen food safety practices. Chinese governments at the central, provincial, and local levels have merchandized Taiwanese milkfish products to attract Taiwanese residents’ support. Taiwan’s case involving the ECFA has shown that trade liberalization and the global seafood trade involve political, social, and human–environment relationships that are more complex than the free market principles governing FTAs.

346

V. Policy Implications

The Taiwanese government’s strategy in the aquaculture restructuring matches the Code of Conduct (see introduction), which encourages countries to ensure food safety and quality. The Taiwanese government facilitates fish farmers and business people to take “particular care before and during harvesting and on-site processing and in storage and transport of the products” (2011: 57). The government provides subsidies and assistance for these quality-oriented activities, and fish farmers have changed their practices to alleviate land subsidence. Taiwan’s experience reveals that countries can commit to the Code and generate positive outcomes. However, Agenda 21 needs frequent updating to broaden the scope of Taiwanese sustainable aquaculture. In the case of grouper, the use of fish meal, which is a global issue, also remains an issue to the Taiwanese government and fish farmers. While fish farmers seek local solutions, the government may simultaneously work with other countries to encourage the more sustainable use of low- value fish. Other countries can learn two lessons from Taiwan’s aquaculture restructuring. First, communication between Taiwanese fish farmers and the government is vital. Fish farmers have provided constructive feedback to inform governance of the processing farmed seafood. For example, the growing trend towards ecological and non-toxic aquaculture has gone hand in hand with fish farmers who market their own products. The fish farmers who have practised primary processing and freezing have succeeded in influencing the Taiwanese government to amend the TGAP standards. The government has done so to regulate the fish farmers’ primary processing operations to enhance food safety. The fish farmers have integrated primary processing and traceability with their fish farming business to explore new markets. Second, Taiwanese fish farmers have shown resilience in reversing environmental degradation and managing price fluctuations. Ecological and economic sustainability is vital to aquaculture development. Taiwanese fish farmers have experienced the decline of tiger prawn farming, land subsidence, and food safety episodes. At the policy level, top-down knowledge transfer is not always the best option for Taiwanese aquaculture. In fact, Taiwanese fish farmers have integrated scientific and local knowledge to manage their environments. The transition from using antibiotics to treat fish disease to using prevention with probiotics and water quality testing is one example. All policy measures would be more effective if government officials

347

were to take the fish farmers’ experience into account to enhance sustainability. Governance is not a one-way or top-down process. Multiple stakeholders’ participation in policy-making and implementation should be considered. I conclude that Taiwanese aquaculture has shown the potential to achieve sustainability at the ecological, economic, and social levels; the ECFA is one of several policies that provide a framework for trading Taiwanese farmed seafood. Taiwanese fish farmers have used diverse strategies to overcome the limitations imposed by cross-strait relations, environmental constraints in Taiwan, and competition from other countries. Taiwan’s case shows how food production and marketing are related to sustainability and free trade agreements. Concepts and practices enhancing food security, food safety, and food quality are inseparable from sustainable food production. Farmed seafood is both a commodity and part of the environment that connects livelihoods to coastal and marine resources. High-quality seafood has been redefined in the process as healthy, safe, delicious, and ecological food the production of which benefits both producers and consumers. Traceability is not only a form of enhancing the practices of fish farmers, but also a way to govern the aquaculture sector to meet global standards. The result is that Taiwanese fish farmers are experimenting with marketing their products in various markets and in various ways. The ECFA provided new options for Taiwanese business people and fish farmers to calculate the costs and benefits of exporting their products to China in new ways. Taiwanese fish farmers developed strategies for the production, distribution, processing, and marketing of seafood to sustain their livelihoods, the environment, and production with or without the Chinese market. The fish farmers and business people diversified their markets by exporting seafood, increasing the value of seafood products with traceability and new fish farming practices, and marketing and branding their products in domestic markets. The ongoing development of Taiwanese aquaculture needs the participation of multiple stakeholders in policy-making and implementation processes (Chen and Qiu 2014). In-depth understanding of fish farmers’ exercise of agency, cost–benefit calculations, and relations with the environment is essential to accomplishing the goal of sustaining Taiwanese aquaculture. This research has focused strongly on the impacts of ECFA on seafood production and trade. From the perspectives of Taiwanese fish farmers and seafood business people, Taiwanese

348

seafood are valued differently in China and Taiwan. They also understand that consumers in other countries may have various seafood preferences, which could affect the demand for Taiwanese products. Extending from these findings, I would like to conduct further research on how consumers in other countries, such as the United States, select farmed seafood and how they perceive Taiwanese farmed seafood. I will investigate whether and how Taiwanese farmed seafood products meet the demands of the international consumers.

349

REFERENCES

Some authors provide both Chinese and English names and article/book titles. However, if no English is given, I provide Mandarin pinyin and an English translation. I use sentence-case capitalization to maximize readability.

Acheson, James 1988. The Lobster Gangs of Maine . Hanover & London: University Press of New England. 2003. Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry . Hanover & London: University Press of New England.

Agrawal, Arun 2005. Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects . Durham: Duke University Press.

Alava, Veronica 1998. Effect of Salinity, Dietary Lipid Source and Level on Growth of Milkfish ( Chanos Chanos ) Fry. Aquaculture 167:229–236.

Andreatta, Susan and Anne Parlier 2010. The Political Ecology of Small-scale Commercial Fishermen in Carteret County, North Carolina. Human Organization 69 (2):180–191.

Appadurai, Arjun 1986. Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value. In Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective , Pp. 3 –65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2000. Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination. Public Culture 12 (1):1 – 19.

Armitage, Derek and Chui-ling Tam 2007. A Political Ecology of Sustainable Livelihoods in Coastal Sulawesi, Indonesia . Canadian Journal of Development Studies 28 (1):39–57.

Asche, Frank and Martin Smith 2009. Trade and Fisheries: Key Issues for the World Trade Organization . World Trade Organization: Staff Working Paper ERSD-2010-03.

350

Asia Regional Integration Center 2013. Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in Asia and the Pacific. Last modified January 10, 2013. https://aric.adb.org/blog/free-trade-agreements-ftas-in-asia-and-the-pacific

Asia Regional Integration Center 2013. Free Trade Agreements. Accessed August 30, 2016. https://aric.adb.org/fta

Asian Development Bank 2004. Evaluation Document: Development of Technology and Extension for Small-scale Fish Farms in Northeastern Thailand. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/35940/files/technology- fish-farms-tha.pdf

Baird, Ian and Noah Quastel 2011. Dolphin-Safe Tuna from California to Thailand: Localisms in Environmental Certification of Global Commodity Networks. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101 (2):337 –355.

Bagumir, Ananias, Ewen Todd, Charles Muyanja and George Nasinyama 2009. National Food Safety Control Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Uganda’s Aquaculture Control System Meet International Requirements. Food Policy 34:458 – 467.

Befu, Harumi 1980. Political Ecology of Fishing in Japan: Techno-Environmental Impact of Industrialization in the Inland Sea. In George Dalton (ed.), Research in Economic Anthropology: A Research Annual (Volume 3) , Pp. 323 –347. Greenwich: Jai Press.

Béné, Christophe 2005. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Discourse, Policy Controversies and the Role of Science in the Politics of Shrimp Farming Development. Development Policy Review 23 (5):585 –614.

Béné, Christophe, Robert Arthur, Hannah Norbury, Edward Allison, Malcolm Beveridge, Simon Bush, Liam Campling, Will Lescen, David Little, Dale Squires, Shakuntala Thilsted, Max Troell and Meryl Williams 2016. Contribution of Fisheries and Aquaculture to Food Security and Poverty Reduction: Assessing the Current Evidence. World Development 79:177 –196.

Bestor, Theodore 2000. How Sushi Went Global. Foreign Policy 121:54–63. 2001. Supply-side Sushi: Commodity, Market, and the Global City. American Anthropologist 103:76–95. 200 4. Tsukiji: The Fish Market at the Center of the World. Berkeley: University of California Press.

351

Biersack, Aletta 2006. Reimagining Political Ecology: Culture/Power/History/Nature. In Aletta Biersack and James Greenberg (eds.), Reimagining Political Ecology , Pp. 3 –42. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Blaikie, Piers and Harold Brookfield 1987. Land Degradation and Society . London: Methuen.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc and Dennis Hickey 2012. Introduction: More Than Two “Sides” to Every Story: An Introduction to New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue . In Jean-Marc Blanchard and Dennis Hickey (Eds.), New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue , Pp. 1 –27. London & New York: Routledge.

Bosco, Joseph 1992. Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics. Ethnology 31 (2):157 –183. 1994. Faction versus Ideology: Mobilization Strategies in Taiwan's Elections. The China Quarterly 137:28 –62.

Brock, Darryl 2015. Aid Through Aquaculture. Taiwan Today . Last modified December 1, 2015. http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=234062&ctNode=2198&mp=9

Bureau of Animal and Plant Inspection and Quarantine, Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) (動植物防疫檢疫局) 2012. chuqin chanpin chukou jianyi liucheng ji xiangguan guiding (Regulations and Procedures for Inspecting Livestock and Exports; 畜禽產品出口檢疫流程及 相關規定). Accessed December 1, 2016. http://coa.cpc.org.tw/edu/WebPage/FCKeditorUpload/10e73331-0346-4648-9d9a- 8b4bb1d209ee/1_%E7%95%9C%E7%A6%BD%E7%94%A2%E5%93%81%E5%87 %BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%AA%A2%E7%96%AB%E6%B5%81%E7%A8%8B%E5 %8F%8A%E7%9B%B8%E9%97%9C%E8%A6%8F%E5%AE%9A- %E9%AB%98%E6%B0%B8%E9%9D%92%E6%8A%80%E5%A3%AB.pdf 2016. shu dalu nongchanpin jianyi jianyan faling guiding (Regulations and Inspections for Agricultural Exports to China; 輸大陸農產品檢疫檢驗法令規定). Accessed December 1, 2016. https://www.baphiq.gov.tw/view.php?catid=12510

Bureau of Foreign Trade, Republic of China (Taiwan) (中華民國國際貿易局) 2015. xiaosantong: lishi dangan (The profile of Mini-Three Links policy; 小三通：歷史 檔案). Last modified April 14, 2015. http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=746&pid=457950&dl_DateRang e=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt_Keyword=&Pageid=0

352

2016a. dalu wupin buzhunxu shuru xiangmu huizongbiao (The list of banned Chinese items for imports; 大陸物品不准許輸入項目彙總表). Last modified May 4, 2016. https://fbfh.trade.gov.tw/rich/text/fhj/asp/downloadMW0.asp 2016b. yi qianshu ji tuidong zhong zhi FTA) (FTAs signed and under negotiation between Taiwan and other countries; 已簽署及推動中之 FTA). Accessed December 10, 2016. http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=764 Various Years. zhonghua minguo jinchukou maoyi tongji (Trade statistics of the Republic of China, Taiwan; 中華民國進出口貿易統計). Last modified December 10, 2016. http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/

Burfisher, Mary 2003. Overview. In Mary Burfisher (ed.), Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO , Pp. 1 – 40. New York: Nova Science.

Bush, Simon and Peter Oosterveer 2007. The Missing Link: Intersecting Governance and Trade in the Space of Place and the Space of Flows. Sociologia Ruralis 47 (4):384 –399.

