University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences
Academic year 2018 - 2019
International Development discourses and the Development of Ghana A historical discursive analysis
Yassine Ejdaa - 11231203 June 17, 2019 Bachelor’s thesis Human Geography Word count: 19524 Supervisor: dhr. dr. A.F.M. Zaal
1 ABSTRACT
Development is a highly discursive topic; many perspectives and discourses provide different meanings on development and how to achieve it. This research focusses on the historical evolution of politics in Ghana and their associated changing discourse on economic progress. It links the general international development discourses with the national perspectives of political leaders. This thesis answers the question: How are international development discourses reflected in the political history of Ghana? Overall, two distinct groups of leaders reigned in Ghana: the socialists who plea for protectionism against foreign interference and the pro-Western liberalists who turn to the Bretton Woods institutions for financial aid. Although Ghana is in the grasp of the neoliberal discourse since the economic crisis of 1982, popular resistance against western interference and policies remains – as a legacy of Nkrumah. Future policies should try to involve the populace in the development and economic prosperity of Ghana as the SAPs and PRSPs failed to do so.
Keywords: International Financial Institution, development, discourse, Ghana, socialism, structural adjustment, economic stability, liberalization, PRSP.
2
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABBREVIATIONS 6
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 8
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 10
Social Science and Discourse 11
The Power of Discourse 12
CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES 13
What is development? 13
The Evolution of the Discourse on Development 14
The Modernization theory 14 The Evolutionary Theory 15 Stages of Development 15 Criticism of Modernization 16
Dependency and World Systems Theory 17 Neo-Marxism 17 Latin American structuralism 17 Criticism of Dependency 18 World Systems Theory 18
Neoliberalism and the magic of the market 18
Neoliberalism in practice 19 Structural Adjustment Programs 19 The World Bank and SAPs 20 Criticism of SAPs 20 Alternative policies 21 Poverty Reduction Strategies 21 Criticism of PRSPs 22
Post-development 22 Postmodernism 23 Criticism of post-development 23
Conclusion 24
4 CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN GHANA 25
The Bretton Woods institutions 25
THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 27
Ghana in the pre-SAPs era 27 Pre-independence 27 Nkrumah and free Ghana 29 Nkrumah’s road to autocracy 29 Nkrumaism 30 Industrialization and Africanization 30 Neo-colonialism and Pan-Africanism 31 Socialism and Protectionism 34 Decline in Nkrumah’s popularity 35 Coup d’état 35 Ghana under military rule (1966 – 1969) 35 Kofi A. Busia and the civilian government (1969 – 1972): the Second Republic 36 Busia’s downfall 36 The National Redemption Council (1972 – 1979): Second Military Regime 37 Rawlings and the Third Republic (1979 – 1981) 37
Ghana in the post-SAPs era 38 The Provisional National Defense Council (1982 – 1993) 38 Ghana and the Structural Adjustment Programs 39 Return to Democracy: the Fourth Republic (1993 – present) 40 Ghana and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 41 The effects of GPRS 41
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 43
Nkrumah’s discourse 43
The period of political and economic precariousness 44 1966-1969 44 1969-1972 44 1972-1982 44
The interference of the IMF and the World Bank 45 Structural Adjustment Program 45 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 46
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 47
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 48
REFERENCES 49
SOURCES 53
5 ABBREVIATIONS
ADA Avoidance of Discrimination Act AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council AYO Anlo Youth Organization CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPP Convention People’s Party ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America ERP Economic Recovery Program ESF Emergency Social Fund GBA Ghana Bar Association GDP Gross Domestic Product GPRS Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Funds MAP Muslim Association Party NAL National Alliance of Liberals NDC National Democratic Congress NGO Non-Governmental Organization NLC National Liberation Council NLM National Liberation Movement NRC National Redemption Council NPP New Patriotic Party NUGS National Union of Ghanaian Students PAMSCAD Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment PFP Popular Front Party PNDC Provisional National Defense Council PNP People’s National Party PP Progress Party PRS(P) Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper) SAP Structural Adjustment Program SMC Supreme Military Council UGCC United Gold Coast Convention UP United Party WB World Bank
6
It is far easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the needle’s eye, hump and all, than for an erstwhile colonial administration to give sound and honest counsel of a political nature to its liberated territory.
- Kwame Nkrumah -
7 CHAPTER 1: Introduction
The concept of International Development arose around the late 40s, at the end of World War II. The war led to massive destruction, the era of colonialization came to an end and left former colonies exploited and underdeveloped, and the Cold War, which threatened the expansion of communism, started. International development primarily targeted the colonies that gained independence. These newly formed states needed construction of governance to stimulate growth to eradicate poverty, hunger, and economic instability (Layne, 2007; Helleiner, 2006). The term development suggests that countries have different levels of development and there is a hierarchy, a goal to pursue. It implies that there is one path for underdeveloped states to follow to receive the status of ‘developed’. But what is development? What do we mean by progress and prosperity? Many scholars, politicians, economists, etc. have attempted to define development resulting in the evolution of a variety of discourses on international development over the past decades. These discourses hold different ideas of what development is and how to achieve it. The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now part of the World Bank –- in 1944 can be seen as a means to spread a discourse to different underdeveloped nations (Helleiner, 2014). These International Financial Institutions (IFIs) offer loans for their member states to finance development programs; first mainly for the reconstruction of Europe, later more focused on economic development in the Global South. The IMF and the World Bank, however, do not just have a passive function of financial assistance; they hold the power to dictate the introduction of policies that are in line with their philosophy on development. Consequently, nations that implement these laws will receive financial assistance. Additionally, the creation of discourses on development is a dynamic process. By analyzing the realizations and shortcomings of previous discourses, new ideas are formed. This has resulted in a wide spectrum of different development programs following different discourses (Ruger, 2005). The diversity of development discourse is the main focus of this research. Ghana is by many scholars considered as the African pioneer regarding economic progress and position in the international market. Ghana was the first sub-Saharan state to gain independence and also one of the first and successful countries to implement the Structural Adjustment Programs of the IFIs (Brydon & Legge, 1996). Additionally, Ghana is also known for its resistance to neoliberal policies. The Ghanaian government is, for example, the only African government still controlling its export of cocoa beans while the cocoa export of other sub-Saharan states is in hand of foreign companies and multinationals (Wilcox & Abbott, 2004). This research investigates Ghana’s development path between 1947 and 2008 to clarify its leading role amongst the developing nations. This will be done by linking the perspectives of the Ghanaian political leaders with the overall discourse on development to highlight their relationship and investigate the origin of the Ghanaian resistance to neoliberalism and trade liberalization. The subject of Ghana and its economic and political development is not unknown to the academic world. Ghana received a lot of university attention due to its pioneering role and because the Ghanaian academic system is relatively extensive. The novelty of this research lies in its completeness of the Ghanaian historical development and its link with international
8 development discourses. Previous academic research mainly focused on certain decades or regime of the political history of Ghana. By looking at the entire history since 1947, the emphasis lies on the evolution of ideologies and discourses and their interrelations. It helps to understand how discourses got created and which events contributed to certain perspectives. The main research question of this thesis is:
How are international development discourses reflected in the political history of Ghana?
To guide the research, several sub-questions were drafted. The first one is directed to the general perspectives on international development and their evolution:
What are the different discourses on international development and how did they evolve over time?
The second question focusses on the Ghanaian political and economic situation after World War II up till 2008 and the influence of political leaders on the development of Ghana:
How did the political history of Ghana effect the national economy and development?
The last sub-question is directed to the power of the International Financial Institutions and the resistance they experienced in amongst Ghana’s population.
How did the International Financial Institutions influence the development of Ghana?
Chapter two outlines the methodology of the research including an elaboration on the importance of discourse analysis. Chapter three describes the history of development thinking; the main theories and the relation to each other. The fourth chapter delves into the political history of Ghana since 1947. It extensively describes the sequence of political leaders and their discourse and perspective on economic progress. Additionally, the relation to the IMF and the World Bank is included. Chapter five provides the analysis of this research by answering the main research question. Finally, a short conclusion and discussion will conclude this thesis.
9
CHAPTER 2: Methodology
This chapter provides an outline of the methodology of the research. This includes the research strategy, the research design and methods of data collection, the units of research, the type of analytic approach and finally a description of the sources. Additionally, chapter two is a plea for the use of discourse analysis in the field of social sciences. The chapter delineates its importance and added value to investigation on prevailing discourses and their power relations. This bachelor’s thesis explores the political situation throughout the history of Ghana to offer a better understanding of past economic and social events and the reciprocity between the Ghanaian development and the international aid community. The intentions lie in placing the Ghanaian development into a wider context to elucidate important actors and stakeholders and their relationship and contribution to the process of economic growth in Ghana. In the current globalized political environment, the process of development has become more complex and interwoven. A qualitative research strategy is more fitted for this purpose of broader context shaping and articulation of the complexity of the situation. This research strategy is consistent with the analytic induction as analytic approach. In the analytic induction approach, the investigator starts the research with some assumptions and a broad hypothesis. In the course of the investigation, this hypothesis will be adapted as new information comes to light. The research is carried out iteratively; more knowledge on the situation will alter the theory and conclusion. By doing qualitative research, the experiences of the Ghanaian population and politics become the focal point of the investigation; the meaning of the interference from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the liberalization process becomes the subject. The emphasis lies on the profundity of the knowledge rather than the generalization of the outcomes (Bryman, 2016). The research focusses on development and economic growth in the case of Ghana; a case study research design seemed most suited. By applying a case study design, the research was able to intensively explore the Ghanaian historical situation and evolution in detail. The focus lies on the unique characteristics of Ghana in its path to economic stability and the complex nature of the phenomenon. Additionally, a case study proved to be most suitable for investigating political decisions and policies (Bryman, 2016). The discourses and perspectives of political leaders of Ghana and the international development aid milieu are the units of research. The national and international discourses will be studied adjacent to each other to explore common grounds, contradictions, and frictions. The information used for this research is mainly based on the secondary analysis of qualitative academic literature. As this academic literature is predominantly western and has a discursive nature, the research tried to involve non-western, mostly Ghanaian scholars into the data collection. Luckily, the Ghanaian academic world is well organized and extensive, so African publications were not hard to find. Furthermore, policy documents, speeches, and publications by political leaders were primary analyzed to crawl into the mindset and reasonings of these influential characters. The next
10 section will elaborate on the concept of discourse and the reasons why it should not be neglected.
Social Science and Discourse
Many scholars have tried to define the term discourse (see e.g. Hall, 1992). This research will use the definition given by Hajer, Van Den Brink & Metze (2006). They write that a discourse is:
… an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices. (Hajer, Van Den brink & Metze, 2006 - p. 67)
A discourse is a coherence of statements, a particular way of representing and talking about a specific kind of knowledge about a topic. As denoted in the definition above, a discourse gives social phenomena meaning and has a reproductive nature. The French political philosopher Michel Foucault argues that all social practices entail meaning, and that meaning shapes and influences our actions. The practice of producing meaning creates discourses and so all social practices have a discursive aspect (Hall, 1992). In line with this thinking, is the ontological position of the constructionist philosophy. Viewed through the constructionist lens, reality and social phenomena are not independent of but are constructed by actors and individuals. Knowledge of the social world comes about through an active creation by social actors such as organizations, institutions or individuals. Meanings are developed through interactions with other individuals. Additionally, there is not one reason, not one reality; absolute truths are illusions (Bryman, 2016).
The concept of discourse is not about whether things exist but about where meaning comes from. (Stuart Hall, 1997)
The constructivist position advocates for research on the power of language and discourse. Analyzing discourses is deemed crucial because discourses hold power – they possess a constructive force; a discourse actually constructs the object or event itself. The ways we think influences the way we act and our conduct. In other words, all social practices must be understood through their discursive construction (Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009). Hall (1997) adds that discourses do not only construct social phenomena but also regulates the knowledge on a topic through power relationships. There is not just one discourse on social phenomena. Different discourses with different perspectives and meanings interact. The dominant, prevailing discourse rules out alternative perspectives and ways of talking about a topic. Hall (1992) underscores that with sufficient time and effort, certain ways of talking about and understanding the world can become so natural that they become axioms or assumed truths, making it difficult for alternative perspectives to thrive. This power of discourse is also what Foucault brought forward in his academic writings and theories (Hall, 1997). Foucault is seen as one of the greatest philosophers and historians of the second half of the twentieth century and he is the most cited philosopher in the field of social science. His
11 scientific interests were focused on providing a different perspective on history than the prevailing train of thought. He undermined the assumption that everything now is better than the past. By presenting an alternative view, he emphasizes the power of discourse in society and shows us that we too often take things for granted. Foucault encourages us to look at the dominant ideas and institutions of our time and to critically analyze their interactions, history, and evolution (Eribon & Holierhoek, 1990; Hall, 1992). The critical discourse analysis practitioners - also known as the Foucauldian discourse analysts - try to track how discourses are constructed and maintained. Hereby, a historical review of the evolution of discourses on the topic is crucial to illustrate the changing meaning of the topic. Equally important is the research on the power of discourses; the influence of the dominant discourse on other perspectives and the linkage between different discourses as they influence each other (Bryman, 2016).
