1 From the publication series of KCCRC Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center
Iranian Influence and interference in Southern Kurdistan: Reasons and most potent and effective principles
This article is an edited translation of the original in Kurdish. Translated by (Shkow Sherzad).
From the publication series of KCCRC 2 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center
All Rights Reserved for: Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center
May 2018 3 Iranian Influence and interference in Southern Kurdistan: Reasons and most potent and effective principles
Arkan Ahmad Jaff 3.2 - The political differences of Kurdistan .s Political Parties׳Region 3.3 - The economy of the Kurdistan Region Contents: 3.4 - The will and advantages for both sides to conduct bilateral relations. Introduction 3.5 - Nationalism and the development of the idea of independence in the Kurdistan Region. Part 1 Historical relations between Kurds and Iran and the international relations strategy of the Islamic Summary: Republic of Iran Bilateral relations between the Kurds and Iran 1.1 - Kurdish territory and the deep and historical have deep roots dating back to pre-Christian roots of Kurdish and Iranian relations antiquity. Over this time relations between the 1.2 - International relations strategy of the two sides have experienced periods of increased Islamic Republic of Iran and decreased ties. Iran throughout its history has attempted to keep its bilateral relations with the Kurds active and worked to enhance its power over the region at all costs. Part 2 After the First World War and the splitting of s geography and Kurdistan into four constituent parts, three parts׳The status of Iraqi Kurdistan diplomacy and its impact on Iranian influence in of Kurdish territory fell outside the state of Iran. Iraqi Kurdistan Nevertheless, given the vast border Iran has with Iraq it has always attempted to maintain bilateral s geography and the relations with the Iraqi Kurds so that it can use׳Iraqi Kurdistan - 2.1 s security belt the ties as an advantage when facing off against׳boundaries of Iran 2.2 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region Iraq. Iran has been successful to a great extent and the Iraqi government in its strategic objectives in regards to the Iraqi 2.3 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region Kurds. For example, it was able to use the Iraqi and the Iranian opposition. Kurds to apply pressure on the former Iraqi 2.4 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region regime to settle border issues in the 1975 Algiers and states that present a threat to the Islamic Agreement. Republic of Iran. The success of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 and the subsequent break out of the Iran-Iraq war forced a distinct period of bilateral relations Part 3 between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds. The 1991 Iraqi Internal politics and the political space for Iranian Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi government influence and interference in the Kurdistan furthered this recent period in bilateral relations Region with Iran and continued until the collapse of the athist regime in 2003. The destruction׳The foundational condition of Iraqi Iraqi Ba - 3.1 Kurdistan and the political space available to the of the former Iraqi system ushered in the latest s political parties. period of ties between the two sides. Although׳Kurdistan Region
4 this period has faced numerous challenges principles and reasons behind the strengthening and obstacles, it has developed into a fruitful of Iranian influence in the Kurdish Region of Iraq relationship in which strength and power over the are in large part due to the actions of the Iraqi s status׳s current status Kurds themselves. For that reason, Iran׳Iraqi Kurdish territory mark Iran in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and therefore has and its ability for control in Iraqi Kurdistan are awarded the Iranians a position whereby they more to do with these policies and underlying can influence the political direction of the Iraqi reasons than reasoning owing to some distinct Kurds. historical period. Hence, whenever and wherever The guiding principle of this research is there is a strengthening of the underlying causes Iran s ׳ historical analysis and the collection of data via for Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan dependence on books, magazines and internet status and power in Kurdish territory in turn sources. The questions that this paper is aiming increases, and vice-versa. That is why this paper to answer are the following; aims to discuss the reasons and principles behind 1. What are the most potent and effective Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. principles of Iranian influence and interference This paper is important because it will inform in the Kurdistan Region? readers of the reasons and origins behind Iranian s power in influence in Iraqi Kurdistan in general and in׳To what extent does it affect Iran .2 the Kurdish region and does it open the door for particular that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. further political interference by Iran. The paper will also provide a more precise 3. To what extent do these strong and active picture for politicians and academics alike to principles impact the bilateral relationship review their political policies towards regional between the two sides. and international states on the one hand, and 4. Can Iranian influence and interference in the develop their understanding of the internal Kurdistan Region be ended? reasons driving the phenomenon on the other. The paper is working on the hypothesis that This understanding will aid decision makers in its attempts to find ample opportunity for to increase, strengthen and improve bilateral bilateral relations the Kurdistan Region itself has relations where the causes of Iranian influence provided the groundwork for Iran to achieve its owing to Iraqi Kurdish policy are advantageous s and correct those policies that disadvantage׳objectives readily. Hence, the Kurdistan region efforts in strengthening bilateral ties are critical bilateral ties. With this objective in mind the reasons for the continued strengthening of the guiding principle of this research is historical relationship between the two sides on the one analysis and the collection of data via dependence hand and the enhancement of Iranian influence on various sources. and interference in Iraqi Kurdish territory on the The paper divides between an introduction, three other. parts and a conclusion. The first part is titled, Key terms: Kurd, Iran, Kurdistan Region of «Historical relations between the Kurds and Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian desire of Iran and the international relations strategy of power in the Kurdistan Region, The reasons for the Islamic Republic of Iran». This part further Iranian political influence and interference in the divides into two sections; firstly discussing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Kurdish territory and the historical origins od bilateral relations between the Kurds and Iran and secondly debating the international relations Introduction: strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. s Pahlavi period and that of the The second part of the paper is titled, «The׳In both Iran Islamic Republic the country has always kept geographic and diplomatic relations status of a close eye on the revolutionary movement in the Kurds and its impact on Iranian influence Iraqi Kurdistan and has continually worked to in the Kurdistan Region.» With the second part increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdish territory. In further dividing into four subsections; the first its dealings with the Kurdish Region of Iraq Iran subsection debates the geographic status of the has worked to promote its interests. In truth, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its importance to
5 s security belt. The second and most likely the first peoples to set foot on׳the borders of Iran subsection explores the relations between the Persian soil. (3) These historians also point Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi government. The out that the Kurds themselves believe that third subsection discusses relations between the in a historical perspective they are natives Kurdistan Region and the Iranian opposition. of Iran and integral members of the Persian And the last subsection concludes this part of the civilisation. (4) paper by examining the connections between the Furthermore, Linguists note that the Kurdish Kurdistan Region with states that present a threat language which is Indo-European at source to the Islamic Republic of Iran. is later a branch of the Farsi language group. The last section is titled «Internal politics and Iranian linguists use this fact to support their the political space for Iranian influence and case that Kurdish and Farsi are one of the same interference in the Kurdistan Region». The third and that the two languages do not have separate part of the paper then divides into five further and distinct roots. To further this position, subsections studying first, the foundational these scholars explain that century-old sources s political that talk about the Kurdish people rely upon׳condition of the Kurdistan Region parties and the political space available to them. on Farsi (Iranian language) and that early Second, The political differences of Kurdistan sources produced by the Kurdish people also «s Political Parties. Third the economy use Farsi. They point to the «Sharafnama׳Region of the Kurdistan Region.Fourth, the will and by Sharafkhan Bitlis as an obvious example. advantages for both sides to conduct bilateral These scholars believe that the promotion of relations.Lastly, the notion of nationalism and Kurdish as a separate language to Farsi began the ideological development of independence in at the end of the 19th century as one of the first the Kurdistan Region. signs of Kurdish nationalism. (5) The hope is that this paper benefits readers, and In this regard, Richard W. Cottam observed it is also important to mention that no research is that «Those Iranians that have a strong free from criticism. understanding of history know very well that there is a strong link between their history and that of the Kurds». He continues his Part 1 observation by claiming that all Kurds of the Historical relations between the Kurds and Iran Middle East are of Iranian origin not only the and the international relations strategy of the Kurds of Iran. (6) Islamic Republic of Iran Iranian academics go further arguing that throughout ancient history the Kurdish lands were dependent on that of Iran and that Kurds 1.1 - Kurdish territory and the deep as a people have themselves at one time or and historical roots of Kurdish and another have governed the whole of Iranian Iranian relations territory. They explain that the Kurds believe themselves to be descendants of the Medes The Kurds have close ties to Iran as a result of a civilisation that ruled Iran from 700 to 550 factors including but not limited to; religion, BC. Relying on this viewpoint, these scholars language and a shared history.(1) According to explain that the capital city of the Median historical sources, the Kurds are a member of Empire was Ecbatana which was close to the the Aryan race, and at the same time, the name modern Iranian town of Hamadan. For their «Iran» in Persian suggests the ‹land of the part, the Iranians understand the Median For that reason, there is an argument .׳Aryans Empire to have been the first in a chain of to suggest that the Kurds are of Iranian empires that have in the past ruled the territory background. of Iran. Hence, via this reading of history the Historians support this case by arguing that Kurdish people did, in fact, rule Iranian lands Iran is the motherland of the Kurds (2), that as the Medes. Owing to this reading of history the Kurds are the most Iranic people of Iran, the Iranians believe that the promotion of
6 Kurdish independence is a new phenomenon 1.2 - International relations strategy that was initially spurred by the colonisation of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the region by foreign states namely Great Britain and later by United States intervention Since the return of Imam Khomeini to Iran and and influence. The Iranian scholars argue that the subsequent establishment of the Islamic these foreign powers aimed to use the ideology Republic of Iran, Iran has followed the concept of nationalism to divide and rule the Middle of «neither east nor west». This announcement East. (7) This underlying philosophy has issued initially as a Fatwa was designed to s neutral stance in the Cold War and׳guided Iranian policy towards the Kurds settled outline Iran in Iran. Distinct from other neighbouring states that it would neither support the Soviet Union hosting Kurdish populations Iran has officially nor would it support the United States, a doctrine recognised the presence of a Kurdish people that later became enshrined in the constitution of in Iran. However, they have not identified the Islamic Republic of Iran. (11) the Kurds as a people of different or distinct The Constitution of the Islamic Republic Iran nationality. Instead, Iran sees them as a group dedicated Articles 154 ,153 ,152 and 155 of part amongst many other groups that make up the 10 to the issue of international politics. In respect Iranian identity. (8) to the neutral stance of Iran article 152 states; This Iranian view of the Kurds was evident «The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic when the Kurdish war of independence of Iran is based upon the rejection of all collapsed after the signing of the 1975 Algiers forms of domination, both the exertion of it Agreement between Iraq and Iran forcing the and submission to it, the preservation of the Kurds to flee Iraq and seek refuge in Iran. The independence of the country in all respects and leader of Iran at the time Mohammad Reza its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of Shah Pahlavi responding to the displaced Iraqi all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the Kurdish peoples explained his displeasure with hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance them being in refugee camps for an extended of mutually peaceful relations with all non- period and advocated that given their shared belligerent States» (12) lineage and language with the Iranian people What is more, an international strategy of Iran is they should be free to leave the refugee camps to export the Islamic revolution across the globe. and mix with the people of Iran. (9) For this reason, in the immediate aftermath of The collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1979 the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeini ordered and the establishment of the Islamic Republic the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary of Iran developed a new policy towards Guard Corps of which one of its founding aims separation attempts believing it to be a direct was to export the idea of the Islamic revolution s vision was one that׳violation of Islamic principles. In response to abroad. Imam Khomeini Khud Mukhtari Ayatollah Khomeini addressed transcended the borders of Iran and sought a the Kurdish question of Iran and reiterated his global Islamic revolution. (13) Furthermore, s׳support for a unified Iran by saying «I have according to the Iranian Constitution, Iran always explained that in Islam there are no international strategy is to refrain itself from ethnicities, languages, nations and borders. All all forms of interference in the internal affairs a, are equal of other nations while at the same time the׳Muslims, be them Sunni, or Shi -s right to act in self׳brothers and all benefit from the rights awarded Constitution reserves Iran them by Islam.»(10) defence to protect itself from foreign oppression. Hence, it is clear that Iran has always viewed the In this regard article 154 of the Islamic Republic ,s Constitution says׳Kurds as a part of the Iranian nation and identity of Iran and by consequence regards Iraqi Kurdistan as «The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal former Iranian territory. Its policies towards human felicity throughout human society and the Kurdish Region of Iraq is one of keeping it considers the attainment of independence, close to the Iranian sphere of influence. freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly,
