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PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN POST-COMMUNIST

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of in the Graduate School

of the Ohio University

By

Rossen V. Vassilev, M.A.

The Ohio State University 2000

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Richard Gunther, Adviser Approved by

Professor Anthony Mughan

Professor Goldie Shabad Adviser Department of Political Science UMI Number 9971652

UMI

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Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Aitor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to explain why post-Communist Bulgaria has successfully

established a new democratic order but has so far failed to become a truly consolidated

. In order to accoimt for this hardly unexpected outcome, the study brings into

analytical focus key propositions derived from the recent literature. The

major hypotheses of the mainstream approaches to democratic transition and consolidation are tested systematically and rigorously for the purpose of measuring the impact of both structural and micropolitical factors upon the coimtry’s democratization trajectory.

The first part of the analysis imderscores that the Bulgarian transition has taken place under inauspicious structural and contextual circumstances that are generally unfavorable to democratic transition and consolidation. These include (a) the legacies of a highly divisive modem history, (b) weak democratic traditions and generally impropitious historical heritage

from a distant semi-democratic past, (c) a of rising (and thus far disappointed) expectations among a discontented , as the most enduring legacy of the relatively successful modernization of the country under the Communist regime, (d) a combination of

fiscal, macroeconomic, social, health, and demographic crises of destabilizing proportions,

(e) ethnic tensions and conflicts which are just short of a stateness crisis.

11 The second part of the analysis demonstrates that the political elite has made major strides toward successful democratization in spite of the inauspicious objective conditions, but has been unable to consolidate fully the new set of political and economic institutions in

Bulgaria. Even though intensive high-level negotiations were held and several comprehensive political agreements were signed, the main party elites have often pursued the individually “rational” strategy of maximizing the “benefits” of power domination while minimizing the “costs” of concessions to and cooperation with the opposing side, thus leading to the collectively “irrational” outcome of political polarization and fierce partisan confrontation. Such a myopic rational, zero-sum strategy may have facilitated the anti-

Communist opposition’s successful “march across the institutions” but has at the same time precipitated a ferocious political conflict between Left and Right, leading to the fundamental disruption of the consolidation process. As a result, the democratic project has run into some major hiu*dles of institutional, attitudinal and especially behavioral nature. The dissertation concludes that the explicit theoretical criteria for full democratic consolidation have not been met.

Ill Dedicated to the memory of my parents

IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The work on this dissertation was completed thanks to the contribution of many people, which comes to confirm the general recognition that a dissertation is almost by definition a collective effort. First of all, I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee. Professors Richard Gimther, Goldie Shabad and Anthony Mughan, all of whom must be given credit for being the co-authors of this study.

Next, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Professor Albert

Melone of the Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois, who was kind enough to provide me with his unpublished manuscript on democratization in post-Communist

Bulgaria. The manuscript contains Dr. Melone’s primary research, which is based on a series of in-depth interviews with top Bulgarian politicians and judicial officials.

Finally, the research on this dissertation owes a lot to my father, Vasil Vasilev, who made a valuable contribution before he passed away on 14 October 1999. Not only did my father encourage my efforts to finish this work, but he acted throughout the dissertation- writing process as my research assistant and consultant, making helpful suggestions, offering insightful comments, and collecting almost 700 pages of primary and secondary research data, including interviews with members of the Bulgarian political elite, many of whom he knew personally. VITA

December 23, 1952 ...... Bom—, Bulgaria

1991 ...... M.A. in Political Science, The Ohio State University

1994-present ...... Graduate Teaching and Research Associate. The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

Research Publication

R. Vassilev, “Modernization Theory Revisited: The Case of Bulgaria.” East European Politics and Societies 13, no. 3 (1999).

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication...... iv

Acknowledgments ...... v

Vita...... vi

Table of Contents ...... vii

List of Tables ...... x

Chapters

1. Introduction...... 1

Perspectives on democratization...... 7 Research design and methodology...... 11 Sources of data...... 24 Outline of the study ...... 26

2. Electoral democracy...... 28

Elections and electoral fiaud...... 29 1990 GNA election ...... 31 1991 parliamentary election ...... 38 1992 presidential election ...... 43 1994 parliamentary election ...... 47 1996 presidential election ...... 50 1997 parliamentary election ...... 54 Restrictions on political parties...... 57 Political and civil ...... 61

3. Partial consolidation...... 69

vn Structural dimension ...... 75 Attitudinal dimension...... 84 Behavioral dimension ...... 95

4. The historical context ...... 104

Bulgaria before World War 1 ...... 107 The demise of Bulgarian democracy...... 114 The advent of state ...... 119 The character of the pre-transition regime...... 125 The exit of Zhivkov ...... 129 Effect of historical memories...... 133

5. Prior experience with democracy...... 143

Weak democratic tradition...... 146 Effect on political culture...... 151

6. Modernization and its discontents...... 166

Economic growth and social progress...... 172 Social mobilization ...... 184 The rise of the new intelligentsia...... 188 Value system change...... 197

7. Macroeconomic conditions...... 200

The socioeconomic crisis...... 206 From crisis to catastrophe...... 219 The social costs...... 223 Effect on regime support...... 228

8. Ethnic Divisions ...... 240

The ...... 246 The pathologies of ...... 249 The evolution of the MRF ...... 264 The integration of the MRF...... 272

9. Elite-negotiated transition ...... 279

The players’ strategies...... 280 The round table talks ...... 292 The founding election...... 309

viii The ouster of Mladenov ...... 313 The election of Zhelev ...... 317

10. Grand coalition ...... 321

The ouster of Lukanov ...... 324 The PCC agreements...... 339 The grand coalition government ...... 346

11. New constitution...... 352

The constitutional settlement...... 354 Monarchy versus republic ...... 368

12. Potential challenger elites...... 380

The ex-Communists ...... 382 The ethnic Turkish party...... 394 The neonationalists...... 399 The armed forces...... 405

13. Style of political behavior ...... 413

The triumphant militants...... 416 March across the institutions...... 430 A divided ...... 439

14. Conclusion...... 443

Theoretical implications...... 444 Implications for future research...... 466

List of References...... 468

IX LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

2.1 The GNA election, 10-17 June 1990 ...... 36

2.2 National Assembly election, 13 October 1991 ...... 40

2.3 Presidential election, 12-19 January 1992 ...... 46

2.4 National Assembly election, 18 December 1994 ...... 50

2.5 Presidential election, October 27-November 3, 1996 ...... 54

2.6 National Assembly election, 19 April 1997 ...... 56

3.1 Level of democratic legitimacy ...... 85

3.2 Public trust in institutions ...... 88

3.3 Support for alternatives to democracy...... 90

6.1 Socioeconomic levels of Third Wave ...... 177

7.1 Major economic indicators, 1989-1998 ...... 221

7.2 Level of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy ...... 233

7.3 Multiple regression analysis of mass dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Bulgaria ...... 235

7.4 Factor analysis of Bulgarian responses to democratic legitimacy, political discontent and political disaffection questions...... 238

8.1 Opinion of different ethnic groups in Bulgaria...... 260 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Theoretically speaking, there are two distinct stages in any transition to democracy.

First, there is the short-term phase of establishing democratic institutions, such as

introducing free, competitive elections and adopting a democratic constitution. Second, there

is the much more difficult stage of promoting conditions that are conducive to democratic persistence and consolidation. According to Przeworski, “the central question concerning transitions is whether they lead to consolidated democracy” (1991: 51).

Post-Communist transitions demonstrate that the breakdown of non-democratic regimes does not mean that consolidated democracy will necessarily follow. Beginning in

1989, the former Soviet-bloc in Eastern embarked on a process of transformation, as a result of which their previously non-democratic systems were dismantled and replaced by democratizing regimes in the space of a relatively short period of time. But more than a decade later, a truly consolidated democracy has not been reached in a majority of these cases. Elected and representative institutions have become established, but widespread , rampant lawlessness, economic decline and the steep fall in living standards have brought about widespread dissatisfaction, cynicism, mass , regime instability and uncertainty about the future. While some commentators believe that the consolidation of democracy is a long-term, perhaps generational process of

1 gradual and protracted change, there is the opposite view held by scholars like Giuseppe Di

Palma, who caution that if democratization turns out to be a particularly drawn-out affair,

this should be a cause for concern because it would mean that the new regimes have

encountered some serious consolidation obstacles (see Di Palma 1990: 153).

This study will analyze the stumbling blocs to full democratic consolidation in post-

Communist Bulgaria, which has successfully completed its transition to democracy, but has

so far failed to consolidate fully its new democratic system. Michael Waller (1996: 40) describes Bulgaria as a case which is “in so many ways the most interesting” among the post-

Communist countries of Eastern Europe. It is one of several post-Communist nations in the

Balkan peninsula (the remainder being , , and the successor states of former

Yugoslavia), for all of which it was predicted that democratization will run into some hefty obstacles. This prediction was based on the dismal condition of their economies; the depth of their ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages; the poorly developed state of their civil societies (given the lack of institutionalized social pluralism under ); the institutional legacies and other die-hard remnants from their non-democratic past; and their old tradition of recurrent military intervention in politics. The traditionally authoritarian political culture of the is also considered to be incongruent with democracy and democratic consolidation (Gilberg 1994). All these countries (except for Slovenia) are experiencing complicated and uncertain transitions, which either have not resulted in genuine democracy or have failed to consolidate.

In spite of such dire predictions, Bulgaria is credited as having achieved a relatively peaceful transition to political and social pluralism and a mixed economy (Gilberg 1994:

207). Many commentators have praised the significant democratic progress made by a

2 country undergoing one of the region’s most difficult changeovers to democracy. In spite of appalling economic and social conditions and seemingly insurmountable political odds, there have been no instances of coups d’etat, armed violence, acts of terrorism, politically related murders, or other major signs of democratic instability and regression. Ideologically antagonistic parties have peacefully alternated in power after each of several popularly contested elections. With a few notable exceptions attributable to the turmoil of the transition, the main venues for dealing with the country’s numerous ills and problems appear to be party politics, electoral competition, and parliamentary bargaining and compromise. A new, formally democratic Constitution was approved by a parliament elected on a fully democratic basis. With some significant exceptions, of association and organization is generally respected. There is relatively equitable and open competition for popular votes among the political parties with low levels of government harassment or restriction of opposition groups. Comparatively few cases of electoral violence, or manipulation of the voting process have been recorded, while ballot fraud is kept at tolerable levels. The party governments formed have been more or less an accurate reflection of majority opinion, as expressed in published electoral results, which is further proof that political pluralism in Bulgaria is functioning reasonably well.

Even though some theorists see the institutional conditions for contestation as more important than participation (see, for example, Schumpeter 1950), meaningful mass participation in elections is a major indicator of the strength of democratic support. Voter turnout in the post-Communist elections was really impressive as a very large majority of registered Bulgarian voters exercised their privilege to vote. Increased , press, and assembly has contributed to reasonably equitable conditions of electoral

3 competition and participation. There is also greater of religious and ethnic , and protection of individual (though not of collective) . In spite of some very serious and persistent shortcomings, there is an increased degree of procedural certainty and predictability about the operative rules of the democratic game. No major political group in Bulgaria has openly indicated a desire to assume control of the government through clearly undemocratic methods. Despite widespread skepticism and doubts, no forcible seizure of government power without competitive elections has taken place, nor is there any widespread expectation that such an illegal seizure may occur in the near future.

Citing what he considers his main achievements in office on the eve of the 1996 presidential primary. President Zhelev singled out Bulgaria’s peaceful transition to democracy, the absence of ethnic and other strife, and continued democratic support among the population and the armed forces (interview with Zheliu Zhelev in Standarr, February 13.

1996). In his farewell address to the nation on 21 January 1997, the outgoing president proudly declared that

1 am the first head of state in Bulgaria’s 1,300-year-long history who was not installed with sword and fire or a revolution but through the free will of the Bulgarian people expressed in direct, fair and democratic elections. (BTA in English, January 21, 1997)

In spite of these hopeful signs of democratic strength and resilience, progress towards a stable, consolidated democracy has been uneven and slow. As the findings in the substantive chapters will show, the country continues to face serious obstacles to democratic institutionalization. Its entire post-Communist period has been marked by political conflict and recurrent crises. Once the early revolutionary euphoria died down, a host of severe challenges and destabilizing problems beset the new regime, such as a disastrous socioeconomic downturn, persistent cabinet instability, ethnic tensions, and the sharp confrontation between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), successor to the ex-Communists. on the political Left versus the staunchly anti-Communist Union of Democratic Forces

(UDF) on the political Right. Social and political polarization continues to endanger the long-term stability of the country. The basic change from a centrally- to a capitalist with of regulatory agencies has proved far more difficult than was anticipated in the wake of widespread optimism at the start of the transition. .An unfortunate side-effect of the transition is the widespread and growing neglect of the economic and social rights of the population, which has lessened the value of the newly acquired political and .

There are unmistakable signs of sharp socioeconomic regression and stagnation, including the country’s de-industrialization and de-modemization, the weakening of state capacity to perform basic ftmctions and responsibilities, an explosion in criminality (e.g.. the official crime rate more than tripled in the single year of 1991 alone), official corruption, mass emigration, and a dramatic demographic collapse. An important aspect of the consolidation of democracy is the existence of autonomous organizational and associational life of a protected by and with some base in the economy (Linz, Stepan and

Gunther 1995: 83; Linz and Stepan 1996). But neither civil society, nor even the . are firmly established in practice.

The conflicts between the ideologically antagonistic political forces have left the nation permanently and dangerously divided. The transfers of executive power from one or coalition to another have not been as peaceful and orderly, as required under democratic proceduralism. Whereas elections have been institutionalized and electoral

5 winners have not been prevented from taking office, it cannot be taken for granted that they

“‘will not have their terms arbitrarily terminated”— a necessary condition of democratization

according to O ’Dormell (1997: 43). Pressure from the street, acts o f mob violence and

parliamentary boycotts have repeatedly displaced parliament as the center of politics. Such severe crises challenge the legitimacy of popularly elected governments, if not of the new system itself. In fact, the UDF cabinet o f Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, which lost a parliamentary vote of confidence in October 1992, is so far the only post-Communist government in Bulgaria to have left office entirely by due constitutional process.

With government institutions repeatedly under , the Bulgarian state has been beset by a double crisis of effectiveness and authority. Democracy has survived, but it remains by and large anaemic and unconsolidated. Decrying the long-running feud between

Left and Right and the unpredictable, sometimes violent nature of post-Communist politics in Bulgaria, former Prime Minister Lukanov compared the transition to “political cannibalism” and a “corrida,” that is, Spanish-style bullfighting (Lukanov 1993: 4). In his farewell speech in January 1997, President Zhelev candidly admitted that the “Bulgarian model of transition has been unsuccessful.” He blamed this “failure” mainly on the parliamentary form of government prescribed by the new constitution, advocating its replacement with a presidential model of democracy (BTA in English, January 21, 1997).

Clearly, the permanency or even the fully democratic nature of the new regime is not beyond doubt.

What are the existing obstacles to the creation of necessary conditions for the consolidation of a well-functioning democracy in Bulgaria? The research problem is to identify a set of factors that help account for the two divergent outcomes of Bulgaria’s

6 democratization process: (a) success in completing the transition to democracy, and (b) failure to consolidate fiilly the new democratic order. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to explain why Bulgaria’s newly attained formal democracy is only partially consolidated.

For the purpose of selecting plausible explanatory variables, I have inquired into the mainstream theoretical literature on democratic transition and consolidation.

Perspectives on Democratization

There is little consensus regarding the prerequisites facilitating democratic transition and consolidation. What conditions are necessary or sufficient for a democratic order to emerge and consolidate is a matter of continuing theoretical debate in comparative politics.

Some scholars believe that not all conditions promoting the establishment of a democratic regime will necessarily promote its consolidation (see Huntington 1991). Past studies emphasized the influence of structural and contextual factors, while more recent ones have focused on the key role of political elites.

Theoretically speaking, one may differentiate between two dominant comparative approaches to democratization. On the one hand are those scholars who have traditionally stressed the role of objective socioeconomic forces and national political culture as democratic preconditions. In their view, are the inevitable product of large- scale historical forces. The political sociologists of the 1950s and 1960s sought to explain variation in democratic outcomes by means of structural and contextual factors, which are presumed to affect political behavior in a direct way. They have approached democratization at the level of macroanalysis based on background information about , social structure, cultural systems, demographic composition and other variables common to

7 political sociology. Following the classical model o f Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 1960) of a strong association between democratization and the overall level of socioeconomic development, their main focus is on the social-structural “requisites” for stable democracy

(see Lemer 1958; Komhauser 1960; Rostow I960; Deutsch 1961; Cutright 1963; Almond and Powell 1966; Moore 1966; Black 1966; Neubauer 1967; Diamond 1992; Lipset et al.

1993; Przeworski et al. 1996). Using various sociological indices (e.g., level of national income, rate of mass literacy, industrialization, urbanization, social stratification, degree of national integration, etc.) to measure long-run, large-scale social change and its political consequences, they have established that “high levels of socioeconomic development are associated with not only the presence but the stability of democracy” (Diamond 1992: 108).

From this theoretical perspective, modernization is seen as the principal causal variable of democratization. A certain threshold minimum of national wealth and prosperity is deemed necessary to make democracy possible, because no regime can be stable in a situation of extreme poverty and mass disaffection.

The major social forces which accompany a high level of socioeconomic development—industrialization, educational expansion, urbanization, increased cultural awareness, secularization, the growth of the middle classes, etc.—are believed to foster certain modernity-oriented values and beliefs which are conducive to the emergence of democracy. A high degree of mutual trust, tolerance, accommodation and compromise forms the basis of the so-called “civic culture,” a type of democratic political culture which is the presumed causal mechanism leading from affluence to stable democracy (Lipset 1959;

Almond and Verba 1963,1980; Pye and Verba 1965; Inglehart 1990). Since politics is also a reflection of the specific historical situation in which political events take place, the past

8 is seen as the best predictor of future developments (see Mannheim 1936; Moore 1966;

Skocpol 1984). The historical dimension of political behavior is particularly important for post-Communist efforts to install and sustain stable democracy (Rose and Haerpfer 1992).

While historical determinism was rejected in the past by behavioral-oriented scholars, comparative “path dependence” analysis is now recognized as a useful form of nomothetic social-science thinking (see Stark 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; Collier 1991 ). Scholars also believe that some previous experience with democracy is a critical historical variable that contributes to the success of democratization. Huntington, for example, argues that prior democratic experience is more conducive than none to the consolidation of new democracies

(1991: 270-271).

This macro-oriented, sociologically deterministic approach to democratization has been eclipsed by a more process-oriented emphasis on micropolitics and elite political culture. In the latter perspective, democratization is approached at the level of microanalysis based on psychological interpretations of political behavior. Emphasizing elite primacy and determinism, many comparativists have focused on the circumstances and events that play a major role in country-specific transition processes. The strategic-choice models of transition to democracy emphasize the centrality of elite calculations and behavior, that is, the actions or inactions of political and other national elites. According to key theoreticians of democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America, successful transitions to democracy can be achieved only as a result of formal negotiations and pacts between formerly adversarial elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and

Valenzuela 1992). If a transition is pacted or negotiated between regime soft-liners and opposition moderates, then democracy is more likely to succeed (Karl 1991; Przeworski

1991).

The scholarly literature on democratic transition and consolidation focuses in particular on variability in elite structure, arguing that the political elite’s acceptance of democratic institutions and adherence to the norms of electoral competition have important long-term consequences for the consolidation of new democratic regimes. For democratic consolidation to occur, traditionally antagonistic elite factions must become structurally integrated and consensually unified on how the game of democratic politics is to be played

(Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988; Higley and Moore 1981; Field and Higley 1985; Burton and Higley 1987a; Higley and Burton 1989). There is a link between variations in elite structure (that is, the attitudes, values and interpersonal relations among elite members) and regime consolidation. Studies with elite orientation have identified three basic types: ( 1 ) the divided or “consensually disunited” elite typical of authoritarian systems; (2) the totalitarian or “ideologically unified” type foimd in totalitarian regimes; and (3) the pluralistic or

“consensually unified” type that exists in long-established democracies. Only the consensually unified elite is associated with consolidated democracy (Burton and Higley

1987a; Sartori 1987; Higley and Burton 1989). Procedural consensus and structural integration allows elite groups to play politics as a positive-sum or “politics-as-bargaining” game, rather than a zero-sum or “politics-as-war” game, thereby establishing the basis for a consolidated democratic order. Consensual elite unification is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for democratic consolidation (Burton and Higley 1987b: 8).

Recently published contributions explore ways of achieving elite consensus in regard to the procedures and institutions of political democracy and describes various historical

10 trajectories of elite transformation and integration (Gimther and Higley 1992; Diamondouros.

Gunther and Puhle 1995). One study (Gunther and Higley 1992) distinguishes two types of

consolidation processes which result in elite consensual unity in support of the rules and

procedures of political democracy. In “elite convergences,” consensual unity is achieved

through a series of deliberate, tactical steps by rival elites over a relatively long period of

time. To become reliable competitors for electoral support, formerly radical elite factions abandon their extremist ideologies and adhere to the democratic rules of the game (Burton.

Gunther and Higley 1992a). Rational-choice, utilitarian calculations of maximizing electoral advantage lead to elite transformation and unity. By contrast, “elite settlements” are broad compromise agreements among previously adversarial elite factions, providing a necessary precondition for consolidated democracy. The leaders of all politically significant groups meet face-to-face behind closed doors to settle their basic disagreements and negotiate the ground rules for non-violent, institutionalized competition for political office based on the norms of restrained partisanship (Burton and Higley 1987b; Burton, Gunther and Higley

1992).

Research Design and Methodology

The principal purpose of this thesis is to account for the two dependent variables: (a) successful transition to democracy, and (b) only partial (or incomplete) consolidation. The research strategy employed here is to make rigorous use of the qualitative case-study method in order to analyze and explain the reasons for the two divergent outcomes of Bulgaria’s regime change. First, the analysis tests the once influential structural and cultural theories of democratization which focus on macro-level conditions, in particular historically

11 generated context, politico-cultural traditions, level of development, macroeconomic and sociostructural circumstances, and subcultural divisions in society. Secondly, it assesses the actor models of the elite-centric literature, which emphasize the actions and interactions of political elites and their key contribution to the processes of democratic transition and consolidation. In accordance with the definition in a recent study, the political elite is identified as “the persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic position in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Burton.

Gunther and Higley 1992). In this way, functional political eliteness is attributed to formal positions in government structures and party hierarchies, thereby including the leaderships of all politically significant groups in Bulgaria, ranging from the incumbent government to major oppositional forces.

An entire section is devoted to each of these two different sets of explanatory variables, asking how much they have contributed independently to the mixed record of

Bulgaria’s democratization. The operationalization of the variables will be discussed in the relevant substantive chapters. What follows below is a list of the main factors that are expected on theoretical grounds to affect the two dependent variables:

I. Dependent variables

1. Completed transition to democracy 2. Partial consolidation of democracy

II. Independent variables

1. Structural-historical and sociocultural conditions: a) Historical experiences and legacies b) Prior exposure to democracy c) Level of socioeconomic development d) Current macroeconomic and social conditions

1 2 e) Ethnic heterogeneity and conflict

2. Elite factors and procedural variables: a) Elite-negotiated mode of the transition b) Breakdown and renewal of elite consensus c) Constitution-making formula d) Lack of actual or potential challenger elites e) Style of elite behavior and interactions

In the first section, the dissertation discusses the two outcome variables, (a) the successful completion of the democratic transition, and (b) the only partial consolidation of the democratic regime. Proceeding from a purely formal-procedural definition of democracy

(Dahl 1971; Linz 1975; Schumpeter 1950), and applying the criteria formulated in recent scholarship on democratic consolidation (Higley and Gunther 1992; Diamondouros, Gunther and Puhle 1995 ; Linz and Stepan 1996), this study argues that post-Communist Bulgaria has completed its democratic transition and is now an electoral democracy, but has failed to become fully consolidated. A democratic transition is considered to be successfully completed

when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government has full authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. (Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995)

In other words, the authority of popularly elected leaders should not be constrained by

“reserve powers” held by any group or institution that is not electorally responsible, such as the military in Latin America and Southern Europe or the former Communist nomenklatura in post-Communist Europe. On the strength of the evidence presented in Chapter 2,1 argue that electoral democracy has become an established principle of state organization and governance in Bulgaria in accordance with the minimal, formal-procedural criteria used in

13 this analysis. The country completed the first, transformative phase of its democratic transition perhaps as early as the end of 1991—the year when the new Constitution was adopted and the anti-Communist opposition came to power. This double achievement led to a relatively quick institutional consolidation of the new regime. The Bulgarian neodemocracy became even more inclusive in December 1992 when the cabinet of . nominated by the Movement for Rights and (MRF), a predominantly Turkish party, was approved by the National Assembly, thus helping to incorporate the sizeable ethnic Turkish minority into the political structme of the coimtry. The intense nationalist opposition to the MRF has been on the wane, after it became clear that the latter is not going to split up Bulgaria along ethno-religious lines. Another positive step in the transition process was taken, at least symbolically, with the December 1994 election, when peacefully voted the Socialist opposition (the ex-Communists) back into power rather than voice their growing disaffection and anger with poor economic and social conditions through violent protests in the streets.

According to the procedmal conception applied in this study, a consolidated democracy is one in which

...none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the actions of democratically elected decision makers. This does not mean that there are no minorities ready to challenge and question the legitimacy of the democratic process by non-democratic means. It means, however, that the major actors do not turn to them and they remain politically isolated. To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the ‘only game in town.’ (Linz 1990: 158)

Based on the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 ,1 argue that Bulgaria has so far failed to become a truly consolidated democracy, that is, “a regime that meets all the

14 procedural criteria of democracy and also in which ail politically significant groups accept

established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game” (Burton,

Gunther and Higley 1992: 3). Although a purely formal democracy was achieved with the

holding of fi-ee elections in June 1990 and the adoption of a democratic constitution in July

1991, the process of consolidation has remained incomplete according to the structural,

attitudinal and behavioral criteria implicit in the procedural definition of consolidated democracy:

Structural: ...no significant reserve domains of power should exist that preclude important public policies fi*om being determined by the , procedures and institutions that have been sanctioned by the new democratic process.

Attitudinal: When a strong majority of public opinion acknowledges that the regime's democratic procedures and institutions are appropriate and legitimate, and where support for anti-system alternatives is quite low or isolated from the pro-democratic forces.

Behavioral: When no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actor spends significant resources attempting to achieve its objectives by challenging the regime’s institutions or rules with appeals for a military coup or revolutionary activities, and when the pro-democratic forces abide by its rules and do not engage in semi loyal politics. (Gunther, Linz and Stepan 1995).

While some significant progress has been made towards the entrenchment of the new regime, the latter is plagued by problems with respect to all three dimensions of consolidation, such as the inability of the state to maintain even the most basic law-and-order functions, relatively low democratic legitimacy, widespread public distrust of the new institutions, significant attitudinal support for anti democratic alternatives, confrontational style of politics by incumbents, and the semi loyal behavior of the political opposition in open violation of the democratic rules-of-the-game. An important requirement for consolidation

15 has not been met, namely, that the major political actors accept the rules of electoral competition and seek for their party or coalition electoral control over the legislature rather than attempt to alter the rules of the game or subvert the democratic system through extra- parliamentary opposition or revolutionary street tactics.

Structurally, the popularly-elected government is sovereign and does not share power in the policy-making sphere de jure or de facto. The adoption of a new constitution has institutionalized the operative rules of democratic contestation and accountability. National politics in Bulgaria is anchored in the freely-elected parliament which has become the central

(though, on occasion, far from the only) arena for contests between the opposing political parties. But it is premature to talk of structural consolidation, given the relatively short time that the new representative institutions have existed, their rather uneven or poor functioning, their frequent manipulation for partisan purposes, and the numerous potential sources of institutional instability. A major sign of institutional weakness and failure is the administrative incapacity of the state, especially its inability to dispense the most basic public goods and services, including the maintenance of public law and order.

Long-term consolidation depends on strong attitudinal support for democracy.

.A.lthough moderately pro-democratic in the abstract, attitudes of the mass public in Bulgaria are ambivalent about the merits of the new regime because of its disastrous record in terms of policy outputs and economic indicators. As public opinion surveys show, mass frustration, apathy and disappointment with political, social and economic realities have eroded confidence in the new post-Communist institutions and increased public support for anti­ democratic alternatives. But disillusionment with the performance of the new authorities has not been translated into a clear rejection of democracy. According to data analysis presented

16 in this study, a distinction is made between democratic legitimacy and popular assessments of regime performance. Because there has also been little electoral endorsement of fringe groups and movements, Bulgaria’s political parties and other organized elites have not been tempted to offer authoritarian choices.

Behaviorally, there is no immediate or direct threat from any openly anti democratic forces with links to the predecessor regime or imdemocratic foreign countries. This is evidenced by the public commitment of major party elites to the legitimacy of democracy and its procedural norms. But some parties do question the democratic loyalty of other parties or even their right to compete for political power. A number of politicians have sought to ban ideologically rival parties like the ex-Communists or ethnic minority parties, such as the MRF and the United Macedonian Organization-llinden- (UMO-llinden-

Pirin). While all politically significant groups publicly support the new democratic institutions as the only legitimate arena for their political contests, they often fail to observe the behavioral rules of the democratic game. As a result of elite polemics and confrontation, the new democracy has been plagued by polarization of society into two warring camps and sharp political antagonisms between ex-Communists and anti-Commimists. The rancorous tone of political discourse (in sharp contrast with “elite integration”) and the frequent recourse to extraparliamentary mobilization and even street violence by anti-Communist militants constitute clear evidence that the behavioral criterion for consolidation is not met.

As we shall see below, such imdemocratic behavior has deep historical roots and precedents.

The second section of the study examines the transition’s key background conditions, such as the heritage of history, prior exposure to democracy, stage of socioeconomic development, macroeconomic and social conditions, and ethnic heterogeneity and conflict,

17 asking how these structural and contextual variables may have affected the national elite’s efforts to install and consolidate the new set of political institutions in Bulgaria. As this section makes clear, the context of the transition has been less than favorable to the establishment, let alone the consolidation, of the new democracy. Post-Communist Bulgaria clearly lacks the structural and cultural “prerequisites” for introducing and consolidating an accepted and predictable set of rules for political competition and cooperation. It remains a prisoner of the painful experiences and memories of a tragic, violent past, whose legacy has divided the population into two ideologically irreconcilable and antagonistic camps. It has a relatively short, distant experience with democracy and a weak tradition of democratic political culture. The national economy, especially the industrial sector, and the social safety net have disintegrated. As a result, unemployment, poverty, income disparity, crime and corruption have reached historically unprecedented proportions. Problems with the ethnic

Turkish and Muslim minorities have proven to be another serious obstacle to national unity and democratic consolidation. In fact, the country’s level of socioeconomic development on the eve of the transition seems to be the only factor conducive to the success of the democratization project. But while the industrialization and modernity achieved during the

Communist era may have facilitated the move to democracy, the gains of the modernization process have been eroded by the subsequent near collapse of the national economy. The sharply negative setting of the transition has generally rendered the task of consolidating a meaningful democracy in Bulgaria even more difficult and complicated than in the other East

European cases.

Of course, the political effects of these background variables are not uniformly negative. On the one hand, a tragic, strife-ridden history is a factor which has undoubtedly

18 contributed to Left-Right divisions and conflicts, historical revenge-seeking, and political witch-hunts in present-day Bulgaria. Similarly, the severe economic crisis is another destabilizing factor, which has generated social turmoil, despair and profound popular misgivings about the competence and credibility of the new authorities, thereby creating a fertile ground for extra-parliamentary mobilization and revolutionary street action by the political opposition. On the other hand, the political consequences of other negative objective circumstances are not so clear-cut. While Bulgaria obviously lacks strong democratic traditions, the successful transition to democracy was facilitated by its prior democratic experience, including the rapid revival of its old multiparty system and the survival of a participant political culture (e.g., high levels of voter participation, partisan identification, interpersonal trust, political competency, political efficacy, interest in politics, etc.), which has contributed to the absence of armed violence and the relatively widespread acceptance of the new system. The conflict between the ethnic Turkish minority and Bulgarian nationalists has provoked clearly semiloyal acts and rhetoric on both sides but has remained generally peaceful, with the Turkish-dominated MRF emerging as a major legitimate player on the Bulgarian political scene, especially after it nominated Prime Minister Berov’s minority “cabinet of experts” in December 1992. Even though it is exacerbated by serious economic and social problems, the inter ethnic conflict has not undermined or broken up the new democracy.

While the political effects of these variables are very important, they should not be seen as determinative of democratization outcomes. It is clear that the relative absence of favorable historical, political-cultural, socioeconomic and cultural influences has not prevented Bulgaria from successfully completing its transition to formal democracy.

19 Historical and politico-cultural conditions, especially the traumatic failure of the previous democratic experiment and the enduring legacy of mutual intolerance and sharp confrontation between Left and Right, were not auspicious for a return to democratic rule, yet Bulgaria today is imquestionably an electoral democracy. As opinion surveys used in this study indicate, the post-Communist regime’s performance crisis has undermined trust in the new pluralistic institutions and eroded public satisfaction with democracy, without destroying democratic legitimacy. The situation has been aggravated by ethno-religious frictions between ethnic Turks and their nationalist opponents, which have persisted to this day but have not derailed the democratization process. Due to partisan discord, economic failure and social tensions, none of the governments democratically elected since June 1990 was able to complete its constitutional term of office, but democracy itself has not been endangered or overthrown. It is clear that macroconditions, or what some call political ecology, have strained the transition to democracy in Bulgaria without leading to democratic backsliding or regime breakdown. The macropolitical approach alone cannot provide a full explanation for the successful transition to democracy, at least not without accounting for the causal effects of the elite factor. Nor could one blame the incomplete consolidation of the new regime on the influence of unpropitious objective conditions alone, without mentioning the incompetence, corruption and collective irresponsibility of the national elite.

A third and final section deals with micropolitical variables, such as the elite- negotiated mode of the transition, the breakdown and renewal of elite consensus, the constitution-making formula, the absence of actual or potential challenger elites, the style of political behavior, and other elite-related factors that are expected on theoretical grounds to contribute independently to the outcome of Bulgaria’s democratization. The relatively

20 orderly launching of Bulgaria's changeover to democracy provides evidence of a democratization process brokered and worked out single-handedly by party leaders outside of the public limelight, a development which is in accord with the logic of elite-oriented models. Intensive formal and informal negotiations between party elites took place in the post-Zhivkov interregnum. A comprehensive pact among the major political groups did occur with the Roimd Table accords, the parliamentary election of UDF leader Zhelev to the newly-created presidency, and the negotiations on a new constitution, contributing to the successful completion of the transition. By negotiating a pacted transition, Bulgaria’s previously disunified political factions arrived at a democratic consensus that paved the way for the installation of the new democracy.

But Spanish-style bargaining and agreements have not ensured full democratic consolidation in Bulgaria. A formal settlement on the nature of the new regime was reached at the Round Table talks, but broke down soon after the ruling Socialists won the founding election. Because of partisan and personal animosities, face-to-face contacts between party leaders failed to promote mutual respect, trust and civility. The democratic consensus hammered out at the Roimd Table proved to be tenuous, fragile and largely based on the overconfident expectations of the anti-Communist opposition that it would inevitably prevail in any free, open and fair election. When electoral returns proved otherwise, some opposition leaders began to have second thoughts about the trustworthiness and acceptability of the ex-

Communists as partners, as well as the desirability of an elite pact which allowed the BSP to remain in power on the basis of its popular mandate and precluded retribution against the members of the old regime. Even though the spirit of the Round Table carried into the election of Zhelev to the presidency, hardliners in the opposition saw the Round Table

21 accords and the new constitution as a betrayal of their revolutionary goals, especially the principle of historical justice which required that the BSP be removed from power and that revenge be exacted from the former Communists for their past abuses. In August 1990, some of the hardliners led the mob assault on the BSP headquarters in , a revolutionary act which they tried to glorify as “the storming of our own Bastille.”

The elite accommodation accomplished through a painstaking process of negotiation and compromise at the Round Table disintegrated during the street riots and mob violence in the second half of 1990, which cut short the constitutionally mandated terms of the recently elected President and the popularly chosen government of Socialist

Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov. A new pact had to be negotiated to avoid a civil war and total regime collapse. Following the dangerous political crisis in the fall of 1990, procedural consensus was restored only through new inter-elite agreements hammered out at the all- night negotiating session of President Zhelev s Political Consultative Council, which facilitated the formation of a broad-based coalition government and rescued the country from the brink of a political disaster.

A new set of political accords, paving the way for the Grosse Koalition-iypc government of Prime Minister Dimitar Popov and the adoption of a democratic constitution on 12 July 1991, postponed the regime crisis, but evidently failed to resolve it. Throughout this period, the country continued to roller-coast from one crisis to another, ending prematurely the life of the MRF-nominated cabinet of Professor Berov and the Democratic

Left cabinet of Prime Minister . The first was driven out by a three-month-old parliamentary boycott of the opposition, while the second was forced to step down by street protests and nationwide political strikes. President Zhelev was nearly toppled by

22 a similar street coup, when his former party colleagues organized massive demonstrations, hunger strikes and the public burning of his books, demanding his immediate resignation.

The democratic game of politics is sustained by the shared norms that elites develop towards each other. The weak consolidation of Bulgarian democracy is indicated by the failure of the new political elite to adhere fully to the norms and principles of democratic behavior. In addition to the negative influence of the structural and cultural factors discussed in the second section, Bulgaria has fallen short of consolidation also because of the relative absence of collaborative dispositions, behavioral moderation and self-restraint on the part of key party elites. The uncooperative behavior of party leaders can be traced to the confounding effect of the contextual factors as filtered through elite values, dispositions and behaviors. With successive party governments adopting divisive policies that have had a catastrophic impact on the national economy and the capacity of the state to perform even the most fundamental law-and-order functions, the opposition has chosen rancor, semiloyal obstructionism and extraparliamentary mobilization. Obviously, there is as yet no full consensus on, nor even clear understanding of, the procedural legitimacy of democratically elected parliaments and governments or the proper role of the political opposition. As a result, the task of entrenching democracy and the rule of law in Bulgaria remains far from finished.

Sources of Data

There have been relatively few scholarly accounts of the Bulgarian transition to democracy. Even fewer in number are those more systematic contributions that stand out as substantively rich and theoretically rigorous. To my knowledge, the only in-depth, book-

23 length studies of recent democratization politics in Bulgaria are the two edited volumes by

John Bell (1998) and Iliana Zloch-Christy (1996).This detailed case study is an attempt to correct this deficiency by providing a richly nuanced understanding of Bulgaria’s political context and dynamics. It is eclectic in approach, relying heavily on secondary data analysis of press interviews, library resources, historical research, available aggregative statistics, voting data and public opinion surveys. Attitudinal data from mass opinion polls, such as the

Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP), the New Democracies Barometer, the

Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer, the Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press,

East/West Poll, and other prestigious survey sources, were analyzed. A wealth of economic and social information was culled from publications of Bulgaria’s National Statistical

Institute, the United Nations, the U.S. Government, and other public sources. Extensive use was made of press accoimts, monographic literature and other secondary sources, including the analysis and re-analysis of previously collected data. Memoirs by the transition’s main protagonists such as Zheliu Zhelev, Andrei Lukanov, Petko Simeonov, and others, other published recollections, public documents and speeches, election campaign materials, party brochures and other openly available primary sources have been examined through in-depth qualitative analysis to see how democratic the politically signifrcant actors in Bulgaria are and to what extent the democratic game of politics has taken root in Bulgaria.

But many of the research questions posed here could be answered only through intensive elite interviewing. Many of this study’s insights are based on the re-analysis of

Professor Albert Melone’s interviews with a large number of elite members who currently occupy top positions in Bulgaria, or have been influential since the time the country began its transition to democracy. I am most grateful to Dr. Melone, Political Science Professor at

24 the Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois, for providing me with his unpublished primary research, which is based on an extensive series of in-depth interviews with Bulgarian politicians and judicial officiais (see Melone 1996b). These political influentials and high-ranking government officials were selected for probing elite interviewing because of their important role in the processes of post-Communist democratization. The dissertation relies also on evidence collected from other published elite interviews (e.g., Antova-Konstantinova 1990) and numerous press interviews. Where the interviews have proven basically uninformative and no other direct evidence is available, elite attitudes, values and orientations have been inferred from observable pattems of elite behavior and interactions (even though behavioral manifestations are known to be highly ambiguous and inconclusive as empirical evidence).

Outline of the Study

The purpose of the next chapter 2 is to ascertain whether the political game in

Bulgaria is indeed fully democratic in accordance with the minimal formal-procedural criteria set forth by Linz and others. Chapter 3 deals with the consolidation processes in

Bulgaria, including the absence of maximalist anti-democratic forces with significant popular backing. A minimalist definition of democratic consolidation would require that there should be no politically significant anti-system or semi-loyal groups; all politically important actors must both proclaim their adherence to democratic principles and behave democratically. This first section stakes out and measures the two dependent variables, that is, the extent to which

Bulgaria has completed its democratic transition and the degree of its consolidation.

25 The subsequent two sections introduce two different sets of theoretically relevant factors which are believed to affect the outcome variables of this analysis. The second section deals with the major structural and cultural forces influencing the processes of transition and consolidation. I examine five dimensions of Bulgaria’s transition context; national history and its lasting legacy, the importance of prior democratic experiments, stage of development, the influence of socioeconomic conditions, and the impact of ethnocultural pluralism. Chapter 4 presents a historical overview, which delves into the role of historically generated context in bringing about the successes and failures of democratization. Chapter

5 focuses on how the politico-cultural heritage of the past, including Bulgaria’s previous democratic experience, predisposes the politically relevant elites to seek or reject a democratic agreement capable of forging broad procedural consensus in support of the democratic rules of the game. The processes of socioeconomic modernization, which are believed to have fostered political democratization in Bulgaria, are analyzed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 7 discusses the immediate economic and social circumstances in Bulgaria and measures the long-term effects of the economic crisis on public attitudes towards the new regime and economy. Finally, Chapter 8 addresses Bulgaria’s ethnic divisions and

“stateness” problem and how their impact may hamper or facilitate the democratic outcome.

The third and last section explores the key micropolitical dynamics of the transition.

By focusing on elite variables, this section addresses the critical role of political leaders as the driving force behind any consensus or dissensus on democratic proceduralism. Through what is sometimes called “process tracing,” Chapters 9, 10 and 11 examine the evidence of inter-elite negotiations, accommodation and consensus, such as the path-breaking Round

Table accords, the PCC agreements, the BSP-UDF coalition cabinet, and the constitutional

26 talks leading to the adoption of a democratic basic charter. Chapter 12 focuses on the general

absence of real or potential challenger elites which could question and reject the acceptability

of the adopted set of democratic institutions and behavioral norms. Chapter 13 probes the

behavioral obstacles undermining democratic consolidation, especially the threat to democracy posed by the country’s dangerous polarization, mutual intolerance and ideological confrontation between Left and Right. The concluding chapter 14 summarizes the empirical

findings of the preceding chapters, trying to elucidate their meaning and significance in light of the study’s explicit theoretical framework. With the help of these findings, it attempts to refine the theoretical assumptions originally employed for the present analysis.

27 CHAPTER 2

ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

The liberal conception of democracy implies free, fair and open elections, widespread public participation, regular and formalized political competition for office, freedom of speech and the press, and the rule of law (see Schumpeter 1950; Dahl 1956,1971, 1989; Linz

1975; Sartori 1987; Held 1987). A sort of “procedural minimum,” as defined by Juan Linz, is now widely accepted as a necessary element of . In Linz’s definition, a political system can be called democratic only

when it allows the free formulation o f political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to rule , without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political commimity from expressing their preference by norms requiring the use o f force to enforce them. (1975: 182-183)

This formal-procedural definition is said to be an ideal type in the Weberian sense, all of whose criteria must be closely approximated before a regime can be considered democratic

(Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992:1). For the purposes of this dissertation democracy will be understood in strictly minimalist, institutional-procedural terms. This means that democracy is a political regime that (1 ) is based on public contestation of political office and competitive, multiparty elections; and (2) guarantees basic civil and political liberties.

28 Admittedly, such a definition is an arbitrary, operational one, leaving out procedural quality or lack of social and economic as defining criteria.

Is post-Communist Bulgaria a fully democratic polity according to the formal criteria set forth by Schumpeter, Linz, Dahl and others? For the political game in Bulgaria to be considered fully democratic, the following procedural requirements must be met: ( 1 ) open, competitive and binding elections, held at regular intervals and under universal , must be the only legitimate route to government formation; (2) voting fraud, which might inhibit or invalidate expressions of citizen preferences, must be minimal; (3) no political parties or ideological movements should be banned, discriminated against or otherwise excluded from electoral competition; and (4) citizens must enjoy the full range of political and civil liberties necessary for political competition and participation. These four procedural requirements are logically implied by the concept of democracy as defined in this chapter.

On the basis of the available evidence in each of these four critical areas, it is evident that

Bulgaria has, for the most part, met the minimal, formal-procedural criteria. There are comparatively few limits on competition and participation—the two fundamental institutional dimensions in Dahl’s model—insofar as relatively open, competitive and fair elections under conditions of greater freedom, universal franchise and political pluralism are the only legitimate route to constitute the government in the post-Communist era.

Elections and Electoral Fraud

The relatively unrestricted right to open contestation of all effective positions of governmental power is a major requirement of the minimalist understanding of democratic politics. Free, fair and open elections are the cornerstone of :

29 ■‘Selecting rulers through elections is the heart of democracy, and democracy is real only if rulers are willing to give up power as a result of elections” (Huntington 1991: 267). To ensure democratic legitimacy and to give political pluralism real meaning, the government needs to have a freely-given and periodic electoral mandate from the people. Even though one needs to avoid the so-called “electoralist fallacy” (Linz and Stepan 1996:4), democracy would be unthinkable without reasonably competitive and influential elections which are held regularly on the basis of and the results of which determine who governs. In Dahl’s words, elections and a competitive, multiparty system are crucial for ensuring that political representatives will be “somewhat responsive to the preferences of ordinary citizens” (1956: 131). The opposition must have some real chance of winning the elections and taking office (Dahl 1971). But for elections to be legitimate and representative, full voting equality and widespread pubUc participation are required. The former requirement means that all votes cast must carry the same weight, while the latter requirement implies that the more inclusive the level of political participation in the selection of national leaders and policies, the more democratic the political system (Oppenheim 1971: 37-38). Electoral participation of less than 50% of registered voters (who again must represent a preponderant majority of the eligible adult population) would indicate a level of citizen alienation that puts into serious question democratic inclusiveness. For elections to be a valid reflection of what

Jean-Jacques Rousseau defined as “the general will,” the pluralistic electoral process must not be fraudulent or tampered with in any way. No padding of voter turnout should be allowed to distort the outcome of electoral races. Rigged elections with certain, pre­ determined results are, by definition, incompatible with democracy. And violence at election

30 time is even more incompatible with the principle of democratic control over the

government.

There have been six national since 1990, with full rights of organization and contestation. The evidence presented here will show that these multiparty, secret-ballot elections were relatively free and competitive, thus guaranteeing to make the government accountable to the electorate. Political office is openly and peacefully contested and there is no arrangement (as in the Polish election of 1989) protecting against the possibility of electoral defeat for the elite of the old regime. Not only is the political opposition allowed to participate in elections, but it has not been seriously curbed or harassed in its legitimate activities. The evidence from the six national elections will also show that voters were generally not manipulated or miscounted. Nor have there been any persistent attempts at restricting voter turnout by such devices as violence, voter intimidation, cumbersome voter registration laws, etc. Election fraud, though existing, was relatively minimal and could not have inhibited or invalidated the expression of political preferences.

There was no gross distortion of the representation of public opinion resulting from election laws that might have cast doubt about the fairness of Bulgaria’s electoral process. The results of these elections demonstrate that, in strictly procedural terms, Bulgaria is already an electoral democracy. The relative openness of the democratic electoral process is a positive indicator that representative institutions are taking root.

The 1990 GNA Election

The parliamentary election of Jime 1990 was Bulgaria’s first genuinely free and fair multiparty contest in the postwar era and was therefore seen as an important test of the

31 democratization process set in motion after the ouster of state and party leader Todor

Zhivkov by his own colleagues on 10 November 1989. Held under reasonably free conditions, the election legitimated the democratic arrangements that had been made through a negotiated agreement between reformist elements of the ruling elite and leaders of the newly organized opposition.

The removal of Zhivkov had come in the wake of anti-govemment protests during the October 1989 international environmental conference, held in Sofia under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He was replaced by

Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov, one of the more liberal members of the BCP .

Starting in December, there were new demonstrations for democracy, in which tens of thousands of Bulgarians took part. Mass gave impetus to change and the new leadership immediately proclaimed that Bulgaria needed radical reforms, giving real power to the people. In response, a nascent opposition movement called for far-reaching political and economic changes, particularly the holding of democratic elections. In January 1990, the

BCP government abandoned single-party rule and began to negotiate the revamping of the political system with opposition groups, including of Democratic Forces, an umbrella organization of sixteen parties, groups and movements founded on 7 December

1989.

The Round Table talks reached a series of agreements designed to help Bulgaria make a peaceful transition to a democratic society. The agreements provided for elections in June 1990 to a new legislature, which would meet to draft and adopt a new constitution, after which it would vote whether to disband itself or to finish its four-year term. Since it would be functioning both as a parliament and as a constitutional assembly to democratize

32 the political system of the country, the newly elected legislature was given the special status of a Grand National Assembly (GNA). The Round Table negotiators also drafted a new electoral law which was quickly ratified by the parliament. While the right to vote by direct secret ballot remained universal for all Bulgarian citizens eighteen years of age or older, the representatives they chose were now responsible only to the electorate. Rules concerning eligibility for nomination and the nomination process itself also changed under the new electoral law. All political parties and registered non-party organizations were allowed to field candidates. Individuals were nominated for participation in the elections with 500 signatures of voters from their district, while an imlimited number of candidates were allowed to run fi"om each constituency. The Bulgarian Socialist Party, formerly the Bulgarian

Communist Party (BCP), nominated 479 candidates; the UDF, 429; the Bulgarian Agrarian

National Union (BANU), a former ally of the BCP that had severed ties with the Socialists before the election, 428. Two minor coalitions, the Political Opposition Bloc and the rightist

United People’s Alliance, nominated 142 and 24 candidates, respectively. In addition, some

40 parties, movements and groups, many o f them quite negligible, fielded 1,596 candidates.

A total of 3,098 candidates, including individual candidacies, were officially registered for the election (Nikolaev 1990b).

A new electoral procedure was introduced. The 400 GNA representatives were selected by a mixed system in two rounds of voting on June 10 and 17. Half the parliamentary seats were distributed by d’Hondt formula of proportional representation from party lists in 28 multi-member districts. A 4% minimum of the vote was required for a party to achieve representation. The other 200 seats were decided by majority vote from 200 single-member districts with an approximately equal number of inhabitants. A runoff

33 election between the top two contenders was required in each single-member constituency

where less than half of the electorate turned out to vote on June 10 or where no candidate received an absolute majority of the votes. In a procedure confusing to many voters, each voter cast two votes—one for a candidate elected by majority vote and one for the list o f a party running in a PR constituency (Nikolaev 1990b; Ashley 1990b). Finally, the round-table agreement included several provisions, such as the end of state monopoly in the mass media and publishing, that were intended to make the elections more competitive. These provisions required the government to provide state resources to the opposition during the election campaign and to ensure equal access to media outlets. Newsprint was made available to the mushrooming opposition press and censorship was abolished. Free television time was allotted to the political parties for debates between their candidates (Bell 1991b: 262-263).

The conduct of the election was closely monitored by local and foreign observers, including the CSCE and other international organizations. The Central Electoral Commission, now a neutral body, supervised the operation of subordinate commissions in the districts, overseeing the equitable implementation of electoral laws. The CEC was headed by Law

Professor Zhivko Stalev who had no political connections. Election commissions at all levels included members from all political parties (Bell 1990).