The Power of Discourse
This research examines the social phenomenon of international development by applying a Foucauldian approach to discursive analysis. This research strategy provides a tool to describe how actors and organizations use discourses and arguments to frame their interests. Three aspects of the discourses will be explored: (1) the meaning of development of the discourse and the evolution of this meaning, (2) how different discourses construct the process of development and how they influence governmental acting and policy making, and (3) how the different discourses relate to each other, which one is the most dominant and enjoys a power advantage. The latter component, the relationship between knowledge and power, is typical for the Foucauldian discourse analysis. Besides focusing on the meaning and the origin of a discourse, the power of the discourse and who imposes it, is equally relevant. The academic world of international development aid is in constant debate. This is because international development is a rather recent field of study with a large discursive component. International development is fueled by different stakeholders: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions (IFIs), governments and multilateral organizations. These different actors serve different interests and have a different meaning on development, and thus act according to different discourses. It is the task of social scientists to examine this variety in interests and discourses, to map them and to investigate them from a historical perspective in order to reveal the evolution of the discourses and their influence on development. But it is not only important to examine the past. Joining Foucault’s method of reasoning, examining the limitations of contemporary perspectives on development can be of even greater importance. It helps us to not take ideas for granted, to locate dominant discourses, analyze their shortcomings and to think of alternatives. It helps us to move forward. It helps us to develop.
12
CHAPTER 3: International Development Discourses
As discussed in chapter two, all social practices entail meaning, so does international development. Development is a complex and contradictory term with not just one unambiguous definition. Different stakeholders with differing interests may have different perspectives on what development is; there is little consensus on the meaning of development. This chapter will elaborate on the diversity of the conceptualization of development and, more importantly, the historical changes that occurred when dominant ideas where questioned and altered. This will be done by placing the particular meanings on development in the context of their institutional, political and historical moments. To clearly illustrate the different discourses, this chapter will present them as static entities, separate from each other. It must be clarified that a discourse is dynamic, in constant change. By evaluating the limitations of previous perspectives, new discourses are created or adjusted. Additionally, as stated before, different discourses can exist during the same period. It is not a clearly demarcated sequence but rather an intertwined complex process.
Development occupies the centre of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation … at the same time, very few words are as feeble, as fragile and as incapable of giving substance and meaning to thought and behaviour. (Esteva, 1992 - p.8)
What is development?
The main issue with defining development is the dependency on value judgments. We need to acknowledge the divergence in opinions on the objectives and aspirations of development. There is, on the other hand, however, a general basis in the definition that is independent of its discourse: development is a continuous and cumulative process of change that is not always positive and is comprehensive – not just change in one particular element (Thomas, 2000). A widespread assumption is that development is a synonym for prosperity and progress and is thus, put differently, always a beneficial improvement. This belief was and still is, criticized by many social scientists (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Arturo Escobar, for example, discusses in his book Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World (2011) the negative outcome of development on the Global South. He suggests that the development project is a Western creation that made the lives of people in the South worse instead of ameliorating them. Also, Edward Wadie Said – the auteur of the acclaimed book Orientalism (1978) – offers criticism of the Western perception of the East, what he refers to as Orientalism. As Said (1978) addresses in his book:
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, by teaching it,
13 settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style of dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient … (Said, 1978 - p.3)
He argues that - by romanticizing the Orient - the West provides an Other against which the own identity of superiority can be created. According to this thinking, international develop- ment became a mechanism of control comparable to colonialism. Interventionist development – even with positive consequences – is thus per definition a problem because it sets the terms of how people in underdeveloped countries should live (Arturo, 1995). Both scholars try to make us aware of the axiom of development as inherently positive and break the tendency to view development as unquestioned and interventionist rather than complex and discursive (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Therefore, they are both indispensable when talking about and examining international development.
The Evolution of the Discourse on Development
Just as there is not one fixed definition of development, there is no single development discourse. Instead, there are only suggestions on what development is and should contain. Different discourses present different meanings and explanations of what they think development is. Examining discourses can make social events more understandable as it examines the consequences by looking at the causes, the ways of thinking that resulted in these consequences. A development theory aims to describe how development took place in the past and how it can be improved in the future. A new development discourse is therefore always built on the flaws of the previous one. Development discourses are thus, as mentioned before, dynamic, constantly redefined as new insights and limitations emerge (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009; Daniels et al., 2012). This section summarizes the main development theories to illustrate the changing patterns of development throughout the world in the post-world war II era. These discourses will be linked to the thinking and acting of the World Bank and the IMF. The choice to link the general discourses to the World Bank and the IMF is because of the large influence the institutions have on the field of development relative to other organizations such as the UN; the World Bank is the world’s premier economic multilateral institution and the largest financial contributor to development projects (Ruger, 2005; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF played a vital role in the realization of the liberalization processes of Ghana as discussed in chapter four (Brydon & Legge, 1996). Their vision and influence on development can therefore not be ignored. The discourses that will be discussed are, in chronological order: the Modernization theory (1940s – 1960s), the Dependency theory and World System theory (1960s – 1970s), the Neoliberal discourse (1980s – now) and the Post-development discourse (1990s – now).
The Modernization theory
In the aftermath of World War II, two distinctive worldviews and ideologies were developed. This disparity in perspective resulted in the division of the world in two main power blocks: the capitalist western block led by the United States and the communist block led by the Soviet Union (USSR). This geopolitical tension between two opposite ideologies brought about an armed peace; the so-called Cold War. The world was divided into three: the capitalist West as the “first world”, the communist block as the “second world” and the remaining countries that did not actively participate in the Cold War. The latter was also
14 named the “third world” or developing countries (Daniels et al., 2012). The goal of the West in this period was to spread capitalism and contain Soviet expansionism. The containment of communism was advocated by George F. Kennan’s, former U.S. diplomat, “Long Telegram” or X article. In his article, published in 1946, Kennan pleas for a policy of containment of the Soviet Union and strong anti-communism (Kennan, 1946). The expansion of their ideologies was only possible in the neutral third world so both blocks fought for the dominance of the developing countries. Foreign policies and international development aid became the battlefields of the Cold War. The Western conception of develop-ment was led by a strong capitalist ideology. The idea that developing countries should follow the exact path and mirror the evolution of the U.S. and Europa prevailed. Development was seen as a positive and irreversible process all societies had to pass through sooner or later. The Third World countries were stimulated to adopt Western capital, technology and values as a toolkit for development and growth (Power, 2002; Daniels et al., 2012).
The Evolutionary Theory
The idea of modernization was drafted on the experience of Europe on their development history. Hereby, there is a distinction between modern economies and traditional societies. Modern economies were characterized by the process of rationalization with its goal-oriented hard-working philosophy and high productivity, whereas the dominant ethos in the more traditional societies was based on leisure, recreation, and culture. Talcott Parsons - sociologist and one of the main proponents of the modernization theory – emphasized this dichotomy and claimed that changes in attitude and ethics were essential for development and economic progress. Traditional societies would have to abandon their orientation to family, religion, and community to develop into a more modern, entrepreneurial and rational economy. Culture, religion, and traditions were framed as obstacles for development that had to be vacated. In other words, echoing economist Bert Hoselitz, hindrances to development were internal to societies and needed to be reconstituted to pursue the European example (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Stages of Development
The development theorists of the 1950s and 1960s viewed the process of development as a series of consecutive stages every nation had to pass through. This unilinear model reappeared in Rostow’s book published in 1960: The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. The title shows the emphasis on the process of economic growth rather than development in this period. Economic growth was a synonym for development and this economic growth could be reached by passing through five ‘development stages’. These five phases would turn any peasant agrarian nation into a modern industrial economy through the process of modernization. Walt Whitman Rostow drafted five universal stages of economic development built on the evaluation of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The five stages are: (1) Traditional society, (2) Conditions for take-off, (3) Take-off, (4) Drive to maturity and (5) Age of high mass consumption, further explained below (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
(1) Traditional society The first stage is characterized by production and trade that is based on custom and barter. Technology and science are of primitive nature placing a ceiling on productivity. Small-scale
15 agriculture is the main occupation in these societies. Fatalism – the doctrine that assumes that man has no influence on his own destiny – prevails neglecting personal capabilities.
(2) Conditions for take-off The first phase after the traditional society is marked by an invasion of advanced societies. This invasion tears down the cultural and traditional values by showing alternative and new ideas of living a better life in the form of economic progress. Entrepreneurship and capital investment are developed together with the build and centralization of an effective nation- state and the expansion of education.
(3) Take-off After the stage of preparation, economic growth can commence. The last traditional barriers are removed to further increase investments – from 5% to 10% of Gross National Product (GNP) - and commercialization of agriculture. More industrialization leads to the rapid emergence of leading sectors that will later stimulate the growth of other sectors.
(4) Drive to maturity The fourth phase is characterized by a further increase in investment – from 10 to 20 percent of national income and an extension of modern technology to other resources. The agricultural and industrial sectors become more diversified and the nation-state is able to produce more of their own goods; import starts decreasing. The nation becomes part of the international economy.
(5) Age of high mass consumption In the final stage the main focus of economic growth shifts to a more socially-oriented perspective. The real incomes rose, and society pays more attention to social welfare and security (Rostow, 1990; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
After this theoretical review on the modernization theory, some key features can be distinguished. The most prominent one is the requirement for nations to embrace the process of industrialization and commercialization of the agricultural sector – from subsistence farming to the large-scale cultivation of cash crops. Hereby, the experience of the West would serve as an instruction manual. Although the western influence in the aid for modernization was considered crucial, it was also accepted that the driving force of industrialization and economic growth had to come from within. The middle-class entrepreneurs would, therefore, turn to be vital in forming a modernizing elite. The social change in attitude among the population was stressed to be essential to sustain economic prosperity and industrialization (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). In practice, the modernization discourse ruled the field of development in the 1950s and early 1960s. Modernization became the reference point for the bulk of development projects in the Global South, especially by the US government and UN agencies. Projects were directed to enhance agricultural efficiency, urban industrialization and support large- scale infrastructural projects such as transport infrastructure and power plants. The dilation and improvement of technologies were therefor indispensable (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Criticism of Modernization
In the late 1960s, criticism of the modernization theory rose in response to the analysis of previous development policies. These policies under the modernization discourse did not provide the results that were anticipated. In particular, the economic growth that was
16 promised by the policies was rather limited. Instead, the poverty in the developing countries persisted, often together with the widening gap between rich and poor. This polarization was also increasing at the international scale as the disparity between the most and least developed countries enlarged. The Modernization theory was criticized for denigrating the traditional economies and their cultures and only valuing Western modern norms. Modernists ignored the diversity and value of ancient non-Western societies and cultures. The main critique on modernization was that it neglected the historical development of nations that were shaped by international relationships, especially the impact of colonialism on developing countries. It frames the underdevelopment of the Global South as a choice disregarding the lack of freedom to develop independently of colonial rule or, subsequently, the dominance of the international organi-zations such as the World Bank or the IMF. The recognition of these accusations led to the development of a new discourse: the dependency theory (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Dependency and World Systems Theory
The foundation of the dependency theory was the argumentation that the persistent poverty and the low economic development rates in the Global South were a result of the exploitation of the advanced nations. In other words, by considering the global historical context, the dependency discourse argues that the growth of one nation can only be reached by the active exploitation of another less developed country (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Neo-Marxism
The theory of dependency was built on two prominent intellectual trends: neo-Marxism and Latin American structuralism. The neo-Marxist perspective analyzed the different stages of capitalist expansion and how these affected the exploitation of underdeveloped nations. The most prominent period was the era of colonialism that involved control of Western nations over the politics, administration, economy and legal system of countries in the South. The neo-Marxist theorists argue that this period of control was the starting point of severe exploitation making it exceptionally difficult for underdeveloped nations to escape from foreign rule and develop independently. Even after being decolonized, the development trajectories of these nations were still dictated by Western actors such as multinational organizations or international financial institutions (IFIs) through the process of neo- colonialism (Thomas, 2000; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009 - p.32-33).