Bush, Simon, Peter Oosterveer, Megan Bailey and Arthur Mol 2015. Sustainability Governance of Chains and Networks: A Review and Future Outlook. Journal of Cleaner Production 107:8 –19.

Bush, Simon, Hilde Toonen, Peter Oosterveer and Arthur Mol 2013. The “Devils Triangle” of MSC Certification: Balancing Credibility, Accessibility and Continuous Improvement. Marine Policy 73:288 –293. Bush, Simon, Paul van Zwieten, Leontine Visser, Han van Dijk, Roel Bosma, Willem de Boer and Marc Verdeem 2010. Scenarios for Resilient Shrimp Aquaculture in Tropical Coastal Areas . Ecology and Society 15 (2):15 –31.

Business Dictionary 2016. Slotting Allowance. Accessed October 1, 2016. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/slotting-fee.html

Cai, Kevin 2011. Introduction: Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations Since 1979. In Kevin Cai (ed.), Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations since 1979: Policy Adjustment and Institutional Change across the Straits , Pp. 1 –18. Singapore: World Scientific.

Cao, Yong-he ( 曹永和) 2006 [1979]. mingdai yuye zhilue bushuo (Supplementary note on Taiwanese fisheries in ; 明代漁業誌略補說). In Yong-he Cao (ed.), taiwan zaoqi lishi yanjiu (Historical studies of early Taiwan ; 臺灣早期歷史研究), Pp. 175 –254. Taipei: Lian Jing (台北：聯經).

353

Capling, Ann 2008. Preferential Trade Agreements as Instruments of Foreign Policy: An Australia- Japan Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region. The Pacific Review 21 (1):27 –43.

Carrier, James 1995. Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700 . London: Routledge.

Carson, Rachel 1962. Silent Spring . Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Cavagnaro, Elena and George Curiel 2012. The Three Levels of Sustainability . Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.

Central Weather Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國中央氣象局) Year unknown . qiwen tongji: yue pingjul (Monthly averages temperatures; 氣溫統計: 月平均). http://www.cwb.gov.tw/V7/climate/monthlyMean/Taiwan_tx.htm

Chan, Yuk-wah 2016. Food Localism and Resistance: A Revival of Agriculture and Cross-border Relations in Hong Kong. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 57 (3):313 –325.

Chang, Su-pan ( 張素盼) 2014. zhuoshuixi sanbai nian: lishi, shehui, huanjing (Three hundred years of zhuoshuixi : History, society, and environment; 濁水溪三百年：歷史、社會、環境). Xinbei: Weicheng ( 新北：衛城).

Chang, Yu-xin ( 張玉欣) and Ming-ruo Chu ( 朱明若) 2003. taiwan de shi wenhua yichan: wuyuzi―ziran yu renwei zhi weixie yu tiaozhan (The culinary heritage in Taiwan : Mullet roe and the threats and challenges from nature and human beings; 臺灣的食文化遺產：烏魚子―自然與人為之威脅與挑戰) In Yu-xin Chang (ed.), shanwei, haiwei, taiwanwei: taiwan yinshi wenhua lishi (Taiwan’s culinary culture and history: 山味、海味、臺灣味：臺灣的飲食文化歷 史), Pp., 293–314. Taipei: Foundation of Chinese Dietary Culture ( 台北: 中華飲食文 化基金會).

Chao, Nai-hsien 2010. Milkfish Processing and Value-addition in Taiwan. In I-chiu Liou and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), Milkfish Aquaculture in Asia , Pp. 169–186. Taipei: High Point.

354

Chen, Chung-ling and Guo-hao Qiu 2014. The Long and Bumpy Journey: Taiwan’s Aquaculture Development and Management. Marine Policy 48:152 –161.

Chen, Heng-an ( 陳亨安) 2014. Research and Analysis of Trade Development Strategy in China. jingji yanjiu (Economic Research; 經濟研究; Economic Research) 14: 363 –389.

Chen, Mei-chu ( 陳美菊) and Li-shu Li ( 李淑麗) 2010. The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Taiwan’s Trade, and Policy Responses Thereto ( 全球經濟危機對台灣貿易之影響及對策). jingji yanjiu (Economic Research; 經濟研究; Economic Research) 10: 279 –297.

Chen, Nancy 2014. Between Abundance and Insecurity: Securing Food and Medicine in an Age of Chinese Biotechnology. In Nancy Chen and Lesley Sharp (eds.), Bioinsecurity and Vulnerability , Pp. 87 –102. Santa Fe: SAR Press.

Chen, Steve 2012. Unbalanced Threat or Rising Integration? Explaining Relations across the Taiwan Strait. In Jean-Marc Blanchard and Dennis Hickey (eds.), New Thinking about the Taiwan Issue , Pp. 92 –115. London & New York: Routledge.

Chen, Yu-hui, Chia-yi Cheng, Chung-chang Chen, Wu-chung Lee and I-chiu Liao 2010. The Effective Way to Ease Price Fluctuation: A Case Study on Taiwan’s Milkfish Industry. In I-chiu Liou and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), Milkfish Aquaculture in Asia , Pp. 177–186. Taipei: High Point.

Cheng, Eric Siu-kei 2016. Return Migrants, Mini-tours and Rural Regeneration: A Study of Local Food Movement in Taiwan. Asia-Pacific Viewpoint 57 (3):338 –350.

China Times ( 中國時報) 1994. shuichan yangzhi wangguo de tuohuang boshi (The trailblazer of the aquaculture kingdom; 水產養殖王國的拓荒博士). November 10, 1994. 2014. ECFA hou tai shibanyu chanzhi beizeng (The production volume and value of grouper doubled after the ECFA implementation; ECFA 後台石斑魚產值倍增). November 27, 2014. http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20141127000095- 260203 2015. tai wuyuzi qihuo keju, denglujia po wan (Expensive Taiwanese mullet roe: Worth more than TWD10,000 in China; 台烏魚子奇貨可居 登陸價破萬). February 14, 2015. http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150214001040-260301

355

Chou, Hsin-yiu (周信佑) 2007. shibanyu bingdu xing jibin g (Viral diseases in groupers; 石斑魚病毒性疾病). In Fan-hua Nan ( 冉繁華) (ed.), Handbook of Grouper (石斑), Pp. 130 –137. : Taiwan Fisheries Economic Development Association; Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) (基隆: 台灣漁業經濟發展協會; 農委會).

Chou, Kuei-tien (周桂田) and Jian-ming Hsu ( 徐建銘) 2015. cong tudi dao canzhuo shang de konghuang: jielu yu lijie women de shipin anquan daodi nali chulecuo (Dangers from farm to table: Exploring and understanding what is wrong with our food safety; 從土地到餐桌上的恐慌：揭露與理解我們的食品安 全到底哪裡出了錯). Taipei: shangye zhoukan (台北: 商業週刊).

Chuang, Ching-ta (莊慶達) 2005. Exploitation of White Shrimp Market in Taiwan ( 台灣白蝦市場之行銷推動). shuichan shiyansuo tekan (Special Issue by Fisheries Research Institute; 水產試驗 所特刊) 6:187 –197.

Chuang, Ya-zhong (莊雅仲) 2016. cuobian gebi, xiangnong shenghuo ji zhuju lunli (Dwellings and alleys; 厝邊隔壁 、巷弄生活及住居倫理). In Ying-keui Huang and Wen-der Chen (eds.), 21 shiji de difang shehui: duozhong difang rentong xia de shequnxing yu shehui xiangxiang (Local societies in the 21 st century: Sociality and the social imaginary for multi-local identities; 21 世紀的地方社會：多重地方認同下的社群性與社會想像), Pp. 101 – 129. : qun-xue (新北市：群學)

Chuang, Ying-jang (莊英章) 1970. taiwan hsiangtsun de jian jiao yinshih: Iko yutsun de litzu (An example of a jiao ritual process in a Taiwanese fishing village; 臺灣鄉村的建醮儀式：一個漁村的例 子). Journal of Institute of Ethnology, (中央研究院民族學研究所 集刊) 29:131 –150.

Clark, Cal, and Evelyn Clark 2016. An Overall Model of Development in Taiwan. In Cal Clark and Evelyn Clark (eds.), Challenging Neoliberalism: Globalization and the Economic Miracles in Chile and Taiwan, Pp. 45–68. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Classic Kinmen Travel 2016. Mini-three Links. Accessed November 1, 2016. http://kinmen.travel/chinese/CP.aspx?sn=545

356

Cohen, Myron 1976. House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan . New York: Columbia University Press. Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff 2001. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. In Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (eds.), Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism , Pp. 1 – 56. Durham: Duke University Press.

Commonwealth Magazine ( 天下雜誌) 2011. taiwan shuiguo, hainan techan? (Taiwanese fruit is actually local produce in Hainan?; 台灣水果，海南特產?) Issue 330. April 19. 2013. shimuyu qizuo kan zhongguo lianse kucheng (The milkfish trade contract: A struggle under the influence of China; 虱目魚契作看中國臉色苦撐) 518. March 20. http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5047873

Connell, Raewyn 2010. Understanding Neoliberalism. In Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton (eds.), Neoliberalism and Everyday Life , Pp. 22 –36. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Copper, John 2013. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder: Westview.

Coulter, Kendra and William Schumann 2012. Governing Matters: Intellectual Labor and the Work of Governing. In Kendra Coulter and William Schumann (eds.), Governing Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives on Political Labor, Power, and Government , Pp. 1 –19. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國行政院農業委員會) (COA) 2000. guoji nongye hezuo yu jingzheng (International cooperation and competition in agriculture; 國際農業合作與競爭). Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=2291 2001. jiaru WTO yuye yinying duice (Fisheries’ responses after Taiwan joined the WTO; 加入 WTO 漁業因應對策). Accessed May 15, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=3979 2002. taiwan jiaru WTO yangzhi yuye zhi chulu (The future of Taiwanese aquaculture after entering the WTO; 台灣加入 WTO 養殖漁業之出路). Accessed May 15, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=4076 2004. woguo jiaru WTO hou nongye fazhan qingshi yu yinying cuoshi zhixing qingxing (Our country’s agriculture: The situation after entering the WTO and implementing the policy measures; 我國加入 WTO 後農業發展情勢與因應措施執行情形). Accessed May 15, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=8334 2007. youji nongye xiangguan fagui (Laws and regulations for organic agriculture; 有機 農業相關法規). Accessed April 30, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=18830

357

2009a. nongchanpin pifa shichang guanli banfa (Regulations for Management of Agricultural Product Wholesales Market; 農產品批發市場管理辦法). Last modified January 23, 2009. http://law.coa.gov.tw/GLRSnewsout/EngLawContent.aspx?Type=C&id=25 2009b. tuidong jingzhi nongye jiankang zhuoyue fangan (Programs to promote quality agriculture; 推動精緻農業健康卓越方案). Accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=19572 2012a. A Century of Innovative : Fisheries (耕耘台灣農業大世紀 ：漁業風華). Taipei: Council of Agriculture, ROC (Taiwan) ( 台北: 行政院農委會). 2012b. dazao shuichan jingpin de xingxiang ji hangxiao (Creating brands of seafood products and marketing; 打造水產精品的形象及行銷). Accessed June 5, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=2447707&print=1 2015a. liangan nongchan maoyi guanxi zhi yanbian yu zhanwang (Changing cross-strait trade relations and prospects; 兩岸農產貿易關係之演變與展望). Accessed June 15, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2503049 2015b. shuichan waixiao xian uang ji fudao cuoshi (Updated information on seafood export and government measures; 水產外銷現況及輔導措施). Last modified May 8, 2015. http://coa.cpc.org.tw/edu/WebPage/FCKeditorUpload/ea7979ca-8cf6-443f- af3a-71e4a5bbc941/01- %E6%B0%B4%E7%94%A2%E5%A4%96%E9%8A%B7%E6%94%BF%E7%AD% 96%E8%88%87%E6%A1%88%E4%BE%8B%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9_%E9%9 9%B3%E5%BB%BA%E4%BD%91%E7%B0%A1%E4%BB%BB%E6%8A%80%E 6%AD%A3.pdf 2016. yuchanpin jiaoyi hangqing (Transactions database for seafood in fish markets; 漁 產品交易行情). Accessed October 1, 2016. http://m.coa.gov.tw/outside/AquaticTrans/Search.aspx Year Unknown. kua shiji nongye jianshe fangan (Program of Agricultural Development in the New Millennium; 跨世紀農業建設方案). Accessed September 1, 2016. http://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2943

Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China (Taiwan) (行政院經濟建 設委員會) 2004. Taiwan Agenda 21: Vision and Strategies for National Sustainable Development. , Taiwan.