The June 1990 multiparty ballot was thus an important move towards political pluralism. The holding of this founding election can be regarded as the birth date of the new

Bulgarian democracy. The election was marked by an extremely high voter turnout, even for a founding election. In the first roimd of voting, 90.79% of the Bulgarians eligible to vote went to the polls. In the second round, when voting took place in 81 of the 200 single­ member districts, 84.14% participated. Lacking time and resources, the UDF campaigned

34 mostly in the cities where it did very well among middle-class professionals and young

people. But it made the serious tactical mistake of relying too heavily on negative

campaigning. Using the services of a British advertizing agency, the incumbent BSP

campaigned vigorously as a reform party. It took advantage of the fragmentation and

inexperience of the opposition to win among older citizens and the residents of smaller cities,

towns and rural areas, playing on their fears o f the . In contrast to many of their

counterparts in Eastern Europe (save for Himgary), reformers in Bulgaria’s new Socialist

leadership enjoyed genuine political standing and popular appeal (see Nikolaev 1990c;

Garber 1992; Koulov 1995).

Although it received less than half of the popular vote (47.15%), the BSP won an

absolute majority in the Seventh GNA with a total of 211 of the 400 seats (see Table 2.1 ).

With 36.20% of the vote, the UDF obtained 144 parliamentary seats, but it outpolled the

Socialists in most Bulgarian cities. The newly established, predominantly ethnic Turkish

organization, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, won 6.03% of the popular vote and

23 seats. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, traditionally Bulgaria’s largest political party, received only 16 seats, although it had garnered 8.03% of the vote (a result of the distorting effect of single-seat races). The remaining six seats were divided among two

independent candidates and three small groups: the Fatherland Union, formerly known as the

Fatherland Front, (2 seats); the Social Democratic Party (non-Marxist) headed by Yanko

Yankov (1 seat); and the neonationalist Fatherland Party of Labor (1 seat).

35 Party Votes % votes Seats % seats BSP 2,886,766 47.15 211 52.75 UDF 2,317,798 36.20 144 36.00 BANU 491,587 8.03 16 4.00 MRF 368,929 6.03 23 5.75 Others 158,279 2.59 6 1.50 Total 6,224, 369 100.00 400 100.00

Table 2.1: The GNA election, 10-17 June 1990

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

Although party leaders had called on their supporters to create a violence-free atmosphere for the elections, some commentators (see Bell 1991b) claim that the election campaign was marred by intimidation tactics, including some violence, used by local BSP members, especially in the countryside. A pre-election document issued by the UDF ( 1990) claimed that many violations of the electoral law and the Round Table agreements were committed by officials of the ruling party, in addition to errors and gaps in the electoral lists.

After the election, the UDF continued to complain that there had been numerous cases of fraud and intimidation, particularly in rural areas, where the old Zhivkov-era power structures were still in place. officials were accused of having pressured their constituents to vote for the BSP. The Central Electoral Commission announced that it had received 1,138 complaints about alleged irregularities in the two roimds of voting. The

Commission acknowledged that it had foimd some evidence of abuses, including the presence of mayors, policemen and other unauthorized persons at polling stations. Ballots

36 had also been reported stolen or discarded. The Commission’s report recommended that

parliament consider the charges and, if they were justified, order new elections in some

constituencies, but it also concluded that these violations did not fundamentally affect the

outcome o f the poll (Bell 1991b: 263; Nikolaev 1990c; Karasimeonov 1997).

Overall, the elections were generally peaceful and orderly. This was the first

Bulgarian election without a single political murder (Todorova 1992: fh. 45). The majority

of the country’s citizens accepted the legitimacy of the results. According to foreign

observers, the voting was reasonably free of ballot tampering, interference or coercion. Most

accusations of manipulation and intimidation proved to be unfounded. There were indeed

some irregularities, but the general consensus was that these isolated instances had no substantial effect on the final results (Voorhees 1991: 5; Todorova 1992: 165; Crampton

1993: 17).

In September 1990, the newly elected GNA voted to confirm Acting Prime Minister

Andrei Lukanov of the BSP. The new cabinet was almost entirely from the BSP, despite

Lukanov’s efforts to form a coalition government of national unity capable of introducing effective austerity measures and marketization programs. UDF leaders rejected all offers to join a coalition government and repeatedly pledged never to cooperate with the ex-

Communists. Both the MRF and BANU also distanced themselves from the BSP and declined its proposals for a coalition. Because decisions of the GNA, as a constituent assembly, required a two-thirds majority, the opposition could veto all Socialist constitution- writing initiatives (Bell, Gould and Smolka 1990). The BSP’s election victory turned into a political stalemate, as the Lukanov government quickly lost popularity because of the souring economy. In October 1990, Lukanov survived a no-confidence motion in the GNA

37 by a single vote. In November, there was a wave of strikes organized by the UDF and the

trade unions against the government. After weeks of demonstrations and a four-day general

strike calling for the ouster of the BSP cabinet, Lukanov and his ministers resigned on

November 29. A civil war and total democratic breakdown were averted only when the

cabinet was replaced by a coalition government whose composition had been negotiated

among the major parliamentary parties. The new Prime Minister was Dimitar Popov, a politically imafftliated judge. The cabinet included ministers from the BSP, the UDF,

BANU, as well as five independents. No ministers from the MRF were appointed to the multiparty coalition, which served imtil the next elections.

The 1991 Parliamentary Election

The timing of the next parliamentary election was the focus of heated political debate in the first half of 1991. The GNA was dissolved on July 17 and reconstituted as an ordinary

National Assembly. After a new constitution had been ratified on July 12 and a new electoral law went into effect in August, elections for an ordinary National Assembly were set for mid-October 1991. The new elections were held imder the D’Hondt system of proportional representation, eliminating the mixed electoral system of Jime 1990. The country was divided into thirty-one electoral districts. A party could claim parliamentary seats if its lists of candidates had collected a minimum of 4% of the total votes, which was calculated on a nationwide basis. Given the participation of 42competing parties, groups and coalitions in the election, this percentage threshold on representation was intended to prevent a paralyzing party fragmentation in the legislature.

38 Foreign observers for the election included a 60-member international mission sponsored by two U.S. institutes for international relations and a British team of 11 experts.

The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly sent a nine-member delegation. The electoral law prescribed a 25-member Central Electoral Commission which was appointed by President Zhelev in consultation with the political parties. The central commission then appointed and oversaw electoral commissions in the local districts and set strict policy guidelines for the conduct of the balloting.

In contrast to the previous election, only a third of the Bulgarian electorate voted in favor of the Socialist party and its allies on 13 October 1991. The BSP had formed a pre­ election alliance with nine minor parties, five of them known to have a strong nationalistic orientation: the Fatherland Party of Labor, the Bulgarian , the Christian

Women’s Movement, the Christian Republican Party, and the National Democratic Party.

The Fatherland Party of Labor, the political wing of the nationalistic Committee for the

Defense ofNational Interests (CDNI), was active in ethnically mixed regions. The candidates of the coalition partners appeared on the BSP’s election lists but were not given a fixed quota.

39 Party Votes % votes Seats % seats UDF (Movement) 1,903,567 34.36 110 45.83 BSP 1,836,050 33.14 106 44.17 MRF 418,168 7.55 24 10.00 BANU (United) 214,052 3.86 - - BANU () 190,454 3.54 - - UDF (Center) 177,295 3.20 - - UDF (Liberals) 155,902 2.81 - - Monarchists 100,883 1.82 - - Business Bloc 73,379 1.32 - - National 62,462 1.13 - - Others 408,625 7.27 - - Total 5,540, 837 100.00 240 100.00

Table 2.2: National Assembly election, 13 October 1991

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

The high voter turnout of79.20% reflected the importance which Bulgarians attached to this second post-Communist vote (Verona 1991; Kostova 1992). The election results—

34.34% for the Union of Democratic Forces-Movement (UDF-Movement), 33.14% for the

BSP and its allies, and 7.55% for the MRP—marked the end of the government domination of the ex-Communists. None of the many parties located in the political center obtained parliamentary representation. The Agrarians were split into two main factions, neither of which managed to breach the 4% barrier (although BANU-United, with 3.86% o f the vote.

40 came very close to doing so). Breakaway groups that had left the UDF managed to gamer

only 2-3% of the vote each, which led to their disappearance fi’om the parliamentary scene.

Overall, nearly 25% of the votes went to 35 parties and coalitions, as well as to independent

candidates, none of which received the 4% minimum required to be seated in the 240-

member parliament (see Table 2.2).

The electoral process was again clouded by accusations of voter manipulation and

fraud. In the election itself, many voters were reportedly confused by the various different- colored ballots stacked in several dozen piles inside the voting booths (Dainov 1992: 12).

Yet the fairness of the election was not in doubt since international observers and Bulgarian election officials alike agreed that the voting had been open and fair, some minor technical irregularities notwithstanding (Perry 1992: 78; Karasimeonov 1997). Although victorious at the polls, the UDF again claimed that balloting had not been completely fraud-free, but a parliamentary commission entrusted with an investigation of the charges failed to reach a consensus.

The UDF-Movement became the largest party in the National Assembly, with 110 deputies out of 240, against 106 for the BSP and 24 for the MRF. The outcome meant that the election did not provide the kind of broad popular mandate that the UDF leadership had expected. By the summer of 1991 the UDF had suffered a series of splits and realignments, as large sections of the original coalition had left to form the UDF-Center and the UDF-

Liberals. Other factions had decided to run as separate political parties. But the election results showed that it was the hardline UDF-Movement which represented the majority of anti-Communist voters. Partisan politics in the country acquired a bipolar configuration, as almost equal numbers of Socialist and UDF deputies confronted each other in the badly-

41 divided legislature (Dainov 1992: 12-13). As the third, swing-vote party in parliament, the

MRP was in a position to play the role of king-maker in the formation of a new government.

Only with its strong support was the UDF-Movement able to command a parliamentary

majority and form a government. The cabinet of Filip Dimitrov, a 36-year-old attorney and

UDF leader, was approved by the National Assembly on November 8. Dimitrov, deputy

chairman of the , became the world’s first and so far only environmental party

leader to head a national government. Both the BSP and the MRF were excluded from his

cabinet, which became Bulgaria’s first government without Commimist representatives in

nearly half a century.

With the new government pursuing Polish-style “shock therapy,’’ the deregulation of prices and a rising jobless rate alarmed the trade unions and led to crippling strikes. In a

matter of months, the number of imemployed shot from 27,000 to 420,000. Following the enactment of anti-Communist laws, thousands of state officials, academics and journalists were fired from their jobs without due process. A series of controversial political trials were staged against former government officials, including ex-prime minister Lukanov, the most pivotal figure in the transition. Even President Zhelev became alarmed by the hardline positions of the UDF government, which he accused of waging a war against pluralism and openly violating the new Constitution. The reform policies exacerbated the economic crisis in the Turkish-populated areas, which strained the cabinet’s relations with the MRF, even though the latter stood by the Prime Minister to defeat a censure motion by the Socialists on 24 July 1992. As political and social turmoil mounted, the informal UDF-

MRF alliance collapsed in the fall of 1992, when MRF leader Ahmed Dogan accused the government of trying to impose a right-wing in the country. Prime Minister

42 Dimitrov was forced to resign on 28 October 1992 after the MRF joined its former arch-rival, the BSP, to pass a vote of no-confidence in the UDF cabinet. The pretext for the censure were accusations fi'om Zhelev s office that high-ranking government officials had violated the U.N. embargo against the former Yugoslav republics by negotiating a secret arms sale to the Republic o f .

After the UDF and the BSP each failed to form a government, a “cabinet of experts” appointed at the initiative of the MRF was approved on 30 December 1992. Professor

Lyuben Berov, an ethnic Bulgarian chosen by the MRF, became the new prime minister.

Berov, who had formerly served as economic advisor to President Zhelev, was an independent, but First Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Matinchev was a senior member of the MRF who supervised government policies on behalf of his party. With the support of the

Socialists in the National Assembly, Berov remained in power for nearly two years.

The 1992 Presidential Election

In the third nationwide contest since the fall of Zhivkov, President Zhelev and his running mate, poetess and former anti-Commimist , won

Bulgaria’s first ever direct presidential elections, which were held in January 1992. The office of President of the Republic had been created under the Round Table agreements of

1990 to replace the Zhivkov-era State Council. The Constitution of 1991, which declared

Bulgaria a parliamentary democracy, significantly curtailed presidential powers, even though it stipulated direct elections for the presidency. According to the guidelines which the new constitution set for this now largely ceremonial post, the president, who serves a five-year term and can be re-elected only once, is the Bulgarian head of state and commander-in-chief

43 of the armed forces. The office’s only significant political prerogatives are representing the country abroad, appointing the cabinet and other high-ranking officials with parliamentary approval, and the right to send legislation back to the National Assembly for reconsideration.

After delegates to the Round Table decided to recommend Petar Mladenov for president, the Assembly unanimously elected him to the new post on 3 April 1990. He gave up the BSP leadership in keeping with the new rules of separating party and state. In July

1990, Mladenov was forced to resign by UDF-led protests over allegations that he had threatened to use tanks against hostile demonstrators in Sofia the previous December. Zheliu

Zhelev, an academic and UDF chairman, was elected president by the GNA in

August 1990 in a compromise between the Socialist majority and the opposition after the other candidates had failed to win the required two-thirds of the vote in the Assembly. The newly elected president had to give up the UDF chairmanship and accept the former internal security minister, Colonel-General Atanas Semerdjiev of the BSP, as his vice-president.

In the January 1992 elections, Zhelev ran as a candidate of the UDF, but he failed to win a clear victory in the first roimd of voting (see Table 2.3). In a field crowded by 22 contenders, the incumbent received 44.58% of the vote in the first round. Law Professor

Velko Valkanov, an independent running with the official backing of the BSP, received

30.52%. A dark-horse candidate with American as well as Bulgarian citizenship, Mr. George

Ganchev of the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), captured 16.80% of the vote to finish third.

The BBB, a centrist political party, had been foimded in December 1990 to work for the encouragement of private business and to attract foreign capital.

Although Zhelev was blamed by many Bulgarians for high imemployment, rising prices and other economic shocks resulting from the shift toward a market economy, he

44 could have won the required majority in the first round if not for the good showing of

Ganchev, a U.S.-based entrepreneur and colorful media personality. Ganchev and his popular

running mate, , ran in the election with an unabashedly populist and nationalist political message. Beron had replaced Zhelev as UDF chairman in August 1990, but was

later forced out by allegations of having been an informer for Zhivkov’s secret police.

Ganchev’s unexpected third-place finish reflected the deep unpopularity of Bulgarian politicians.

Under the new constitution, a president is elected in the first round upon receiving more than half of the valid votes cast and if turnout is over 50%. If neither of these conditions is met, the two front-nmners must compete in a second round of voting, in which a simple plurality and no minimum turnout are required. The two fi-ont-runners faced each other in a second round of voting a week later, since neither had won an absolute majority.

In the runoff on January 19, Zhelev prevailed by polling 52.85% of the vote against 47.15% for Valkanov and his running mate, Roumen Vodenicharov, a UDF founder and former deputy in the GNA. While Zhelev and Dimitrova championed Westem-style democracy, a free market and attracting foreign investment, the Valkanov-Vodenicharov duo ran as ardent nationalists mobilizing the nationalistic, anti-Turkish vote in addition to the Left-leaning electorate. Valkanov invoked the sufferings of the newly unemployed and retired people, whose standard of living had plunged with economic reforms, but he also attacked President

Zhelev’s promises to promote the rights of the ethnic Turkish minority.

45 First ballot, 12 January 1992

Candidates Votes % of vote Zheliu Zhelev 2,273,468 44.66 Velko Valkanov 1,549,754 30.44 854,020 16.80 Others 413,867 8.10 Total 5,091,109 100.00

Second ballot, 19 January 1992

Candidates Votes % of vote Zheliu Zhelev 2,781,165 52.85 Velko Valkanov 2,481,209 47.15 Total 5,262,374 100.00

Table 2.3; Presidential election, 12-19 January 1992

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

Once again, there was relatively widespread public participation in the election: voter turnout was 75.41% in the first round of voting and 75.92% in the second round. In contrast to the previous two democratic ballots, the presidential election of January 1992 was marked by relatively few official complaints about electoral misbehavior, manipulation or fraud.

When the Central Electoral Commission submitted its records to the National Assembly, there was comparatively little recorded evidence of voting irregularities or violations of the law (ETA in English, January 30,1992). The electoral law adopted in August 1991 provided

46 for the nomination of presidential candidates by official political parties and coalitions or by a minimum o f5,000 citizens for independents, but a clause in the 1991 Constitution imposed greater restrictions, including the requirement that candidates for the presidency must have resided in Bulgaria for a minimum of five years. While the latter provision was aimed at preventing former King Simeon 11, who lives in but holds a Bulgarian passport, from standing as a presidential candidate, it also bars other Bulgarian exiles from contesting that office. The Constitutional Court had to approve the eligibility of George Ganchev, since he had not lived in Bulgaria for the previous five years (Nikolaev 1992). Such restrictions on eligibility for high public office, though hardly democratic, are not uncommon and can be found in most modem democracies.

The 1994 Parliamentary Election

Appointed in December 1992, the minority government o f Prof. Berov was kept in power by support in the National Assembly from the MRP, the BSP, and breakaway factions of the UDF. The Socialists began to reassert themselves as the strongest political force in the country. A hostile UDF accused the government of delaying reforms and pressed for new parliamentary elections to resolve the political impasse. But the coalition, formerly the largest parliamentary bloc, was weakened by new internal divisions and defections. .After several of its no-confidence motions were defeated in parliament, the UDF launched a full legislative boycott, forcing Berov to resign in September 1994. His cabinet was replaced by a caretaker government headed by , an economist who had been Berov’s minister for privatization.

47 In spite of Socialist attempts to reintroduce majoritarian elements in the voting

system, the 1991 electoral law remained in effect for the December 1994 elections. In

consultation with the political parties, the Central Electoral Commission appointed election

commissions in the nation’s 31 electoral districts and named the commission chairmen

according to the recommendations of regional governors. The UDF nominated more

members of election commissions than any other party or coalition of parties.

Forty-eight parties and coalitions of parties participated in the parliamentary elections

held on 18 December 1994. Thirty-nine of them had met the requirement of running

candidates on party lists in at least 11 electoral districts, which gave them free access to the

mass media during the election campaign Only one small political party, the Bulgarian

Liberal Congress, was denied registration on procedural grounds by the Supreme Court, even though it had previously been approved by the Central Electoral Commission.

After Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, Bulgaria joined the region-wide swing to the

left. The , a coalition including the BSP-Fatherland Party of Labor alliance.

B ANU-Alexander Stamboliisky of Svetoslav Shivarov, and Ecoglasnost (formerly a fb under­ member of the UDF) of Stefan Gaitandzhiev, won 43.50% of the votes and an absolute majority of 125 seats in the 240-member legislature. Its candidates outpolled the competition in 25 of the nation’s 31 electoral constituencies. The UDF received 24.23% of the votes and

69 seats. The Popular Union (PU), a newly formed coalition of Anastasia Dimitro v-Mozer ’ s

BANU and the Democratic Party of Stefan Savov (a splinter faction of the UDF), won 6.50% of the popular vote and 18 legislative seats. The MRF chalked up 5.44% to gain 15 seats, while the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) of George Ganchev received 4.72% and 13 seats

(see Table 2.4). With just under 4% of the vote (3.79%), the Democratic Alternative (a

48 coalition of several center-left parties, including the Social Democratic Party of Petar

Dertliev) failed to win any parliamentary seats. None of the candidates of the Patriotic

Union, an alliance of several openly nationalist organizations, was elected to parliament.

Voter turnout was 75.23%, but 2% of the votes cast were declared invalid. The vote for the

Democratic Left reflected widespread discontent with the confrontational policies, internal

squabbling and lack of effective leadership on the part of the anti-Communist parties. In a

widely expected political backlash against the harshness of economic reform, voters also expressed deep dissatisfaction with Bulgaria’s disastrous economic performance, sharply

lower living standards and growing crime rate. Since the UDF was widely associated with and blamed for the severe hardship caused by the reforms, the Socialists managed to capitalize on the public’s mood by promising to reverse the country’s catastrophic economic decline (Karasimeonov 1995; Crampton 1995).

The Central Electoral Commission, which was again chaired by an independent acceptable to all political forces, reported no serious voting improprieties during the election, even though Dertliev and Alexander Tomov charged that miscounting of ballots had prevented their Democratic Alternative coalition fi'om breaching the 4% barrier.

In spite of its absolute majority in the new parliament, the BSP offered to form a government of national unity. While Socialist leader Zhan Videnov ruled out cooperation with the UDF (whose entire leadership had stepped down following the election defeat), he proposed a coalition with the other three parliamentary parties. But neither party agreed to participate in a coalition govenunent with the BSP. A predominantly Socialist cabinet (7

Socialists, 2 Agrarians, 1 Ecoglasnost member, and 7 independents) headed by Videnov won parliamentary approval on 25 January 1995. Despite its generous electoral promises, the

49 ineffective and badly divided Videnov cabinet failed miserably to improve the disastrous

state of the economy. After only two years in office, the Democratic Left government was

forced out of power by mass street protests and strikes, leading to the early parliamentary elections of April 1997.

Party Votes % votes Seats % votes Democratic Left 2,181,658 43.50 125 52.08 UDF 1,215,210 23.23 69 28.75 Popular Union 326,496 6.50 18 7.50 MRF 272,833 5.44 15 6.25 BBB 237,224 4.72 13 5.42 Others 781,886 15.61 -- Total 5,015,307 100.00 240 100.00

Table 2.4: National Assembly election, 18 December 1994

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

The 1996 Presidential Election

Bulgaria’s second presidential vote took place in the autumn o f1996. It was preceded by a U.S.-style primary—the first election of its kind in Europe—designed to select a single presidential candidate for the traditionally fractious anti-BSP opposition. In the preliminary ballot held on 1 June 1996, of the UDF received 65.74% of the popular vote against 34.26% for inciunbent President Zhelev. Zhelev’s candidacy had the support of the

50 Popular Union and the MRF. The turnout was rather low, as only 849,796 valid votes were cast—less than 12% of all eligible voters in Bulgaria. According to official results from regional electoral commissions, Stoyanov, a 44-year-old lawyer and vice-chairman of the

UDF, won in most regions, with the notable exception of those with an ethnic Turkish majority, where Zhelev obtained between 74% and 84% of the vote. The UDF’s strong organization at the grass-roots level helped Stoyanov beat the incumbent, who relied more on his familiar name and face (Jones 1996). Zhelev accepted the results of the primary, promising not to run in the upcoming presidential elections.

In the first round of the presidential election held on 27 October 1996, Stoyanov and his running mate. Agrarian Todor Kavaldzhiev, garnered 43.98% of the vote. Their candidacy had the support of the (UntDF), an alliance of the UDF, the Popular Union, and the MRF, as well as the blessing of former king Simeon II. The candidates of the BSP-led “Together for Bulgaria" coalition. Culture Minister Ivan Marazov. a history professor, and First Deputy Foreign Minister , were a distant second with 27.04%. BBB leader George Ganchev and his running mate Arlin Antonov finished third with 21.91%. The candidates of the Democratic Center (later renamed the Euroleft)

Alexander Tomov and Lyudmil Marinchevski won 3.16% of the vote. A pair of mock candidates poking fun at the absurdity ofBulgarian politics, comedians Khristo Boychev and

Ivan Kalekov, received 1.34%. Voter turnout was disappointing low as only 62.73% of the

Bulgarians listed in the electoral registers went to the polls (Krause 1996b).

The elections took place amid a catastrophic economic crisis, for which the BSP cabinet was mainly blamed. In his electoral campaign, Stoyanov actively portrayed himself as the leader of “a new majority of impoverished people and those who fear becoming so”

51 (AFP, November 3, 1996). The BSP had to replace its presidential candidate at the last

minute, after Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, who had been ahead in most pre-election

polls, was barred by the Central Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court from running

on the pretext of not being a Bulgarian citizen “by birth,” as required by the Constitution.

Pirinski was bom in New York City in 1949, the son o f a Bulgarian father and an American

mother, but his parents later resettled in Bulgaria. Former caretaker premier Reneta Indzhov a

was also denied registration as a presidential candidate, because her mnning mate. General

Stoyan Tsonkov, was still on active duty in the armed forces and therefore was precluded by

law from running in the election. This was not the first time that politicians have sought to

defeat their opponents in the court room rather than at the ballot box.

According to the Central Electoral Commission, 4,201,320 eligible voters

participated in the second round o f voting on 3 November 1996. On the eve of the second

ballot, Stoyanov was warmly received by Chancellor and other German

leaders, who publicly called him “ottr candidate” (BTA in English, November 1, 1996).

Western governments and international financial institutions had just turned down Sofia's

urgent pleas for emergency loans to meet outstanding debt repayments and a growing grain

shortage, which also indirectly helped Stoyanov by aggravating the crisis atmosphere in the country. Of the votes declared valid, 59.76% were cast for Stoyanov and Kavaldzhiev. while

40.33% went to Marazov and Bokova. Voter turnout was 61.72%. In his landslide victory.

Stoyanov won more than two-thirds of the vote in Sofia and other cities, as well as a small majority in many towns and villages, which had traditionally backed the BSP. Marazov gained a slight majority only in the northwest of the country (Krause 1996c).

52 The new president was portrayed as an embodiment of the moderate anti-Communist

Right, straddling the deep political and social divisions in his country. A pragmatic,

pro-market intellectual, he promised to distance himself from the hardline politics of

confrontation and polarization practiced by the UDF in the past, stressing instead the need

for “reasonable change” (Koinova 1996). Stoyanov pledged that, as president, he would

engage in “a tolerant political dialogue” and support “all positive steps” taken by the ruling

Socialists (Sergeeva 1996). During the election campaign, he avoided direct criticism of the

BSP, but also suggested the holding of early parliamentary elections.

CEC chairman Baicho Panev announced that the Commission had established that

isolated violations committed in the presidential election were too insignificant to invalidate the outcome of the ballot. Foreign and local observers agreed that the voting had been generally free, open and fair. An OSCE observer mission confirmed that the elections took place in a “calm and thoughtful fashion” and thus “assisted in the further development and entrenchment of democracy in Bulgaria.” But the mission was critical of the election law, including the privileges given to candidates nominated by the parties represented in parliament, who were given extra time on radio and TV, and did not need to provide bank guarantees to receive public subsidies for their campaigns. A statement issued by 11 observers from the U.S. International Republican Institute (IRI) hailed the election’s

“remarkable professionalism” (BTA in English, October 30, 1996). But international observers were surprised to find that 350,000 more people had registered to vote than expected in accordance with the country’s official demographic statistics (AFP, October 29.

1996). Since no explanation was ever provided for this discrepancy, it is impossible to say

53 whether it was due to electoral fraud or to incompetence and oversight on the part of the election authorities responsible for revising and updating voter lists.

First ballot, 27 October 1996

Candidates Votes % of vote Petar Stoyanov 1,889,825 43.98 Ivan Marazov 1,158,204 27.04 George Ganchev 937,837 21.91 Others 302,321 7.07 Total 4,288,187 100.00

Second ballot, 3 November 1996

Candidates Votes % of votes Petar Stoyanov 2,502,517 59.76 Ivan Marazov 1,687,242 40.33 Total 4,189,759 100.00

Table 2.5: Presidential election, October 27-November 3, 1996

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

The 1997 Parliamentary Election

The April 19 parliamentary elections took place amidst sharp political and economic tensions in the country, which had led to the resignation of the besieged Videnov cabinet in

54 December 1996. Under the threat of more social turmoil, protest strikes and street violence.

Prime Minister-designate Nikolai Dobrev had refused to form another BSP government.

Appointed by President Stoyanov at the end of February 1997, the UDF-dominated caretaker

cabinet of Sofia mayor faced an unprecedented economic downturn

resulting in widespread shortages of fuel, bread and other food staples, alleviated only by

emergency financial and humanitarian assistance from abroad.

The United Democratic Forces (UntDF) alliance, comprising the UDF. the

Democratic Party of Stefan Savov, BANU of Anastasia Dimitrov-Mozer, and the Bulgarian

Social Democratic Party of Petar Dertliev, ran an election campaign emphasizing close cooperation with the international lending institutions, integration into NATO and the EU. speedy privatization of the public sector, price liberalization, ensuring a more investor-

fnendly legal climate in the country, and declaring a war on organized crime and corruption.

Capitalizing on a protest vote against a status quo perceived as no longer tolerable, the

UntDF won an absolute majority, garnering 52.23% of the ballots and 137 of the 240 parliamentary seats. The Democratic Left, composed of the BSP and Ecoglasnost (after

BANU-Alexander Stamboliisky of Svetoslav Shivarov had decided to run separately in the race), won 22.17% and only 58 seats, sharply down from its 125-seat majority in the previous Assembly. Three smaller parties also made it into parliament. The first, the Union for National Salvation, won 7.50% of the vote and 19 seats. Composed of the Ahmed

Dogan's MRF, BANU-Nikola Petkov of Milan Drenchev, the Green Party of Alexander

Karakachanov, the Party of the Democratic Center, the New Choice Party, and the pro­ monarchy , this diverse coalition was openly supported by former king Simeon II, who visited Bulgaria on the eve of the election. The recently

55 established European Left (the Euroleft) received 5.52% of all valid votes cast and 14

parliamentary seats. This second left-wing party to enter parliament was led by Alexander

Tomov, a former Socialist leader who had left the BSP in 1994. In the months before the

election, the Euroleft was joined by thousands of BSP defectors opposed to Videnov’s

discredited policies. Finally, the Bulgarian Business Bloc of George Ganchev won 4.95%

of the vote and 12 seats in the 38th National Assembly (see Table 2.6). Zheliu Zhelev ’s

Liberal Forum, which had turned down an invitation to join the Union for National Salvation because of its pro-monarchist members, failed to clear the 4% barrier.

Party Votes % votes Seats % seats United Democratic Forces (UntDF) 2,223,714 52.26 137 57.08 Democratic Left 939,308 22.07 58 24.17 Union for National Salvation 323,429 7.60 19 7.92 Euro-left 234,058 5.50 14 5.83 BBB 209,796 4.93 12 5.00 Others 324,996 7.64 - - Total 4,255,301 100.00 240 100.00

Table 2.6: National Assembly election, 19 April 1997

Source: Based on official results released by the Central Electoral Commission.

Over 200 international observers fi’om the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe, the

U.S. International Republican Institute, Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and other

Western organizations, 60 foreign diplomats, and two Bulgarian NGOs (the Association for

56 Fair Elections and Civil Rights, and the Civil Initiative for Fair and Democratic Elections) monitored the poll and declared the elections free, fair and in compliance with the law. The

Central Electoral Commission stated that there had been no serious irregularities on election day that could have affected the voting procedure (BTA in English, April 21,1997). Election monitors were once again baffled by the fact that over 300,000 more Bulgarians had registered to vote than expected according to the country’s official demographic statistics

{Duma, April 23, 1997).

The voter turnout of62.43% was the lowest since 1990. Mired in deep poverty, many

Bulgarians chose to stay home, as they did not expect any positive change to come from the ballot box. The election was again marred by protests and complaints. During the pre­ election campaign, BSP leader Purvanov protested the caretaker cabinet’s campaign of sacking officials in the government bureaucracy, the publicly owned economic sector, and the state-controlled media. The Socialists charged that these “illegal dismissals’’ and the court proceedings launched against Videnov, senior members of his cabinet, and other BSP functionaries, all of whom had been banned from leaving the country and had their bank accounts frozen, were “politically motivated” and aimed at intimidating the BSP electorate.

MRF leader Dogan also protested against government harassment and “provocations against ethnic peace” on the eve of the election, including police raids and arrests of ethnic Turkish businessmen with close ties to his Movement (Trud, April 14, 1997).

Restrictions on Political Parties

Another major requirement of the minimalist definition of democracy is the relatively unrestricted right to organize. For democracy to exist, there must be a plurality of parties

57 advocating alternative conceptions of society and having a legitimate chance to gain power through electoral means. While classical scholars considered intermediary associations between citizens and government incompatible with democracy, nowadays the emphasis is on political pluralism based on vigorous competition among parties and movements representing the interests of significant social groups. Hence, the right to full participation in elections includes the right to organize politically. Linz (1975: 184) asserts that the freedom of political parties to compete for power offersprima a facie test of the democratic character of the government. Banning parties or ideological movements means the exclusion of certain social groups from the political arena and the denial of their right to have their interests represented. Moreover, if major organized segments of society are excluded from the political system, they may respond by turning to destabilizing forms of opposition, challenging the legitimacy of the regime. If group autonomy and self-organization are not tolerated by the regime, the result will be a limited, exclusivist democracy that is unlikely to be viable and stable in the long run.

In the ethnically diverse and politically mobilized societies of Eastern Europe, a successful transition to democracy is more likely to take place under conditions of democratic incorporation and accommodation (Remington 1994: 230). These may include guarantees for minority representation, as have been granted to some political parties representing ethnic minorities in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania, for which the threshold requirements for parliamentary participation have been fully or partly lifted.

Post-Communist Bulgaria’s record in respect to freedom of political association is anything but perfect, but it does not provide grounds for denying the democraticness of its political system. The new regime was confronted with one of the most delicate issues in post-

58 Communist Bulgaria: the relations between the Bulgarian majority and the large Turkish

minority, which comprises about 9.7% of the population. Article 11 (4) of the 1991

Constitution bans political parties based on ethnic identity or religious affiliation, but the

MRF claims that it is not ethnically based, as it includes many non-Turks, such as Bulgarian

Muslims known as “Pomaks,” Gypsies, Tatars, and even some ethnic Bulgarians. It is registered not as a party but as a movement, and its foimding documents do not refer to any specific ethnic or religious base. Although it had supported the registration of the MRF for the June 1990 elections (obviously in the hope of diverting votes from the UDF), the BSP became its major rival in the emotionally charged political atmosphere of the October 1991 elections. In contravention of the new Constitution and the 1991 election law, the Central

Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court allowed the participation of the MRF in the national and local elections even though a lower Sofia court had earlier refused to recognize it as a political party on the grounds that it represented ethnic and religious interests (Nedeva

1993: 129). In April 1992, fifty-three nationalist and Socialist members of the National

Assembly, joined by ninety-three deputies in the preceding parliament, petitioned the

Constitutional Court to declare the MRF an “anticonstitutional” party and to bar its members from the legislature because of its ethnic ties. They pointed out that non-T urks comprise only about 4-5% of the party’s entire membership. In a very close vote on 21 April 1992, the

Constitutional Court rejected this claim and implicitly affirmed the MRF’s legal status. This judicial ruling contradicting a controversial constitutional clause has ensured that the most important ethnic and religious minority in Bulgaria is not excluded from the political process. It was also an indirect recognition that the MRF is too powerful and well-organized to be easily suppressed or restricted.

59 By contrast, the largest organization ofBulgarian Gypsies, the Democratic Romani

Union, which represents about 50,000 Gypsies throughout Bulgaria, was prevented by the

very same court from participation in elections. The organization had gained political

strength when its leader, theater director Manoush Romanov, was elected to the GNA on the

party list of the UDF in the 1990 election, but it was later denied the status of an electoral

party on the grounds that this would violate the constitutional prohibition on parties with a

racial, ethnic, or religious basis (see Troxel 1992b: 60). This decision o f the Constitutional

Court has made Bulgaria the only country in Eastern Europe in which the Roma are not

allowed to participate in the electoral process through their own political organizations

(Barany 1994: 247), a fact which has prompted the Council of Europe to criticize the

Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 for banning ethnic and religious parties.

Quite similar is the case of the United Macedonian Organization-Ilinden-Pirin

(UMO-llinden-Pirin), a group claiming to represent Bulgaria’s Macedonian minority and calling for the autonomy of Pirin Macedonia, a region in southwestern Bulgaria, and its

eventual union with the neighboring Republic ofMacedonia. Although supported by the BSP and other political parties, its demands for local autonomy have been resisted by the UDF.

It has been prevented from electoral participation and finally outlawed by the Constitutional

Court in March 2000. By contrast, legal recognition has been extended to the Internal

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union ofMacedonian Societies (IMRO-UMS). an ethnic Macedonian organization with 160 chapters throughout Bulgaria, which is strongly pro-Bulgarian and pro-UDF (its members played a prominent role in the January 1997 riots against the Videnov government). Under Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tatarchev, the honorary chairman and dominant figure of the IMRO-UMS, a campaign of legal and

60 police harassment was waged against UMO-llinden-Pirin members, attracting the unwanted attention of international organizations (Bell 1998: 189-206).

Many have charged that the constitutional ban on ethnic and religious parties is discriminatory and at variance with the Constitution itself, which requires conformity with international law. But supporters of constitutional Article 11 (4) claim that its intention is not so much to ban political parties organized along ethnic or religious lines, as to promote the development of a more stabilizing, interest-oriented in Bulgaria and avoid the danger of ethnic separatism and religious conflict. As the disintegration of multinational states like the USSR, and Czechoslovakia has shown, ethnicity and religion can be a very divisive basis upon which to organize ethnically-mixed politically.

Many Bulgarians fear that ethnic-based parties can easily threaten the integrity of the state.

As has often been pointed out, even when not seeking outright separatism and secession,

“such parties attract an overriding loyalty fi’om their adherents so that the stabilizing effects of cross-cutting cleavages are not operative” (Smith 1993: 10). It is for this reason that separatist or autonomist organizations with radicalized followings, such as the Turkish

Democratic Party of Adem Kenan, accused by the authorities of extremism and militant pan-

Turkism, have not been legally recognized.

Political and Civil Liberties

The holding of regular elections with several competing parties, universal citizen eligibility and minimal electoral fi*aud is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. For elections to be free, fair and meaningful, citizens must enjoy a wide array of political and civil liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of public contestation and

61 electoral participation (Linz 1975; 183). A wide range of political freedoms that guarantee the right to organize and compete peacefully for votes are essential, even when there are some dejure or defacto limits (Dahl 1971). Human rights are the cornerstone of democracy.

Without permissive democratic attributes such as freedom to get information from alternative sources and try to influence others; free, critical and accessible mass media; the ability to move about and engage in political activity; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and judicial action, democracy would be imthinkable (Dahl 1971; Powell 1982: 175-176). In promoting the observance of political and civil liberties, a democratic government has to recognize not only basic human rights and freedoms but also some collective rights (the so-called “third- generation” human rights). Group rights include the political freedom to organize parties representing the minority population. Today collective rights are considered an essential element in the protection of freedom for ethnic minorities, including a special sensitivity to their legitimate needs and interests. The freedoms of different ethnic groups are better guaranteed if they acquire official status as minorities and if their collective rights are set out in national legislation. Only then can minorities promote and achieve their group demands and interests (Nedeva 1993).

Bulgaria’s human rights record since 10 November 1989 constitutes further evidence that political life in the country has been democratized. The removal of Zhivkov ushered in a period of democratic legal reforms. The round-table accords contained a number of provisions for political and civil liberties, including a law that guaranteed the constitutional right of citizens to form and join political parties. The round-table agreements introduced legal changes in the political system, including a multiparty system, separation of powers, constitutional protection of freedom of speech and the press, access to alternative sources of

62 information, and the legalization of . Finally, there was a broad consensus that a new constitution guaranteeing all these rights and freedoms was necessary to complete the democratization process.

The Constitution approved in July 1991 does not contain any openly illiberal features.

It provides for a free, democratic and pluralistic society whose citizens enjoy equal protection under the law as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms normally associated with democracy, including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, conscience, and the press

(Melone 1994; Perry 1992: 78). The right to private property is also guaranteed as well as the country’s commitment to a market economy. So is freedom of travel as all previous restrictions, especially for drafr-age males, on travel abroad have been lifted. The

Constitution explicitly bans the persecution, discrimination and assimilation of minority groups, protects cultural and religious freedoms, and recognizes the rights of citizens for whom Bulgarian is not a mother tongue to communicate and study in their own language.

There is, however, no reference in its text to the existence of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in Bulgaria, let alone any constitutional guarantees for minority rights. Provisions in the Constitution refer to the basic rights and freedoms of individuals recognized by international law but, as Nedeva (1993: 135-136) points out, do not recognize collective rights and liberties for minorities. As a legal text, the new Constitution is consistent with international standards, although not all appropriate judicial mechanisms have been established in order to put it into practice. When Bulgaria became a member of the Council of Europe in 1991, it signed a number of protocols dealing with hiunan rights, including one stating that every citizen can appeal to and win binding judgement from the European Coun of Justice.

63 But a formal constitution which is generally democratic by design may still bear little relation to the informal, operative rules of the political game. Attributes of democracy take root more slowly and may be completely entrenched only after many problems and crises have been resolved (Smith 1993:4). Human right violations by incumbent governments have taken place, including mass firings of civil servants and other government bureaucrats whose political loyalty is suspect. International concern was voiced over political under the so-called Panev and Kapudaliev “decommimization” laws (enacted by the legislature in

1992), as a result of which thousands of Bulgarians lost their employment because of their past political affiliations and activities. In violation of the new Bulgarian Constitution and a number of international conventions which Bulgaria has signed, the courts used these lustration laws to replace the presumption of innocence with the notion of collective guilt, on the basis of which political opponents were fired from their jobs without due process.

While the imprisonment of former BSP premier Andrei Lukanov was the most visible case, many civil servants were also deprived of their civil liberties and illegally persecuted in

“witch-hunting” campaigns ( Lukanov 1993; Berschi 1995). A 1998 law on the civil service has banned former BCP officials from occupying high-ranking civil service posts for a period of five years. Such flagrant instances o f abuse of power are not isolated. With every recent change of government in Sofia, thousands of state bureaucrats have been dismissed from their jobs in the public sector or the government apparatus because of their perceived loyalty to the departing administration. Given the fact that abuses of executive power and legal repressions against political opponents are still widespread, the formal liberties laid down in the new Constitution are yet to be successfully and permanently translated into actual rights and freedoms for all citizens.

64 Another problem area is censorship and . Every post-Communist government has tried to muzzle the state-nm mass media by sacking unfriendly journalists, placing loyalists in top positions and controlling media content. Every government has also accused the independent mass media of negativism and scaring away foreign investors. The ruling UDF cabinet has been no less heavy-handed than its predecessors in this respect, citing the need to solve the socioeconomic crisis and attract foreign capital. Without any public debate, it banned Bulgaria’s two most popular TV satirical shows, Kanaleto (“The

Little Channel”) and Khushove (“Rebels”) after both had poked fun at follies at the highest level of government. In August 1999, Bulgarian Internet Society chairman Veni Markovski publicly protested against the government’s “shameful and disgraceful attempt” to seize

Internet providers and obtain users’ names and passwords in order to control the political opposition{Pari, August 16,1999), something no other country in the world has attempted to do.

According to country reports on human rights practices published by the U.S. State

Department, Bulgaria’s human rights record is satisfactory, though not without serious blemishes. There have been a large number of cases in which people, mostly Gypsies, died in police custody as a result of severe beatings. Some of those allegations were substantiated by Bulgarian and international human rights groups, forcing the government to fire the national police chief in 1995. While other human rights reports confirm that civil liberties in Bulgaria are generally respected, they also points to a number of persisting problems, including attempts at reimposing government controls over the state-owned mass media, human rights violations by the police against Gypsy suspects, and the harsh conditions in

Bulgarian prisons. The Chief Prosecutor’s office reported in 1998 that incidents involving

65 and the illegal torture of detainees were widespread. These findings were

confirmed by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee in a non governmental National Report on

Human Development describing human rights violations in Bulgaria.

Bulgarian Gypsies especially remain an oppressed class-ethnic understratum, whose

rights continue to be ignored and infnnged upon by the authorities. A report issued by the

Council of Europe’s Commission Against and Intolerance charges that Bulgaria

“lacks structures and policies to deal with racism and intolerance” and that the treatment of

Bulgarian Gypsies is particularly worrying (BTA, June 17, 1998). Members of the Roma community have gone on hunger strikes and other protests to draw attention to their plight as victims of discrimination and racist abuse. Their anger is directed against the refusal of

Bulgarian employers to hire Gypsies and media coverage that ignores their problems and focuses on criminal activities among the Roma community. According to the Democratic

Romani Union, 92% of Bulgarian Gypsies are unemployed; they also constitute 90% of all prison inmates (AFP, May 30, 1998). There is also a growing and willful neglect of economic, social, labor, education and social-welfare rights compared to the Communist period, which may prove to be destabilizing in the long run. Guaranteed jobs, affordable housing, subsidized prices and rents, free universal health care and post-secondaiy education are now things of the past. These and other problems are a reminder that the realities of democratic may fall short of popular expectations.

Despite such chronic problems, no one can deny that the country has made progress toward personal freedom in the past few years. Although numerous other instances of failure to uphold individual rights could be cited, these are still fairly isolated cases in Bulgaria’s human rights record. This is confirmed by human rights reports published by Helsinki

66 Watch, Amnesty International, and the Hiunan Rights Watch. In a recent report on political rights and civil liberties, the New York-based Freedom House (1998) rated Bulgaria on its seven-point scale for democracy as among the “free” countries in the world, though showing signs of recent backsliding.

The process of granting group rights to ethnic minorities in Bulgaria has been equally uneven. The various cabinets followed a cautious line because of strong opposition from Bulgarians, especially those living in ethnically mixed areas. The principle that

Bulgaria is a unitary nation-state is strictly followed in constitutional practice. National legislation does not recognize collective rights as a basis for dealing with the problems of minority groups. Only in 1997 did Bulgaria sign the Council of Europe’s Convention for the

Protection of National Minorities, because Bulgarian politicians fear that the Convention would enable the ethnic Turkish minority to declare cultural and administrative autonomy.

Bulgaria has been criticized internationally over its minority policy, but the approach it follows in political practice is more tolerant. Steps have been taken to restore the rights of ethnic Turks and other Muslims who were subjected to Zhivkov’s assimilation drive of 1984-

1989. A law on the restoration of Islamic names was passed in 1990, which allowed Muslims full freedom in the choice of names. Another law passed in 1991 amnestied all Turks and

Muslims prosecuted in connection with the assimilation campaign. Under the so-called

Dogan Act o f 1992, housing, property and employment were restored to all ethnic Turks who had fled to during the mass exodus o f 1989. The teaching of Turkish and other minority languages is now allowed in all Bulgarian schools on an extracurricular basis, though Turkish-language instruction is not part of the regular curriculum, as the MRF has demanded (Nedeva 1993: 135-136). A growing number of Muslim high schools and

67 seminaries have been opened throughout the country, including an Islamic Center and an

Islamic College in Sofia for the theological training of Muslim clergy. Speaking before an audience of local ethnic Turks during his visit to Bulgaria in 1995, Turkish president

Suleyman Demirel praised the Bulgarian government, acknowledging that in recent years it has demonstrated a soimd record of protecting the rights of its Turkish minority and stamping out ethnic-based discrimination.

Although a highly subjective measure, how citizens feel about the extent of the government’s respect for their rights and liberties is also an important indicator of the extent of democratization. According to the New Democracies Barometer V which measured how the East Europeans perceived their degree of freedom in 1998 compared with what it used to be under the old regime, on each of the eight measures of individual freedom the great majority of Bulgarians today feel much freer than before (see Rose and Haerpfer 1998; 55-

58). The perceived state of freedom in Eastern Europe obviously meets the minimal preconditions of a democratic society. Perceived gains in individual freedom in Bulgaria appear to be, on the whole, equal or even greater in scope compared to other post-Communist countries. But nearly half (44.4%) of the Bulgarian respondents in the Central and Eastern

Euro-Barometer 8 ( 1997) claimed that there was either not much respect or no respect at all for . These survey data point to some serious defects in this area, even though foreign governments and intemational organizations have praised the increased respect for human rights in democratizing Bulgaria.

68 CHAPTER 3

PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION

According to a recent study, in order to conclude that democratic consolidation has occurred in a particular case,

it is necessary to ascertain whether the regime is fully democratic, and then to determine if that regime is consolidated.In our conceptualization, both the concept of democracy and consolidation are ‘ideal types’, and both must be closely approximated before one can conclude that democratic consolidation has occurred. (Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995)

The preceding chapter has determined that Bulgaria is by and large an electoral democracy.

What this chapter will try to do is ascertain whether the new democracy is also consolidated or highly institutionalized—that is, more likely to endure than not.

To begin with, there is a great divergence of views concerning the appropriate definition of “consolidation of democracy” and its differentia specifica. Some scholars even question its implication as a final stage of democratization, given the prevailing understanding that democracy is not an end result, but a process that can never be completed

(Bunce 1995). But for analytical and comparative purposes it is necessary to define a concept that provides a clear idea of what a consolidated democracy is and what its essential elements are. The literature offers no conceptual definition of consolidation, but this lack is more than made up for by a multitude of operational ones. One operational definition is based on the peaceful turnover of power by governments that lose elections, which Huntington (1991:

69 267) describes as the sine qua non of democracy, that is, a necessary, though not a sufficient

condition for democratic consolidation. A similar definition states that consolidation is a

stage which is not reached until all the democratic institutions are in place and the new democracy has proven itself capable of transferring power to the opposition (Sorensen 1994:

43). A procedurally more demanding version is the “two-tumover test” proposed by

Huntington whereby a democracy may be viewed as consolidated “if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of the transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to the election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election” (1991: 266-267).

But these criteria do not provide a sufficiently discriminating distinction between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies. For example, Gunther, Puhle and

Diamandouros (1995: 12) point out that under such criteria democracies such as Japan and

Italy could not have been regarded as consolidated until party turnovers in government finally took place in the early 1990s. Another definition of democratic consolidation using very similar indicators to operationalize democratic consolidation is the one suggested by

Samuel Valenzuela ( 1992), which comprises: ( 1 ) the absence of undemocratically generated

“tutelary powers”; (2) the absence of “reserve domains” of policy-making authority; (3) the absence of distortions and in the electoral process; (4) free and fair elections as the only viable and legitimate way to constitute the national government. But the problem here is that the last two of Valenzuela’s consolidation criteria coincide with the minimal procedural requirements for democratic rule, discussed in the previous chapter.

In contrast, actor-centered conceptualizations posit that a democratic regime may be considered consolidated when “all politically significant groups regard its key political

70 institutions as the only legitimate frameworic for political contestation and adhere to democratic rules of the game” (Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995). Under this minimalist definition, a democracy is consolidated when a set of democratic political institutions is widely accepted as the legitimate common arena for the expression of political conflict; conversely, a democracy is imconsolidated when the legitimacy of democratic political institutions is questioned by some relatively powerful elites. Accordingly, a democratic regime may be regarded as consolidated if the legitimacy of its key political institutions is not challenged, or if its basic norms of political behavior are not regularly violated by politically significant groups -the so-called “negative consolidation” of democracy (see Pridham 1995). This definition is very similar to Przeworski’s conceptualization of consolidated democracy as “a system in which the politically relevant forces subject their values and interests to the uncertain interplay of democratic institutions and comply with the outcomes of the democratic process” (1991:51). In other words, as long as there are major powerful groups and institutions (such as the armed forces in Southern

Europe and Latin America or the old Communist elites in the former Soviet bloc) that may try to circiunvent or veto democratically made decisions, democracy is not consolidated and the potential for its overthrow remains real.