7 and ‹supporting the ׳while scrupulously refraining from all forms ‹exporting the revolution its international ׳of interference in the internal affairs of other struggles of oppressed peoples nations, it supports the just struggles of the activities cannot be defined as interference with afun (oppressed) against the Mustakbirun the affairs of foreign countries. Instead, Iran׳Mustad (oppressors) in every corner of the globe.» (13) believes it is carrying out a vital constitutional Therefore, Iran presents the international obligation. This belief leads Iran to view itself activities that it conducts as support for the as an international actor that is defending struggle of the oppressed and as attempts humanity against oppressive world powers. As to export its revolution. By relying on this a byproduct, Iran sees it as its obligation to aid constitutional perspective, the Iranian foreign the Kurdish people from oppressive regimes athist regime of Saddam Hussein׳ministry has attempted and continues to strive to like the Ba increase Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan by and the global superpowers that seek to use spreading its revolutionary message via various them in their international politics. Therefore, methods. In the period of the Iran-Iraq War Iran Iran has demonstrated in with its actions that it built its relationship with the then Iraqi Kurdish is following this policy path when it comes to leadership via operation Ramadan. (14) After the dealing with the Kurds generally and the Iraqi Iraqi Kurdish elections of 1992 Iran reinforces Kurds in particular. It has continuously increased its relations with the Iraqi Kurds by establishing its influence and status amongst the Iraqi Kurds its first office in Iraqi Kurdistan in the capital and the broader Kurdish community. city of Erbil and called it the ‹Erbil Office for This trend continued .׳Relations with Iran with similar offices opening in the cities and Part 2 s geography and׳towns of Sulaimania, Duhok, Salahadin, and The status of Iraqi Kurdistan Darbandikhan. These offices aimed to establish diplomacy and its impact on Iranian influence in relations between the Kurdish political parties Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran as well as offering humanitarian aid to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi Kurdish s geography׳population at large. (16) 2.1 - Iraqi Kurdistan s security׳Following this Iran gave the responsibility of those and the boundaries of Iran tasks to its official consul and representatives belt in the region and publically and successfully The security of the Middle East is dependent on engaged with the Iraqi Kurds on matters to do the states that make up the region. Any turmoil with the arts and culture, science and academia. or trouble that effects one country will, in turn, (17) Via its consul in the Kurdistan Region of affect the security of the Middle East at large. Iraq Iran has been able to run many Iranian book fairs, artistic and drama exhibitions in the Iraqi Kurdistan as a quasi-state in the region Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well as running controls a geopolitically strategic territory that various Farsi language courses for residents of sits in the centre of the Middle East. (20) Many Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, there have also been observers view Iraqi Kurdistan as an entity that many academic exchanges between the two sides enjoys relations with the Kurds in Iran, Syria with numerous Kurdish and Iranian universities and Turkey. Moreover, the territory that the signing memorandums of understanding to Iraqi Kurds control is rich in resources and hosts further scientific research. (18) a chain of mountain ranges such as the Zagros In the media field, the Sahar TV network plays mountains, which stretches from Iran through an essential role as it works to send pro-Iranian Iraqi Kurdistan to eastern Turkey. (21) Given news to citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan and also these geopolitical realities, it is easy to understand covers Kurdish developments in line with the why Iran views the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as .s worldview׳Islamic Republic of Iran an integral part of its national security belt and For the reasons outlined above, Iran believes hence, has a vested interest in the preservation that by enshrining its actions in the doctrines of
8 of political stability in Iraqi Kurdistan. (22) This In 2003 when the former Baathist regime in Iraq reality for the Iranians is evident to observers came to an end, Iran became the first foreign that pay close attention to relations between state to open a consulate in Erbil. (28) In the Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. In meetings between same manner, Iran became the first international Kurdish politicians and Iranian officials, the state to send its forces under the command of Iranians openly express the interdependence of Qasim Sulaimani to Iraqi Kurdistan to aid the security between both Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. Kurds when the Islamic State took over swathes For this reason, Iran has attempted to protect its of northern Iraq in 29( .2014) The Iranian internal security and that of Iraqi Kurdistan via assistance went so far as to assist the Iraqi Kurds increasing its influence in the Iraqi Kurdistan and in defending Makhmur, and in that assistance, interfering when necessary in the internal affairs Iran lost numerous officers. In fact, Iran believes of the Iraqi Kurds. that they were the primary protectors of Erbil and t for them the Kurdish capital would׳Iran feels threatened by the existence of this Iraqi if it weren Kurdish territory as on the one hand, Iran fears have fallen to the Islamic State. (30) the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan will spur Iranian Kurds to also The Iraqi Kurds for their part showed their seek the same political outcome from Iran as the respect and gratitude to Iran for their assistance Iraqi Kurds would enjoy. (24) On the other hand, in two ways. First, they sent direct and special it fears instability in Iraqi Kurdistan and has correspondence from Massoud Barzani the continuously used its foreign policy to prevent former President of Iraqi Kurdistan, to the s stability Iran has worked Iranians to thank them for their assistance. And׳it. Hence, to protect it to protect the security of the Iraqi Kurds. secondly, this gratitude was reiterated in a press conference in Erbil when the Iranian Foreign Minister visited the city. (30) The most prominent threats facing Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan are; 2.2 - Relations between the 1) Active Iranian opposition groups compromising the security of Iran’s border. Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the 2) Instability and insecurity in Iraqi Kurdistan Iraqi Government. and it spilling over to Iran. Since the establishment of the Iraqi state and the 3) Increased foreign influence in Iraqi Kurdistan inclusion of Kurdish territory in the creation of from foreign powers that are hostile to Iran like that state conflict and strife have been an ongoing the United States and Turkey. (25) feature of relations between both the Kurds of Iraq and the Iraqi State as well as between the Iran uses influence and interference in Iraqi states of Iraq and Iran. (32) In the early days of s security goals because the Iraqi state relations between the Kurds and׳Kurdistan to achieve it it believes instability in Iraqi Kurdistan is an the government of Abdul-Karim Qasim soured opportunity for other states to interfere in the and Iran was quick to seize this opportunity internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan, which in turn to establish its links with the Iraqi Kurdish would have a negative impact on the internal leadership. To make contact with the Kurds of security of Iran. To remedy this threat, Iran has Iraq Iran sent Iranian officials from its embassy installed a network of spies and informants in in Baghdad, namely Isa Bijman (an Iranian Kurd Iraqi Kurdistan.(26) In this regard, a former and leading figure in Iran’s SAWK agency). Iranian foreign minister Dr Ali Akbari while The delegations set up meetings with the Iraqi giving a seminar in 1996 explains that the Kurdish leadership via the then secretary of the security of Iran remains enshrined in the peace Kurdistan Democratic Party Ibrahim Ahmed. and security of the entire Middle East region and (33) that this principle is the driver of Iranian foreign What is more, the Iranians later set up direct policy. (27) meetings with the then Kurdish leader Mullah
9 Mustafa Barzani via Mansour Pour ( another Following the Iraqi Kurdish uprising against Kurdish member of Iran’s SAWK agency). the Iraqi State in the spring of 1991 and Following on from these meetings Iran established the establishment of the government of the a base for its SAWK agency in Iraqi Kurdistan Kurdistan Region of Iraq relations between the under the command of Mansour Pour to develop Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad were non-existent. In better relations between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran. fact, the two sides saw each other as enemies, Through this base, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership with each posing a security threat to the other. s poor relations with Iraq the׳sent their requirements for their war against the Owing to Iran Iraqi government to the Iranians, and the Iranians country continued with its doctrine of organising in the most part provided for the Iraqi Kurds. (34) and assisting dissident groups within Iraq. As a Isa Bijman openly expressed that Iran was a result, the Iranians used the unique geopolitical critical player in the Iraqi Kurdish war against environment of this period to increase its status the Iraqi government. He explained that Iran and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. provided for all the Iraqi Kurdish requirements. The next significant geopolitical shift in the The country treated the wounded Iraqi Kurds in region came with the 2003 Iraq war which Iranian hospitals, sent Iranian soldiers to assist resulted in the collapse of the Iraqi Regime of the Iraqi Kurds, set up wireless communications Saddam Hussain and the power shift in Iraq in Mansour Pour’s base, and had radio from the minority Sunni Arabs to the majority a Arabs. (38) From the start of this new Iraqi׳communications equipment made in Germany Shi and sent to the Iraqi Kurdish mountains to be regime, the Iranians offered religious, cultural, used by the Iraqi Kurds. (35) political, military and economic assistance to the In 1970 when negotiations restarted between new Iraqi leadership. This new found friendship Iran, Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurds Iran became between the two states derived, on the one hand, unhappy with the direction and attempted to from the fact that the new leaders in Baghdad force the talks to collapse. The then Iranian leader were former Iraqi dissidents who had spent long Mohammed Reza Shah sent a letter to Mullah periods residing in Iran and receiving support Mustafa Barzani via Sheikh Baba Ali (the son from the Iranian government. And, on the of Sheikh Mahmoud) inviting the Kurdish leader other, from the fact that both sides now shared to Tehran. The Iranians subsequently promised a common religious and sectarian heritage. (39) that they would continue to provide the Iraqi Hence, regardless of the fact that Iran continuously Kurds with anything they required if they pulled tries to maintain and strengthen its relations with out from the negotiations. In this regard, Mullah the Kurdistan Region of Iraq the Iranian state is Mustafa and Baba Ali visited Iran on the 15th now more prone to side with the Iraqi state in January 1970 to discuss the situation with the disagreements that erupt between the Kurdistan Shah of Iran. This Kurdish delegation came Region of Iraq and the Iraqi government. away with a promise of full Iranian assistance Moreover, it continuously attempts to seek for their struggle against the Iraqi state. (36) compromise from the Iraqi Kurds when settling At the onset of the Iran-Iraq war relations between disputes between the two sides. In this regard, Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan soured Iran offers support to the Iraqi government by s applying economic pressure on the Kurds via the׳as a result of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan engagement in negotiations with the Iraqi closing of border crossings among other forms government. The poor relations between the of coercion. two sides continued until the Patriotic Union of In summary, Iran continually assisted the Iraqi s talks with Baghdad collapsed. For Kurds while Iraq was under the regime of׳Kurdistan athist party. It used the opportunity to׳its part, Iran decided to favour the Kurdistan the Ba Democratic Party over the Patriotic Union increase its status and influence in the Kurdish of Kurdistan and increased its engagement Region of Iraq by opening offices in cities across it engagement and assistance to them as the the region of which the decision-making office Kurdistan Democratic Party had not engaged in for the Ramadan operations was perhaps the talks with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. (37) best example. However, post2003- the Iranian