Courtenay, Philip 2011. The Taiwan Strait Issue. Assessed September 10, 2016. http://www.rgsq.org.au/taiwan-strait-issue

Crate, Susan 2006. Cows, Kin, and Globalization: An Ethnography of Sustainability . Lanham: Altamira.

358

Cruz, Philip, Merlia Andalecio, Remedios Bolivar and Kevin Fitzsimmons 2008. Tilapia-Shrimp Polyculture in Negros Island, Philippines: A Review. Journal of World Aquaculture Society 39 (6):713–725. Database of Taiwanese Old Photos 2007. shimuyu yuwen (Milkfish ponds; 虱目魚魚塭). Photo taken in 1927. Accessed August 31, 2017. http://photo.lib.ntu.edu.tw/pic/db/detail.jsp?dtd_id=32&id=17807&3&pk=seq&showl evel=2

De Glopper, Donald 1972. Doing Business in Lukang. In William Willmott (ed.), Economic Organization in Chinese Society , Pp. 297 –326. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Delgado, Christopher, Nikolas Wada, Mark Rosegrant, Siet Meijer and Mahfuzuddin Ahmed 2003. Fish to 2020: Supply and Demand in Changing Global Markets . Washington, D.C. and Penang: International Food Policy Research Institute and Worldfish Center.

Deng, Huo-tu ( 鄧火土) (ed.) 1979. shuichan yangzhi (Aquaculture; 水產養殖). Taipei: fengnianshe (台北：豐年社).

Descola, Philippe (Janet Lloyd. trans.) 2013. Beyond Nature and Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Diamond, Norma 1969. Kun Shen: A Taiwan Village . New York: Irvington.

Ding, Che-shi ( 丁澈士) 2013. quanqiu qihou bianqian xia taiwan shuili ziyuan kaifa liyong zhi weiji yu yinying zhidao (Taiwanese water resource management as influenced by global climate change; 全球氣候變遷下台灣水利資源開發利用之危機與因應之道). In Mei-fang Fan ( 范玫芳), Zong-de Lin ( 林宗德), He-qing Li ( 李河清), Mei-ling Peng ( 潘美玲), Gu-yang Yang ( 楊谷洋) and Guan-hang Lo ( 駱冠宏), fenghe rili de beihou-shui, keji, zai nan (Water, technology, and disaster; 風和日麗的背後―水、科技、災難), Pp. 204 –229. : National Chiaotung University Press (新竹：國立交通大學出版 社).

Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan) ( 行 政院主計總處) 2010. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, and Husbandry Census . Accessed August 12, 2016. http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html

Douglas, Mary 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo . Harmondworth: Penguin.

359

Douglas, Mary and Baron Isherwood 1980. The World of Goods . London: Penguin.

Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky 1982. Risk and Culture . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Draper, Melissa and Jum Schultz 2008. Introduction. In Jum Schultz and Melissa Draper (eds.), Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia’s Challenge to Globalization , Pp. 1 –8. Berkley: University of California Press.

Dunsire, Andrew 1993. Modes of Governance. In Jan Kooiman (ed.), Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions , Pp. 21–34. London: SAGE.

Duval-Diop, Dominique and John Grimes 2005. Tales from Two Deltas: Catfish Fillets, High-Value Foods, and Globalization. Economic Geography 81 (2):177–200.

Election Study Center, National Cheng-chi University (N.C.C.U.) (政治大學選舉研究中心) 2016a. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity in Taiwan (1994-2015). Accessed September 1, 2016. http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166 2016b. Changes in the Unification–Independence Stances of Taiwanese (1994 –2015). Accessed September 1, 2016. http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167

Escobar, Arturo 2008. Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes . Durham: Duke University Press.

Fabinyi, Michael 2016 Sustainable Seafood Consumption in China. Marine Policy 74:85 –87.

Fabinyi, Michael and Neng Liu 2016. The Social Context of the Chinese Food System: An Ethnographic Study of the Beijing Seafood Market. Sustainability 8 (244):1 –17.

Fabinyi, Michael, Michael Pido, Babylyn Harani, Jennelyn Caceres, Arselene Uyami-Bitara, Aileen De Las Alas, Jose Buenconsejo and Evan de Leon 2012. Luxury Seafood Consumption in China and the Intensification of Coastal Livelihoods in Southeast Asia: The Live Reef Fish for Food Trade in Balabac, Philippines. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53 (2):118 –132.

360

Ferguson, James 1994. The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ferguson, James and Akhil Gupta 2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. American Ethnologist 29 (4):981 –1002.

Fish Base, Taiwan 2014. haixian zhinan (Seafood choice; 海鮮指南). Last modified April 1, 2015. http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php

Fish World ( 養魚世界) 2003. han jinyao 64 dun shu ou shui chan bei tui (Due to the detection of banned veterinary drugs 64 tonnes of seafood export were detained in Europe; 含禁藥 64 噸 輸歐水產被退). November 1. 61–62.

Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 漁業署) 1999. fangdu yuchuan zousi nongyuchu chanpin (Crackdown on the use of fishing boats to smuggle agricultural and seafood products; 防杜漁船走私農漁畜產品). Accessed May 10, 2016. http://www.fa.gov.tw/mobile/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=827&chk=1426dd02- 0785-4d96-9a58-2a102fc3dfbd¶m=pn%3d113 2012. 2007 niandu yuchan pingzhun jijin zhi pingzhun yuzhong ji qi pingzhun jiage (In 2007, fish varieties included in the buffer stock scheme and the prices set: 96 年度漁 產平準基金之平準魚種及其平準價格). Last modified June 5, 2012. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsRuleFisheries/content.aspx?id=306&chk=158ade43- e3aa-4b9e-9653- cbc7ecd64100¶m=pn%3d4%26kind%3d%e9%a4%8a%e6%ae%96%e5%88%86 %e7%9b%ae 2013a. yuchuan yunban yangzhi huoyu guanli banfa (Regulation of Live Farmed Fish Carrier Management; 漁船運搬養殖活魚管理辦法). Last modified April 30, 2013. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsCentralFisheries/content.aspx?id=24&chk=c8603084- b5f4-4f2a-a92f-cff3cb115c5b¶m=pn%3D2%26yy%3D%26mm%3D 2013b. yuwen yangzhi yuye dengjizheng (The aquaculture voluntary registration system; 漁塭養殖漁業登記證). Last modified December 3, 2013. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/ForumsGuest/content.aspx?id=20107671&chk=bdcff294- ebed-4675-bf30-824c0107715b 2014a. Fifteenth Anniversary (1998-2013) of Fisheries Agency . Taipei: Fisheries Agency. 2014b. qianding ECFA hou yuchanpin xiaolu dafu zengjia, yumin pubian shouyi (Fishermen mostly benefit from the ECFA, since export volumes of Taiwanese seafood products to China has greatly increased; 簽訂 ECFA 後漁產品銷陸大幅增 加，漁民普遍受益). Last modified June 19, 2014.

361

http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1101&chk=5f8a26a7-ccd6- 4db5-9ad1-e9df49559ea1 2014c. shibanyu chanzhi beizeng, dianshi chengjin, yuyeshu biaoyang shibanyu chanye jiechu gongxian zhe (The Midas touch that doubles the production value of groupers: The Fisheries Agency announces commendations of outstanding contributors to the grouper sector; 石斑魚產值倍增 點石成金：漁業署表揚石斑魚產業傑出貢獻者). Last modified December, 12, 2014. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/NewsPaper/content.aspx?id=1152&chk=df9c0bd6-1035- 42b8-860e-79f20c52125b . 2015a. 104 niandu chanxiao luli pingxuan buzhu shishi yaodian (A note on the subsidy for TGAP participants in 2015; 104 年度產銷履歷評選補助實施要點). Last modified March 5, 2015. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/Announce/content.aspx?id=238&chk=282cf438-5aed- 4151-9813-f2871adce049 2015b. yangzhi yuzhong fangyang liang leiji biao 2014 (Aquaculture stocking data in 2014; 2014 年養殖魚種放養量累計表). Accessed July 10, 2016. https://www.fa.gov.tw/upload/264/2015010713382370472.pdf 2016a. gonggao youqi yulei yangzhi shuichanpin taiwan lianghao nongye gu fan (TGAP) (Announcing the TGAP finfish product guideline; 公告「有鰭魚類養殖水產品台灣 良好農業規範」). Last modified April 19, 2016. http://www.fa.gov.tw/cht/LawsRuleFisheries/content.aspx?id=513&chk=c992e221- 45f6-406e-973c-a24e8f111b39¶m=pn%3D1 2016b. The Fishermen Association Act. Last modified March 9, 2016. http://www.fa.gov.tw/en/LegalsActs/content.aspx?id=3&chk=e6760d67-d794-41ed- ab5a-c3a3449e34b4¶m 2016c. hangqing tongji chaxun (Transactions database for seafood in fish markets; 行情 統計查詢). Accessed January 3, 2017. http://efish.fa.gov.tw/efish/statistics/trendchart.htm

Fisheries Agency Statistics Yearbook, Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan). (Fisheries Agency Statistics) Various Years. yuye tongji nianbao (Fisheries Agency Statistics Yearbook; 漁業統計). Taipei: Fisheries Agency.

Fisheries Extension (漁業推廣) 2011. xunhuanshui yangzhi jiangdi chengben tigao shengchan xiaoyi (Decreasing production costs and enhancing efficiency through water circulation; 循環水養殖降 低成本提高生產效益). March 2011. 294.

Fisheries Research Institute ( 水產試驗所) 2011. Marine Aquaculture Species in Taiwan (台灣海水養殖魚介類圖說). Keelung: Fisheries Research Institute, COA.

362

2016. shimuyu chi shuizhi de pH zhi fanwei wei duoshao jiaohao ? (What is the best range of pH values in milkfish ponds?; 虱目魚池水質的 pH 值範圍為多少較好?) Last modified December 31, 2016. http://www.tfrin.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=159383&ctNode=1225&mp=3

Fisherman Magazine ( 漁友) 1982. fei qitu yong wuwu jiahuan yinmou, pohuai taiwan jingji jianshe (The communist gang barters to destroy Taiwan’s economic development; 匪企圖用物物交換陰謀 ，破壞台灣經濟建設). March 20. 51. 1984. yuyou hangqian zhidao (Reminders for your fishing trip; 漁友航前指導). May 20. 19.