It is the analytically more rigorous actor-based definition, perceiving democratic consolidation as a continuous process, rather than a specific stage, that will be employed here to establish whether Bulgaria’s fledgling democracy can be regarded as consolidated. Some writers (see Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995) have warned that the use of various empirical tests of regime stability should not be confused with the concept of consolidated democracy; therefore, it is necessary to identify independent measures of democratic

71 consolidation which are logically derived from the minimalist definition and are tied to distinct empirically observable referents. What are the substantive components or dimensions of “democratic consolidation”? According to Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros,

Evidence of consolidation or the lack thereof should not be derived from such behavioral manifestations as efforts (successful or otherwise) to topple a regime, but rather from public statements by leaders of political parties, social movements and large secondary organizations, official documents and ideological declarations by such groups, symbolic gestures and behavioral habits that reflect a denial of the legitimacy of a regime’s representative institutions and its behavioral norms. (1995)

Rather than rely solely on obvious behavioral indicators such as military coups, mass- level protests or rebellions as the sole measures o f consolidation, Linz, Stepan and Gunther

(1995: 79) argue that democratic consolidation involves three distinct criteria or

“dimensions,” namely, structiual, attitudinal and behavioral (see the discussion of the three criteria in the introductory Chapter 1). This tri-fold operationalization (used with some modifications also in Linz and Stepan 1996: 5-6) goes one step beyond the simplistic dichotomous distinction between “attitudinal” and “behavioral” components of democratic consolidation. Moreover, this operational definition is not confined to the usual specification of regime instability as being indicated only by irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures of government executive power by force (see Field and Higley

1985; Higley and Burton 1989).

The thesis of this chapter is that Bulgaria has remained a partially consolidated democracy. On the basis of the structural, attitudinal and behavioral criteria implicit in the minimal definition, the new democratic regime cannot be seen as fully consolidated, at least in its behavioral dimension. A minimum of institutional entrenchment has been achieved, even though the regime has not fully consolidated its democratic institutional framework.

72 Even the fundamental issue o f monarchy versus republic has yet to be definitively resolved,

as the political elite continues to postpone the holding of a new popular referendum on this

constitutional question. There are significant forces within the ruling UDF who challenge the

present republican form o f government as illegitimate and imposed illegally by the

Communists in the 1946 referendum.

Despite political and social tensions, Bulgaria’s representative institutions have been democratized and stand a realistic chance of becoming consolidated. But democratic

institutions have also lost a great deal of their efficaciousness and credibility in a corrupted, criminalized state. As I will argue in the rest of this study, constitutionalism and the rule of law are undermined by pervasive lawlessness, official graft and the ineradicable influence of organized crime. The intractable crime problem is especially dangerous for the legitimacy, effectiveness and cohesiveness of the new democratic order. The judiciary has so far failed to perform its functions of serving as a guardian of public law and order, as well as an autonomous and neutral arbiter among the political forces. With the judicial branch doing the bidding of parties and politicians, courts have become places for politics, rather than justice, subjecting opponents to political persecution and perpetuating a cycle of partisan hatred and revenge.

While the regime has institutionalized itself through the successful establishment of relatively stable instrumentalities of democratic governance, it has been unable to proceed to the next, consolidating phase of its transition due to some attitudinal and especially behavioral obstacles. Strong attitudinal support is necessary to ensure long-term democratic consolidation. But Bulgaria cannot be regarded fully consolidated in attitudinal terms, because popular support for the new authorities is comparatively weak. As we shall see

73 below, the general public harbors some serious doubts and misgivings about the merits of the new institutions, as less than a third of Bulgarians express trust in them. Just over half of the mass public believes that democracy is the best system for the coimtry, while popular support for anti democratic alternatives, such as Communism, military rule or strongman dictatorship, is dangerously close to the 50% mark and is in fact the highest in Eastern

Europe.

There are no significant political forces which are openly hostile to democracy and this “partial” democratic achievement is hardly imimportant; “Without such a consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations and frustrations of elections and party competitions” (Dahl 1956:132-133). But in spite of elite negotiations and agreements, there is a lot to be desired in terms of democratic behavior and practices, as evidenced by many instances of ideological intolerance, petty partisanship, personal vendettas, and legal reprisals against political opponents. What is particularly dangerous for democratic authenticity and survivability is the highly divisive and militant style of politics. Few of the politically significant forces in Bulgaria have adhered faithfully and unreservedly to the democratic norms of political behavior and competition. The winners in political struggles engage in a majoritarian or intolerant behavior, while the losers resort to semiloyal or disloyal obstructionism. After every change of government, managers of the public sector of the economy and the state-owned mass media are routinely replaced by faithful supporters of the incumbents. Purges of state officials are so extensive that even high school principals are replaced by activists of the ruling party. In turn, the political opposition has not refrained from using extraparliamentary pressures and other illegal forms of power play. The very concept of “loyal opposition,” and the political tolerance and loyalty to law and

74 constitutionalism that it implies, is yet to take root in Bulgarian politics. The major political parties claim to be committed to the long-term maintenance of the new democratic system, but their confrontational behavior and obstructionist tactics are hardly conducive to its cohesion and viability.

Structural Dimension

The structural consolidation of democracy implies the absence of significant reserve domains of policy-making power. A well-organized and stable democratic society needs viable democratic institutions (the so-called “rules of the game”) with an unimpaired capacity to generate the necessary public policies. This requires a high level of institutionalization defined by Himtington as

the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. (1968: 12)

But whenever political forces in a post- are polarized into two opposing

Ideological camps, this tends to create a highly volatile situation which does not establish a sound institutional basis for consolidated democracy (McFaul 1993). Such a sharp bipolar confrontation between ex-Commimists and anti-Communists clearly exists in Bulgaria. But is it accompanied by any structural impediments such as undemocratic “enclaves” of decision-making power which can prevent the consolidation of democracy? Various undemocratically generated “tutelary powers” or “reserve domains” of policy-making authority delayed, if only temporarily, the completion of the transitions to democracy in

75 Portugal, Chile, Poland, and other neodemocracies (see Valenzuela 1992; Gunther, Puhle and

Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996).

Even though the building of new democratic institutions has been a complex and controversial process, Bulgaria became the first ex-Communist country to adopt a new constitution. Despite the tumultuousness and volatility of the post-Communist environment, regular democratic processes~the rules of the game for political competition and cooperation—have taken hold, indicating a measure of institutional consolidation. While lacking in a durable tradition of legal and civic culture, the country has made considerable progress in laying the foundations of viable democratic institutions and in establishing basic political procedures. There are no laws that constrain the sovereignty of the democratic government. Nor are there any clauses in the 1991 Constitution that can serve as a basis for non-democratic intervention in politics. Institutional structures appear to be the only dimension of democracy to have become rooted in Bulgaria.

Although no radical changes were introduced in the formal structure of the government, actual decision-making authority has been transferred to the various representative institutions. The new Constitution explicitly makes the political system a parliamentary democracy with legally separate legislative, executive and judicial branches.

Democratic political institutions, such as a relatively stable and coherent multiparty system; regular, competitive and binding elections; popularly elected parliament and presidency; a constitutionally autonomous judiciary, are not constrained by reserve powers held de jure or de facto by any group or institution that is not electorally responsible. Nor are there any tutelary powers with links to surviving elements of the ancien regime. Set up as a result of the round-table accords and the new Constitution, the new political system is firmly in place

76 and is functioning in accordance with regular, formalized procedures. Apart from the Round

Table, a temporary ad hoc body active in the initial stage of the transition, there are no extraordinary or alternative governmental structures whose powers are beyond the control of the National Assembly or some other elective political authority. All major decision­ making institutions in Bulgaria are democratically based and electorally responsible.

In what is clearly a parliamentary system of government, the unicameral National

Assembly is a permanently functioning legislature vested with extensive authority and control over the executive branch, including the state bureaucracy. As the central representative institution of Bulgarian democracy, it has the exclusive right to approve the prime minister and the cabinet, elect members of the judiciary, and amend the constitution.

Zhelev (1996: 189) has complained that Bulgaria’s parliament has few checks to limit its power. Curtis (1993: 190-192), on the other hand, sees the National Assembly as a weak legislative body because for most of the time it has been quite evenly split on many issues, thus allowing the cabinet (the Council of Ministers) to become the power center of the government which exercises total control over decision-making. But the several cabinet crises since 1990 indicate that the current political system is clearly based on the supremacy of the Assembly. In fact, the new Constitution makes the cabinet too closely and directly dependent on the legislature, which has opened the door to executive instability. While the cabinet runs the day-to-day administration of the Bulgarian state, the legislature is endowed with ultimate political responsibility over the executive branch. A vote of no-confidence in the government can be proposed by one-fiffh of the legislators and in case of approval the entire cabinet must resign immediately. The only check is that such approval requires a simple majority of all elected deputies and not just of those present, as well as the prohibition

77 of a new vote of censure in less than six months after the defeat of a previous one (Tzvetkov

1993:477- 478).

The 1991 Constitution provides for a president, who is elected directly for a fi ve-year term and is not politically accountable to the legislatiu'e. While the presidency is a relatively weak institution, it bears significant symbolic and moral authority. But the political prerogatives of the head of state are too circumscribed for Bulgaria to be considered a semi- . Apart from a number of purely ceremonial functions, the head of state is entitled to call parliamentary and local elections and to appoint a caretaker government, but the National Assembly is dissolved only if no agreement is reached on the formation of a new cabinet. The president is constitutionally required to discharge these powers in consultation with both the cabinet and the legislature. Not only is the presidency deprived of a legislative initiative, but the office has few powers of appointment. The president appoints, promotes or dismisses diplomats, senior officers and other top government bureaucrats only at the proposal of the prime minister and the approval of the National

Assembly. The head of state is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and exercises control over the intelligence services. But even these powers were curtailed in 1992, when responsibility for foreign intelligence and internal security began to be shared with the prime minister. The so-called “delaying” presidential veto can be overruled by a simple legislative majority. In other words, under the Constitution the president can act only by consensus and with the support of parliament and the cabinet. Tzvetkov (1993: 478-479) questions why there should be direct elections for such a symbolic head of state who is not even entitled to more than two consecutive terms.

78 Although the presidency is largely a ceremonial position, the fact that the head of state is directly elected by the people lends it somewhat greater political authority than in countries like Hungary, or the Czech Republic where the president is elected by parliament. On the basis of his limited constitutional powers and taking advantage of numerous existing legal loopholes, Zhelev, as Bulgaria’s first-ever directly elected president, was able to wield a significant, if often controversial, influence over national politics. His successor, Petar Stoyanov, has been equally forceful, though far more tactful, in carrying out his constitutionally prescribed functions, thus reinforcing the impression that Bulgaria may indeed be moving towards a semi-presidential system. In fact, Zhelev has repeatedly called for Bulgaria’s constitutionally-prescribed parliamentary system of government to be replaced by a strong presidential republic.

Under the new Constitution, the judiciary is granted an independent and coequal status with the legislature and the executive. But the establishment of an independent, authoritative judiciary, which is free fi’om legislative and executive influence, has been a slow and still unfinished process. Bulgarian judges, including the members of the highest national judicial institutions (the Supreme Court and the newly-instituted Constitutional

Court) are not popularly chosen. They are elected to five-year terms from quotas nominated by the parties represented in the National Assembly, the presidency, and tlie Supreme

Judicial Council (a new supervisory body which is itself subject to quota appointments).

Although the judges cannot be removed fix>m their posts, their mandates are not renewable.

The principle of restricted terms for the top jurists was used to abolish the formerly absolute control of the BCP over the justice system. In November 1990, Judge Dimitar Lozanchev

(who had been nominated by the UDF) became the first politically neutral chief justice of

79 the Supreme Court in the postwar period. O f the 18 Supreme Court judges elected the next

year, only two were former members of the BCP.

Instead of serving the interests of the state, as they did previously, Bulgarian jurists

are now free to uphold the law and defend the Constitution. On paper at least, a relatively

autonomous judicial system was created out of the politicized institutions inherited from the

Communist era. Engelbrekt (1992) believes that this positive development has been

facilitated by Bulgaria’s bipolar structure of politics, as both the BSP and the UDF have

supported the establishment of an independent court system capable of acting as an

autonomous arbiter in their numerous disputes. This role is increasingly played by a

Constitutional Court with strong judicial review functions and ultimate authority on

constitutional matters. President Zhelev has praised “the principled stand of the

Constitutional Court, which in several crisis situations has defended the right of society to

be governed within the framework of the Constitution, rather than by the political will of the

ruling majority” (1995: 274).

But this semblance of judicial independence, legitimacy and stability, which has

elicited some highly laudatory comments from abroad (see Melone and Hays 1994; Melone

1996a), conceals a much more complicated reality. Far more than the executive or the

legislature, Bulgaria’s judiciary continues to experience serious institutionalization problems

because it is highly politicized and of low professional quality. Most judges are either

Commimist-era holdovers or, in recent years, partisan loyalists of the anti-Communist

parties. Allowing the executive and legislative branches to appoint the members of top j udicial bodies has diminished the independence of the court system. One controversial result

of the prominent role of political appointees in the judicial branch is the politicization and

80 misuse of the law as a weapon of revenge against inconvenient political opponents. This is

hardly a novelty, since it has been a common practice throughout Bulgarian history for the

powers of the judiciary to be manipulated in order to persecute the political opposition.

The best-known example of such judicial illegalities was the case of former Prime

Minister Lukanov. He was imprisoned in 1992 for his role as Zhivkov’s foreign-trade

minister in providing economic and military assistance to anti-Western regimes, parties and

movements in the Third World (see Lukanov 1993, 1998). After the UDF-MRP majority in

the National Assembly had lifted his parliamentary immunity and impounded his travel passport, Lukanov was kept in solitary confinement without bail for more than six months on the pretext that he might flee justice. He was released from jail only after the MRF altered its stance in response to strong pressure from abroad and criticism from President Zhelev.

There are many other instances, where the political forces in Bulgaria have tried to bend and manipulate the law to their own advantage. Not only is the judiciary ruled by the politics of the day, but the prevailing climate of chaos and lawlessness in the country has fostered widespread cynicism and public mistrust of the legal system, which is seen by ordinary citizens as politicized, corrupt and incapable of combating the explosion in criminality and violence. The politicization of the Bulgarian judiciary and its misuse for petty partisan struggles and political vendettas have delayed the establishment of an independent authority and prestige for the courts. Because of widespread abuses of the legal process, the reformed justice system has yet to emerge as a legitimate and neutral third force in Bulgarian politics.

Still worse, the repeated shocks of political and economic crises since 1989 have profoundly undermined the basis of legal authority and efficacy. In a recent study, Daskalov claims that the "rule of law”has totally collapsed in Bulgaria (1998: 25-26). The erosion of

81 State legitimacy, effectiveness and cohesion has taken the form of a sharp decline in social, legal and moral standards which bind society together and help democratic constitutions and judicial systems work. Comparative opinion surveys indicate that mass attitudes towards public institutions in particular are marked by distrust, cynicism and open disrespect for law and order. As the state’s administrative capacity has weakened, public laws, regulations and taxes are openly defied and evaded. Moral norms and values have been replaced by selfishness, criminality, irresponsibility in public and private behavior, callousness and even brutality toward fellow citizens (Deltcheva 1996). Vice President Todor Kavaldzhiev has admitted that corruption and abuse of power are rampant in practically all echelons of the government, including the executive branch, the courts, the police and all other state institutions {Standart, November 15, 1999).

The explosion in crime and the collapse of the ability of the state to enforce the law constitute a very serious institutional failure, which is a common problem to most, if not all, post-Communist transitions. Due to the all-pervasive climate of illegality and disorder, the public ratings of the police and the judiciary, as measiu-ed by the New Democracies

Barometer surveys, are among the lowest of all institutions in Bulgaria (see Table 3.2). Prof.

Chavdar Dobrev, a liberal-minded BSP intellectual, attributes the crime wave that has hit post-Communist Bulgaria mainly to

the manner in which oiu- state was destroyed. As it turns out, this act of destruction has coincided with the sudden enrichment of a narrow stratum of the old nomenklatura class, including many members of the previous state security apparatus. Like in the fairy tales, some individuals became multimillionaires overnight. It is intriguing to find out how some people have managed to amass their enormous fortimes of suspicious origin (the so-called “laundered money”), and why the government is completely incapable of investigating the origins of such private wealth. At the same time, ordinary Bulgarians have become so impoverished that they are threatened with a

82 biological . Crime continues to be on the rise. How could our young people leam moral values from the sub-products of Western mass culture, gambling, lewd sex, pornography and prostitution? Selfishness has become the hallmark of public morality. We were promised to embark upon the “road to Europe.” Instead, Bulgaria, which used to be one of the most developed countries in Eastern Europe, is now behind the least developed countries and “banana republics” of the Third World. (Dobrev 1998: 66)

Zhelev, on the other hand, blames the escalation of criminality and the erosion of state

capacities on the collective irresponsibility of the entire political elite:

I am shocked by the fact that in spite of the real threat to the legal order of our country, the responsible state agencies, the political forces and individual politicians alike continue to seek political dividends from this national tragedy. Instead of living up to their responsibility for the crime problem, they are playing the blame game: parliament is blaming the police and the cabinet, the police is blaming the courts and the prosecutors, the courts are blaming the prosecutors and the police, the Socialists are blaming the UDF, and the UDF is blaming the BSP and everybody else. Such games are dangerous, if not ruinous, for our state. .. It is high time for the government to show that it is capable of governing, that it has the courage and the political will to perform its official functions, to guarantee law and order in the country, to safeguard the lives, property, honor and dignity of its citizens ... It is also high time for the political forces to assume responsibility for the crime problem—not by washing their hands and adopting empty declarations, but by passing the necessary anti-crime legislation in parliament and identifying the corrupt politicians in their own ranks. Because there is nothing more pathetic than political parties which, while pretending to fight crime, tolerate in their midst members who have amassed millions of unknown origin. (Zhelev 1996: 123-125)

All these various forms of systemic instability and disequilibrium are threatening

institutional breakdown, social disorder and even the collapse of the state. For this reason.

Bulgarian democracy cannot be seen as fully consolidated structurally, even though major progress in democratic institution-building has been achieved. Political structures have become more democratic and representative, as not a single institution of the state appears to be openly controlled by non-democratic forces. But their problematic and ineffective

functioning cannot ensure the legitimacy and long-term endurance of the democratic regime.

83 Attitudinal Dimension

A defining characteristic of democratic regimes is that their long-term survival and effective fimctioning depend significantly on favorable public opinion (Easton 1965). Broad- based popular support is important to all democratic regimes, but it is doubly so for the consolidation of new democracies, such as those in Eastern Europe. Sorensen (1993: 46) argues that the final phase of consolidation is the process whereby democratic institutions and practices become deeply ingrained in the country’s political culture. In this phase, not only political leaders but most other political actors and the majority of the population accept democratic principles and practices as part of the legitimate and natural order of things.

According to Linz, “democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular historical juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals” (1978: 18).

In spite of some significant gains, this end-phase of consolidation has not been achieved in post-Communist Bulgaria. Although public opinion data indicate that an absolute majority of Bulgarians are committed to democracy/?er5e, mass-level attitudinal support for the new regime is not nearly as enthusiastic and widespread as it was at the start of the transition. The severe problems accompanying economic and political reforms have led to the spread of some ambivalent attitudes and even radical anti-democratic views at the mass level. As the Bulgarian case indicates, mass enthusiasm at the outset of the transition may not necessarily translate into a long-lasting attachment to democracy. Survey data suggest that mass preferences for the alternatives to the democracy have reappeared in spite of the supposedly permanent discrediting of all anti-system options. Clearly, the institutionalization of popular support for democracy is less than solid.

84 An absolute majority of public opinion is supportive of democracy as the best system

for the country, but the level of democratic legitimacy is comparatively low; only 56.7% of

Bulgarians believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, compared

to 71.8% of Hungarians, 79.5% of Spaniards, and 87.8% of Greeks (see Table 3.1). Popular

approval is based more on the desirability of democracy in the abstract than on unequivocal

endorsement of the institutions, procedures and practices of the new regime (as required by

the attitudinal criterion of democratic consolidation used in this study). Still, this scale of

normative democratic commitment provides a reserve of goodwill for the new regime,

shielding it so far from the destabilizing effects of its performance fiasco.

Q: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: Democracy is the best political system for a country like ours.

Bulgaria Hungary Spain Agree 56.7 71.8 79.5 87.8 Disagree 18.9 10.4 7.4 3.6 Depends 24.4 17.8 13.2 8.5

Table 3.1. Level of democratic legitimacy (in percentages)

Source: Comparative National Elections Project survey (1997).

This relatively low level of system support is accompanied by a real crisis of

confidence in Bulgaria’s democratic institutions. The failures of regime performance began well before public trust in the new structures could be built up. According to the New

Democracies Barometer surveys, mass feelings of trust in and loyalty to the post-Communist

85 institutions, such as political parties, the cabinet, parliament, the police and the courts, the new labor unions, private business, etc., either have remained stagnant or have been declining since 1991. Table 3.2 illustrates the level of confidence as measured by items on trust in government and other institutions or incumbents. With the exception of the presidency and the armed forces, trust in Bulgarian institutions is so low (on average only

29% of respondents feel trust in them), as to suggest the presence of a real “confidence gap,” which has been theoretically linked to poor regime performance and weakly legitimate government (see Lipset and Schneider 1987). Bulgarian democracy cannot be seen as fully consolidated attitudinally as long as survey data continue to reveal exceedingly high levels of popular mistrust in the institutions of the new regime and civil society.

Recent public opinion polls have elicited evidence of growing frustration with the poor record of the new system. Some of the responses in the polls reveal an unmistakable degree of skepticism about the competence of the new authorities. That there is ambivalence in regime support at the mass level is also evidenced by the nostalgia for the stability, security and relative prosperity ofZhivkov’s regime. In poll after poll, many Bulgarians view the ancien regime more favorably than the present system. As one commentator has remarked, “if early hopes are disappointed, aspects of the older order will appear better in retrospect” (Smith 1993: 7). Economic assessments of the capitalist present as compared to the Communist past also reveal how quickly widespread feelings of uneasiness, uncertainty, insecurity and fear of the painful consequences o f market reforms can erode the “negatively reinforced legitimacy” of the early transition period.

Such findings are consistent with observed regionwide trends. In retrospect, many

East Europeans are openly nostalgic about the economic and social security of the old days.

86 A majority of respondents in the New Democracies Barometer V (see Rose and Haerpfer

1998) give a highly positive rating to the centrally-plaimed economy, while expressing clear

disapproval of the new economic system, as only in Poland does a strong majority of

respondents view the new market economy positively. As Rose and Haerpfer warn, a

transitional economy which is “in the throes o f‘wild’ privatization may be less acceptable

than the predictability of a command economy ” (1994a: 6). In the minds of many East

Europeans, the introduction of capitalism is increasingly associated with the growth of the economic jungle and an inegalitarian, uncivilized society.

Mass-level support for political alternatives to democracy is the most prevalent in

Bulgaria, compared to the other surveyed nations (see Table 3.3). While only a relative minority of respondents have openly demanded non-democratic rule in one form or another, the sum total of supporters for one or more political alternatives to democracy such as

Communism (24%), military rule (13%) or the “firm hand” of an authoritarian leader (29%)

is larger in Bulgaria (44%) than in any other East European country. These contradictory

findings imply that, even though the level of public acceptance of democratic politics is above the 50% mark, there are many opponents of the new institutional order.

87 Q; There are many different institutions in this country, for example, government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents no trust and 7 great trust, how great is your personal trust in each of these institutions.

Institution Trusts Neutral Does not trust Government 34 20 45 Parliament 21 23 56 President 70 14 16 Parties 13 21 66 Civil servants 18 27 54 Courts 19 22 59 Police 27 25 48 Military 54 22 23 Private enterprise 22 26 52 Churches 26 23 50 New trade unions 12 23 66 Average 29 22 49

Table 3.2: Public trust in institutions, in percentages (those in the three highest groups, 5-7, are classified as trusting; group 4 as neutral; and groups 1-3 as not trusting)

Source: New Democracies Barometer V (Rose and Haerpfer 1998).

While nearly half of Bulgarians have no confidence in the new institutions and look to non-democratic options, such empirical indicators of low regime support have not led to a rejection of democracy, as the democratic legitimacy responses clearly indicate. Only 23% of Bulgarian respondents in the New Democracies Barometer V (see Rose and Haerpfer

1998) approve of the suspension of parliament and the abolishment of political parties.

88 Continued positive support for an economically ineffectual regime can be explained by the absence of viable political alternatives: an international political environment dominated by a diplomatically and militarily assertive West is hardly conducive to “authoritarian temptations,” that is, the contemplation of possible replacements for the new system. If, for strictly pragmatic reasons, no alternative to democracy is seen as viable, negative regime legitimacy will be reinforced by default, even though system-supportive attitudes and perceptions are not very widespread due to the system’s failure to meet basic human demands and needs. Mass dissatisfaction with the breakdown of law and order and with the hardships involved in the process of economic transformation has obviously undermined the basic trustworthiness of the new democratic institutions, but the lack of unequivocally strong endorsement of the new regime has not been translated into majority demands for a non- democratic alternative such as Commimism, military rule or personal dictatorship. Also on the positive side, many of the anti-regime members of post-Commimist societies are generally older, less educated, less mobilized and less politically active than the regime- supporting population, and for this reason they are less influential in politics (McIntoshet al. 1994: 506; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Rose 1996). Advances in perceived individual freedoms may also accoimt to a large extent for continued democratic support at the mass level in spite of severe social dislocations and economic pain. According to Rose and

Haerpfer (1994: 6), insofar as present economic hardships are seen as a result of escaping from past political dissatisfactions, most East Europeans may prefer an ineffective democratic regime to a strong authoritarian government.

89 Q: Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had. Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree; (A) We should return to Communist rule; (B) The army should govern the country; (C) Best get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can quickly decide things.

Country Return to Military Strong Agree with Communism rule leader A, B or C Bulgaria 24 13 29 44 Slovakia 29 6 23 43 Romania 20 18 26 40 Poland 15 6 37 33 Hungary 23 1 18 32 Czech Republic 16 3 13 25 Croatia 14 4 11 24 Slovenia 14 1 13 22

Table 3.3: Support for alternatives to democracy (in percentages)

Source: New Democracies Barometer V (Rose and Haerpfer 1998).

In another encouraging sign, despite these contradictory attitudinal findings at the mass level not a single major party leader in Bulgaria has publicly advocated the abandonment of parliamentary democracy or the restoration of the old Communist regime.

A major condition for democratic consolidation, namely the weakness or absence of radical maximalist actors whose propaganda and subversive activities can cause political havoc, seems to have been met. But democratic unity is undermined by the destabilizing “” that the UDF and the BSP have been waging against each other since the outset of the transition. Rather than work together for the salvation of their economically wrecked

90 country, rival party leaders berate, denigrate, slander or mock each other in public, frequently questioning the devotion of their political opponents to pluralist democracy. According to former President Zhelev, national consensus is more a fiction than reality in post-Communist

Bulgaria (1998: 220-221).

There are also some exceptions to the prevailing democratic consensus at the declaratory level, as several political figures with some popular following, such as George

Ganchev, Roumen Vodenicharov and Nikolai Kolev-Bosiya—to name just the most famous

“trouble-makers”- have suggested that presidential dictatorship or military rule is needed to stamp out petty partisanship, corruption, organized crime, and economic breakdown. In a widely-publicized extraconstitutional appeal to the military in 1996, ex-dissident poet

Nikolai Kolev-Bosiya blamed all the political forces for the desperate straits in which

Bulgaria found itself:

I appeal to the officer corps and all yoimg recruits serving in the armed forces: officers and soldiers, what happened to your patriotism? You have witnessed how our country is being pillaged and plundered. Only people who are fanatical patriots can save our Motherland now, when it is in mortal danger. It is history itself that is testing us through this terrible fate as well as bestowing upon us the high honor of becoming national saviors. The Bulgarian state is now totally bankrupt! Dashed are our fading hopes for a normal transition from Communism to democracy. .. In reality, the open civil war that started on 9 has now turned into a Cold War. In fact, we see the elements of an open civil war which is being once again waged in our country. .. Neither the ruling Socialists, nor the new, still frail opposition have the strategy, the cadres or indeed the philosophical acumen required to carry out the necessary long-term reforms...therefore, all political parties and their satellites must be temporarily banned from political life.... Nor is the new Constitution any good; it must be repealed along with many of the current laws. (BTA, February 12, 1996)

According to this founding member of the UDF and participant in the Roimd Table, the only way out of the country’s critical situation is either through

91 ...the imposition o f martial law, a military coup d’etat, emergency rule, or a military junta. .. There is a national force capable of saving our country, namely the army. .. What I have in mind are the young officers rather than the top brass of the . (BTA, February 12, 1996)

Other politicians could easily espouse authoritarian alternatives to democracy had they been supported by sizeable anti-democratic minorities with significant political and electoral resources. But electoral results show in behavioral terms that there is far less attitudinal support among the mass public for anti-system alternatives than opinion surveys suggest. In all recent Bulgarian elections, voting for fringe parties and groups has been consistently low. For instance, the forty or so fringe parties drew only 8.41% of the vote in the parliamentary elections of October 1991, confirming that they enjoy only limited support nationwide.

A good example of this lack of electoral support for radicals of any kind, even when they profess strong devotion to democracy, are the neonationalist parties. Although there is a strong popular opposition to extending too many rights and privileges to ethnoreligious minorities in Bulgaria, these parties have garnered few votes from the population in national electoral races. Only the Fatherland Party of Labor had a representative independently elected to the Grand National Assembly in June 1990. In the October 1991 elections, the nationalists made it into parliament thanks to their pre-election union with the Socialists, but the combined total votes for their two most successful parties, the National Radical Party

(NRP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP), did not exceed 1.5% of the total votes cast.

The NRP received 62,462 votes (or 1.13% of the total) and the NDP received 15,399 votes

(0.28% of the total). Nationalist candidates had their best showing in the second round of the

1992 presidential elections (47.15% of the vote), but that was only because the Valkanov-

92 Vodenicharov ticket was officially backed by the BSP. Not a single nationalist candidate was

elected to the National Assembly in December 1994, even though the neonationalist parties

had united in an electoral alliance called the Patriotic Union, which garnered just 1.4% of the

popular vote. The only exception was the Fatherland Party of Labor with four deputies

elected on the party list of the BSP. George Ganchev received nearly 22% of the ballots in the first round of the 1996 presidential race, while his party, the BBB, garnered about 5% of the vote in both the 1994 and 1997 parliamentary elections, but this good showing owed more to the votes of disgruntled BSP members and supporters than to strong nationalist backing. The Bulgarian evidence thus provides little support for Herbert Kitschelt’s theoretical prediction that the emerging party systems in post-Communist Europe would be structured along a “liberal” versus “nationalist” dimension rather than the familiar “Left-

Right” ideological axis (see Kitschelt 1992).

The lack of strong electoral support for the nationalist parties is surprising, given the sensitivity of the ethnic problem in Bulgaria and the relative popularity of nationalism as a political ideology. Nor can it be fully explained by the cooptation of the nationalist vote by the BSP, since the latter's patriotic zeal became visible only at the October 1991 elections and, in one of the characteristic policy zig-zags by the Socialists, was followed by a tacit

BSP-MRF cooperation during Prime Minister Berov’s term in office. A more plausible explanation is that while the ultrapatriotic rhetoric of the neonationalists appeals to many voters, it also stirs fear that their confrontational style may trigger political violence. This fear of potential domestic conflict was obvious in the New Democracies Barometer V (see

Rose and Haerpfer 1998), in which Bulgarians were the only nation to rank the danger of ethnic conflict as the greatest threat to their national security.

93 Parties and groups of the far Left also seem to enjoy little electoral support fi-om the populace, as none of their offtcial candidates in national elections has so far been elected to public office. Their best showing was in the December 1994 elections, when a group calling itself the Bulgarian received 78,606 votes or 1.51% of the total votes; the

Alliance for Socialism (an electoral coalition comprising the Bulgarian United Communist

Party, the Bulgarian Workers’ Party, the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Party, and the

Workers’ Youth Union) won 6,019 votes; the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party (of

Angel Tsonev) won 4,703 votes; the Bulgarian Workers’ Social Democratic Party (of architect Manol Dimitrov) garnered 3,827 votes; and the Bulgarian Workers’ and Peasants’

Party (of Stancho Stanchev) just 3,661 votes. Altogether, these eight parties received 96,816 votes or 1.86% of all votes cast in that election. Electoral outcomes suggest that nostalgia for the Communist past is not as widespread, as is often feared. Yet, in spite of the hard Left’s lack of elected representatives, the BCP alone, as its chairman Vladimir Spasov was quick to point out, won more popular votes in December 1994 than all the neonationalist parties of the Patriotic Union taken together (Bozhkov 1995), which is a clear sign that hardliners of all stripes are unpopular with voters.

It is obvious that radical parties of all ideological persuasions have a consistently poor electoral record. Under these circumstances, no potential challengers to democratic rule can hope to mobilize substantial electoral resources on behalf of their radical cause. Things may change, however, if economic and social conditions continue to deteriorate. The rise of anti-regime parties and movements is still a distinct possibility, providing a chance for political opportunists to exploit popular disenchantment with an economically ineffectual government in order to win votes and political office.

94 Behavioral Dimension

Given the empirically established distinction between individual values and observable political behavior (see Barry 1970: 89-98), the behavioral dimension of consolidation becomes all the more significant. An important behavioral manifestation of the consolidation of democracy is the democratic behavior of all major political actors -that is, the absence of any significant political elites that are openly disloyal and reject the political institutions of modem democracy in principle and/or in action. This is seen as a critical indicator of democratic consolidation in the conceptualization of Gunther, Puhle and

Diamandouros (1995). Even the existence of politically significant semi-loyal elite groups is believed to constitute empirical evidence that democratic consolidation has not been completed. There must be no irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures of government executive power by dissident elite groups (Higley and Burton 1989).

Guillermo O’Donnell includes among the key democratic “attributes” also the requirement that “elected (and some appointed) officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end of their constitutionally mandated terms” (O’Doimell 1997: 41).

As will be discussed in Chapter 13, no mass political parties or movements in

Bulgaria are openly questioning the legitimacy of the new pluralistic regime and posing an explicit authoritarian alternative to it. There are no major antidemocratic or neo-totalitarian parties and movements which, like the Nazis in interwar Germany, boldly declare their open opposition to the legitimacy of the democratic political institutions or regularly violate the fundamental democratic norms of political behavior. Nor is the polity endangered fi-om within by powerful secessionist or expansionist ideologies. Because there are no known extremist movements, terrorist organizations or armed paramilitary groups, some Western

95 analysts have described the country as an “oasis of stability” in a turbulent region (see Brown

1994: 105: Engelbrekt 1994a). Former Deputy Secretary o f State Eagleburger called it “a

virtual island of stability in the Balkans” (Washington Post, March 6, 1992: A20).

What is also important from the viewpoint of elite theory, there are no elite groups

or non-democratic institutions surviving from the Communist past whose members openly

reserve the right to interfere in the democratic process in order to protect their factional or

institutional interests (as the armed forces continue to do in many Latin American countries).

The democratization process in Bulgaria has not been dependent on the acceptance of a set

of undemocratic elite “pacts” that define areas of vital interest for the elite of the old regime

and serve to restrict democratic rule. The old Communist elite never even attempted to

preserve its former privileges or prevent the establishment of full democratic control over

the political system.

A significant indicator of the absence of democratic consolidation is the open

rejection of a democratic constitution by important elite groups and their supporters (Burton,

Gunther and Higley 1992). The new Bulgarian constitution was promulgated in the summer

of 1991. All parliamentary parties took part in the drafting of this carefully crafted

compromise document. At the time o f its signing, though, 91 elected representatives failed

to subscribe to it. All but two of the MRP deputies declined to approve the new basic law

because of the constitutional ban on parties based on ethnic or religious affiliation. Forty-

three radical UDF deputies openly refused to sign it. Although Perry (1991) and others

downplay their widely-publicized boycott as aiming mostly to put pressure on the BSP

majority in the Assembly to agree to early parliamentary elections, the boycotting hardliners were also motivated by some fundamental disagreements with the constitutional text itself

96 (see Engelbrekt 199 lb). Among other things, they opposed the document because it defined

Bulgaria as a “social-welfare state” (a formulation they had vehemently rejected), precluded the restoration of the abolished monarchy, and shielded top officials of the Communist Party from prosecution for abuses during their 45 years in power. To prevent the signing of the draft, 23 UDF deputies went on a hunger strike, claiming that the Socialist-dominated parliament no longer represented political opinion in the country and also demanding that a national referendum be held on the new Constitution with a two-thirds majority needed for its approval. Despite this controversy, the Constitution was adopted by a substantial margin in parliament as 309 legislators voted for it—far more than the two-thirds majority required in the 400-member legislature. But the UDF deputies, who had signed it, were expelled from the “” coalition, an act of revenge by the hardliners opposed to the Constitution who had become dominant in the UDF leadership.

Even though all but two of the MRP deputies refused to ratify the new Constitution, the new democracy does not have to deal with any influential separatist groups. While not a unitary nation-state, Bulgaria faces no immediate challenge to its territorial and political homogeneity comparable to the stateness crises imdermining such former multinational polities as the , Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. Since the re-establishment of an independent Bulgarian polity in 1878, ethnic Turks, the country’s largest minority, have never openly pressed for autonomy or unification with Turkey. Only the small Turkish

Democratic Party led by Adem Kenan has taken separatist positions, by demanding far- reaching administrative and cultural autonomy for regions dominated by ethnic Turks and even a Bulgarian-Turkish federation. While sympathetic to such aspirations, the ethnic

Turks’ main political party, the MRF, has publicly rejected separatism and extremism,

97 perhaps out of fear that it may be banned under the new Constitution. Former MRF Vice-

Chairman Yunal Lutfi insists:

Let me be categorical about , which seems to be the red rag to the nationalist bull. We are totally opposed to the kind o f fundamentalism that swept Iran, for example. We are against autonomy for a Turkish or Islamic enclave, and firmly reject such ideas as in&inging national sovereignty. We have excluded from our movement any extremist, like Adem Kenan, who argues that Bulgarian Juries are part of the Turkish nation. He is not a terrorist, as some of our opponents claim, it is just that his ideas do not compromise with reality. He looks for support, but cannot find any except among a few fanatics. All fundamentalism is doomed to failure because sooner or later we have to discover what all of us have in common: our language, our culture, our tolerance and willingness to join a dialogue. (Interview with Lutfi in Ward 1992: 23-24)

The only other openly separatist group today is the United Macedonian Organization

Ilinden-Pirin (UMO-Ilinden-Pirin), a group based in southwestern Bulgaria, which has been

banned by the Constitutional Court for espousing secessionist views. Its leaders want to set

up an autonomous state in the Pirin region, which they claim is inhabited mainly by the

country’s 250,000 Macedonians, and which is to be eventually linked up with the

neighboring Republic of Macedonia (see Bell 1998: 189-206). In November 1997, UMO-

Ilinden-Pirin announced its plan, complete with a map, for creating a new state called the

“‘Republic of Pirin Macedonia” and centered around the regional capital of

(BTA in English, November 6, 1997). The Bulgarian government, however, denies the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation and language. Quoting an unofficial figure from the December 1992 census, government officials claim that the number of Bulgarian citizens who identify themselves as Macedonians is as low as 6,700 (Engelbrekt 1994b).

Even though no major political force has openly challenged political and civil rights, national unity or the pluralist civil society, behavioral challenges to democracy itself are

98 hardly absent. The continuing economic crisis in particular has produced enormous social

stress as well as some radical opposition to the established democratic order. A number of

Communist-oriented organizations were formed, including four neo-Communist groups that

have assumed the name, if not the mantle, of the former Bulgarian Commimist Party. In

response to ethnic conflict in neighboring Yugoslavia, radical nationalist parties have

proliferated, professing extreme nationalism and anti-minority sentiments. Although violent

methods and flagrantly discriminatory practices are rejected by the mainstream parties, some

leading politicians have used nationalism as an instrument to maximize public support for

their party (Engelbrekt 199 le). The tragedy of war-torn Yugoslavia has had a sobering effect

on Bulgarian nationalists, but some radical groups and organizations appear to espouse even

more hardline views, mixed with growing animosity towards the West. In nearly all cases,

the activities of the nationalists are directed against Bulgaria’s Turkish and Roma minorities.

Gilberg (1994: 207) believes that these hinge organizations, although numerically weak, have radical political agendas and behavioral dispositions that may become a potential challenge to Bulgaria’s new regime. But the leaders of these parties and groups have so far taken a more responsible, pragmatic attitude toward politics and have embraced relatively moderate practical policies, which has made Bulgaria’s inter ethnic relations among the least troubled in the Balkans.

Even as there are no radical political parties and movements with significant popular support which are seeking to overturn the democratic status quo, the representative regime in Bulgaria cannot be regarded as consolidated behaviorally. The prevailing procedural consensus among elite contenders for political power has not resulted in consolidated and durable democracy. While all important elite groups and factions endorse democracy in

99 words, not all of them adhere to its behavioral procedures and rules in practice, thereby posing some implicit threat to the democratic game of politics. The examples of undemocratic opposition behavior are many, ranging from the torching of the BSP headquarters in August 1990 to the mob assault on Parliament in January 1997. The formal- procedural certainty and predictability of electoral democracy have been seriously disrupted by the opposition’s use of extraparliamentary tactics and street pressure to topple legitimately elected cabinets and presidents in open violation of the principle of orderly constitutional change of government without coercion and violence. The use of violent protests and political strikes to overthrow incumbents violates O’Donnell’s above-mentioned requirement and smacks of attempts to subvert democratic rule in the name of democracy. In response to economic turmoil and semiloyal opposition challenges, the party in power has often resorted to demagogy, legal reprisals and political repression, raising serious doubts about its genuine commitment to or even proper understanding of the meaning of democracy. As a result, a less tolerant, authoritarian style of government has emerged, which is often justified with the need to deal with the ravages of the socioeconomic crisis.

The BSP and the UDF have been locked in a no-holds-barred struggle over the spoils of political office and for control over the privatization of the national economy. The policy of ideological militancy and confrontation pursued by the “hawks” in each camp conceals a very serious potential threat to democratic legitimacy and survival. The sharp polarization of Bulgarian society between two opposing coalitions has produced a bipolar model of party politics, with the BSP and the UDF facing each other off in a badly divided country on many of the issues arising in the transition process. Even after the number of parties represented in parliament increased from three in 1992 to six in 1997, this confrontational bipolar model

100 still shapes the dynamics of party competition in Bulgaria. Although the heated partisan

contest over basic policy and substantive issues is focused mostly in the parliamentary arena,

in behavioral terms it is disturbingly reminiscent of Sartorian “polarized pluralism,” raising

questions about mutual toleration and elite compliance with the fundamental rules of the

democratic game. Such highly conflictive politics carries the risk of regime deconsolidation,

as measured by the militant, uncompromising and confrontational behavior of rival party

elites.

On the plus side, there have been few open acts of destabilization, such as attempted

coups d'etat, acts of terrorism, armed separatism, deadly street violence or politically related

murders that could jeopardize the young democracy. Among the more notable exceptions is the unsolved murder of Lukanov, who was shot by an unknown gunman outside his Sofia home on 2 October 1996, thereby continuing the old Bulgarian tradition of political assassinations. Due to the economic crisis, social tensions and ideological polarization, the country has also experienced growing levels of political unrest, including street riots and mob violence. Political conflicts during the transition were not always resolved peacefully and within the realm of law. With the worsening of socioeconomic conditions, the political opposition has on a number of occasions resorted to extra-parliamentary pressures, illegal blackmail tactics, parliamentary boycotts, and other active and destabilizing expressions of discontent to force the resignation of the incumbents. Circumventing established procedural arrangements, a wave of opposition-led political strikes, mass protests, student sit-ins and campus occupations forced President Mladenov to resign in July 1990 over the charge that he had threatened to order army tanks into Sofia during a hostile opposition demonstration the previous December. Mladenov’s reluctant resignation was followed by more street

101 protests and the erecting of “Cities of Truth” (tent encampments of anti-govemment protestors) in the downtown squares of the major cities. On 26 August 1990, an angry crowd of opposition supporters sacked and set ablaze the BSP headquarters in Sofia to protest the delay in removing the illuminated red star atop the building. Some commentators claim that the mob violence, led by Podkrepa leader Konstantin Trenchev and student leader Emil

Koshloukov, was intended to provoke a popular uprising against the Socialist government, but this attempt was successfully thwarted by moderate elements in the UDF and in the BSP

(Baskin 1990). For political reasons, judges in Sofia have so far stalled the official investigation of this incident, thus preventing the uncovering of evidence that might prove or disprove the existence of such a serious anti-regime plot.

The democratically elected cabinet of Prime Minister Lukanov was compelled to resign in November 1990 by a four-day general strike that paralyzed the entire country, mass rallies and demonstrations, barricades in the streets, and an “indefinite” parliamentary walkout by the opposition. Lukanov's forced resignation looked to some observers like

“Prague, February 1948, in reverse—more street democracy than parliamentary democracy”

(Brown: 1994: 106). More student protests and sit-ins, as well as a hunger strike by radical

UDF parliamentarians demanding the dissolution of the National Assembly and the holding of new general elections, almost derailed the signature of the new Constitution in July 1991.

Similar street tactics were used in June 1993, when large crowds led by the UDF leaders repeatedly demonstrated in Sofia in an unsuccessful attempt to force the resignation of

President Zhelev. In September 1994, the MRF-nominated minority cabinet of Prime

Minister Berov was forced to step down by a three-month-old parliamentary boycott by the militant opposition. In early 1997, the government of Prime Minister Videnov collapsed in

102 the face of a street revolt, in which Bulgarians, especially those living in Sofia and other large cities, expressed their disenchantment, frustration and anger with calamitous economic circumstances through political strikes, mass rallies and street riots. The rebellion resulted from the deliberate efforts of the united opposition and sympathetic media outlets to transform actions of social protest into mass political disorder, including traffic blockades and economic shutdowns. On the night of 10-11 January 1997, a crowd of protestors besieged for 10 hours and tried to storm the National Assembly, in which the deputies of the ruling Democratic Left majority had barricaded themselves. Such illegal practices call into question elite commitment to commonly accepted principles of democratic governance and the rule of law, which complicates Bulgaria’s progress towards consolidation.

Ideological militancy and lack of self-restraint has prevented the build-up of mutual confidence and understanding between key political elites, which cannot be conducive to democratic rule and civil peace in the country. If tit-for-tat behavior had been the BSP’s response, the situation in the country would have exploded a long time ago. With the UDF choosing extraparliamentary mobilization and rancor whenever its arch-rival, the BSP, is in power, the consolidation process seems to be stalled. But the prospects for future consolidation in Bulgaria should not be dismissed altogether as a causaperduta. Only a very small minority (8%) of Bulgarian respondents in the New Democracies Barometer V (see

Rose and Haerpfer 1998) felt that Bulgaria was likely to revert to dictatorship. That is to say, in spite of extant problems of institutional, attitudinal and behavioral nature, an unconstitutional seizure of government executive power by force is not expected, which is an unmistakable sign of democratic progress and resilience.

103 CHAPTER 4

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Structural and contextual influences emanate mostly from the historical context, the economic setting and the sociocultural environment, which will be the subject of this and the next four chapters. This chapter will introduce an important contextual factor by probing into the historical background of the Bulgarian transition to democracy. The historic perspective is very important because the comprehension of current events would be impossible without a proper understanding of how history has molded the present. In comparative inquiry, the historical approach is mostly used in case studies like this one, which proceed from the premise that political change (including democratization) can be explicated only in historical, country-specific terms. As idiographic particularists argue, events earlier in a nation’s political history tend to determine what will happen in the future.

The most important determinants of democratization are rooted in a country’s recent historical experiences (Rose and Haerpfer 1992). The type o f the prior regime in particular can determine, in a path-dependent manner, the long-term prospects for democratic transition and consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 55-65). Each post-Communist nation has unique national history and a distinctive traditional culture, as even the legitimacy of Communist rule varied significantly from country to country. The recent past is especially important for the kind of political learning and historical memories that shape the transition trajectories of

104 the post-Communist societies. Given its generally undemocratic past. Eastern Europe’s

legacy of history is believed to be unfavorable to the introduction of democracy and the

processes of its consolidation (Ekiert 1992).

The post-Communist development of Bulgaria can be best understood by examining

its modem history and its imprint on national identity, traditions, political culture and

institutions. Only the country’s more recent experiences should be seen as relevant to

comprehending and explaining its contemporary politics. The first part of this chapter will

examine the grim modem through a brief sketch of the domestic political context from independence in 1878 to the system change of 1989-1990. It will argue that the dominant pattem of 20th-century Bulgarian politics is that of lack of political moderation, self-restraint and compromise, as well as frequent and violent challenges to regime

legitimacy and survival. As a result, the post-1989 regime has to struggle with a historical

legacy highly unfavorable to democratic consolidation, derived mainly from: (1) pre-

Communist politics that was characterized by bitter elite divisions, political intolerance, violent partisan struggles, regime instability, and frequent illegal seizures of executive power; and (2) the Communist suppression of political and social pluralism, elite dissent, and civil society, which further deepened the split in Bulgarian society.

The historical strength o f the traditional Left in Bulgaria has made it more difficult

for the to dominate the transition, precipitating a fierce political competition between the political forces, which has become the dominant pattem under the pluralistic conditions of the new order. While waged mostly with non-violent methods, the confrontation between the major political parties can be seen as continuation of the civil war that marked Bulgarian politics between the end of World War 1 and the consolidation of

105 Communist power in the late 1940s. This particular historical period engendered an irreconcilable split in Bulgarian society, the results of which are felt to this day. The divisive heritage of history is a major factor contributing to the political fragmentation of Bulgarian society, which is often blamed for government instability, the failure of market reforms, and an economic disaster of historical proportions. The negative legacies of both historical periods have created a deep and pervasive ideological cleavage among Bulgarians that has yet to be closed. It is against this negative historical background that the transition is taking place.

The historical developments outlined below should provide the necessary context for full understanding of Bulgaria’s consolidation difficulties. As this brief historical survey will show, the history of Bulgaria is characterized by social injustice, political violence, regime fragility and frequent interruptions, rather than by legitimacy, stability and continuity.

The lack of institutionalized checks on executive power allowed goveming elites to rule society in a self-interested, capricious and arbitrary way, usually relying on little more than the coercive capacities of the state. The memory of these undemocratic experiences has polarized a good portion of the Bulgarian population and political elite. Even the current economic and social distress has not led to the attenuation of historical memory. Thanks to this enduring legacy of partisan antagonisms, the past continues to divide the political forces perhaps more profoundly than in any other country of post-Communist Europe. Deeply embedded in collective political behaviors and psyche, this unpropitious tradition of ideological rifts, mistrust, animosities and confrontation persists, hindering the process of consolidation.

106 Bulgaria before

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 liberated Bulgaria from nearly five centuries of Ottoman rule. The convocation of a Constituent Assembly in 1879 led to the drafting of the country’s first constitution. Most deputies to the Assembly at Tumovo came from

Bulgaria’s two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, although there were also representatives of the ethnic and religious minorities, mostly Muslim Turks (Statelova and Markova 1979). The Liberals, who were imcompromising champions of republican democracy, a sovereign parliament and extensive civil and political liberties, incorporated many of their revolutionary ideas into what has been described as one of the most democratic constitutions o f its time (see Black 1943,1976; Evans 1960; Jelavich 1977; Crampton 1987.

1997; Tzvetkov 1993; Ciutis 1993; Pundeff 1994). A socio cultural explanation for the adoption of a democratic fundamental law claims that the leading Liberals were intellectually

"heirs of Western political thought” (Black 1976: 118). Since peasants constituted the vast majority of the population, and most rural households owned their land, Bulgaria was a country of predominantly small farmers, with only a few large landowners, wealthy merchants and industrialists (Pundeff 1991: 67). This relatively egalitarian class structure explains the initial political weakness of conservative forces traditionally seeking to restrict and democratic rights, such as the monarchy, the army, the state bureaucracy and the business class, which would later come to play a hegemonic role in

Bulgarian politics (Black 1976: 118).