10 attitude has shifted to one of support for the new The agreement between the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi government, while at the same time trying Iran resulted in the confinement of the Kurdish to maintain relations with the Iraqi Kurds and political parties in Iran. What is more, in 1968 the preserve its influence in the region. Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan assassinated some of the leading figures of the Kurdish Movement in Iran like Abdullah 2.3 - Relations between the Kurdistan Moaini. According to some accounts, the arrest Region and the Iranian opposition. and assassination of Abdullah Moaini occurred Another primary cause of Iranian efforts to seek in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaimania. His body influence and interfere in the affairs of Iraqi was then given to the Iranian government and Kurdistan draws from the fact that Iran hosts put on display in the predominantly Kurdish an internal Kurdish population with an active Iranian town of Mahabat. (43) Therefore, under political movement. The Kurdish question in Iran the leadership of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is a matter of much concern for the Iranians, and Iran was able to mostly insulate itself from thus they attach great importance to the issue. As the Kurdish revolutionary parties within Iran a result, the Iranians have been and continue to by working to increase its influence with the be in a continuous effort to restrict and dismantle Kurdish revolutionary movement in Iraq. It the Kurdish opposition parties in Iran. Iran was able to achieve security in the mountainous believes that the actions of these Kurdish groups border regions with Iraqi Kurdistan by trading create insecurity in the border regions with Iraqi Iranian support for the Kurds against the Iraqi Kurdistan and therefore Iran has no option but to state for Iraqi Kurdish support for Iran against station troops at the border regions on their side the Kurdish movement in Iran. of the border. And by consequence to ensure the In 1979 the Islamic Revolution of Iran under security of Iran, the Iranians must seek policies the leadership of Imam Khomeini swept away that force the Iraqi Kurds to secure the shared the old guard and ushered in a new Islamic border from their side. These policies usually political reality in Iran. During the turmoil of the take the form of influence and interference in the revolution, the Kurdish parties in Iran clashed military affairs of the Iraqi Kurds. (40) with government forces and were able to take Since the leadership of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi control of numerous Kurdish towns and cities. In Iran has continued to follow a policy of support an attempt to regain control of the country Imam for the Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against the Khomeini issued a statement describing the Iraqi State. The Iranians offer this support on the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran as the party of condition that the Iraqi Kurds assist them in their the devil and issued a religious decree outlawing efforts to weaken and dismantle the Kurdish the party. (44) Hence, the new Islamic Republic parties and Kurdish movement as a whole in Iran. of Iran quickly came to grips with the threat The agreement between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds posed to it by its Kurdish population and like the has proved fruitful to some extent for both sides. regime before it offered the Iraqi Kurds Iranian A document held by the Iranian SAVAK agency support in their struggle against the Iraqi state on dated 24th August 1963 explains that while giving the condition of Iraqi Kurdish assistance with s Kurdish problem. (45) Iran hoped that׳a press conference in Germany Jalal Talabani Iran communicated that the Kurdish leadership in Iraq with Iraqi Kurdish support it could silence the believe that the Kurds of Iran should not conduct Kurdish-Iranian nationalist groups in Iran. (46) any political activities against the Iranian State. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq agreed (41) Moreover, in 1966 the leader of the Kurdish to this condition quickly, and an agreement in movement in Iraqi Kurdistan the late Mullah this regard signed between Massoud Barzani Mustafa Barzani warned the Iranian Kurds that and Mustafa Chamran in 1979 established that any activity they conduct against the Iranian the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq would state would be considered treasonous against the support the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Kurdish revolution as a whole. (42) militarily against the Iranian Kurdish Nationalist. (47) The other dominant Iraqi Kurdish political
11 party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, chose to What is more, Iran continuously engaged in refrain from engaging militarily with the Iranian cross-border operations to dismantle resources of Kurds and decided not to accept the agreement the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. On one proposed by the Iranians. (48) This issue occasion in July 1996, the Iranian Revolutionary remained a sticking point between Iran and the Guard attempted to capture the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan until the geopolitics Kurdish movement in Iran by attacking their of the region changed once again with the 1991 bases and infrastructure in Koya. (54) They Iraqi Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi state. (49) also forced the Iraqi Kurdish parties to stop The Kurdish uprising of 1991 resulted in radio broadcasts that were being transmitted by the establishment of the Kurdish Regional the Kurdish parties of Iran from Iraqi Kurdish Government and posed a new threat to the territory. Iranians. Iran feared that with the establishment In March 2015, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish quasi-state the Iranian Kurdish parties of Iran announced that they planned to restart would now have access to unregulated territory their operations against the Iranian state. (55) outside of Iran to plan operations against them. Iran responded harshly with General Salam, the Iran, therefore, considered this new reality as one deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary of the most prominent threats facing the borders Guard, issuing a warning to the Kurdish Regional of the Iranian state. (50) Government. The General statement read; An Iranian delegation visited Iraqi Kurdistan «We warn the proxy governments of the region in 1993 to remedy the Kurdish threat. On their and the political leadership in northern Iraq that visit, the Iranians received pledges from Iraqi they need to keep the pledges they have made to Kurdish leaders that they would not allow the the Iranian state. We will not hesitate to destroy Iranian Kurds space within their territory to plan any region that poses a threat to the national and carry out operations against Iran. However, security of our country.» (56) feeling that this was not enough of a guarantee, The Kurdish Regional government responded the Iranians established numerous official with a statement the following day. The representation offices with the aim of using them Kurdish Regional Government condemned the as external resources to combat any activity that announcement by General Salam and described the Iranian Kurdish parties conduct within Iraqi the threats as unhelpful to bilateral relations. (57) Kurdistan. (51) A more pressing concern for the Iranians when it The Kurdish civil war that erupted between the comes to the Kurdish movement in Iran is that they two main Iraqi Kurdish parties the Kurdistan believe the United States and Israel are using it Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of as a tool to destabilise Iran. Moreover, they argue Kurdistan was another challenge for the Iranians. that the United States and Israel are funding and The civil war caused instability in Iraqi Kurdistan equipping the Iranian Kurds in this regard. (58) and by consequence allowed space for the Iranian Hence, the chairman of the Supreme National Kurds to carry out their activities. The Kurdish Security Council of Iran, Ali Shamkhani, made civil war alarmed the Iranians so much so that a statement regarding the planned 2017 Kurdish they were forced to increase their pressure on independence referendum. In the announcement, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to stand against he referred to the current military and security the Kurdish groups of Iran whom the Iranians agreements between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran and considered counter-revolutionaries. In meetings threatened that Iran was ready to pull out of all with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in August deals. He said; 1994, the Iranians warned the Kurds that; «The breaking away of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq «If Iranian Kurdish security is compromised as would spell the end of all agreements between a result of actions by enemies of the Iranian state us. Moreover, to protect its shared border within Iraqi Kurdish territory then the security [with Iraqi Kurdistan] from the activities of of Iraqi Kurdistan will also be compromised counter-revolutionary [Iranian Kurdish] forces by actions of enemies of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iran would be prepared to review its relations Iranian Kurdish territory.» (53) with the Iraqi Kurds and change the nature its
12 engagement.» (59) the United States and Iran further soured after Therefore, there is an argument to suggest that some pro-Khomeini Iranian students stormed Iran has used the presence of Iranian Kurdish the United States embassy in Tehran on the 4th groups in Iraqi Kurdistan as a pretence to increase November 1979 and held United States officials its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Furthermore, hostage. (66) the Iranian government has expressed openly Following the Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan that had the state in 1991, the Kurds worked to build and Iranian Kurds not used Iraqi Kurdish territory restructure their relations with foreign nations. s desperation for relations with׳Iran would not have felt the need to interfere in Iraqi Kurdistan internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. The Iranians have foreign states opened the door for foreign countries also expressed that Iran has no problem with to enter Iraqi Kurdistan and consequently made the political system in place in northern Iraq Iraqi Kurdistan another geopolitical space (whatever the Kurds choose). They argue that where international rivalries were played out. s open door׳their sole issue is that Iranian Kurds also use the From the onset, Iraqi Kurdistan territory in their conflict against the Iranian state policy to foreigners made Iran feel uneasy and (60). threatened, and by consequence, Iran worked harder to increase its presence and influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. (67) 2.4 - Relations between the Kurdistan As the Iraqi Kurds developed their international Region and states that present a relations with the likes of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, threat to the Islamic Republic of United States, and Israel Iran felt increasingly Iran. threatened as it views these states and its most notable foreign competitors. To remedy the Since its beginnings, the Kurdish nationalist threat, Iran worked to increase its influence in movement in Iraqi Kurdistan has sought relations Iraqi Kurdistan and interfered in internal Iraqi with foreign states. The Iranian government of Kurdish political process to pressure the Kurdish Mohammad Reza Pahlavi held excellent links government away from these relations and as with the Iraqi Kurdish movement until the a result, reduced the threat that these relations signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975. The presented to Iran. In more recent years Iran Iranians in this period also enjoyed positive views the developing economic and political relations with the United States and Israel ties between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan and the making it even acceptable for the Iraqi Kurds to increased influence that the Turkish government develop relationships with these two states. In has over the Iraqi Kurdistan as a cause for fact, the connections were so productive that on concern for its political and economic interests. occasion the Kurds received support from the (68) This anxiety became more apparent after United States and Israeli via the then Iranian the Iraqi Kurds joined the oil economy 2013 government. (61) In 1972 it was the Shah of Iran via the construction of an oil pipeline from that gave the leader of the Kurdish movement Iraqi Kurdistan through Turkey to the Ceyhan Mullah Mustafa Barzani the news that the United port. These developments evidenced how close States had pledged its support and assistance relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey had to the Iraqi Kurds (62) which resulted in a 16 become. For the Turks relations with the Iraqi million dollar aid package to the Iraqi Kurdish Kurds played well. On the one hand, it worked leaders. (63) to decrease Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan Following the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 and on the other it worked to reduce the political numerous SAVAK agency documents fell into activity of the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey. the hands of the new Iranian government and at The Iranians saw the Kurdistan Democratic the same time, the Iranian ceased their relations Party of Iraq as the party that had allowed with the United States and Israel and identified Turkish influence to grow in Iraqi Kurdistan and both nations as the most prominent enemies of therefore as a countermeasure worked with the Iran and the world. (64) The relations between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the central Iraqi