Foley, Paul and Eliazabeth Havice 2016. The Rise of Territorial Eco-certifications: New Politics of Transnational Sustainability Governance in the Fisheries Sector. Geoforum 69:24 –33.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2006. Definitions. Accessed August 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6941e/x6941e04.htm 2009. General Situation of World Fish Stocks. Accessed August 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf 2011 [1995]. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Accessed June 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/3/a-v9878e/index.html 2012. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture . Rome: FAO. Accessed August 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e.pdf 2014. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture . Rome: FAO. Accessed August 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf 2016. Fishery Statistical Collections: Global Aquaculture Production. Accessed August 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en Year Unknown. Artificial Propagation of Finfish. Last modified March 1, 2016. http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/ac742e/AC742E04.htm#ch4

Ford, Lucy 2013. EU Trade Governance and Policy: A Critical Perspective. Journal of Contemporary European Research 9 (4):279–296.

Foreign Trade Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 經濟部國際貿易局) 2016. zhongguo dalu shipin shangjian san da liucheng (Three major steps to export food products to China; 中國大陸食品商檢三大流程). Last modified July 8, 2016. http://info.taiwantrade.com/CH/resources/MAIN/TC/S0/promo/food/food.html Various Years. Trade Statistics. Accessed November 1, 2016. http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=1375

363

Forsyth, Timothy 2003. Critical Political Ecology . London & New York: Routledge.

Foucault, Michel 1991. (authored by Graham Burchell). Governmentality. In Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality , Pp. 87 –104. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison . New York: Vintage Books.

Freidberg, Susanne 2004. French Beans and Food Scares: Culture and Commerce in an Anxious Age . New York: Oxford Press.

Friedman, Edward 2007. China’s Incorporation of Taiwan: The Manipulation of Community Tensions. In Peter Chow (ed.), Economic Integration, Democratization and National Security in : Shifting Paradigms in US, China and Taiwan Relations , Pp. 29 –55. Cheltenham & Northampton: Edward Elgar.

Friedman, Harriet, and Philip McMichael 1989. Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present. Sociologia Ruralis XXIX (2):93 –117.

Fujian Provincial Government 2005. mintai shuichanpin maoyi huangjin shuidao zhengzai xingcheng (The emergence of a golden trade route for seafood products between Fujian and Taiwan; 閩台水產品 貿易黃金水道正在形成). March 21, 2005. http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=14612 2010. shangbannian mintai maoyie tongbi zengzhang 78.6% (Trade between Fujian and Taiwan grew 78.6% in the first half 2010; 上半年閩台貿易額同比增長 78.6%). July 14, 2010. http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=264184 2012. jinnian qian qi yue fujian dui tai xiaoe maoyie tongbi zengzhang 13 ％ (Exports to Taiwan via the Petty Trade increased 13% from Jan to July, 2012; 今年前七月福建 對台小額貿易額同比增長 13%). August 16, 2012. http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=498438 2014. wosheng shangbannian duitai xiaoe maoyi tongbi zengzhang 23% (Exports to Taiwan via the Petty Trade increased 23% in the first half of 2014; 我省上半年對台 小額貿易同比增長 23%). July 17, 2014. http://www.fujian.gov.cn/inc/doc.htm?docid=758703 2015. yijidu wosheng duitai xiaoe maoyi 3.3 yi yuan (Chinese products exported to Taiwan via the Petty Trade valued at RMB 0.33 billion during the first trading season; 一季度我省對台小額貿易 3.3 億元). April 16, 2015. http://www.fujian.gov.cn/xw/ztzl/mty/xwdt/201504/t20150416_925720.htm

364

Gallin, Bernard and Rita Gallin 1982. Socioeconomic Life in Rural Taiwan: Twenty Years of Development and Change. Modern China 8 (2):205–246. Gates, Hill 1996. China’s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Geertz, Clifford 1974. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays . New York: Basic Books.

Geheb, Kim and Tony Binns 1997. “Fishing Farmers” or “Farming Fishermen”? The Quest for Household Income and Nutritional Security on the Kenyan Shores of Lake Victoria. African Affairs 96 (382): 73 –93.

Gezon, Lisa 1999. Of Shrimps and Spirit Possession: Toward a Political Ecology of Resource Management in Northern Madagascar. American Anthropologist 101 (1):58 –67. 2005. Finding the Global in the Local: Environmental Struggles in Northern Madagascar. In Susan Paulson and Lisa Gezon (eds.), Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales, and Social Groups , Pp. 135–153. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2006. Global Visions, Local Landscapes: A Political Ecology of Conservation, Conflict, and Control in Northern Madagascar . Lanham & New York: Altamira Press.

Gezon, Lisa and Susan Paulson 2005. Place, Power, Difference: Multiscale Research at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century. In Susan Paulson and Lisa Gezon (eds.), Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales, and Social Groups , Pp. 1 –16. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

GINIFAB ( 兩岸通) 2006. zhuanying taiwan shuiguo yunsong dao dalu (Specializing in exporting Taiwanese fruit to China; 專營台灣水果運送到大陸). Last modified May 29, 2006. http://www.ginifab.com/forwarder/freight_fruit.html

Global G. A.P. Year unknown. The Global G.A.P. Aquaculture Standard. Last modified April 29, 2016. http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-producers/aquaculture

Gold, Thomas 1986. State and Society in the . Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Google Earth 2017. Satellite images.

365

Goss, Jasper, David Burch and Roy Rickson. 2000. Agri-Food Restructuring and Third World Transnationals: Thailand, the CP Group and the Global Shrimp Industry. World Development 28 (3):513 –530.

Grano, Simona 2015. Environmental Governance in Taiwan: A New Generation of Activists and Stakeholders . London: Routledge.

Greenberg, James 2006. The Political Ecology of Fisheries in the Upper Gulf of California. In Aletta Biersack and James Greenberg (eds.), Reimagining Political Ecology , Pp. 121 –149. Durham: Duke University Press.

Greenberg, James and Thomas Park 1994. Political Ecology. Journal of Political Ecology 1:1 –14.

Greenhouse, Carol 2010. Introduction. In Carol Greenhouse (ed.), Ethnographies of Neoliberalism , Pp. 1 – 10. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Gross, Joan 2014. Food activism in Western Oregon. In Carole Counihan and Valeria Siniscalchi (eds.), Food activism: Agency, Democracy and Economy , Pp. 15-30. London & New York: Bloomsbury.

Grossman, Lawrence 1998. The Political Ecology of Bananas Contract Farming, Peasants, and Agrarian Change in the Eastern Caribbean . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gudeman, Stephan 1978. The Demise of a Rural Economy: From Subsistence to Capitalism in a Latin American Village . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2005. Community and Economy: Economy’s Base. In James Carrier (ed.), A Handbook of Economic Anthropology , Pp. 94 –109. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Hall, Derek 2003. The International Political Ecology of Industrial Shrimp Aquaculture and Industrial Plantation Forestry in Southeast Asia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34:251– 264.

Harrell, Steven 1981. Effects of Economic Change on Two Taiwanese Villages. Modern China 7 (1):31 – 54. 1985. Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard? Reflections on an Entrepreneurial Ethic. Modern China 11 (2):203 –226.

366

Harvey, David 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change . New York: Blackwell. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hatanaka, Maki 2010. Governing Sustainability: Examining Audits and Compliance in a Third-Party- Certified Organic Shrimp Farming Project in Rural Indonesia. Local Environment 15 (3):233 –244.

Heyman, Josiah 2013. Political Economy. In James Carrier and Deborah Gewertz (eds.), The Handbook of Sociocultural Anthropology , Pp. 88 –106. London: Bloombury.

Ho, Ming-sho 2014. Resisting Naphtha Crackers: A Historical Survey of Environmental Politics in Taiwan. China Perspectives 3:5 –14.

Ho, Sam 1978. Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970 . New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ho, Yong-hsin (何榮幸) 2014. xueyun shidai: cong yebaihe dao taiyanghua (Two generations of student movements; 學運世代: 從野百合到太陽花). Taipei: shibao wenhua (台北：時報文 化).

Hobsbawm, Eric 1983. Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Pp. 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael 2005. NGOs, the State, and Democracy under Globalization: The Case of Taiwan. In Robert Weller (ed.), Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia: Organizing between Family and State , Pp. 42 –57. London & New York: Routledge.

Hsieh, Chi-cheng ( 謝志誠) and Ming-xiu Ho ( 何明修) 2011. baqing you taiwan: guoguang shihua de gushi (Kuokuang petrochemical plant: The island tour; 八輕遊台灣：國光石化的故事). Taipei: zuoan wenhua (台北：左 岸文化).

367

Hsieh, Guo-xin ( 謝國興) 2009. qiyuan yu haiyuan: gaoxiong qiedingxiang de yuye yu miaohui (Fisheries and temple activities in Qieding township, Kaohsiung; 祈願與還願：高雄茄萣鄉的漁業與 廟會). yazhou yanjiu (Asian Studies; 亞洲研究) 59:129–148.

Hsieh, Guo-xiong ( 謝國雄) 2003. chaxiang shehui zhi (A tea-growing community; 茶鄉社會誌) Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica ( 台北：中央研究院社會所).

Hsieh, Jia-yu (謝家裕) 2014. yangzhi shuichan dongwu jiankang guanli shouce (A handbook for managing the health of cultured aquatic species; 養殖水產動物健康管理手冊). Taipei: Taiwan Aquaculture Development Foundation. Hsieh, Pasha 2011. The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law. Journal of International Economic Law 14 (1):121–156.

Hsu, Chung-hsin ( 許忠信) 2011. ECFA’s Impacts on Taiwan (ECFA 東西向貿易對台灣之衝擊). Taipei: Sharing ( 台北：新學林).

Hsu, Wei-chen, Hung-cheng Chang, Kuan-tsung Chang, En-kai Lin, Jun-king Liu and Yuei-an Liou 2015. Observing Land Subsidence and Revealing the Factors that Influence it Using a Multi-Sensor Approach in , Taiwan. Remote Sensing 7: 8202–8223.

Hsu, Wen-fu ( 許文富) 1970. taiwan xianyu yunxiao zhi yanjiu (A study of Taiwan’s fresh fish distribution; 臺灣 鮮魚運銷之研究). Taipei: National Taiwan University.

Hsueh, Yueh-shuen ( 薛月順) 2010. The Transformation of Taiwan into “The Empire of the Giant Tiger Prawn” (1968- 1988): The Roles of the Government and the People (台灣「草蝦王國」的形成（ 1968 – 1988 ）—政府與民間扮演的角色). Academia Historica Newsletter (國史館 館刊) 24:130–176. 2016. taiwan diao dawang: qiu yi-hua xiansheng fangtan lu (Oral history of Yi-hua Qiu, the king of Taiwan Tilapia; 臺灣鯛大王—邱益華先生訪談錄). Academia Historica Research Newsletter 10:205–225.

Hsueh, Yueh-shuen and Pin-tsang Tseng ( 薛月順、曾品滄) 2006. The Reminiscences of Ting-lang Huang and Lieh-tang Lin (黃丁郎、林烈堂訪談 錄). Taipei: Academia Historica ( 台北: 國史館).