Latin American structuralism
Structuralist thinkers claim that to develop underlying economic and social structures needs to be altered. This argument was a result of the Great Depression in Latin America in the 1930s. Latin American exporters experienced heavy competition with other producing areas. This competition imposed low prices for their products making them less able to buy manufactured goods. Latin America experienced a structural disadvantage in the world economy leaving them heavily dependent on Western markets. Raúl Prebisch - an Argentinian economist and director of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) - argued that the global economic order was divided into two: the industrial core and the agricultural periphery. The former reigned world politics and trade and depleted the peripheral countries. This word order shaped the peripheral nations as exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured
17 goods. The national income from export was relatively low - mainly due to international competition – pushing these nations into a forced cycle of poverty because of imported high- value goods, which they actually could not afford. As a result, ECLA composed policy propositions focused on protectionism and the increase in domestic production to decrease the import costs. These policies were aimed at withdrawing Latin American countries from the international economy. Paul Baran – often called the ‘father of dependency’ – suggested that the exploitation of the periphery is inherent to capitalism. One cannot thrive without the deprivation of the other. The industrialized West needs raw materials to offer economic opportunities. To secure this supply of resources, industrialized economies hold close partnerships with the elites of the Global South. It was only these elite groups that were reaping the benefits of international collaboration increasing the wealth gap in the underdeveloped nations. André Gunder Frank – who elaborated on the work of Baran – even stated that true progress in the developing world could only be reached by de-linking from the Western world. The lack of progress in the underdeveloped countries is thus not inherently cultural but lays in their unequal participation in the global economy (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Criticism of Dependency
Criticism of the dependency discourse was that both Baran and Frank oversimplified and overgeneralized their theories. They had built their theories on the experiences of Latin America and had generalized it to the global level ignoring the diversity between nations. Dependency approaches also failed to look for true causes of underdevelopment besides blaming the Western capitalist system. They never focused on internal factors that influence the poverty and development of the nation. Consequently, it was not able to present workable policy advises. The dependency theorists, on the other hand, were able to create a more critical understanding of the role of the West in the field of international development (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
World Systems Theory
The World systems theory was created in the mid-1970s until the 1980s by Immanuel Wallerstein. This period was characterized by rapid economic growth in several East Asian countries opening up new research grounds for development. The World Systems approach rejects the one-way relationship between the South and the North of the dependency theory but builds on the statement that underdevelopment is indeed influenced by global capitalism. Wallerstein’s perspective agrees with the fundamentally unequal nature of the global system; there is a diversity in the possibilities of economies to develop that correlates with capital accumulation. World Systems theorists added a category to the core-periphery model: the semi-periphery to further distinguish developing areas with a higher potential such as Brazil or Hong Kong. In other words, the World Systems theory adds dynamism to the possibilities of nations, in contrast to the more static approach of dependency, but is still being criticked for its overgeneralizing character. It does offer a more positive view on integration into the world economy; not every integration is negative (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Neoliberalism and the magic of the market
18 The criticism of previous theories on development destabilized the field of international development thinking. Not one discourse could withstand the counterarguments. There was room for alternative perspectives to come forward. This is where neoliberalism appears. The neoliberal approach starts developing in the early 1980s and prevails in this decennium. The oil price rose drastically in 1973 and 1979 stirring up an economic relapse in the world economy that impelled the ‘debt crisis’ in the Global South in the early 1980s. The belief in the state as a market regulator and provider of social support lost ground. As a result, a decline in state involvement in the economy was construed as stimulating economic growth and development. This ideology was quickly adopted in the Global North and then translated into development policies to import neoliberalism in the South (Simon, 2008). Keynesianism - that pleas for the intervention of the state in the economies of developing nations to control the development – was replaced by the opposite neoliberalism that rejects such role of the state. The idea of capitalism and free markets regained interests after two decades of anti-capitalist attitudes of the dependency and later World systems theory. If we would let market forces take over, growth and prosperity would follow logically. The argument of protectionism of the Western society of the dependency theory was moved aside and thrust in the integration into the world market increased. Some elements of the modernization theory - such as export, international competition and the obstacle of tradition – resurrected (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). The limited development of the South was the result of misguided policies and an over-concentration on the public and domestic sector. Neoliberal policy proposals were aimed at the privatization of state-owned enterprises, allowance of the free market to prosper with its expansion and free trade and inviting foreign investors. The provision of goods and services by the government is limited to those that cannot be offered by the private sector. The focus lays – just like with the modernization theory – on creating economic freedom for individuals by focusing on their capabilities and entrepreneurial opportunities. These new entrepreneurs are seen as the engines of bottom-up development and economic progress. Short-term investments will lead to long-term growth.
Neoliberalism in practice
Because of the economic recession of the early 1970s, banks were not able to offer loans to their former clients in the industrial countries and turned to less developed nations – who were not deemed creditworthy before. The second escalation in oil prices causes Northern countries to raise their interest rates dramatically. Suddenly, developing countries found themselves in a plight as they had to pay back large amounts of money to the banks. This resulted in the so-called ‘debt crisis’ as developing nations were not able to meet the deadlines of their repayments. Consequently, most countries turned to the World Bank and the IMF to reschedule their loans. These International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – in their turn – imposed policies in the shape of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to stimulate economic growth and stability in order to ensure loan repayments (Simon, 2008; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Structural Adjustment Programs
The Structural Adjustment Programs were designed to maximize the outlook of repayment by debtors; this was their main goal. The inability to repay the debts was thought to be the result of corruption and overly bureaucratic government. Subsequently, the structural adjustment of developing nations in favor of the free market was outlined as the solution to secure
19 repayment. This reshaping of the economy had to be initiated by national governments of the South but was subject to large pressure of the World Bank and the IMF. The loans were granted under certain conditions – the so-called ‘conditionalities’ - namely structural reformation and opening of the economy to the international market (Kovach & Fourmy, 2006). To ensure the refund of the loans, national income had to increase. That was only possible by liberalizing the economy so export revenues could transcend the import costs.
The World Bank and SAPs
The World Bank was mainly involved in ameliorating economic effectiveness through the adaptation of structures in which transactions occurred. Such measures considered downsizing social welfare support and cutting government expenditures, trade liberalization and export augmentation, privatization and tax diminution. Without these adjustments, countries would be subject to increasing poverty and stagnation of the economy. Neoliberal academics thought, at least initially, that restructuration would bring economic stability and progress (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Criticism of SAPs
However, in the late 1990s, skepticism on the outcomes of the SAPs increased; even the IMF acknowledged that economic growth rates had not reached expectations (Kovach & Fourmy, 2006). Many development and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) criticized the structural adjustment programs for causing poor economic functioning while the IFIs held on to the argument that what-if-SAPs-were-not-implemented situations were impossible to measure and so thus also the true effect of the SAPs. The SAPs were producing a widespread dependency of emerging economies on the World Bank and the IMF and were accused of being too superficial. They lacked a holistic perspective on economic problems by disregarding the volatility and inequalities of international markets – previously address by the World Systems theory – and the relation between history and socio-economic structures of developing nations as cited by the dependency school. This lack of understanding resulted in the unjustified blame of Southern economies for not executing the adjustments correctly and causing the debt crisis themselves (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). On top of these economic shortcomings, structural adjustment programs were associated with social deterioration in welfare. The 1980s was referred to as the ‘lost decade’ of development as several social factors aggravated rather than improved; the unemployment rate grew, real wages decreased and government expenses on social welfare were reduced increasing the price of food and basic products. People had to pay for health and education due to the cut of services provided by the government. As a result, dropout rates from especially secondary school increased, infant mortality improvements stagnated and the number of diseases and malnutrition rose. Governmental services proofed to be vital in supporting human health. All these processes led to a rise in poverty under the neoliberal regime of the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF. The export-oriented nature of the SAPs made the agricultural sector of developing nations vulnerable to global demand as self- sufficiency was replaced by profitable cash-crops. A sudden drop in world prices of cash- crops could trigger a dramatic ripple effect resulting in famine and poverty as was the case in Sudan when cotton prices fell in the mid-1980s (Kovach & Fourmy, 2006). Those reaping the benefits of the adjustment policies were therefore mainly large trading companies and merchants (Simon, 2008). It took the World Bank and the IMF another decade to recognize
20 these anti-neoliberal claims and look for alternative policies more concentrated on the social welfare of the state and poverty alleviation (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
Alternative policies
It became impossible for the World Bank and the IMF to ignore the ubiquitous criticism and protest against their neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs. The SAPs needed to be rethought. A transformation in purpose from structural adjustment and trade liberalization to poverty reduction and social welfare was the outcome. This was primarily translated into Emergency Social Funds (ESFs) that were set up to counteract the negative outcomes of the SAPs discussed before. These, however, were often of short-term existence, seldom serving the poorest population, invested only in infrastructure and did not address the sources of the growing poverty. The IFIs soon realized that ESFs were not the solution to their problem; growing poverty was inherent to the SAPs.
Poverty Reduction Strategies
The only solution was to overthrow the Structural Adjustment Programs and replace them by the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) at the start of the 1990s as part of the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiative. The PRSs had three main goals: reduce poverty, tackle the debts of developing nations and include Southern countries in the decision-making process (Simon, 2008). The IMF and the World Bank stimulated indebted countries to come up with their plans and programs to reduce poverty in exchange for debt relief. Governments had to present a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to the International Financial Institutions to apply for a loan and receive assistance. By introducing this measure, the IFIs tried to move away from the imposed conditionalities of the SAPs (Simon, 2008; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are based on several core principles: country driven good governance to promote empowerment and independence, ameliorate security by investing in human capital - instead of physical capital – and the provision of a social safety net to support the most disadvantaged in the society (Craig & Porter, 2003). PRSPs have to provide a long-term approach to poverty alleviation that is oriented towards partnership and outcomes; poverty rates had to decline. The PRSPs abandoned the monoconcentration on economic parameters to achieve development. Until now, economic growth and participation in the world markets had been synonyms for development. Evaluation of development was measured using income statistics such as Gross National Product (GNP). The discipline of international development now demanded a plural, multidimensional approach to development and poverty. A key economist and philosopher in this multidimensionality of poverty was Amartya Kumar Sen. Sen addresses in his article A decade of human development (2000) the different concerns on international development: hunger, epidemic outbreaks, social injustice and growing disparities between rich and poor. These different discontents highlighted the multidimensional nature of development and poverty that is central to the PRSPs (Sen, 2000; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
21 Criticism of PRSPs
Although the PRSPs seem to have numerous improvements in comparison to the SAPs, some criticism arose of the Poverty Reduction Strategies of the World Bank and the IMF. Several commentators argue that the underlying neoliberal discourse of the International Financial Institutions is still present. Neoliberal principles - such as privatization and trade liberalization – must be followed to develop; neoliberal macroeconomic reform and economic growth will – in other words- reduce poverty (Kovach & Fourmy, 2006). The power of the developing nations in PRSP is also debatable given the persistent dominance of the IFIs. The prescriptive and imposing nature of the SAPs may indeed have disappeared, but the financial support still heavily depends on the judgment of the IFIs on the applied Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The financial institutions still hold power over the approval of funds. As Chant & McIlwaine (2009) put it into words:
PRSPs do not address the causes of poverty but, rather, the symptoms. (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009 - p. 47)
Another criticism is directed to the lack of transparency of PRSPs for civil societies. There is seldom public participation or consultation in the composition of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; often only sympathizers of the government are involved. Additionally, gender issues have frequently not been included in the papers or at a minimal level. PRSPs have found to be stereotyping towards women and neglecting children’s issues (Chant, 2007). To conclude, PRSPs are an improvement to the SAPs in their commitment towards poverty reduction in the Global South. On the other hand, the neoliberal discourse is still prevailing giving many activists food for protest against the World Bank and IMF. The field of international development has not satisfied us yet.
Post-development
Development is the new religion of the West … it is the imposition of science as power … it does not work … it means cultural Westernisation and homogenisation … and it brings environmental destruction. It is rejected not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its world-view and mindset. (Pieterse, 2000 – p.175)
It is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success. (Sachs, 1997 – p. 147)
The second half of the twentieth century was the era of development. Since 1950, global prosperity and total eradication of poverty were believed to be achievable through international development. After nearly fifty years, nothing of these promises became reality: poverty had increase together with undernourishment and violence, large regions remained underdeveloped and exploitation and oppression were still largely present (Escobar, 2011). Additionally, development had required the loss of culture and tradition and thus also of rich and diverse modes of life. It reshaped but never really abandoned prior colonial discourses. All these dilemmas of development led to a growing anti-development movement (Pieterse, 2000).
22 The most recent discourse on development is the post-development movement advocated by critical thinkers as Arturo Escobar, Gustavo Esteva and James Sidaway. The post-development discourse found his roots in the dependency school as it goes against the idea of modernization and highlights the perspective of the South on development. Post- developmentalists are not concerned with the question of how to achieve development but rather with the questions: what is development, what are the assumptions on progress and who claims to have the key to it (Sidaway, 2002).