13 s economic interests the Kurdish Region as a formal autonomous׳government to forward Iran in the country and by consequence its influence Iraqi region in the Iraqi constitution. (75) as a whole in the country. (69) Iran believes the United States is interested in Saudi Arabia also presented a challenge for the Iraqi Kurdistan for numerous reasons; first, the Iranian government as it had perpetually tried to United States wants to counter the dominance a community in Iraq. Second, the is׳take advantage of the presence of Islamic groups of the Shi in Iraqi Kurdistan to build its relations with the the existence of a connection between the Kurds s and Israel. Third, the United States intends to׳Iraqi Kurds. (70) Saudi Arabia is one of Iran leading rivals in the Middle East and therefore weaken the government in Baghdad by using meant Iran had to direct its foreign policy at the Iraqi Kurds as a tool. Fourth, to support countering these attempts at influence by Saudi the Iranian Kurds in their opposition to Tehran. Arabia. Hence, Iran has worked tirelessly to Fifth, the United States wants to use Iraqi strengthen its relations with the religious parties, Kurdish territory as a military and intelligence groups and individuals in Iraqi Kurdistan. To this base against Iran. And sixth, because the United s׳end, Iran intentionally invites notable Islamic States has economic interests in Iraqi Kurdistan movements and Islamic individuals within Iraqi oil market. (76) i congress to its annual For these reasons, Iran views the presence of the׳Kurdistan, like the Shafi International Islamic Unity Conference (71) United States in Iraqi Kurdistan as a direct and Since 1991 the United States has proved to be severe threat to Iran. Compounding this fear is a staunch ally of the Iraqi Kurds and has played the fact that the United States also has military a significant role in its political, economic and bases in Afghanistan meaning Iran feels that social development. (72) United States influence the United States has intentionally worked to is so strong in Iraqi Kurdistan that during the surround Iran militarily. (77) To oppose the threat 1990s the United from the United States, Iran works to increase its׳ Kurdish civil war of the States was able to prevent both Iraqi Kurdish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and uses its pressure parties from accepting Iranian mediation to cards to interfere in the internal affairs of the stop the violence by threatening to withdraw its Kurdish Region reducing the United States based support for the fledgeling region. 73( ) To avoid threat to them. Iranian influence in the Kurdish civil war, the Another concern for Iran is the Israeli interest in s׳United States invited both Kurdish leaders to Iraqi Kurdistan. For Iran, the source of Israel Washington in September 1998 and mediated interest in Iraqi Kurdistan is because the central between them. By the end of the visit, peace Iraqi government presents a significant obstacle was restored with both sides agreeing to the to Israel in its foreign policy objectives for the Washington Agreement. (74) Iran views this Middle East. Hence, Israel works to strengthen increase in United States influence in Iraqi its position amongst the Iraqi Kurds and aims to Kurdistan as a significant concern and threat. In separate Iraqi Kurdistan from the rest of the Iraqi particular, the fact that the United States worked state so that Israel can use Iraqi Kurdistan as a s concern when it׳to prevent Iranian influence in the civil war at a foreign policy base. (78) Iran time when Iran has on many occasions played comes to Israel is that it fears that Israel intends the role of mediator between Kurdish factions to set up stations in countries and regions that s moves on׳and parties made the Iranians extremely uneasy. border Iran. For the Iranians, Israel Kurdish relations with the United States has Iraqi Kurdistan fall in line with this Israeli foreign continued to expand. In 2003 the Iraqi Kurds policy objective. (79) In fact, Iran understands proved to be a significant ally in the campaign to that Israel wants to open military bases in the athist Regime. In turn, Kurdish mountains to sow the seeds of division׳topple the former Iraqi Ba the United States has been a vital ally for the between the different Iranian communities, to s nuclear program, and to use them׳Iraqi Kurds in their quest for the establishment of spy on Iran federalism in the post-Saddam Iraqi state. With to launch military operations into Iran against United States support the Iraqi Kurds were able its nuclear program whenever an opportunity to force the Iraqi government to formally accept presents itself. (80)
14 Therefore, to protects its security from foreign Kurds Mullah Mustafa Barzani decided to leave threats Iran is in a continuous race against other the Iraqi capital and headed back to the Kurdish actors to better its relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. mountains of northern Iraq. (81) For the Iranians, Realpolitik obliges Iran to strengthen its status this breakdown of relations between Baghdad and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan so that it can and Erbil served as an opportunity to meddle continue to have some semblance of control over in the affairs of Iraq and Kurdistan. Iran seized the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan and by the opportunity by using its SAVAK agency to consequence keep its border with the Iraqi Kurds make contact with the notable figures in the Iraqi protected from foreign influence. Kurdish leadership. (82) This new Iranian connection and the souring of relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Part 3 - Internal politics and the government forced the Kurdistan Democratic political space for Iranian influence Party (the only Kurdish party at the time) to move and interference in the Kurdistan its political activities from Baghdad to Tehran. Region of Iraq Iran for its part used the opportunity to build further relations with Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the Iraqi Kurds by allowing the opening 3.1 - The foundational condition of Kurdistan Democratic Party representation offices in Iran in 1964 and officially recognised Iraqi Kurdistan and the political Shamsadin Mufti as the formal representative of space available to the Kurdistan Mullah Mustafa in Iran. (83) In the same year, s political parties. the then leader of the SAVAK agency Hassan׳Region Pakravan with the assistance of Isa Pijman visit Haji Omaran to meet with Mullah Mustafa. (84) The conditions in which the Iraqi Kurdistan The Iranian relationship with the Iraqi Kurds established itself and the political space in which culminated with Iran opening direct offices the Iraqi Kurdish political parties function has and relations with the Kurdish revolutionary been rife with opportunities for the Iranians to movement in Iraqi Kurdistan with the intention interfere in its internal politics and by consequence of offering assistance to the Kurds. These initial widened Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. relations between the two sides come to an end Following the Kurdish uprising of 1991 and with the signing of the Algiers Agreement in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional 1975 between Iran and Iraq and the subsequent Government Iran maintained its interest in the collapse of the Kurdish revolutionary movement region and played a direct role in shaping the in Iraq. issues and politics that the Kurdistan Regional In the prelude to the Iranian revolution when government was involved. This Iranian hand in protests against the Iranian monarchy gained the affairs of the Kurdish Regional government pace, in October 1978, the acting leader of the is identifiable with a historical account of Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, Qiada Moqda, Kurdistan. s support for the׳announced the Kurdish Party The collapse of the Iraqi monarchy and the Iranian revolutionaries and, in this regard, sent a establishment of the Republic of Iraq in 1958 under delegation to Paris to meet with Imam Khomeini. the leadership of Abdulkarim Qasim was the first Following the success of the Islamic Revolution time that Kurdish rights in Iraq were officially in Iran, the Kurdistan Democratic Party sent a recognised and relations between the Iraqi second delegation led by Idrees Barzani to meet government and Iraqi Kurdistan was normalised. once again with Imam Khomeini in the Iranian However, the friendly relations between the two town of Qom. The fact that the commission sides was short-lived. Relations between the two was welcomed by Imam Khomeini personally soured as the political space available to the Iraqi signalled that the party was free to continue their Kurds was gradually decreased. The situation activities within Iran. (85) As a result, the interim became so severe that the leader of the Iraqi leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party
15 met on the 10th November 1979 at the Zewe The military alliance between the Patriotic Union camp near the city of Urmia to hold their party of Kurdistan and the Iranian state worked to re- conference. At the Conference Massoud Barzani warm relations between the two sides and once was selected as the party leader. (86) again allow the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the use Iranian territory to achieve their objectives Kurdistan Democratic Party worked with the against the Iraqi state. Moreover, relationships Iranians to create allied forces to fight against between the two parties developed to such point the Iraqi state from Iraqi Kurdish territory. (87) that the Iranians allowed the Patriotic Union of From its establishment, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to open official representation offices Kurdistan maintained an antagonistic stance in Tehran, Kirmashan, Sardasht, and Razaya. towards Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and thus at (95) the onset of civil hostilities in Iran the leader of Furthermore, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani prompted the Iranians to work to establish an made contact with the leadership of the Iranian Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. To that revolutionaries and expressed his parties support end, Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri met with for their Islamic revolution. (88) As the Islamic Hussain Maronsi in a refugee camp in Karaj and revolution of Iran progressed and hostilities asked that he work with notable religious figures spread across the country, the Patriotic Union of of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to establish an Kurdistan took the opportunity to; first transfer Islamic Party in the region and as a result, he the majority of its bases and activities from Syria founded the Islamic Army of Kurdistan. (96) Also, to Iran. Second, use Iranian territory and the at the close of 1983 Sheikh Mohammed Barzinji revolutionary disorder of Iran to shift its military a notable religious figure in Iraqi Kurdistan was commanders back into Iraq (89). And third, to displaced to Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan as a result move its official politburo headquarters to the of Iraqi state pressure. While in Iran he worked Iranian village of Nawzang. (90) with the Iranians to establish the ‹Army of the the military wing of the Movement for ,׳To assist the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan directly, Quran the Iranians summoned Jalal Talabani to Tehran Islamic Relations. (97) for talks lasting twenty-two days (- 1979/07/23 In 1987 the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja 1979/08/16). In his visit to Iran, the leader of the faced anti-government protests and civil Patriotic Union of Kurdistan met with numerous disorder. The subsequent brutal crackdown by Iranian leaders amongst them Imam Khomeini the Iraqi government forced the displacement and his deputy Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri. numerous notable religious individuals from In their meeting, the Iranians pledged to provide the country to Iran including Omer Abdulaziz, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan with all Osman Abdulaziz, Ali Abdulaziz, Amed Kaka necessary assistance for their struggle. (91) To Mohammed, Sheikh Sadiq Sargati and Said this end, Jalal Talabani placed Dr Fuad Massoum Ahmed Abdulwahab. The then Iranian Prime as his official ambassador in Tehran to relay of minister welcomed these religious refugees, correspondence between the two leaders. (92) and while they were in Iran, the men met in the Relations between Iran and the Patriotic Union Iranian town of Sinah at the home of Sheikh of Kurdistan hit a stumbling block with the Mohammed Barzinji. Ayatollah Khamenei outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. However, after attended the meeting and after much discussion the collapse of negotiations between Iraqi state decided to change the name of their party from to the ‹Islamic ׳and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1983 the ‹Movement for Islamic Relations The following day the .׳Party once again transferred its bases of activity Movement of Kurdistan to Iran. (93) What is more, the Patriotic Union of party used the Dar Al Hussain mosque in Sinah Kurdistan went on to work in military alliance to announce their new name. (98) with Iran against the Iraqi state. The most notable Hence, an observation into the history of allied operation between the two sides was their prominent political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan joint attack on the oil wells of Kirkuk in October immediately reveals that all the parties have 94( .1986) maintained strong connections with the Islamic