As heirs to the revolutionary democratic movement for national liberation, the

Liberals wanted a republican form of government, but that option was denied by the 1878

Treaty of Berlin imposed by the Great Powers. The Tumovo Constitution defined Bulgaria

107 as a , in which the crowned head of state had the limited prerogatives

assigned to rulers of constitutional and parliamentary monarchies such as Belgium or the

United Kingdom. Principal power in the government lay in a unicameral parliament, the

National Assembly. Voting rights were extended to all male citizens over 21, making

Bulgaria the fifth country in Europe to introduce imiversal male suffrage after ,

Denmark, and Germany (Tzvetkov 1993: 12). A young German prince, Alexander

von Battenberg, who had fought as a volunteer with the Russian army in 1877-1978. was

chosen as Bulgaria’s hereditary monarch. For the next 67 years, the country was saddled with

an alien monarchy imposed fi’om outside and lacking native roots. After Belgium,

and France, the restored Bulgarian polity emerged as the fourth parliamentary democracy in

Europe, based on a liberal, “semi-republican” constitution (Tzvetkov 1993: 12). Many

Bulgarian historians attribute the subsequent disastrous ftmctioning of the new democracy- despite the liberal spirit of its 1879 constitution—to the unprincipled struggle for political

office among power-hungry politicians in a poor, imderdeveloped coimtry, which offered few opportunities for advancement in the private sector.

Political conflict and instability marked the formative years of the Third Bulgarian

Kingdom. Party elites fought ferociously for political power and the spoils it offered. While the Tumovo Constitution was democratic in character, no consensus existed among the squabbling politicians regarding the practical application of its principles. In a clear sign of government instability, seven cabinets and two parliaments were dismissed in the first two years of Bulgaria’s independent existence. The intense institutional rivalry between the

Liberal-dominated legislature and the Conservative-backed monarch undermined constitutional rule. The Liberal Party attracted the support of the peasantry and the small

108 national intelligentsia, while the Conservative Party represented the class interests of the rising Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the new state bureaucracy. From the beginning of his rule.

Prince Alexander opposed the parliamentary system because of the many restrictions it imposed on his authority. After two years of bitter feuding with the National Assembly, he staged a royal coup d’etat, dismissing the Liberal cabinet and suspending the Tumovo

Constitution. The institutional conflict was resolved only when the constitution was restored by a political compromise in 1883. This was the prelude to more than a century of conflict and turmoil, starting a tradition of political divisions and disunity that continues today.

Foreign interference in Bulgarian affairs was another factor contributing to political violence and instability. Diplomatic tensions with resulted in a series of Russophile military conspiracies, starting a tradition of army interference in civilian politics. Russian- trained Bulgarian officers deposed Alexander in an army coup on 21 August 1886, the first of several military interventions during the pre-Communist era. , a pro-

Austrian ex-Liberal, led a successful counter-coup three days later, but abdicated under heavy Russian pressure. When Stambolov became prime minister in 1887, the young

Bulgarian state was still plagued by intrigue, military plots and political violence. His “iron hand” rule often bypassed Bulgaria’s representative institutions but brought unprecedented political and economic stability to the country. His People’s Liberal Party derived strong political support from the growing entrepreneurial class which benefitted from Stambolov s modernizing and state-protectionist policies (see Perry 1993). Despite Russian and Orthodox

Church objections, the National Assembly installed Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, a

Catholic German prince hand-picked by Stambolov, on the Bulgarian throne in August 1887.

But Stambolov soon became a political liability in the eyes of the new monarch, who wanted

109 to improve relations with Russia. In 1894, Ferdinand sacked his powerful prime minister, nicknamed “the Bulgarian Bismark,” because the prince wanted to increase his own powers.

A year later, Macedonian radicals (with the connivance of the Palace and the new

Conservative cabinet) assassinated Stambolov in revenge for his suppression of their irredentist movement, the first in a series of major political assassinations.

As no strong and charismatic politician like Stambolov emerged in the next twenty years, the monarchy became the dominant force in Bulgarian politics. Ferdinand, who declared himself king in 1908, accumulated power by manipulating party elites to his own advantage and established a strong personal regime. The cabinet depended on the monarch’s will rather than the confidence o f parliament. Royal supremacy was aided by a weak legal framework for legislative control over the throne as well as the fi-agmentation of the original

Liberal and Conservative parties into a dozen competing factions. As the National Assembly exercised only nominal power over the executive, it had only minor influence on government decision-making. Weak and unstable governments rotated in power until 1919 in a quasi- parliamentary system that rarely functioned according to the democratic constitution.

Inspired by the radical ideologies of socialism and , Bulgaria’s peasant and working classes began to assert themselves on the political scene. They were led by disaffected intellectuals, who in their finstrated and alienation from bourgeois society had turned to revolutionary politics. As Charles and Barbara Jelavich (1977: 204) note, although industrially underdeveloped, Bulgaria produced one of the most vigorous

Socialist movements. Foimded in 1891, the Bulgarian Workers’ Social Democratic Party

(BWSDP) was marked by a strong psychological predisposition for social justice and political characteristic of the Bulgarian intelligentsia of the late 19th and early

110 20th century (Rothschild 1959). Even though Bulgaria had only about 137,000 urban workers in 1900, the BWSDP became one of the first social-democratic parties to gain parliamentary representation. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) was established in 1899 as an expression of growing rural discontent and resentment against the goveming urban elite, even though land in Bulgaria was more evenly distributed among the peasantry than in the rest of Europe, making social tensions in the countryside far less explosive (Tzvetkov 1993: 9). Though led by urban-based intellectuals, BANU was seen by

Bulgarian peasants as a party representing their class interests. In a country that was predominantly rural and agricultural, the left-wing, anti-monarchist Agrarians became the dominant opposition party in the National Assembly after 1908.

With the emergence of new, radical leftist parties, Bulgaria’s elite structure became even more fi-agmented and sharply polarized between Left and Right. Anti-regime activities and propaganda by left-wing militants increased domestic turmoil. BANU’s opposition to high rural unemployment, heavy government taxes and usurious interest rates led to widespread protests and mutinies in the countryside which were quelled by force. The police opened fire on peasants demonstrating against the government in May 1900, killing 90 and wounding over 400. Influenced by the 1905 revolution in Russia, industrial workers and radical students staged for the next four years a series of militant demonstrations and strikes.

Prime Minister of the stambolovist People’s Liberal Party was assassinated in 1907. Student riots forced the conservative government of the People’s Liberal Party to resign in January 1908. Political instability was so widespread that when the Thirteenth

Ordinary National Assembly completed its five-year term in 1908, this was a unique case in the history of Bulgarian parliamentism (Tzvetkov 1993).

I l l Alarmed by growing social turbulence and left-wing radicalism in the country.

Bulgaria’s ruling class decided to open up the electoral process in order to accommodate the demands of the new contending forces entering the political arena. The center-right

Democratic Party, which had won the majority of seats in the 1908 elections, enacted a series of progressive laws which further democratized the political system by introducing popular referenda and proportional representation in national and local elections (see Malinov 1938).

A plausible explanation for the adoption of a PR electoral system in Bulgaria is provided by

Stein Rokkan’s hypothesis which suggests that proportional representation was introduced in many European countries at the end of the 19th and the begiiming of the 20th century

through a convergence of pressures fi-om below and from above. The rising working class wanted to lower the thresholds of representation in order to gain access to the legislatures, and the most threatened o f the old-established parties demanded PR to protect their position against the new waves of mobilized voters created by universal suffrage. (Rokkan et al. 1970: 157)

The thrust of Rokkan’s hypothesis is that the choice of PR provided an institutional basis for elite integration which incorporated rather than excluded challenger elites (Lijphart

1992). But in a predominantly peasant society like Bulgaria the position of the established bourgeois parties became in fact more vulnerable under a PR system which made the manipulation of the ballot box far more difficult. The Agrarian Union monopolized the vote of the Bulgarian peasantry, which had previously supported the Liberals. The rural electoral strength of the Agrarians combined with working class mobilization by the Social Democrats gradually shifted the balance of political power far to the Left, especially after the trauma of

Bulgarian defeats in the and World War I . By threatening the basic interests of a national bourgeoisie whose commitment to democracy and popular sovereignty

112 was always ambiguous and instrumental, this shift injected further uncertainty and

unpredictability into the political system.

Post-Liberation Bulgaria was therefore more or less an electoral democracy, but was by no means free from political violence and government instability (see Kostadinova 1995).

The pre-1934 Bulgarian democracy was neither liberal, nor did it ever become entrenched and consolidated. Civil um-est, government instability, military coups, and political violence plagued the country both before and after World War 1 due to the fundamental feuds among rival party elites. An autocratic monarchy, a semi loyal national bourgeoisie, extreme polarization between radical parties of the Left and the Right, and foreign intervention were at the root of democratic fragility and decay. Antagonistic elite factions clashed violently in their contests for power, trying to dominate the central government and the rewards of political office. A "‘Bulgarian tradition” of government intolerance for the political opposition had emerged since before World War I (Lampe 1991: 48).

The struggle for supremacy between the monarch and the parliament continued unabated. When territorial claims in Ottoman-ruled Macedonia and a lack of legislative control over the throne involved Bulgaria in the First Balkan War (1912-1913), the Second

Balkan War (1913), and World War I (1915-1918), the forces of Bulgarian began to gain strength. The Agrarian Union led by the young and charismatic Alexander

Stamboliisky was the largest and most vocal anti-. Although it never gained more than 21% of the popular vote before World War I, BANU had a large, unified following among Bulgarian peasants, victimized by policies that were more beneficial to urban rather than rural interests, despite the numerical preponderance of the peasantry.

Stamboliisky’s declared goal was to establish a republic ruled by a permanent lural majority

113 that would replace the monarchy and the “bourgeois” representative institutions established

by the Tumovo Constitution (Bell 1977). BANU became a powerful and controversial force

in Bulgarian politics, creating an enduring tradition of agrarian radicalism that is strongly

egalitarian, anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist in its ideological orientation. This legacy is

reflected in a populist value system among all Bulgarians who tend to view industrial

capitalism and Western capital as imdesirable, if not evil (Black 1976: 122).

The Demise of Bulgarian Democracy

Following the war defeats, the fragile foundations of democracy were shaken by the postwar political, economic and social crisis. During the chaotic post-WWI era, internecine violence between the forces of Left and Right further destabilized Bulgaria's domestic politics. In the closing days of World War I, a BANU-led soldier rebellion was crushed only with the help o f the German Army. Fearing for his life. King Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his son Boris and fled abroad. Because the devastation of the war, economic collapse and postwar hardships had radicalized the population, the leftist parties scored impressive electoral victories. The Social Democrats had split into two rival factions: the center-left

Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSD?) and a pro-Bolshevik group, the Bulgarian

Communist Party (BCP), which advocated proletarian revolution and the overthrow of capitalism.

The results o f the 1919, 1920 and 1923 general elections reflected massive public dissatisfaction with the impoverished and chaotic living conditions of the immediate postwar years. With 53.9% of the popular vote in 1923, BANU emerged as the majority party in parliament, followed by the Communists (19.4%) and the Social Democrats (2.6%). As

114 national politics shifted dramatically to the Left, the stage was set for a violent clash betw een the highly polarized political forces—the result of deep ideological divisions and a weak democratic commitment on the part of a national bourgeoisie determined to protect its class interests and property rights by all necessary means. For the next twenty years, right-wing army factions organized in the Military League and encouraged by the conservative parties and the Palace involved themselves in civilian life to an unprecedented degree, further destabilizing the political system.

As head of Europe’s first Agrarian government, Stamboliisky introduced a series of radical reforms intended to relieve the plight of the impoverished peasantry, such as a progressive income tax system, a land reform according to the principle “land belongs to those who cultivate it,” universal health care, free and compulsory secondary education, and the abolition of the rich merchants’ monopoly on grain trade. His redistributive policies were opposed by traditional economic interests represented by the conservative parties and the throne. Not only were the illegal profits of war profiteers confiscated by the Agrarian government, but Stamboliisky vowed to abolish the monarchy and the army, blaming them for ultranationalism, militarism and the war debacles. The populist policies of the

Stamboliisky regime induced an anti-elitist, egalitarian mentality among the population, contributing to the persistence of a leftist, socialist-communitarian tradition.

When leaders of the wartime conservative cabinets were put on trial for war­ mongering and war-profiteering, the Bulgarian right imited in a proto-fascist coalition called the People’s Accord, which represented the interests of the most elements of the native bourgeoisie. Encouraged by the conservative parties and the Palace, the army staged a coup d’etat on 9 June 1923. During the disorganized resistance to the coup, Stamboliisky

115 was assassinated by Macedonian extremists fiercely opposed to his policy of seeking a democratic of all Balkan states. His mutilated body was thrown into a river and his severed head was reportedly delivered to the Palace. Infuriated by Stamboliisky’s refusal to pay war reparations o f 2.25 billion gold fi’ancs, an amoimt which was

“astronomical if not absurd for a small and ruined coimtry,” the Western Powers remained indifferent to the violent overthrow of Bulgaria’s democratic regime (Pundeff 1991:81). The

Palace-backed military coup against Stamboliisky in 1923 left a lasting tragic and divisive legacy that still divides Bulgarian society (ibid.: 85).

A belated counter-coup by the Communists was brutally crushed in September 1923.

The new conservative cabinet of Professor Alexander Tsankov held restricted elections in a climate of electoral fraud and police terror, but government repression failed to end civil strife and instability in the country. As mutual fear, distrust and hostility between the warring

Left and Right deepened, Bulgaria’s political culture was increasingly characterized by political intolerance and violent elite struggles (Lampe 1991: 38). The authoritarian regime that came to power with the 9 June 1923 coup resembled in many respects the right-wing death-squad “democracies” of post-WWU Latin America. Linked to the interests of a revolutionary foreign power, the Communists never abandoned their left-wing radicalism and ideological opposition to the institutions of “bourgeois democracy.” When the BCP was outlawed in 1924, militant Commimists dynamited a cathedral in Sofia where King Boris III was to be present, killing 128 high-ranking state officials. This desperate act brought a government reign of terror, in which over 20,000 Communists and Agrarians were murdered without trial, including some of Bulgaria’s best-known intellectuals and artists.

116 Compared to the violence and bloodshed of the preceding years, the late 1920s brought relative tranquility to the country. “Bloody” Tsankov was replaced in 1926 by

Andrei Liapchev, whose government was more tolerant of the political opposition. But the

international scene was anything but stable or favorable to democracy. The world economic depression that started in 1929 devastated the Bulgarian economy, as the GNP fell by more than one-third between 1929 and 1934. A wave of industrial strikes and mass protests hit the country in 1930-1931. The economic crisis, high unemployment and internecine violence between Macedonian extremist groups in Bulgaria generated broad discontent among

Bulgarian voters. In June 1931, Liapchev’s conservative cabinet was defeated by the center- left Popular Bloc coalition in the last open, free, and fair parliamentary elections until the restoration of democracy in 1990.

The rise of and , the totalitarian forms of modem capitalism, in the international arena also contributed to the resumption of Lefr-Right hostilities in Bulgaria.

Pro-fascist groups with close ties to fascist Italy and enjoyed the support of the business class, the military and the crown. Although such groups never attracted a large popular following, their militant activities contributed to a climate of violence and lawlessness that paved the way for a right-wing coup by the Military League and on

19 May 1934. The main goal of Zveno, an elitist group of right-wing politicians and intellectuals with close connections to the conservative parties and fascist Italy, was to reform and centralize existing political institutions so that the power of the state could be used directly to promote regime stability and economic growth (Curtis 1993: 37-38). The new, supra-party cabinet of Zveno leader implemented draconian measures which effectively ended multiparty democracy. It dissolved parliament, abrogated the

117 Tumovo Constitution and banned all political parties and mass organizations such as the labor unions. Bulgarian developments were in line with the breakdown of democracy throughout Eastern and Central Europe. The military coups of 1923 and 1934 demonstrated that Bulgaria’s upper classes supported parliamentary democracy only as long as their hegemonic positions in government, society and the economy were not seriously challenged by a radicalized and electorally strong left-wing opposition. Partly for this reason, the class struggle in Bulgaria was historically waged with undemocratic, often ruthlessly violent methods. The traditional Right dominated Bulgarian politics for most of the pre-Communist period, using manipulation o f election laws, voter fraud and violence at the polls, when not openly resorting to dictatorship and police terror.

The Zveno regime wanted to establish a republic, but its political base was too narrow to consolidate power. Boris III used pro-monarchy civilian and military factions to remove Zveno from power in January 1935 and impose a personal regime, which BSDP leader Petar Dertliev describes as “a combination of fascism and monarchical absolutism”

(interview with Dertliev in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 78). In the following years, the king relied on a series of pliant conservative cabinets to rule Bulgaria, curb the political power of the army, and suppress parties opposed to his royal dictatorship. A broad opposition coalition, the People’s Constitutional Bloc, brought all leftist forces together for the 1938 elections. Even though only individual candidates were allowed to run under a carefully controlled electoral procedure that excluded party lists, the People’s Constitutional Bloc elected over sixty deputies to the 160-seat parliament. Elections in the next few years were similarly restricted in order to maintain the non-party system and royal control over the

National Assembly.

118 The pro-fascist cabinet of Prof. aligned Bulgaria with the Axis powers during World War II. Fearing public protests, Filov resisted German pressures to send

Bulgarian troops to the Soviet front, declaring instead war on the U.S. and the U.K. The capital Sofia was devastated by massive Allied air raids in 1943-1944. Under directives from

Moscow, the Communists launched organized armed resistance against the government in

1941, which responded with a campaign of savage terror and atrocities, killing nearly 30,000 guerilla fighters and their civilian supporters. The Agrarian Union was split between a right wing, which remained the strongest political party among the tolerated legal opposition, and the left-wing Pladne group, which under the leadership ot'Nikola Petkov and G. M. Dimitrov aligned itself with the BCP. The Fatherland Front, a “popular front” coalition comprising the

Communists, the Social Democrats, the Pladne Agrarians and Zveno, was formed in 1942 to save Bulgaria from another national catastrophe. The wartime crisis coincided with the early death of King Boris in 1943, who was the strongest advocate of close ties with Hitler

(Pundeff 1991: 91). A moderate cabinet headed by Agrarian Konstantin Muraviev annulled the alliance with Germany, but despite its proclamation of neutrality and last-minute efforts to negotiate an armistice with the Western Allies, the Red Army entered Bulgaria in early

September 1944. The short-lived Muraviev government was deposed in the early hours of

September 9 by a bloodless military coup organized by the Fatherland Front and backed by a general political strike.

The Advent of State Socialism

Non-Communists dominated the first Fatherland Front cabinet of Zveno leader

Kimon Georgiev, but the BCP, helped by the presence o f the Red Army in the country, soon

119 emerged as the dominant political force. Although it had only about 14,000 surviving members on 9 September 1944, the BCP grew rapidly in membership and claimed the allegiance of a substantial segment of the population (Oren 1971). As Todorova explains, in

Bulgaria “the ideas of socialism and communism had strong indigenous roots, unlike many of its East European counterparts” (1992: 162), so the Communist party did not have to be created from scratch, as in Hungary or Romania. According to Rothschild (1959: 300), historical affinity for Russia also contributed to the strong support which many Bulgarians extended to the -backed Communists. For a large section of the population, the new regime brought hopes for democracy, freedom, equality and social justice (Zhelev 1996:

131).

Rising Cold War tensions split the Fatherland Front coalition. To consolidate power, the Communists gradually purged all opposition figures, exiled the royal family, and held elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. A national referendum in

September 1946 abolished the monarchy in favor of a people’s republic, leading to the exile of Simeon II, the adolescent son of Boris m. Discredited by its subversion of parliamentary democracy and its wartime alliance with Hitler, the monarchy was genuinely unpopular, but the referendum results were so skewed (85.18% voted for a people’s republic and only

3.89% for the monarchy) that fraud was widely suspected (Tzvetkov 1993:295). Women and young adults over 18 were given the right to vote for the first time, but a climate of political violence pervaded the entire electoral process.

The elections for a Sixth Grand National Assembly in October 1946 gave the

Communists 275 of the 465 parliamentary seats, which allowed BCP leader and longtime

Comintern chairman to become prime minister. Although ballot-rigging

120 was suspected, the pro-Communist vote reflected the deep disillusionment among the

Bulgarian population with the disastrous performance of the pre-Communist regime. The

BCP gained control of all significant ministries, with the rest being divided among the

Pladne Agrarians, the Social Democrats and Zveno. Growing BCP influence generated an anti-Communist backlash imder Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov. In response, the Communists began to one by one their erstwhile political partners, starting with Zveno. Within a year, the BCP had used its power base to remove all key opposition figures from the government. The only remaining obstacle was a imified BANU which, in an alliance with other non-Commimist parties, demanded a return to the Tumovo Constitution. Because the

Agrarians enjoyed the open backing of the Western Allies, their resistance created a stalemate with the BCP for over a year. The power struggle, which centered on the nature of the new constitution, ended in mid-1947, when Petkov was arrested and executed as a

Western agent, creating a martyr whose name has remained a rallying cry for anti-

Communist Agrarians. Next, the Communists disbanded the Social Democrats and declared

Bulgaria a popular democracy. The ruthless manner in which the BCP regime dealt with the political opposition left a deep and lasting historical legacy of bitterness, hatred and mistrust in Bulgarian society, the effects of which are still evident today. Bulgaria was completely under BCP domination by December 1947, when parliament adopted the so-called . Although the parliamentary system of the T umovo Constitution was nominally retained, the new basic law established a “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

While ideological conflicts and violence against political opponents prevented the pre-1934 semi-democratic regime from becoming a stable and consolidated democracy, the

Communist takeover undermined the formal democratic stmctures established by the

121 Tumovo Constitution, subjugated civil society and strengthened Bulgaria’s tradition of

political intolerance. Apart from the BCP and a pro-Communist faction of BANU. all political parties were either abolished or dissolved into the Fatherland Front, which became a pro-govemment satellite organization. After a thorough purge in 1947, the Agrarian Union retained only nominal independence to preserve the facade of a two-party system. Coalition governments consisting of the BCP, BANU, and the Fatherland Front formally ruled

Bulgaria, but real power was concentrated in the hands of the top Communist bureaucracy.

Regular parliamentary and local elections were held under a universal suffrage and secret ballot, but voting was neither fair, nor free. Voter mobilization by the regime actually had the opposite effect of producing apathy, cynicism, and alienation at the mass level but, in spite of such clearly undemocratic practices. Communist Bulgaria retained at least the semblance of electoral proceduralism and party pluralism.

From the start, the BCP government, while claiming as its model, often veered sharply from it. served more as an ideological cover for those who held power. By 1949, centralization o f public life was almost universal and all state institutions were subordinated to the ruling party, which allowed no challenge to the official ideology. The means employed by the Communists to attain monopoly on power were clearly undemocratic; the political system was under total control of the regime, political and civil rights were restricted, civil society lost its autonomy, and the basic means of economic production and exchange were expropriated by the party-state. In retum, the new authorities guaranteed full employment, low food prices, affordable housing, and other generous social benefits, such as subsidized energy consumption and public transport, free and universal medical care and higher education, accessible legal services, as well as upward

122 mobility opportunities for the members of the working class. In spite of constitutionally- guaranteed freedoms and regime rhetoric about popular democracy, the BCP’s policy of extensive social penetration and enforced ideological conformity subverted any genuine practice of openly competitive elections or civil liberties, thereby blocking the free expression of other political interests and preferences.

Following the Commimist-engineered transformation of Bulgaria’s elite structure, a “new class” of high-ranking party bweaucrats emerged, derisively known as the “red bourgeoisie.” Disillusioned with the betrayal of their idealistic expectations, many veteran

Communists became alienated from the new system. A number of BCP leaders resisted the total subordination of Bulgaria to foreign interests and sought a confederation with

Yugoslavia as a counterweight to Stalin’s encroachments. But the rise to power of Vulko

Chervenkov, a Moscow-trained Communist and Stalin’s handpicked successor to Dimitrov, initiated the practice of eliminating all actual or potential opponents. The trial and execution of deputy premier and wartime party leader on charges of anti-Soviet collaboration with Tito began four years of extensive purges, expelling nearly a quarter of the BCP membership (Brown 1970). Many party veterans found themselves languishing in the same prisons and detention camps in which they had been incarcerated by the previous monarcho-fascist regime. Following the elimination of the intraparty opposition, Bulgaria became one of the USSR’s most loyal client states both in domestic and foreign policy.

With the ascendancy of Todor Zhivkov, Khrushchev’s protégé, the Stalinist period in Bulgaria came to an abrupt end. Chervenkov and other Stalinists were expelled from the

BCP for violations of “socialist legality,” political terror subsided, the power of the secret police was sharply curtailed, the regime became much more lenient toward internal dissent,

123 and political prisoners were released, including all those sentenced by the People’s Courts.

The post-Stalin “thaw” also revived anti-regime dissent within party ranks. A group of senior party officials, including General Dobri Terpeshev, a former BCP Politburo member and the military leader of the wartime home resistance, addressed a public letter to the BCP Central

Committee denouncing the regime for imposing a Stalinist dictatorship in Bulgaria (Zhivkov

1997: 192; Dionisiev 1994). A “generals’ plot” to overthrow Zhivkov, the most serious military conspiracy against the regime, was thwarted in April 1965. Finally, the idea of

“socialism with a human face” advocated by the Prague Spring reformers in Czechoslovakia had a profoimd effect on the Bulgarian intelligentsia (see Markov 1990; Simeonov 1996), forcing the BCP to tighten party discipline and reaffirm control over all social organizations.

The regime’s supposed ideological unity thus appeared to be fragile and less than monolithic, as many BCP members opposed the practice, if not the theory of "real socialism.” Zhivkov initiated a series of limited reforms, which were intended to allow some decentralization of decision-making, especially in the economy. He stepped down as prime minister in 1971, when a new constitution created the position o f President of the State

Council (head of state), to which Zhivkov was named. Approved by a national referendum, the 1971 constitution declared Bulgaria a “mass-based popular democracy” instead of

“dictatorship of the proletariat” and “worker-peasant state” as prescribed in the 1947 basic document, thus implying that the war against internal enemies had finally ended. It also strengthened the role of the National Assembly, even though the latter continued to rubber- stamp legislation and nominations proposed by the BCP apparatus. To improve living standards and reinvigorate economic growth, a new program of economic reforms, borrowed from the Hungarian experience and designated the “New Economic Mechanism ” (NEM),

124 was launched in 1979. Although the reforms decentralized the Bulgarian economy, they did

little to meet the challenge of a globalized market or placate a population with rapidly rising expectations. For both internal and external reasons, Zhivkov decided to play the nationalist card. Although nationalism ran counter to the BCP’s doctrine of “proletarian internationalism,” this step was not so imusual, as Commimist governments throughout

Eastern Europe resorted to nationalist appeals to regain lost popularity (see Feffer 1992:

230). Zhivkov’s so-called “revival process,” the campaign to assimilate Bulgaria’s ethnic

Turks initiated in 1984-1985, was partly intended to win public legitimacy for the regime by exploiting patriotic sentiments, but it backfired by generating a climate of distrust and enmity between the two ethnic communities and tarnishing Bulgaria’s image abroad.

Character of the Pre-transition Regime

Kitschelt has defined Bulgaria’s Communist regime as “patrimonial”(see Kitschelt et al. 1999: 23-24), but his conception of the term seems to deviate from ’s category of patrimonialism, that is, a form of traditional in which authority rests on the personal and formally arbitrary power exercised by a despotic ruler and the royal household (see Weber 1968: 643-644). The Bulgarian case clearly does not fit many of

Kitschelt’s own criteria for “patrimonial communism,” such as traditional authoritarian or absolute rule, and unmobilized working class in the pre-Communist past; low levels of formal professional bureaucratization imderCommimism; preemptive reform by Communist incumbents (rather than govemment-opposition negotiations), strong presidential powers and weak parliaments, weak and strong nationalists in the post-Communist era

(see Kitschelt et al. 1999; 36-37). In fact, on a number of characteristics Zhivkov’s Bulgaria

125 seemed to be closer to the Kitschelt’s “national-accommodative” rather than “patrimonial” type of communist regime.

Linz and Stepan (1996: 233; 333-343), on the other hand, describe pre-transition

Bulgaria as an example of “early post-,” a type of regime that “is very close to the totalitarian ideal type but differs from it on at least one key dimension, normally some constraints on the leader” (1996: 42). There is ample empirical evidence showing that

Bulgaria in 1988-1989 was clearly a post-totalitarian type of society. Bell ( 1986:147) claims that during the long Zhivkov era Bulgaria followed slowly and haltingly the same path of peaceful reform and liberalization traveled more rapidly by Kadar’s Hungary. As already mentioned, it retained at least the semblance of a parliamentary government, electoral procediu-alism and a two-party system. Though elections were neither fair nor free, there was no political office whose incumbents were unelected. Political power was concentrated in the hands of the governing party elite, but some elements of social and economic pluralism and autonomy were allowed to re-emerge, especially after Zhivkov’s April 1956 BCP plenum which launched the “destalinization” of the . In a good-will gesture to the former political opposition, parties disbanded since the late 1940s, such as Zveno, the

Social Democrats and the Nikola Petkov Agrarians, were publicly exonerated and praised for their participation in the struggle against fascism, while their surviving leaders (Kimon

Georgiev, Dimo Kazasov and others) enjoyed higher social standing. In another sign of reconciliation with civil society, Zhivkov recognized the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox

Church as of national identity and unity, lifting restrictions on religious services and allowing some Church influence in cultural life and even foreign affairs. The celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state in 1981 ushered in a period of greater

126 artistic and cultural freedoms championed by Zhivkov’s daughter Liudmila and her circle of liberal-minded intellectuals and artists. It also broadened access to governmental decision­ making for prominent members of the non-party intellectual and cultural elite of the country, formerly excluded from the decisional processes. The regime’s newly-found nationalism in particular provided more space for unofficial social initiatives from below and greater amount of independent cultural and artistic activity. A number of prominent poets, novelists, playwrights, painters, movie and theater directors began to exercise influence rivaling that of Politburo members.

An important step towards and an autonomous economic society were Zhivkov’s experiments with Westem-style marketization, deregulation and even privatization of the economy. As early as 1973, Bulgaria enacted the first law in the entire

East bloc, allowing joint economic ventures with the participation of Western capital. Under the New Economic Mechanism, enterprises began to operate under self-management with the right to set prices, salaries, and production goals. Output and pricing were increasingly influenced by market conditions, government subsidies were cut, while private enterprise and increased social differentiation were allowed. Executive Decree No. 56 in particular encouraged the formation of privately-owned companies in Bulgaria, of which over 20,000 existed by the end of 1989 (Simeonov 1996: 288).

There was also a great upsurge in autonomous political activity in the final stage of the Zhivkov regime. Critical intellectuals in particular nurtured civic development from below, including spontaneous forms of association. After 1985, autonomous groups and

“informal” organizations made up mostly of intellectuals sprang up in open opposition to the

127 regime. As one of those who championed dissent under late Communism, Zheiiu Zhelev remembers this period as one of unprecedented political and cultural tolerance.

After Gorbachev’s rise to power in the U.S.S.R, was permitted in Bulgaria as well, a factor giving rise to a more overt struggle against the regime, led by the intelligentsia. I wrote an article entitled “The Great Moment of the Intelligentsia” which appeared in the weekly magazine of the Committee for Culture. 1 was one of the initiators and organizers of the first “informal” opposition organization of the Bulgarian intelligentsia against the country’s totalitarian regime.... (Interview with Zhelev in Ward 1992: 3)

Given the greater permissiveness of the authorities, a number of organized opposition groups began to emerge as an expression of an alternative public opinion, especially among artistic and academic circles in Sofia. Since the mid-1980s, dissident groups were also being formed in reaction to Zhivkov’s anti-Turkish campaign. The Independent Society for the Defense of Human Rights was founded by Eduard Genov in 1987 to monitor human-right violations by the government. A religious opposition group, the Committee for the Protection of

Religious Rights and Freedoms, was formed the same year under the leadership of Father

Khristofor Subev. Painter Svetlan Rusev, a BCP Central Committee member, organized an independent environmental group, Ecoglasnost, to protest environmental pollution and other government abuses in Bulgaria. These dissident organizations were joined by many party members and even several Central Committee members, as well as by close relatives of top regime officials. Ecoglasnost activist Petar Beron recalls that “These organizations were composed mostly by intelligentsia from . Most of these people were also former Communists. Most were highly positioned members of the Communist party”

(interview with Beron in Melone 1996b). , chairman of the National

.Assembly and ex-prime minister, resigned his Politburo seat because his wife, journalist

Sonya Bakkish, had been participating in Ecoglasnost protests. The Independent Club for

128 Support of Giasnost and Democracy, including many leading Sofia intellectuals, was formed

in 1988 to work for democratization of the political system. In the same year Konstantin

Trenchev founded the Podkrepa Independent , a Bulgarian copy of Polish

Solidarity. Although Dr. Trenchev and several other dissident activists were arrested and

briefly imprisoned, the regime seemed to have tacitly accepted autonomous organizational

activity and grassroots opposition. In a further move towards political pluralism, elections

for mayors and local councilors, held on 28 February 1988, permitted for the first time since

1946 the nomination of multiple candidates other than those endorsed by the BCP, BANU.

and the Fatherland Front. Candidates presented by independent groups and public

organizations garnered over a quarter of the total votes cast. The end of the Zhivkov regime

thus coincided with limited economic and political pluralism.

The Exit of Zhivkov

As the international context began to change dramatically after 1985, the long

Zhivkov era was drawing to an end. Soviet reforms had a crucial impact on events in

Bulgaria, as elsewhere in the . The example of Gorbachev’s radical changes created strong pressure on Zhivkov to step down and allow a new generation of younger, more liberal leaders to take over. In public at least, Zhivkov endorsed Gorbachev and his revolutionary reforms. “Perestroika” and “giasnost” became the new buzzwords in Bulgaria.

The press was suddenly filled with free debates, and many independent societies and associations were legalized. A significant reshuffle occurred among Bulgaria’s senior leadership, as wartime veterans were replaced by younger technocrats with liberal credentials and better educational backgrounds. A party congress in April 1986 outlined a new program

129 that was, at least on paper, even more radical than reforms in the Soviet Union. Zhivkov’s

“July Concept” included an unprecedented degree of economic liberalization, press freedoms and administrative decentralization. There was even a proposal to limit terms of office for higher party and government officials. A draft for a new constitution was circulated for discussion without a clause guaranteeing the leading role of the BCP in politics and society.

But there were growing disagreements between Gorbachev and Zhivkov, especially over reform issues. Zhivkov’s ideas for reforming Bulgaria were much closer to the Chinese model than to the Soviet one, with Zhivkov accusing Gorbachev of “putting the cart before the horse” (Zhivkov 1993: 130). The new policy o f reforms also exacerbated existing elite divisions. Some media controls were reimposed after sharp criticism of the authorities and exposure of official corruption and malfeasance had appeared in the press. At a July 1988 plenum, Zhivkov ousted from the BCP Politburo several prominent proponents of

Gorbachevism.

In spite of these reversals, pressure for change continued to build within the country.

The regime’s ideological imity and political cohesiveness began to fall apart, especially over the issue of tolerance for political dissent. When Foreign Minister Mladenov organized an international environmental conference in Sofia in October 1989 and invited independent

Bulgarian groups to participate, the police roughed up and arrested many anti-govemment demonstrators. At this point, elite rifts came out into the open when Mladenov, with the support of trusted associates from the Foreign Ministry, refused to take orders from Zhivkov and demonstratively tendered his resignation. His challenge to Zhivkov was a sign that elite dissensus had reached a crisis level, spreading even among the top party leadership. After his resignation was rejected, Mladenov began conspiring with other top officials to replace

130 Zhivkov. He reportedly received support from at least four other Politburo members,

including the Minister ofNational Defense, Army General Dobri Dzhurov. Only a week after

an Ecoglasnost-led protest march on Parliament, Zhivkov was deposed by his own Politburo

colleagues who were clearly worried over mounting protests at home and changes elsewhere

in Eastern Europe. The pivotal confrontation reportedly took place on November 8, when a

delegation of several Politburo members met twice in private with Zhivkov and persuaded

him to resign. The next day the Politburo voted to accept his resignation and appoint

Mladenov as the next party leader. At a Central Committee plenum held on November 10.

Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov officially announced Zhivkov’s replacement, while

Mladenov outlined a program for extensive regime liberalization.

With Zhivkov stepping down peacefully, Bulgaria’s transition was set in motion. The circumstances around its inception showed that regime change was imposed mostly from above and did not result directly from pressure from below. While confirming the analysis of Higley and Burton (1989) concerning the role of divided political elites as an agent of democratic transitions (for an account of the comparable Soviet case, see Lane 1996), this episode also points to the important part that international influences play in regime breakdowns. Gorbachev’s foreign-policy decision to renounce the so-called Brezhnev

Doctrine and to withdraw support for the “fraternal countries ” precipitated the domino-like collapse of Communist regimes throughout the region. Because of its extremely close and privileged ties to the Soviet Union, the effects of the “Gorbachev syndrome” were felt more strongly in Bulgaria than in any other East-bloc country. In Bulgaria as elsewhere in the East bloc, Gorbachev’s reforms were a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the breakdown of the Communist system (see Bunce 1995: fh. 22).

131 The fall of Communism in Bulgaria was not preceded by any major political or socioeconomic crisis, apart from the regime’s accumulation of $ 10.3 billion in foreign debts, which on a per capita basis (about $ 1,200) was second only to Htmgary’s (about S1,500) in the entire Soviet bloc (Engelbrekt 1992). The country certainly had its share of problems, but there was nothing comparable to the profoimd systemic crises of Poland or Romania. The malaise of the system, especially in the economy, was not seriously felt until the end o f 1989, which not only limited popular discontent with the economic performance of the Zhivkov regime, but also explains why there was no real mass opposition (Karasimeonov 1996: 255).

Bulgaria ranked last (with the lowest score of 6) in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s index of the rising crisis levels in fifteen major Communist states during the late 1980s. In fact, it was listed as one of the four relatively more successful regimes (the other three being , East

Germany, and North Korea), which had escaped the state of grave general crisis gripping the rest o f the Communist world (see Brzezinski 1989: 234-235). This analysis is confirmed by a 1994 survey conducted by the Bulgarian ASSA-M polling agency, which showed that only

7% of surveyed Bulgarians felt that their country had been in a state of crisis either before or during 1989 (Markov 1994).

Several reasons have been cited for the relative success and stability of the Zhivkov regime (see Karasimeonov 1996: 254-255). Unlike the other East-bloc nations, where virulent anti-Soviet nationalism was inseparable from the ideological rejection of

Communism, Bulgarians have generally retained their historically strong pro-Russian sentiments and the ruling Communists were never seen as promoting the interests of a foreign imperial power. For this reason, the end of Bulgarian Communism cannot be understood as a process of national liberation, in which a traditional national identity was

132 mobilized against an alien political ideology. Secondly, the Communists were successful in

modernizing a country, which had been one of the poorest and most backward in interwar

Europe, resulting in a rapid rise in living standards and the creation of a large middle class

loyal to the regime. Thirdly, Zhivkov succeeded in coopting all social groups and especially

the artistic intelligentsia, which before 1989 never seriously challenged the BCP’s hegemony. Communist Bulgaria had what Karl and Schmitter ( 1994:56) call a “successful” authoritarian experience, that is, one characterized by a moderate level of repression and economic success. Because of its internal stability, Bulgaria was widely expected to lag behind in the process o f regime transformation. In this sense, there was nothing preordained or inevitable about the subsequent transition to democracy in terms of a systemic crisis in the economy, polity or society.

EfTect of Historical Memories

Sharply negative personal experiences and historical memories deeply embedded in a country’s collective consciousness can be far more resilient and influential than a rather questionable and distant democratic tradition. Modem Bulgarian history is marked by deep and indelible political divisions and conflicts. Those on the Left still remember the merciless right-wing terror of the pre-Communist era: “My family paid a heavy toll during that historical period. Eight of my immediate relatives were either killed or imprisoned by the fascist regime in Bulgaria...or fell in the war against Nazi Germany” (Lukanov 1998: 88).

The Communist regime installed on 9 September 1944 continued this tradition of terror and violence, the legacy of which in terms of bitter partisan rivalries, mutual recriminations, and desire for revenge is hardly conducive to democratic consolidation.

133 KJiristo Danov, the first non-Communist minister of the interior since 1946, claims that at least 25,000 people were murdered without trial after the coup of September 9 (Tzvetkov

1993: 266). The regime also organized the so-called “People’s Courts” from 1946 to 1948, which tried 11,122 defendants on charges of being responsible for Bulgaria’s alliance with

Nazi Germany and the wartime catastrophe, and condemned 2,730 officials o f the fascist regime to death, 1,305 to life imprisonment, and 5,119 to lesser prison terms. Prince Kiril

(the brother of Boris III) and two other regents for the infant King Simeon II, 10 royal advisers, 3 former prime ministers, 35 senior ministers, and practically all deputies of the parliamentary majorities since 1 March 1941 were executed (Pimdeff 1994: 187).

It would be no exaggeration to say that for most of its modem history the country has been in a state of political volatility and recurrent civil war, pitting Bulgarians against each other like in no other East European country. The brutality with which right-wing regimes decimated the leftist opposition prior to 1944 and the ruthless manner in which the

Communist regime was imposed in Bulgaria have left deep psychological scars, creating an enduring ideological schism in society between ex-Communists and anti-Communists.

Neither the pre-September 1944 fascist terror nor the later Communist revenge killings have been forgotten or forgiven. The carnage of Left-Right struggles has left a deep mark on popular consciousness that endures today. National traumatization was so profound that the past remains an issue that deeply divides elite groups and the population at large in Bulgaria.

This fundamental cleavage has had a strongly polarizing effect on party relations and interactions, retaining the potential to destabilize democratic politics. For example, because the BSDP was harshly repressed by the Communists in the late 1940s, the Social Democrats have remained hostile to the BSP, even though the programmatic appeals of both parties are

134 nearly identical. Social Democratic leader Petar Dertliev invokes history as one of the reasons for his party’s lingering distrust of the ex-Communists:

Today, the Communists demand an ethical tone and a civilized demeanor from participants in the opposition’s rallies. But this is a ridiculous demand! Why don’t they open old newspapers and documents to see what they were doing right after 9 September 1944? Their rallies in city squares and their posters on every wall screamed “Death to the Enemies of the People!” There were staged processions of women in black; show trials demanding the death penalty and sending innocent people to prison or to the gallows only because of their beliefs. Let them remember all that! (Interview with Dertliev in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 84)

Even after the BSDP’s contentious split fi’om the UDF in 1991, the implacable anti-

Communism o f the Social Democrats has thwarted all efforts, domestic or foreign, to unify

Bulgaria’s democratic Left.

The events surrounding the coup d’etat of 9 September 1944 are especially controversial. The former Communists insist that it was an anti-fascist popular uprising and therefore part of the worldwide fight against fascism and Nazism (see Valkanov 1996;

Zhivkov 1993, 1997; Lukanov 1997,1998; Dobrev 1998). In contrast, the anti-Communists have denounced it as a Moscow-inspired putsch which destroyed “democracy” in Bulgaria. led to the murder or exile of many Bulgarians, and delivered the country into the hands of

Stalin. They tend to refer to Bulgarian anti-fascists as “national traitors” and dismiss

Bulgaria’s participation in the war against Nazi Germany in 1944-1945 as “senseless slaughter.” It is for this reason that the anti-Commimist deputies vehemently opposed a 1995 law passed by the BSP majority in parliament that gave former Bulgarian guerilla fighters the status of wartime combatants against Nazi Germany. The UDF argued that Bulgaria’s

BCP-led guerilla movement during World War II was controlled by Moscow and in fact did not appear until Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. It also pointed out that

135 most guerilla operations were directed at Bulgarian targets and not against the German

military. The shrill debate on the bill in question showed that this emotional and divisive

controversy is still very much alive. Anzhel Vagenstein, a popular movie director and a

Socialist parliamentary deputy, castigated BSP’s critics in the Assembly with the caustic

remark that “...all those who claim that the anti-fascist resistance in Bulgaria was illegitimate

are fascists” (BTA in English, May 12, 1995).

Following the recommendations of Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tatarchev, the Supreme

Court on 26 August 1996 voided the sentences that the People’s Courts had handed down against Bulgaria’s wartime politicians. The very next day the Socialist daily Duma ran a

front-page headline screaming “The Supreme Court Rehabilitates Fascism!” For their part,

UDF parliamentary leaders dismissed as “Red propaganda” all protests against this act of legal and moral exoneration of Bulgaria’s WWII fascist leadership. That this issue can stir raw emotions and inflammatory rhetoric was no less evident from the contrasting way in which the ruling BSP and the opposition UDF commemorated recent anniversaries of the 9

September 1944 takeover (which imtil 1990 was Bulgaria’s national holiday). Members and supporters of the Socialist Party marked the 51st anniversary in 1995 with a large festive gathering at the common grave of resistance fighters in a Sofia park. The gathering was addressed by top party leaders, including BSP deputy chairman Yanaki Stoilov, who insisted that the celebration enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians, adding that the former Communist party was now a party of promise, defending “fundamental democratic values” and the “social rights of ordinary people.” Stoilov gave this one-sided interpretation of the controversial event and its relation to contemporary politics:

136 September 9th is an important page in Bulgarian history, which will forever remain indelibly imprinted in popular memory for its role in the struggle for social justice.... Shadows of the past are creeping over Bulgaria’s present, and the evil power of corrupt politicians is seeking to erase this part of Bulgarian history by destroying the monuments of heroes who died for noble ideals. (BTA, September 9, 1995)

In stark contrast, to the strains of funeral music and with flags lowered and placards reading “Never Again September 9th,” UDF members and supporters marched in somber processions across Sofia and other Bulgarian cities to commemorate the “victims of

Communism.”A memorial service was held at a Sofia cathedral for the thousands of people killed under the BCP rule. Requiems were also held in churches throughout the country. In a statement televised that night, the UDF leadership called on Bulgarians “to bow their heads before the victims of the brutal Communist regime and to express their will to reject re-

Communization” (BTA in English, September 9, 1995).

A year later, the 52nd anniversary of the Communist takeover was again marked by demonstrations by both supporters and opponents, confirming that this date, like no other in

Bulgaria’s modem history, deeply divides society. In Sofia, thousands of Socialists assembled to mark the event, which a pro-BSP newspaper called “a great day that will forever remain alive in the memory of the Bulgarian people ” {Zemya, September 9, 1996:

1 ). In contrast, the anti-Communist opposition held protest rallies in Sofia and other cities to commemorate the victims of “Communist terror,” while the UDF official daily charged that the BSP-organized festivities around the country “unmask the demagoguery of the

Socialists’ fairy tales about change” (Demokratsiya, September 10,1996). Returned to power in April 1997, the UDF canceled the planned construction of a memorial to the unknown

Bulgarian soldier in downtown Sofia, replacing it with a monument to the “victims of

137 Communism.” One could hardly imagine more irreconcilable and biased perceptions of a pivotal historical event, the collective memory of which continues to cast dark shadows over

Bulgaria’s current politics.

The slow process of healing old woimds has been less than conducive to national reconciliation and full elite integration. There is no national consensus to forgive and forget past errors and misdeeds. Among the East European respondents in the 1991 Times-Mirror

Center for the People & the Press, East-West Poll, Bulgarians at the start of the transition were among the most vengeful and unforgiving towards the old elite, with 61.2% insisting that Communist officials should be replaced and held accountable for their past abuses of power. Bulgaria became the first post-Communist coimtry in Eastern Europe to prosecute its former Communist leaders, sending a disproportionately large number of them to jail (see

Engelbrekt and Perry 1992; Berschi 1995). Bulgaria is also the only country in the region where decommimization campaigns and the militant search for retributive justice have continued imabated to this day.

This destabilizing desire for revenge, contributing to an extreme and uncivilized polarization, has been resisted by President Stoyanov and former president Zhelev, both of whom have supported the BSP’s efforts to renew itself. Their more conciliatory approach have often put them at odds with the hardliners dominating the anti-Communist opposition who see the struggle for democracy mainly as one of historical retribution against the ex-

Communists. While many in the current UDF leadership follow a strident anti-Communist line, Zhelev and Stoyanov have advocated mutual understanding and reconciliation, opposing the idea of legal reprisals against former Communist office-holders. On these grounds, both have objected to the decommimization “witch-hunts” and wholesale purges

138 in the state bureaucracy, the courts of law and the mass media, as well as the various

“lustration” laws enacted by the National Assembly since 1992. As president, Zhelev

pardoned a number of imprisoned ex-Communist leaders, including former BCP Prime

Minister Georgi Atanasov. He has also rejected the idea ofbanning the Socialist party. Other

moderate politicians are equally opposed to the idea of revenge against individuals.

According to Lyubomir Sobadzhiev, leader of the Movement, a charter member of the UDF,

Some vengeful people are suggesting a witch-hunt, to root out and try the old Communists who were responsible for economic and social turmoil, and abuses of human rights. But although it would be quite natural to follow this line of thought, nothing positive would come of it. would only waste time and effort on such a witch-hunt, which would end up by creating a kind of public sympathy for the victims. (Interview with Sobadzhiev in Ward 1992: 17)

Himself an innocent victim of Communist repression, exiled King Simeon also opposes the over-politicization ofhistory and has admonished Bulgarians that their country 's catastrophic situation “can be rectified only by national consensus on forgiveness for past errors”

(interview with Simeon II in Ward 1992: 7). Unfortunately, these voices of moderation and reason have not found much sympathy and support among hardliners in the anti-Communist opposition. According to Lukanov, Bulgaria remains mired in the hatreds of the past, which is the biggest obstacle to the entrenchment of Bulgarian democracy: “Some political forces just do not want to turn the page—they are seeking historical revenge, which poses a very serious danger.... Revenge can only bring back the civil tragedies of the past” (interview with

Lukanov in Vecherni Novini, April 7, 1992).

On the whole, the entire historical era before the democratic revolution of 1989-1990 is remembered as one characterized by ideological conflict, civil war and widespread

139 suffering inflicted by Communists and anti-Communists alike. Zhelev has described the period from 1919 to 1944 as “25 years of undeclared civil war”:

This undeclared civil war began with the soldier mutinies of 1918. It continued with the coup d’etat of 9 Jime 1923, and was followed by the September 1923 uprising, when the Comintern, using for its own goals popular discontent with the coup regime of Prime Minister Alexander Tzankov, threw Bulgarians in a fratricidal war against each other. Next was the barbaric bombing o f the St. Nedelia Cathedral in April 1925, which was used by the authorities as a pretext for the mass slaughter of the Bulgarian intelligentsia. What followed were the political assassinations of the 1920s and 1930s. Then we had the coup d’etat of 19 May 1934, which abolished the constitution, banned all political parties and outlawed the free press. This undeclared civil war became especially merciless during 1941-1944, which brought us the massacres of anti-fascists, the demolition of their houses, and the public display of the severed heads of Communist guerrillas. (Zhelev 1996: 130).

Four decades of authoritarian BCP rule only deepened the enduring ideological schism in society, which still polarizes national culture and politics today. Like an omnipresent specter, this grim history has haunted the entire transition process and is likely to affect the tenor of Bulgarian politics far into the future. As Petko Simeonov implies, the imprint of a tragic history can be seen in anti-Communist slogans such as “We shall never forget, nor shall we ever forgive!” which are “dragging Bulgaria into a dark abyss”

(Simeonov 1996: 223). The scars o f past conflicts may take a long time to heal, especially since the parents and/or grandparents of a number of current anti-Communist leaders were tried and convicted by the Commimist-controlled People’s Courts and some were even executed. Democratic Party leader Stefan Savov was quite typical in that respect:

...my father was a minister in one of the last governments during the Second World War and a MP ... My father was in fact killed by the Communists; he suffered two heart attacks in prison and was sent to a labor camp in . (Interview with Savov in Melone 1996b)

140 On the plus side, bitter memories of civil strife, violence and brutal suppression of dissent make the prospect of stable and secure democracy all the more attractive to the political winners and losers of today. Although the evidence is skimpy and impressionistic, the severe elite conflict and violent struggles of the past iq>pear to have left a legacy of deep fear of civil war that is a positive factor for moderation and self-restraint limiting the threat of violence. Advocating the need to end the “Bulgarian civil war,” Lukanov. the main architect of the transition, has underlined the profound impact ofhistory on elite perceptions and calculations:

The idea we had from the very beginning was to move the notion of peaceful transition into the center of the political debate, being aware not only of the dangers of the transition as such, but the additional dangers that have been rooted in the Bulgarian civil war, as I call it, in the fact that the Left and the Right, the leftist and rightist sectors of the Bulgarian society have been in conditions of a civil war—hot and cold—for seventy years, starting from the end of the First World War and the well-known September 1923 uprising against the coup d’etat, carried out in June 1923.