368

Hu, Tai-li 1983. My Mother-in-law's Village: Rural Industrialization and Change in Taiwan . Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

Hu, Xing-hua ( 胡興華) 2004. taiwan de yangzhi yuye (Taiwanese aquaculture ; 台灣的養殖漁業). taibei xian xindian shi : yuanzu wenhua (新店市：遠足文化). Huang, Shu-min 1981. Agricultural Degradation: Changing Community Systems in Rural Taiwan . Washington: University Press of America. 2013. Taiwanese Organic Farming and its Technological Change: Limitations in Development, Taiwan Journal of Anthropology 11(1): 9–34.

Huang, Ying-kuei ( 黃應貴) 2016. duozhong difang rentong xia de shequnxing yu shehui xiangxiang (Introduction: Sociality and the social imaginary for multi-local identities; 多重地方認同下的社群 性與社會想像). In Ying-keui Huang and Wen-der Chen (eds.), 21shiji de difang shehui : duozhong difang rentong xia de shequnxing yu shehui xiangxiang (Local societies of the 21 st century: Sociality and the social imaginary for multi-local identities; 21 世紀的地方社會：多重地方認同下的社群性與社會想像), Pp. 1–46. New Taipei City: qun-xue (新北市：群學).

Huang Ying-kuei ( 黃應貴) and Wen-der Chen ( 陳文德) (eds.) 2016. 21shiji de difang shehui: duozhong difang rentong xia de shequnxing yu shehui xiangxiang (Local societies of the 21 st century: Sociality and the social imaginary for multi-local identities; 21 世紀的地方社會： 多重地方認同下的社群性與社會想 像). New Taipei City: qun-xue (新北市：群學) .

Huang, Yu ( 黃瑜) 2010. Getting Rich Together, and Its Aftermath: The History of Shrimp Aquaculture Development in Southern China ( 共同富裕思想的延續：回顧中國南方對蝦養殖業 的起步). Journal of Chinese Dietary Culture (中國飲食文化) 6 (2):35–65.

Inda, Jonathan and Renato Rosaldo 2008. Tracking Global Flow. In Jonathan Inda and Renato Rosaldo (eds.), The Anthropology of Globalization , Pp. 1–48. Malden: Blackwell.

IndexMundi 2016. Shrimp Monthly Price. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=shrimp&months=180

369

Islam, Md Saidul 2014. Confronting the Blue Revolution: Industrial Aquaculture and Sustainability in the Global South . Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Jacobs, Bruce 2008. Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy . Norwalk: Eastbridge.

Jiao, Junl (焦鈞) 2015. shuiguo zhengzhi xue: liangan nongye jiaoliu shinian huigu yu zhanwang (The politics of fruit: A retrospective of 10 years of agricultural exchange across the Taiwan Strait ; 水果政治學：兩岸農業交流十年回顧與展望). Kaohsiung: Juliu ( 高 雄：巨流).

Johnston, Josée 2006. Who Cares about the Commons? In Josée Johnston, Michael Gismondi and James Goodman (eds.), Nature’s Revenge: Reclaiming Sustainability in an Age of Corporate Globalization , Pp.39–71. Peterborough: Broadview Press.

Ka, Chih-ming 1998. Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895 –1945 . Boulder: Westview Press.

Kalfagianni, Agni and Philipp Pattberg 2013. Fishing in Muddy Waters: Exploring the Conditions for Effective Governance of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Marine Policy 38:124–132.

Kearney, Michael 1996. Reconceptualizing the Peasantry: Anthropology in Global Perspective . Boulder: Westview Press.

Kjærnes, Unni, Mark Harvey and Alan Warde 2007. Trust in Food: A Comparative and Institutional Analysis . Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Klein, Jakob 2009. Creating Ethical Food Consumers? Promoting Organic Foods in Urban Southwest China. Social Anthropology 17 (1):74–89. 2015. Eating Green: Ecological Food Consumption in Urban China. In K.O. Kim (ed.), Re-orienting Cuisine: East Asian Foodways in the Twenty-first Century , Pp. 238–262. New York & Oxford: Berghanhn.

370

Kleinman, Sherryl 1980. Learning the Ropes as Fieldwork Analysis. In William Shaffir, Robert Stebbins and Allan Turowetz (eds.), Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research , Pp. 171–183. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Kopytoff, Igor 1986. The Cultural Biography of Things. In Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective , Pp. 64–81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kuo, Pin-han ( 郭品含) and Xiao-wen Wang ( 王筱雯) 2013. taiwan yantian shidi zhi weixie yu jihui (Threats and opportunities to Taiwanese saltpans and wetlands; 台灣鹽田濕地之威脅與機會). Science Monthly (科學月刊) 522: 456–461.

Kusumawati, Rini, Simon Bush and Leontine Visser 2013. Can Patrons Be Bypassed? Frictions between Local and Global Regulatory Networks over Shrimp Aquaculture in East Kalimantan. Society & Natural Resources 26 (8):898–911.

Laws and Regulations Database , Republic of China, Taiwan 2016. Offshore Islands Development Act. Last modified June 10, 2015. http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030121 Year unknown a. Veterinary Drugs Control Act. Last modified April 15, 2016. http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=M0130015 Year unknown b. Agriculture Production and Certification Act. Last modified April 15, 2016. http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=M0060072

Lee, Chaur-shyan 1984. The Milkfish Industry in Taiwan. In J. Juario, R. Ferraris and L. Benitez (eds.), Advances in Milkfish Biology and Culture: Proceedings of the Second International Milkfish Aquaculture Conference , 4–8 October 1983 Iloiolo City, Philippines , Pp. 183–198. Manila: Island Pub.

Lee, Wu-chung, Yu-hui Chen, and I-chiu Liao 2003. The Competitiveness of Eel Aquaculture in Taiwan, Japan, and China. Aquaculture 221 (1-4):115–124.

Lélé , Sharachchandra 1991. Sustainable Development: A Critical Review. World Development 19 (6):607–621.

Lemke, Thomas 2011. Foucault, Governmentality, ad Critique . Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers.

371

Li, Tania 2007a. Governmentality. Anthropologica 49 (2):275 –281. 2007b. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics . Durham: Duke University Press.

Li, Wei-yi ( 李威宜) 2016. zhiwaren de defang (A community of sock makers; 織襪人的地方). In Ying-keui Huang and Wen-der Chen (eds.), 21shiji de difang shehui: duozhong difang rentong xia de shequnxing yu shehui xiangxiang (Local societies of the 21 st century: Sociality and the social imaginary for multi-local identities; 21 世紀的地方社會：多重地方 認同下的社群性與社會想像), Pp. 235–285. New Taipei City: qun-xue (新北市：群 學).

Liao, I-chiu 1989. taiwan shuichan yangzhi de xiankuang yu zhanwang (The Future of Contemporary Taiwanese Aquaculture ; 台灣水產養殖的現況與展望). Fish World . March 21. 37- 48.

Liao, I-chiu and Yew-Hu Chien 1996. The Evolution of the Grass Prawn ( Penaeus Monodon ) Hatchery Industry in Taiwan. Aquacultural Engineering 15 (2):111 –131.

Liao, I-chiu and Eduardo Leaño 2010a. Grow-out Culture of Milkfish in Taiwan. In I-chiu Liou and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), Milkfish Aquaculture in Asia , Pp. 145 –156. Taipei: High Point. 2010b. Overview of Milkfish Aquaculture in Taiwan. In I-chiu Liou and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), Milkfish Aquaculture in Asia , Pp. 131 –135. Taipei: High Point.

Liao, I-chiu, Eduardo Leaño and Lien-tang Lin 2010. Mass Propagation and Fry Production of Milkfish in Taiwan. In I-chiu Liou and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), Milkfish Aquaculture in Asia , Pp. 137 –144. Taipei: High Point.

Liao, Kun-rong ( 廖坤榮) 2013. hou ECFA nan taiwan minzhong zhengzhi jingji taidu fenxi (Analyzing the politico-economic attitudes of residents in south Taiwan after ECFA was implemented; 後 ECFA 南臺灣民眾政治經濟態度分析). In Kun-rong Liao (ed.), ECFA yu liangan heping fazhan jizhi (ECFA and cross-strait peaceful development; ECFA 與兩岸和平發展機制), Pp. 288–304. Taipei: Hanlu ( 台北：翰蘆).

Liberty Times (自由時報) 2005a. cuxiao shimuyu, pinchanghui haoshizai (A milkfish promotional event; 促銷虱目 魚 品嚐會好食在). November 26. http://old.ltn.com.tw/2005/new/nov/26/today- south5.htm

372

2005b. zhuanjia: yangzhi shiban lanyong kongqueshilu (The abuse of malachite green in grouper farming; 專家: 養殖石斑濫用孔雀綠). September 16. http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/34417 2011. gaolinghua shehui, jiayunpeng zuolao [Aging societies: Chiayi, Yunlin, and Penghu at the top; 高齡化社會，嘉雲澎在列]. July 12. http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/507866 2014. shibanyu, qiudaoyu chanliang chuang quanqiu diyi, ma zongtong guigong ECFA (President Ma says: ECFA leads to top-ranked production of groupers and saury 石斑 魚、秋刀魚產量創全球第一，馬總統歸功 ECFA). November 26. http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1167124 2015. baixia chanliang ruijian jia yang yezhe tan wu xia kemai (white-leg production drops while the price goes up due to a shortage; 白蝦產量銳減價揚 業者歎無蝦可 賣). November 5. http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/1495120

Lien, Marianne 2004. The Virtual Consumer: Constructions of Uncertainty in Marketing Discourse. In Christina Garsten and Monica de Montoya (eds.), Market matters: Exploring cultural processes in the global marketplace , Pp. 46–69. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. Standards, Science and Scale: The Case of Tasmanian Atlantic Salmon. In David Inglis and Debra Gimlin (eds.), The Globalization of Food , Pp. 65–80. Oxford: Berg. 2015. Becoming Salmon: Aquaculture and the Domestication of a Fish . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lin, Jih-wen 2016. The PRC as a Player in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics: A Two-level Game Analysis. In Gunter Schubert (ed.), Taiwan and the “China Impact:” Challenges and Opportunities , Pp. 15–35. New York: Routledge.

Lin, Manhong (林滿紅) 1994. 400 nian lai de liangan fenhe: yige Jingmaoshi de huigu (Four centuries of trade between Taiwan and China; 四百年來的兩岸分合：一個經貿史的回顧). Taipei: zili (臺北：自立).

Lin, Qing-fen ( 林清芬) and Li-ju Hsiao ( 蕭李居) 2008. liao i-chiu: shuichan yangzhi de kailu xianfeng (I-chiu Liao: The trailblazer of Taiwanese aquaculture; 廖一久：水產養殖的開路先鋒). Taipei: Academia Historica ( 台北: 國史館).

Lin, Thung-hong ( 林宗弘) 2013. Chinese Impacts on Taiwan after ECFA Cross-Strait Trade: Income Inequality and Class Politics (ECFA 之後的中國效應：兩岸貿易對台灣貧富差距與階級政治的 影響). In Wen-shen Yang ( 楊文山) and Po-san Wan ( 尹寶珊) (eds.), Facing Challenges: A Comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong (面對挑戰：台灣與香港之比

373

較), Pp. 287 –325. Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica ( 台北：中央研究 院社會學研究所). 2016. Cross-strait Trade and Class Cleavages in Taiwan. In Gunter Schubert (ed.), Taiwan and the “China Impact:” Challenges and Opportunities , Pp. 174–195. New York: Routledge.