Postmodernism
The post-development discourse is rooted in the postmodern view. According to Jean- François Lyotard – a French philosopher who assembled various strands under the overarching term of postmodernism – postmodernists hold an incredulity towards metanarratives. A postmodern developmentalist studies the narrative about the narratives on the meaning of development; they question the assumptions of the modern age. Postmodernism highlights the sense of invincibility of the West that results in a universal knowledge on how to achieve progress. Thereby, they doubt the ability of Western academics in understanding the world and imposing solutions. Postmodernists accentuate the complexity of life as a lived experience. The previous European discourses are no longer seen as truths but as dominant silencing dissident perspectives (Marchand & Parpart, 2003). The rise of the postmodernist movement coheres with the emergence of the term discourse. Michel Foucault - a prominent postmodernist thinker – underlines the need for the analysis of discourses to reveal the power relations related to knowledge and language. According to Foucault, a discourse is the site where meanings are disputed, and power relations established. A discourse analysis can expose the power of hegemonic knowledge so that this supremacy can be contested by counter-hegemonic discourses to provide new ideas on “reality”. These arguments were further elaborated in chapter one (Marchand & Parpart, 2003). The Colombian anthropologist Arturo Escobar argues that the ubiquitous perspectives on development divide the world in First, Second and Third World, in developed and underdeveloped, in the North and the South, generally the modern and the primitive. This homogenization of a collection of totally different nations – which he calls discursive homogenization - overgeneralizes and devalues the South. It creates an oppositional block against the developed world (Escobar, 2011). Additionally, development in the Global South can be gained by simply modernizing and westernizing. Mimicking Western political, social and economic systems is the key to the development of the Third World (Parpart, 1995). The superiority of western values in the field of international development is rejected in the postmodern arena. People have the right to their own culture, history, values, and world view. A new approach to development is needed; one that includes the knowledge and requirements of the people in the Global South rather than Western expertise. Postmodernism pleas to render the populations of the South agency so they have the freedom to choose independently what they consider as development (Parpart, 1995). Development is no longer seen as a one-way street but as a diversity of pathways that are context-specific and not related (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009)
Criticism of post-development
23 The most extreme post-development thinkers ask for the abandoning of the term ‘development’ altogether. However, opponents argue that related issues such as poverty, malnutrition and social unrest in underdeveloped nations won’t disappear with it. Furthermore, critics debate that post-development is not truly beyond or outside development discourse but rather represents the reformulation of a collection of critics that were long acknowledged in the field of development. It was generally accepted that there are winners and losers in development but the post-developmentalism, according to the contradictors, exaggerates on the negative outcomes and cases. The failures of development are seen as a failure of the concept, not because of the political and social context. To reject the term development is to deny the possibility of progress and improvements in well-being (Sidaway, 2002; Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Conclusion
The history of international development discourses has been tumultuous. In general, we can distinguish an oscillating trend between oppositional ideas. The modernization theory and neoliberalism plea for economic expansion to facilitate export and access to the international market. Both discourses are economically oriented and stimulated by the industrialized West. They both nominate the free market as the provider of welfare and development and follow a top-down approach. According to these discourses, there is one path to development. Furthermore, these discourses favor globalization, international market, capitalism, international interference, and development aid. The other camp consists of the critical discourses of the dependency and world systems theory and post-development. These too contain large similarities. These discourses advocate for different perspectives on development to tackle Western domination in the field. Their opinion reflects the neo-Marxist perspective on capitalism; development aid maintains the international inequalities as capitalism cannot exist without the exploitation. They plea for a bottom-up approach to development where local knowledge is the stimulant and a protectionistic attitude prevails against foreign interference. There is not one road to development, rather development is a context-specific concept.
24
CHAPTER 4: International Development and Trade Liberalization in Ghana
After theoretically outlining the different discourses on development and their evolution over the past decades, this chapter will investigate the tangible outcomes and consequences of these discourses. This will be done by delving into the case of international development – mainly focused on trade liberalization - in Ghana. Therefore, the historical situation and development will be outlined to link them with the discourses of the IMF and the World Bank. The power relations between these multilateral agencies and the Ghanaian government are the focal points of this chapter.
The Bretton Woods institutions
Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cannot be disregarded when speaking of international development. They play an extensive role in steering development in the Global South by prescribing various development programs. By implementing their idea on development in these programs, they hold the discursive power to spread their discourse amongst the Third World nations. Multilateral institutions are inter-governmental organizations that are funded by multiple member states. Although they are depending on their member nations for their financial resources, multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF operate separately of the members and the United Nations (UN). In contrast to global public organizations, multilateral agencies are not governed by their member states (Boas, 2008). By becoming a member of the World Bank or the IMF, states approve the power of these agencies. States that want to get involved in global governance – the rules, norms, and institutions that function on a global scale – receive a lot of pressure to join the International Financial Institutions. In other words, developing countries that want to attract foreign investors and capital need to have a membership to the international financial system (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009).
25 The Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the IMF – where established in the aftermath of world war two to regulate the reconstruction of Europe and later support the development of the South (Ruger, 2005). To obtain membership to the World Bank, states first need to be a member of the IMF. The main difference between both institutions is that the IMF offers short-term loans to absorb sudden economic decrease and aims to maintain international economic stability while the World Bank is more concerned with the long-term development of countries in the South by providing long-term loans to governments mainly for infrastructural projects (Boas, 2008). The voting power of the member states of the World Bank is not equally distributed. It depends on the national financial contribution. The more financial aid a nation provides, the more power it holds in the decision-making process. This resulted in an overrepresentation of the high-income countries – collectively holding sixty percent of the votes – and a smaller role for the low- and middle-income countries. Put differently, the World Bank is firmly controlled by the wealthiest industrialized countries overrepresenting their discourse on development in the programs and policy advises. The western hegemony with its largely neoliberal standpoint prevails within the Bretton Woods institutions (Wade, 2002). The neoliberal policies of the World Bank and the IMF included the Structural Adjustment Programs and later the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The overarching idea is the reduction of the power of the State and increased interference with the international market. The SAPs were focused on the cut of governmental expenditures and a diminution of the social welfare support. Tax reduction, privatization of State-owned institutions, trade liberalization and a rise in export were the main principles of structural adjustment to bring economic progress and stability (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). After a decade of rising poverty and economic dysfunctioning, the SAPs had proven to be less effective and sometimes even detrimental to national development. The IFIs started with a new policy strategy aimed at wealth distribution and the reduction of poverty. Investment in human capital instead of physical capital - according to the Bretton Woods institutions – would eradicate poverty with a bottom-up approach (Simon, 2008; Craig & Porter, 2003). The next section shapes the economic and political history of Ghana since its independence. The emphasis lies on the political leaders and their discourse on development. Here too, political discourses are presented as static entities with clear historical demarcations. This, on the other hand, was not the case in reality. Ideas and perspectives of political leaders still lived on after they were ousted and had major impacts by for example creating opposition to later dominating political parties.
26
THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA
The following section of this chapter describes the political discursive history of the Republic of Ghana. This will be done – like the chapter on international discourses – starting at the end of World War II. Furthermore, the Ghanaian political evolution is divided into two: the period before SAPs were implemented and after. This partition helps in understanding the influence of the World Bank and the IMF on the economic development of Ghana.
Ghana in the pre-SAPs era
On 6 March 1957 Ghana gained independence. It was the first African state to detach from the colonial rule of the West that would trigger other African nations to follow. The first president, Kwame Nkrumah was optimistic about the future of his country; Ghana was finally free to grow and gain its place among other nations in the international order. Ghana – with its focus on democracy, the social sector and the expansion of education and health, and with a strong economic basis – became an example for the modern African state. The Ghanaian state gave the West hope in the development of Africa in general; other African states had to follow the path of Ghana (Brydon & Legge, 1996). The Ghanaian development story takes off with the prominent politician – Kwame Nkrumah.
Pre-independence
Nkrumah started his political carrier as secretary general of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), an organization of intellectuals and leaders founded in 1947. Through the affiliation of the young radical populist - Kwame Nkrumah – the previously rather elitist political party received more public attention. This was a result of the more engaged attitude of Nkrumah reflected in his organization of demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. Two years later, in June 1949, Nkrumah separated from the UGCC and founded his own political party: the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Nkrumah’s full political commitment was launched. The rising
27
popularity of the CPP was due to the successful involvement of all classes: intellectuals, merchants, farmers, students, traditional leaders, and employed people. Previous political efforts, on the other hand, were mainly focused on the urban intelligentsia and neglected rural populations. Nkrumah aimed to bring about a social movement that unites all Ghanaians and confront the British. The CPP – that asked for immediate self-determination - was extremer than the UGCC that tried to engage in dialogue with the British (Huysmans, 1993; p. 63-68; Awoonor, 1990; Pellow & Chazan, 1986). The British convoked a commission of middle-class Africans - Nkrumah deliberately not included – to draft a new constitution that would render Ghana more self-organizing power. Nkrumah quickly realized that this constitution would fall short on the demand for total independence of Ghana and launched a counter campaign named Positive Action based on absolute nonviolent resistance. The unions under the guise of Positive Action organized a general strike on the 8th of January 1950 that escalated to violence. Subsequently, Nkrumah and his followers were arrested by the British governor on the charge of provoking agitation against the British regime; a rather improvident move as the Ghanaian population now elevated the anti-colonialists to martyrs. The pressure on the colonial regime becomes larger (Huysmans, 1993; p. 63-68). In 1951, the first elections under colonial authority were organized. These elections resulted in the victory for the CPP. Nkrumah and his companions were released early from prison under the condition that they would drop their demand for independence. Consequently, Nkrumah was appointed to the prime minister of the Gold Coast – the name the British gave their colony before independence – and can thus increase his grip on the state apparatus. The Convention People's Party can now occupy key positions and also the main economic product – cocoa – undergoes an administrative centralization through the establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2011). The aim of the CPP was a complete socio-political transformation with central governance and a reduction of the privileges of traditional authorities (Huysmans, 1993). In the second elections, three years later, Nkrumah's CPP had to contend with several oppositional groups. These groups unite to form the National Liberation Movement (NLM), set up by disaffected CPP members from the Ashanti region. The NLM led by Kofi Abrefa Busia demanded a federal government with an upper house of parliament where traditional leaders could deliver resistance to the CPP majority. They condemned the idea of unitary, centralized governance of Nkrumah and stressed the heterogeneous needs of different groups and cultures in the Ghanaian ethnic mosaic. This component of ethnic diversity convinced the British administration to organize new elections in 1956. However, the leading role of the CPP in the anti-colonial battle and the personal status of Nkrumah ensured that once again the CPP became the largest political party in the Gold Coast. One year later, on the sixth of March 1957, Ghana becomes the first independent African state with the full transfer of governance (Huysmans, 1933; Pellow & Chazan, 1986).
28 At long last, the battle has ended! And thus, Ghana, your beloved country is free forever! (Kwame Nkrumah, 1957)
Figure 2. Kwame Nkrumah giving its independence speech on 6 March 1957 (Pulse Ghana, 2019).
Nkrumah and free Ghana
Kwame Nkrumah inherited a relatively rich country with low foreign debt, well-developed infrastructure, and large economic potential. The high international cocoa prices enhanced governmental incomes providing the opportunity for investments in other sectors. The country seemed prosperous. After an era of colonial exploitation, Ghana was determined to restrict trade by implementing strict policies increasing tariffs and exchange rate controls. Nkrumah wanted to break free from the reduction of Ghana as an importer of expensive finished goods and an exporter of raw materials at an exorbitantly low price. Ghana had to become more self- sufficient by investing in the industry and economy while firmly controlling the import (Kwame Asiedu, 2013).
Nkrumah’s road to autocracy
The elections before independence had created tumult in the political arena; there was not one unambiguous vision for the future of Ghana. The political debate on the development of Ghana created a discursive dichotomy between oppositional political parties who could not come to terms with one another. With the CPP as the largest party, Nkrumah tried to undermine the influence of the opposition. This suppression was the result of a series of strikes in Accra – the capital of Ghana – by the Ga people who felt politically ignored.
29 Additionally, when Nkrumah destooled most chiefs in Ashanti because they did not support the CPP, the local population started revolting and organizing strikes. Several ethnic groups and their local political parties rioted against Nkrumah's plans. In response, Nkrumah drafted the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) on the sixth of December 1957 that banned regional or tribally-based political parties. Nkrumah sought to eliminate tribalism as it would keep local populations and tribes loyal to their local traditional chiefs instead of the nation- state. Tribalism was opposed to Nkrumah’s unitary vision as it would create a disunified Ghana. The introduction of the ADA meant that all political parties became illegal as they were all bound to a certain region, religion or tribe (e.g. Anlo Youth Organization (AYO), Muslim Association Party (MAP)). Additionally, the National Liberation Movement (NLM) – that formed the main opposition in the 1956 elections – was disbanded and the boisterous opponents such as Joseph Boakye Danquah were arrested (Huysmans, 1993). The Avoidance of Discrimination Act provoked a lot of disagreement amongst political protagonists in Ghana. Kofi Abrefa Busia answered to this total ban on tribal politics by uniting the counterparties to form the United Party (UP). Busia and his followers highlighted the repressive character of the ADA and the anti-tribalism and took a more liberal position in the debate (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). In a way, Nkrumah similarly treated his opposition as the British did in Ghana before independence. By arresting and incarcerating the political rivals both Nkrumah and the British attempted to silence alternative visions and opinions on the future of Ghana. Nkrumah handled opponents in the same way as he was handled by the British. In 1960, through a referendum, Nkrumah obtained full political administrative power and became the first president of the Republic of Ghana. A new constitution would grant the president the possibility of rejecting decisions made by the parliament. The CPP dominates the political scene by creating an autocratic government that resembles more that of a dictatorship rather than a democracy. The road for Nkrumah's vision on the development was open with minimal counteraction (Huysmans, 1993).
Nkrumaism
To investigate Nkrumah’s perspective and discourse of development, this research is based on three major documents written by Nkrumah that clarify his vision for Ghana: his speech during the independence ceremony in 1957, the seven-year development plan constituted and published by Nkrumah in 1964 and the academic book Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of imperialism written and edited by Nkrumah in 1965. The analysis of these documents can reveal Nkrumah’s intentions and opinions. Nkrumaism will be used to provide an overarching term that contains all of Nkrumah's ideas. This part is classified according to different main arguments to link each one with the international development discourses discussed in chapter two.