Since then, vendetta was—I would say—the principle of Bulgarian politics. One side persecutes the other, oppressing it in different forms, starting with very violent forms—killings, summary executions and both the Left and the Right are responsible for these acts...these severely limit one’s opportunities and civil rights because of belonging to the losing side at a given period of time.

So, this was a fact of life we were clearly aware of, because many of us, especially Mladenov and myself, had been on that side. His father was killed, my grandfather was killed. So, although I happened to spend a great part of my life as a representative of the winning side, I was deeply aware of the injustice, dangers and constant confrontations. And some of the other participants in the reform process at the beginning were themselves participants in this civil war—the armed struggle during the Resistance. Mr. Dzhurov, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior, who was previously Chief of the General Staff, Mr. Semerdjiev, were themselves guerrillas.

1 am trying to emphasize the idea that the reformers within the BCP were not only politically and intellectually, but also morally committed to stop the

141 civil war, to avoid the dangers of physical con&ontation inherent both in Bulgaria’s history and in the difficulties inherent in the process of transition.... (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b)

While the ideologization of politics, polarization and intense political confrontation

are the immediate effects of tragically negative historical experiences and collective

memories, the widespread popular reaction to past repression and violence may reinforce

opposition to authoritarian alternatives to democracy. Lukanov, Dertliev and other leaders

have called for an end to the endless and self-sustaining cycle of revenge. Another

ameliorating factor conducive to reconciliation is, ironically, Zhivkov’s successful policy of

substituting manipulative cooptation, especially of the intelligentsia, for past coercion and

repression, thus avoiding the creation of modem anti-Communist martyrs and saints. Unlike

Argentina, Chile and other former Latin American , there are no mothers of the

‘‘disappeared” in Bulgaria.

142 CHAPTERS

PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH DEMOCRACY

Historical experience is often linked to political learning, but the latter can admittedly cut both ways, especially in countries like Bulgaria which have witnessed the repeated snuffing-out of democratic rule and prolonged spells of non-democratic government:

...an overthrow of democracy at any time during the past history of a country shortens the life expectancy of any democratic regime in that country. To the extent that political learning does occur, then, it seems that the lessons learned by antidemocratic forces from the past subversion of democracy are more effective than the traditions that can be relied on by democrats. (Przeworski et al. 1996: 44)

Country-specific historical trajectories can lead to very different collective experiences, shaping distinct kinds of national identities, political culture and tradition. The historical influences on contemporary politics are especially strong in areas such as political culture and institutional design (Wilson 1996:17-23). As the previous chapter demonstrated, history has as firm a hold over Bulgarians, as over all other peoples of the Balkans. The political values of Bulgarians have been shaped by their distinctive national history and cultural tradition—authoritarian as well as democratic. But history and its intervening variable, political culture, are complex structures consisting of multiple layers.

It is often argued that the absence of democratic traditions impedes the consolidation of new democracies and, conversely, that democracy is more stable and durable in countries

143 that have experienced a democratic regime in the past. Scholars believe that some previous

experience with democracy is a critical historical variable that contributes to the success of

democratization. Prior exposure to democratic institutions such as free elections, parliaments,

competitive political parties, etc. is a necessary condition on a par with such democratic

“prerequisites” as a strong national economy, educated population, tolerant political

attitudes, and a large middle class which is materially prosperous and economically

autonomous from the state. As Huntington (1991) has pointed out, historically very few

countries were able to institute stable democratic systems on their first democratization

attempt. On the basis of extensive historical evidence, he concludes that prior democratic

experience is more conducive than none to the consolidation of new democracies. Clearly,

matters are much worse in those democratizing countries where democratic traditions are

weak or non-existent. This proposition leads Huntington to hypothesize that “a longer and more recent experience with democracy is more conducive to democratic consolidation than

is a shorter and more distant one” (1991: 270-271). This hypothesis cannot be tested comparatively here, so it will be briefly examined in the context of the Bulgarian case. This chapter will investigate the empirical evidence in an attempt to determine to what degree, if any, Bulgaria’s limited, distant and far from positive democratic experience may have contributed to, or obstructed, democratization.

Huntington lists Bulgaria among the democratizing countries which, prior to their current transformation, “had no democratic experience at all” (1991: 271). Most commentators share this view that Bulgaria, like the other post-Communist countries of

Eastern Europe, had little in the way of pre-existing democratic experience. Others tend to divide the region into a democratic “North” and an authoritarian “Southeast,” arguing that

144 “Prior to World War n, the northern tier countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) had a brief experience with some measure of democratic rule; the southern tier countries

(Romania and Bulgaria) did not” (Sadowski 1993: 168). Berglund and Dellenbrant (1994:

243) even raise the question whether Bulgaria and Romania could be theoretically regarded as “part and parcel” of Eastern Europe.

If true, the Bulgarian case would not fit the proposition regarding the favorable impact of prior democratic experience on the transition to democracy. But, as discussed in the preceding chapter, Bulgaria did have some limited experience with political democracy in the pre-Communist past, even though its democratic roots and traditions are rather shallow and weak. It certainly had much longer experience with parliamentary democracy than either

Hungary or Poland, even though that experience was neither recent, nor quite positive. A

Bulgarian historian notes the comparative strength of Bulgaria’s democratic tradition:

Bulgarians had a working, although not entirely democratic parliamentary system from 1879 to 1934, when seven out of 28 parliamentary elections brought the opposition to power. What is more, Bulgaria’s traditions in this respect seem to have been sufficiently strong to make possible the use of strictly constitutional means for the removal from power of practically every more authoritarian government. After all, even the communist regime was put an end to by free elections. (Tzvetkov 1993: 507)

This limited but undeniable experience would exclude Bulgaria fi-om the list of total neophytes in the “Third Wave” of democratization, for it obviously represents a case of re­ democratization rather than democratization. After all, there are historical antecedents of the present regime.

This chapter will make the argument that even though Bulgaria’s bleak twentieth- century history remains a socio-psychological obstacle to consolidation, its prior exposure to democratic rule has been a contributing factor to the successful changeover to political

145 democracy. There is sufficient reason to believe that the incomplete consolidation of

Bulgaria’s new democracy is due, at least in part, to historical continuities with the

Communist past, but also with the authoritarian political culture and intolerant practices of

the pre-Commimist period. From a politico-cultural perspective, the legacy of a longer and

more recent dictatorial rule may have deprived Bulgaria of democratic traditions and a

participant civic culture that could support a durable pluralistic order. But the evidence that

historical and cultural factors have pre-determined Bulgaria’s inability to institutionalize a

consolidated democracy over the past decade is too mixed and ambiguous to validate this

cultural-deterministic argument. For, in spite of such an inauspicious historical heritage,

post-Communist Bulgaria has been able to design and operate relatively stable and

democratic political institutions.

Weak Democratic Tradition

While the Bulgarian case may be used as evidence to confirm the hypothesis that prior democratization experience is more conducive than none to the inauguration of new democracies, the influence of this imcertain and controversial democratic legacy should not be overestimated. Bulgaria until 1989 had a much longer and more recent experience of non- democratic rule than of formal parliamentary democracy. Cyril Black ( 1976: 119) notes that in times of sporadic democratic governance there was limited political pluralism, including a multiparty system, some political and civil freedoms, and competitive elections that sometimes imseated the incumbents. But in the longer periods of authoritarian reaction popular participation was restricted, and police terror and military coups were employed to maintain the status quo. According to Black, during the period of King Boris’s personal

146 dictatorship (1935-1943) a form of state-dominated , rather than open political

violence, was used to preserve the privileged order, including considerable bureaucratic

consultation with major interest groups in society. But as we have seen from the previous

chapter, armed force was also applied periodically against the monarchy’s domestic enemies,

so the non-democratic nature of the royal regime is beyond doubt.

As one commentator points out, “In Central and Eastern Europe, 20th-century history

is a record of too many alternatives to democracy. Every post-Communist country has been

subject to undemocratic governments longer than democratic rule. Moreover, each country has had at least two different forms of undemocratic governance” (Rose 1996a: 40). The relatively short and distant exposure to questionable democratic practices before the 1934 military takeover is completely overshadowed by the more recent life experiences under

fascism and then the Stalinist version of socialism. Claims by some of Bulgaria’s current politicians that the pre-Communist regimes, including that of Boris III, were “representative” and “democratic” are belied by the historical record as well as the recollections of many contemporaries, including a veteran Social Democrat who recalls that “The first military coup occurred in 1923, and the second in 1934, so we had right-wing and after 1944 left- wing totalitarianism in Bulgaria but no normal political life ” (interview with Ruen Krumov in Ward 1992: 196).

The fact that Bulgaria’s new democracy is a case of restoration rather than

“instauration” has nonetheless affected its transition trajectory. The earlier and distant experiment with democracy has left a legacy, albeit a very tenuous one, of a democratic- oriented, relatively participant political culture which has contributed to regime change. After suppressing political pluralism and civil society for four decades, even the BCP regime

147 discovered that it could no longer ignore popular aspirations for political freedom and

participation. This historico-cultural legacy contributes to democratic legitimacy today,

allowing the regime to weather the deconsolidating effects of a severe economic slump and

a succession of political crises.

Although Bulgaria had only a short and intermittent history of democratic rule, this democratic experience has clearly had some beneficial effect on the current democratic transformation of the country by creating a tradition of party pluralism which became the basis for renewed democratic politics. As will be discussed later in this chapter, democratic- oriented parties, and even some anti-democratic groups, that had been banned since the late

1940s quickly re-entered the political arena, and the Communist party itself has returned to its pre-Bolshevik, social-democratic roots. Despite the pitfalls, disappointments, and turmoil of the post-Communist period, Bulgana has managed tocraft a relatively democratic political order—largely modeled on its previous institutional experience—that has so far survived the traumatic period of transition to capitalism.

Again, this is not to deny that the case for historical continuity of Bulgarian democracy is not particularly strong. Although Bulgaria was obviously democratic for intermittent periods of its modem history, it never developed strong, deep-rooted traditions of liberal democracy and democratic political culture. In fact, only the Czechs are credited with having an abiding democratic heritage among the East Europeans, since Czechoslovakia was the only country in the region which had a successful and stable democracy from 1918 to 1938 (see Pogany 1996). It is argued that parliamentary democracy is therefore “more deeply rooted in Czechoslovakia’s political culture than is the case in any of its Central and

East European neighbors” (Batt 1993: 35).

148 But why has Bulgaria, with a much longer history of independent and democratic

existence than Czechoslovakia, obviously failed to develop deeply entrenched democratic

values? Dealing with the imponderables of political culture, culturalist explanations

encounter the resistance of some ambiguous and contradictory evidence, which is open to

many conflicting interpretations. The most plausible explanation, supported by many writers,

is that there is a political tradition of political intolerance and collective violence, which is

an integral part of Bulgaria’s historical record. The pattern of political change in modem

Bulgarian history is characterized by cycles of bloodshed, revenge and reprisals, hindering

the penetration and consolidation of a democratic political culture. Bulgaria was a highly

volatile and unstable society until the consolidation of Communist power in the late 1940s.

Political violence, especially at election time, was widespread. Assassinations were commonplace occurrences: a number of prominent Bulgarian politicians, such as premiers

Stefan Stambolov, Dimitar Petkov, and Alexander Stamboliisky, fell victim to politically

inspired murder. In addition to long periods of coercive authoritarian rule, pre-1989 Bulgaria saw one royal coup d’etat, five military coups and counter-coups, a large-scale soldier mutiny and a full-fledged armed Commimist rebellion. Even the Zhivkov regime was brought down through a palace revolution. Former Socialist Prime Minister Lukanov, before himself falling victim to an unknown assassin’s bullet, lamented the persistence of a tradition of political intolerance, vengeance and violence: “Political vendetta is an unfortunate part of Bulgaria’s political history” (quoted in Melone 1994: 258).

As a number of writers have noted, in the pre-Communist past several Bulgarian parties and organizations, such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization

(IMRO), the pro-monarchist Union of Bulgarian National Legions, the Military League, the

149 Union of Reserved Officers, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and others, openly advocated and frequently resorted to force and political assassination to achieve their political agendas. Moreover, the fascist regimes that ruled Bulgaria in 1923-1926 and again in 1934-1944 used deadly violence and police terror on a vast scale against political opponents. After the Soviet occupation of the country in September 1944, the Communists resorted to revenge killings and violence to purge the political opposition and strengthen their grip on power. Thousands of their real or presumed opponents were killed, imprisoned or exiled. In postwar Europe’s earliest and most extensive war crimes trial, some 2,730 high- ranking officials of the wartime governments were executed as war criminals, including ex­ premiers Bogdan Filov, Dobri Bozhilov and Ivan Bagrianov, three former regents, thirty-five former cabinet ministers and sixty-eight deputies from the wartime National Assemblies.

This was followed by another, Moscow-directed purge in the late 1940s, in which many top

Communist functionaries, such as deputy premier and former BCP chief Traicho Rostov, were liquidated on charges of high treason, anti-Sovietism and “bourgeois” nationalism.

These historical events had deep resonances in the collective social psychology and mentality of Bulgarians.

This legacy of political extremism and violence in Bulgaria subsided in the later years of the BCP regime and was replaced by a more stable and peaceful political environment.

Even the Commimist tradition of using force against “counter-” and class enemies gradually waned. At a Central Committee plenum in April 1956, the post-Stalinist leadership under Zhivkov ruled out any resort to violence in intraparty affairs and demanded the strict application of “socialist legality” in government (yet labor camps for political detainees were not closed until 1962). Bulgaria experienced a long period of relative political

150 tranquility prior to the democratic revolution of 1989-1990. The only exception was a short­ lived terrorist campaign by ethnic Turks in the mid-1980s in reaction to Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign.

The more sanguinary episodes of modern history have left an indelible mark on modem national consciousness, which cannot but influence the current political situation.

The climate of political intolerance, violence and vengeance has not disappeared entirely.

Repeated instances of organized street rioting, mob violence and revenge firings of political opponents have marred the transition to democracy. The darker side of their historical heritage also predisposes Bulgarians to mutual distrust, cynicism, intolerance and hostility.

To a very large extent, this complex historical legacy accounts for the sharp polarization and confrontation of Bulgaria’s stressful transition (see Vladimirov 1999). Because democratic traditions have never been particularly strong at the elite level, nor are they deeply ingrained in mass political cultiue, the prospects for consolidating democracy in post-Communist

Bulgaria are believed to be less than promising: “Since we have had a political vacuum for

5 7 years, it will be difficult to establish a normal political life” (interview with Ruen ICrumov in Ward 1992: 201). When a democratizing country has no or very weak democratic traditions, the popular legitimacy of its new democratic actors and institutions tends to be fragile. As a result, political culture and history may become serious obstacles to consolidation.

Effect on Political Culture

A cultural heritage is historically changeable, but political culture is often slow to change because it is part of the superego o f most members of society. It is often assumed that

151 there are uniformly shared values and political experiences among those who reached adulthood under Communist rule (Rose 1996a). Some find Bulgaria to be still “to a large extent under the dominance of communal, even patriarchal, attitudes and dispositions due to a very short history of democratic politics and civil society in the pre-commimist era. followed by the atomization and pseudo- imder communism” (Karasimeonov

1996: 261). From this perspective, the present is defined far more by recent Communist inheritances than by any distant democratic antecedents. The “totalitarian culture” imposed by the BCP regime is seen as “a major barrier to ideological and political pluralism and to the establishment o f a democratic political culture” (Karasimeonov 1995: 155). Like many others, Roumen Vodenicharov, chairman of the Independent Society for the Defense of

Human Rights, has complained of what he perceives as the national political culture’s

“incongruence” with democratic behavioral norms and values:

The mentality of the vast majority of Bulgarians is still incompatible with the very idea of democracy. First of all, Bulgarians are still accustomed to having somebody tell them what to do and what not to do. Freedom, in the genuine meaning of the word, would throw Bulgaria into chaos. If you happen to attend a political meeting in Bulgaria (as I have so often done), the first thing that will strike you is that nobody present listens to anybody else, and that everyone wants to impose his or her own opinions on all the others. If someone voices an opinion contrary to your own, then they become your enemy. And if somebody expresses some unorthodox views, such people are immediately branded as either lunatics or former agents of Zhivkov’s State Security.... We cannot be further from democracy... My only hope are the young people, many of whom will study abroad and will acquire a mentality different fi"om our own. (Interview with Vodenicharov in Antova- Konstantinova 1990: 97)

Given Bulgaria’s extended periods of authoritarian rule, the experiences and political learning derived from a more distant and questionable democratic past are limited to only a tiny age cohort of older Bulgarians, thus depriving the coimtry of an important agent of

152 democratic conditioning and socialization. This unpropitious sociocultural circumstance is corroborated by Stefan Savov, the late Democratic Party leader:

I am one of the very few people left from my generation. I had the benefit of knowing what the democratic life was like before the imposition of the Communist regime. .. I am saying all this to illustrate that there are few people in the UDF who have the required political experience. It would be fair to admit that we are now in the process of learning the trade o f politics. This is the case because during the past 40 years there has been no chance whatsoever for normal political life. (Interview with Savov in Melone 1996b)

But the part that national history and traditional culture play in democratization outcomes is always difficult to measure since the relationship is mediated and cannot be easily expressed in the natural units of the variables. One needs to avoid the historicist fallacy that individuals are likely to think and behave alike if they share a common history and culture. As studies of West German and Italian democratizations in the postwar era suggest, one needs a longer-time perspective to ascertain the effects of cultural legacies of the authoritarian past on the politics and social conflicts of the democratic present. The tragic history of Bulgaria’s previous experiment with democracy could hardly have created a sense of social trust, cooperation and belonging necessary for full participation in a democratic political community, yet democratization is now a fact of life. Nor could the country’s decidedly mixed historical record and imcertain democratic traditions ensure the perpetuation of its new democracy, given the formidable odds that it has had to face, yet democracy has endured.

It appears that repeated democratic breakdowns and the far longer duration of dictatorial rule have not destroyed entirely Bulgaria’s traditions of parliamentary democracy and multiparty pluralism, nor have they affected in a uniformly adverse way Bulgaria’s political culture. Pre-existing experience o f democratic self-government, even if distant and

153 severely limited as in the Bulgarian case, can influence the level of popular support for

democratic norms and ideals—a variable which is seen by many scholars as a major determinant of the resilience of new democracies. Students of political culture in particular have argued that normative commitment to representative democracy is grounded in the

fundamental beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens, which can either promote or hamper the long-term prospects of democratization (see Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba

1963, 1980; Verba 1965; Pye and Verba 1965; Dahl 1971; Brown and Gray 1977; Dalton

1988; Eckstein 1988; Gibson, Duce, and Tauten 1992; Diamond 1993; Mason 1993; Evans and Whitfield 1995; McDonough 1995).

Political culture theorists have emphasized three particular indicators, namely interpersonal trust, sense of political efficacy and interest in politics, as central to the political cooperation and participation that are necessary for democratic development (McIntosh and

Mac Iver 1993). In Making Democracy Work (1993), Robert Pumam writes that a representative democracy requires above all social trust. According to Larry Diamond, a diffuse sense of trust is especially important because it

not only facilitates bargaining and compromise but encourages political discussion, makes political conflicts less threatening, and thus helps to transform politics into a non-zero-sum game in which leaders and followers of defeated parties can accept exclusion from state power without having to fear for their basic interests. (Diamond 1993: 11)

Another of the cultural requisites for democracy is a widespread perception of political or civic competence—the belief that the government is accountable to the citizenry, that citizens can exercise some measure of control over their political leaders, and that the government has a reasonably responsive capacity. Finally, interest in politics is seen by normative theories of democracy as the basis for informed citizen participation and popular

154 control over the government, without which ruling elites cannot be held accountable.

Democracy may not survive for long without responsible, astute, well-informed, and politically interested voters who are capable of making independent and rational judgements at the polls (Downs 1957; Dahl 1971, 1989).

According to the political cultiu’e approach, countries with levels o f trust, efficacy, and political interest similar to those observed in the established democracies of Western

Europe theoretically stand a better chance for democratic consolidation (McIntosh and Mac

Iver 1993). But democratic prospects in the former East-bloc countries are presumably constrained by a “communist cultural legacy” which mani fests itself inter alia in “the cynical aversion to politics and organized political parties, the lack of trust, and the expectation that government should provide” (Diamond 1993:413). Communist rule is believed to have left behind a non-democratic civil society, which is cynical and deeply distrustful of politics, parties and politicians (Jowitt 1992a and b; Schmitter 1994; Berglund and Dellenbrant 1994;

Pogany 1996). The uniform impact of political experience under Communism on the orientations, attachments and behavior of ordinary citizens is said to include , collectivism, passivity, and mistrust. One writer has even referred to that legacy as the syndrome of “civilizational incompetence” which is based on the incongruence of the “bloc” political culture of the Communist period with the new democratic institutions imported from the West (Sztompka 1996). In a variation of the “culturally-divided Eastern Europe” hypothesis, only in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have pre-World War II democratic experiences as well as autonomous organizational activity under late Communism generated

“increased efficacy and participation and greater appreciation for the values of truth, accountability, lawfulness, and free discourse” (Diamond 1993: 413).

155 But the idea of Bulgarians as hopeless “laggards” in terms o f civic culture compared to Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians or Poles is not entirely supported by empirical data collected in a series of political cultiu’e surveys which assess the extent of popular support for democracy in the region. In such opinion surveys, a range of normative values and norms have been used by the interviewers that the local mass public ought to endorse if its value structure is to be classified as democratic, thus providing a firm cultural foundation for a successful democratic regime (Rose and Haerpfer 1994). Indirectly, these comparative polls also test the cultural imprint of Communist legacies on the present.

As is evident from statistical data published by McIntosh and Mac Iver ( 1993:8), the level of social trust in Bulgaria seems to have been Europe’s highest in 1992—a totally unexpected finding given the supposed atomization and alienation of Bulgarian society under

Communist auspices, as well as the political and ethnic strife of the transition period.

Secondly, the self-confidence of Bulgarians that their political actions may actually produce a change in governmental policy—what Almond and Verba have termed a sense of “political efficacy”—is no less remarkable. Even after declining by 7% from the previous year, the level of confidence in the new democratic process has remained high, as two-thirds of the

Bulgarian respondents felt that they could effect political change through the simple act of voting. Finally, in another empirical finding that confounds conventional wisdom, interest in politics among Bulgarians in 1992, while suffering a similarly dramatic decline from the preceding year, did not differ significantly from levels observed among the highest-ranking nations, both East and West. Clearly, time-space comparisons with the other East European countries and with the West European nations on these three core dimensions of political

156 culture refute the popular argument that Bulgaria lacks the cultiual basis for consolidated

democracy.

But how about the region’s presumed cultural legacy of “cynical aversion” to politics

and organized political parties? In fact, if the culturalist argument is correct about the

hypothesized effects of trust, efficacy, and political interest (see Pye 1965: 22), then given

the above findings we should expect to observe very little “free-riding” and a higher than

average level of mass political participation in post-Communist Bulgaria. Indeed, as

described in Chapter 2, the level of voter participation in Bulgaria’s democratic national

elections is rather high, falling to under three-fourths of registered voters only in the 1996 presidential ballot and the 1997 parliamentary elections. Marked by voter sophistication and prospective evaluations of government performance, it ranks among the highest in Eastern

Europe (Kitschelt, Dimitrov and Kanev 1995). Only a third of Bulgarian respondents express an identification with a political party or movement, as the level of partisan identification has declined by nearly a half—from around 62% in 1991 (see Rose and Haerpfer 1992) to only

32.2% in a 1997 poll o f the Comparative National Elections Project (which is still remarkably high compared to the West European and North American averages of about

10%). The less intensely people identify with political parties, the less likely they are to vote and to participate generally in politics. In spite o f such relatively weak party identification, the “index of volatility,” which measures inter-election shifts in votes, shows that Bulgaria has a lower degree of volatility in party support between elections than any other post-

Communist coimtry in the region (see Rose 1996b: 152-153).

Finally, do the East Europeans, including the Bulgarians, differ very significantly

from the average Western nation in their “expectation that government should provide” (a

157 very dubious formulation for any social-value analysis, which seems to assume that the government’s main function is to extract resources from the population rather than serve the needs of the citizenry by providing a range of expected goods and services)? Has

“collectivist welfarism” become a second nature and the region’s predominant habit? When one compares cross-national percentage figures for this empirical indicator (see Mason

1993), the only anomalous case, in terms o f unusually weak support for an active government role in the economy, appears to be the U.S. (not an entirely unexpected finding given the anti-government and anti-social or “rugged” of most Americans).

Collectivist welfare values appear to be far more widespread among the East Europeans, including the Bulgarians (according to the New Democracies Barometer III, the proportion of those clearly in favor of collective welfare is as high as 44% in Bulgaria). But these statistical differences are still not significant enough to confirm that the region’s political culture lacks in individualism (an indicator of rather questionable validity, as I have already explained).

In a further confirmation of such findings, a series of USIA-commissioned sample surveys about mass-level conceptions of democracy in Eastern Europe (see McIntosh,

Mac Iver, Abele, and Smeltz 1994) revealed that solid majorities of Bulgarians view the three principles in Dahl’s conception of polyarchy (a multiparty system, freedom to criticize the government, and ) as “essential” to democratic rule, scoring well ahead of the other surveyed East European nations in this indirect measure of normative commitment to democratic norms and ideals. In spite of repeated lapses into and dictatorship, the participatory civic culture underlying Bulgaria’s old democratic order

158 has remained alive and has provided the basis for a return to democratic principles and practices.

But a democratic legacy arguably involves much more than the question of developing and maintaining appropriate attitudes, norms and values. Some practical exposure to electoral competition in the past is needed, contributing to mass political consciousness and efficacy, while disposing rival elites towards greater commitment to accommodation and democratic proceduralism. According to an area expert, “countries that had enjoyed a short though very important period of democracy in the interwar period,” such as Poland,

Czechoslovakia and Himgary, do not lack the “organizational skills and civic-mindedness necessary for the formation of autonomous groups,” while, by contrast, in Bulgaria and

Romania, “countries that had virtually no experience with democracy,” the lack thereof has

“proved a rather insurmoimtable barrier to grass-roots endeavors for change” (Sadowski

1993: 170).

Despite such contrary views, democratic experience in the form of pre-existing competitive structures, accumulated political know-how and organizational skills was an important part of the push for democratic change fi'om below in Bulgaria as well. The persistence of “traditional” political parties and the role played by these “survivals” from the pre-Communist era in the processes of democratization and party system formation in

Eastern Europe have already attracted some scholarly attention (see Cotta 1994; Golosov

1996). The initial stage of post-Zhivkov democratization allowed for a large number of long- repressed political organizations and associations to re-emerge in a very short order in

Bulgaria. As Commimist elite unity and cohesion began to disintegrate in late 1989,

159 surviving party elites from the pre-Communist period were able quickly to revive the old multiparty system, some remnants of which had continued to function in exile.

Party pluralism was restored very quickly after 10 November 1989, as the revived traditional parties from the pre-Communist era resumed their activities. Only a couple of days after Zhivkov’s fall, a group of intellectuals led by Elka Konstantinova (a future minister of culture in the first UDF cabinet of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov) restored the

Radical Democratic Party (RDP), an important centrist party of the pre-Communist past. A few days later, on 25 November 1989, 40 surviving members of the anti-Communist

Agrarian movement renewed the activity of Nikola Petkov s Bulgarian Agrarian National

Union under the chairmanship of party veteran Milan Drenchev. They were soon joined by other Agrarian veterans who were returning from exile abroad, including Tsanko Barev and

Anastasia Dimitrov-Mozer, the daughter of the late BANU leader. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov

(Gemeto). BANU-Nikola Petkov also re-founded its youth wing, the Agrarian Youth

Movement, which had been outlawed in 1947. The very next day, led by their octogenarian party ex-chairman, Atanas Moskov, a small group of veteran Social Democrats, who had similarly survived exile or long terms in Commimist prisons, re-established the Bulgarian

Social Democratic Party (BSDP), which had been banned since 1948:

Seven men who had survived concentration camps refounded the Social Democratic Party on 26 November 1989; it took just 16 days for the strength of our movement to reassert itself. Dr. Atanas Moskov, a doctor of international law, was 86 years old then, and had spent fifteen years in the camps. Dr. Petar Dertliev, a medical doctor, became the President of our SDP. On 1 February 1990 I founded the opposition newspaper Svoboden Narod as a weekly; it is now daily. The party now has 84,000 members, mainly in the towns which were its original power base all those years ago. From 1947 to 1989 the Social Democratic Party had existed in exile, in , and Svoboden Narod had been edited as a monthly in Vienna from 1956 to 1989. (Interview with Ruen Krumov in Ward 1992: 200)

160 The current BSDP chairman, Petar Dertliev, had been an active member of the opposition

faction in the Sixth Grand National Assembly elected in 1946, but later served 10 years in

labor camps.

The revival of Bulgaria’s “historical” parties stimulated the creation of new parties

and political organizations. On 7 December 1989, these three restored democratic parties were joined by several established dissident groups and a number of more recently-founded opposition organizations to form the Union of Democratic Forces. The new alliance was next joined by the Democratic Party, which had been re-founded by a group of veteran activists

led by provisional chairman Boris Kyurkchiev on 19 December 1989. Established in the early 1890s as a splinter faction of the old Liberal Party, the Democratic Party was among the most important parties in the pre-Communist period. A center-right party mainly of the middle class, which during World War II opposed both the pro-German government and the

Communist-led Fatherland Front, it remained in opposition after 1944 and was disbanded in 1947. Its leader, party veteran Stefan Savov (who passed away in December 1999), was elected chairman of the UDF-dominated National Assembly in 1991 -1992. Later he became co-founder as well as co-chairman of the Popular Union, which split from the UDF and became an independent party in 1994. The availability o f this pool of aging, yet experienced and politically still active party veterans not only allowed the “historical” parties to make their second appearances, but it made a difference in terms of democratic leadership recruitment. Unlike Romania, Slovakia, Russia and most other CIS countries, none of the major opposition leaders in Bulgaria came from the old party-state apparatus. All of these surviving pre-Communist parties, “but especially the Agrarians, had played an important role in Bulgarian political life before the communist takeover” (Karasimeonov 1996: 258).

161 Apart from the restoration of these major traditional parties, other groups that had played a significant part in Bulgarian politics before the Communist takeover of the country also came back to life. The return from foreign exile of Dr. Ivan Dochev, wartime leader of the pro-fascist, chauvinistic and staunchly monarchist Union of Bulgarian National Legions, helped revive the small but vocal pro-monarchical movement, which is demanding the restoration of King Simeon II on the throne. In September 1995, the surviving Legionnaires commemorated the re-foundation of their organization (now renamed the Bulgarian

Democratic Forum) at a reunion in organized and hosted by President Stoyanov's parents, Stefan and Penka Stoyanov (the father had been Dochev s right-hand man during the wartime years). The way some the “historical” political parties were resurrected is an example of how quickly and successfully remnants of the old multiparty system could become the basis for renewed pluralist politics. If party system formation had to start from scratch, this would have certainly delayed the inauguration of the new democracy.

The Social Democratic roots of Bulgarian Communism is another factor contributing to the current process of democratization. The BCP was a militant offshoot of the Bulgarian

Workers’ Social Democratic Party (BWSDP), a working-class movement founded in 1891 by intellectuals and committed democrats, including leader Dimitar Blagoev. Until right-wing terror and government repression decimated party ranks and forced the BCP underground in the aftermath of the June 1923 fascist coup, the Communists were a strong legislative party devoted to social justice and popular participation. Years of forced exile abroad or undergroimd existence at home took its toll, however. The surviving BCP members either succumbed to left-wing or came under the thumb of Stalin, who

162 used Bulgarian leaders like Vasil Kolarov and Georgi Dimitrov to control the Moscow-based

Communist International (the Comintern).

The dual nature of the BCP’s historical heritage promoted the emergence within the

Zhivkov regime of a liberal-minded and reform-oriented elite, which rejected ideological dogmatism and was instrumental in mobilizing party support for democratic changes.

B ANU-Nikola Petkov leader Milan Drenchev has stressed that “Fortunately, a lot of people emerged within the BCP who were keenly aware that they had to make concessions and undertake reforms for the democratization of our society. We should be grateful to them for this, because that’s how we have avoided the spilling of blood” (interview with Drenchev in Antova-Konstantinova 1990; 57). Another consequence was that the anti-regime opposition in Bulgaria was “generated initially within the Communist Party and only later transferred beyond its ranks ’ (Karasimeonov 1996:158). The reform-minded party elite that emerged within the BCP proved to be ready to negotiate consensual reforms with the fledgling democratic opposition-a major explanatory variable, according to elite-oriented studies of democratization (see Gunther, Diamonadorous and Puhle 1995).

In another continuity from past democratic experience, the new^ basic law has fully restored the traditional role of the National Assembly as the center of political power and authority in Bulgarian politics, as was originally envisioned by the Liberal architects of the

Tumovo Constitution. This development is in line with the theoretical expectation that the processes of democratic institution-building in the transformative societies of Eastern Europe would reflect the traditional institutional patterns from the pre-Commimist era (Lomax 1993 ;

Golosov 1996). The direct popular representation prescribed by the Constitution of 1879 is seen by many Bulgarians as a model for democratic governance (Curtis 1993: 189). All

163 delegations at the round-table talks, including the reform Communists, firmly insisted on the

unconditional assumption of supreme power in the country by the National Assembly. In

arguing the idea of historical continuity, one writer has suggested that the pre-Communist

political environments, even though transformed as a result of the [Communist] regime's activities, played a significant role in shaping both the process of democratization and the institutional architecture of the emerging post-communist polity. (Golosov 1996: 9)

According to this line of analysis, such coimtry-specific

patterns, viewed as links between the pre-Communist conditions and the processes of democratic institution building are very important for understanding the continuous nature of social and political development in the region. (Golosov 1996: 90)

Since Bulgaria had adopted and operated the institutions of West European-type parliamentary democracy in the pre-Communist past, and these institutions continued to exist formally throughout the Communist period, this institutional experience has facilitated current efforts to forge and maintain a new representative democracy.

Although weak, Bulgaria’s democratic tradition has quite obviously played a positive role in securing a peaceful return to democracy. There can be little doubt that the restoration of democracy in Bulgaria owes much to the multiparty and parliamentary traditions based on the earlier experiment with democracy. The failure of Bulgaria’s previous experiment with democracy may or may not encourage would-be anti-democrats, but it has certainly driven home the lesson that contending party elites need to avoid the violence, intolerance, personal retribution and other costly mistakes of the past if the current process of democratization is to succeed. In view of their country’s rather spotty but still undeniable record of past democratic self-governance, post-Communist Bulgaria’s new breed of politicians may have found the work of democratization just a little bit easier due in part to

164 the surviving pluralist and parliamentary traditions. Therefore, to contrast the presence of “a

historical tradition of democracy in Latin America and southern Europe” with the “absence

(save for Czechoslovakia) of any such tradition in the east”—as Valerie Bunce (1995: 120) and others have done—is to risk engaging in exaggeration on both counts. The above empirical findings also seem to vindicate a critic who has rejected the widely assumed existence of a cultural divide in the region between “North” and “Southeast” tiers (the latter being the “immanently conformist, not freedom-loving, nondemocratic” Orthodox Balkans) as nothing more than a “predictable and trivial explanation” based on “the now internalized

Central European myth” (Todorova 1992: 165). Arguably, this cultural-historical “myth” may not adequately reflect empirical reality although it has been defended even by writers hailing from the Balkan region (see Tismaneanu 1992).

Insofar as the new Bulgarian leaders are concerned, the historical past may be a powerful source of negative lessons in terms of what to avoid, rather than what to do. in order to craft a successful and consolidated democracy. The most important lesson to be learned from such a tragic and violent history, which seems to be haunting the national psyche, is for Bulgarians not to repeat the mistakes of their elders. But it may be a lesson that has been largely forgotten or that it was never properly learned. While ambiguous and open to divergent interpretations, Bulgaria’s historico-cultural legacies may have contributed to the democratic changeover but are hardly conducive to consolidating democracy.

165 CHAPTER 6

MODERNIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The modernization school of politics emphasizes variables of context, such as level of development, class structure, socioeconomic equality, national integration, the development of a modem administrative state, and other sociostructural determinants.

Modernization is defined as “the process by which economic and technological change leads to the transformation of the institutions and values of a society” (Augustinos 1991: 2). It includes the fundamental transformation of traditional attitudes, beliefs and habits of mind, as well as pre-modem pattems and institutions of authority. According to modernization theorists, there is a powerful and robust linkage between democracy and the state of economic and social development. Historically, periods leading to democracy are usually ones of relative material prosperity and social progress. According to Dahl,

an advanced economy automatically generates many of the conditions required for a pluralistic social order. And as a pluralistic social order evolves...some of its members make demands for participating in decisions by means more appropriate to a competitive than to a hegemonic political system. (1971: 78)

Affluence reinforces democracy by giving a broad cross section of the population an economic stake in its political institutions. Today most well-to-do countries have stable democratic regimes (though the reverse is not always true). Economic prosperity seems to

166 be positively related to democracy and democratic stability. From this perspective,

modernization is seen as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for democratization.

Pioneering the argument that “democracy is related to the state of economic development,” Lipset (1960: 31) focused in particular on the mediating role of social structure and political culture. The process of socioeconomic modernization in traditional agrarian societies brings about radical structural transformations that are strongly favorable to democratization. A high correlation has been found between the establishment of democratic regimes and a modem, industrialized economy with its more differentiated social structure, better educated populace, and urbanized way of life. Dahl argues that the various developmental factors fostering democratization include:

...a high level of urbanization, a rapidly declining or relatively small agricultural population, great occupational diversity, extensive literacy, a comparatively large number of persons who have attended institutions of higher education, an economic order in which production is mainly carried on by relatively autonomous firms whose decisions are strongly oriented toward national and international markets, and relatively high levels of conventional indicators of well-being, such as physicians and hospital beds per thousand persons, life expectancy, infant mortality, percentage of families with various consumer durables, and so on. (1989: 251)

The profound changes wrought by the modernization process, especially in occupational and status structures, produce a “revolution of rising expectations” in the population. The social basis for this psychocultural change is in the spread of literacy and mass education, particularly higher education, among the lower classes. Socioeconomic development, producing increased income, greater economic security, secularization, and widespread higher education, promotes democracy by encouraging socially dispossessed groups to choose political bargaining and moderation over radicalism and revolution.

Democracy is more stable in affluent countries, because the intensity of their distributional

167 conflicts is lower due to their higher income levels and larger middle classes (Lipset 1960:

45-50).The level of economic development also has a very strong positive effect on the probability that a democratic regime, once established, will endure and take root (Przeworski ei al. 1996: 40-41). As Lipset put it, “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (1960: 31).

Larry Diamond and Juan Linz have argued that new professional and business elites as well as other college-educated middle-class groups promote democracy because they are more inclined to value individual , democratic participation and social compromise

(Diamond and Linz 1988: 12). There is a hypothesized coimection between liberal democracy and the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class, which is materially prosperous, economically autonomous from the state, and attached to liberal-democratic values

(Lindblom 1977: 161-169). Other scholars see the urban working classes of industrial capitalism and their political parties as the principal agent of popular sovereignty and democratization (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).

The early modernization literature focused on urbanization, industrialization and universal literacy as the most important explanatory variables. In addition to socioeconomic development, some modernization theorists have argued that a more egalitarian class structure also contributes to democracy. In other words, when national wealth is distributed more evenly, class distinctions are less likely to result in social and political polarization. In this view, greater social equality is a major structural factor which improves the prospects for democracy. It has been assumed that significant class-based cleavages, such as those found in rigidly stratified and severely imequal societies, have been detrimental to democratization, while socioeconomic equality has contributed to democratic stability by

168 reducing redistributional pressures and moderating the intensity of class-based politics.

Persistent inequalities of wealth, income and status can be a serious challenge to the long­ term maintenance of any democracy. In contrast, the historical absence of deep class cleavages breeds an egalitarian social culture which clearly helps to foster the development of democratic political institutions and democratic legitimacy. For example, democracy has fared far better in the Scandinavian countries where democratization has coincided with greater social and economic inclusiveness, than in the Latin American and Southern

European nations where socioeconomic inclusion has been much more limited. As Lipset admonished, “a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite results either in (dictatorial rule o f the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular- based dictatorship)” (1960: 31).

This sociostructural hypothesis is confirmed by data obtained from recent quantitative cross-national research. The findings of Muller (1988,1995) and Muller and Seligson ( 1987.

1994) in particular reveal that high levels o f income inequality have a strong negative effect on democratic sustainability that tends to reduce the robust positive impact of economic development. It has also been found that historically democracy is much more durable in countries where existing social inequalities are declining over time, mainly because “people expect democracy to reduce income inequality, and democracies are more likely to survive when they do” (Przeworski et al. 1996: 43).

First popularized in the context of Third-World development studies, the hypotheses of modernization theory were also applied to the comparative study of Communism. When tested in the field of Communist politics, the “social requisites” of democracy have yielded some theoretically valuable clues about the underlying causes of change in Marxist-Leninist

169 societies (see Moore 1950; Brzezinski 1964; Apter 1965; Black 1966; Johnson 1970;

FCautsky 1972; Field 1974; Bialer 1980). In an explicit rejection of the “totalitarian” model of Friedrich and Brzezinski, Communist regimes were construed much more benignly as

“mobilization systems” offering an alternative road to the industrialization and modernization of underdeveloped areas. According to the closely related convergence theories, the industrialization and economic growth of Soviet-type systems would lead over the long run to profound social transformation, political value change, and a shift to pluralistic institutions similar to those of the established Western democracies. More recently, a number of observers have argued that the process of modernization and social mobilization central to achieving a high level of socioeconomic development and modernity gave rise to new social strata with strongly democratic political values and beliefs, which formed the backbone of ’s program of and perestroika (see

Remington 1990; Lewin 1988; Bahry 1993; Pye 1990; Augustinos 1991)

By contrast, students of comparative Communism who are more skeptical of the modernization paradigm have subscribed to a darker vision of Marxist-Leninist systems and their capacity for change. Andrew Janos, Kenneth Jowitt and other commentators saw such regimes not as embodying the quest for industrialism and development, but as examples either of Spencerian militancy - that is, “garrison states” presiding over “barracks societies” and “barracks economies’’ (Y anos 1991 )—or of a corrupt, backward form of authoritarianism, paternalism, patrimonialism and “neo-” (Jowitt 1971,1978,1983; Yanos 1976.

1995).

Contrary to these more pessimistic interpretations of Leninist regimes, at least one writer (Bell 1991a) has concluded that Bulgaria’s transition to democracy may have been

170 in part due to the success of its Communist government in developing the country in the

preceding decades. The analysis below provides convincing evidence confirming this

conclusion. The specific contribution of this chapter is to elaborate and refine theoretically

this developmentalist argument, while expanding and strengthening its supportive empirical

base. As this chapter will argue, the Bulgarian experience under Communism seems to

support the hypotheses of the modernization paradigm. Before starting its rocky transition

to democracy, it became one of the economically more successful Soviet-bloc nations. Its

postwar social and economic record provides evidence strongly supportive of the

modernization model. The BCP regime modernized Bulgaria through a combination of

accelerated economic growth, industrialization, urbanization, and mass education. The postwar Bulgarian economy was transformed fi'om an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural one to a predominantly urban-industrial and service economy. Economic growth created greater social and political diversity as well as heightened political awareness and participation. The regime also eliminated the social differences of the past and reduced the polarizing effects of class-based cleavages. As unemployment disappeared, there was greatly

increased involvement of women in the labor force. The result was a rapid, basic transformation of society’s social class structure. As educational levels increased, and as rr:ore people achieved middle-class life-styles, political values and orientations changed. An

increasing urban population demanded a more open political system. The rise of a large stratum of college-educated people and professionals and the crucial role of the intelligentsia in the modernization process furnished the leadership cadres for the country’s “intellectuals’ revolution.” The democratic transition was therefore a natural outgrowth of the regime’s success in fostering economic and social progress, which expanded the educated intermediate

171 strata in society. Its deepest roots lay in the revolution of rising expectations brought about by the rapid pace of industrialization and modernization Bulgaria had experienced throughout the postwar period. The Bulgarian case thus seems to fit the propositions of the classical Lipset model concerning the specific social and cultural mechanisms by which modernization fosters democracy. Modernization, in fact, created the initial conditions for the changeover to democracy.

To the extent that it succeeds in illuminating the deterministic nature of the broader societal forces that push national politics in a more pluralistic direction, this analysis brings back into theoretical focus the insights of the once-celebrated and influential modernization literature. Even a skeptic like Yanos has recognized that

one can argue quite convincingly that technological innovation, including its impact on beliefs, structures, and social goods, represents the only logical point of departiu'e for the study of both communism and the dynamics of political change across the wider landscape of the modem world. (1991:104)

Economic Growth and Social Progress

Compared to its mixed record in the Third World “periphery,” modernization was more or less a success in the “semi-peripheral” Second World. Before embarking on a course of political democratization, the Soviet-bloc coimtries had undergone immense structural change after World War II, advancing decisively towards becoming urbanized, literate societies with access to advanced scientific knowledge and modem industrial technology.

Bulgaria began its democratic metamorphosis only after the rapid economic modemization and social mobilization of this once backward rural-based society of peripheral capitalism.

The Commimists had assumed control over a largely traditional agrarian society that was

172 “still dominated by patriarchal, communal attitudes” (Karasimeonov 1996: 255). Through central planning and active state intervention, the regime mobilized national resources on an unprecedented scale to undertake the capital accumulation and investment necessary for catching up with more advanced economies. For ideological, military-political and self­ legitimation purposes, the goal of industrialization was ambitiously pursued, leading to economic growth and the expansion of public investments in infrastructure, communications, social welfare, educational and health facilities. As noted in the introduction to an economic study of pre-1989 Bulgaria, “it has been one of the great success stories of the twentieth century, with the highest rate of economic growth in Europe and a degree of structural change second to none” (Lampe 1986:8). This perhaps overly generous assessment captures the enormous headway made by postwar Bulgaria in its drive for modernity and social transformation. That is why the Communist period is generally associated with steady economic growth and rising living standards for the majority of the population, at least before the decade of the 1980s. This also explains why the anti-Communist opposition in pre-transition Bulgaria was so slow to materialize.

All the indicators commonly tested in association with modemization

(industrialization, urbanization, higher income level, egalitarian class structure, the spread of education, and effective governance) have been strongly positive in the Bulgarian case—a fact that has been only rarely acknowledged by Western observers. Trying to explain this omission, Robert McIntyre has suggested that

...the pace of change in the physically obvious signs of higher living standards has been greater in Bulgaria (noting of course very different initial levels) than in countries such as Himgary whose development has been regularly and approvingly noted in the West. The failure to appreciate fully Bulgarian developments undoubtedly has manifold roots, including the geo­

173 political filter applied with opposite effect to countries perceived to be close to versus moving away from Soviet forms of organization. Favorable attention can be secured by either domestic or foreign policy deviation. Although there have been important economic changes in Bulgaria, they have not thus far been in the direction of a significantly greater use of market forces and so they have been largely ignored. (1988a: 125)

Nevertheless, the relatively successful performance of the Bulgarian economy, at least until the mid-1980s, did attract some scholarly attention. According to McIntyre

( 1988a: 125), foreign economists in particular viewed Bulgaria as an intriguing case, where the Soviet-style centrally-planned economy was relatively efficient and which occasionally experimenting with some innovative economic policies.

The most widely utilized indices of socioeconomic modemization are the size and distribution of national income, as well as levels of industrialization, consumption, urbanization and education, all of which have shown high positive zero-order correlations with democracy (see Lipset 1960: 27-45). Annual per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) is the indicator of a country’s wealth most frequently used in connection with economic development. The statistical reliability of the per capita GDP variable as a social indicator is not particularly high (see Wyzan 1996a; Evans and Whitefield 1995: 491), but since it is commonly regarded as the most readily comparable figure, it is acceptable for the purposes of this study. Samuel Huntington ( 1991:271 -272) has used this empirical measure as a rough index to compare the “Third Wave” democracies by level of modemization. He classifies

Bulgaria in the top category of more advanced newcomers to democracy (with per capita

GDP of 55,000 and more in 1987), along with Spain, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and

Hungary. Huntington’s placement of Bulgaria within this top category is general ly replicated when one uses more up-to-date data (see Table 6.1), which confirm that at the beginning of

174 its democratization the country undoubtedly fell within the range of middle level of

development where, according to Huntington, most transitions actually occur. For

comparative purposes. Table 6.1 uses the last pre-transition year as benchmark in order to

avoid the distorting effect of revolutionary tiumoil (in many cases, national income fell

dramatically beginning in the first year of the democratic transition).

During its 45 years in power, the Bulgarian Commimist Party carried out a radical in Bulgaria by eliminating widespread poverty and reducing the class-based divisions, inequalities and conflicts of the pre-Commimist era. Though highly controversial, the nationalization of industry and the forced collectivization of agriculture helped to create one of the most egalitarian societies in postwar Europe, in which economic interests were

forcibly homogenized and class cleavages were relatively minimal. A popular index of income inequality, the so-called Gini coefficient, showed pre-1989 Bulgaria to be among the most egalitarian cases in the world (see Wiles 1975: 253-254; McIntyre 1988a: 144; Wyzan

1996b). Using an alternative measure of inequality, namely the size of income share received by the richest and the poorest segments of the population, George Kiirian’s index of social indicators ranked Bulgaria as one of the world’s most equal societies (along with

Czechoslovakia and East Germany). The wealthiest 10% of Bulgarians received only 18.8% of the GDP in 1980, while 26.6% of national income went to the bottom 40% of the population (Kurian 1984: 101-102)--one of the most equal income pattems worldwide. A comparison between Bulgaria and Greece of the 1970s—two neighboring countries with very similar levels of socioeconomic development at that time—revealed a far more uniform income distribution in Bulgarian society. Even after the richest 1% of the Greek population had been omitted from the sample, the ratio of the household income of the 95 th percentile

175 to the 5th percentile was reportedly 11.11:1 in Greece, compared to only 4.9:1 in Bulgaria

(Ape! and Strumpel 1976: 173-174).

Even though some scholars question the hypothesized negative etTect of unequal income distributions on democratization (see, for example, Bollen and Jackman 1985,1989,

1995), others see substantial economic inequality as less conducive to democracy than a more egalitarian social structure. This analysis sides with the latter view, especially since it can be argued both deductively and empirically that—as in the Bulgarian case—income equality sooner or later generates demands for political equality and democracy; conversely, significant income differentials and widespread poverty lead to the marginalization and disenfranchisement of large sectors of the population which lack the necessary resources for meaningful participation in the political process.

176 Country/ Per capita GDP at pre-transition year purchasing power parity (in constant 1985 US dollars) East Germany 1988 10,433 Taiwan 1990 8,067 Spain 1974 7,294 Bulgaria 1988 6,866 South Korea 1990 6,665 Hungary 1988 5,562 Argentina 1982 5,488 Greece 1973 5,218 Poland 1988 4,529 Portugal 1973 4,474 Chile 1989 4,335 Czechoslovakia 1988 4,111 Uruguay 1984 3,952 1984 3,833 1990 3,250 Turkey 1983 2,907 Romania 1988 2,090 Ecuador 1978 1,861 Philippines 1985 1,542 Nicaragua 1989 1,324

Table 6.1: Socioeconomic levels of Third Wave democracies

Source: Adapted from World Bank estimates, Penn World Tables (Release 5.6).