Lin, Yan-hong ( 林彥宏), Qi-wei Yu ( 余祁暐) and Zhi-li Sun ( 孫智麗) 2014. woguo shibanyu xiaofei zhe diaocha ji neixu shichang yanjiu (A survey of the domestic market and consumption of grouper in Taiwan; 我國石斑魚消費者調查及 內需市場研究). Animal Science and Technology (動物科技) 40:12 –19.

Liou, To-hai 2011. Cross-Taiwan Straits Economic Relations and the ECFA. In Kevin Cai (ed.), Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations since 1979 , Pp. 155–186. New Jersey & London: World Scientific.

Liu, bing-zhong ( 劉秉忠) 2007. taiwan shibanyu yangzhi de guoqu, xiankuang yu zhanwa ng (The past, present, and future of Taiwanese grouper farming; 台灣石斑魚養殖的過去、現況與展望). In Fan-hua Nan ( 冉繁華) (ed.), Handbook of Grouper (石斑), Pp. 8–23. Keelung: Taiwan Fisheries Economic Development Association; Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) (基隆: 台灣漁業經濟發展協會; 農委會).

Liu, Che-wei ( 劉志偉) 2009. International Food Regime and Food Dependency: The Development of Hog Industry in Postwar Taiwan ( 國際農糧體制與臺灣的糧食依賴：戰後臺灣養豬業 的歷史考察). Taiwan Historical Research (臺灣史研究) 16 (2):105 –60. 2011. International Food Regimes and National Diet: The Political ’s Wheaten Foods ( 國際農糧體制與國民飲食：戰後臺灣麵食的政治經濟學). Journal of Chinese Dietary Culture (中國飲食文化) 7 (1):1–60.

Liu, Hsin-tzu ( 劉欣姿) 2016. The Impact of China’s New Normal on Taiwan Economy: Results from a Global Vector Autoregressive Model ( 中國大陸經濟新常態對臺灣的影響―GVAR 模型 之應用). jingji yanjiu (Economic Research; 經濟研究) 16:234–248.

Longo, Stefano, Brett Clark and Richard York 2013. The Globalization of Ecologically Intensive Aquaculture (1984–2008). Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 3: 297–305.

Loring, Philip, Craig Gerlach and Henry Penn 2015. “Community Work” in a Climate of Adaptation: Responding to Change in Rural Alaska. Human Ecology 44 (1):119–128.

374

Lu, Hsin-Yi 2002. The Politics of Locality: Making a Nation of Communities in Taiwan . London & New York: Routledge.

Lukasik, Victoria and Shelley Alexander 2011. Human-Coyote Interactions in Calgary, Alberta. Human Dimensions of Wildlife 16 (2):114–127.

Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國行政院大陸委員會) 2014. shibanyu fenduan yangzhi, yangzhihu yin ECFA pubian shouhui (Farming groupers via multiple stages; Fish farmers mostly benefit from ECFA; 石斑鱼分段養殖，養 殖户因 ECFA 普遍受惠). Accessed May 10, 2016. http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=109022&ctNode=6009&mp=2

Mansfield, Becky 2011. Is Fish Health Food or Poison? Farmed Fish and the Material Production of Un/Healthy Nature . Antipode 43 (2):413 –434.

Martin, Roy 2012. A History of the Seafood Industry. In Linda Granata, George Flick and Roy Martin (eds.), Seafood Industry: Species, Products, Processing, and Safety , Pp. 1–13. Iowa: Wiley-Blackwell.

Meltzoff, Sarah 1995. Marisquadoras of the Shellfish Revolution: The Rise of Women in Co-management on Illa de Arousa, Galicia. Journal of Political Ecology 2:20 –38.

Milner, Helen 1999. The Political Economy of International Trade. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 91 –114.

Min Sheng Bao (民生報) 2005. shimuyu ji, keneng tuichi liang ge yue. qunian liangbo da hanliu yingxiang (Possible two-month delay for the milkfish harvest season; 虱目魚季，可能推遲兩 個月). B8. April 15.

Ministry of Education, Republic of China (Taiwan). ( 中華民國教育部) Year unknown. taiwan minnanyu changyongci cidian (Hokkien dictionary of Taiwanese Hokkien; 臺灣閩南語常用詞辭典). Last modified December 30, 2016. http://twblg.dict.edu.tw/holodict_new/index.html

375

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國外交部) 2016. Diplomatic Ties of Taiwan. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=0757912EB2F1C601&sms=26470E539 B6FA395/

Mintz, Sidney 1982. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History . New York: Penguin Books.

Nader, Laura 1972. Up the Anthropologist: Perspective Gained from Studying Up. In Dell Hymes (ed.), Reinventing Anthropology. Pp. 284–311 . New York: Pantheon Books.

Narragansett Bay Commission 2009. Estuarine Science: Salinity. Accessed February 1, 2017. http://omp.gso.uri.edu/ompweb/doee/science/physical/chsal1.htm

Nash, Colin 2011. The History of Aquaculture . Ames: Wiley-Blackwell.

National Council for Sustainable Development Network 2010. Taiwan Agenda 21. Accessed January 10, 2017. http://nsdn.epa.gov.tw/NSDN/en/agenda/index.htm

National Land Surveying and Mapping Center, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國內政部國 土測繪中心) 2015. Boundaries of Townships and Cities. Accessed December 10, 2015. http://tgos.nat.gov.tw/tgos/Web/Metadata/TGOS_MetaData_View.aspx?MID=DA2 C058E0BB0C85B80938EE2671C4453&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp% 3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BSHOW_BACK_BUTTON=false&%3B amp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bkeyword= TW-07-301000100G-614001 (Open access: http://data.gov.tw/license )

Nations Online Project 2012. Taiwan Map. Last modified April 20, 2016. http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/taiwan-map.htm

National Policy Foundation ( 財團法人國家政策研究基金會) 2010. liangan qianding ECFA dui taiwan de yingxiang (The impacts to Taiwan of signing the ECFA; 兩岸簽訂 ECFA 對台灣的影響). Last modified July 7, 2010. http://www.npf.org.tw/2/7761 2013. fumao xieyi zhengyi buli huopin maoyi xieyi qianding (The controversy over the Service Trade Pact Agreement negotiation makes the signing of Good Trade Pact

376

Agreement difficult; 服貿協議爭議不利貨品貿易協議簽訂). Last modified October 2, 2013. http://www.npf.org.tw/1/12764

National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 中華民國主計總處) 2016. Statistics of Salary and Productivity. Accessed September 5, 2016. http://www.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=523&CtUnit=363&BaseDSD=7 Naylor, Rosamond, Rebecca Goldburg, Jurgenne Primavera, Nils Kautsky, Malcolm Beveridge, Jason Clay, Carl Folke, Jane Lubchenco, Harold Mooney and Max Troell 2000. Effect of Aquaculture on World Fish Supplies. Nature 405:1017–1024.

Netting, Robert 1993. Smallholders, Householders: Farm Families and the Ecology of Intensive, Sustainable Agriculture . Stanford: Stanford University Press.

News & Market 2013. yue guangguang man huanghuang: manmiao bujian le (3)― ribenman shuo: weihe kuku xiangbi? luman shuo: gai buhui lundao wo ? (The depletion of glass eel resources; 月光光，鰻荒慌- 鰻苗不見了(3) 日本鰻說：為何苦苦相逼？鱸鰻說： 該不會輪到我？). March 18, 2013. https://www.newsmarket.com.tw/blog/26002 2014. zijingqu nongye jiazhi, shi shengji haishi taokong ? (Free Economic Pilot Zone: Does it elevate or devastate the value of Taiwanese agricultural products?; 自經區農 業加值，是升級還是掏空？). March 31, 2014. http://www.newsmarket.com.tw/blog/48706/

Nonini, Donald 2008. Is China Becoming Neoliberal? Critique of Anthropology 28 (2):145–176.

Nye, Joseph 1990. Soft Power. Foreign Policy 80: 153–171.

Omoto, Reiko and Stefanie Scott 2016. Multifuctionality and Agrarian Transition in Alternative Agro-food Production in the Global South: The Case of Organic Shrimp Certification in the Mekong delta, Vietnam. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 57 (1):121 –137.

Ong, Aihwa 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty . Durham: Duke University Press.

Pan, Cheng-xin 2012. Normative Convergence and Cross-Strait Divergence: Westphalian Sovereignty as an Ideational Source of the Taiwan Conflict. In Jean-Marc Blanchard and Dennis Hickey (eds.), New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue , Pp. 28–47. London & New York: Routledge.

377

Pasternak, Burton 1972. The Sociology of : Two Taiwanese Villages. In William Willmott (ed.), Economic Organization in Chinese Society , Pp. 193–213. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Paul, Brojo and Christian Vogl 2012. Key Performance Characteristics of Organic Shrimp Aquaculture in Southwest Bangladesh. Sustainability 4:995–1012.

Peet, Richard and Michael Watts 1996. Liberation Ecology: Development, Sustainability, and Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism. In Richard Peet and Michael Watts (eds.), Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements , Pp. 1–45. London & New York: Routledge.

Peluso, Nancy 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Peluso, Nancy and Michael Watts 2001. Violent Environments. In Nancy Peluso and Michael Watts (eds.), Violent Environments , Pp. 3–38. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Phillips, Lynne 1998. Introduction: Neoliberalism in Latin America. In Lynne Phillips (ed.), The Third Wave of Modernization in Latin America: Cultural Perspectives on Neoliberalism , Pp. 3–28. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. 2006. Food and Globalization. Annual Review of Anthropology 35:37–57.

Polanyi, Karl 1977. The Livelihood of Man . New York, San Francisco& London: Academic Press.

Ponte, Stefano 2007. Greener than Thou: The Political Economy of Fish Ecolabeling and its Local Manifestations in South Africa. World Development 36 (1):159–175. Pradhan, Dolagobinda and Mark Flaherty 2007. National Initiatives, Local Effects: Trade Liberalization, Shrimp Aquaculture, and Coastal Communities in Orissa, India. Society & Natural Resources 21 (1):63–76.

Pramod, Ganapathiraju, Katrina Nakamura, Tong Pitcher and Leslie Delagran 2014. Estimates of Illegal and Unreported Fish in Seafood Imports to the USA. Marine Policy 48: 102–113.

378

Ran, Fan-hua ( 冉繁華) (ed.) 2007. Handbook of Grouper (石斑). Keelung: Taiwan Fisheries Economic Development Association and Council of Agriculture and Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 基隆：台灣漁業經濟發展協會及農委會).

Rappaport, Roy 1984 [1968]. Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People . New Haven: Yale University Press.

Redfield, Robert 1960. The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Rees, Martha and Josephine Smart 2000. Globalities in Multiple Localities: Introductory Thoughts. In Martha Rees and Josephine Smart (eds.), Plural Globalities in Multiple Localities: New World Borders , Pp. 1–18. Lanham, New York & Oxford: University Press of America.

Rigger, Shelley 2011. Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Rose, Nikolas 1996. Governing “Advanced” Liberal Democracies. In Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government , Pp. 37–64. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Schubert, Gunter 2016. Introduction. In Gunter Schubert (ed.), Taiwan and the “China Impact”: Challenges and Opportunities , Pp. 1–12. New York: Routledge. Schuller, Mark. 2007. Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti. Political and Legal Anthropology Review 32 (1):84 –104.

