An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban

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An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban POLICYBRIEF #44 Institute for AUGust 2011 Social Policy and Understanding RESEARCH MAKING AN ImPACT AN EXtended PRofile of THE Pakistani Taliban Shehzad H. Qazi, ISPU Research Associate INTRODUCTION1 Pakistan and a decade after 9/11 vows to continue fighting the US, the war in FATA is crucial for both he Federally Administered Tribal Areas Pakistani national security and US foreign policy and (FATA) of Pakistan covers an area of 27, national security objectives. Both states have made the 270 sq. kilometers, roughly the size of elimination of al-Qaeda from the tribal areas a major goal. T Massachusetts. This tremendously small Nevertheless, the Pakistani state lacks the capability to area, however, is home to over roughly 45,000 militants fight a protracted war and this creates challenges for and forty militant groups,2 among them the Afghan both states to accomplish their stated objectives. Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al- This brief discusses the history and background of Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, and the conflict in FATA. The following section will address the Pakistani Taliban. This policy brief focuses on the the Pakistani Taliban’s ideological nature and some last of these insurgent groups and seeks to produce essential characteristics of the movement are explained. an extended profile of it. Next, the structural organization of groups, especially Much confusion exists about the Pakistani Taliban, for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is illustrated. Finally, many discussions about its members have taken place recruitment patterns are surveyed with a discussion of within the context of the Afghan insurgency. In other some factors that have helped militants mobilize fighters. words, it has not been analyzed as a distinct militant movement in its own right, although its members have BACKGROUND been involved in insurgent activity and terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan, trained Times Square bomber he origins of the Pakistani Taliban can be traced Faisal Shehzad, and participated in numerous suicide T to two significant developments after the United bombings and urban guerrilla attacks inside Pakistan, States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. First, the most recent high profile one being the siege at the thousands of Pakistani Pakthun tribesmen were Pakistan Naval Base Mehran in Karachi. mobilized for armed action and crossed the Durand An important characteristic of the Pakistani Taliban is Line into Afghanistan to resist both the American and their alliance with al-Qaeda, including personal relations the NATO forces. For example Sufi Mohammad, the dating back to the days of the Soviet-Afghan war.3 The Pakhtun cleric and leader of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e- Taliban have provided shelter to al-Qaeda leaders, been Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement operationally active with it, and most recently vowed of Islamic Law), infiltrated Afghanistan with roughly to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, 10,000 boys and young men. Nek Mohammed Wazir and since al-Qaeda has been involved in attacks inside Abdullah Mehsud, both of whom subsequently fought AUGUST 2011 POLICY BRIEF ABOUT THE AUTHOR return for shelter.”5 Most of the two groups’ leadership and cadre escaped to South Waziristan, where they were offered protection by the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe, SHEHZAD H. QAZI who, after two decades of engagement, had become ISPU Research Associate sympathetic toward both groups. Al-Qaeda also began leasing compounds from tribesmen to establish Shehzad H. Qazi is a training camps and command and control centers, 6 Research Associate at as well as recruiting local tribesmen. This rekindling of old alliances and forging new ones renewed a ISPU and a former Mary culture of militancy that had been cultivated during F. Crisler scholar (2008- the Soviet-Afghan War. 2010) at the Indiana University School of Liberal Arts and a former DSRP Scholar (2007-2010) at Whereas initially the army had the the Center for Research and Learning. In 2007 Shehzad founded the Council on Strategic and tribal elders’ permission to engage in International Affairs, a student-led think-tank at military action, its harsh tactics soon IUPUI, and served as its Director from 2009-2010. made them angry and unwilling He received his B.A. in International Studies from to hand over any foreign fighters. the Indiana University School of Liberal Arts and While these developments both radicalized and Honors College. He graduated with Highest mobilized the locals, it was the Pakistan Army’s 2002 Distinction and was also awarded the Indiana invasion of the tribal areas that transformed the existing University School of Liberal Arts