177 As a structural dimension, the relatively egalitarian character of Bulgarian society

was due in part to a very rapid improvement of living conditions in the countryside which

flattened the historical urban-rural imbalance (McIntyre 1988a: 129). Urban-rural

differentials in living standards continue to be relatively minimal today, with average rural

incomes actually higher than urban ones (see Hassan and Peters 1996). For this reason, rural

living standards and the minimal difference in household income level between the urban

and rural sectors have attracted the attention of a number of Western analysts (see Black

1976; Brucan 1983; Turgeon 1983: 38-39; Alton 1985; Wyzan 1988: McIntyre 1988a,

1988b, 1989; Boyd 1990; Creed 1995, some of whom have praised the comparatively high level of rural living conditions in Bulgaria.

The historically low levels of socioeconomic inequality and the Communist- engineered social homogeneity have fostered strongly egalitarian social values and attitudes

(see Rose 1992; Mason 1993) that are highly conducive to political participation, tolerance, cooperation, and support for democratic liberties and procedures. They have also contributed to a level of interpersonal trust, interest in politics, and a sense o f political efficacy that are among the highest in reunited Europe (see McIntosh and Abele Mac Iver 1993: 7-9).

Political culture theorists have emphasized these three particular indicators as central to the political cooperation and participation that are necessary for democratization{ibid.). This finding seems to contradict the widely-held view articulated by Jowitt and other students of comparative Communism that Leninist regimes have bequeathed nothing but a dismal anti­ democratic legacy of fragmentation, political cynicism, mutual suspicion and deep social distrust (Jowitt 1992a, 1992b).

178 Another very important change that took place under Communist auspices was the country’s belated industrial revolution. The postwar period was marked by rapid economic and social transformation from an overwhelmingly rural-agricultural to a predominantly urban-industrial way oflife, conceptualized by Cyril Black (1976:112) as the historical shift from 75% or more of the labor force in agriculture to the same proportion in industry and the service sector. Bulgaria was among the most marginalized and imderdeveloped countries in

Eastern Europe at the close of World War II, with only Albania ranking behind it. It was a predominantly agrarian nation very poor in natural resources. When the Communists consolidated their monopolistic power in the late 1940s, Bulgaria was still mostly a rural- based, agrarian society with a small holder subsistence economy and poor facilities in transport, communication and administration. But the new regime, which equated socialism with heavy industry and a large industrial working class, was ideologically committed to a radical program of state-led modemization, accelerated industrial development, and scientific-technological revolution. Industrialization was achieved via the “secularization”

(that is, rationalization) of society by a modernity-committed elite (Augustinos 1990: 5).

Following the etatist developmental model, the BCP launched the economic modemization of the country, relying on a high degree of government activism, centralized planning and massive mobilization of national resources for the rapid building of heavy industry practically from scratch. With only very limited access to intemational capital markets and no foreign direct investment, Bulgaria had one of the highest investment rates in the world and accomplished impressive aggregate economic growth (Feiwel 1977). The accelerated development of the manufacturing sector resulted in a profound transformation of the entire economy and society. To achieve its ambitious development plans, the BCP

179 provided stable, effective and reliable leadership which, notwithstanding its despotic

arbitrariness and Bolshevik voluntarism, created an environment of extraordinary regime

stability, administrative efficiency and predictability that was conducive to political

integration, social tranquility and economic progress. Public expenditure grew quickly, especially state investments in heavy industry, armaments, and modem infrastructure.

Bulgaria’s postwar record vindicates Alexander Gerschenkron’s developmentalist thesis stressing the positive mobilizational role of the state as an agent of modemization and manager of socioeconomic change in undeveloped societies (Gerschenkron 1966:353-355).

A poor country like Bulgaria obviously could not have hoped to establish economic and political stability without strong governmental control over the economy and society to ensure organizational, technological and resource-utilization improvements. State socialism was a mobilizational system which allowed poor, undeveloped nations like Bulgaria to leap­ frog a prolonged period of initial accumulation of private capital. In fact, most advanced industrial countries (e.g., Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, China, and even the

Southeast Asian “tigers”) developed their economies with the state playing a predominant role in planning and financing investments. This important practical lesson of modemization theory is largely forgotten in the present political climate of free-market ideology, mass privatizations, economic deregulation and antistatist (see Nove 1995).

Most Bulgarian industry was constructed after World War II in the form of large state-owned enterprises, producing industrial and consumer goods principally for export to the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(CMEA). From the most agricultural economy of the region, Bulgaria became with

Czechoslovakia the most industrialized (Bristow 1996: x).The official division of labor

180 among CMEA partners assigned Bulgaria the responsibility for manufacturing advanced electronic technology, including industrial robotics, computer hardware, telecommunications equipment and other high-tech components for the Soviet-bloc market. There were also rapid advances in steel-making, petrochemicals, machine-tool production, arms manufacture, nuclear energy and shipbuilding. The leading manufacturing sector, machine building, accounted for a quarter of all industrial output in 1980 (Kurian 1984: 442). Over 70% of

Bulgaria’s CMEA exports consisted of machinery and electronics {Financial Times

Newsletter, May 4, 1990). As Bristow (1996: 106) points out, this choice clearly defied economic rationality: for reasons of comparative advantage (climate, natural resources, national economic tradition, dominant agrarian conditions, etc.), Bulgaria should have specialized in agriculture; instead it became one of the world’s top producers of electric fork- lift trucks. Nearly 40% of Bulagria’s labor force in 1980 was employed in industry, the 13th highest percentage in the world (Kurian 1984:252). When the transition to democracy began.

75% of Bulgaria’s national income was derived from industry and construction (see Lampe

1986: 144). As a result, it had the largest share of its labor force employed in industry and construction among the Soviet-bloc nations (see the United Nations Development Program

1993).

The industrialization program also produced an unusually high growth in foreign trade volume, especially with CMEA partners. Bulgaria’s total trade turnover (exports plus imports) reached 100% of its GDP by the mid-1980, which was without precedent among the centrally planned economies (Lampe 1986: 156; McIntyre 1988: 7-8). Through mutual trade, joint production ventures, economic-technical assistance and low-priced Soviet oil and natural-gas supplies, Bulgaria was tied closely to markets in the USSR and other East-bloc

181 countries. With investment given priority over consumption, the pace of structural

transformation was striking, but at high material and non-material costs for the population,

the legacy of which in terms of social dislocation, deferred consumption, consumer

dissatisfaction and frustrated life-style aspirations came back to haunt the regime at the end

of the 1980s. Worse still, the process of industrialization occurred at a grievous cost to

Bulgaria’s natural environment.

In spite of the priority accorded to industrialization (to which indices of national

wealth are clearly related), agriculture has continued to play a prominent role (see Creed

1995). Although the population has become predominantly urban, nearly a fifth of the

Bulgarian work force is still employed in agriculture-related occupations (see McIntyre 1988 :

149; World Bank 1991: 36). Land collectivization, launched as early as 1946, was carried

out more quickly and more ruthlessly than in any other East European country. 44% of the

land had been collectivized by 1950; this figure reached 92% in 1958. The campaign of land collectivization was nearly complete in 1960. Originally, some 3,450 collective farms had

been established, which were merged into 932 larger units by 1958. In 1971, all collective

farms were amalgamated into 161 “agro-industrial complexes’’ (AlC), each equipped w ith

its own factories for the processing o f harvests (Shoemaker 1993: 224; Bristow 1996: 6-8).

By January 1974, Bulgaria had 170 AlCs, their size ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 hectares

(Brown 1976: 114 fh 7). The modemization and mechanization of the agricultural sector resulted in an extensive transfer of the labor force from agriculture to industry and trade. This emphasis on agriculture and food production also pushed Bulgaria’s world ranking in 1980 to 5th in daily calorie consumption and 10th in daily protein consumption, as well as first in

182 cigarette production and exports (both in total volume and on a per-capita basis) (Kurian

1984: 351-353,442).

Huntington argues that “In considerable measure, the wave of democratizations that began in 1974 was the product of the economic growth of the previous two decades” (1991:

61). As this analysis demonstrates, Bulgaria was hardly an exception. In the early 1950s, it was still a predominantly agrarian country with backward economic and social conditions.

It was economically the least developed among the CMEA members. But thanks to its efforts to transform and expand the economy, its per-capita income in 1980, estimated by the World

Bank at $4,150, was on par with Htmgary's $4,180 (see Lampe 1986:161; Kurian 1984:98).

Bulgaria’s per capita GDP had increased in real terms more than eightfold between 1939 and

1980 (see Lampe 1986: 144). By all the measurable indices, it enjoyed a considerable expansion in real output. Real economic growth averaged 9.6% annually from 1951 to 1967.

7.5% from 1967 to 1974, slowing down to a rate of 4-5% in the late 1970s. This rapid progress was accompanied by substantial structural change: the share o f industry in national income rose from 37% in 1951 to 58% in 1979 (Feiwel 1977). Over 60% of the GDP in 1985 was attributable to the manufacturing sector, compared to only 13% from agriculture (Pantev

1996: 18). Prof. Dobrev concludes that “the post-November 10,1989 changes were a result of the revolution’ in Bulgarian economy and society. ” (1998: 18). Bulgaria’s per-capita income had risen by the early 1980s to about 40% of that of the most advanced West

European countries (see Lengyel, Kostova and Lazic 1996), but later in the decade it began to stagnate under of the combined burden of acute labor shortages, higher military spending, the sharply increasing costs of Soviet imports, and a huge (and growing) external debt. The global structural crisis of the 1970s and 1980s affected Bulgaria no less severely than the

183 other modernizing nations in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the world economy, most of which underwent protracted cycles of very high external indebtedness, budget deficits, capital disinvestment, and negative economic growth. By the late 1980s, the national economy was in a state of decline. Despite reforms under the New Economic Mechanism

(NEM), a substantial slow down in economic production and the ever-growing cost of servicing the foreign debt led to a fiscal crisis of the state. While the central ly-p lanned model had worked spectacularly well during the initial, extensive-growth phase of the industrialization drive, it proved ill-suited for the needs of intensive, knowledge-based growth in a more complex, interdependent and technologically-advanced global economy.

In addition to structural deficiencies of the socialist economy, the costly “Cold War” with a materially and technologically superior West was another factor that contributed to the

Soviet bloc’s economic downturn and ultimate fall.

Social Mobilization

Accelerated economic expansion, the growth of large-scale industry and the reorientation from an agricultural to an industrial-based economy resulted in comparable advances in living standards, public consumption, urbanization and educational level.

Bulgaria experienced one of the most thoroughgoing processes of industry-driven deruralization of the labor force in postwar Europe (McIntyre 1988: 147). At the end of

World War II, three-quarters of all Bulgarians were still peasants involved in small-scale, self-subsistent farming. Urbanization resulted mainly fi’om rural migration leading to a rapid decline in the share of the rural population and significant changes in Bulgaria’s demographic characteristics. The combined effects of extremely rapid industrialization and

184 agricultural collectivization produced a drastic reversal in the rural-urban ratio of the demographic structure: from 24.7% in 1946 (see McIntyre 1988: 149) the urban population almost tripled to 67.0% in 1988 (see Curtis 1993: 278). With the Czech Republic and the three Baltic states, Bulgaria is now among the most urbanized coimtries in Central and

Eastern Europe, a dramatic change for a country which had over 80% of its population living in isolated villages and cultivating small holdings at the turn of the century.

Rapid urbanization and industrialization led to an equally striking shift in the work force profile from agricultural to non-agricultural jobs. The massive movement of the population from the countryside to urban centers in search of wage employment provided by the industrial sector swelled the ranks of blue-collar workers in the burgeoning cities. As a result of the sharp decline in the number of agricultural jobs, less than a third of Bulgarians now reside in rural areas. Comparatively speaking, urban residents are believed to view the world through a cognitive prism different from that of rural residents, making them more tolerant, politically more sophisticated, active and influential, and more likely to reject authoritarianism.

Industrialism and urbanization also tend to elevate a country’s literacy level. After its 9 September 1944 takeover, the BCP focused its efforts on promoting socialist over traditional-religious values and meeting the requirements of the scientific-technological revolution. The emphasis on secular learning and technical training led to a massive expansion and modemization of the school sector. The country ranked high on scales of literacy. Thanks to the official commitment to science and educational progress, Bulgaria in

1980 had 86% of its school-age population enrolled in secondary schools, the 17th highest percentage among all nations (Kurian 1984: 442). The universal spread of literacy and

185 education also increased the number of Bulgarians with post-secondary education. By 1975,

there were 511,851 university graduates in a population of about 8.5 million (Lengyel,

Kostova, and Lazic 1996: 65). The number o f college graduates active in the labor force jumped from less than 10,000 in 1939 to 340,000 in 1989, including 120,000 industrial

engineers (Todorova 1992: 153).

The proportion of eligible Bulgarians enrolled full-time in educational institutions at the primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels was comparable to that of the more advanced nations (see World Bank 1991 : vii). With priority given to scientific and technical training, Bulgaria in 1980 was ranked 3rd in the world in per-capita expenditure on scienti fic research, 4th in number of scientists and engineers engaged in basic research and development, 6th in number of professional and technical personnel, and 9th in level of scientific and technical education and expertise. With a relatively small population, it also ranked in 9th place in the number of volumes in public libraries (Kurian 1984: 442).

Generally speaking, the better educated nations are, the more likely they are to resist authoritarian rule and support democracy. Conversely, lower educational levels result in greater political skepticism, a more limited sense of political competence and efficacy, less political participation, indifference or cynical rejection of democratic politics (Przeworski etal. 1995: 37).

The regime was also relatively successful in satisfying basic human demands and needs by providing full employment, low prices, affordable housing and generous social- welfare benefits. George Kurian’s 1984 book of selected social indicators ranked Bulgaria relatively high on all quality-of-life indices and other composite scales measuring development. In 1980, it ranked 22nd among the 190 nations surveyed on the Index of Net

186 Social Progress, 29th on the Physical Quality of Life Index, and 32nd on the Combined

Economic and Social Indicators Scale. Another manifestation of postwar Bulgaria’s social mobilization and progress was the growing participation of women in the work place, particularly in white-collar professions such as teachers, lawyers, physicians and dentists. In

1980, 57% of Bulgaria’s university students were women, the top highest percentage in

Europe (Kurian 1984: 371).

Bulgaria’s degree of industrialization and urbanization, standard of living, and educational level thus grew quickly after World War II, steadily narrowing the gap with the more advanced European nations. According to Bulgaria’s National Statistical Institute

(1991), over 90% of Bulgarians own their homes, which is among the world’s highest levels of home ownership. At 32 telephones per 100 people in 1990, Bulgaria’s rather unreliable telephone network is still the most advanced in Eastern Europe. This rapid socioeconomic growth and the transition from an agrarian to an urban-industrial economy increased the social mobilization, cultural awareness and political astuteness of the population, leading to open and politically destabilizing demands for a better quality of life and regime liberalization. It unleashed rapid rises in expectations for higher standards o f living that the regime was unable to meet (Curtis 1993:61). This is the meaning of “the revolution of rising expectations” in Bulgaria and every other country in the Soviet orbit. As Todorova points out, educational progress created, on the one hand, a well-trained, literate, technologically- skilled and highly-productive work force but, on the other, produced a surplus of young people with college diplomas pursuing increasingly scarce white-collar jobs (1992: 153).

Many yoimg intellectuals were overqualified and underemployed. Frustrated hopes for upward social mobility only heightened the general level of social resentment and discontent.

187 Mass education produces important changes in the distribution of political values and beliefs in the population, to which the regime must respond if it hopes to limit the accumulation ofpublic disaffection and grievances. According to Lipset ( 1960:4), the higher one’s level of education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic institutions and practices. The growth of the educated middle classes in particular tends to expand the sociocultural base for democracy. As we shall see below, the evidence from the Bulgarian case appears to confirm this prediction as well.

The Rise of the New Intelligentsia

According to the modernization paradigm, economic development and social progress result in the formation and maturation of new socioeconomic and professional groups, whose specialized skills and expert knowledge make them indispensable to the modernizing effort. The growth of urban-based professional and business elites in backward agrarian societies has historically helped to shift social and political values and orientations in a more democratic direction. Calling attention to these underlying causes of regime change, the so-called convergence theory speculated that Soviet-type societies would be transformed into democracies mainly as a result of the process of structural change, tending ultimately to “converge” with the established democracies of the West. In the early 1960s,

Walt W. Rostow (1960) and Daniel Bell (1960) predicted the gradual waning of the supposedly “monolithic” Communist bloc. The vast modernization literature thus spawned the only positive and predictive theory implying the eventual demise of Soviet-style

Communism, even though the model never truly specified the general causal mechanisms of the predicted system change.

188 A specific “breakdown mechanism” was suggested by Frank Parkin (1972: 45-62),

who argued that “elite differentiation” at the heart of the modernization process would give

rise to a historically “ascendant class” formed fi’om the “scientific, economic and creative

forces” essential to the pursuit of development and modernity. A society becomes ripe for

social revolution. Parkin believed, when there is a “power disequilibrium” between the

economic, social and political dimensions of the stratification order. Social transformation

becomes inevitable when the ruling political elite is not the class which is socially and

economically dominant through its control of the production process. The “system contradiction” that this power imbalance creates can be resolved only when the stratification equilibrium is restored “by concentrating all the dimensions of power in the hands of one social class.” The historical paradigmatic case is that of the socially and economically ascendant bourgeoisie which replaced a politically dominant but declining aristocacry by gaining mastery over all pillars of power—social, economic and political.

According to Parkin, while the nomenklatura class retained control over the politico- administrative apparatus of the Communist state, the social and economic power of the intelligentsia rested on “its command of the skills, knowledge and general attributes which are held to be of central importance for the development of productive and scientific forces in modem industrial society” (Parkin 1972: 50). The intellectual class occupied a position of high public prestige and social honor “by virtue of its command over socially valued knowledge and expertise.” Elite differentiation between the Commimist apparatchiki and the white-collar intelligentsia created a political cleavage between these two elite groups with divergent bases of social legitimacy. The diversification of the national elite caused by modernization became a source of polarization between the politically dominant party-state

189 bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the socially and economically ascendant intelligentsia, on the other. Parkin predicted that the social antagonism between these two rival elites will result in the latter group seizing political power and removing the Communist bureaucracy from the top of the hierarchical order.

The process of socioeconomic development in Communist coimtries seemed to confirm such predictions by increasing the number and variety of interests in society and enhancing the role and social value of higher education and specialized skills in the economy. The intellectual mobilization pivotal to socioeconomic development and the growing centrality of knowledge as the sine qua non of economic dynamism gave rise to new social forces with their own interests and demands. The so-called “new intelligentsia” began to seek genuine participation in political and economic decision-making. Modernization increased the social and economic weight of this highly-educated and modernity-oriented social group with a claim to higher moral authority and a potential aspiration to political leadership, but it did not change its politically subordinate status.

Postwar Bulgaria did not deviate from this portentous social trend. Though culturally and politically influential and regarded as the spiritual leader of society, the traditional

Bulgarian intelligentsia had been relatively small throughout the pre-Communist era

(Daskalov 1996). The Communist-directed industrialization and urbanization brought into existence a very large middle class of college-educated professionals and intellectuals, most of whom were ideologically loyal to the regime but wanted a larger role in central decision­ making and resented party interference in their respective fields of expertise. Their entry into party ranks not only increased the intelligentsia’s political clout, but changed the social composition of the BCP from a membership clearly dominated by peasants in 1944 to one,

190 in which urban industrial workers and white-collar professionals became predominant by the mid-1980s (see McIntyre 1988: 59; Curtis 1993: 285). As elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, the greater priority accorded to technical-managerial over political recruitment criteria provided the social basis, from which the camp of pro-democracy reformers, many of them prominent party functionaries and intellectuals, emerged in opposition to Zhivkov’s autocratic rule (Bell

1991a: 28).

Partly because Zhivkov wooed and pampered the creative intelligentsia (which has been traditionally secular, left-leaning and Russophile rather than religiously devout, anti-

Communist and Russophobe, as in the rest of Eastern Europe), no intellectual-led opposition emerged in Bulgaria comparable to Poland’s or Czechoslovakia’s

(Daskalov 1996:77-79). But the ideological rigidity of the party-state curbed the expression of independent thought and stifled creative freedom, prompting demands for relaxed government controls over artistic and cultural freedoms. As poet, literary critic and UDF founder Marko Ganchev recounts, the intelligentsia chafed under the restrictions of the unreformed political system, even though

...it was of course always more liberal here than in the Soviet Union. Some works were even published against the regime, but few of them found their way into libraries and bookshops; they were snapped up by the intelligentsia. 1 should say that this word "intelligentsia” is something different from what you in the West call “an educated readership”.... But there has always been a class of those academics, doctors, writers, artists, , actors, who have, so to speak, borne the flag of truth in an age of lies. They have had access to foreign books and newspapers, some have traveled abroad, some have even published oversees. as in Russia never existed here in any quantity because the country was too small, and the political police were too numerous; the network of informers spread to every desk in every office, and there were no typewriters, photocopiers or paper stocks beyond state control. In every printing house a “responsible secretary” had the responsibility of using the telephone if anything questionable came in to be

191 printed. Yet we published Solzhenitsyn here before he was allowed by Gorbachev [in the USSR]. (Interview with Ganchev in Ward 1992: 181)

Middle-class frustration was also increased by a leveling social policy, under which white-collar professionals received remuneration no higher than the salaries ofhighly skilled industrial workers. Though outwardly submissive, this large, urbanized, well-educated and socially prominent middle class perceived the authoritarian institutions and practices of the regime as an anachronism incompatible with the requirements of modem life (see Markov

1990; Simeonov 1996).

While not openly rebellious, this newly mobilized social group demanded the expression and representation of its collective interests through greater access to political and cultural power as well as to economic opportimity and rewards. It became strongly attracted to the new reformist policies of glasnost and perestroika introduced by Gorbachev in the

Soviet Union. Marked by such sociopsychological proclivities as greater attachment to non- dogmatic rationality, political equality and democracy, as well as a higher value placed on individual freedom, professional autonomy and life-style satisfaction, the politicized

Bulgarian intelligentsia became a powerful factor for reforms in the late 1980s as it exerted strong pressure on the regime for meaningful change and demanded more voice in running the country. Its members were seeking increased socioeconomic and political participation in order to be able to exercise a greater say in determining their own lives and in realizing their creative potential. Its already high public standing, deriving from advanced education, specialized knowledge and professional status, was further enhanced due to its increasingly critical attitude toward the Zhivkov regime (Daskalov 1996). As Zheliu Zhelev wrote in a

Bulgarian journal for arts and culture back in the dissident 1988:

192 ...there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the interests of the intelligentsia, as a whole, and the bureaucracy, which creates the prerequisites for a conflict between these two social groups. The real intelligentsia, due to the specific, creative nature of its basic social activity, has always valued freedom, democracy, glasnost and openness, and will always fervently do so. It needs these attributes not just now, in connection with the current perestroika, but always and permanently, given the specific nature of its work. It is well known that there can be no authentic intelligentsia without free and unrestricted exchange of views, without free movement of ideas and people, free access to information, or guaranteed publicity for the products of scientific research and artistic creation. Without such freedoms...diere can be no authentic intelligentsia, because without them it can fulfill neither its fundamental social role nor its principal public mission of being the spiritual leader of civil society and the creator of new ideas and spiritual values. (Zhelev 1988)

Accordingly, the struggle against the all-powerful Communist bureaucracy "turned the intelligentsia into the protagonist of perestroika, while perestroika itself became a great time for the intelligentsia”(Zhelev 1988).

New socioeconomic conditions and requirements had given birth to a significant and growing intellectual class, part of which became the foundation of an intelligentsia-based democratic movement from below. Feelings of alienation from and resistance to the

Communist authorities led to the increasingly oppositionist stance and more active involvement of the intelligentsia in politics. A relatively small but vocal group of dissident intellectuals became the nucleus of a nascent civil society by openly criticizing the government over a number ofbiuriing ecological, cultural, economic and political issues (see

Simeonov 1996). Calling for a more under pluralistic political, economic and cultural institutions, it rejected the hierarchical system and absolute domination of the party elite, and sought greater access to the policy process. Former Radical-Democratic Party leader Elka Konstantinova believes that impatience with ideological intolerance and paternalistic authority created the stirrings for freedom and democracy:

193 As you know, the intelligentsia was the most oppressed, repressed and manipulated part of Bulgarian society. This was due to strict censorship and self-censorship, as well as the ever-present feeling that we caimot openly say what we think, nor publish what we believe to be true. That is why we, the intellectuals, have led the struggle for democracy.... (Interview with Prof. Konstantinova in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 17)

As intellectual dissent spread, the secret police reported on the eve o f the transition to democracy that 95% of the Bulgarian intelligentsia was anti-regime, as even high-ranking officials in Zhivkov’s own entourage mocked their leader and the dominant party dogmas

(Bell 1993: 84). Soon after Zhivkov’s ouster, many of Bulgaria’s best-known intellectuals and artistic figures formed the UDF. Petko Simeonov, one of the its original founders, recalls that the UDF’s ruling body, the National Coordinating Council, was composed predominanty of intellectuals:

The persons involved were mainly intellectuals. In the first call of the UDF Coordinating Committee , all the members were intellectuals. There was not a single worker or a peasant as a member of the Coordinating Committee. (Interview with Simeonov in Melone 1996b)

The modernizing Commimist society had thus brought forth, as its antithesis, new social forces dedicated to its replacement and anticipating to gain from its downfall. Given its comparatively high public esteem, skills in management and communication, and key role in the modernizing program, the intelligentsia became in effect an alternative political elite or “counter-elite” (to use Pareto’s terminology), ready and willing to challenge the political dominance of the old ruling class. The emergence of a pro-democracy movement led by the new ascendant class of white-collar professionals and reform-minded intellectuals was therefore a direct outcome of the concrete dynamics of modernization and the social forces it had unleashed.

194 The prominent role of intellectuals turned activists in the overthrow of Communism was historically not so unusual, since Bulgaria’s revolutionary movements throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centiuies, including the Communist movement itself, were all founded and led by the national intelligentsia. The BCP-directed modernization of Bulgarian society only served to increase their social role, public prestige and niunbers. Due to their idealistic mindset and natural inclination to challenge traditional authority, intellectuals tend to embrace dissident attitudes and provide anti-establishment movements with leadership as well as the revolutionary goal of setting up a “brave new world ” As James Billington ( 1980) argues, it is not the grievances of common people but the utopian dreams and “revolutionary faith” of disgruntled intellectuals (or what he calls the “fire in the minds of men”) that is responsible for the genesis of all political .

It is clearly the new intelligentsia, the nation’s intellectual and cultural elite created under Communism, that has been the driving force behind liberalization and democratization in Bulgaria. Members of Bulgaria’s artistic elite were especially prominent in the struggle to depose the Zhivkov clique and many of them have been very active in democratic politics:

Novelists, poets, literary critics and playwrights have become ...political commentators and politicians.... Parliament numbers among its elected deputies 17 members of the Bulgarian Writers’ Union (including Valery Petrov, Georgi Aleksiev, Georgi Velichkov, Georgi Mishev, Elka Konstantinova, Yordan Radichkov, Marico Ganchev and Rudenko Yordanov) as well as non-imion writers such as the literary critics Edvin Sugarev and Mikhail Nedelchev, who is also an official spokesman for the opposition Union of Democratic Forces. (lovine 1991: 255)

Dissident intellectuals have played a key role in toppling the old regimes and the installation of democracy in all formerly Communist countries in the region (Tismaneanu

1992, 1996). As George Schopflin has aptly remarked, “this was predictable given the

195 traditionally important position that intellectuals and intellectual ideas have held in Central and Eastern Europe” (1993: 193).

The case of Bulgaria thus seems to confirm Parkin’s universalistic predictions, even though there are a number of serious problems plaguing the fit between theory and empirical reality. To begin, it is empirically questionable whether the national intelligentsia was economically dominant under Communism. Neither the intelligentsia as a whole nor even the technico-managerial part of it (that is, engineers, economists, production managers and other specialists) was an authentic ownership class the way that the bourgeoisie is under capitalism. Moreover, since access to elite status was under the control of the top leadership, the leading managerial and business cadres were all members of the governing party-elite.

As part of the Communist nomenklatura responsible for political decision-making and economic management, the technocrats could hardly be regarded as a separate social group distinct from and/or opposed to the party-state bureaucracy. For reasons of definitional scope and functional equivalence, this particular group could be included in the national intelligentsia only under a comprehensive definition broadly based on educational status and professional qualifications. Members of the managerial and business elite played only a marginal role in the democratic revolution (an empirical finding at variance with the earlier transitions of Southern Europe and Latin America). Therefore, the intelligentsia as a broad- based, well-educated middle class cannot be called economically dominant under

Commimism, notwithstanding the directive function of the in the production, exchange and distribution of economic resources. Nor has the intelligentsia become politically and socioeconomically dominant under the new, democratic-capitalist order (as

Parkin’s predictive model would lead us to anticipate), even though the top layer o f this

196 heterogenous social group is again prominent in government and business circles. In fact, compared to pre-transition times, a substantial section of this formerly large middle-class stratum is now socially marginalized and materially proletarianized. Bulgaria’s economic crisis in particular is responsible for the intelligentsia’s sharp decline in economic status, social prestige, public credibility and even moral authority (see Daskalov 1996: 81-84).

Such discrepancies between the conceptual-theoretical and the empirical- observational notwithstanding, the explanatory power and predictive value ofParkin s model lie in probing and highlighting the macropolitical consequences of the rise of a strategic social group such as the new intelligentsia, which has become the main agent of democratic change in the formerly state-socialist societies. Barrington Moore’s famous dictum “no bourgeois, no democracy” appears to be contradicted in our case, for the bourgeoisie as a property-owning social class did not exist in pre-transition Bulgaria or anywhere else in the former East bloc. Members of the artistic and cultural intelligentsia, rather than businessmen and technocrats, led the pro-democracy movement from below. Some clarification is obviously needed regarding the relative contribution of the various middle-class groups, particularly the intellectuals, in the process of overthrowing the old regime and bringing about democracy.

Value System Change

As Lipset assumed, any credible explanation about how modernization fosters democracy must be cultural as well as sociostructural. Traditional culture, beliefs and orientations are reshaped by economic progress and changes in social structure.

Socioeconomic development, including industrialization, urbanization, better education, and

197 the global revolution in mass transportation, information and communications, has promoted value transformation among Bulgarians in a more democratic and tolerant direction. The modem, mban and industrialized way of life has led to the gradual replacement of parochial, religious and traditional values by more cosmopolitan, secular-humanist and enlightened views on social and moral issues. According to published survey data, with the exception of the issue of the involvement of women outside the home (which probably reflects a backlash against the massive influx of women into the labor force in recent decades due to economic pressures, rather than any principled opposition to greater participation of women in economic activity), public opinion in Bulgaria is as liberal-progressive as that in the other post-Communist countries or in post-Franco Spain, tending to be strongly atheistic/agnostic, very supportive of abortion rights and, to a lesser extent, of gay rights as well (see

McDonough 1995: 671).

Even more significantly, recent mass surveys on ethnic tolerance suggest that

Bulgarians also tend to be willing to grant ethnic minorities the right to form political organizations, to have parliamentary representation, or even to teach classes in minority languages (see McIntosh and Mac Iver 1993: 14). Such findings contradict the widely- accepted belief that “the commimist states on the whole not only fostered traditional forms of ethnic consciousness but a whole host of traditional attitudes as well, especially with respect to relationships of authority in the family, school, politics, and the workplace”

(Yanos 1995: 155). The lack of any abiding attachment to pre-modem familial values, identities, roles and institutions, revealed by these and other attitudinal data, can have far- reaching political effects. Modernity culture in the form of more enlightened attitudes on ethical, cultural, social and ethnic issues makes people politically more open-minded, liberal

198 and tolerant as well as highly attuned to the ideals of freedom, pluralism and democratic

(McDonough 1995; see also Almond and Verba 1963). Modem attitudes and

value orientations in terms of overcoming the anachronistic residues of traditionalism,

patriarchialism, nationalism and religious superstition are indispensable for realizing the

modem vision of mass democracy.

The weight of the evidence above provides confirmation of the existence of a

positive relationship between the establishment of democracy and the various dimensions

of socioeconomic development. Soviet-type regimes played a positive role as agents of

progress and development, but the gung-ho modemization they were promoting led to

heightened economic, cultural and political expectations among the population, which the

Communist system was unable to fulfill. Bulgarians in particular paid a high price for rapid

economic growth in terms of environmental degradation and sacrificed quality of life. As anticipated by modemization theorists, the state-led developmental process also created a

large, politically and culturally dissatisfied middle class of white-collar employees and

intellectuals, who played a key role in the replacement of the Communist mobilization

system. The Bulgarian case thus seems to support Lipset’s social mobilization theory, especially its emphasis on the pro-democratic role of the middle classes and the long-term political effects of modemization-driven cultural change.

199 CHAPTER 7

MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Many scholars believed that successful regime performance over time is an important

factor which contributes to building and maintaining a “reservoir” of broad-based system support. In their view, political regimes are resilient in the long run only if there is deep popular belief in the effectiveness and legitimacy of their institutions. Sound and effective economic policies in terms of delivering what people want and expect from the government are an important dimension of regime performance and efficacy (Diamond 1992).

Performance is understood as the output o f state services that deliver economic and social benefits to the population and enforce public order (Weil 1989). Regime support in a democracy depends on a balance between citizen demands and state capacity to satisfy such demands by providing the necessary state services (Schiunpeter 1950). If expectations surpass the system’s ability to deliver the expected public goods, the result is a demand overload on the state, which may lead to a rejection of the existing political system. A strong correlation has been found between the successful economic policies of new democratic regimes and their consolidation and persistence (Diamond and Linz 1988). Mass public commitment to democracy is facilitated by a generally successful performance of the fledgling democratic system in meeting basic human wants and needs. Sustained economic growth, attenuation of poverty, and high rates of upward social mobility were instrumental

200 in legitimating the postwar democratic order in West Germany, Japan and Italy, even though initial levels of popular support were relatively low (e.g., less than a quarter of West

Germans expressed unconditional support for the new system well into the 1950s). Not only does economic growth contribute to the acceptance and entrenchment of a new democratic regime, but the more robust the national economy, the more likely is democracy to take root

(Przeworski et al. 1996: 42; Londregan and Poole 1990). From this perspective, system legitimacy is seen as a function of regime performance. Regime ineffectiveness

(unsatisfactory output) leads, after some time, to system illegitimacy (rejection of the system).

Historically, steady and broad improvement in economic conditions has contributed to the endorsement and consolidation of new democracies, whereas periods of economic distress have endangered long-term regime stability and survival. Depressed living standards and downward social mobility accompanying prolonged economic crisis and stagnation can easily radicalize large groups of the population, especially those least advantaged by the existing order of things. A crisis represents an input overload of the system, resulting either from escalating demands for more public services or from reduced state capacity to meet popular demands and expectations (Schumpeter 1950). That there is a relation between economic distress and extremist politics is not necessarily the logical consequence, but it is quite clearly the empirical reality. For instance, severe economic decline contributed to regime decay and replacement in Weimar Germany, , Bulgaria and a number of other semi-democracies of the interwar period.

Sound economic performance is especially important for democratic survival in countries in transition to democratic rule. The fragility of neodemocracies stems from their

201 greater vulnerability to serious economic crises. Even under more favorable circumstances, the consolidation of a new democracy, complete with established democratic institutions and procedures, constitutionalism and the rule of law, is difficult to achieve. In the countries of the former Soviet bloc, this task is further complicated by the so-called problem of

"simultaneity”: the new democracies have been restructuring their political and legal systems at the same time they are marketizing and privatizing their economies ex nihilo, plunging reluctant populations into an alien world of economic self-reliance, monetized interpersonal relations and negative social solidarity. As McFaul notes, “Transitions involving only the altering of political institutions are more likely to succeed than situations in which political, economic, and social institutions are all in flux at the same time” (1999: 12).

By contrast, a less deterministic argument has been made to the effect that democracies depend far less on performance legitimation than non-democratic regimes, presumably because when “the choice is between a fi’ee and an imfi'ee political regime, political beliefs are of primary importance” (Rose 1996a: 20). Even a structuralist like Lipset has cautioned against an overly heavy emphasis on socioeconomic determinism, arguing that once political democracy has been established, it “may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form” (1960: 28). This view draws on the analytical distinction between “diffuse” (imconditional) system support and “instrumental” (specific) evaluations of regime performance (Easton 1965). Leonardo Morlino and Jose Montero

(1995) have distinguished between democratic legitimacy and regime efficacy, separating the desirability of democracy in the abstract from perceptions of its current performance.

Poor regime performance has been linked to declining public confidence in institutions but not to a weakening of popular support for democracy (Weil 1989). In other words,

202 democratic legitimacy is seen as independent from the realities or perceptions of system performance.

The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe are sometimes cited as evidence supporting this more optimistic view. The transitions to capitalist democracy have been plagued by painful economic, social, demographic and other problems, including the growing incapacity of the state to dispense the most basic public goods and services, on which civilized society depends for its survival. Many of the transiting countries are mired in socioeconomic crisis; unemployment and inflation remain dangerously high; social dislocation, poverty, corruption, and street crime are rampant across the region, justifying the ofl-heard pejorative reference to a “Wild East.” The IMF-ordered process of shutting down money-losing economic units while privatizing the few profitable ones has created severe hardship among dispirited populations. Socioeconomic inequality, seen by Jean-

Jacques Rousseau and J. S. Mill as the main barrier to democracy and political equality, is reaching destabilizing proportions. The social strains brought on by radical change and economic chaos have embittered long-suffering populations and polarized party politics without leading to political extremism and democratic breakdown. High levels of dissatisfaction with the gloomy present do not necessarily signify a desire for the return of old-style Communism but are seen as an expression of mass-level disillusionment with the economic policy outputs of the government of the day (Rose and Haerpfer 1994b, 1996). As the idealists suggest, incomplete mass-level support for the new democratic regimes may be attributed more to the lackluster performance of the post-Communist economies than to any loss of popular enthusiasm for democratic politics. Since the average East European has been found to approve of the new political regime while sharply disapproving of the new

203 economic system, the “positive attachment to new democratic regimes is not economically determined” (Rose 1996b: 103). In a nutshell, poor economic conditions may not spell doom for democracy.

While this idealist argument is intuitively plausible and intellectually appealing, it remains an open question for how long such punishing transitional costs will be tolerated by mass publics accustomed to the authoritarian welfarism and egalitarianism of the Communist past. As Adam Przeworski (1991: ch. 4) has predicted, market reforms will inevitably provoke a political backlash once the population has experienced dramatic declines in incomes, living standards and consumption levels. Charles Gati (1996) notes that such problems have already eroded public confidence in democracy and market reforms, threatening long-term regime stability and survival. He refers to recent mass opinion surveys, in which respondent evaluations of the Communist period are far more positive than at the start of the transition, whereas the present is increasingly associated with lack of efficacy and dramatic economic failure. According to Mason, Orkeny and Sidorenko-Stephenson ( 1997:

16), a pattern of fond memories of the Communist era is emerging in virtually all answers to questions involving retrospective evaluations of personal and national economic situations, the respondent’s own social status, and even the political system. Gati draws the pessimistic conclusion that the prevailing public mood in most post-Communist countries points to “imsuccessflil transitions to democracy” (1996: 169). As economic determinists argue, protracted performance crisis may doom democracy, after all.

On the basis of current macroeconomic evidence presented in this study, it is evident that only a minority of Bulgarians have benefitted fi-om the transition to democracy. By nearly every macroeconomic standard, Bulgaria is in a far worse shape now than in the

204 Communist past. The short-term effects of market-oriented reforms have been economic stagnation, unemployment, inflation, increasing inequality of incomes, widespread impoverishment and even malnutrition (see Pickles 1993; Angelov 1996; Bristow 1996;

Crampton 1996; Gareth 1996; Ivanov 1996). The change o f economic system has broadened the scope of the transitional agenda, adding another point of friction between the contending political forces. If anything, the simultaneous move toward capitalism has hurt rather than helped the transition to political democracy. Poor governance is at least partly responsible for the profound economic crisis. Instead of rescuing the battered economy, political parties and successive party governments have squandered years by bickering over economic strategies and failing to agree on the pace or extent of reforms. The gravity of current economic and social problems has made the forging of political consensus in Bulgaria even harder to achieve, whether as a consequence or as a cause. Political polarization and government paralysis have been aggravated by the tensions of economic change. At the outset of Bulgaria’s economically troubled transition. President Zhelev underlined the instrumental linkage between economic performance and regime survival:

The country is in a transitional period, rendering its economy extremely unstable. We are in a deep economic crisis which makes the connection between politics and much closer and far more direct. (Zhelev 1995: 47)

Yet the new system’s capacity to withstand the severe economic slump without a regime collapse has provided more confidence in the long-nm durability of democracy.

The Bulgarian case is therefore ideal for probing and illuminating the hypothesized effects of poor macroeconomic conditions on regime legitimacy and survival. From the standpoint of structural theory, Bulgaria is an intriguing puzzle, given the fact that a

205 catastrophic economic downturn has failed to destroy support for the new pluralist order. But could a case of precarious democratic survival be seen as confirming the idealist hypothesis, given the population’s dissatisfaction with democracy, shrinking confidence in the new institutions, nostalgia for the Communist past, and other negative empirical indicators?

While the evidence from a single-country case is by itself insufficient to settle the theoretical dispute between structuralists and idealists, the specific contribution of this chapter is to cast some additional empirical light on the issues under investigation.

In view of the available empirical evidence, the intellectually more plausible structuralist theory appears to be less satisfactory as a scientific explanation of post-

Communist realities. The weight of the Bulgarian evidence fails to support the materialist argument that system legitimacy depends on regime effectiveness and that socioeconomic conditions determine mass-level political attitudes. While the economic performance deficit of disastrous proportions has become a source of widespread popular dissatisfaction potentially threatening long-term regime survival, it has not led to democratic backsliding and collapse. In spite of the economic fiasco, Bulgaria’s democratic regime remains capable of eliciting popular loyalty to its political features.

The Socioeconomic Crisis

Before investigating the subjective evaluations of regime performance, it is necessary to examine in some depth Bulgaria’s objective socioeconomic conditions, employing as empirical indicators levels of real GNP growth, industrial production, unemployment, inflation, and other commonly tested economic indices. What the available empirical evidence will show is a dramatically weakened state capacity to deliver expected services

206 and benefits that could not but severely disappoint the heightened expectations of the population at the start of the transition.

It would be no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria’s economic crisis is assuming the scale of a national catastrophe. Due to the depth of the economy’s downturn, the country is faced with a daunting mix of problems. Production decline is observed in virtually all sectors of the economy, making the crisis appear all-pervasive and systemic. There is an accelerating process of deindustrialization in a country, which until recently was regarded together with

Czechoslovakia as the most industrialized in Eastern Europe (see Bristow 1996: x). The process of building a market economy has proven to be economically disruptive and socially divisive; organized crime, official corruption, poverty and glaring income disparities are rampant. Its dilapidated, underfunded infi-astructure and aging housing stock are crumbling.

Its once enviable social safety-net system is falling apart. With the introduction of an IMF- prescribed currency board on 1 July 1997, the financial situation has stabilized, but Bulgaria can no longer hope to solve its economic problems by simply printing more money or using the Keynesian stimulative policy of large budget deficits. Bulgarians are confronting what

Przeworski has described as “the all too normal problems of the economics, the politics, and the culture of poor capitalism” (1991: 191), painfully familiar to many crisis-ridden Third

World nations. As Huntington (1991) points out, democracy is a guarantee against political tyranny but not necessarily against economic failure.

There are many reasons for this dramatic economic decline, the more important of which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Because of its past overreliance on

East-bloc markets, Bulgaria’s economy has been in a state of near collapse since 1990.

Although its macroeconomic problems are roughly similar in nature to those afflicting all

207 post-Communist countries, Bulgaria has suffered more than the rest from the dissolution of

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991. Some 84% of its foreign trade in 1989 was conducted with CMEA partners—a proportion higher than any of the other former members. Most of the traditional export markets for Bulgarian industry and agriculture evaporated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the CMEA. Minassian reports that Bulgaria’s total trade turnover in 1991 (in constant US dollars) fell threefold compared to 1989, mostly as a result of the precipitous drop in trade with the ex-Soviet bloc countries. The switch to hard currency pricing and the demise of the CMEA reduced

Bulgaria’s GNP by 20% in 1991, compared to 7-8% in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and just 3% in Poland (Minassian 1994). According to the Union of Bulgarian Industry (UBI),

Bulgaria’s exports totaled $4,890 million in 1996, compared to $13,434 million in 1990.

Goods worth $13,435 million were imported in 1990, but by 1996 imports had fallen to

$5,074 million (BTA in English, November 6, 1997).

The collapse of the post-Soviet economy has been especially damaging to Bulgaria, since more than half of its foreign trade until 1989 was with the Soviet Union. The Russians have drastically reduced all foreign imports with calamitous consequences for Bulgarian producers who lost lucrative former markets in Russia. While Bulgarian exports to the USSR equaled $8.6 billion in 1990, exports to all CIS countries were down to $940 million by

1996. Trade turnover between Bulgaria and the Russian Federation fell more than 90%—from

517 billion in 1988 to a mere $1.2 billion in 1998.

Traditional markets in Eastern Europe were deliberately abandoned, as attempts were made to re-orient Bulgaria’s foreign trade towards the West. Commercial links with the Arab world have also suffered, especially after Prime Minister Dimtrov made a controversial visit

208 to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in 1992 (Terzieva-Karayaneva 1995: 35). A typical example of how the new, sharply negative economic environment has adversely affected the

Bulgarian economy is the case of Balkancar, an engineering and metalwork company which was formerly the world’s largest producer of electric fork-lift trucks. The company manufactured 57,784 trucks in 1990, most of which were sold to the USSR. It built over

29,000 in 1991, but less than 20,000 in 1992. After its annual production fell to just 4,891 trucks in 1994, the government has been imsuccessftilly trying to sell it to foreign investors

(Shoemaker 1993: 224; Duma, June 4, 1997). Balkancar’s fate is not different from that of other Bulgarian export-oriented industries that depended heavily on Soviet-bloc markets.

Further substantial losses were incurred by economic embargoes against Iraq and

Libya, both of which owe Bulgaria billions of dollars for past exports, and against

Yugoslavia, an important trading partner whose territory links Bulgaria to vital markets in

Central and Western Europe. Exports dropped especially as a result of the Yugoslav sanctions, which according to some estimates had cost Bulgaria about S8.5 billion between

1992 and 1995 alone. The Bulgarian government has complained that it incurred nearly S1 billion in lost trade, extra transportation costs and ecological damage as a resulting of

NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 (BTA, June 3, 1999).

Bulgaria has also had difficulty financing its huge foreign debt to Western banks and governments, which on a per capita basis is the second highest in the region after Hungary’s

(Engelbrekt 1992). When the Socialist government of Prime Minister Lukanov declared a moratorium on debt service in April 1990, it was cut off from vital access to Western financial markets, making it impossible for this resource-poor country to raise enough credit to pay for critical raw materials and fuels that used to be imported cheaply from the Soviet

209 Union. Although Bulgaria concluded rescheduling agreements with government and commercial creditors at the end of 1994, which reduced the indebtedness level from S12 billion to SI0.4 billion, it is unclear how it will be able to service the foreign debt under the terms set by the London and Paris clubs of creditors. Foreign and internal debts totaled 188% of the GNP in 1994, making Bulgaria the most heavily indebted country in Europe. The foreign debt equaled no less than 76% of Bulgaria’s national income in 1995. As Prof.

Dimiter Ivanov has concluded, “Today there is no doubt that the Bulgarian economy is trapped in a debt crisis” (1996), as a result of which it is in a worse shape financially than any other country in Eastern Europe, except for Albania.

At a time when Bulgarians are sinking deeper in poverty, debt service has contributed to a substantial net outflow of capital. In 1995, for instance, with an estimated trade surplus of only $500 million, the country had to repay $1 billion to foreign creditors (Konstantinova

1996). Bulgaria’s foreign currency reserves are barely sufficient to meet scheduled debt payments without substantial amounts of foreign aid. With no realistic near-term prospect for increasing its exports to raise badly-needed foreign exchange, foreign debt totaled S10.2 billion as o f the end of 1998, according to government figures. In spite of its financial ruin and apparent insolvency, Bulgaria repaid over $1 billion in 1995, $1.26 billion in 1996,51.6 billion in 1997, and nearly $700 million in 1998. Nearly 53% of budget spending in 1996 went to service the foreign and domestic debt, leaving Bulgaria virtually without financial resources and triggering destructive hyperinflation. Interest payments on the foreign and internal debt accounted for 55.9% o f all expenditures in the 1997 budget (BTA, June 20,

1997).

210 The drastic devaluation of the Bulgarian currency (the lev) since 1990 has made the foreign debt burden even heavier to bear, imposing a great strain on the economy. In another sign of Bulgaria’s economic fragility, the foreign exchange rate of its national currency fell from 1.27 lev to a US dollar in 1990 to a historically low level of 3,000 lev/US dollar in

February 1997. In late 1996, Bulgaria’s central bank had to temporarily raise its prime interest rate to a draconian annual rate of 300% in an attempt to restore depositors’ confidence in banking institutions and escape hyperinflation. The Bulgarian currency stabilized at a level of about 1,800-1,900 lev/US dollar after the adoption of the currency board but, according to the National Statistical Institute (NSI), this progress on the inflation front was mainly due to sharply lower per-capita income and a very contracted level of private consumption, which fell by 60% in 1997 compared to the previous year (BTA, May

15, 1997). The imofflcial, black-market rate hovers aroimd 3,400 lev/US dollar. An unintended, though hardly unforeseen consequence of the flxed high exchange rate has been the further collapse of Bulgarian exports, which are now too expensive to compete successfully on international markets.

In spite of earlier hopes of reorienting their foreign trade towards the West.

Bulgarians have gained only limited access to new foreign markets. As in the case of other

East European countries, an association agreement with the (EU) has not lived up to early expectations. The EU has not granted more generous import quotas to the

East Europeans out of fear that this would be detrimental to the competitiveness of its South

European members. For Bulgaria, which must earn large amounts of hard currency to pay off its foreign debt, foreign trade barriers present a formidable obstacle to its financial recovery. At the same time, the abrupt removal of all tariffs on Western imports, as

211 advocated by foreign advisers, has flooded the domestic market with cheap imported goods which wiped out the national industry.

Although its investment laws were significantly liberalized in 1992, Bulgaria has been less than successful in attracting Western capital (Engelbrekt 1993; Marinov and

Marinova 1997). Although the coimtry has ptusued a policy of opening its domestic market to the outside world—among other things, it made its currency fully convertible in 1990, joined the IMF and the World Bank in September 1990, signed a cooperation agreement with the European Association (EFT A) in 1992, became an associated member of the

Eli in March 1993, and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 1996—there have been relatively few direct foreign investments. The much anticipated flow of Western capital has not materialized, perhaps because foreign investors prefer the more attractive and better known markets in Central Europe (Engelbrekt 1994).

Between 1990 and 1993, Bulgaria received less than 2% of all foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe, even though it has about 10% of the population of the region

(Minassian 1994). Discouraged by inconsistent regulation, cumbersome bureaucracy and organized crime, its total foreign investment through 1998 was only $2.02 billion, even though Bulgaria’s 1992 Foreign Investment Law allowing for full foreign ownership and unlimited repatriation of profits is among the most liberal and market-oriented legislation in the region. Germany and Belgiiun are the biggest foreign investors in Bulgaria, providing half of its foreign capital. Nor has the country received significant amounts of assistance from foreign governments and international funding institutions. Comparatively speaking,

Bulgaria has received less international economic support than most other post-Communist countries in Europe. The contrast is even sharper when one considers the massive infusions

212 of international financial assistance to the earlier democratizing regimes in Southern Europe

(for example, Greece alone has received well over $40 billion in direct EU aid since 1974).