Schut, Marc, Núria Soares, Gerrie van de Ven and Maja Slingerland 2014. Multi-actor Governance of Sustainable Biofuels in Developing Countries: The Case of Mozambique. Energy Policy 65:631 –643.

Scott, James 1999. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

379

Seaweb 2006. Leading Voices for a Healthy Ocean: Our Mission. Accessed Aug 21, 2016. http://www.seaweb.org/about.php

Segi, Shio 2013. The Making of Environmental Subjectivity in Managing Marine Protected Areas: A Case Study from Southeast Cebu. Human Organization 72 (4):336–346.

Seki, Koki 2009. Green Neoliberalism, Ecogovernmentality, and Emergent Community: A Case of Coastal Resource Management in Palawan, the Philippines. Philippine Studies 57 (4):543 –578.

Shang, Yung and Chem Tisdell 1997. Economic Decision Making in Sustainable Aquacultural Development. In Johen Bardach (ed.), Sustainable Aquaculture , Pp. 127–148. New York [u.a.]: Wiley.

Shao, Kuang-tsao, Jui-sheng Chang, Ming-shiou Jeng, Tzu-hsuan Tu, Chuan-wen Ho, Yih-wen Chiu, Tin-yam Chan, Ping-ho Ho, Shyh-min Chao, Shoou-jeng Joung and Pai-lei Lin 2015. A Guide Book of Common Economic Aquatic Animals and Plants in Taiwan . Taipei: Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan).

Shao, Kuang-tsao ( 邵廣昭) and Yun-zhi Liao ( 廖運志) 2015. Taiwan Seafood Guide. Accessed February 15, 2015. http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php .

Shen, Shi-xin ( 沈士新), An-cang Cheng ( 鄭安倉), Bing-zhong Liu ( 劉秉忠), Zheng-hui Lin ( 林 正輝) and Fan-hua Ran (冉繁華) 2014. taiwan shibanyu chanye xiankuang yu qushi (New Trends in the Contemporary Taiwanese Grouper Sector; 臺灣石斑魚產業現況與趨勢). shuichan yangzhi shengji (The Biotechnology of Aquaculture; 水產養殖生技) 38:1–7.

Sheriff, Natsja, David Little and Kwanta Tantikamton 2008. Aquaculture and the Poor: Is the Culture of High-value Fish a Viable Livelihood Option for the Poor? Marine Policy 32:1094–1102.

Simon, Scott 2003. Sweet and Sour: Life-Worlds of Taipei Women Entrepreneurs . Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 2005. Tanners of Taiwan: Life Strategies and National Culture. Cambridge: Westview.

Smart, Alan 1993. Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Social Capital. Cultural Anthropology 8 (3):388–408.

380

Smart, Alan and Josephine Smart 2005. Introduction. In Alan Smart and Josephine Smart (eds.), Petty Capitalists and Globalization: Flexibility, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development , Pp. 1–22. New York: State University of New York Press, Albany. 2011. (Im)mobilizing Technology: Slow Science, Food Safety, and Borders. Identities 18 (6):529–550. 2012. Governing Beef: Program Implementation, Unintended Consequences, and BSE Control in Alberta. In Kendra Coulter and William Schuman (eds.), Governing Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives on Political Labor, Power, and Government , Pp. 69–92. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. Food, Borders, and Diseases. In Jakob Klein and James Watson (eds.), The Handbook of Food and Anthropology , Pp. 249–266. London & New York: Bloomsbury.

Statistical Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan) ( 行政院主計總署) 2013. 99 nian nonglinyumu ye pucha (The Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Census 2010 ; 99 年農林漁牧業普查). Accessed April 15, 2013. http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas04/bc1/public/agr3.html

Steward, Julian 1955. Theory of Cultural Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution . Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Stocking Census, Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Republic of China (Taiwan) (養殖 漁業放養查詢平臺) Year unknown. yangzhi yuye fangyang chaxun pingtai (Taiwanese aquaculture: Stocking census database; 養殖漁業放養查詢平臺). Accessed February 1, 2017. http://fadopen.fa.gov.tw/fadopen/service/qrySpeciesSummaryYearlyReport.action

Stonich, Susan 1995. The Environmental Quality and Social Justice Implications of Shrimp Mariculture Development in Honduras. Human Ecology 23 (2):143–168.

Stonich, Susan, John Bort and Luis Ovares 1997. Globalization of Shrimp Mariculture; The Impact on Social Justice and Environmental Quality in Central America. Society & Natural Resources 10:161– 179.

Su, Huei-meei, Mao-sen Su, Kuo-feng Tseng and I-chiu Liao 2008. Development of Techniques for Enhancing Seed Production of Epinephelus coioides in Taiwan. In I-chiu Lio and Eduardo Leaño (eds.), The Aquacultue of Groupers , Pp. 29–48. Keelung: National Taiwan Ocean University.

381

Sun, Sheng-liang 2011. Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Beijing’s Policy Adjustment. In Kevin Cai (ed.), Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations Since 1979: Policy Adjustment and Institutional Change Across the Straits , Pp. 51–86. Singapore: World Scientific.

Taichung Fish Market (台中魚市場股份有限公司) 2016. Official Website. Last modified July 22, 2016. http://www.tcfish.com.tw/index.php/underwriter-area/notes-underwriter-license- application

Taisheng Magazine ( 台商張老師刊物) 2009. zuijin dalu dui taiwan shifang naxie youli zhengce? (How have recent Chinese policies benefited Taiwan?; 最近大陸對台灣釋放哪些有利政策？). Accessed October 29, 2016. http://www.chinabiz.org.tw/News/GetJournalShow?pid=162&cat_id=174&gid=40&i d=606

Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in Boston 2014. 2014 Seafood Expo in North America. Accessed May 24, 2016. http://www.roc- taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=485888&ctNode=2400&mp=21

Taiwan Eel Farming Industry Development Foundation 2000. taiwan manyu yangzhi shi (The history of eel farming in Taiwan). Last modified September 23, 2000. http://www.eel.org.tw/modules/tadnews/page.php?nsn=21

Taiwanese Traceable Agricultural Products 2016. shime shi chanxiao luli (What is traceability; 什麼是產銷履歷). Accessed October 10, 2016. http://taft.coa.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4&CtNode=296&role=C

Tam, Chui-ling 2006. Harmony Hurts: Participation and Silent Conflict at an Indonesian Fish Pond. Environmental Management 38 (1):1-15. 2015. Timing Exclusion and Communicating Time: A Spatial Analysis of Participation Failure in an Indonesian MPA. Marine Policy 54:122–129.

Tan, Chee-beng and Yuling Ding 2010. The Promotion of Tea in South China: Re-inventing Tradition in an Old Industry. Food and Foodways 18 (3):121–144.

Tang, Shui-yan and Ching-ping Tang 1997. Democratization and Environmental Politics in Taiwan. Asia Survey XXXVII (3): 281–294.

382

2004. Local Governance and Environmental Conservation: Graval Politics and the Preservation of an Endangered Bird Species in Taiwan. Environment and Planning 36:173–189.

The Economist 2003. The Promise of a Blue Revolution. August 7, 2003. http://www.economist.com/node/1974103 2014. Interview with Taiwan’s President: Straight from Mr. Ma’s Mouth. March 28. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president

The Fish Database of Taiwan (台灣魚類資料庫) 2014. The Fish Database of Taiwan. Accessed February 1, 2017. http://fishdb.sinica.edu.tw/chi/seafoodguide.php

The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council in China ( 國務院台灣事務辦公室) 2009. Press Conference. Last modified May 27, 2009. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201101/t20110106_1679304.htm

The World Commission on Environment and Development 1987. Our Common Future . Oxford: OUP.

Troell, Max 2009. Integrated Marine and Brackishwater Aquaculture in Tropical Regions: Research, Implementation and Prospects. In Doris Soto (ed.), Integrated Mariculture: A Global Review. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper. No.529 , Pp. 47–131. Rome: FAO.

Tsai, Ming-chang 2001. Dependency, the State and Class in the Neoliberal Transition of Taiwan. The World Quarterly 22 (3):359–379. 2012. Narrating Neoliberal Transitions: Rhetoric of the State in South Africa and Taiwan. Comparative Sociology 11:251–273.

Tseng, Pin-cang (曾品滄) 2012. Brackish and Fresh Water Ponds: A Comparative Analysis of Taiwanese Aquaculture Development in the ( 塭與塘：清代臺灣養殖漁業發展的 比較分析). Taiwan Historical Research (臺灣史研究) 19 (4):1–47.

Tsing, Anna 2005. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection . Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2015. The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins . Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

383

Tung, Hans and Yun-han Chu 2016. Signalling Peace: A Theory of the ECFA and a Peace Dividend beyond the Taiwan Strait. In Gunter Schubert (ed.), Taiwan and the “China Impact:” Challenges and Opportunities , Pp. 110–129. New York: Routledge.

Tung, Zhen-yuan (童振源) 2006. taiwan de diyichang WTO maoyi zhengce jiantao: lianan jingmao guanxi zhanwang (The future of cross-strait relations: An early evaluation of Taiwan’s WTO membership; 台灣的第一場 WTO 貿易政策檢討：兩岸經貿關係展望). Prospect & Exploration (展望與探索) 4 (7):1–6.

United Daily ( 聯合報) 1999. muli shoujia jihu bufu chengben (Oyster price lower than fishermen’s production cost; 牡蠣售價幾乎不敷成本). Unknown page. September 24. 2003a. shimuyu diedie buxiu, yumin pan buzhu gugong, yuyeshu biaoshi zhijie buzhu weifan shimao guiding, jiang zeqi shuoming (Milkfish price keeps dropping and fish farmers want subsidies to employ workers; the Fisheries Agency said subsidizing violates the WTO—more news to come for farmers ; 虱目魚跌跌不休漁民盼補助雇 工， 漁業署表示直接補助違反世貿規定，將擇期說明). B2. August 30. 2003b. weishu gongbu: guonei sanjian shuichanpin, yanchu jinyao lumeisu (Food and Drug Administration: Banned drug chloromycetin detected in three aquaculture products; 衛署公布: 國內三件水產品 驗出禁藥氯黴素). A6. October 24. 2004. chanpin moduan jianyan zhengqu hualian sheli (Hualien fights for food products inspection before shipping to markets; 產品末端檢驗，爭取花蓮設立). B1. January 19. 2010a. yu xuejia yumin zuotan guotaiban fuzhuren yunnuo shiban qizuo (Taiwan Affairs Office promises trade contract with fishermen in Xuejia; 與學甲漁民座談 國台辦副 主任 允諾試辦契作). B1. August 24. 2010b. zongtong fu: ECFA shi FTA qiaomenzhuan (The President’s Office: ECFA is a stepping stone to FTAs; 總統府：ECFA 是 FTA 敲門磚). A4. June 6. 2011a. anhui tuan qianyue, qianwan caigou nongchan (Anhui team signed contract to purchase agricultural products valued over TWD10 million; 安徽團簽約 千萬採購農 產). A15. April 23. 2011b. wei nongyuye mousheng, shifu dongqilai (City governments take initiatives to help agricultural and fisheries sectors; 為農漁業謀生，市府動起來). B2. April 7. 2013. dabaiyou, shimuyu, qianggong neimeng shichang ( and milkfish enter Inner Mongolia markets; 大白柚、虱目魚 搶攻內蒙市場). B2. December 4. 2014a. ran zaosizheng, baixia shoucheng jiao wangnian cha (EMS negatively affected white-leg shrimp production this year; 染早死症 白蝦收成較往年差). B1. November 11. 2014b. yu gongxiaoshe gou siwan guan xuejia shimuyu song (Hainan group purchased 40,000 cans of milkfish floss; 豫供銷社 購四萬罐學甲虱目魚鬆). A14. June 15.