Industrialization and Africanization
Economically, Nkrumah was determined to develop the Ghanaian economy to a level that it could compete with the large western powers on international markets. Ghana had to become a modern industrial state that would be an example for other African states. According to Nkrumah, this could be done by rapidly industrializing the country. To be truly independent, Ghana had to become less dependent on foreign capital, technology, and goods. Self- sufficiency would provide the answer for complete autonomy by diminishing the import and increasing the export (Brydon & Legge, 1996).
30 Kwame Nkrumah applied a bottom-up approach for its modernization process. He wanted more Ghanaians to occupy administrative functions in the civil service. He wanted to involve the population into the development process as they were involved in the battle for independence. The Ghanaian economy had to Africanize meaning that all industries, sectors, corporations, etc. in Ghana had to be under the supervision of Ghanaians; foreign control and involvement had to be taken over by the Ghanaian population and government. This included the nationalization of non-African companies and institutions. Africanization – a term introduced by Nkrumah – is used to indicate all structural reforms that resulted from colonial emancipation. This term can simply signify the process of replacing white, western staff by black Africans but also increase the African influence and alterations to serve African needs. Africanization highlights the self-organizing character of Nkrumah’s post-colonial attitude (Huysmans, 1993). To effectuate this Africanization of the Ghanaian administration, the Ghanaian population needed to be educated. Additionally, Nkrumah wanted to shape his modern Ghana by the power of science and technology. Innovation would uplift the Ghanaian economy. In other words, an expanded educational system could equip the population with the latest innovations in industrial and agricultural technology. Nkrumah and the CPP created the Accelerated Development Plan for Education in 1951. This plan increased state control over the educational system by halting financial support to religious schools and the appropriation of missionary schools by the government. The CPP wanted to form a universal education system of high standards that would be available to the entire population. In 1961, primary education became compulsory. Education would become the backbone of Nkrumah's development plan; it would provide the key to the Africanization of the political, economic and social administration. Schooled Ghanaians would now be able to take over positions formerly occupied by western officials and so slowly increase the grip on the economy (Nkrumah, 1984; Huysmans, 1993). The main project in this economic growth plan was the construction of the Akosombo dam at Lake Volta in eastern Ghana. This hydroelectric power plant would provide the energy for the modernization of the Ghanaian economy as power was regarded as essential to modernize. The construction of the dam started in 1961 and took until 1965 to complete. This large provision of energy of the power plant gave Ghana the possibility to export electricity to neighboring countries – Togo and Benin. However, the Volta River Project was the largest single investment in the economic development plan of Ghana and the government had to invoke financial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and the World Bank for the construction (Arhin, 1993). These foreign loans placed Ghana in great debt, so Nkrumah had to find a way to repay these loans and minimize the debt. The cocoa sector would provide the answer to this. In 1954 the world price of cocoa tripled so the revenue of the sector boosted suddenly. Rather than allowing the producer to keep this profit, Nkrumah introduced government levies to claim the extra revenue. This policy increased the State budget; therefore, Nkrumah was able to invest in national development projects such as the Akosombo dam. On the other hand, the cocoa-producing regions were the major constituencies that supported Nkrumah's reign. By denying their opportunity for additional income, Nkrumah lost political support from these regions (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2011).
Neo-colonialism and Pan-Africanism
Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa. (Kwame Nkrumah, 1957)
31 Nkrumah’s fight against colonialism, Eurocentrism and white supremacy did not end with the declaration of Ghana as an independent state. In his article Neo-colonialism, the last Stage of imperialism (1965) Nkrumah offers a critical perspective to western domination in global politics. He pleas for a halt on foreign interference in the affairs of developing nations as he describes it to be a subtle, new form of colonialism: neo-colonialism. Imperialism, according to Kwame Nkrumah, just simply switches tactics. Neo-colonialism is defined in this article as the modern, subtle interference of the west while talking about and granting ‘freedom’ and ‘independence'. Neo-colonialism is not restricted to the field of economics but transcends to the spheres of politics, ideology, religion, and culture. (Nkrumah, 1965). Delving deeper into the article, Nkrumah provides examples to make his concept of neo-colonialism tangible. For example, Nkrumah argues that international markets favor Western powers while obstructing the development of underdeveloped nations. In the 1950s, the general price of primary products – most of the time exported by the Global South – fell by an average of 33 percent while the price of manufactured goods – imported by the Global South - rose with 3.5 percent. Paradoxically, while in this period the export of developing countries rose, their foreign income from this export decreased. Developing nations become increasingly dependent on the financial assistance offered by the International Financial Institutions to fill this growing budget deficit. For the industrialized countries, it is the other way around; they receive more income because they import raw materials at a low price and export high-value, manufactured goods. The dominance of the industrialized world restrains the development of the Global South. Former colonies received the label of ‘free' and ‘independent' while they are still heavily depending on western institutions (Nkrumah, 1965). This suppressive character of the capitalist, global system is also reflected in the high- interest rates of loans offered by western institutions. In 1961, the interest rates amounted to five percent – in some cases up to seven or eight percent – while the repayment periods become shorter. Nkrumah highlights that - in the same year – the average sum extracted of debtor countries by donors was 11,8 million dollars while only inputting 6 million dollars; a total profit of donors of almost 6 million dollars. This economic ‘aid' offers a subtle method of penetration into the political and economic affairs of developing countries. The term neo- colonialism underscores the manipulation of western policies to serve their own interests (Nkrumah, 1965). Finally, Nkrumah turns his attention to the multilateral aid of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank. He emphasizes that all international support agencies – including the Bretton Woods institutions but also, for example, the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – are financed mainly by US capital. Besides, various offensive conditions are attached to the loans offered by these institutions, such as supplying information on their economy and granting the financial institution the power to disapprove of the plans and policies implemented with their financial support. Nkrumah states multilateral aid as another neo-colonial trap, as a mean to maintain the influence in the economy and politics of underdeveloped nations even after granting them independence. International development aid turns out to be another means of imperialism, of extending the western rule over foreign nations to serve their own interests (Nkrumah, 1965). This attitude towards multilateral aid was not merely a theoretical viewpoint but was also reflected in practice. Although Nkrumah turned to the World Bank for financial assistance for the construction of the Akosombo dam, other economic policy proposals by the IMF in May 1965 were rejected because of the nature of western interference of these policies (Berry, 1995). According to Nkrumah, the unjust world order is a result of the prevailing capitalist ideology. Capitalism can only expand under two principles of sacrifice: the subjugation of the working class and the elimination of the control of the State in the economy. To raise living
32 standards, both principles were abandoned in western industrialized countries. The battle between rich and poor was no longer a national issue but became one at the international level (Nkrumah, 1965). Karl Marx - the major capitalist critic – investigated the exploitation of the working class that would lead to a growing wealth gap between the rich and the poor, between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. This process of utilization of the working class – which he called primitive accumulation – would gradually decrease the labor wages to increase the profit for the business owners and entrepreneurs. Marxists underscore profit as a fancy term for exploitation. The growing discontent under the labor class would result in national conflicts demanding a more socialist regime. This crisis, however, according to Marx, would occur on the national level (De Angelis, 2001). Nkrumah extends on this theory and states that this crisis – in the current globalized world – will strike at the international stage.
World capitalism has postponed its crisis but only at the cost of transforming it into an international crisis. The danger is now not civil war within individual States provoked by intolerable conditions within those States, but international war provoked ultimately by the misery of the majority of mankind who daily grow poorer and poorer. (Nkrumah, 1965)
As Karl Marx stated, crises are endemic to capitalism; uneven distributions of wealth are inherent to the nature of a capitalist economy. In a more contemporary light of the capitalist world order, all economies cannot obtain the same level of industrialization and modernization. There must be a wealth gap between certain regions for capitalism to thrive; the development of one nation comes at the expense of the development of another nation. Thus, international development aid will not overcome underdevelopment and poverty but rather maintain it. To fight poverty in a capitalist world is a paradox as poverty is inherent to capitalism (Nkrumah, 1965). Nkrumah lashes in his article out at the international interference of the United States and their intentions:
Speaking in 1951, the then President of the United States, Mr Truman, said, ‘The only kind of war we seek is the good old fight against man’s ancient enemies. . . poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy.’ Sentiments of a similar nature have been re- echoed by all political leaders in the developed world but the stark fact remains: whatever wars may have been won since 1951, none of them is the war against poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy. (Nkrumah, 1965)
But Nkrumah is not just negative on the inequalities produced by the capitalist world system. A future of subtle exploitation is not inescapable for Africa. National independence was the first step in this revolt but will not suffice; Nkrumah's dream for complete freedom was not fulfilled yet. The neo-colonial, more subtle and underlying acts ought to be eradicated too. As Marx pointed to the revolt of the working class to overthrow the hierarchy produced by capitalism, so did Nkrumah. However, now the working force has become the entire African population. Nkrumah advocated for an African unification to reunite the divided continent. An African unity will place the monopolists face-to-face with their working class. Pan- Africanism – the movement that focusses on uniting and strengthening Africa – is intertwined with the rejection of capitalism and the embrace of socialism. Socialism, as was thought by Nkrumah, does not produce the wealth gap; it serves the needs of all classes in the society.
33 Nkrumah was convinced that his Pan-African ideology and socialism would lead to the collapse of western imperialism and neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965).
Socialism and Protectionism
On the eleventh of March 1964, former president Kwame Nkrumah published his seven-year development plan to turn Ghana into a modern state by 1970. The plan summarizes Nkrumah's vision for the future of the economy and the political landscape of Ghana. The main goals highlighted in the plan were: firstly, to increase the economic growth rate of Ghana, secondly, to rapidly develop the state and cooperative sector to create a socialist economy, and thirdly, to completely eradicate the colonial structure of the Ghanaian economy. The repetitive use of the word socialism underscores the socialist vision of Nkrumah where the state controls the different branches of the economy, including the public utilities, heavy industry and the production sector of raw materials. Additionally, the state is also the provider of basic living needs and social welfare. The goal was a self-sustaining economy based on socialist production and distribution (Nkrumah, 1964). This socialist perspective can be seen as a logical reaction to the history of colonial rule in Ghana. Nkrumah was determined to rule out all signs of colonialism and exploitation and socialism would provide a path for doing that:
Socialism, which is aimed at the emancipation of the people from exploitation, has to be built by the people. It is the expression of the people whose Government accepts responsibility for promoting their welfare to the fullest possible extent. (Nkrumah, 1964 – p.3)
This fear from exploitation, on the other hand, did not result in extreme protectionism and a ban on all foreign investment. Foreign investors were welcomed as partners rather than exploiters. As cited by Nkrumah, these investors could invest in Ghana's economic growth under one condition: an adequate share of the investor's profits would have to be reinvested in the development of Ghana and the investors themselves (Nkrumah, 1964).
We intend that the State should retain control of the strategic branches of the economy, including public utilities, raw materials, and heavy industry. The State will also participate in light and consumer goods industries in which the rates of return on capital should be highest. We intend also that those industries which provide the basic living needs of the people shall be State-owned, in order to prevent any exploitation. (Nkrumah, 1964 – p. 7)
In 1961, Kwame Nkrumah visited a series of communist countries including the Soviet Union, China and some Eastern European countries to strengthen the diplomatic bonds and solidarity. During these trips, Nkrumah got acquainted with communism. It made him more convinced of the importance of the State in controlling the economy and fighting poverty. This familiarity with communism is reflected in the Ghanaian civil service in the first half of the 1960s. Since 1952, the civil service underwent an Africanization; more and more seats were taken by Ghanaians dispelling western civil servants. This changed after Nkrumah's visit to the Soviet Union. To gradually implement the socialist and communist ideology into Ghanaian politics and economy, Nkrumah started attracting expats from the Soviet Union to occupy the civil service (Arhin, 1993, Gebe, 2008). Additionally, as Nkrumah points out in his academic book, the Soviet Union offered a substantially larger amount of aid activities in
34 developing countries than the western block. Thereby, the interest rates on communist loans were much lower, around two percent in comparison to the five to six percent on western loans (Nkrumah, 1965). These factors ensured that Nkrumah tended more towards a socialist and communist political system than western capitalism.
Decline in Nkrumah’s popularity
Nkrumah’s vision was shared by the bulk of the Ghanaian population during the 1950s and early 1960s. This, however, changed with the elections for a second referendum in 1965. The manipulation of this second referendum made Ghana into a one-party state governed by Nkrumah’s CPP. Both referenda - this one and the one of 1960 that gave Nkrumah full administrative power - increased the power of the president to an almost absolute level; the president was now able to dismiss judges of the Supreme Court from their function and to strictly control the mass media. Through this dictator-like regime, Nkrumah lost significant respect and prestige and got less and less beloved by the Ghanaian population. Nkrumah's popularity decreased (Huysmans, 1993). Nkrumah was also economically under pressure. In the mid-1960s, the price of cocoa collapsed, destroying the stability of the Ghanaian economy that heavily relied on the revenues of the cocoa sector. Additionally, the Akosombo dam at Lake Volta had cost the Ghanaian economy a substantial amount of money. As a result, in 1965 with the opening of the dam, Ghana was nearly bankrupt. The build of the dam had proven to be too expensive and had put Ghana in immense debt. Nkrumah's plans had proven to be too ambitious and had thrown Ghana into an economic depression (Berry, 1995).