16 Republic of Iran and have worked continuously followers were subsequently pushed out of Iraqi to strengthen these ties. These relationships Kurdistan and forced to retreat to Iran. Mullah make clear that each of the Iraqi Kurdish Mustafa immediately asked the Iranians not to political forces outlined above has contributed accept the men as per their bilateral agreement. to the increasing influence Iran enjoys in Iraqi The Iranians responded by satisfying both sides. Kurdistan, and for Iran, the Kurdish parties and On the one hand, they assisted Mullah Mustafa their internal struggles and requirements have (102) and on the other to show that the Iranians given the Iranians sufficient space to interfere in were friends of the Kurds they welcomed s wing (103) disarmed them׳the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan. Ibrahim Ahmed and relocated them to a factory near Hamadan province. (104) 3.2 - The political differences of The divisions within the Iraqi Kurdish leadership s political parties opened the door for Iran to strengthen its׳Kurdistan Region etat of Abdul Salam Arif influence among the different wings of the׳Following the coup d and the collapse of the government of Abdul Kurdistan Democratic Party and by consequence Karim Qasim in 1963, Mulla Mustafa Barzani within the Kurdish movement and the Iraqi unilaterally signed an agreement with Abdul Kurdish territory as a whole. To this end, the Salam Arif in February 1964 and sparked Iranian leadership summoned Ibrahim Ahmed to disagreement within the Kurdistan Democratic Tehran for meetings with the Iranian leadership Party. (99) Some of the dissatisfied members of and in these meetings promised him full Iranian the Kurdistan Democratic Party such as Ibrahim backing. (105) Moreover, Iran unhappy with s agreement with Abdul Salam׳Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, Nawzad Ahmed and Omer Mullah Mustafa Mustafa openly expressed their dissatisfaction Arif sent a correspondence outlining their feelings and announced that they would not abide by the about the deal to the Iraqi Kurdish leader. (106) It agreement and that they would instead continue was these Iranian actions that Jalal Talabani later to seek military ends until they achieved self- blamed for causing division and disagreement government for Kurdistan. This significant among the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. (107) difference between the different wings of the The next significant development in Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party increased tensions Kurdish politics came with the establishment within the Kurdistan Democratic Party. (100) of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1976. The tensions within the Kurdistan Democratic Naturally, the two Kurdish parties became rivals, Party reached a crisis point in April 1964. and this rivalry became a pretext for both the s wing of the party held the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic׳Ibrahim Ahmed Sixth Kurdistan Democratic Party conference in Union of Kurdistan to seek deeper alliances the town of Mawat on the 9th April 1964 with with Iran. By consequence, both parties became the meeting deciding to unseat Mullah Mustafa the driving force behind Irans continuously Barzani as the head of the party. In response, increasing influence in internal Iraqi Kurdish s wing of the party held affairs. (108) Furthermore, following the success׳Mullah Mustafa Barzani the Sixth Kurdistan Democratic Party Congress of the Islamic revolution in Iran the new Iranian on the 9th June 1964 in the town of Kaladze. The regime also views the Kurdish political rivalry as occasion was used by Mullah Mustafa Barzani an opportunity to increase its sphere of influence to fortify his position by using the members of and therefore immediately worked to attract s foreign׳party congress to pass a decision to expel Ibrahim the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Iran s wing from the party. (101) policy towards the Iraqi Kurds continued in this׳Ahmed Following this, on the 13th July 1964, Mullah manner, and during the second half of the Iran- Mustafa Barzani sent military forces to his party Iraq war, Iran successfully lured the Patriotic headquarters in Isawe in the Mawat Region of Union of Kurdistan. Following this, the Iranians s wing strengthened their ties with both Kurdish parties׳Iraqi Kurdistan to oust Ibrahim Ahmed from Iraqi Kurdistan. Ibrahim Ahmed and his by establishing the Joint Operation Ramadan command centres, which placed the Kurdish
17 s political and military political figures. (118) The visit came after the׳parties directly under Iran influence. (109) To stabilise its newfound control collapse of talks in Tehran between the two the Iranians invited delegations from both parties Kurdish parties conducted with the mediation to Tehran. The delegations led by Jalal Talabani of the United States. According to Nawshirwan and Idrees Barzani met on 8th November 1986 Mustafa, the next attempt at conciliation by Iran with Iranian officials and with Iranian assistance was «to send the message to the United States reached a bilateral peace agreement. (110) that Iran could achieve what the Americans s influence over the Iraqi׳t and that Iran׳Iran increased its support to the Kurds following couldn the establishment of the Kurdistan Front in May Kurdish leaders was higher than the Americans.» 111( 1987) and also played a significant role To this end, Iran was able to instigate secondary in the organisation and execution of the Iraqi talks between the two Kurdish parties in October Kurdish uprising of 1991, the planning of which 1995 and achieve an agreement by the end. (119) s influence over the Iraqi Kurds was such׳was carried out on Iranian soil. Moreover, Iranian Iran military officials from the headquarters of the that following the agreement between the Ramadan Operation played an immense role in Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic the logistical planning of the uprising. (112) Union of Kurdistan; it was also able to mediate Following the success of the Iraq Kurdish an agreement between the Patriotic Union uprising, the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish elections of Kurdistan and the Islamic Movement of left the Iranians feeling aggrieved and went as Kurdistan in 1997 and between the Kurdistan far as to threaten revenge. (113) However, the Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Socialist Iranians continued to understand the geopolitical Party. What is more, Iran was also able to oversee importance of Iraqi Kurdistan and in wanting the signing of a memorandum of understanding to maintain its influence used the Kurdish civil between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the war as another opportunity to interfere in and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. influence Iraqi Kurdish affairs. In this regard, (120) It is for this reason that the sidelining Iran became one of the first international states of Iran in the final agreement that ended the to attempt to mediate this Iraqi Kurdish crisis by Kurdish civil war between the Kurdish parties demonstrating its readiness to host both leaders that was signed in Washington became a cause Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani. (114) For for Iranian concern. The Iranians viewed the Iran acting as a mediator between the two Kurdish United States intervention as a direct threat to parties allowed it further space to expand its Iranian hegemony in Iraqi Kurdistan and by influence and ability to interfere in Iraqi Kurdish consequence a threat to Iranian national security. (s general involvement in the Kurdish (121׳affairs. Iran s ability to influence׳civil war meant that it was an influential player Hence, it is clear that Iran in the internal Kurdish conflicts when it chose to and interfere in the affairs of Iraqi Kurdish take sides. (115) For example in the early clashes matters connects to the political rivalries between between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the internal Kurdish factions. The splintering of s ability to׳the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, the Iranians the Kurdish polity maximised Iran famously sided with the Islamic Movement of interfere in the affairs not only of the individual Kurdistan. Moreover, in the civil war between political parties but ultimately the Kurdistan the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Regional Government. Union of Kurdistan, the Iranians were a decisive force in establishing the location of the final border between the two sides. (116) 3.3 - The economy of the Kurdistan s aim was also Region׳In its attempts at mediation, Iran to raise its status amongst the residents of Iraqi The Kurdish market is highly dependent Kurdistan. (117) In 1994, an Iranian delegation on imported goods because its economy is from the headquarters of Operation Ramadan neither self-sufficient, independent, or stable. visited the Iraqi Kurdistan to hold meetings with Furthermore, the region is landlocked and has no Jalal Talabani and other significant Iraqi Kurdish
18 independent access to the sea; instead, it shares 3.4 - The will and advantages for both land borders with Iran. Turkey and Syria. For sides to conduct bilateral relations. this reason, Iraqi Kurdistan has established deep economic connections with its neighbouring The relationship between the Kurdistan states, in which those nearby states flood Iraqi Freedom Movement in northern Iraq and Kurdish markets with their products. Iranian interference in the Kurdistan Region For the Iranians, the -513kilometre border with was not merely as a result of Iranian pressure. Iraqi Kurdistan presents a two-fold economic On occasions, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership advantage. Firstly, it allows Iran to take also desired Iranian interference because the .s landlocked nature intervention offered advantages to both sides׳advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan to export its products to the Iraqi Kurdish market Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi consistently tried to use the Iraqi Kurds to his advantage and secondly, it can take advantage of Iraqi when Iran applied pressure on the government s geopolitical location as a stepping׳Kurdistan in Iraq. The Kurds sought friendly and reliable stone to other foreign markets. (122) To support relations with Iran so that they could get their this cross-border economic relationship Iran and message to the outside world via Mohammad Iraqi Kurdistan enjoy crossing points at Parwez Reza Shah Pahlavi and also use the Iranian state Khan, Basmakh, and Haji Omaran. Hence, as a bridge to gain access to its economic and Iraqi Kurdistan is a crucial commercial outpost military requirements. As mentioned in previous for Iran and therefore is wary of any attempt by sections the Iraqi Kurds were successful in this s number one economic competitor in regard as they did, in fact, receive the finances׳Turkey, it Iraqi Kurdistan, to encroach on its export market and weapons they required from outside powers in the region. (123) Iraqi Kurdistan has also like the United States and Israel via their Iranian worked hard to build this financial relationship neighbours. (126) with Iran, a relationship which the Kurds also Moreover, after the 1975 Algiers Agreement benefit significantly. This economic relationship and the subsequent Islamic Revolution in Iran between the two sides was as present during the the two rival Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Iraqi Kurdish civil war as it is today. (124) Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic For these reasons, Iran is in a continuous struggle Union of Kurdistan competed with each other to also increase its economic influence in Iraqi to make contact and build relationships with the Kurdistan. Moreover, this financial relationship leadership of the revolution. (127) Hence, both that has developed between the two sides has parties subsequently made contact with the leader proved to be an excellent pressure card for the of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, and s support for his rebellion. As׳Iranians against the Iraqi Kurds. declared their party (125) Anytime Iran becomes unhappy with the the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had not enjoyed political direction within Iraqi Kurdistan it closes friendly relations with Mohammad Reza Shah s government, it became the first Iraqi׳Pahlavi its border crossings putting pressure on Kurdish Kurdish political party to contemplate ties with markets. This Iranian policy was evident after the Iranian revolutionaries. In this regard, the the Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017. leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Once the poll was carried out on 25th September Talabani, sent correspondence to both Ayatollah 2017 against the wishes of the Iranians, Iran Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari and Ayatollah closed its border crossings to force the Kurds to Hussein-Ali Montazeri and later sent a letter to nullify its results. Imam Khomeini. (128) s courting׳Therefore, the Iranians have established The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan themselves as a cornerstone of the Kurdish of Imam Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic economy and uses this position to enhance revolutionaries was also evident when Imam its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and uses Iraqi Khomeini was in exile in the French town of Kurdish dependence on the Iranian trade and Neauphle-le-Château. While Imam Khomeini infrastructure to interfere in its political process. was in France the leadership of the Patriotic