384

United Nations 2010. Sustainable Development: From Brundtland to Rio 2012. Background Paper. Accessed June 10, 2016. http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/gsp/docs/GSP1- 6_Background%20on%20Sustainable%20Devt.pdf

United Nations Development Group 2006. Millennium Project. Accessed July 20, 2016. http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/

Valdivia, Gabriela 2015. Eco-governmentality. In Tom Perreault, Gavin Bridge and James McCarthy (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology , Pp. 467 –480. London and New York: Routledge.

Vandergeest, Peter 2007. Certification and Communities: Alternatives for Regulating the Environmental and Social Impacts of Shrimp Farming. World Development 35 (7):1152–1171.

Vandergeest, Peter, Mark Flaherty and Paul Miller 1999. A Political Ecology of Shrimp Aquaculture in Thailand. Rural Sociology 64 (4):573 –596.

Vandergeest, Peter, Stefano Ponte and Simon Bush 2015. Assembling Sustainable Territories: Space, Subjects, Objects and Expertise in Seafood Certification. Environment and Planning A 47:1907–1925. Vayda, Andrew and Bradley Walters 1999. Against Political Ecology. Human Ecology 27 (1):167 –179.

Wang, Chia-chou ( 王嘉州) and Min-chen Hsieh ( 謝旻臻) 2014. An Analysis of Public-Private Collaborative Partnership and Policy Making Process Based on Contract Aquaculture Farming of Milkfish in Xuejia ( 學甲虱目魚 契作之公私協力與政策過程分析). Prospect & Exploration (展望與探索) 12 (6):49–65.

Wang, Miao and Maixin Lu 2016. Tilapia Polyculture: A Global Review. Aquaculture Research 47 (8):2363–2374.

Wang, Po-shan ( 王柏山) 2001. The Rise and Fall of Taiwan’s Commercial Aquaculture: The Change and Adaptation of the Eel and Shrimp Culture Technology ( 台灣商業性養殖業之崛起 與衰落：養鰻業與養蝦業之變遷與調適). shehui ke jiaoyu yanjiu (Social Studies and Education; 社會科教育研究) 6:79–106.

385

Wang, Song-xing ( 王崧興) 1967. Keui-shan Tao: Study of a Chinese Fishing Community in Formosa (龜山島：漢 人漁村社會之研究). Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica ( 台北: 中央研 究院民族學研究所).

Wang, Wen-liang ( 王文亮) and Hui-li Huang (黃慧琍) 2010. nanying yangzhi zhi (Aquaculture in Tainan: 南瀛養殖誌). Xinying: Tainan County Government ( 新營: 台南縣政府).

Wang, Yu-qi ( 王瑜琦) 2014. xulun (Introduction; 緒論). In Pu-xing ( 張朴性) (ed.), Aquatic Probiotics ( 水產益生菌), Pp.8–18. Kaohsiung: Fish Breeding Association of Taiwan.

Watson, James 1997. Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia . Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Watts, Michael 1983. Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2015. Now and Then: The Origins of Political Ecology and the Rebirth of Adaptation as a Form of Thought. In Tome Perreault, Gavin Bridge and James McCarthy (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology , Pp. 19–50. London &New York: Routledge.

Weller, Robert 2001. Living at the Edge: Religion, Capitalism, and the End of the Nation-State in Taiwan. In Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (eds.), Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism , Pp. 215–39. Durham & London: Duke University Press. 2006. Discovering Nature: Globalization and Environmental Culture in China and Taiwan . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White, Leslie 1943. Energy and the Evolution of Culture. American Anthropologist 45:335–354.

Wiber, Melanie, Sheena Young, and Lisette Wilson 2012. Impact of Aquaculture on Commercial Fisheries: Fishermen’s Local Ecological Knowledge. Human Ecology 40:29–40.

Wilk, Richard 2006. From Wild Weeds to Artisanal Cheese. In Richard Wilk (ed.), Fast Food/Slow Food: The Cultural Economy of the Global Food System , Pp. 13–27. Lanham: Altamira.

386

Williams, Jack and Cha’ang-yi Chang 2008. Taiwan’s Environmental Struggle: Toward a Green Silicon Island . London & New York: Routledge.

Wolf, Eric 1972. Ownership and Political Ecology. Anthropological Quarterly 45 (3):201 –205. 1982. Europe and the People Without History . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wolford, Wendy 2010. The Land is Ours Now: Social Mobilization and the Meanings of Land in Brazil . Durham: Duke University Press.

World Trade Organization (WTO) 2009. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Accessed December 20, 2016. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_e.htm Year Unknown. Cross-straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Accessed March 10, 2016. http://rtais.wto.org/rtadocs/713/TOA/English/Combined%20ECFA%20Text.pdf

Wright, Susan and Sue Reinhold 2011. “Study Through”: A Strategy for Studying Political Transformation. Or Sex, Lies and British Politics. In Cris Shore, Susan Wright and Davide Però (eds.), Policy Worlds: Anthropology and Analysis of Contemporary Power , Pp. 86 –104. New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Yan, Yun-xiang 2012. Food Safety and Social Risk in Contemporary Chia. The Journal of Asian Studies 71 (3):705–729.

Yang, Hong-ren ( 楊弘任) 2007. Making Community Work: Case Study of Lin-bien (社區如何動起來？黑珍珠之 鄉的派系、在地師傳與社區總體營造). Taipei: Zuoan ( 新北市：左岸文化 ).

Yang, Mayfair 1989. The Gift Economy and State Power in China. Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1):25–54.

Yanow, Dvora 2011. A Policy Ethnographer’s Reading of Policy Anthropology. In Cris Shore, Susan Wright and Davide Però (eds.), Policy Worlds: Anthropology and Analysis of Contemporary Power , Pp. 300 –313. New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books.

387

Yuan, Shou-lian (袁壽廉) 1990. taiwan diqu zhuyao yuchanpin yunxiao zhi yanjiu (A study of the distribution of major seafood products within Taiwan; 台灣地區主要漁產品運銷之研究). Taipei: Taiwan Fisheries Bureau, ROC (Taiwan) (台北: 台灣省政府農林廳漁業局).

Zorriehzahra, Mohamma and Reza Banaederakhshan 2015. Early Mortality Syndrome (EMS) as New Emerging Threat in Shrimp Industry. Advances in Animal and Veterinary Sciences 3 (2):64–72.

Zuindeau, Bertrand 2007. Territorial Equity and Sustainable Development. Environmental Values 16 (2): 253–268.

388

APPENDIX: LYRICS OF FATHER’S MILKFISH (IN HOKKIEN)

阿爸的虱目魚魚魚 (主唱：蕭煌奇) 作詞：武雄 作曲：蕭煌奇 編曲：黃雨勳

歌詞：：： 彼一年 寒冷的冬天 寒流來的時 彼一暝 伊對夢中雄雄驚醒 靴管籠落去 襖仔幔落去 欲去海邊巡魚池 伊講 伊的虱目魚 攏無臭土味 真值錢 但是上驚這款天氣 若是小可無注意 今年就免想過年

伊怨嘆 客廳內 歸暗看電視 月初嘟退伍的囝兒 叫伊鬥陣去 伊嘛無願意 因為粗重的頭路伊無趣味

伊講 無論虱目魚 世界好滋味 有外甜 嘛是乎人嫌相多幼刺 青春少年時 就愛靠家己 惦莊腳所在賺袂著錢 伊才會 決定愈離開 決定飛上天 去城市 不管序大人按怎好嘴 伊欲賺魚翅 無愛撿魚刺 為著將來賺大錢 只要將來賺大錢 管汰伊 阿爸的虱目魚

彼一年 彼場風颱雨 淹過彼條路 彼下晡 伊向天公伯嘆一口氣 不聽別人的阻止 鐵馬騎出去 欲去巡魚池 伊講 伊的虱目魚 真用心來飼 當值錢 偏偏遇到這款天氣 如今水攏加淹去 滿街路四界攏是

伊怨嘆 伊家己 為著虱目魚 連後生攏趕趕出去 只剩一個人 行到水池邊 面前的一切也已經攏無意義

伊講 無論虱目魚 世界好滋味 有外甜 嘛是需要頂面的支持 飼料彼呢貴 又擱歹景氣 漁會的政策攏荒廢 伊看見 水淹彼呢淀 四界攏嘛是 伊的魚 親像是開嘴咧叫伊 叫伊緊放棄 叫伊緊返去 伊講伊有聽見 伊講伊有看見 彼暝的 夢中的虱目魚

聽講 彼暗的電視 攏有報到伊 的名字 無人知最後伊流去叨位 新聞足諷刺 畫面足趣味 有人惦馬路塊撈魚 伊彼個 城市的後生 警察來通知彼當時 飲茫茫惦路邊甲人相爭 伊講虱目魚 其實攏無刺 人講伊已經醉 伊講伊無騙你 虱目魚 原本是 伊的名字

389 Mail - [email protected] https://outlook.office.com/owa/?realm=ucalgary.ca&exsvurl=1&ll-cc...

Re: Permission of using a map made by George Chou

George Chou

Fri 2017-09-01 10:09 AM

To: Siu Kei Cheng ;

Yes, of course you can.

Siu Kei Cheng < [email protected] >於 2017 年9月2日 週六，上午12:04 寫道：

Dear George Chou,

I am wring here to confirm with you that I can use the aached map of China and Taiwan you made for my dissertaon and publicaon. It can be modified and labeled. Your kind response will be highly appreciated.

Best Regards,

Eric Siu-kei Cheng

-- Best Regards

引線視覺設計有限公司｜COIL GRAPHICS DESIGN COMPANY 周治宇．George Chou Mobile.0935-336955 ．LINE ID ：georgechou97 台北市 中正區 新生南路一段146 巷7-1 號 1-2F, No.7-1, Sec. 1, Sinsheng S. Rd., Da-an , Taipei City 106, Taiwan TEL ：02-2357 0010 FAX ：02-23578140 統一編號： 97238613

1 of 1 9/1/2017, 10:14 AM Gmail - Using maps in dissertation and journal articles https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=d586144115&jsver=81P...

Eric Cheng

Using maps in dissertation and journal articles 2 messages

Eric Cheng 30 March 2016 at 15:59 To: [email protected]

Dear person-in-charge,

I am doing a research project for my doctoral dissertation and several academic publications. I understand that the maps on your website (e.g., http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/taiwan-map.htm ) is free to use for educational purposes. I would like to ask if it is possible to include the maps in my works? Do I need to seek the permission, and how? If it requires a fee, would you inform me the costs?

Sincerely yours,

Eric Cheng

Klaus Kästle 8 April 2016 at 20:57 To: Eric Cheng

Dear Eric Cheng,

as mentioned on the map page you are free to use the map in your projects. Please refere to the Nations Online Project.

Kind regards Klaus Kästle

Klaus Kästle Publisher & Editor-in-Chief Nations Online Project http://www.nationsonline.org/ Phone: +66 83 6080 270 (Bangkok, Thailand)

-- Nations Online Project ::: Links to the World -- [Quoted text hidden]

1 of 1 8/24/2017, 4:19 PM