Faculty Medal widespread militancy into a full-blown insurgency. In of Academic Distinction. He is currently in the April 2002, the Pakistani Army entered the regions of North and South Waziristan with the intent of graduate program in International Relations at capturing or eliminating the mainly foreign-born al- New York University. Qaeda operatives. The army engaged these fighters and started meeting resistance from local tribesmen who had been angered by the American invasion and the Pakistani Army, were also part of the resistance. thus sympathized with al-Qaeda. Whereas initially From the invasion onward, Pakistani madrasah students the army had the tribal elders’ permission to engage and tribesmen have regularly been recruited and sent in military action, its harsh tactics soon made them to participate in the insurgency in Afghanistan.4 angry and unwilling to hand over any foreign fighters. The second development was the arrival in the The subsequent fight between the Pakistan Army and tribal areas of the Afghan Taliban’s and al-Qaeda’s foreign al-Qaeda insurgents turned into a war between senior leadership, along with hundreds of Afghan, the Pakistan Army and rebel tribesmen.7 Arab, Chechen, Uzbek, East Asian, and Sudanese The insurgency, which was initially limited to North fighters. As Zahid Hussain writes, al-Qaeda militants and South Waziristan, spread during the next few “distributed million of dollars among tribal elders in years throughout FATA. Moreover, several rebel militias ISPU An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban AUGUST 2011 POLICY BRIEF emerged between 2002 and 2006. On December POLITICAL NATURE OF 13, 2007, these militant groups formed the Tehrik-e- THE INSURGENT MOVemeNT Taliban Pakistan (TTP; Student Movement of Pakistan) to coordinate their activities against the American and he Pakistani Taliban have three major characteristics NATO forces in Afghanistan and against the Pakistan T that are essential to understanding the insurgency. Army in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP).8 By First, as explained below, this extremely decentralized 2007, the Swat district had also fallen under rebel movement follows the decisions taken by local Taliban control, and within two years the Pakistani Taliban chapters, decisions that are based on local political controlled towns located a mere sixty miles away needs. Rebel leaders make those decisions and normally from Islamabad. fight when it suits their immediate family, clan, tribal, and economic interests to do so.10 IDEOLOGICAL NATURE Second, the movement remains fractured and rebel OF THE PAKISTANI TALibAN infighting is not uncommon. The power struggle that ensued between Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur n general terms, the Pakistani Taliban can be divided Rahman after Baitullah Mehsud’s death is one key I into two ideological camps: (1) Hakimullah Mehsud example. Moreover, militant groups have fought each and Wali-ur-Rahman are leading members of one other for control of criminal networks, local markets, group that is composed mostly of the TTP. Given “taxes” on commercial activities, and differences over its very close relationship with al-Qaeda, it focuses religious opinion.11 At times, they have also eliminated its activities on fighting the Pakistani state and its rival insurgent leaders or their tribal supporters. For army and considers any participation in the war in example, in 2008 Baitullah Mehsud assassinated tribal Afghanistan a secondary pursuit. This group has also leaders loyal to Mullah Nazir12 and had Haji Namdar been active in training terrorists who have volunteered Khan (Khyber Agency) murdered after the latter broke for al-Qaeda, such as Time Square Bomber Faisal with him to join a rival group.13 Shahzad and Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, Third, local Taliban groups display a variety of who carried out a suicide attack at the CIA Forward interests. In North and South Waziristan, for example, Operating Base in Khost, Afghanistan. the resistance is composed of ideologically motivated (2) This group comprises those Pakistani Taliban who Taliban. In Khyber Agency, however, militant groups closely follow the Afghan Taliban’s advice and thus are composed of the drug mafia, smugglers, and local focus on fighting the American and NATO forces inside criminals. The Orakzai and Bajaur regions feature a Afghanistan. Members of this group, including Mullah combination in which some rebels are motivated by Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, have either left the TTP ideology and others by criminality.14 alliance or are severely critical of its policies vis-à-vis the Pakistan Army. These two groups, of course, are ORGANIZATION not monolithic in themselves, and many instances of rebel infighting may break out among those that fall he Pakistani Taliban, comprising forty militant into the same ideological camp, such as Mangal
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