19 Union of Kurdistan sent a delegation consisting the Iranians to collapse the Iraqi government. of Dr Fuad Mahsoum, Adil Murad, and Ahmed (133) Bamarani to meet with him. In the meetings, the The 1991 Iraqi Kurdish paradigm shift to self- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan expressed to him government and the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish s readiness to civil-war saw the Kurdish parties competing to׳the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan assist him and his revolution in any way that build relations with foreign states to strengthen they can. They also offered their assistance to their internal political positions. (134) In this get Imam Khomeini back into Iran via the Iraqi regard, the Kurdish parties of Iraqi Kurdistan Kurdish mountains. (129) In response to the worked to form alliances with the Iranians and offer made to him by the representatives of the by consequence brought Iranian influence into Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Imam Khomeini the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. During this period asked the delegation what they wanted in return? the Iranians concerned themselves with bringing To which the representatives of the Patriotic the Iraqi Kurdish hostilities to an end and in so Union of Kurdistan responded that the collapse doing courted the Iraqi Kurdish political parties. of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regime was as For example, when during that period a Patriotic vital to them as it was to the Islamic Revolution Union of Kurdistan delegation visited Iran the and therefore all that they wanted in return was Iranians greeted them by saying «Welcome to (s revolution to succeed. your own home». (135׳for Imam Khomeini (130) Good relations between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds The Kurdistan Democratic Party also attempted were mutually beneficial. The Iranians and the to make contact with Imam Khomeini. The Iraq Kurdish factions were in a constant effort leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to better their relationship to reap its benefits. Massoud Barzani paid a visit to Europe but was Hence, the overthrow of the Iraqi government in unable to meet with the Iranian Revolutionary 2003 and the creation of a new federal Iraq was on account of an assassination attempt on the a unique opportunity for both sides to improve Kurdish leader in Vienna by agents of the relations further. As a message of friendship to Iraqi government on 22nd January 131( .1979) the Iraqi Kurds, the Iranians became the first Once the Iranian Revolution was complete, the foreign state to open a consulate in the capital Kurdish parties reiterated their full support to the city of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. (136) Islamic Republic of Iran by sending delegations Therefore, it is clear that both the Iranians to Iran and sending letters of congratulations to and the Iraqi Kurds willed the development of the Iranian revolutionaries and the people of Iran. robust bilateral relations. This mutual desire has (132) played well into the Iranian policy of building The bilateral relationship further developed its influence in and ability to interfere in Iraqi during the Iran-Iraq war. During the conflict, Kurdish affairs. the Kurdistan Freedom movement and the Iranian government worked together against the Iraqi government with each side assisting the 3.5 - Nationalism and the development other with the aim of reaching their respective of the idea of independence in the personal goals and objectives. The Iranians used Kurdistan Region. the relationship firstly, to suppress the ambitions Throughout modern history, the Kurds have of the Iranian Kurds. Secondly, to apply pressure worked for the establishment of self-rule for on the Iraqi government. Thirdly, to create a themselves. These Kurdish efforts have played second front in the Iran-Iraq war in the north out in many ways but most notably via revolution of Iraq to keep the Iraqi Army occupied while and conflict. After the First World War in 1918 it attacked the south of the country, And lastly, and the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the Kurds to collapse the Iraqi government and replace it s promise to׳awaited the fulfilment of the treaty with an Islamic government. The Kurds, on the establish an independent Greater Kurdish state. other hand, used the relationship to move their However, when all was said and done the hope ambitions for self-rule forward by working with
20 was not met. Instead, the promised Kurdish land traditional strategy towards Kurdistan that became divided between Turkey, Iran, Syria, and we will not hold back. It is essential for us to Iraq. be active there and whenever our bilateral As a result, the Kurds of the Middle East, relations head towards the establishment of an troubled by the reality that befell them at the independent Kurdish state, which is the dream of close of First World War developed a nationalist every Kurd, then we will distance ourselves from doctrine with the objective of establishing an this outcome.» (142) From this, it is clear that the independent Kurdish state. After the success Iranians have from the onset tried to minimise s Iraqi coup with the the impact of Iraqi Kurdish success in gaining׳of Abd al-Karim Qasim support of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (the self-rule on its indigenous Kurdish population. In sole Kurdish party at the time), the Kurdish confronting and preventing threatening Kurdish party decided at its fifth congress to retain its advances towards independence, the Iranians position to seek Iraqi Kurdish self-government. have held meetings with the Turks on numerous The Iraqi Kurdish refusal to depart from this occasions. (143) position became the precursor for the collapse of It is important also to mention that the Kurdish s Kurds and the new Iraqi question in Iraqi Kurdistan is one of the most׳relations between Iraq government culminating in an armed conflict in critical foreign policy issues for Iran, Turkey 1961 between the two sides. (137) The Iranians and Syria. (144) To insulate themselves from were also against the Iraqi Kurdish position for the threat posed by the establishment of the Iraqi self-rule as they feared the territorial integrity of Kurdistan Region the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran if the Iranian Kurds pursued the same policy Iran and Turkey held meetings every six months 1990s to confront the threat posed to them׳ objective. (138) in the Kurdish nationalism and their notion of self-rule by the establishment of the Kurdistan Region of entered a new phase following the 1991 Iraqi Iraq. Between 1992 and 1994 these parties met on Kurdish uprising, the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish five occasions and agreed to support the unity of elections of May 1992 and the establishment Iraq and oppose the establishment of federalism of the Kurdish National Assembly, which in that country. Regarding Kurdistan, the three voted for the establishment of federalism for sides decided that they would resist the Kurdish Iraqi Kurdistan in October 139( .1992) These nation-building process, fight any attempt at developments troubled Iran further with the then redrawing the map of the Middle East in favour of Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the Kurds and stand against the use of the Kurds announcing that Iran could not ignore the Iraqi as a pressure card against established regional Kurdish elections if it results in the collapse of states. (145) Moreover, Iran is of the view that the Iraqi state. (140) the establishment of a Kurdistan as a country in s expansionist foreign׳Iran made its feelings clear on the issue during the region is part of Israel its efforts to mediate in the Iraqi Kurdish civil policy and by consequence believes that any war. The Iranian representative made clear future Kurdish state would be in alliance with that its refusal to help the Patriotic Union of Israel threatening Iranian interests. (146) Kurdistan was because the Patriotic Union of In reality, across the region, 25 million Kurds Kurdistan was assisting Iranian Kurdish parties look to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a that were opposed to Iran and also proposing symbol and sole example of a recognised the establishment of an independent Greater Kurdish political order. (147) This reality is the s continuing efforts to gain׳Kurdistan that threatened the territorial integrity reason behind Iran of Iran. Moreover, the Iranians were aggrieved influence in this region. It is important to note, that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan hanged as mentioned previously, that Iran has in the past maps of Greater Kurdistan within their offices given the thumbs up to Kurdish self-rule in Iraq. and headquarters which the Iranians also viewed However, it has always maintained that the Iraqi as a direct threat. (141) Kurds must achieve this in the confines of the What is more, Sardar Masjidi said in regards Iraqi state. If Kurdish ambitions work to break to Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan that «We have a Iraq up, then Iran has warned that it will not be
21 s Iraq dossier, also׳happy and will not remain silent on the issue. who is in charge of Iran (148) warned strongly against the carrying out of the On the subject of the Iraq war of 2003, it referendum explaining that it would have adverse remains evident that Iran was always against effects on the political and security relationship the invasion and overthrow of the former Iraqi of the Iraqi Kurds and Iran. (152) regime, yet Iran has taken advantage of the Following the Iraqi Kurdish independence invasion turning it into a golden opportunity for referendum, the Iranian government responded themselves. Since the attack, Iran has spread indirectly. Many of the Iraqi Kurdish political its influence across Iraq and worked to change parties explain that their loss of control over the the nature of Iraq from a threatening enemy to a disputed territories on 16th October 2017 was as close ally and friend. (149) It is important also to a result of Iranian backed Iraqi military action note that Iran was the first international state to spurred by the execution of the referendum. accept the new geopolitical reality and officially Hence, the Iranians have worked at every recognise the new governing council in Iraq juncture to prevent increased Kurdish self-rule. following the overthrow of the old regime and The Iranians have met every Iraqi Kurdish step to send a delegation to meet with that new Iraqi towards autonomy and independence with an government. (150) element of resistance. Where it has not made The last two decades of Iraqi history has been a direct intervention, it has worked to increase s its influence in the Iraqi Kurdish establishment׳geopolitically turbulent, not least for Iraq neighbouring states. Over this time Iran has to stop further strides forward in a direction not anchored its Iraq policy on the preservation of favoured by Iran. s unity and territorial integrity. That is why׳Iraq the last two decades have seen Iranian policy favour the strengthening of the Iraqi governing Conclusion infrastructure against the consolidation of 1) Iran has maintained the view that the Iraqi Kurdish decentralised control. Whenever Iraqi Kurds are a part of the Iranian people and that s politics is in support of the Iranian Iraqi Kurdish territory is historical geography׳Kurdistan policy bilateral relations between the two are separated from Iran in previous years. Therefore, improved, but whenever the Kurds seek political Iran believes it must keep the Iraqi Kurds onside steps against the Iranian viewpoint, then they and that it must maximise its efforts to retain and are met with harmful political interference to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan influence the Iraqi Kurds to move back in line 2) Under the policy of exporting the Islamic with Iranian policy objectives. (151) Revolution, The Islamic Republic of Iran has This Iranian position was evident during the Iraqi employed every effort to maintain and increase Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017. its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan while at the same During the campaigning phase, Iran made its time preserving its status amongst the Iraqi s reasoning for this is the strategic׳position clear that it was against the referendum Kurds. Iran as it would cause the break up of the Iraqi state. and geopolitical importance of Iraqi Kurdistan. athist regime׳The commander of the Iranian Army, Mohammad 3) During the period of the Ba Bakri, on a visit to Turkey made clear publically of Iraq Iran worked hard to assist the Iraqi that the Iraqi Kurdish Independence Referendum Kurdistan Freedom Movement and by could not be accepted. What is more, the consequence had managed to build a high status ,s Supreme National Security for itself amongst the Iraqi Kurds. However׳Secretary of Iran athist regime of׳Council, Ali Shamkhani warned Iraqi Kurdish following the collapse of the Ba leaders that if the proposed referendum were Iraq in 2003 Iran has changed its position when carried out, then the Kurds would be isolating mediating issues between Baghdad and Erbil in themselves. Furthermore, he explained that Iran support of the government in Baghdad and has viewed any attempt at dividing the state of Iraq as worked continuously to achieve Iraqi Kurdish a colonial plan and Iran would, therefore, work compromise when settling these issues. To to preserve the unity of Iraq. Qasim Sulaiman, reach agreement on the part of the Iraqi Kurds