Coup d’état
Nkrumah’s flirt with socialism and communism was noticed by a wide international audience and finally resulted in a pro-western military coup d’état in 1966. In the setting of the Cold War, the US saw Kwame Nkrumah as a threat to their capitalist interests in Africa; they were afraid of his pro-communist leanings. It is therefore widely recognized that both the United States and Britain were connected in the plotting of the coup (Gebe, 2008). The CIA provided support to the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service. John Stockwell – a retired CIA officer – elaborated in his book In Search of Enemies (1978) on the involvement of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the ousting of the president (Stockwell & Perley, 1978). Former army officers leading the coup justified the overthrow by stating that Nkrumah and the CPP were corrupt and undemocratic. General E. K. Kotoka called the coup d’état a national liberation from the dictatorship of Nkrumah (Berry, 1995).
Ghana under military rule (1966 – 1969)
On the morning of the coup, during a meeting, the plotters decided to set up a council to govern Ghana. The council consisted of four army officers and four police officers that formed a military government under the name of the National Liberation Council (NLC). Although in the first two years the ban on the formation of political parties remained, the council focused on restoring the Ghanaian democratic government. Instead, three committees – the Economic Committee, the Administrative Committee, and the Publicity Committee – were created. These committees consisted of civil servants and politicians and had the responsibility to govern as the military and police lacked the knowledge of governance and economics (Hutchful, 1973; Berry, 1993). The NLC had little idea about the future of Ghana;
35 they were only certain that they did not want a dictator-like government like in the period of Nkrumah (Pinkney, 1972). The National Liberation Council had a more pro-western position. After taking over the power, the NLC ceased most of its diplomatic relations with former communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. The West immediately answered to the coup by supplying food support and recalling some of the policies that were designed to isolate Ghana. Additionally, diluted relationships with Britain were restored. The new regime declared Ghana open for collaboration with Western institutions and multinationals. The World Bank and the IMF arrived in Accra in March 1966 (Hutchful, 1973). The NLC gave the IMF permission to supervise the Ghanaian economy. As Nkrumah had left Ghana in large debt, the IMF was forced to cut government expenses. This meant a limitation on wages and the allowance of foreign companies to operate freely. Nkrumah's industrialization was replaced for a more resource extracted economy with limited manufacturing. The profits were embellished by foreign companies and governmental elites. The expected debt relief due to international cooperation was not met, rather Ghana's debt increased by almost Ȼ 90 million in 1966 (Hutchful, 1987). The new government included the Convention People's Party of Nkrumah in the ban on political parties. Several hundreds of Nkrumah's followers and CPP sympathizers were placed into protective custody together with the confiscation of Nkrumaist organizations. Once the CPP was no longer regarded as a political threat, the majority of these prisoners were freed by 1968 and the transition to an elected civilian government took off. The ban on political parties was dismissed and new political parties were born in late 1968. One year later, the first national elections since 1956 were held with the Progress Party (PP) - led by Kofi Abrefa Busia – and the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) – headed by Komla A. Gbedemah – as the two main participating parties (Pinkney, 1972; Berry, 1993).
Kofi A. Busia and the civilian government (1969 – 1972): the Second Republic
The Progress Party of Busia won the elections of 1969 from the NAL – the successor of the CPP’s right wing. Consequently, Gbedemah’s participation in the National Assembly was prohibited and Busia – a long time oppositional politician of Nkrumah - became Prime Minister of the Second Republic. The Busia administration was subject to high expectations of the Ghanaian population because its parliamentarians were intellectuals and, therefore, knew what needed to be done. The population expected them to serve the overall interests of the nation in contrast with Nkrumah’s administration that chiefly satisfied their own political agenda. The NLC had promised more democracy and freedom in Ghana (Berry, 1993).
Busia’s downfall
Initially, Busia enjoyed popular support for his policies aimed at strengthening foreign connections. It was his numerous austerity measures – recommended by the IMF - that made him lose popularity. Busia, for example, introduced a loan system for university students, while education had been free under the Nkrumah regime. Critics would argue that this made university education only possible for the higher classes of society. Another example is Busia's devaluation of the Cedi – the national currency. The reasoning behind this policy was that the export would increase if goods became cheaper and conversely imports would decrease. In practice, the opposite occurred; export of most goods declined, and imports rose drastically. Other saving measures include increased taxes and wage stagnation. Busia was
36 criticized for undermining the Ghanaian sovereignty. These measures received a lot of public resistance and alienated the bulk of the population. When Kofi Abrefa Busia decided to tighten the defense budget, Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong organized and executed a second army coup d'état to overthrow Busia on charges of corruption. The National Redemption Council (NRC) came into power (Berry, 1993; Hutchful, 1987).
The National Redemption Council (1972 – 1979): Second Military Regime
The unsuccessful Second Republic disclosed the development issues Ghana faced; the uneven distribution of financial support for investments and favoritism towards certain ethnicities or areas. The most important heritage of the past political situation was the uncertainty of the political path as both political systems - one-party state of Nkrumah and Busia's multi-party democracy - had failed. Therefore, the NRC composed a military government with no intentions of creating a democratic regime; little input from the civil service was permitted. Economically, Acheampong inversed the austerity measures, revalued the Cedi, rearranged or rejected foreign debt and nationalized foreign companies. Self-reliance became the most important aspect of the political agenda. Ghanaians were encouraged to (partially) produce their own food through the Operation Feed Yourself program as an attempt to reach higher rates of self-sufficiency. These measures were beneficial in the short-term so popularity and support for the NRC rose quickly. In the long term, however, they did not solve the overarching national problems (Berry, 1993). Transportation and industry suffered under the NRC measures, especially after the rise in world oil prices in 1974. The production of basic food declined because of poor price management while the population kept growing. When the cocoa prices rose in the late 1970s, Ghana could not take advantage of it due to the low productivity of the fields. The product that had supported economic growth in the past, was now neglected. By 1977, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) – the reorganization of the NRC in 1975 – was overloaded with criticism. Political unrest resurfaced, especially after the heavily debated national referendum of 1978 for a union government. Later that year, Acheampong resigned under pressure of other SMC officers and was replaced by General Frederick W. K. Akuffo. Akuffo announced new elections on July 1, 1979, to form a new government. In June 1979, less than one month before the constitutional elections, a young group of army officers led by Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings overthrew the SMC government (Berry, 1993).
Rawlings and the Third Republic (1979 – 1981)
The young officers replaced the council of Akuffo with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The rationale behind Rawlings's coup was a growing corruption and power abuse within the military and political circles, together with the neglect of poverty alleviation (Mireku, 1991). Ghana is now governed by a group of young officers while previously the authorities had been dominated by respected older leaders praised for their wisdom. These new leaders are therefore marginalized and regarded as the proletariat by the population (Hansen & Collins, 1980). Despite the coup, the elections of 1979 took place. The military regime ended, and Ghana was again governed by a constitution. The AFRC gave the new government one well- defined condition: the new government was obliged to put the interests of the population above their own personal objectives to prevent the popular political displeasure. Hilla Limann and his People's National Party (PNP) began ruling the Third Republic of Ghana with a small
37 majority of the votes, together with the oppositional Popular Front Party (PFP) that occupied 30 percent of the legislative seats. The PNP was not able to form a united front as several members had conflicting ideological directions. Different perspectives on national policies within the party complicated the policy-making process so that the government received much skepticism on their ability to steer Ghana out of the economic deprived situation (Berry, 1993). Rawlings remained looking over the shoulders of Limann by monitoring the activities of the civilian administration. A persistent economic decline, an inflation rate at 70 percent in 1981, ongoing savings in wages and a ban on public strikes eroded Limann's public and military support resulting in a second Rawlings-led coup on December 31, 1981 (Berry, 1993; Huysmans, 1993).
Ghana in the post-SAPs era
The Provisional National Defense Council (1982 – 1993)
Rawlings formed the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) – the eight government in fifteen years since the ousting of Nkrumah. To preclude another military regime and find rapprochement to the population, Rawlings – chairman of the PNDC – pointed fifteen cabinet seats to civilians. He wanted to involve all classes – farmers, soldiers, workers, rich and poor – into the process of policy-making. He wanted to “restore human dignity to the Ghanaians”; include the people in the transformation of the economy and administration. Additionally, any interference with the political agenda and popular intentions of the PNDC would not be tolerated (Berry, 1993; Brydon & Legge, 1996). Nonetheless, opposition started to form from various circles: former PNP and PFP members, the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS). The overarching argument was that the Third Republic did not receive time to prove its worth and that the PNDC administration was unconstitutional, abusive to human rights and politically intimidating. To stay faithful to Rawlings's populism and socialism, the PNDC established institutions and committees that incorporated the populace into national politics. The classes at the bottom of society were given the opportunity to engage in decision-making. Furthermore, public tribunals were founded to suppress and convict all antigovernmental actions (Berry, 1993). Economically, Rawlings's council faced a major challenge: finding a way to finance the much-needed reconstruction of the Ghanaian economy. The imprudent expenditures of Nkrumah had initiated an ongoing economic downwards spiral characterized by massive inflation rates, a decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and drops in exports. These severe economic conditions were – according to Rawlings – due to the absence of strong political leadership. Therefore, at the end of the first year in charge, the PNDC introduced the first phase – a four-year program of budget cuts and austerities - of their Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (Berry, 1993; Brydon & Legge, 1996). To reconstruct the economy, large financial inputs had to be found. Only the International Financial Institutions were able to provide such large capital, but the PNDC did not agree unanimously on the consultation of these institutions as ideological left members accused the IFIs partly for the national economic backlog. Workers and students supported the socialist reign of the early Rawlings regime (Jeong, 1995). The magnitude of the economic crisis, on the other hand, worsened in 1983 due to a large loss in crop production as
38 a result of prevalent bush fires and intensification of unemployment as over one million Ghanaians returned after being banished from Nigeria. The call for financial assistance of the IFIs was inevitable (Berry, 1993).
Ghana and the Structural Adjustment Programs
Under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF, Ghana started its ERP in 1983 as an example of the Structural Adjustment Programs. Ghana was one of the first countries to implement the SAPs. The initial and most compelling goals of the ERP was to reduce the Ghanaian debt and create a stable economy with larger export rates (Brydon & Legge, 1996; Jeong, 1995). During the first phase, the government managed to trace the inflation back to twenty percent and stimulate economic growth to 6 percent per year from 1983 to 1987. Additionally, the PNDC was able to repay its loan arrears with a remarkable 500 million American dollars. Ghana and the PNDC gained confidence from the multilateral agencies resulting in a promised financial support of 575 million dollars by 1987. The second phase – which lasted from 1987 to 1989 – was aimed at the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises and further devaluation of the Cedi. In the third and last stage, economic reformations continued with a cut in private corporate taxes to stimulate the expansion of the private sector (Berry, 1993; Kwame Asiedu, 2013). The ERP had also promoted the growth of the production of export goods. A large US$ 4.2 billion program – largely financed by the World Bank and the IMF – was drafted in 1986 to rebuild and extend the infrastructure and industry. By the end of 1991, the Ghanaian international reputation was restored because of the ability of debt repayments in the last four years and Ghana was ready to re-enter the international market (Berry, 1993). The Bank of Ghana no longer controlled the export of foreign traders, although the rule over the export of cocoa and gold remained in their hands (Kwame Asiedu, 2013). Although the ERP had proven to be beneficial to the larger economic situation, the population still experienced financial difficulties. Investments were directed to export goods such as cocoa instead of the food provision. Unemployment remained staggeringly high due to the austerity measures, resulting in an overall reduction in living standards during the first phase of the Economic Recovery Program. If the unemployment would not be tackled, PNDC's opposition could be of a treat to the party's recovery agenda. Moreover, there was still a significant demand for a return to constitutional rule in oppositional circles. This pressure forced the PNDC to demonstrate its intentions to regain constitutionalism and a civilian government. In response to these critiques, the government freed up US$ 85 million to launch the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). This program had to create 40 000 jobs in the most subordinated communities such as small- scale miners and artisans and was designed to enhance the standard living conditions by improving health care, sanitation, water supply, and education (Berry, 1993; Jeong, 1995). At the beginning of the 1990s, the government was convinced of the effectiveness of the ERP; a continuation of the program was obvious. New arrangements with the World Bank were made to maintain financial support. These were admitted under several conditions: the private sector had to be stimulated and numerous economic legislations had to revised. These revisions had to allow and enhance economic liberalization, deregulation and exchange rate reforms. Furthermore, primary education and basic health care ought to improve over the long term (Berry, 1993). The acceptance of the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF did not go without any counteraction. On the contrary, Rawlings's reign met with strong popular resistance against liberal economic reform. He had to be tactical to remain in charge; opposition had to be oppressed in order for Rawlings to execute his envision for Ghana.