22 Iran has assisted Baghdad in all manners while interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan employing economic sanctions on the Iraqi efficiently. For the Iraqi Kurdish parties, a Kurdish government by closing border crossings positive relationship with the Iranian government with them. has meant strong Iranian backing and support for 4) The existence of Iranian Kurdish opposition their causes. groups in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has given 7) Rivalries and conflicts among the Iraqi Kurdish the Iranians ample reason to work to increase its political parties presented Iran with a unique influence and ability to interfere in Iraqi Kurdish opportunity to gain further influence in Iraqi affairs. Iran has always maintained that had the Kurdistan and interfere in the affairs of the Iraqi Iranian Kurds not used Iraqi Kurdish territory for Kurdish political parties and later the government their political activities against the Iranian state of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Moreover, to then Iran would most likely have no reason to achieve this influence, Iran presented itself as a interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan. mediator of the Iraqi Kurdish conflict. 5) The Islamic Republic of Iran is in constant 8) In the economic sphere, Iran has established competition with international and regional and entrenched itself well in the Iraqi Kurdish powers for increased influence and status within market. What is more, while it gains a financial Iraqi Kurdistan and as a result, works to improve advantage from this relationship it also uses s economic dependence on׳its ability to interfere and use its pressure cards Iraqi Kurdistan in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. The purpose of Iran to increase its influence in the Kurdistan s׳s efforts is to keep the Iraqi Kurds in line and Region further. Iran often uses Iraqi Kurdistan׳Iran to have the ability to confront any international economic reliance on Iran as a threat and pressure or regional threats to Iranian territory that may card against the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. On arise from the Iraqi Kurdish region. occasions, this avenue is also exploited by Iran 6) The political parties within Iraqi Kurdistan to interfere in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. were a significant cause when it came to allowing Iran to gain and strengthen its foothold in Iraqi 9) In its dealings with Iraqi Kurdistan Iran has Kurdistan. Looking at the history of each of followed a policy against Kurdish nationalism the prominent political parties within the Iraqi and Kurdish independence as these two doctrines Kurdistan Region it is clear to see that each present a threat to Iran and its territorial integrity. maintains strong ties with the Islamic Republic Hence, whenever the Iraqi Kurds have taken of Iran that they consciously work to strengthen steps closer to freedom and the realisation of these ties. With neither the Kurdish political Kurdish nationalistic goals Iran has stood firmly parties or the Iranian government desiring the against the developments. Furthermore, Iran relationship to sour it is clear that the Iraqi uses these developments as the reasoning behind Kurdish political parties are an essential pillar its attempts to interfere in internal Iraqi Kurdish for Iran in its efforts to increase its influence affairs. in Iraqi Kurdistan. For Iran, the desire of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties to maintain strong Arkan Ahmad Jaff obtained his MA relations with it presents a golden opportunity for in Iran and he is an expert on Iranian Iran to use the Iraqi Kurdish political parties to contemporary history
23 1984- 1988، بهرلیــن. References .1999 13- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: له كهنــاری دانوبــه وه بــۆ خــڕی ناوزهنــگ، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانی كوردســتانی 1- ئامانــج حســن احمــد؛ فــاروق محمــد محمــد امیــن: عێــراق 1975- 1978، بهرلیــن. 1997. پهیوه ندیهكانــی ئێــران و جواڵنــه وهی ڕزگاریخــوازی 14- هێــرش عهبدوڵــاڵ حه مه كهریــم: پهیوه ندییــه كــورد لــه باشــوری كوردســتان لــه ڕاپهڕینیئــازاری سیاســیهكانی ههرێمــی كوردســتان و دهوڵهتانــی دراوســێ، 1991دا، گؤڤــاری زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، پاشــكۆی گۆڤــاری ئێــران، توركیــا و ســوریا 1991- 2003، چاپــی یه كــهم، زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، كۆنفرانســی گه شــهپێدانی ڕاپهڕیــن و ئێــران- تــاران، 2013. خوێندنهوه یهكــی نــوێ بــۆ ڕههه ندهكانــی، ژمــاره 6، 2016. 15- صــاح الخرســان: التیــارات اسیاســیه فــی 2- ره فعــهت مــهال: ڕۆژه ته ماویــهكان، چاپــی یه كــهم، كردســتان العــراق قــراء فــی ملفــات الحــركات و االحــزاب چاپخانــهی كارۆ، ســلێمانی، 2008. الكردیــه فــی العــراق،1946- 2001، مؤسســه البــاغ، الطبعــه 3- ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: پهره ســهندنی شوناســی االولــی، بیــروت- لبنــان، 2001. نهتهوایهتــی كــورد و ئهگه رهكانــی دامهزراندنــی ده وڵهتــی 16- احمــد مســجد جامعــی: كردهــا ایرانــی تریــن ســه ربهخۆی كوردســتان، وهرگێڕانــی. دوكتــۆر یاســین قــوم هســتند: /https://www.mashreghnews.ir سه ردهشــتی، لهبه اڵوكراوهكانــی دهزگای ڕۆشــنبیری DA%/419636/news جهمــال عیرفــان، ســلێمانی، 2014. -17 اردشــیر پشــنگ، زهــرا زمــردی: بررســی تحــوالت 4- علــی تهتــهر نێروهیــی: بزاڤــی ڕزگاریخــوازی نهتــه وهی سیاســی عــراق در پرتــو سیاســت خارجــی ایــران، تركیــه و كــورد لــه كوردســتانی عێــراق لــه ســاڵهكانی جهنگــی ئێــران عربســتان، فصلنامه سیاســت خارجی. ســال 28، شــماره 3، و عێــراق 1980- 1988، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی حاجــی پاییــز 1393. وه رگیــراوه لــه: .http://www.noormags هاشــم، اربیــل، 2008. ir/view/ar/magazine/number/64828. 5- علــی تهتــهر نێروهیــی: سیاســهتی حكومهتــی عێــراق لــه 18- اركان حســن: مناســبات ایــران بــا كردهــای عــراق كوردســتان لــه ســایهی بهڵگه نامــه فه ڕمیهكانــدا، بهرگــی در جنــگ ایــران- عــراق 1980- 1988، پایاننامــه بــرای یه كهمــم، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی زانكــۆی دهــۆك. دریافــت درجــه كارشناســی ارشــد در رشــته تاریــخ گرایــش دهــۆك، 2010. انقــاب اســامی، اســتاد راهنمــا: دكتــر حجــت فــاح توتــكار، 6- فــاروق محمــد محمــد امیــن: سیاســهتی ئێــران بهرامبــهر دانشــگاه بیــن المللــی امــام خمینــی، دانشــكده علــوم انســانی، جواڵنــه وهی ڕزگاریخــوازی كــورد لــه باشــوری كوردســتان گــروه تاریــخ، بهمــن 1393. 1975- 1989، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی ڕێنــوێ، ســلێمانی، -19 اســناد النــه جاسوســی، كردســتان )1(، شــماره 31، 2014. دانشــجویان مســلمان پیــرو خــط امــام. 7- ماجیــد خلییــل فهتــاح؛ فــاروق موحهمــهد حهمهئهمیــن: 20- امیــر محمــد حاجــی یوســفی، احمــد ســلطانی نــژاد: په یوهنــدی ئیســرائیل و كــورد لــه شۆڕشــی ئهیلــول دا ســامان سیاســی در عــراق جدیــد، دفتــر مطالعــات سیاســی 1961- 1975، گؤڤــاری زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، ژمــاره 9، و بیــن المللــی، مركــز چــاپ و انتشــارات وزارت امــور كانونــی یه كهمــی 2016. خارجــه، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، پاییــز 1387. 8- محمــد شــاكهلی: لهبزوتنــهوه وه بــۆ حیزبــی 21- پتانســیل هــا و اینــده حضــور فرهنگــی ایــران در اقلیــم سۆسیالیســتی كوردســتان 1976- ، 1993 باڵوكــراوهی كردســتان عراق- گفتگو با محمد شــیرزاد، وابســته فرهنگی كۆمه ڵــهی ڕوناكبیــری و كۆمه اڵیهتــی كهركــوك، جمهوری اســامی ایران در اقلیم كردســتان عراق، //:http چاپخانــهی كارۆ، كهركــوك، 2011. A7%AA%D8%BE%D8%peace-ipsc.org/fa/%D9 9- نازنــاز محمــد عبدالقــادر: سیاســهتی ئێــران بهرامبــهر 22- حســین علیــی: رونــد جنــگ ایــران و عــراق، نشــر مــرز بزوتنــه وهی ڕزگاریخــوازی كــورد لــه كوردســتانی عێراقــدا و بــوم، چــاپ اریــن، چــاپ اول، جلــد اول، تهــران، 1391. 1961- 1975، چاپــی دووهم، چاپخانــهی ئــاراس، دهزگای 23- حمیــد احمــدی: قومیــت و قومگرایــی در ایــران، افســانه چــاپ و باڵوكردنــه وهی ئــاراس، ههولێــر، 2010. و واقعیــت، نشــر نــی، چــاپ نهــم، چــاپ غزال، تهــران، 1391. 10- نهوشــیروان مســتهفا: خــهون یــان مۆته كــه دیــوی 24- خواســتههای كنونــی و دور نویــن روابــط ایــران نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی عێــراق )-1992 2002( و اقلیــم كردســتان- گفتگــو بــا ناظــم دبــاغ نماینــده اقلیــم یاداشــتی ڕۆژانــهی شــهڕی ناوخــۆ، ناوهنــدی چــاپ و كردســتان عــراق در تهــران: مركــز بیــن المللــی صلــح، باڵوكردنــه وهی كتێبخانــهی جهمالــی عهلــی باپیــر. بــێ AE%D9%http://peace-ipsc.org/fa/%D8%88% ســاڵی چــاپ. 25- دیویــد مكــداول: تاریــخ معاصــر كــرد، ترجمــه. ابراهیــم 11- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: په نجــهكان یهكتــری یونســی، نشــر پانیــذ، چــاپ داالهــو، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، ئهشــكێنن، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی 1383. عێــراق 1979- 1983، بهرلیــن. 1997. 26- ســعید ساســانیان: ایــران و گروهــك هــای 12- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: خوالنــه وه لــه نــاو كــردی ضــد انقــاب؛ ضــرورت اعمــال فشــار بــر اقلیــم بازنــهدا، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی عێــراق كردســتان/ بخــش نخســت، .http://tabyincenter
24 html.948_5864_ac.ir/article ؛ /8C%DB%A7%D8%/22487/ir http://www.sid.ir. Fa/Journal/ViewPaper.aspx?id=254316 . 27- ســعید ساســانیان: ایــران و گروهــك هــای 40- محمــود كریمــی: سیاســت تركیــه در اقلیــم كردســتان كــردی ضدانقــاب؛ ضــرورت اعمــال فشــار بــر اقلیــم و اینــده سیاســی عــراق، مركــز بیــن المللــی مطالعــات صلــح، كردســتا/ بخــش دوم، .http://tabyincenter %8C%DB%A7%D8%/22528/ir %8C%DB%B3%http://peace-ipsc.org/fa/%D8 41- منوچهر پارســا دوســت: ما و عراق از گذشــته دور تا 28- ســلمان علــوی نیــك: هشــت ســال بحــران افرینــی امــروز )تجــاوز عــراق، پیامدهــا، پایــان جنــگ و رویدادهــای اصــاح طلبــان، مركــز اســناد انقــاب اســامی، چــاپ ســوم، پــس از ان(، انتشــار شــركت ســهامی انتشــار، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، 1392. چاپخانــه عمــاد، تهــران، 1386. 29- عــارف بیــژن: رابطــه رژیــم صهیونیســتی و اقلیــم 42- نــادر انتصــار: سیاســت كردهــا در خاوورمیانــه، كردســتان و تأپیــر ان بــر امنیــت ملــی ایــران، //:http ترجمــه. عرفــان قانعــی فــرد، نشــر علــم، چــاپ اول، چــاپ D8%B1%D8%/16186/tabyincenter.ir% رامیــن، تهــران، 1390. 30- عبداللــه شــهبازی: ظهــور و ســقوط ســاطنت پهلــوی، 43- هشــدار شــدید الحــن جانشــینی ســپاه پاســداران بــه خاطــرات ارتشــبد ســابق حســین فردوســت، تهــران، مقامــات اقلیــم كردســتان: /http://www.faratab.com انتشــارات اطلعــات، مؤسســه مطالعــات و پژوهشــهای D8%87%D9%-100/2593/news%. سیاســی، جلــد اول، چــاپ بیســت و هشــتم، تهــران، 1388. 44- واكنــش دولــت اقلیــم كردســتان بــه مواضــع جانشــین 31- عرفــان قانعــی فــرد: پــس از شــصت ســال زندگــی و فرمانــده ســپاه: انتقــاد از مواضــع ســردار ســامی و تأكیــد خاطــرات جــال طالبانــی، تهــران، نشــر علــم، جلــد اول، چــاپ بــر تقویــت مناســبات دوجانبــه: .http://www.faratab رامیــن، چــاپ دوم، اذر 1388. D9%A7%D8%/2610/com/news%86% 32- عرفــان قانعــی فــرد: تندبــاد حــوادث گفتوگویــی بــا 45- وضعیــت گذشــته و حــال حضــور فرهنگــی در اقلیــم ســرهنگ ســتاد عیســی پژمــان مأمــور ویــژه شــاه و نماینــده كردســتان عــراق- گفتگــو بــا محمــد شــیرزاد: مركــز بیــم ســاواك در كردســتان، تهــران، نشــر علــم، چــاپ رامیــن، المللــی مطالعــات صلــح، /http://peace-ipsc.org چــاپ اول، 1390. D8%88%fa/%D9% 33- غلمرضــا نجاتــی: تاریــخ سیاســی بیســت و پنــج ســاله 46- یاســر نورعلــی ونــد: روابــط سیاســی- نظامــی اقلیــم ایــران )از كودتــا تــا انقــاب(، تهــران، مؤسســه خدمــات كردســتان عــراق بــا امریــكا: .http://tabyincenter فرهنگــی رســا، چــاپ نهــم، 1390. D9%B1%D8%/21309/ir%88% 34- فــرزان شــهیدی: اســتقلل اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق و 47- فرهــاد درویشــی، علــی محمدیــان: بررســی تاثیــرات واكنــش هــای احتمالــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، //:http خارجــی تركیــه در اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق بــر منافــع B3%D8%A7%D8%/20924/tabyincenter.ir% جمهــوری اســامی ایــران 1991- 2013، مجلــه سیاســت 35- فرهــاد درویشــی، علــی محمدیــان: بررســی تاثیــرات دفاعــی، ســال 22، شــماره 85، زمســتان 1392. وه رگیــراوه خارجــی تركیــه در اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق بــر منافــع لــه: /http://journals.ihu.ac.ir/index.php/dpj جمهــوری اســامی ایــران 1991- 2013، مجلــه سیاســت issue/view/377 ، ص167. دفاعــی، ســال 22، شــماره 85، زمســتان 1392. وه رگیــراوه 48- محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: لــه: /http://journals.ihu.ac.ir/index.php/dpj بررســی روابــط سیاســی- اقتصــادی كردســتان عــراق بــا issue/view/377 . تركیــه و تأثیــر ان بــر سیاســت خارجــی ایــران، فصلنــاه 36- كریــس كوچیــرا: جنبــش ملــی كــرد، ترجمــه: ابراهیــم تحقیقــات سیاســی بیــن المللــی دانشــگاه ازاد اســامی، یونســی، مؤسســه انتشــارات نگاه، چاپ دوم، چاپ نوبهار، واحــد شــهرضا، شــماره 17، زمســتان 1392، ص11. تهــران، 1377. بــۆ خوێندنــه وهی توێژینــه وه بــه زمانــی فارســی بڕوانــه: 37- محمــد علــی ســلطانی: اوضــاع سیاســی اجتماعــی html.948_5864_http://pir.iaush.ac.ir/article تاریخــی ایــل بــارزان، انتشــار ســازمان اســناد و كتابخانــه ؛ .http://www.sid.ir/Fa/Journal/ViewPaper ملــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، 1384. aspx?id=254316 38- محمدرضــا حافــظ نیــا )دكتــر(: تأثیــر خودگــردان 49- احمــد مســجد جامعــی: كردهــا ایرانــی تریــن قــوم كــردای شــمال عــراق بــر كشــور همســایه، فصلنامــه كشــور هســتند: /https://www.mashreghnews.ir تحقیقــات جغرافیایــی، شــماره 83. وه رگیــراوه لــه: //:http .default.aspx/97284/www.ensani.ir/fa/content .DA%/419636/news 50- محمدرضــا حافــظ نیــا )دكتــر(: تأثیــر خودگــردان 39- محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: كــردای شــمال عــراق بــر كشــور همســایه، فصلنامــه روابــط سیاســی- اقتصــادی كردســتان عــراق بــا تركیــه و تحقیقــات جغرافیایــی، شــماره 83، ص24. وه رگیــراوه لــه: تأثیــر ان بــر سیاســت خارجــی ایــران، فصلنــاه تحقیقــات default./97284/http://www.ensani.ir/fa/content سیاســی بیــن المللــی دانشــگاه ازاد اســامی، واحــد aspx شــهرضا، شــماره 17، زمســتان 1392. بــۆ خوێندنــه وهی 51- حمیــد احمــدی: قومیــت و قومگرایــی در ایــران، افســانه توێژینــه وه بــه زمانــی فارســی بڕوانــه: .http://pir.iaush
25 ســامان سیاســی در عــراق جدیــد، دفتــر مطالعــات سیاســی و واقعیــت، نشــر نــی، چــاپ نهــم، چــاپ غزال، تهــران، 1391، و بیــن المللــی، مركــز چــاپ و انتشــارات وزارت امــور ص 81، 253. خارجــه، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، پاییــز 1387، ص217. 52- هێــرش عهبدوڵــاڵ حهمه كهریــم: پهیوه ندییــه 71- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص 172. سیاســیهكانی ههرێمــی كوردســتان و دهوڵهتانــی دراوســێ، 72- ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: پهره ســهندنی شوناســی ئێــران، توركیــا و ســوریا 1991- 2003، س. پ، ل87. نهتهوایهتــی كــورد و ئهگه رهكانــی دامهزراندنــی ده وڵهتــی 53- حمیــد احمــدی : س. پ، ص 83، 315؛ محمــود كتابــی، ســه ربهخۆی كوردســتان، وهرگێڕانــی. دوكتــۆر یاســین یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: س، پ، ص 11. سه ردهشــتی، لهبه اڵوكراوهكانــی دهزگای ڕۆشــنبیری 54- محمدرضا حافظ نیا: س. پ، ل15. جهمــال عیرفــان، ســلێمانی، 2014، ل322. - 55 النــه جاسوســی، كردســتان )1(، شــماره 31، -73 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل 319. دانشــجویان مســلمان پیــرو خــط امــام. 74- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص167. 56- حمید احمدی : س. پ، ص 101. 75- فــرزان شــهیدی: اســتقلل اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق و 57- ســلمان علــوی نیــك: هشــت ســال بحــران افرینــی واكنــش هــای احتمالــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، //:http اصــاح طلبــان، مركــز اســناد انقــاب اســامی، چــاپ ســوم، B3%D8%A7%D8%/20924/tabyincenter.ir% تهــران، 1392، ص83. 76- پتانســیل هــا و اینــده حضــور فرهنگــی ایــران در 58- بڕوانه دهستوری ئێران: بهشی دهیهم، مادهی 152. اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق- گفتگــو بــا محمــد شــیرزاد، 59- فــاروق محمــد محمــد امیــن: سیاســهتی ئێــران بهرامبهر وابســته فرهنگــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران در اقلیــم جواڵنــه وهی ڕزگاریخــوازی كــورد لــه باشــوری كوردســتان كردســتان عــراق، /http://peace-ipsc.org 1975- 1989، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی ڕێنــوێ، ســلێمانی، A7%AA%D8%BE%D8%fa/%D9 خواســتههای كنونــی 2014، ل138. و دور نویــن روابــط ایــران و اقلیــم كردســتان- گفتگــو 60- بڕوانه دهستوری ئێران: بهشی دهیهم، مادهی 154. بــا ناظــم دبــاغ نماینــده اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق در تهــران: 61- اركان حســن: مناســبات ایــران بــا كردهــای عــراق مركــز بیــن المللــی صلــح، /http://peace-ipsc.org در جنــگ ایــران- عــراق 1980- 1988، پایاننامــه بــرای AE%D9%fa/%D8%88% دریافــت درجــه كارشناســی ارشــد در رشــته تاریــخ گرایــش 77- بۆزانیــاری بڕوانــه: كریــس كوچیــرا: جنبــش ملــی كــرد، انقــاب اســامی، اســتاد راهنمــا: دكتــر حجــت فــاح توتــكار، ترجمــه: ابراهیــم یونســی، مؤسســه انتشــارات نــگاه، چــاپ دانشــگاه بیــن المللــی امــام خمینــی، دانشــكده علــوم انســانی، دوم، چــاپ نوبهــار، تهــران، 1377، ص گــروه تاریــخ، بهمــن 1393. ص 192. 78- عرفــان قانعــی فــرد: پــس از شــصت ســال زندگــی و 62- هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمه كهریم: س. پ، ل-97 98. خاطــرات جــال طالبانــی، تهــران، نشــر علــم، جلــد اول، چــاپ 63- پتانســیل هــا و اینــده حضــور فرهنگــی ایــران در اقلیــم رامیــن، چــاپ دوم، اذر 1388، ص629. كردســتان عراق- گفتگو با محمد شــیرزاد، وابســته فرهنگی 79- عبداللــه شــهبازی: ظهــور و ســقوط ســاطنت پهلــوی، جمهوری اســامی ایران در اقلیم كردســتان عراق، //:http خاطــرات ارتشــبد ســابق حســین فردوســت، تهــران، A7%AA%D8%BE%D8%peace-ipsc.org/fa/%D9 انتشــارات اطلعــات، مؤسســه مطالعــات و پژوهشــهای 64- وضعیــت گذشــته و حــال حضــور فرهنگــی در اقلیــم سیاســی، جلــد اول، چــاپ بیســت و هشــتم، تهــران، 1388 ، كردســتان عــراق- گفتگــو بــا محمــد شــیرزاد: مركــز بیــم ص 501- 502. المللــی مطالعــات صلــح، /http://peace-ipsc.org 80- عرفــان قانعــی فــرد: تندبــاد حــوادث گفتوگویــی بــا D8%88%fa/%D9% ســرهنگ ســتاد عیســی پژمــان مأمــور ویــژه شــاه و نماینــده 65- نهوشــیروان مســتهفا: خــهون یــان مۆته كــه دیــوی ســاواك در كردســتان، تهــران، نشــر علــم، چــاپ رامیــن، نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی عێــراق )-1992 2002( چــاپ اول، 1390، ص131- 133. یاداشــتی ڕۆژانــهی شــهڕی ناوخــۆ، ناوهنــدی چــاپ و 81- نازنــاز محمــد عبدالقــادر: سیاســهتی ئێــران بهرامبــهر باڵوكردنــه وهی كتێبخانــهی جهمالــی عهلــی باپیــر. بــێ بزوتنــه وهی ڕزگاریخــوازی كــورد لــه كوردســتانی عێراقــدا ســاڵی چــاپ ، ل68. 1961- 1975، چاپــی دووهم، چاپخانــهی ئــاراس، دهزگای 66- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص 162. چــاپ و باڵوكردنــه وهی ئــاراس، ههولێــر، 2010، ل 187. 67- عــارف بیــژن: رابطــه رژیــم صهیونیســتی و اقلیــم -82 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل62. كردســتان و تأپیــر ان بــر امنیــت ملــی ایــران، //:http 83- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، صD8%B1%D8%/16186/tabyincenter.ir .171% 84- منوچهر پارســا دوســت: ما و عراق از گذشــته دور تا 68- هێــرش عهبدوڵــاڵ حهمه كهریــم: س. پ، ل91؛ فــرزان امــروز )تجــاوز عــراق، پیامدهــا، پایــان جنــگ و رویدادهــای شــهیدی: اســتقلل اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق و واكنــش هــای پــس از ان(، انتشــار شــركت ســهامی انتشــار، چــاپ دوم، احتمالــی جمهوری اســامی ایــران، .http://tabyincenter چاپخانــه عمــاد، تهــران، 1386، ص B3%D8%A7%D8%/20924/ir .823% 85- محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: س، 69- نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل59؟ پ، ص 13. 70- امیــر محمــد حاجــی یوســفی، احمــد ســلطانی نــژاد:
26 زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، ژمــاره 9، كانونــی یه كهمــی 2016، 86- محمــد علــی ســلطانی: اوضــاع سیاســی اجتماعــی ل436- 442؛ جعفــر حــق پنــا: س. پ، ص 147؛ ســۆفیا تاریخــی ایــل بــارزان، انتشــار ســازمان اســناد و كتابخانــه ئێزابێاڵوانــج: س. پ. ل321. ملــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، 1384، 108- نهوشیروان مصطفی ئهمین: پهنجهكان...، ل109. ص436. 109- منوچهر پارسادوست: س. پ، ص186. 87- نــادر انتصــار: سیاســت كردهــا در خاوورمیانــه، 110- محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان ، ســولماز حیــدری: ترجمــه. عرفــان قانعــی فــرد، نشــر علــم، چــاپ اول، چــاپ س. پ، ص 8. رامیــن، تهــران، 1390، ص138. 111- فاروق محهمهد محهمه دئهمین: س. پ، ل140. 88- دیوید مك داول: س. پ، ص -431 342. 112- فــاروق محه مــهد محهمهدئهمیــن: س. پ، ل170- 89- اركان حسن: س، پ، ل 159. 171. 90- محمــد شــاكهلی: لهبزوتنــهوه وه بــۆ حیزبــی 113- نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل69. سۆسیالیســتی كوردســتان 1976- ، 1993 باڵوكــراوهی 114- محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: س، كۆمه ڵــهی ڕوناكبیــری و كۆمه اڵیهتــی كهركــوك، چاپخانــهی پ، ص 2؛ فرهــاد درویشــی، علــی محمدیــان: س، پ، ص كارۆ، كهركــوك، 2011، ل 57. 151- 160. 91- جعفر حق پناه: س. پ، ص -145 146. 115- محمــود كریمــی: سیاســت تركیــه در اقلیــم كردســتان 92- نادر انتصار: س. پ، ص154. و اینــده سیاســی عــراق، مركــز بیــن المللــی مطالعــات صلــح، 93- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: په نجــهكان یهكتــری 8C%DB%B3%http://peace-ipsc.org/fa/%D8% ئهشــكێنن، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی -116 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ، ل330 عێــراق 1979- 1983، بهرلیــن. 1997، ل25. 117- وضعیــت گذشــته و حــال حضــور فرهنگــی در 94- ڕهفعهت مهال: س. پ، ل -81 84. اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق- گفتگــو بــا محمــد شــیرزاد: مركــز 95- فرهــاد درویشــی، علــی محمدیــان: س، پ، ص 172؛ بیــم المللــی مطالعــات صلــح، /http://peace-ipsc.org هێــرش عهبدوڵــاڵ حهمهكهریــم: س. پ، ل96. D8%88%fa/%D9% 96- هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمهكهریم: س. پ، ل-96 98. -118 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ، ل79. -97 119- نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل63. 98- نهوشــیروان مســتهفا: خــهون یــان مۆته كــه، ل-59 120- هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمهكهریم: س. پ، ل60. 62. 121- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص147. -99 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل -322 325. 122- یاســر نورعلــی ونــد: روابــط سیاســی- نظامــی اقلیــم -100 ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: س. پ. ل 322- 325؛ هێــرش كردســتان عــراق بــا امریــكا: .http://tabyincenter عهبدوڵــاڵ حهمهكهریــم: س. پ، ل124. D9%B1%D8%/21309/ir%88% 101- ســعید ساســانیان: ایــران و گروهــك هــای 123- امیــر محمــد حاجــی یوســفی، احمــد ســلطانی نــژاد: كــردی ضــد انقــاب؛ ضــرورت اعمــال فشــار بــر اقلیــم س. پ، ل217. كردســتان/ بخــش نخســت، .http://tabyincenter 124- فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص8C%DB%A7%D8%/22487/ir 171 -125 سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل332. 102- هشــدار شــدید الحــن جانشــینی ســپاه پاســداران بــه 126-عــارف بیــژن: رابطــه رژیــم صهیونیســتی و اقلیــم مقامــات اقلیــم كردســتان: /http://www.faratab.com كردســتان و تأپیــر ان بــر امنیــت ملــی ایــران، //:D8%87%D9%-100/2593/news http% D8%B1%D8%/16186/tabyincenter.ir%. 103- واكنــش دولــت اقلیــم كردســتان بــه مواضــع جانشــین 127- نهوشیروان مصطفی ئهمین: پهنجهكان...، ل54. فرمانــده ســپاه: انتقــاد از مواضــع ســردار ســامی و تأكیــد 128- عرفان قانعی فرد: تندباد حوادث: ل49 بــر تقویــت مناســبات دوجانبــه: .http://www.faratab 129- فاروق محمد محمد امین: س. پ، ل68؛ نهوشــیروان %86%D9%A7%D8%/2610/com/news مصطفــی ئهمیــن: س. پ، ل88. 104- عــارف بیــژن: رابطــه رژیــم صهیونیســتی و اقلیــم 130- عرفان قانعی فرد: تندباد حوادث، ص163. كردســتان و تأپیــر ان بــر امنیــت ملــی ایــران، //:http 131- صــاح الخرســان: التیــارات اسیاســیه فــی كردســتان D8%B1%D8%/16186/tabyincenter.ir%. العــراق قــراء فــی ملفــات الحــركات و االحــزاب الكردیــه فــی 105- ســعید ساســانیان: ایــران و گروهــك هــای العــراق،1946- 2001، مؤسســه البــاغ، الطبعــهاالولــی، كــردی ضدانقــاب؛ ضــرورت اعمــال فشــار بــر اقلیــم بیــروت- لبنــان، 2001، ص 253. كردســتا/ بخــش دوم، .http://tabyincenter 132- اركان حســن: س. پ. ل45؛ فــاروق محهمــهد %8C%DB%A7%D8%/22528/ir محهمه دئهمیــن: س. پ، ل164. 106- نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل68. 133- حســین علیــی: رونــد جنــگ ایــران و عــراق، نشــر 107- بــۆ زانیــاری زیاتــر بڕوانــه: ماجیــد خلییــل فهتــاح؛ مــرز و بــوم، چــاپ اریــن، چــاپ اول، جلــد اول، تهــران، فــاروق موحه مــهد حهمهئهمیــن: په یوهنــدی ئیســرائیل و 1391، ص624. كــورد لــه شۆڕشــی ئهیلــول دا 1961- 1975، گؤڤــاری
27 · سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل90. 134- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: له كهنــاری دانوبــه وه · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل56. بــۆ خــڕی ناوزهنــگ، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی · بــۆ خوێندنــه وهی ورده كاریهكانــی خولــی چوارهمــی كوردســتانی عێــراق 1975- 1978، بهرلیــن. 1997، ل350. دانوســتانهكان و خوێندنــه وهی دهقیــی ڕێكهوتننامه كــهی 135- نهوشیروان مصطفی امین: پهنجهكان...، ل8. نێــوان یهكێتــی و پارتــی لــه تــاران. بڕوانــه نهوشــیروان 136- فاروق محهمهد محهمهئهمین: س. پ، ل149. مســتهفا: خــهون یــان مۆته كــه، ل78- 86. 137- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: په نجــهكان...، ل122؛ · هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمهكهریم: س. پ، ل103. علــی ته تــهر نێروهیــی: بزاڤــی ڕزگاریخــوازی نهتــه وهی · سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل92. كــورد لــه كوردســتانی عێــراق لــه ســاڵهكانی جهنگــی ئێــران · هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمهكهریم: س. پ، ل90. و عێــراق 1980- 1988، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی حاجــی · محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: س، پ، هاشــم، اربیــل، 2008، ل132. ص 28- 29. 138- اركان حسن: س. پ، ل129. · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل63. 139- نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: خوالنــه وه لــه نــاو · فــرزان شــهیدی: اســتقلل اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق و بازنــهدا، دیــوی نــاوه وهی ڕوداوهكانــی كوردســتانی عێــراق واكنــش هــای احتمالــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، //:http 1984- 1988، بهرلیــن. 1999، ل ؛84 ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: B3%D8%A7%D8%/20924/tabyincenter.ir%. س. پ. ل62 · بڕوانــه ههمــان توێژینــهوه لــه بهشــی دههوم، باســی 140- اركان حسن: س. پ، ل -211 218. ســێیهم. 141- ره فعــهت مــهال: ڕۆژه ته ماویــهكان، چاپــی یه كــهم، · فاروق محهمهد محهمه دئهمین: س. پ، ل162. چاپخانــهی كارۆ، ســلێمانی، 2008، ل88. · نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: له كهنــاری دانووبــهوه...، 142- علی تهتهر نێروهیی: بزاڤی...، ل-217 225. ل350؛ فــاروق محهمــهد محهمهدئهمیــن: س. پ، ل168. 143- حهسهن بابهكر: س. پ، ل-35 37. · اركان حســن: س. پ، ص120؛ فــاروق محهمــهد 144- اركان حسن: س. پ، ل-60 61. محهمه دئهمیــن: س. پ، ل168- 169. 145- واحید عومهر محێدین: س. پ، ل217. · نهوشــیروان مصطفــی امیــن: له كهنــاری دانووبــهوه...، 146- نادر انتصار: س. پ، ص136. ل351. 147- رهفعهت مهال: س. پ، ل16. · علــی تهتــهر نێروهیــی: سیاســهتی حكومهتــی عێــراق لــه 148- واحید عومهر محێدین: س. پ، ل235. كوردســتان لــه ســایهی بهڵگه نامــه فه ڕمیهكانــدا، بهرگــی 149- عرفان قانعی فرد: پس از شصت سال، ص787. یه كــهم، چاپــی یه كــهم، چاپخانــهی زانكــۆی دهــۆك. دهــۆك، 150- رهفعاتی مهال: س. پ، ل-17 18. 2010، ل58؛ فــاروق محهمــهد محهمهدئهمیــن: س. پ، 151- عرفان قانعی فرد: س. پ، ص -954 969. ل158. 152- نازناز محمد عبدالقادر: س. پ، ل149. · اركان حسن: س. پ، ص124- 125. عرفان قانعی فرد: س. پ، ص -954 969. · اركان حسن: س. پ، ص282. دیویــد مكــداول: تاریــخ معاصــر كــرد، ترجمــه. ابراهیــم · سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل90. یونســی، نشــر پانیــذ، چــاپ داالهــو، چــاپ دوم، تهــران، · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل56. 1383، ص541. · فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص167. اركان حسن: س. پ، ل193. · نهوشیروان مصطفی امین: پهنجهكان...، ل59. جعفر حق پناه: س. پ، ص -161 162. · غلمرضــا نجاتــی: تاریــخ سیاســی بیســت و پنــج ســاله سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل63. ایــران )از كودتــا تــا انقــاب(، تهــران، مؤسســه خدمــات Other sources فرهنگــی رســا، چــاپ نهــم، 1390، ص89. · بــۆ زانیــاری بڕوانــه: ئامانــج حســن احمــد؛ فــاروق · فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص146. محمــد محمــد امیــن: پهیوه ندیهكانــی ئێــران و جواڵنــه وهی · سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل 311. ڕزگاریخــوازی كــورد لــه باشــوری كوردســتان لــه · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل60. ڕاپهڕینیئــازاری 1991دا، گؤڤــاری زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، · هێرش عهبدوڵاڵ حهمهكهریم: س. پ، ل90- 91. پاشــكۆی گۆڤــاری زانكــۆی ڕاپهڕیــن، كۆنفرانســی · فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص170. گه شــهپێدانی ڕاپهڕیــن و خوێندنهوه یهكــی نــوێ بــۆ · محمدرضا حافظ نیا: س. پ، ل29. ڕههه ندهكانــی، ژمــاره 6، 2016، ل -150 159. · ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: س. پ. ل 312- 313؛ محمدرضــا · سۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانج: س. پ. ل82. حافــظ نیــا: س. پ، ل29. · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل56. · فرهــاد درویشــی، علــی محمدیــان: س، پ، ص171؛ · فرهاد درویشی، علی محمدیان: س، پ، ص146. عــارف بیــژن: رابطــه رژیــم صهیونیســتی و اقلیــم كردســتان · ســۆفیا ئێزابێاڵوانــج: س. پ. ل 323؛ هێــرش عهبدوڵــاڵ و تأپیــر ان بــر امنیــت ملــی ایــران، .http://tabyincenter حه مه كهریــم: س. پ، ل99.
28 · اردشــیر پشــنگ، زهــرا زمــردی: ههمــان ســه رچاوه، D8%B1%D8%/16186/ir% ل483. · محمدرضا حافظ نیا: س. پ، ل21. · محمــود كتابــی، یداللــه دهقــان، ســولماز حیــدری: س، پ، · نهوشیروان مستهفا: خهون یان مۆتهكه، ل68. ص 12- 13. · اردشــیر پشــنگ، زهــرا زمــردی: بررســی تحــوالت · فــرزان شــهیدی: اســتقلل اقلیــم كردســتان عــراق و سیاســی عــراق در پرتــو سیاســت خارجــی ایــران، تركیــه و واكنــش هــای احتمالــی جمهــوری اســامی ایــران، //:http عربســتان، فصلنامه سیاســت خارجی. ســال 28، شــماره 3، B3%D8%A7%D8%/20924/tabyincenter.ir% پاییــز 1393. وه رگیــراوه لــه: .http://www.noormags ir/view/ar/magazine/number/64828. ، ص494.
29 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center
The Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center (KCCRC) is an independent and not-for-profit organisation based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. KCCRC conducts research and produces policy papers regarding Kurdish, Iraqi and related studies. Within this framework, KCCRC focuses its research on the politics and economics of the region at the macro level, and at the micro level, it concentrates on issues surrounding but not limited to the following;
• Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict • Terrorism • Islamism, extremism and radicalisation • Instability • Internally displaced peoples • Oil and Gas • Political Economy • Ethnic and Sectarian conflict • International politics
KCCRC delivers for its clients by using its unique geographic position to take advantage of the expertise of local and international scholars to give the most precise picture of Kurdish, Iraqi and Middle Eastern affairs.
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