39 Coercive measures offered the PNDC the possibility of depoliticizing the Ghanaian population and downsize – mainly left – political opposition. He had to ignore public claims and needs in order to carry on with his economic adjustment programs and macro-economic goals (Jeong, 1995).
Return to Democracy: the Fourth Republic (1993 – present)
In 1992, Ghana – under international pressure – organized parliamentary elections to return to a constitutional democracy. The one-party state system of Rawlings finally ended to make way for a multi-party-political organization. The PNDC together with its proponents founded a new political party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to participate in the elections. The NDC won the elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes and Jerry Rawlings became the first democratically elected president of the Fourth Republic of Ghana. The following elections in 1996 had the same results and Rawlings was elected for another mandate as president. The era of political and economic unrest had ended, and Ghana entered a period of political stability and economic growth (Adedeji, 2001). After the presidential elections of 2000, the NDC handed the political power over to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). John Kufuor – the NPP’s candidate – began his presidency as of January 2001. Kufuor too reigned for two terms expending the NPP’s majority to 2008 (Herman et al., 2002). The dominance of the SAPs in the last decade of the 20th century had brought overall economic progress to Ghana, but criticism was not excluded. In 1989 Ghanaian civil servants accused the World Bank and IMF of ignoring the vulnerability of the domestic production to international price volatility. They regarded liberalization and macroeconomic stability as the first stage but were skeptical about the large dependency of Ghana on just a small number of export products. They wanted industrialization that offered import-substitutions to reduce the dependency on foreign goods and imports. However, their ability to act was hampered due to Rawlings's oppressive nature towards the opposition and because Ghana was still heavily dependent on the aid of the IFIs (Whitfield, 2010). The return to democracy in 1992 provided some difficulties on the economic reforms. The government shifted his priority away from economic reform towards political marketing to maintain the leadership. The architect of the Economic Recovery Program resigned in 1995 leaving the efforts to reform stalled at the stage of liberalization. Structural reformation lost urgency and was subject to lower political commitment. There were additional factors that negatively shaped the political actions of the late 1990s. Firstly, inflation and currency depreciation in 1990 and 1999 due to rising government expenditures resulted in a halt on loan disbursement and financial input from donors. Secondly, the process of economic reform had been very centralized since the 1980s within the Ministry of Finance; public administration was subordinated. With the arrival of democracy in 1993, the civil service lacked the organizational skills to negotiate effectively with the financial donors. Lastly, the NDC government missed a long-term vision. Despite the presentation of Rawlings's Ghana Vision 2020 development plan to the parliament in 1995, long-term policies remained absent (Whitfield, 2010). At the end of the 20th century, it became clear that the Economic Recovery Program had produced an unequal geographical distribution of wealth. Although the total Ghanaian poverty number fell – from 51.7 percent in 1992 to 39.5 percent in 1998 – rural poverty did not mimic this trend. The capital Accra and gold, timber or cocoa producing regions prospered under the economic reformation of the ERP because their production and thus income rose significantly. Rural, more northern areas, however, were left behind by the economic reformation of the SAPs and still experienced widespread poverty due to the distributional pattern of public spendings. The Structural Adjustment policies of the IMF and
40 the World Bank had brought overall economic progress at the expense of national growing wealth inequalities (Whitfield, 2010).
Ghana and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
In 1999, Ghana got labeled as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). If Ghana wanted to persist with the financial assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, it had to draft and present a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Although started by the Planning Commission of NDC, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) was mainly compiled under President Kufuor after the New Patriotic Party won the elections in 2000 (Whitfield, 2010). Kufuor decided to apply for the HIPC initiative to obtain debt relief. Therefore, the government had to implement its PRSP and World Bank and IMF agreements. The GPRS was largely focused on medium-term priorities. These priorities included modernization of agriculture, a boost of the private sector, a provision of secondary education in each district, expanded infrastructure – energy and transport – and enhancement of health care access. The Ghanaian PRSP was later criticized for using the term ‘wealth creation' and not being pro- poor. This was in contrast with the prevailing discourse of the international aid community. According to the IFIs, the PRSPs had do be focused on poverty alleviation through the provision of social services. PRSPs had to directly target the poorest while the GPRS was still mainly focused on macroeconomic restructuring (Whitfield, 2010). As a result, Kufuor implemented in his first mandate policies focused on macroeconomic stabilization and the fulfillment of the imposed conditionalities of the World Bank, the IMF and the ones negotiated in the HIPC arrangement. By 2004, increased financial resources were freed up for social services. However, the progress rapport on the GPRS of 2004 argued that this increase would mean a cut in resources for the economic services sector which reinforced a sustainable poverty alleviation and maintained wealth creation. Economic improvements were still regarded as more effective in solving the problem of poverty and inequality. During the PNDC rule, leading African academics had stated the ERP as “one of the most successful neoclassical economic reform efforts supported by the IMF and the World Bank.” NDC’s faithfulness to economic reform resulted from this statement (Whitfield, 2010). Even though the government lacked interest in the indicators of the PRSPs, multilateral agencies pressured the Kufuor administration to pursue with the GPRS in its second mandate. This second GPRS, on the other hand, was quite different from the first one. In 2005 Ghana reached macroeconomic stability and debt relief, changing the emphasis to growth-inducing programs. These programs were still focused on the productive sector so expenditures on social services could be preserved. An increase in social cost had to be avoided as it would undermine economic growth. GPRS II concentrated on the agricultural diversification to lower the national dependency on cocoa. The Ghanaian government could not take his eyes off its ambitious goals of economic transformation (Whitfield 2010).
The effects of GPRS
At the beginning of the NPP government, Ghana was still largely dependent on donor funds for investments. Between 2003 and 2005 international aid flow to Ghana increased allowing the government to raise investment expenditures. However, the government budget deficit started to increase again from 2006. This increase was due to several factors: higher governmental expenses to the energy sector, further investments in infrastructure, higher salaries, and a rise in social mitigation expenditures to weaken the consequences of the
41 unpredictable global markets. The costs of energy were not passed on to the population; the government largely supported the energy provision. In 2007 and 2008, the government spent significant capital to prestige events such as the celebration of 50 years of independence, a new presidential palace and the hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations in 2008 (Whitfield, 2010). The fiscal imbalance was exacerbated by a sequence of shocks in 2008. Drought, flood and the global food crisis in 2008 forced the government to augment financial support to the agricultural sector. An increase in oil prices did not favor the fiscal deficit either as subsidies to the energy sector had to be maintained. Finally, the 2008 national elections led to additional administrative expenses. The budget shortage expanded to 14.5 percent of national GDP in 2008 making it hard to find the NPP achievements of the macroeconomic stability (Whitfield, 2010). In 2006 and 2007, as part of the PRSP, the Ghanaian government increased poverty reduction spendings. This financial flow to social services was focused on basic education, health, and electricity provision to rural areas. A major achievement of Kufuor was the National Health Insurance Scheme founded in 2005. Kufuor launched several initiatives aimed at modernizing agriculture and developing agro-processing but due to financial limitations, these initiatives did not take off at the end of his mandate. The NPP government had not succeeded much in improving and modernizing the agricultural sector except for cocoa. The cocoa production doubled between 2000 and 2005 as it was regarded as an important national income source. The boost in the Ghanaian cocoa production and export is ascribable to the NPP policies (Whitfield, 2010). The first decade of the 21st century was characterized by the implementation of the PRSPs by the NPP government. In its first term, the government was able to accomplish macroeconomic stability. The second term, however, nullified their achievements and the NPP left office with the rebirth of the Ghanaian macroeconomic crisis (Whitfield, 2010).
42
CHAPTER 5: Analysis
Since independence Ghana has tried a number of approaches for achieving acceptable rates of growth and development. The economic and political past of Ghana had been turbulent. Many political leaders and parties with different perspectives and discourses came on stage. This chapter will offer a link between the previous two chapters. The ideas of Ghanaian political figures will be connected to the related international development discourse to investigate the pressure from the international community on national politics.
Nkrumah’s discourse
Nkrumah’s vision for the development of Ghana is comprehensive and cannot be defined into one theory of international development. Nkrumah’s discourse – termed as Nkrumaism – includes aspects from different development discourses. After independence, Nkrumah was determined to eradicate all signs of exploitation and restricted trade policies by implementing exchange rate controls and tariffs. He wanted to create an industrialized Ghana that could compete on the world market. The Ghanaian industrialization would make the nation more self-sufficient and less dependent on the import (Kwame Asiedu, 2013). Nkrumah’s ideas agreed partially with the modernization theory. He embraced the process of industrialization and modernization, but initially mainly focused on subsistence, in contrast to the commercialization of export-oriented production of the modernization theory. The Volta dam project provides a clear example of Nkrumah’s intentions as he believed that power was crucial for economic modernization. The Africanization of the civil services is also in line with the modernization theory as the theory argued that the driving force for industrialization had to come from within (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009). Nkrumah's perspective on multilateral aid – which he called subtle imperialism – concurs with the dependency and world systems theory. These theories advocated for protectionism against Western domination and interference, especially on their idea of development. Kwame Nkrumah connects to this idea which he highlights in his article Neo-
43 colonialism, the last Stage of imperialism (1965). In this article, he tried to make the reader aware of neo-colonial activities that occur after the independence of African former colonies and that are inherent to the exploitational nature of capitalism. During his tenure as president, although turning to the World Bank for financial assistance, he attempted to minimize foreign support and rejected policy proposals of the IMF (Berry, 1995). His attitude towards capitalist expansion and exploitation makes Nkrumah into a neo-Marxist. Furthermore, Nkrumah was a prominent defender of African socialism and trusted in the capabilities of the State to involve the entire population in the development of Ghana. The state has a responsibility to provide society with basic living needs and social welfare (Nkrumah, 1964). This makes Nkrumah an anti-neoliberalist because of neoliberalism plea for a decline of the influence of the State and an increased surrender to the free market. To summarize, Nkrumah can be considered as a neo-Marxist, modernization dependency theorist, socialist and anti-neoliberalist. These associations were in many ways opposite to the prevailing Western discourses on development and politics. The coup d'état is, therefore, considered to be a result of his anti-Western and pro-communist attitude.
The period of political and economic precariousness
1966-1969
The National Liberation Council (NLC) - that took over the power of Nkrumah -had a more pro-Western vision. After the coup, the west canceled some of the isolating policies and increased their food supply. The NLC gave the IMF permission to supervise and manage the economy. The industrialization process that had left Ghana with a large debt was replaced by the IMF for a more resource extracted economy. These resources and raw materials were exported by foreign companies, so they largely got away the profits. The Ghanaian fiscal deficit, against the odds, grew (Hutchful, 1987). The NLC had little idea for the Ghanaian development; they were mainly focused on the overthrow of Nkrumah's dictatorship. Their ignorance had led to the approach of the IMF for economic guidance. This period was, therefore, characterized by the Western discourse of modernization and liberalization with the emphasis on export and foreign investments leading to an increase in capital flowing out of Ghana to foreign-owned companies.
1969-1972
When Busia came to power, collaboration with the IMF maintained. The Fund had advised the president to implement several austerity measures to free up money for investments to create macroeconomic stability. Financial support was directed towards more Southern regions as their agricultural sector showed much potential, mainly the cocoa production. On the contrary, the many budget cuts had made Busia rather unpopular amongst the Ghanaian population as he favored certain regions. His devaluation of the Cedi had increased by import making Ghana more dependent on foreign suppliers. The austerity measures of the IMF ignored the needs of minorities and had created public dissatisfaction towards the government (Berry, 1993).
1972-1982
44 Acheampong's National Redemption Council (NRC) inversed the austerity measures and rearranged or rejected foreign debts. The NRC started to nationalize foreign companies and self-reliance became a priority. The bottom-up approach of Nkrumah returned to the scene together with the rejection of interference of the IFIs (Berry, 1993). The NRCs ideology was largely in line with the dependency and world systems theory. The population was encouraged to produce their own food and Acheampong's popularity rose. In the long term, however, the NRC policies did not solve the national economic problems. Transportation, industry, and agriculture suffered under the NRC regime. After the Rawlings's coup, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) had given the new government one condition: the interests of the population were the priority. Several conflicting ideological positions dominated within the government complicated the decision-making process. The Ghanaian economy degraded further.
The interference of the IMF and the World Bank
Structural Adjustment Program
After the second coup, Rawlings formed the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). They wanted to tackle the political underrepresentation of certain classes. Rawlings was faithful to Nkrumah's populism and socialism and tried to integrate the populace into national politics. The Ghanaian economy needed reformation to Rawlings was forced to ask for financial support of the IFIs. Certain left-wing members of the PNDC, however, did not agree on the assistance of the IFIs. They blamed the World Bank and the IMF for the poor performance of the Ghanaian economy. Oppositional discourses existed within the government. After a worsening of the economic crisis in 1983, financial support from the IFIs unavoidable. Ghana started its structural adjustment with the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) guided by the Bretton Woods institutions. The neoliberal discourse on development of these institutions gained ground with little resistance and managed to dominate the Ghanaian politics. Through the ERP, Ghana was able to economically prosper cutting back inflation and repaying loan arrears. By 1991, Ghana's international reputation was restored, and Ghana became, once again, and African example for economic reformation. The ERP had brought macroeconomic stability but the population still experienced financial complications. The program was directed to the export sector leaving unemployment rates at high levels due to austerity measures. The SAPs had proven to be beneficial to the macroeconomic growth and the Ghanaian reform was stated as one of the most successful ones. Nevertheless, the neoliberal discourse of the IFIs had cut the social expenses of the Ghanaian government resulting in an overall reduction of living standards. The government launched in association with the World Bank the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) to create jobs and enhance living standards. These detrimental conditions had increased popular resistance against liberal economic adjustment. On the other hand, there was also subtle governmental resistance from total internationalization of the export. Both the export of gold and cocoa remained under governmental control so capital will not completely flow out of Ghana. To this day, Ghana is the only African country that has not fully surrender its cocoa production to foreign companies (Wilcox & Abbott, 2004). Nkrumah's legacy of
45 Ghana's resistance to international interference and liberalization still shapes the political actions of the Ghanaian government. The macro-economic achievements of the SAPs went at the expense of popular support. Civil servants addressed the Ghanaian dependency on the export of cocoa and gold and advocated for import-substitution oriented industrialization to make the Ghanaian economy more resilient for international market fluctuations. The return to democracy in 1992 and a reduction of financial input from donors due to inflation and currency depreciation made the government less committed to economic reform. At the end of the 20th century, it became clear that the ERP and the Structural Adjustment policies had created large national wealth inequalities; rural areas were still subject to large poverty rates. Additionally, the macroeconomic situation had deteriorated again (Whitfield, 2010).
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
At the turn of the century, Ghana started with his Poverty Reduction Strategy supported by the IMF and World Bank. The Ghanaian government, however, still focused on the recovery of the macroeconomic stability like in the first years of the SAP. Kufuor, the former president, focused on fulfilling the conditionalities of the agreements with donors to maintain their financial assistance. In the first half of the 2000s, the government was not convinced of the idea of a bottom-up development of the PRSPs. It still conceived macroeconomic stability as a provider for social welfare and poverty reduction. The neoliberal discourse on development still ruled the political agenda and interests in poverty reduction and the effectiveness of the PRSPs lacked. An increase in social costs would decrease economic stability. In 2005, Ghana regained macroeconomic stability and debt relief (Whitfield, 2010). Consequently, in 2006, the government increased funds for poverty reduction directed on education, health, and electricity. Several complications between 2007 and 2008, on the other hand, reversed the economic achievement of Kufuor and Ghana was back to an economic crisis. The neoliberal discourse of the SAPs with its emphasis on macroeconomic progress kept Ghana imprisoned during the GPRS period. The IMF and World Bank had acknowledged the limitations of the SAPs and had put the PRSP forward, but as long as the national government is not convinced of the negative outcomes of the SAPs, PRSPs will not be properly implemented. Ghanaian leaders were often trapped between economic or social interests. To satisfy the international community, policies appointed by the major multilateral agencies – the World Bank and the IMF – had to be accepted and implemented. This, however, always met popular resistance. To please the Ghanaian population, on the other hand, large social expenditures were favored. The populace preferred a socialist-leaning government with the main focus of improving living standards. This, however, is at odds with the neoliberal discourse of the West and international financial institutions. This research into international development has clarified the overall debate on neoliberalism and socialism.
46
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion
Since independence Ghana has tried a number of approaches to achieve acceptable rates of growth and development. Ghana's history is characterized by a rapid succession of political leaders with different perspectives on development and economic progress. We see, as the international development discourses, a repetitive return of ideas and discourse. An overall distinction can be made between the socialist leaders who want nothing to do with the IFIs – like Nkrumah – and the pro-Western, neoliberal leaders who turned to the World Bank and IMF for financial support – like Busia. Additionally, this research made clear that the Ghanaian government only asked for international financial aid in times of economic crisis when the need was greatest. Since the economic crisis of 1982, Ghana is in the grasp of the Western neoliberal discourse of the IFIs. However, both the SAPs and PRSPs did not provide the economic prosperity that was expected. The SAPs were effective in rapidly reaching macroeconomic stability but provoked largely unequal national wealth distributions increasing poverty in detrimental regions. The PRSPs, nonetheless, seemed good in their intentions but did not fully reach their goals in Ghana. This is mainly because of the national focus on macroeconomic stability previously achieved under the SAP legislations. The Ghanaian government aimed at meeting the conditionalities of the PRSPs as quickly as possible so it could invest its funds in economic stimulating sectors. The conditionalities draw the attention away from the main purpose of the financial assistance making the PRSPs ineffective in fighting poverty. Although the neoliberal discourse conquered Ghana, popular opposition remains. The Ghanaian disapproval of the interference of international agencies and their neoliberal policies can be regarded as the legacy of Nkrumah's battle with neo- colonialism. Ghana's pioneering role is now reflected in its resistance against western interventions and discourses.
47
CHAPTER 7: Discussion
This research is mainly based on academic literature for the interpretation of political discourses. For the investigation of Nkrumah vision, additional documents – his independence speech, the seven-year development plan and his article on neo-colonialism – were analyzed. A more comprehensive examination of policy documents or speeches of other leaders would offer more in-depth knowledge of their perspectives and ideas. Moreover, the development and political situation in Ghana over the past ten years were disregarded. Further research could build on this gap to investigate Ghana's current discourse and perception of the future. Furthermore, this research focused merely on the national and international levels. Intranational differences in perspectives towards neoliberal policies between for example the northern regions and southern cocoa producing provinces would provide a worthy research topic. Winters, McCulloch & McKay (2004) argue that there are no generalizable conclusions to draw about the relationship between economic restructuring and poverty. The outcomes of this research cannot be generalized for other nations. Therefore, additional research to other national cases could offer comparable material. This research highlighted the complexity of development discourses in the case of Ghana. The Ghanaian resistance to neoliberalism still prevails. Future development policies should listen to the needs of the Ghanaian population and find a way to create a bottom-up development by involving the populace.
48
References
Adedeji, J. L. (2001). The legacy of JJ Rawlings in Ghanaian politics, 1979-2000. African Studies Quarterly, 5(2), 1-27.
Arhin, K. (Ed.). (1993). The life and work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a symposium organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. Africa World Press.
Asante, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in Ghana. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Ateku, A. J. (2017, March 7). Ghana is 60: An African success story with tough challenges ahead. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/ghana-is-60-an-african-success- story-with-tough-challenges-ahead-74049
Awoonor, K. (1990). Ghana: A political history from pre-European to modern times. Sedco Pub.
Berry, L. B. (Ed.). (1995). Ghana: A country study (Vol. 550, No. 153). US Government Printing Office.
Brydon, L., & Legge, K. (1996). Adjusting Society: World Bank, the IMF and Ghana (Vol. 5). IB Tauris.
Bryman, A. (2016). Social research methods. Oxford university press.
Boas, M. (2008). Multilateral institutions and the developing world – Changes and challenges in Desai, V. & Potter, R. B. (2013), The Companion to Development Studies. Routledge. 547- 550
Chant, S. H. (2007). Gender, generation and poverty: exploring the feminisation of poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Edward Elgar Publishing.
49 Chant, S. H., & McIlwaine, C. (2009). Geographies of development in the 21st century: an introduction to the global South. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Craig, D., & Porter, D. (2003). Poverty reduction strategy papers: a new convergence. World development, 31(1), 53-69.
Daniels, P., Sidaway, J., Bradshaw, M., & Shaw, D. (2012). An introduction to human geography. Pearson Higher Ed.
De Angelis, M. (2001). Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s enclosures. The commoner, 2(01), 1-22.
Eribon, D., & Holierhoek, J. (1990). Michel Foucault: een biografie. Van Gennep.
Escobar, A. (1995). Imagining a post-development era. Power of development, 211-227.
Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press.
Esteva, G. (1992). Development in Sachs W. The development Dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power.
Gebe, B. Y. (2008). Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'état. Journal of Pan African Studies, 2(3).
Hagan, G. P. (1985). Nkrumah's Leadership Style: An Assessment from a Cultural Perspective (No. 14). Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana.
Hajer, M. A., Van Den Brink, M., & Metze, T. (2006). Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning. Netherlands geographical studies (ISSN 0169-4839), (344).
Hall, S. (1992). The West and the Rest: Discourse and power.
Hall, S. (1997). The work of representation. Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices, 2, 13-74.
Hansen, E., & Collins, P. (1980). The army, the state, and the 'Rawlings Revolution' in Ghana. African Affairs, 79(314), 3-23.
Helleiner, E. (2006). Reinterpreting Bretton Woods: international development and the neglected origins of embedded liberalism. Development and Change, 37(5), 943-967.
Helleiner, E. (2014). Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods: International development and the making of the postwar order. Cornell University Press.
Herman, R. G., Piccone, T. J., Theodore Piccone, J., & Nuamah, K. (2002). Defending democracy: a global survey of foreign policy trends 1992-2002. Democracy Coalition Project.
Huysmans, L. (1993). Holisme als konstante in de Ghanese politieke evolutie: Invloed van religie op politiek (unpublished master thesis). University of Gent.
50
Hutchful, E. (1973). Military rule and the politics of demilitarisation in Ghana, 1966-1969. PhD Thesis.
Hutchful, E. (1987). The IMF and Ghana: the confidential record. Zed Books.
Jeong, H. W. (1995). Liberal economic reform in Ghana: a contested political agenda. Africa Today, 42(4), 82-104.
Kolavalli, S., & Vigneri, M. (2011). Cocoa in Ghana: Shaping the success of an economy. Yes, Africa can: Success stories from a dynamic continent, 201-218.
Kovach, H., & Fourmy, S. (2006). Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid. Oxfam International.
Kwame Asiedu, M. (2013). Trade liberalization and growth: The Ghanaian experience.
Langdridge, D., & Hagger-Johnson, G. (2009). Introduction to research methods and data analysis in psychology. Pearson Education.
Layne, C. (2007). The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present. Cornell University Press.
Marchand, M. H., & Parpart, J. L. (Eds.). (2003). Feminism/postmodernism/development. Routledge. 2-4.
Mireku, E. (1991). Which way Ghana?: restoring hope and confidence in the Ghanaian. Asuo Peabo.
Nkrumah, K. (1966). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 1965. New York: International.
Parpart, J. L. (1995). Post-modernism, gender and development in Jonathan Crush. Power of development. Psychology Press. 253 – 254
Pellow, D., & Chazan, N. (1986). Ghana: Coping with uncertainty. Westview Pr.
Pieterse, J. N. (2000). After post-development. Third world quarterly, 21(2), 175-191.
Pinkney, R. (1972). Ghana under military rule, 1966-1969 (No. 6). Taylor & Francis.
Power, M. (2002). Enlightenment and the era of modernity. The companion to development studies, 65.
Rostow, W. W., & Rostow, W. W. (1990). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto, Chapter 2: The five stages-of-growth – a summary. Cambridge university press.
Ruger, J. P. (2005). The changing role of the World Bank in global health. American journal of public health, 95(1), 60-70.
51 Sachs, W. (Ed.). (1997). Development dictionary, The: A guide to knowledge as power. Orient Blackswan.
Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism: western conceptions of the Orient. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 115.
Sen, A. (2000). A decade of human development. Journal of human development, 1(1), 17-23.
Sidaway, J. D. (2002). Post-development. The companion to development studies, 147-151.
Simon, D. (2008). 2.5 Neoliberalism, structural adjustment and poverty reduction strategies. The companion to development studies.
Stockwell, J., & Perley, D. (1978). In Search of Enemies: a CIA story (p. 164242). New York: Norton.
Thomas, A. (2000). Meanings and views of development. Poverty and development into the 21st century, 48.
Wade, R. H. (2002). US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas. Review of international political economy, 9(2), 215-243.
Whitfield, L. (2010). The state elite, PRSPs and policy implementation in aid-dependent Ghana. Third World Quarterly, 31(5), 721-737.
Wilcox, M. D., & Abbott, P. C. (2004). Market power and structural adjustment: the case of West African cocoa market liberalization (No. 377-2016-21045).
Winters, L. A., McCulloch, N., & McKay, A. (2004). Trade liberalization and poverty: the evidence so far. Journal of economic literature, 42(1), 72-115.
52
Sources
Kennan, G. (1946). The long telegram. Origins of the Cold War. The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of, 19-31.
Nkrumah, K. (1957). Independence speech. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/2007/02/070129_ghana50_inde pendence_speech.shtml
Nkrumah, K. (1964). Seven-year development plan: a brief outline. Office of the Planning Commission. Retrieved from https://www.ghanahero.com/Visions/Nkrumah_Legacy_Project/documents/deve_plans/7_Yea r_Dev_Plan-Ghana-v3_marked.pdf
Nkrumah, K. (1966). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 1965. New York: International.
Pulse Ghana. (2019, February 4). Ghana: Where we came from and where we are. Retrieved from https://www.pulse.com.gh/news/local/ghana-where-we-came-from-and-where-we- are/0s0x2nd
53