Former Socialist prime minister Videnov complained that “the losses caused by sanctions

and the lack of adequate international assistance increasingly undermines democratic development and economic reform” {Eurowatch, May 22, 1995). The social costs of the economic crisis have been made even worse by the conditionality of foreign lending. The structural-adjustment loans that Bulgaria has received from the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Recovery and Development (EBRD) are contingent on introducing painful neo-liberal reforms at home. The government has been forced to speed up politically destabilizing measures, such as closing money-losing industries and eliminating critical subsidies for food, housing, energy and transport, on which a large majority of Bulgarians rely for survival. Most of these new loans have been used to repay foreign governments and banks for credits lavished on the Zhivkov regime (Prodev 1996).

Bulgaria applied for full EU membership in 1995 and was included in the second wave of East European nations invited to EU accession talks, but its entry is probably many years away. One of the admission criteria is the ability to cope with competition in the EU markets but, according to the European Commission, in the medium term Bulgaria will not be able to compete successfully with the EU economies (BTA in English, November 6,

1997). A report of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences’ Economics Institute predicts that

Bulgaria will have a GNP in 2010 equal in size to what it had in 1990 and will be unable to meet economic conditions for EU membership before 2030 “at best.” In strictly economic terms, the international context of the Bulgarian transition has been less than favorable, further contributing to the dominant downward trend of aggregate economic indicators.

213 Bulgaria’s transition to a mailcet economy has also been hindered by chronic

executive instability. Each of the post-Zhivkov cabinets has been short-lived and internally

divided over the extent and pace of market reforms. Another reason for the severe crisis of

regime performance is the political elite’s reluctance to adopt the unpopular reforms needed

to solve the economic crisis—a failure of leadership resulting mainly from fear of short-term

political consequences such as the loss of electoral support. Economic collapse and chaos

have been aggravated by the policy battles over economic reform and other issues between

the two major political forces in the coimtry, the BSP and the UDF. In office, however, both

parties have avoided for partisan reasons implementing painful austerity measures that could

hurt their popularity with the voters. The search for quick fixes in lieu of sound economic policies has further exacerbated the slump in the economy.

The old Communist elite has cynically used economic reform and privatization as an opportunity to serve its own private economic interests rather than as a means of promoting and strengthening democracy (Dobrev 1998: 203). At the same time, the lack of economic

realism, pragmatism, and hands-on experience among the anti-Communist reformers has resulted in a lot of wishful thinking, utopian schemes and uncritical emulation of foreign economic models. A poorly-conceived, irrational economic policy has led to permanent damage to the country’s economic infrastructure and future growth prospects. According to one of Bulgaria’s best economists, total discontinuity with the old regime’s macroeconomic policies has been sought on purely ideological, non economic grounds:

Desire for radical change and manifestation of determination, on the one hand, along with fear of possible blocking of the transition on the other, pushed the new ruling elite to start almost blindly on the hazardous road of experimentation. (Minassian 1994: 345)

214 A number of Bulgarian politicians have criticized the ideologically dogmatic monetarism of

all post-Communist governments. In the words of Atanas Moskov, the octogenarian honorary chairman of the Social Democratic Party, the result of such misguided ideological zeal is that

So far economic reforms have been confined to the abdication of the state and the scandalous plunder of public wealth. One would think that the goal of the reforms was to help criminals legitimize their booty or allow artful speculators to use the breakdown in law and order in order to amass their fortunes. The Bulgarian population is now divided between the few who are outrageously rich and the many who are dirt poor. In this sense, we have shown a lack of morality like no other East European country. In its legislative work, the current National Assembly has enacted laws to enrich a few individuals or relatively small groups of individuals, which can only discredit our country in the eyes of the world. The Restitution Law, the recently passed Law on Privatization and other similar laws are written in such a way as to benefit only small circles of persons. Thanks to such legislation, reform has bogged down into the quagmire of narrow private interests and corruption. That is why I see nothing but terrible years ahead for ordinary Bulgarians. (Interview with Dr. Moskov in Svoboden Narod, May 15-21, 1992)

Even more damaging to the national economy has been the unprincipled struggle for political office among power-hungry politicians, who in their pursuit of private profit and privilege have ignored or sacrificed Bulgaria’s economic needs and interests. The UDF has emphasized the restitution of previous owners, which has taken precedence over the equitable privatization of the economy. The 1992 Restitution Act, adopted with the aim of returning property nationalized by the Communist regime in the late 1940s, is so ill- conceived that, as one foreign writer notes, “to this day nobody knows who owns what” in

Bulgaria (Sikorski 1996). Foreign investors have been reluctant to invest in properties whose legal title is still in dispute. Large-scale privatization has been sitting on the back-bumer, while state regulation and intervention in the economy, including the use of economic

215 planning and forecasting, has been completely abandoned. The cabinet of Prime Minister

Dimitrov even refused to draft a government economic program in 1991, relying instead on the “magic of the marketplace” of classical despite the still dominant public ownership over the Bulgarian economy. The absence of any clear-headed project for the economic transition has produced only confusion, chaos and in the economic realm.

Nor has the new reformist elite shown itself to be competent or capable of handling the economy, mainly because

...in times of revolutionary changes, the shifting of social layers brings to the forefront of social discontent a number of people of rebel nature but in most cases without the professional competence and skills required. As a rule enthusiasm prevails over sound professional thinking. Logically then emotions dominate over reason—with all the possible implications. Proposals are assessed more on the strength of their source of origin and support than on the grounds of their usefulness for the country’s economy and economic transition (Minassian 1994: 343).

Many of the anti-Communists, who assumed power, share an anti-industrial and even anti- growth ideology, which has led them to renounce the previous regime’s modernization and industrialization strategy. Anti-Communist radicals in the government have also been more concerned with barring members of the old nomenklatura class from private business opportunities than with building a new privatized market economy (Bell 1997: 379).

The antistatist bias of Bulgarian reformers is another destabilizing factor which must be added to the long list of leadership failures. As Przeworski writes, “without an effective state, there can be no democracy and no markets” (1995: 11). With the fall of Communism, the erstwhile glorification of the party-state has been replaced by anti-state nihilism, resulting in a deepening crisis o f all state institutions and ultimately in the breakdown of state capacity and general ungovernability. Doncho Konakchiev, a deputy prime minister in the ill-fated

216 Videnov cabinet, complained that the Socialists found it impossible to curb crime, economic mismanagement and official corruption due to the eroded effectiveness of the Bulgarian state:

Restoring the collapsed state has proven to be far more difficult than restoring the collapsed economy. New grapevines will grow in 3-4 years, even lost foreign markets could be regained in 3-4 years, but once the state collapses, it cannot simply be rebuilt in 3, 4 or 5 years. What we have inherited as a legacy from the previous cabinets is not a state, but only a marked territory—a fenceless yard, so to speak—in which everyone can do as they please. When law and order have broken down, when all respect for society has disappeared, it is exceedingly hard to curb crime and guarantee public safety. (Interview with Konakchiev in Duma, January 31, 1996: 3)

The post-Communist state has drastically abandoned the management and regulation of the national economy. But it is clear now that the state should not have given up its regulatory role in the sphere of economic relations, especially since market institutions designed to replace the state have not been built or firmly established in Bulgaria. The crisis of the state has damaged agriculture, banking, transportation and above all the industrial sector, which badly needs state support in the form of investments, public subsidies and protectionist tariffs. The resulting vacuum has been filled by criminal structures (Dobrev

1998: 89). In the absence of strong, competent and capable state leadership backed by sound professional guidance and financial backing from abroad, ’s " of the market” has remained mostly invisible in Bulgaria, while high-level malfeasance and omnipresent economic crime in the form of theft on the job, official graft and institutionalized corruption have filled the void. The inevitable result has been a very weakened, “criminalized” state (Dobrev 1998:198-199). The collapse of state effectiveness and the rise of a corrupt “crony” capitalism have been catastrophic for the Bulgarian

217 economy, even though the incidence of crime and is not nearly as bad as in many other post-Communist countries.

As state capacity to enforce law and order continues to decline and organized crime tightens its grip on the economy, it is virtually impossible to distinguish legitimate from criminal enterprise. While official statistics are useless indicators of shadow-economy operations, organized crime activities, according to the Bulgarian central bank, amounted to

S9.5 billion in 1994, that is, equal to Bulgaria’s entire GNP {Trud, May 8, 1995).

Glamorized figures from the criminal underworld have been allowed to grow rich and powerful and out of reach of justice. Nearly every private business is forced to pay protection money to racketeers and bribes to corrupt policemen, judges and bureaucrats. Many private companies and banks were set up only to launder “dirty money” from drug and arms trafficking, extortion, protection rackets, gambling, prostitution, copyright piracy, and all kinds of illegal trade, especially with countries that are under U.N. embargo. To give just one example, Bulgaria has the reputation of being the world’s second largest producer (after

China) of pirated video cassettes and audio compact discs. Despite the threat of economic sanctions from the EU and the US, Bulgarian state-owned and private companies illegally copied more than 45 million CDs in 1997 alone, an amount that exceeds many times the needs of the domestic market.

An opinion poll conducted by the Center for Democratic Studies suggests widespread corruption in Bulgaria. As many as 86% of the respondents said bribes are essential to obtain proper medical treatment, 74% said bribes are regularly accepted by customs officials, and

63% named judges and 56% police officers as bribe-takers. Some 57% of the respondents believe “it is a waste o f time” to report cases o f corruption, while 31% said paying bribes

218 was “bad, but unavoidable” (BTA, February 2, 1998). Official corruption and the criminalization of the economy have become a very serious problem deeply affecting regime performance and legitimation that is not limited to Bulgaria.

From Crisis to Catastrophe

Although there are significant error margins in published economic statistics, available data provide a fairly good idea of the aggregate attributes of the economy as a whole. According to the National Statistical Institute (1995), from 1989 to 1994 Bulgaria’s

GNP dropped by 44%, industrial output and total exports fell by 50%, and agricultural production by more than 35%—a fall in production aggregates far worse than the 1929-193 3 economic depression which paved the way for the military coup d’etat of 19 May 1934. In the same period, the real per capita income of the population decreased by 57%. The GNP expanded by just 1.8% in 1994, but even that modest figure was considered encouraging because the national economy had been steadily shrinking for the previous five years (see

Table 7.1).

The economy grew further by 2.1% to about $9.9 billion in 1995, but the socioeconomic situation began to deteriorate again in the fall of 1996, when the Bulgarian economy was plunged into the deepest economic crisis faced by any East European member of the defunct Soviet bloc (Wyzan 1997). National income fell by 9% in 1996—a drop of

1.1% in industry, 13.1% in agriculture, 13% in transport, 20% in construction, 9.3% in domestic trade (BTA, January 30, 1997). Starved for cash needed to meet foreign debt obligations, the ruling Socialists had gambled by allowing large grain exports in 1995, when world market prices were high, although grain was already in short supply at home because

219 of poor harvests. Contrary to the government’s rosy expectations, prices on the world market remained high, while the domestic grain harvest in 1996 was record low. In 1995. some

827,280 tons of grain were exported, earning 7.14 billion leva ($129.3 million at the 1995 average exchange rate of 67.2 leva to SI), but a year later 198,933 tons had to be urgently imported, costing 6.46 billion leva due to a less favorable exchange rate {Trud, March 26,

1997). This resulted in the depletion of state grain reserves and Bulgaria was hit by a severe grain crisis in 1996, causing a bread shortage on the domestic market. Long bread lines appeared in the cities, something unheard of in Communist times. The grain and bread shortages contributed to mass mobilization by the anti-govemment opposition. The wave of strikes, mass demonstrations and other social protests culminated in the nationwide unrest of January-February 1997 and the overthrow of the discredited BSP cabinet of Prime

Minister Videnov.

The 1997 figures were also sharply negative, as the GNP declined by 7.4%. Only in

1998 did the economy show some signs of recovery. According to official statistics, the

GNP grew by 3.5% and the inflation rate was down to just 1.0%—from the statistical point of view, the best year for Bulgaria since the transition to a market economy began.

According to an IMF report (1994), Bulgaria’s estimated per-capita income at market exchange rates (MER) fell to $1,160 by 1993. The EBRD estimated its purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted per-capita income at $3,730, but even this significantly higher statistic represents a 50% decline since 1988. Per-capita income has slumped even more drastically

(in some estimates, by some 60%) after domestic conditions worsened sharply during the winter of 1996-1997, when the country was hit by a new economic crisis. By mid-1997, monthly wages in the budget sector averaged about $64, compared to $80 in strife-ravaged

220 Albania and $136 in NATO-belleagered Yugoslavia. In spite of the financial stabilization achieved under ’s cabinet, estimates for 1998 released by the National Statistical

Institute show a MER per capita GNP of only $1,130{Kontinent, June 13, 1998).

Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Real GNP growth -0.5 -11.8 -23.3 -7.3 -2.4 Industrial output 0.0 -17.6 -27.3 -22.0 -10.9 Inflation rate 6.4 26.3 338.5 91.3 79.6 Unemployment rate 0.0 1.6 7.5 14.8 16.6 Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Real GNP growth 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -7.8 3.5 Industrial output 4.5 7.0 -1.1 -7.0 -1.0 Inflation rate 121.9 32.9 310.8 578.5 1.0 Unemployment rate 12.8 10.8 14.7 15.6 16.5

Table 7.1 : Major economic indicators, 1989-1998 (percentage change over previous year)

Source: Adapted from data provided by Bulgaria’s National Statistical Institute ( 1990-1999).

One reason for depressed living standards is the drastic drop in the number of full­ time employees and a corresponding increase in the number of laid-off and retired people.

Many of the imemployed have been forced into early retirement, which often means sinking deeper into poverty. The level of employment fell by almost 30% between 1989 and 1994—a decrease of substantial and destabilizing magnitude. Unemployment reached a peak in

February 2000, when 657,095 Bulgarians (17.19% of the total labor force) were out of a job

221 {Duma, March 1, 2000), compared to only 31,030 in August 1990. To bring the jobless rate down, the government has spent a large portion of national budgets (39% in 1995) to keep loss-making industrial enterprises afloat (BTA in English, December 13, 1996).

Annual inflation, which poses a particularly serious threat to democratic stability

(see Przeworski et al. 1996:42), rages at double and triple digits (see Table 7.1 ). At 310.8% in 1996 and 578.6% in 1997, Bulgaria’s inflation rate was the highest in Eastern Europe. The prices of goods and services increased more than 23-fold from 1989 to 1994. Inflation had a devastating impact on the income and bank savings of the population, which sustained great financial losses and lost confidence in the national currency. With the sharp fall in the exchange rate of the in early 1997, hyperinflation was added to the list of ills plaguing the post-Communist economy.

Individual or egocentric evaluation of one’s household situation is equally revealing.

Collecting data at the level of familial economic circumstances is methodologically important because this helps the researcher to avoid the “ecological fallacy’’ of using national aggregate data, such as per-capita GNP, to make inferences about household income distributions. In poll after poll, absolute majorities of East Europeans report that their family’s economic condition is much worse now than it was in the pre-transition past. In the

New Democracy Barometer V (Rose and Haerpfer 1998), 60% of the Bulgarian respondents felt that their households had been financially better offbefore the transition, while only 22% say they were worse off. And nearly a third (32%) claimed that their financial situation had been “a lot better’’ under Communism, a percentage greater than in any of the other selected countries in the survey, except for Hungary.

222 The Social Costs

These cataclysmic economic changes have been accompanied by a host of demoralizing social problems such as an escalation of crime, corruption, deteriorating health statistics, drug addiction, increased income inequality and widespread poverty, including the dramatic impoverishment of entire social groups (see Hyder 1995). An acute social crisis is the best indicator of an overloaded state. Addressing the 1995 World Summit for Social

Development in Copenhagen, then President Zhelev described the socioeconomic situation in Bulgaria as “catastrophic” and marked by mass-scale misery, deprivation, despair, uncertainty and pervasive fear of the future (BTA in English, March 12, 1995).

The transition to market economy has sharply increased income differentials among the Bulgarian population. The socioeconomic gap is widening between thenouveau riche class of wealthy businessmen and elected politicians, on the one hand, and disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, disabled persons, pensioners, and young families with children, on the other (Engelbrekt 1994). The transition period has seen the unbridled self­ enrichment of a tiny minority and deprivation and pain for the vast majority of the people.

In Bulgaria, as in the case of all other post-Communist countries, there is growing economic stratification compared with the pre-transition period—what Angelov (1996) has described as the concentration of wealth in the hands of the top 5-7% of the population and penury among the bottom 50-60%. If this process of economic differentiation and immiserization continues, it will lead to a destabilizing social polarization, further reinforcing existing political, ethnic and other divisions in Bulgarian society.

The Gini index is the most commonly used statistical measure of the distribution of wealth, giving each nation an “inequality” ranking according to how national income is

223 spread among the population. It is scaled from 0 (perfect economic equality where wealth is distributed evenly among all citizens) to 100 (a hypothetical case where all national income is concentrated in the hands of a single family). World Bank data indicate that inequality in Bulgaria, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has risen more sharply than in most other transitional economies, as national wealth is increasingly concentrated in the top quintile o f richest households (Wyzan 1996). This glaring income and property stratification of the population has turned into a precondition for social and political polarization in a country that until recently was socially undifferentiated. One of the unintended side effects of the transition is that Bulgaria’s once large middle class is rapidly shrinking (see Kostov

1994). As a social indicator, significant and deepening income disparities are directly linked to the shrinking of the middle class and the material pauperization of a majority of the population—factors which may undermine democratic legitimacy and stability. Countries with lower growth of income inequality, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and

Slovenia, have had a less stressful transition than countries where social differentials have risen more sharply, such as Bulgaria, Russia or . Should the growing class-based cleavages become even deeper and more pervasive in Bulgarian society, this could hamper the process of political bargaining within a pluralistic framework and threaten elite-mass conflict that would be severely disruptive to the regime.

Following the precipitous decline in economic output in terms of GNP, Bulgaria’s living standards have plummeted and poverty has increased. Mahatma Ghandi used to describe poverty as the worst form of violence. A third of all Bulgarian households were classified as poor in 1993, compared with only 2% in 1987-1988 (Wyzan 1996). According to more recent household survey data, nearly three-fourths of the population now lives below

224 the official poverty line. The sense of absolute and relative deprivation among the newly impoverished is all the more devastating, given the fact that a majority of them have never previously experienced poverty. Podkrepa leader Trenchev (whose wife lives in the U.S.) complains that

Prices in America, where per capita income is above $28,000 per annum, are sometimes actually lower than in Bulgaria, where the annual per capita GNP is around $1,200. Just look at what enormous gap we are talking about— Bulgarian prices are more or less comparable to the average international prices, whereas our remuneration is far below the average living wage in the world. We need radical changes because Bulgarians continue to sink into poverty. The moment is fast approaching when they simply will not be able to afford to live. (Interview with Konstantin Trenchev in Duma, July 30. 1998: 5)

Another negative consequence of such widespread impoverishment is the growing incidence of tuberculosis and anaemia, two diseases of poverty and malnutrition believed to have been eradicated in postwar Bulgaria. The number of TB cases has more than doubled since 1990, as 5 out of every 10,000 Bulgarians have been diagnosed with the disease (BTA in English, May 29,1997). The National Center of Hygiene found protein deficiency in 20% of school-age Bulgarians in 1996, an alarming statistic for a country which as recently as

1980 was ranked 5th in daily calorie consumption and 10th in daily protein consumption in the world (see Kurian 1984).

Since annual per-capita GNP is an unreliable empirical indicator of the physical quality of life, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has devised the so-called

Human Development Index (HDl), a measure representing the unweighted average of real purchasing power, life expectancy, literacy and educational level, which has the advantage of greater validity in indicating real levels of socioeconomic development. A country’s mean level of “human development” has been found to better predict its probability of being

225 democratic than its per-capita income (Diamond 1992:102). The annual human development reports published by the UNDP ranked Bulgaria 27th in the world in 1990,33rd in 1991, and

48th in 1994, downgrading its developmental status from a higher-medium-income to a

lower-medium-income country. Bulgaria was ranked 63rd in 1999 among the 190 nations surveyed (UNDP 1999). This drop in HDI ranking is attributable to the sharply lower spending power of the population as well as a decline in life expectancy at birth.

Bulgaria was listed in the 1995 UNDP report as the East European nation with the largest negative population growth. That the country is sharply regressive in demographic terms is due both to a negative reproductive rate and decreased life expectancy. Not only has the Bulgarian population stopped reproducing itself, but average life expectancy has declined by almost four years since the late 1980s, and is now 70.9 years. Men’s life expectancy is only 67.6 years, and women’s is 74.4 years. This evidence is confirmed by recent official statistics issued by Bulgaria’s Statistical Institute. At 8.6 per 1,000 population in 1996

(compared to 14.5 per 1,000 in 1980), Bulgaria has the second lowest birth rate in Europe after . It also has Europe’s second highest mortality rate of 14.0 per 1,000 population.

The natural growth rate of minus 5.4 per 1,000 is a direct result of economic distress. The number of Bulgarians getting married decreased from 7.9 per 1,000 population in 1980 to

4.4 per 1,000 in 1995. Over 150,000 women had an abortion in 1995, while only 71,967 babies were bom. The number of live births fell from 89,134 in 1992 to 72,188 in 1996. In

1998, that number fell further to only a half of the 1996 level {Pari, July 29, 1999). As a result, the number of first graders has dropped by 194,200 or 13.8% since 1990. The population replacement rate for 1996 was 0.58, which is far below the “fertility replacement

226 level” (two children bom per woman) necessary to prevent further population losses (BTA

in English, May 29, 1997).

A total o f650,000 mostly young people emigrated from Bulgaria between 1989 and

1996 (BTA in English, July 10, 1997). In 1998 alone, 2.5 million Bulgarians applied to

emigrate to the U.S. (Standart, October 25, 1999). As a consequence of the prevailing

demographic trends, the current population of 8.349 million (compared to about 9 million

in 1988) is expected to fall to 7.5 million in the year 2010 and to between 6.9 and 7.1 million

in the year 2020, raising fears about the “physical survival” of the Bulgarian nation

(Shishkov 1997). Population aging is also accelerating, as only about 42% of Bulgarians are

now under thirty years of age, 31% are over fifty, and 14% are over sixty-five. The average

age has increased from 32.4 years in I960 to 38.7 years in 1995. In 1997, Bulgaria had 2.4

million elderly people and only 3.5 million people of active age, which means that there are

70 pensioners for every 100 adults of working age. This “population crisis” threatens to

bankrupt the national social insurance system by the year 2000 (BTA in English, December

29, 1997). The only good news is a small decline in the infant mortality rate from 16.9 per

1,000 live births in 1991 to 14.8 in 1995, which is still twice as large as the EU average.

According to the 1995 UNDP report, 7% of Bulgaria’s adults are “absolutely

illiterate.” The situation is likely to worsen in the future, as there were some 50,000 school dropouts in 1996 (BTA in English, May 29,1997). In 1995, it ranked 20th, two places below

Hungary, in the UNDP index of women’s emancipation, which includes women’s

participation in economic and political decision-making (both were the only ex-Communist

countries among the top 20 nations). By 1999, Bulgaria has lost its international standing

even in this category, because the majority of its new unemployed are women. These and

227 other data leave no doubt that the economic crisis has severely depressed Bulgaria’s level of socio-economic development and standard of living, turning it into a poor, peripheral country. One can only conclude that the transition to a capitalist economy has been nothing short of a disaster, severely eroding living standards and the capacity of the state to deliver expected goods and services, particularly law and order. Bulgaria has thus experienced a regime performance failure that is among the worst on record in post-Communist Europe.

Effect on Regime Support

It is commonly assumed that socioeconomic conditions strongly influence political attitudes. Since democratic rule is supposedly based on the consent of the governed, a secure and stable democracy cannot be established and maintained without the acquiescence, if not strong support, of the mass public. Broad-based, popular support is important to any regime, but it is especially so for the survival of democracy. Popular perceptions of the capacity of the democratic system to meet basic wants and needs through effective management of public policies are particularly important in nascent democracies, where system-supportive attitudes need more time to become entrenched. The perceived effectiveness of new democratic regimes depends on their economic performance and is thus fundamentally related to democratic legitimacy (Morlino and Montero 1995: 232-234). A failure of economic performance calls into question the efficacy of democratic institutions and may escalate into a severe systemic crisis accompanied by social polarization, mass protests, political stalemate, and widespread doubts about the viability of the democratic regime

(Diamond and Linz 1988: 44-46).

228 Charles Gati ( 1996) treats mass dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions as an important dimension of popular attitudes towards the regime and thus directly linked to democratic legitimacy. The dramatic drop in mass-level satisfaction with the new political and economic realities in post-Communist Europe is strongly indicative of serious performance failure and even a legitimation crisis: “under conditions of economic decay, democracy cannot take root” (Gati 1996:181). Gati claims that the sharply declining popular satisfaction with regime performance throughout the region indicates that none of the post-

Communist regimes is consolidated attitudinally. Morlino, Gunther and Torcal, on the other hand, maintain that there is “no justification for equating system satisfaction with legitimacy, or for treating dissatisfaction and disaffection as if they were one and the same thing” ( 1997 :

143). One writer even claims that “performance hardly affects legitimation at all” (Weil

1989: 701).

It would serve little purpose to get involved in the theoretical debate involving the idealist versus the instrumentalist view, but even if the questions raised here remain unresolved, certain facts about the issues relevant to this inquiry are quite clear. Public opinion provides some frame of reference for dealing with the question of the political consequences of the economic crisis. Sociotropic economic evaluations relate to the state of the national economy as a whole; in contrast, egocentric economic assessments are based on the respondents’ personal well-being (Kiewiet 1983; Rose and Haerpfer 1994a). Comparative opinion polls allow for a trend analysis of attitudes across Eastern Europe. The sharply more positive assessments of the pre-transition past point to a growing disenchantment and frustration with the policy outputs of the new system. The highly regarded Central and East

European Barometer surveys confirm that the extent of mass disillusionment with reforms

229 throughout Eastern Europe is significant. In fact, popular discontent has become so fundamental and pervasive that it is compared by Gati (1996: 191) to the anti-regime public sentiments that triggered the fall of Communism.

Mass public endorsement of democracy may be facilitated by the successful economic performance of the democratic system, but the new regime in Bulgaria has so far performed most disastrously in the area of the national economy, raising serious doubts about the merits of the incumbent authorities. Bulgarians have suffered many economic setbacks and severe deprivations ever since the Bulgarian economy was laimched on the road of market reform. As a result, the euphoria associated with the fall of Zhivkov has given way to frustration, disappointment, anger, apathy and even longing for “the good old days” of

Communism. As the New Democracies Barometer surveys show, nostalgia for the political stability, economic security and relative prosperity of the old system has become more widespread than at the beginning of the transition. Zhivkov’s authoritarian rule is remembered by many impoverished Bulgarians as a “golden age” of social tranquility and material progress, when job inseciuity, imemployment, poverty, homelessness, inflation and street crime were almost unknown.

An analysis of attitudinal trends across Eastern Europe confirms the substantial regionwide decline in popular acceptance of the market economy. Judging from the replies of Bulgarian respondents in the New Democracies Barometer surveys, the marketization of the economy has lost its previously considerable popular appeal. From early pro-market enthusiasts, Bulgarians have become one of the more anti-capitalist oriented East European nations. Among older people especially, memories of the pre-transition past tend to be colored by rosy recollections of their own youth—a tendency observed in previous transitions

230 to democracy as well (see Morlino and Montero 1995: 234). Bulgaria’s population is significantly older, compared to that of the other countries in the region (see Popova 1996).

In consequence, a relatively larger number of pensioners, in addition to less well-educated, rural-based people, are adversely affected by market reforms which have eroded their economic security and previously guaranteed living standards. Sociotropic pessimism about the current state of the economy is matched by equally negative egocentric evaluations (see

Rose and Haerpfer 1998).

While an economic collapse would be historically a breeding ground for extremist parties and tendencies, this has not occurred in crisis-ridden Bulgaria. Electoral returns and, to a lesser extent, trends in public opinion show that there is relatively limited, though not insignificant, attitudinal support among the mass public for anti-system extremists. In all recent elections, voting for radical parties and groups has been consistently low. Instead of casting protest votes for fiinge candidates, many disaffected voters have simply withdrawn from electoral politics. But the widespread dissatisfaction with poor regime performance and economic inefficiency has provoked numerous protests, strikes, mass demonstrations, violent confrontations and even street riots, none of which is conducive to democratic rule and civil peace in the country. With the worsening of economic and social conditions, anti- govemment opponents have resorted to more unrestrained and destabilizing forms of protest sometimes in clear violation of the Constitution and the established legal order. Clearly, the sharply negative economic context has exacerbated social tensions and undermined democratic legitimacy to an extent, where no state institution (not even the National

Assembly, the centerpiece and symbol of Bulgaria’s parliamentary democracy) is immune from violent outbursts of popular anger and despair.

231 Such widespread economic and social woes have resulted in sharply lower popular satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. In a 1997 poll, 88.4% of the Bulgarian respondents said that they were dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country (see Table 7.2). This particular survey item is important because it has been specifically designed for the Eurobarometer polls to measure the population’s general support for democracy. The Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 1991 -1997 surveys confirm that the temporal decline in public satisfaction with democracy is much larger in absolute figures in Bulgaria than in any other East European coimtry. Thus, responses in the country with the sharpest decline in the economy, Bulgaria, have elicited the highest level of dissatisfaction with democracy throughout the region. The sharply downward trend in the overall pattern of responses raises the alarming question whether these negative subjective evaluations may imply a Habermasian “crisis of legitimation.” While a failure of public expectations of such fundamental proportions cannot be dismissed as merely a short-term, reversible reaction to the debilitating economic crisis, it must be pointed out that the level of mass dissatisfaction in consolidated democracies such as Spain and Greece is no less significant, as 54.5% of the Spaniards and 71.0% of the Greeks participating in the same survey were dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their own countries (see

Table 7.2).

232 Q: In general, are you satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is working in your country?

Bulgaria Spain Greece Very satisfied 1.5 6.4 4.0 Somewhat satisfied 10.1 39.1 25.1 Not very satisfied 42.8 41.2 52.4 Not at all satisfied 45.6 13.3 18.6

Table 7.2: Level of dissatisfaction with democracy (in percentages)

Source: Comparative National Elections Project survey (1997).

As Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer have pointed out, “sociotropic evaluations are particularly relevant in Eastern Europe, for the problems of transformation are political as well as economic, and the new regime is expected to extricate a country from the difficulties that the old regime created” (1994a: 8). A multiple regression analysis of public dissatisfaction with democracy in Bulgaria confirms this view. The five-variable regression model in T able 7.3 indicates that the sociotropic evaluation of the general economic situation in Bulgaria (independent variable #1) is by far the best predictor of a respondent’s level of satisfaction with the working of democracy, with the highest t-statistic of 13.435 and adjusted R square change of .951 (thus accounting fully for 95.1% of the variability of the dependent variable). This is followed by the political situation in the coimtry (variable #2) and government’s wastefulness (variable #3). By contrast, just 0.1% of the variability of the dependent variable is explained by the egocentric evaluation of one’s household situation

(variable #4), although its t-statistic (4.878) is not insignificant. The last predictor included

233 in the model, extent of corruption in Bulgaria (variable #5), has a very low t-statistic (failing to satisfy the "below -2 or above +2" rule), and contributes absolutely nothing to explained variation (adjusted R square change o f .000).

As already mentioned, Montero, Gunther and Torcal argue that a high level of mass dissatisfaction (such as in the Bulgarian case) should not be taken as a rejection of existing democracy, because “democratic regimes can remain stable even in the face of high levels of dissatisfaction with the system” (1997: 130). In their view, democratic legitimacy is distinct from political disaffection (affective estrangement) as well as from political discontent or dissatisfaction. A factor analysis of attitudes underlying the Bulgarian responses in the 1997 CNEP survey confirms this hypothesis. As can be seen from the factor loadings in Table 7.4, there is a significant overlap among the first four survey items (Was respondent informed about politics; Interest in politics; Frequency of political talk;

Democracy is best system), which form a separate subgroup directly related to democratic legitimacy. This underlying dimension is clearly distinct from those of political discontent

(Economic situation. Political situation. Respondent’s economic situation; Democracy functioning satisfactorily) and political disaffection (People like me have no influence;

Politicians don’t care about people like me; Politics too complicated). Obviously, democratic legitimacy and mass dissatisfaction with democracy are separate dimensions.

While statistically meaningful explanations and estimates of democratic support are always questionable, there is little doubt that mass-level dissatisfaction with the economic policy outputs of the new regime, though widespread, is still distinct from the dimension of democratic legitimacy. This confirms the idealist argument that angst and disenchantment with the current regime should not be misconstrued as total rejection of existing democracy

234 or of democratic norms and values, for Bulgarians continue to favor political democracy as

such, while harboring deep reservations and misgivings about the new economic system and

the performance of the present regime. As Mason (1993) notes, dissatisfaction with

democracy is based on economic factors rather than political ones, reflecting the extreme

deprivations and suffering that the majority of East Europeans have experienced during the

transition.

Dependent Variable: In general, are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in Bulgaria?

Independent Variables: 1. Hou would you describe the present economic situation in Bulgaria? 2. How would you describe the present political situation in the country? 3. Do you think the government wastes the taxpayers’ money? 4. How would you describe your present economic situation? 5. Would you say that there exists corruption in Bulgarian society?

Variable Standardized t Sig. Adjusted R coefficient Beta (p<.05) square change #1 .550 13.435 .0005 .951 #2 .244 7.155 .0005 .003 #3 .088 6.117 .0005 .002 #4 .141 4.878 .0005 .001 #5 -.031 -1.996 .0460 .000

Table 7.3. Multiple regression analysis of mass dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Bulgaria

Source: Comparative National Elections Project survey (1997).

235 As Nancy Bermeo (1994) reminds us, “crisis and breakdown are two distinct

phenomena.” In the Bulgarian context, democratic institutions have so far survived economic

breakdown, widespread dissatisfaction with democracy, and the polarization of popular attitudes. The opinion survey data show that persistently poor performance has not escalated

into a genuine legitimation crisis, nor does it necessarily entail the rejection of existing democracy. A disastrous socioeconomic environment has not destroyed support for the democratic system, implying that the nature of the relationship may not be directly causal.

While objective economic factors are far more important than the idealists would admit, their role in sustaining democracies is not as strongly instrumental and determinative, as purported by the structuralists. There may be another reason why popular discontent with dismal regime performance has not undermined democratic institutions in Bulgaria. According to

Huntington (1991:262-263), dissatisfaction with democratic performance and nostalgia for the old regime have been observed in nearly all previous transitions (e.g., Germany, Japan.

Spain, Greece, Portugal, etc.) and do not necessarily undermine democratic legitimacy. In his opinion, new democracies may become in fact sturdier once people realize that democratic rule is a solution to the problem of tyrarmy but not necessarily to other problems, particularly economic ones.

In spite of sharp partisan differentiation along the traditional Leff-Right axis, all major political parties in Bulgaria, including the economically more conservative UDF (see

Kostov 1992), support a mixed economy, a regulated market, and a modem welfare state for

Bulgaria (Daskalov 1991: 85). Only a few right-wing politicians, following fashionable theories rather than economic practice in the West, oppose a strong government role in the

236 economy and advocate a neoliberal type of free-matlcet individualism and .

Party consensus on the divisive issue of social and economic policy has been a stabilizing factor, reflecting a mass-level preference for a more egalitarian, social-democratic economic model and rejection of an unrestricted free market (e.g., 62.2% of the Bulgarian respondents in the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll, supported a more social-democratic form of capitalism such as practiced in Sweden, while only 12.3% wanted a free-market capitalist economy such as in the U.S. or Japan).

Although party leaders have refused to share the blame for the economic crisis and constantly accuse each other of incompetence, corruption and mismanagement of the economy, none of them has voiced anti-system sentiments or openly engaged in system blame. Few politicians have claimed that either the democratic system or the new capitalist economy are the culprit for the regime’s performance disaster, rather than the incumbents’ ineffectual policies. The economic crisis and rising income inequality have generated a sharp political debate about the socioeconomic costs of the transition, but the population has so far vented its profound disappointment on officeholders rather than on the new system itself.

Voters threw the incumbents out of office in the last three parliamentary elections (1991,

1994, and 1997), while re-electing a popular President Zhelev by a slim margin in the second round of the 1992 election—only to reject him in the primary of the 1996 presidential race.

In repeatedly voting the government out and the opposition into office, Bulgarians have acted in a way that democratic voters are supposed to do in a Downsian classic reaction to performance failiwe (see Himtington 1991:266-267), which has contributed to the prevailing absence of deadly political violence.

237 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Was respondent informed about politics? .843 Interest in politics .830 Frequency of political talk with fiiends .758 Democracy is best system .563 Economic situation of Bulgaria .772 Political situation of Bulgaria .732 Respondent’s economic situation .323 .591 Democracy functioning satisfactorily .530 People like me have no influence .780 Politicians don’t care .760 Politics too complicated .718

Table 7.4. Factor analysis of Bulgarian responses to democratic legitimacy, political discontent and political disaffection questions (Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization)

Source: Comparative National Elections Project survey (1997).

The empirical evidence thus erodes the credibility of the determinist analysis. True, the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy points to a fundamental failure of mass expectations. Sociotropic and egocentric responses in public opinion polls reflect a unmistakable degree of ambiguity and ambivalence about the new economy, which is associated with performance inefRcacy and social decline. Due to dire economic problems and the glaring inability of the new regime to deal effectively with them,

Bulgarians feel a sense of nostalgia for a more secure and stable past. Because of their daily tribulations and their revulsion at the criminalization of the economy and society, public trust

238 in the new pluralistic institutions is dangerously low (see Chapter 3). Nor is belief in democratic legitimacy particularly high. But the empirical evidence also indicates that the structuralists may have exaggerated their arguments for the socioeconomic determination of democracy. The short-term political effects of the sharply negative economic indicators fail to validate the hypothesized instrumental link between performance failure and democratic breakdown. Economic crisis and democratic illegitimacy are not the same thing, after all. In the case of Bulgaria, a most serious performance failiu'e has not led to regime collapse and the overthrow of democratic institutions. Economic stoicism and the relative strength of normative support for democracy per se have enabled Bulgarians to weather thus far the meltdown of the economy. The economic slump has produced widespread social discontent the extent of which may outstrip pre-transition levels, but has not resulted in a regime demise and replacement.

239 CHAPTER 8

ETHNIC DIVISIONS

In non-homogeneous societies, vertical difTerentiation (segmentation) on the basis of ethnicity, race, language or religion often has higher salience for their members than horizontal differentiation on the basis of socioeconomic class or ideology (Bryant 1992).

This may give rise to the so-called “stateness” problems in aspiring new democracies:

...when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state, there is what we call a “stateness” problem. (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16)

Some scholars see “stateness” issues as basic for democratic transition and consolidation

(see Linz and Stepan 1996: 16-37); others view a sense of national unity as the only necessary background condition for achieving stable democracy (see Rustow 1970:350-352;

Schmitter 1994: 65-66; Tarrow 1995: 207). The democratization literature has devoted relatively little theoretical attention to “stateness” problems, because it has focused mostly on transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, “where the challenge of competing within one territorial state, or the question of who was a citizen of the new democratic polity, was on the whole not a salient issue” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). By contrast, in Eastern Europe

where historical resentments run much deeper and existing political frontiers often run through rather than around nations, ethnolinguistic divisions can

240 become explosive and easily overwhelm the usual social cleavages. (Schmitter 1994: 73)

The fall of Communism has been followed by a regionwide drift towards ethnic tensions, right-wing and the most virulent forms of ethno-nationalism and separatism, culminating in the tragic fratricidal wars in Yugoslavia and in parts of what was the USSR.

With some encouragement from abroad, economic breakdown, social turmoil and political

Instability have transformed existing ethnic differences into major ethnic conflicts.

The explosiveness of subcultural divisions is a major problem for ethnically non- homogeneous neodemocracies like Bulgaria. In general, ethnic cleavages pose two major challenges for new democratic regimes, especially in countries, in which the fundamental issue of national boundaries remains unresolved (see Bogdanor 1995 ; Linz and Stepan 1996:

26). The first problem is internal and concerns the democratic principle o f majority rule: where party cleavages are based on fundamental identities and loyalties, the ethnic minority will remain a permanent political minority without a fair share in government. If the is also territorially concentrated (as in the Albanian-majority Kosovo province of

Serbia, the Kurdish-majority Anatolia region in Turkey or in the Rhodope Mountain area in

Bulgaria, populated mostly by ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims known as “Pomaks”). this may give rise to demands for autonomy, partition or secession, which are likely to be resisted by the national majority. A related problem is that ethnic minorities tend to support ethnicity-based parties which, in their view, are more likely to defend the interests of their own ethnic community, often ignoring the parties’ ideology or social affiliation. This prevents the formation of a more stable party system based on existing socioeconomic divisions and on links between political parties and major social groups.

241 The second danger posed by ethnic cleavages is that of irredentism, when a minority in one state is of the same ethnic composition as the majority in another, usually neighboring state. Irredentist claims for territorial revision can question established borders and may provoke serious inter-state conflict. Fear of separatist ethnic minorities and irredentist neigbors may fuel “defensive nationalism” among the , especially if there is a historical legacy of domination of the latter by the former (McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, and

Nolle 1995). It must be pointed out that minorities and majorities in much of Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans, are inextricably intermixed in ethnically non-homogenous polities, whose dominant ethnic majorities of today often used to be the historically dominated ethnic minorities of the past.

According to Bogdanor (1995), the central challenge facing the new democracies today is not economic, but political and deriving from ethnic, religious and linguistic differences within the state. That is why populist nationalism, long suppressed by

Communist regimes, has re-emerged as the “dominant” political force in the region. If ethnic frictions and are so threatening to state integration and survival, what could be done to ameliorate them or contain their political effects? On the assumption that such divisions are so intense and enduring that they completely overshadow other conflicts and preclude pluralist politics, the “consociational” model of democracy has been advocated as the only viable institutional device for minimizing subcultural conflict by steering it away from national political institutions. Arend Lijphart writes that

It may be difficult, but it is not impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society. In a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of

242 the population. Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy. (Lijphart 1977: 1)

The threat to democratic durability posed by permanent ethnic or religious minorities forms the core of Lijphart’s argument for a consociational democracy that recognizes and incorporates the organizations o f such minorities. In countries tom apart by severe ethnic cleavages and conflicts, the alternative to consocialism is believed to be an irrational

“Hobbesian war of all against all” and the inevitable breakdown of democracy (Lijphart

1975. 1977). But other commentators have pointed out that the consociational model is not without problems of its own. While institutional factors can play an important part in the incorporation of cultural minorities in democratic politics, the use of consociational devices and practices may actually aggravate ethnic tensions by focusing too much attention on them to the exclusion of other important democratization issues (Bogdanor 1995). Though intended to promote political integration in multi-ethnic states, a federal arrangement may also provide a ready basis for the emergence of separatist movements and ethnic-based claims to autonomy, which can threaten the very existence o f such states.

But how much of an existential threat is Bulgaria’s ethnic heterogeneity? While ethnic and religious identities do remain a source of mass political mobilization in Eastern

Europe, their potential appears constrained, given the small percentage of people who either identify strongly with an ethnic minority or regularly attend church (Rose 1996b: 143-144).

In none of these transformative societies, including Bulgaria, does the ethnic majority comprise less than 85% of the population. According to a 1997 Comparative National

Elections Project poll, the number of the religiously devout in Bulgaria is low as 7.6%. From this perspective, the potential for ethnic and religious strife should be limited. But, as the

243 cases of Spain’s Basques or Northern Ireland’s Catholics come to remind us, the political effects of multiethnicity and other subcultural divisions are not always minimized by the relative size of the aggrieved minority population.

Some writers totally dismiss the idea that there are extreme nationalism or any serious ethnic conflict in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria (see Meininger and Radoeva 1996: 57). But others acknowledge that majority-minority problems have strained the democratic transition in Bulgaria (see Ilchev and Perry 1993). As we shall see below, when Bulgaria began its democratic transformation, the ethnic conflict inherited from the Communist past appeared to pose a serious threat to political stability and democratization, if not to state cohesiveness itself. Trying to shore itself up by manipulating nationalist sentiments, the Zhivkov regime had created a polarizing conflict along ethno-religious lines by subjecting the Muslim

Turkish minority in Bulgaria to a harsh campaign of cultural and linguistic assimilation.

When the anti-Turkish assimilation drive was officially ended in December 1989 and the rights of ethnic Turks began to be restored, this provoked a veritable explosion of nationalist sentiments by majority Bulgarians. Fomer MRF vice-president Yunal Lutfi has pointed to a long history of troubled ethnic relations in Bulgaria:

History shows that the Tiu"ks living in Bulgaria were proverbial for their patience and easy-going nature, as witness the number of churches built and allowed to continue active worship during the centuries of the Ottoman presence. Ever since Bulgaria was liberated fi-om the Ottoman presence there has never been any violence from the Turkish minority towards the Bulgarian majority, while we have seen violence on the part of the Bulgarian majority towards the minorities. Violence has taken many forms, predominantly in the dark years of 1984-85, when assimilation in its various forms reached new depths. Violence took the form of educational deprivation and economic degradation, but especially forced name-changes and forced emigration. Police, dogs and tanks during those years descended on peaceful Turks and within two months nearly one and a half million Turks were compelled to take Bulgarian names. In those terrible years up to 1989 we reacted by

244 founding the Movement, as thousands of Turks were sent to the Beiene camp on the Danube, and over a hundred met untimely death. In the period from May to August 1989, 320,000 Turks were deported to Turkey, of whom 140,000 have come back. This issue remains on the conscience of the Government as an unresolved social dilemma. Many of my compatriots have still not managed to gain back their old jobs and homes because of discrimination, and their children were not accepted back into schools for a long time. (Interview with Lutfi in Ward 1992: 21-22)

In another sign of majority-minority disagreements, some leaders of ultranationalist groups

have denied the existence of any ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. In an atmosphere of heightened ethnic tensions and mass neonationalist protests, the Turkish-dominated MRF barely won legal recognition and for a time its very existence was in danger. Acknowledging the perilousness of the situation, Social-Democratic leader Petar Dertliev has attributed

Bulgaria’s ethnic tensions and conflicts to the influence of historical and political factors:

Bulgaria spent five centuries under the Turkish yoke, and it is very easy to create negative attitudes against the Turidsh people. Additionally, fascists and the far right always base their propaganda on certain visual symbols like some minority groups: Jews, Arabs, etc. In Bulgaria, the group that can be exploited for such purposes is the Turks. .. This fact is going to be exploited by the Communists. .. Unfortunately, 1 suspect that the UDF may be tempted to use this cause, too. The left and the right both will play that card. (Interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b)

The ethnic issue has resisted democratic crafting as much as any other problem on the

transition agenda. Even today, ethnic tensions continue to smoulder underneath the

seemingly placid surface. For instance, NATO’s air war against neighboring Yugoslavia over

its treatment of the Kosovo Albanians has encouraged Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority

to take a more assertive stand against the Bulgarian majority. Speaking from the rostrum of

the National Assembly, MRF leader Ahmed Dogan has defiantly warned ethnic Bulgarians:

1 know that there are many people, including in this National Assembly, who are doing all they can to eliminate the MRF from the political life of the country. 1 do not want to discuss what this may lead to, except to remind you

245 of what is taking place in Kosovo ever since Ibrahim Rugova’s Albanian Democratic League has been eclipsed by the KLA of Adem Demaci. (168 Chasa, May 14-20, 1999)

As we will see below, the Bulgarian case comes to confirm the proposition that it is much harder for political leaders to reach consensual unity in societies deeply divided along ethno-religious lines, an intervening variable with powerful impact on elite strategies and interactions. It may take much longer for such societies to achieve the political consensus and cooperation essential for democracy, even though a broad-based bargain is obviously not altogether impossible, providing an effective solution to ethnic minority problems.

The ethnicity conflict has recently subsided, thus strengthening the democratization process and reducing the danger of future challenges to the integrity of the state. Despite the existence of some unmistakable evidence of nationalist fervor and irredentist aspirations, the structure of conflict in Bulgaria’s ethnically non-homogenous society is political and socioeconomic, rather than subcultural and ethno-religious. The political establishment now includes Bulgaria’s largest and most influential ethnic minority party. The democratic logic of bargaining and cooperation between different subcultural groups stands a good chance of ultimately prevailing over intolerance and divisiveness.

The Ethnic Conflict

Bulgaria’s minority problems arose well before the transition process was initiated.

One of the dark legacies of Zhivkov’s rule was the ethnic conflict involving the large T urkish community, which comprised 9.43% of Bulgaria’s population o f8,487,317, according to the

1992 census. Over 80% of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks are concentrated in the northeastern and the southwestern parts of the country. A majority of them are employed in tobacco farming,

246 but a large number of Turks also used to work in the manufacturing sector. A privileged elite of urban-based, college-educated Turks was formed during the Communist era and, as

Todorova notes, “among them are to be found the most ardent exponents of a distinct ethnic consciousness” (1992: 154).

An ugly manifestation of chauvinism, the forced assimilation of ethnic Turks in the winter of 1984-1985 led to clashes with the police resulting in about half a dozen deaths and strained relations between the two ethnic communities. The Zhivkov regime insisted that those claiming to be minority Turks were actually ethnic Bulgarians descended from ancestors who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the five centuries of Ottoman rule. The BCP government decided to Christianize the names of the Turkish-speaking and

Muslim population for the purpose of forming an ethnically monolithic Bulgarian nation and reducing the danger of pan-Turkism and Islamic fimdamentalism in the country. Muslim

Turks were denied the right to learn the in school, observe Islamic holidays, or openly practice Islamic customs and traditions. Turkish-language publications and broadcasts were banned after 1984, leading to charges from neighboring Turkey (itself one of the world’s worst abusers of human rights, including minority rights) that Bulgaria was engaged in “.” These measures radically mobilized minority public opinion in Bulgaria and led to sporadic protests and demonstrations by ethnic Turks. In reaction to the activities of an undergroimd Turkish resistance, a number of Turkish activists were imprisoned or expelled from the country. Bulgarian courts passed death sentences on several ethnic Turks implicated in isolated acts of political murder and terrorism.

Pressure to assimilate the Turkish minority continued through 1989, despite the fact that such a policy was obviously in conflict with the political and economic liberalization of

247 late Communism. Bulgarians, especially the urban-based intelligentsia, have generally viewed the so-called “revival process,” that is, the outright attempt to assimilate the Turkish and Muslim minorities with the larger Bulgarian population, as a national disgrace brought about by the regime’s chauvinism and political insensitivity (Perry 1991; Poulton 1991).

Zhelev’s Discussion Club for the Support of Glasnost and Democracy proclaimed in early

1989:

For an entire century after their liberation, the Bulgarians displayed tolerance and magnanimity toward minorities. They sympathized profoimdly with the tragedy of the Armenian nation at the beginning of this century. They saved the Bulgarian Jews fi’om Hitler’s gas chambers. Now, when we are keeping silent about the real causes of the endless outflow of refugees, who are said to be “vacationers,” our national dignity is dying. {Helsinki Watch, October 1989: 5)

Encouraged by widespread sympathy among Bulgarians, the Turkish minority staged mass demonstrations and himger strikes in May 1989. The only response by the Bulgarian government was a televised speech by Zhivkov, in which he appealed to Turkey to open its borders for those ethnic Turks in Bulgaria wishing to emigrate. A new law had guaranteed the unrestricted right of all Bulgarian citizens to obtain passports for travel abroad and had eliminated the requirement for exit visas. As a result, some 310,000 ethnic Turks immigrated to Turkey before the alarmed Turkish government closed the border (Nikolaev 1990). Nearly half of them eventually returned because they were disappointed with poor living conditions in Turkey. During this mass exodus, another400,000 filed immigration applications, creating a fertile groimd for the rise of both ethnic Turkish separatism and Bulgarian nationalism.

Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign served to deepen divisive national identities and exacerbate ethnic scapegoating and myth-making. At the beginning of the transition, the problems of ethnic conflict seemed particularly intractable, since such indivisible

248 fundamentals concerning self-identity as culture, language, religion and ethnicity were at stake. Old and the poisoning effects of the previous regime’s propaganda lingered on, creating serious political tensions within Bulgaria’s democratic consensus.

Even though Bulgarian nationalists have refused to negotiate with the MRF and there is no grassroots dialogue between the two ethnic communities, pragmatic arguments by mainstream party leaders that reconciliation and cooperation are necessary for Bulgarian democracy to progress in peace and stability have prevailed. Another reason why mass mobilization based on traditional ethnic identities and animosities has faltered is the stronger cross-cutting influence of political ideology and the evolution towards moderation by both the MRF and its neonationalist foes. As we shall see below, even though the ethnic conflict has continued throughout the transition period, it never evolved into a serious “stateness” problem.

The Pathologies of Nationalism

After the ouster of Zhivkov and following mass demonstrations by ethnic Turks, the rights to practice Islam and bear Turkish names were legally re-established. Resolutions adopted by the BCP Central Committee, the National Assembly and Georgi Atanassov’s cabinet rejected the campaign of forcible ethnic assimilation as anti-constitutional and leading to a serious erosion of national unity. But, as BCP reformers had feared, the decision to renounce the “revival process,” made public on 29 December 1989, sparked nationwide protests by Bulgarian nationalists, who used mass mobilization and organization to resist the new policy. The protesters played on widespread fears of Islamic fundamentalism and

T urkish irredentism as well as on the negative historical memories of five centuries of brutal

249 Ottoman rule. Former Interior Minister Atanas Semerdjiev recounts the sudden unfolding of these stormy events:

The country was stormed by waves of public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. To better imderstand the complexity of the situation just contemplate that in the Kurdjali region (bordering Turkey) and in many other places there were parallel public rallies going on: on one side there were ten to fifteen thousand people, and on the other side twelve to fifteen thousand massed in demonstrations and coimter-demonstrations; on one side people were expressing nationalistic, pro-Bulgarian slogans: they sought to nullify the decision taken by the top state and Party institutions, or at least—to have a moratorium placed on it. On the other side, we had the and Moslems. They supported the decision, but at the same time they were using some unrealistic, I dare say, provocative slogans aimed at the Bulgarian population. In general, this was the situation everywhere. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

Then UDF chairman Zheliu Zhelev has offered this historical-sociological explanation for the growing ethnic tension, blaming it on the misguided policies of the former regime:

Our ethnic problem is based above all on demographics—namely, the catastrophic drop in the birth rate of Bulgarians compared to a high reproductive rate among the other ethnic groups, especially Turks and Gypsies. The former Communist regime is responsible for the decline in Bulgarian birth rates. The forcible collectivization of the Bulgarian village delivered a crushing blow to the national rate of reproduction. In 1944, Bulgaria was still a predominantly agrarian nation. Having lost their land, the peasants flocked to the cities in search of work. They were also attracted by the Stalinist industrialization of the country. Why did we have to construct all these monstrous industrial giants? Many former Bulgarian peasants found themselves inhabiting the cities under very miserable living conditions— cramped in small apartments and earning low wages. .. According to unpublished demographic statistics that I have seen, during the past four decades one and a half million Bulgarians were not bom as a result of this barbarous socioeconomic policy. To conceal this heinous crime against the Bulgarian nation, Zhivkov and his gang undertook the disastrous adventure with the name change of the Turks. This led to the total discrediting and international isolation of Bulgaria and the mass exodus of ethnic Turks—as if fleeing from the plague-to a country, which is not among the most democratic in the world. (Interview with Zhelev in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 40-41)

250 Roumen Vodenicharov, chairman of the Independent Society for the Defense of Human

Rights, has blamed ethnic strife in Bulgaria equally on the militancy of Bulgarian nationalism and the separatist sentiments of ethnic Turks:

In the crowds of nationalists demonstrating around the National Assembly there were a lot of young people who obviously know little of Bulgaria’s history.... They were manipulated by cheap slogans like "Turks—in Turkey!” and their patriotic sentiments were, regrettably, channeled in the wrong direction. This process is dangerous because, if such sentiments are inflamed, this may lead to bloodshed, as has happened in Romania between ethnic Hungarians and . Or in Kosovo. Therefore, all these events do great harm to the democratic process. I condemn both the Bulgarian nationalists and the separatist feelings which, unfortunately, have taken hold over part of the Turkish minority. These separatist feelings are a manifestation of what I call “pan-Doganism” rather than pan-Turkism, because they are linked to Ahmed Dogan, who cannot understand that by establishing a religious-based political organization he is violating the new Constitution (imperfect as it is) and, secondly, he has created the nationalist movement in Bulgaria.... This has provoked an ugly confrontation reminiscent of the standoff between NATO and the , which never went to war with each other, but were always dangerously close to doing so. (Interview with Vodenicharov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990:92- 93)

But Todor Zhivkov offered a different, more self-serving explanation for the conflict, blaming it mainly on the aggressively pan-Turkic and expansionist policies of the Turkish government:

They started very early on with propaganda claims that some two million ethnic Turks live in Bulgaria. That their religious freedoms and personal rights were being violated. That ethnic minorities in Bulgaria should be allowed to organize as a separate minority community. This continued for many years. (Zhivkov 1993: 84)

Zhivkov also accused the Turkish army of having a secret plan to implement the “Cyprus scenario” in Bulgaria (1993:150). He attributed the “revival process” to Turkey ’s campaign to foment separatism among ethnic Turks in Bulgaria:

251 The main reason for this was the fact that the Turkish government launched wide-scale subversive activities inside Bulgaria. It began to manipulate anti- Bulgarian citizens and to establish organizations with pan-Turkic goals and agendas...activities which were in violation of the existing laws and at variance with the sentiments of the vast majority of Bulgarian Muslims. There were terrorist acts even before the so-called “revival process.” Acts of terrorism continued to be carried out thereafter, which further destabilized the situation in the country. Some of these pan-Turkic organizations had far- reaching goals, such as declaring autonomy for the regions inhabited by large numbers o f Muslims.

Without trying to explain in greater detail the complex realities behind the so- called revival process, I would like to emphasize in particular that it was these subversive activities which prompted us to launch this dramatic program. We could not just sit and watch from the sidelines the unfolding of this illegal, externally organized pan-Turkic campaign. The legitimate interests of Bulgaria and its entire population, including the Muslims, were at stake. We needed effective measures to protect the interests, personal security and the future of the population. .. These activities continued for many years until the tragically depressing events of 1989. Using promises, as well as psychological and physical pressures, Turkey’s agents persuaded thousands of ethnic Turks to abandon their homes and motherland, and emigrate to Turkey. .. The truth is that we begged the departing Turks to stay. We appealed to them that as Bulgarian citizens they should stay here, in Bulgaria. That they should think things over. All was in vain. Thousands slaughtered their livestock, sold their property, and left. They acted like zombies, as if hypnotized. Neither we, nor Turkey was prepared for such an exodus. (Zhivkov 1997: 447-448)

While the historical genesis of the ethnic problem is still hotly debated in Bulgaria, the reversal of Zhivkov’s program aimed at creating an ethnically homogenous nation led to an immediate backlash among Bulgarian nationalists who began to organize for resistance at the grassroots level. With slogans like “No to Separatism,” “Down With the Traitors to the Bulgarian Nation!” and “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians,” they demonstrated against what they called the government’s “policy of national nihilism. ” The protesters set up the

Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), which accused the Turkish minority of nourishing “irredentist” aspirations and called for a referendum on the ethnic

252 issue. The ethnonationalists saw the return of Tuddsh names as a step toward Muslim cultural and political autonomy, as well as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state. By exploiting widespread fears of a military invasion by NATO-backed Turkey and the “Cyprusization” of Bulgaria (that is, the forcible partitioning of the country between

Bulgarians and Muslim Turks), the nationalist backlash seriously threatened the country's political stability and peaceful transition to democracy. In Bulgaria, as in the case of the other post-Communist countries of southeastern Europe, “ethnocracy” rather than democracy was seen as threatening to become the wave o f the future (see Tismaneanu 1992: 249).

The post-Zhivkov BCP government must be given credit for doing its utmost to restore peace and tranquility in the country with the help of other mainstream parties and public organizations. It rejected a referendum on the ethnic question on the grounds that issues of human rights should not be resolved by popular opinion. During the two weeks of tumultuous protests and strikes by the neonationalists, the UDF openly supported the BCP cabinet’s principled position. According to one commentator, it was the widespread nationalist demonstrations over the Turkish issue that “forced the BCP and the UDF to recognise the common ground uniting them against the threat of uncontained chauvinism and which then enabled them to make progress...in the round table discussions” (Crampton 1993 :

27).

In the midst of the nationalist demonstrations, the Grand Mufti (the spiritual leader of Bulgaria’s Muslims) announced that the Muslim clergy were opposed to extremist demands for regional autonomy or territorial partition, and supported the current status of

Bulgarian as the only official language. His conciliatory stance was intended to reassure the nationalists that ethnic Turks were not seeking to fiagment Bulgaria. Emergency talks aimed

253 at ending ethnic strife and restoring order were held in January 1990 between the government and various independent groups and associations organized in the Social Council of Citizens

(SCC). The participants appealed to all Bulgarians to call off rallies and strikes in order to ensure a peaceful and constructive atmosphere during the negotiations. The protests ended only after the Council, representing forces from the entire , reached a compromise that condemned past violations of minority rights in Bulgaria and reaffirmed the values of pluralism, but opposed separatist movements and confirmed Bulgarian as the official language. An 11-point draft declaration, entitled A Realistic Approach Toward

National Reconciliation, was signed by the government and the SCC on January 12 and presented to the National Assembly for approval. It pledged to restore ethnic Turkish names and religious freedoms, but did not endorse regional autonomy for the Turkish minority and recommended that all secessionist groups be outlawed (Perry 1991). It also insisted that

Bulgarian should remain the only official language of the country. On January 15, the

Assembly approved the declaration and passed an amnesty for all ethnic Turks sentenced since 1984 in connection with the assimilation campaign. The first direct challenge to the government’s new ethnic policy posed by the forces of nationalist fundamentalism was successfully contained.

In the wake of the SCC talks, the atmosphere in the country improved to such an extent that the danger of violence between Bulgarian nationalists and ethnic Turks seemed to have been averted (see Ashley 1990a). A Tmkish-language newspaper published by the

MRF and focusing on Bulgaria’s ethnic problems was allowed to appear for the first time since 1985. Many in the UDF leadership greeted the easing of ethnic tensions with open relief:

254 This was, in our view, the last convulsion in the agony of the Communist nomenklatura, which is still trying to preserve its privileges. Thank God they’ve failed! The Bulgarian people, though often accused of apathy and passivity, saw through their latest lies. Look, I am not trying to defend anyone. Pan-Turkism is as dangerous and uncivilized as Bulgarian chauvinism. But this problem must be solved once and for all by ensuring equal rights for all people, regardless of their religious faith. (Interview with Emil Koshloukov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990; 28)

But the danger of inter ethnic conflict had not completely disappeared. While the government pledged to restore civil and religious freedoms to the ethnic Turkish population, the nationalists were engaged in well-organized mass resistance to the new ethnic policy. In

February 1990, the Committee on National Reconciliation (CNR), a civic group working to implement the SCC agreement, urged President Mladenov to do more to defuse rising ethnic animosties. The CNR complained about unlawful discrimination by local officials who were preventing reconciliation between the two ethnic communities. The next month, thousands of ethnic Turks and Pomaks protested in Sofia, demanding more concessions from the authorities on the restoration of Muslim names and rights (BTA in English, March 5,1990).

Mladenov met with representatives of the country’s Turkish-speaking and Muslim population, who complained to him about the employment, housing, and education problems faced by former refugees who were returning from Turkey. In response, another high-level body was formed, the Public Coimcil on the Ethnic Issues (PCEI), which included representatives of the MRF, the BSP, the UDF and the labor unions, as well as other concerned public organizations.

Following the Jime 1990 elections, in which 24 MRF representatives were elected to the GNA, the PCEI reported mounting ethnic tension in the country and issued an appeal for calm and tolerance. The Council’s report blamed the problem on the legacies of the

255 Zhivkov era and minority impatience with the slow progress in eliminating human rights abuses. It also called on the GNA to give priority to establishing a consistent policy on the ethnic issue. After nationalist demonstrators had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the MRP deputies from attending the first session of the new parliament in Veliko Tumovo, CDNI organized several large demonstrations to protest what it called “the creation of a pro-T urkish parliamentary group in the Grand National Assembly.” The protesters demanded the immediate recall of the parliamentarians from the MRF, which they blamed for the recent escalation of ethnic tensions. But in an open rebuff to the ethnonationalists, the Assembly passed a resolution firmly supporting the rights of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria (BTA in

English, July 20, 1990).

On November 6, the newly elected parliament finally approved a law allowing ethnic

Turks in Bulgaria to resume the names they were forced to give up during the assimilation drive. In reaction to this decision, extreme nationalists staged protest demonstrations in areas where the population is ethnically mixed. CDNI, which reportedly included members of the former BCP nomenklatura who were involved in the violent acts against the ethnic Turks in the 1984-1989 period, announced the establishment of the so-called “Bulgarian Republic of

Razgrad”:

Outraged by the treacherous pro-Turkish policy of the Bulgarian parliament, concerned over the fate of our fatherland, the citizens of Razgrad relinquish the services of the central state leadership and, determined to stand up to the bitter end for the national interests of Bulgaria, have proclaimed the existence of a Bulgarian Republic of Razgrad... The Republic of Razgrad recognizes all laws of Bulgaria with the exception of those which jeopardize its national integrity and degrade the national dignity of its citizens. (BTA in English, November 22, 1990).

256 Centered in the city of Razgrad, which is located in a region in northeastern Bulgaria heavily

populated by Muslim Ttnks, the Razgrad Republic eventually grew into the neonationalist

Association of Free Bulgarian Cities with Free Bulgarian Citizens, which included a dozen

other towns with large Turidsh populations such as , Aitos, Kurdzhali, ,

Silistra and Isperikh. The nationalists threatened that if the government remained indifferent

to the militant separatism o f ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, the Associated Free Cities will declare

their independence from the Bulgarian State and may even join Greece. The Bulgarian citizens of several cities and towns announced their intentions to establish civil self- government and join the Association. After staging several protest rallies in the ethnically- mixed regional center of Kurdzhali, the Fatherland Party of Labor and CDNI appealed for work stoppages and civil disobedience, declaring the Grand National Assembly, Prime

Minister Lukanov’s government and President 2Ihelev's election illegitimate, because they do not reflect the actual correlation of political forces in the country (BTA in English.

November 19, 1990).

President Zhelev and most other Bulgarian politicians criticized CDNI’s campaign and distanced themselves from its radical demands. Zhelev went on national television to denounce the Razgrad Republic as a form of “feudal separatism and dangerous precedent which encroaches on this country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” (BTA in English,

November 24,1990). Zhelev called on all political parties and public institutions to condemn the nationalist protests, strikes, sit-ins, and traffic blockades. Only the BSP leadership refrained from expressing its attitude towards the inter-ethnic tensions or the president’s declaration. Urban intellectuals were the leaders of the campaign to ensure the restoration of human and civil rights to Muslim Turks, whereas many ordinary Bulgarians living in

257 predominantly Turkish regions vehemently opposed the new policy as betrayal of national

interests. According to Duncan Perry (1991), the government had to perform a delicate balancing act—from the point of view of the MRF and its Bulgarian supporters, progress was too slow, but from the neonationalist perspective, the regime was encoiuaging anti-Bulgarian separatism.

Mass protests by the nationalists thwarted government plans to include Turkish- language classes, starting in January 1991, in the school curriculum in areas inhabited by ethnic Turks. The cabinet decided, in an attempted compromise, to introduce the optional teaching of Turkish in Bulgarian schools only from the next academic year. In response,

35,000 ethnic Turkish students went on strike and boycotted classes throughout Bulgaria to protest this delay. The MRF leadership called this step illegal and, in fact, a “moratorium” on the issue. The Movement insisted that the decision contradicted President Zhelev’s recent statement in the European parliament at Strasbourg that the rights and freedoms of ethnic

Turks in Bulgaria had been reinstated. The situation was described as “alarming, because thousands of minors are involved and tension may lead to imforeseeable consequences”

(BTA in English, February 5, 1991).

In a televised speech to the nation, the new Prime Minister Dimitar Popov criticized the nationalist protestors for spreading feelings of mistrust and intolerance between

Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. He warned that ethnic hostility was damaging Bulgaria’s image abroad and declared that his government was determined to implement the parliamentary decision on the optional teaching of Turkish. Turkish was finally included in the school curriculum in September 1991 and, with the exception of the nationalist groups which opposed it as a surrender of national interests, most political parties supported the change.

258 The government’s room for maneuver was limited, as Bulgarian public opinion was

badly divided over this issue. According to the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the People &

the Press, East/WestPoll, an absolute majority of Bulgarians (59.5%) blamed post-

Communist reforms for the worsening state of inter-ethnic relations in their country. Hunger

strikes and sit-ins organized by the nationalists continued throughout 1991 and 1992, and protesters demanded that the legislature take urgent measures to deal with the ethnic controversy. Strong resistance to the government’s policy on the ethnic question, including clearly semi loyal utterances and acts, brought these groups dangerously close to being an anti-system opposition. When signing the 14 December 1990 inter-party agreement on restoring civil peace in the country, the neonationalist Fatherland Party of Labor (FPL) had urged the authorities “not to make biased decisions on the national and ethnic issues which will only result in social destabilization and tensions ’ (BTA in English, December 1990). At a press conference held in April 1991, FPL Chairman Roumen Popov vowed that his party would fight with all legal means at its disposal to preserve the Bulgarian character of the nation-state. He implicitly endorsed Zhivkov’s ethnic policy by suggesting that “an equitable agreement be concluded on the emigration of all those who do not feel Bulgarian and wish to leave the country.” In an implied reference to the conflict over the teaching of Turkish in

Bulgarian schools, he also complained that learning a foreign language should be a common right and not a “privilege for people with non-Bulgarian consciousness ” (BTA in English,

April 4, 1991).

The next month, some 600 members of the ultranationalist National Radical Party

(NRP) held the constituent session of an “alternative civil parliament ” to serve as a counterweight to the existing Grand National Assembly, electing party chairman Ivan

259 Georgiev as its “speaker.” They also appointed a “shadow” cabinet headed by NRP deputy

chairman Ivan Krustev as another forum for expressing nationalistic public opinion. Calling

President Zhelev a “servile American lackey, ” Dr. Georgiev claimed that “Zhelev is a traitor

and inspirer of the idea of introducing Turkish language in our schools.” If its demands were not met, the NRP threatened to begin “a life-or-death struggle for the survival of the

Bulgarian ndX\on'\Duma, April 15, 1991). These and other actions and statements showed that the ethnonationalists relied on radical demagoguery, remaining throughout this turbulent period less than a loyal opposition.

Q: I’d like you to rate some different groups of people in Bulgaria according to how you feel about them. For each group, please tell me whether your opinion is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable?

Very Mostly Mostly Very favorable favorable unfavorable unfavorable Turks 13.7 38.4 28.4 10.9 Muslim 13.6 47.6 17.4 4.3 Bulgarians Gypsies 5.5 15.2 31.8 39.3 Jews 11.1 52.1 8.3 1.3 Armenians 15.1 52.6 5.8 1.3 Bessarabian 10.9 45.3 2.2 1.1 Bulgarians

Table 8.1 : Opinion of different ethnic groups in Bulgaria (in percentages)

Source: Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll (1991).

260 Tensions were aggravated by hunger strikes by ethnic Turks calling for the restitution

of their homes, which had been sold during their mass exodus to Turkey in 1989. Bulgarians

who had cheaply purchased real estate and other property from the departing Turks were now

resisting a government decree that annulled all such transactions and compensated ethnic

Turks who had returned to Bulgaria. The nationalists protested that the measme was an act

of illegal discrimination against one ethnic group in favor of another (BTA in English, May

16,1991). A new set of round-table negotiations was convened in December 1991 to address

many of the unresolved ethnic issues, but the talks made little headway and majority- minority tensions continued.

Authoritative mass surveys illustrate some of the difficulties that the new pluralistic regime experienced in satisfying legitimate minority demands, while trying to placate a hard­ line neonationalist opposition, which claimed substantial popular backing for its anti-Turkish stance and engaged in a dangerously acrimonious and demagogic style of political discourse.

It is evident from statistical data presented in McIntosh and Mac Iver (1993: 14) that

Bulgarians tend to be more willing than West Europeans to grant ethnic minorities the right to form political organizations or have parliamentary representation, but they lag behind all other selected nations on the more divisive issue of teaching classes in minority languages, a reluctance which was exploited by the Bulgarian nationalists in their anti-Turkish propaganda.

Majority suspicions of any positive measures to protect minorities also found reflection in the 1991 Constitution. While providing extensive legal safeguards for individual rights and freedoms, the new basic charter avoids explicit recognition of group rights and restricts the electoral participation of parties based on ethnic or religious allegiance. It also

261 bans cultural associations and religious societies that have “political aims” or engage in

“political activity.” The parliamentarians who drafted the fundamental law sought in this manner to counteract the effect of the new PR electoral law, introduced in the same year as the new Constitution, which tends to encourage the formation of such parties. One of the constitutional framers, Roumen Vodenicharov, has openly justified banning political parties based on ethnic and religious affiliation, such as the MRF, even as he admitted that

...this would be a violation of human rights, because there should be Muslim parties, as there are Christian parties throughout the world; but for as long as our process of democratization is still shaky and fragile, religious-based parties can only endanger it. (Interview with Vodenicharov in Antova- Konstantinova 1990:93)

Although constitutional clauses allow minority language schools and other elements of minority cultural life, there is no emphasis on consociational power-sharing at the executive level or any other institutional methods by which the political participation of

Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities could be secured. This omission reflects the great concern felt by a strong majority of ethnic Bulgarians (69.9% in the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the

People & the Press, East/West Poll) that minority groups inside the country pose a serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity, a level of apprehension exceeded in the same poll only by that expressed by Czechs and Slovaks on the eve of their federation’s “velvet divorce.”

Despite such constitutional defects and strong nationalist pressures, Bulgaria’s various post-1989 governments stood firm in their determination to guarantee basic rights to every Bulgarian citizen regardless of his or her ethnic origin and religion. There are a number of reasons for the regime’s resolve and steadfastness in the face of heated nationalist opposition. To begin with, the nationalists have a relatively narrow political base, as popular

262 support for their protests and extremist positions has been unstable and generally limited in scope. This finding is supported by attitudinal data and electoral results, as well as the observations of a number of area specialists (see Troxel 1993: 200-201; McIntosh 1995).

BSDP leader Petar Dertliev has predicted that the ethnic situation in Bulgaria will never get out of hand: “That which has happened in Russia, in Romania, or in Yugoslavia cannot happen in Bulgaria” (interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b). Public opinion polls in particular show that the level of xenophobic, including Turkophobic, intolerance is quite limited in Bulgaria, depriving the nationalists of a reliable base of mass support. When asked to rate various ethnic minorities in their own country, Bulgarian respondents are distinctly more positive in their ratings when compared to answers to similar questions asked in the other East European coimtries. Only the Gypsies come out with an unfavorable rating of more than 50%, while all other ethnic groups receive more than a 50% favorable rating (see

Table 8.1).

The extent of Bulgaria’s ethnic and racial tolerance can also be gauged from a comparison of attitudes towards different ethnic and racial groups, as Bulgarian respondents in the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll emerge as more tolerant than most other East European nations, although a study comparing tolerance of minority rights in Bulgaria and Romania finds that Bulgarians generally display higher levels of ethnic intolerance than Romanians (see McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, and Nolle 1995).

Therefore, the new regime’s principled consistency and firmness on this issue has been based on a relatively solid foundation of ethnic and racial tolerance, which is the result of centuries of multinational and multilingual communal life. In spite of perceived anti-Turkish elements

263 in Bulgaria’s political culture, there is no historical tradition of ethnic , hatred or bigotry. Petar Dertliev insists that

...we, Bulgarians, are the champions ofhuman rights in the Balkans. You will not find such support in either Greece or Turkey, nor in Yugoslavia and Romania. Well, it is quite possible that we represent an imperfect model of a tolerant polyethnic society. Nevertheless, it functions successfully. (Interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b)

The regime’s opposition to chauvinistic sentiments has paid off over the long run.

After consecutive governments resisted successfully the nationalist challenge to the restoration of the rights and freedoms of minority Turks and Muslims, tensions between the two ethnic and religious communities are on the decline. By the time of the 1997 parliamentary elections, organized nationalist opposition to the MRP had subsided to a considerable extent. Despite intense political competition for office, most of the party elites representing the two major ethnic groups clearly share a broad system of democratic beliefs and values, which has allowed the ethno-religious conflict to proceed within established institutional channels, thus gradually dissolving the initial explosive disagreements into compromise solutions.

The Evolution of the MRF

Another reason why the minority problem may be resolved peacefully and in a manner acceptable by international standards is the evolutionary change of the MRF itself, which has cast off its earlier semiloyal overtones and ambiguities. The central government’s firm stand against minority discrimination and exclusion has been facilitated by the gravitation of the MRF fi^om sectarianisn;, political alienation and semi loyalty to greater participation and accommodation.

264 It must be noted, however, that the Movement’s original aloofiiess and perceived

semi loyalty was not entirely its fault. As mentioned elsewhere in this study, its leaders were

excluded from the round-table discussions in early 1990. As Podkrepa leader Trenchev

recalls, “on our side of the table some UDF people did not want representatives of the ethnic

Turks to participate” (interview with Dr. Trenchev in Melone 1996b). The Movement was

not given due attention because the major political parties, especially the UDF, believed that

it lacked a sufficiently strong base of mass support to challenge or disrupt the inter-elite negotiations (Simeonov 1996). The UDF leadership even refused to include MRF representatives into its round-table quota, probably fearing that anti-Turkish sentiments among Bulgarian voters might lessen its own electoral appeal. Professor Stefan

Gaitandzhiev, a UDF founder and delegate at the Round Table, explains the rationale behind this refusal:

Most of the participants were in favor of the idea that the UDF should represent the interests of the national minorities, to take the role of their only defender and to rightfully count on their votes in future elections. But the Movement for Rights and Freedoms of Ahmed Dogan declared that it did not want to enter the UDF; instead, it wanted a share of the UDF quota at the Roundtable. This MRF proposal was most strongly rejected by Roumen Vodenicharov from the Independent Society for the Defense of Human Rights, who at that time had the support of most Bulgarian Moslems. And 1 think this reflected to a great extent a struggle for influence over those people. Nationalistic convictions were at the time more pronounced in people like Petko Simeonov and Zheliu Zhelev. ..

The basic principle of the Roundtable was that there were two sides only. On the one side stood the UDF—and on the other the BCP . the Movement for Rights and Freedoms requested participation from the UDF quota. They were not invited. And the bulk of the members of the UDF Coordinating Committee as well as the participants in the Roundtable Talks were not sure that the MRF would stick to the goals of the UDF. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms was not considered a big organization—at the time it was a newly created organization. The disagreement was over a matter of principle. .. In retrospect, it was a correct decision not to seat the Movement.

265 As it has turned out, the fact that they were not seated has not been an obstacle for the peaceful transition. The reason for this conclusion is that a fundamental problem for Bulgaria is to avoid ethnic conflicts. (Interview with Gaitandzhiev in Melone 1996b)

The round-table agreements regarding the restoration and protection of minority rights were negotiated and signed on behalf of the ethnic Turkish and Muslim community by UDF leaders, who at the same time were accusing the MRF of being a creation of the BSP designed to split up the opposition vote. Zhelev even compared the MRF to the nationalistic- oriented CDNI: “, like Bulgarian nationalism, only serves the interests of the BSP” (Demokratsiya, June 5, 1990).

The MRF had to wage an uphill battle to overcome its public image as a polarizing political force with a hidden irredentist agenda. Its leader Ahmed Dogan had difficulty convincing Bulgarians that his party, consisting of well over 100,000 Muslims and only

3,000 Bulgarians, was not ethnically based, especially since the Movement had also publicly insisted that before joining Europe, Bulgaria should normalize its relations with Turkey and solve ethnic problems at home. While Dogan and other MRF leaders have praised and even built a monument to several ethnic Turks who were executed by Zhivkov’s regime for carrying out a short-lived bombing campaign in the mid-1980s, most ethnic Bulgarians see them as terrorists and the murderers of innocent civilians (their monument has been repeatedly defaced). Public opinion polls show that most Bulgarians regard the MRF as the political party of the Turkish minority. Many also resented its ability to play the role of political powerbroker by taking advantage of the almost even number of legislative seats held by the UDF and the BSP from October 1991 to December 1994. Filip Bokov, a former

2 6 6 reformist BSP leader and now a high-ranking Euroleft member, echoed such doubts about the Movement’s real motivations and intentions:

They claim that they are not a movement based on ethnic origin but rather that they work for the freedom and human rights of all. But if one looks at where they campaign and hears their speeches, it is doubtless that they are a movement based on the ethnic origin of its members. So this movement causes another reaction on the Bulgarian side which also starts to organize on an ethnic, nationalistic basis. This movement cannot be viewed outside the context of Bulgarian-Turkish relations, what Turkey does to encourage this movement. There is also the fear that this movement might put up the question of autonomy in this country which might be encouraged by Turkey. We are very aware of Turidsh policies in the last 20-25 years in Cyprus. (Quoted in Feffer 1992: 235)

Roumen Vodenicharov, an early supporter of the MRF now turned opponent, shares these widespread apprehensions and misgivings, especially about the so-called "Cyprus scenario”:

In my view, the Cyprus scenario is being applied to Bulgaria with the aim of converting it into a confederation of two nations: Bulgarians and Turks. If the constitutional ban on ethnic parties is not enforced in the new, 37th National Assembly, and if the secessionist appetites of Dogan, Hodzha, Kenan and others are not resisted, then it is very likely that in the not too distant future Bulgaria will be divided like Cyprus. And no one will help us then. Like no one has helped Cyprus over the past 20 years. (Interview with Vodenicharov in Duma, September 10, 1994)

Because the MRF was for a long time saddled with a semi-loyal reputation, Dogan and other leaders have repeatedly proclaimed that their organization supports the territorial integrity, national security and sovereignty of Bulgaria. While striving to secure for ethnic

T urks in Bulgaria the possibility of learning their own mother tongue, the MRF has accepted the principle that the is the only official language of the country. Dogan has characterized his party as a “factor which is favorable for the security of Bulgaria.” Also contributing to the MRF’s perceived semi-loyal profile was its ambiguous stance on the issue

267 of cooperating or entering alliances with ethnic Bulgarian parties. Partly because of the perceived strong anti-Turkish orientation of many Bulgarians, the Movement’s early agenda precluded building coalitions with other parties or entering the government—an act of self­ isolation that hampered its inclusion in the political elite structure. Invited by the victorious

Socialists to participate in a broad-based coalition government after the June 1990 elections,

Dogan proposed instead that the BSP and the UDF form a ruling coalition as a “way of guaranteeing the promotion of the democratic processes in Bulgaria” (BTA in English, June

29, 1990). He promised his party’s support for such a coalition cabinet, but refused to take part in it.

It was only at a national conference held in October 1990 that the MRF, decrying the dangerous political polarization in the country and the shrill partisanship of public debate, decided that it was time to join forces with other centrist opposition parties and become “the nucleus of a future political center” (BTA in English, October 25, 1990). In the words of

Dogan, the “conference once again confirmed our determination, as a constructive force, to defend the peaceful transition. ” He urged other parties “to consider how we can work together, because we depend on one another in the building of a democratic civil society.”

Given its still vague position on the issue of entering the government, the Movement was not included in Dimitar Popov’s grand coalition, which incorporated all other legislative parties.

Then UDF leader Filip Dimitrov explained the MRF’s non-participation in the cabinet with the political tactfulness of the Movement, which took into account the difficult situation in regions populated by ethnically mixed population (BTA in English, December 20, 1990).

The MRF had endorsed the candidates of the UDF in the run-off of the June 1990 ballot, but relations between the two parties were strained because of the Movement’s

2 6 8 exclusion from the Round Table deliberations. Before the election, Dogan had declared that the MRF would never align itself with the UDF. He openly called the BSP and the UDF the

“two snakes”: the BSP was the “big snake” and the UDF was the “small snake” (Simeonov

1996: 550). Immediately after the election, Dogan publicly charged that his Movement had won only about 370,000 votes out of the “two million Muslims in Bulgaria” mainly because of

the attacks to which the Muslims were subjected in the last weeks preceding the elections on the part of different political parties and especially the UDF, as a result of which part of the Muslims voted for the BSP and another part for the UDF. (BTA in English, June 14, 1990)

Only in 1991 did the MRF begin to make political overtures to the UDF. Their failure to reconcile differences was perceived by many observers as a major weakness of the anti-BSP opposition (see Curtis 1993:206; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, and Nolle 1995). While some cooperation between the two parties did occur in 1991-1992, the limits o f such cooperation were evident from the fact that the MRF was not included in the UDF cabinet of Prime

Minister Filip Dimitrov.

Beginning in 1991, the MRF had to adjust to a new political situation created by the intensity of the nationalist opposition and the adoption of a constitution banning ethnic and religious parties. During the June 1990 election the Socialists supported the Movement obviously in the hope of drawing votes away from the UDF, but in the October 1991 election the BSP sided with the nationalists, trying to exploit ethnic divisions in order to broaden its electoral base and avoid a widely expected defeat. Given the participation of several parties with extreme nationalist agenda, ethnic issues assumed a much more central and divisive role in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 1991 electoral campaign. The neonationalist

269 parties accused the Movement of being a disloyal player, pointing to the fact that most of its

deputies had abstained in the parliamentary vote for the new Constitution.

In response to these challenges, the Movement broadened its political platform to

embrace all issues of civil liberties, pledging to support the imity of the Bulgarian state while

advocating full and unequivocal respect for the rights and freedoms of ethnic and religious

minorities in Bulgaria. The MRF took this step partly to avoid the constitutional prohibition of political parties based on ethnic and religious ties. Another reason, suggested by Nedeva

( 1993:138), is that the 150,000 ethnic Turks who have returned from Turkey since 1989 tend to identify themselves more closely with Bulgaria than with Turkey, thus contributing to the restructuring of their national political identities. “Such identities are less primordial and

fixed than is often assumed,” according to Linz, Stepan and Gunther (1995: 92), who assert that the emergence of complementary multiple identities among minority populations is conducive to democratic consolidation in polities with “stateness” problems.

In part to alleviate the fears of Bulgarian nationalists, the MRF also renounced publicly Islamic fundamentalism, Turkish nationalism, ethnic separatism and demands for local or cultural autonomy. It has distanced itself from radical ethnic Turkish leader Adem

Kenan, who advocates the creation of a federation of Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria, in which all predominantly Turkish areas should be given administrative and cultural autonomy. While stressing the importance of Muslim religion, ethnic Turkish culture and close ties with neighboring Turkey, Ahmed Dogan publicly professes that “Bulgaria is our fatherland and our national self-consciousness is a Bulgarian one” (quoted in Angelov 1990:

27). The MRF also limited its long-term goals to ensuring that the rights of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria are protected, introducing Turkish as an optional school subject, and bringing to

270 justice the leaders of the assimilation campaign. The Movement has explicitly endorsed the new capitalist-democratic order as well as Bulgaria’s traditional organization, thus refuting the nationalist charge that its disagreement with certain constitutional clauses amounts to an anti-system stance. With these steps, the largest ethnic minority party finally joined in the democratic consensus that more or less unifies post-Commimist Bulgaria’s otherwise squabbling party elites.

Tlie Movement’s inclusion has been assisted by a proportional electoral system which, though limited by a 4% threshold, has contributed to accommodating minority interests in Bulgaria. One of the political consequences of a limited PR system, with a mean index of proportionality (i.e., the fit between votes and legislative seats) of 85% in Bulgaria

(Rose 1996: 163), has been to achieve a relatively fair representation of minorities, allowing minority voters to elect candidates who truly represent their interests. In recognition o f this reality, the major ethnic Bulgarian parties, including the UDF and even the pro-nationalist

BSP, have regularly nominated ethnic Turks to run in districts where Muslim populations are concentrated and ethnic-based support for the MRF is particularly strong.

Unlike consociational devices which institutionalize ethnic differences and representation, a PR system does not automatically guarantee a say in government for a small ethnic party like the MRF, which will always remain a minority presence in the national legislature. But it has ensured that the Movement’s constituents are accurately represented in parliament and fairly treated, so that their voices can be heard in the halls of government.

This has also been made possible by post-Commimist Bulgaria’s revolving-door system where stable legislative majorities with firm control over the executive have been more the exception than the rule.

271 The constitutional ban on parties with ethnic and religious affiliation was clearly designed to avoid the proliferation of separate ethnic minority parties which could pose a threat to the internal cohesion of the Bulgarian polity. Since the MRF was already part of the existing national party system, and it is too powerful and well-organized to be easily suppressed, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1992 that the prohibition should not be enforced against it. But the constitutional ban has nonetheless forced the Movement to broaden its mass electorate beyond the Turkish and Muslim communities and to incorporate in its agenda many non-minority issues with wider voter appeal, which has further legitimized its right to compete for political office despite its minority status.

The Integration of the MRF

At first, the MRF aligned itself with the UDF in an anti-Commimist alliance aiming at removing the ruling Socialists from power and pimishing those responsible for the assimilation campaign of 1984-1989. Because of the sensitivity of the Turkish issue, the

Movement was not made part of the first UDF government formed in October 1991. Even though it provided the votes necessary for parliamentary approval of the new cabinet, the

MRF again remained without a fair share in government. An informal elite coalition was formed between the two parties, as the parliamentary caucus of the MRF extended crucial legislative backing to the minority cabinet of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, helping it to survive in office for almost a year. According to Karasimeonov ( 1995: 169), the two parties became allies in parliament due to the ideological hostility they shared towards the BSP.

Their strategic alliance fell apart in October 1992, however. When the UDF refused to accommodate many of its social and economic demands, the MRF withdrew its support from

272 the Filip Dimitrov cabinet (see Bates 1994). Due to its continuing political isolation, the

process of making the Movement an integral and responsible part of the new political

establishment remained incomplete.

The defacto coalition with the UDF was replaced by a marriage o f convenience with the BSP, which allowed the minority cabinet of the MRF-nominated Prime Minister Berov to survive in power for almost two years. In response, the UDF accused the MRF of betrayal and of selling out to the ex-Communists:

It went the way of the Communists, and this is something that should be absolutely understood. Otherwise, the entire pictme of the Bulgarian political situation as it presently exists is absolutely distorted. The point is that with many excuses the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as well as the MP’s who left the Union of Democratic Forces—both of them inspired by the tremendous efforts on the part of President Zheliu Zhelev—practically joined the Communist party in parliament. You will see if you go through the votes, there is a stable majority o f 140 or so. Therefore, on all critical points they are voting with the Communists. .. (Interview with Filip Dimitrov in Melone 1996b)

But the UDF leaders had only themselves to blame for their breakup with the MRF. The dogmatically neoliberal economic policy of the Filip Dimitrov cabinet was challenged even within the UDF’s own parliamentary caucus. Matters were made worse by the government’s rejection of any compromises with the BSP and the trade unions. Policy differences, rather than any unilateral demands for government posts or the formation of a coalition cabinet, split up the UDF-MRF alliance. With the Left-Right dimension regaining its traditional relevance in terms of party identification in Bulgaria, socioeconomic interests rather than ethnic aspirations or ideological anti-Communism were increasingly defining the MRF’s place in the political spectrum. There was growing antagonism between the two partners over the UDF policy of economic austerity, madcetization, privatization and land restitution,

273 which was hurting the interests of the MRF’s impoverished rural constituency. Social and economic interests have replaced and the goal of retribution for past

Communist abuses, redrawing the previous battle lines between ex-Communists and anti­ communists in Bulgaria. Miroslav Darmov, a former MRF parliamentary deputy, acknowledged that

We emphasize the social orientation of the market economy. Because our electorate are people of middle status, they are concerned with the social plan of the government. We also differ with the UDF on land policy. Because the Turkish population is mostly agrarian, they are not interested in having the land go to the previous owners. (Quoted in Feffer 1992: 236)

While the Movement had previously supported the positions of its ally in parliament, on 17

September 1992 it joined the BSP in forcing out National Assembly chairman Stefan Savov, one of the more conservative UDF leaders. Karasimeonov (1995:169) alludes to the reasons for this controversial move, pointing out that Savov’s Democratic Party represents the interests of the pre-9 September 1944 bourgeoisie, especially former business owners who are now reclaiming their old properties, including land estates in the Turkish-populated areas.

Another reason was the deliberate policy of the MRF leadership to prevent by means of shifting alliances the dominance of national politics by either of the two political behemoths, the UDF and the BSP. The MRF assumed the role of defending minority rights and maintaining a balance of power in Bulgarian politics. Its careful equidistance between the modern-day successors to Bulgaria’s and traditional Right is hardly accidental: whereas the fierce bipolar competition between the BSP and the UDF can be seen as a purely

Left-Right ideological confrontation, their rivalry rarely revolves around ethnic issues and both parties have on occasion wrapped themselves up in the mantle ofBulgarian nationalism.

274 The evidence points to the MRF’s evolution from an alienated minority organization with a narrow, ethnic-based agenda into a national centrist party, which has become a

“critical player” in modem Bulgarian politics (Ilchev and Perry 1993: 40). It is an explicit exponent of the socioeconomic interests of its rank-and-file members, understood according to the traditional Left-Right model of party politics. At a press conference held on 6 October

1991, Dogan accused his former allies in the UDF of “blue fascism.” He explained that the

MRF was “returning to its natural place in the center,” because the bipolar structure in parliament and the country had exhausted its potential (BTA in English, October 7, 1992).

In an article for the 168 Chasa weekly, Dogan explained the change in his party’s positions:

in its analysis of the situation in Bulgaria, the MRF reached the conclusion that right-wing is taking the upper hand in this country and that there is a dangerous tendency of its development into right-wing extremism.” He was clearly referring to the radicalism of the Movement’s own coalition partner, the UDF. According to Dogan, this “dangerous tendency” had forced his party to “turn to the left after having occupied the political space of moderate conservatism for months on end.” The MRF leader went on to criticize the

“shock therapy” economic policies of the Filip Dimitrov cabinet, as well as its pro-NATO foreign policy, in which he saw the desire of one of the two “” to dominate and interfere in Bulgarian political life. Dogan’s article concluded with the words:

The failure of the government to take into account the interests of the majority of the Bulgarians may provoke social cataclysms which we do not wish to be held responsible for. They are trying to include us in certain international structures but this runs counter to the vital interests of the Bulgarian people and we can no longer remain accomplices and powerless observers of these tendencies. (BTA in English, October 7, 1992)

275 Pragmatic policy and the socioeconomic interests of constituents have taken the

upper hand over narrowly-focused ethnicity, religious and cultural issues. The Movement

has clearly evolved from a marginal ethnic-based group into a moderate mainstream party,

whose pragmatic-oriented leadership could not ignore the demands and preferences of its own mass membership. Nor could it accept, as a national centrist party committed to Max

Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” the instability and social conflicts brought on by the

UDF’s hard-line policy of virulent anti-Communism and historical retribution against members o f the old ruling elite.

The turning point of the MRF’s gradual incorporation in the political elite structure was the appointment in December 1992 of the MRF -nominated government of Professor

Berov. Although most of the ministerial appointees were ethnic Bulgarians, First Deputy

Prime Minister Yevgeny Matinchev was a senior member of the MRF who supervised the work of the government on behalf of his party. The fact of the Movement’s ultimate control over the new cabinet was recognized by Zlatka Rouseva, deputy head of the UDF parliamentary caucus, who declared in the National Assembly that “The mandate of the MRF means in practice the formation of a Turkish government in our coimtry! Even if no MRF member participates in it, it would still be a Turkish government ” (Svoboden Narod,

December 23-30, 1992). The party fragmentation of parliament allowed the Movement to convert its minority status into majority power as a political arbiter between the feuding UDF and BSP. To the amazement of many observers, a tacit BSP-MRF legislative alliance emerged, sustaining the Berov cabinet in office for almost two years until a three-month-old parliamentary boycott by the UDF and the BSP’s own desire for new elections ultimately forced its resignation in September 1994.

276 In another important development, the Socialists had to temper their nationalist impulses for the sake of preserving their parliamentary alliance with the MRF. The de facto coalition between the two former arch-enemies largely neutralized the polarizing effects of the BSP’s previous anti-Tiu-kish propaganda and became an important step towards the unification of the national political elite. The unprecedented fact of a modem democracy being ruled by a relatively small ethnic minority party also implies that ethnic cleavages in

Bulgaria are neither cumulative nor deep enough to override ideological politics and socioeconomic interests. Strictly partisan considerations-primari ly in the form of an intense political conflict between the UDF and the BSP which led the reins of government to be entrusted to a neutral third party—appear to have been more salient than ethnic divisions and enmities.

Once they were allowed to influence decisions on political power, the MRF leaders realized that their minority party had much more to gain from participating in the democratic game of politics than from staying on the outside. At that point, there was a marked change in the Movement’s attitudes and behavior, which grew more self-confident, moderate and mainstream in its politics (Nedeva 1993). There was a change also in the pattern of its interactions with the other party elites, all of whom recognized its co-equal status. Even the most fanatical Bulgarian nationalists had to acknowledge that the MRF is not a disloyal political competitor and that their fears of the country being splintered along ethnic and religious lines were exaggerated. Even though many nationalists still believe that the

Movement represents a fundamental threat to Bulgaria’s unity and territorial integrity, a major precondition for an ethnic majority’s toleration of cultural minorities, namely that the majority must not feel politically or economically threatened, has been satisfied.

277 By the time of the 1997 parliamentary elections, the previously semi-loyal, anti-

Turkish elements in the nationalists’ rhetoric and propaganda had been largely toned down, thereby contributing further to the widespread acceptance of the MRF. In that election, the

Movement led a broad and diverse coalition of leA-centrist, centrist and monarchist parties called the Union for National Salvation, which opposed both the UDF and the ruling

Socialists and was openly supported by former king Simeon II. Contrary to some of the pessimistic generalizations at the opening of this chapter, the main and most salient cleavage in Bulgaria appears to be political-ideological, rather than a subcultural one. The ethnicity conflict has recently subsided to such an extent that minority questions no longer present a direct challenge to the new regime. Unlike the KLA of the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia, ethnic minority parties in Bulgaria have not used the country’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity to make separatist demands, use violence or seek political and military assistance from abroad in order to achieve local independence.

Clearly, democracy does not depend on national and religious homogeneity or the absence of ethnic nationalism in order to survive. Cultural plmalism may not necessarily lead to fragmentation of society and breakup of the democratic polity. On the other hand, it can complicate democratization processes by creating political tensions and making the political elite’s consensual unification and structural integration even harder to achieve. A future deconsolidating challenge posed by subcultural heterogeneity and ethnic politics cannot be ruled out. Even with the political incorporation of the Muslim Turkish minority, Bulgaria’s ethnic and religious cleavages, exacerbated by an impoverished economic environment and bitter partisan struggles, remain a potential obstacle to the forging of long-term democratic consolidation.

278 CHAPTER 9

ELITE-NEGOTIATED TRANSITION

The autonomy of political variables and explanations has recently been accorded an increasing importance of place. In contrast to the structuralist emphasis on context and determination, actor-centered approaches to the issues of democratic transition and consolidation have stressed variables of agency and process, focusing in particular on the contingent choices and strategies employed by key political players in the process of

“crafting” new democracies. Direct inter-elite negotiations leading to elite moderation and compromise are deemed necessary for successful democratic consolidation (see Burton and

Higley 1987a; Di Palma 1990; Field and Higley 1985; Gunther and Higley 1992; Higley and

Burton 1989; Higley and Moore 1981). The rest of this study will concentrate on the political process and micropolitical dynamics of post-Communist Bulgaria. This and the next four chapters will examine the critical role of procedural and elite variables, including the degree of consensual and structural unification of rival party elites—the causa sine qua_non of institutionalized democracy in the elite-oriented paradigm (see Burton and Higley 1987b;

Gunther and Higley 1992; Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995).

This chapter focuses on some procedural characteristics of the transition that have ensured the relatively stable and orderly start of the new democracy. It will argue that a transacted transition did take place in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria involving several distinct steps,

279 such as the negotiation and signing of the round-table accords between the government and the organized opposition in January-May 1990, the holding of foundational elections in June

1990, and the parliamentary election of the opposition leader as President of the Republic in August 1990. In spite of sharp ideological polarization, the cooperation among the principal political actors in the first half of 1990 was remarkable. No instances of armed violence, military coups or civil war interrupted Bulgaria’s early democratic trajectory. The democratization process commanded agreement among the mutually antagonistic ruling and opposition elites, which was sufficient to overcome the numerous problems and obstacles to the transition. The relatively well-crafled transition to democracy in Bulgaria was effected by what Huntington (1991: 164) calls “the methods of democracy”: negotiations, compromises and agreements. The dynamics of the democratic transition made it possible for the major players involved to converge on an elite accommodation, crafting pacted reform and ending Communist rule without a fi’atricidal war or undemocratic institutional legacies.

The Players’ Strategies

A high degree of initial mass mobilization is necessary for launching the democratic transition (Gunther and Higley 1992; Tarrow 1995). Fundamental social action in the form of mass pressures, protests and strikes-what O’Donnell and Schmitter ( 1986:53-56) call the

“popular upsurge” -helped end the Communist monopoly on power and initiated democratization in all countries of Eastern Europe (Linden 1990). The pluralization of politics in Bulgaria began with mass public action in the streets after the 10 November 1989 palace revolution. The resignation of Zhivkov was followed by increasingly militant

280 grassroots mobilization, notably in the large cities. There was an explosive surge in the number and activity of alternative groups and organizations. The BCP government came under intense pressure to introduce genuine reforms in the Bulgaria’s political and economic institutions.

The altered domestic and international scene forced the post-Zhivkov leadership to adopt a new strategy geared towards its long-term stn-vival by focusing on peaceful co­ existence with the newly developing opposition (Engelbrekt 1990a). In order to avoid possible banishment from politics and preserve its future electoral chances, the BCP turned to radical reforms aimed at divesting itself of the negative legacies of the past. In response to opposition pressures and the emergence of effective politics of protest, the regime tried to demonstrate a genuine commitment to democratic norms and procedures rather than pay lip service to democracy and constitutionalism, as in the past. Faced with mounting pressures for change, the BCP hard-liners had to make room for yoimger, more liberal party leaders willing to negotiate and cooperate with the opposition. A Central Committee plenum held on 16 November 1989 started a widespread purge of top-ranking officials belonging to

Zhivkov’s irmer circle. Responding to mass protests in December, the BCP widened the scope of the piuge and brought back into the leadership an old party reformer, Alexander

Lilov, who had been ousted in 1983. Zhivkov and his son, Vladimir, as well as several of their cronies, were expelled from the party. The fonner leader and his policies were attacked at many independent mass rallies and vigils, which began in Sofia and then spread to the rest of the country. Zhivkov’s authoritarianism, malfeasance, and other abuses of power were severely criticized in the mass media and the National Assembly. Even his participation

281 in the wartime resistance was questioned. The ex-leader was placed under house arrest on

18 January 1990.

During his first months in power, the leader Petar Mladenov concentrated

his efforts on political liberalization by small but impressive confidence-building steps. His

speeches centered on constructing a democratic, law-governed state and civil society,

instituting fi^eedom and pluralism, separating party and state, and shifting power to a government responsible to the National Assembly rather than the ruling party. Mladenov

recognized the right of independent groups and movements to exist legally by allowing them to hold public meetings, permitting the mass media to cover their activities, and meeting himself with several of their leaders. He also abolished articles of the penal code proscribing unauthorized political activity and granted an amnesty to all those sentenced under their provisions. The Sixth Department of the State Security agency, whose task was to watch and persecute , was dismantled. The media were given a degree of freedom unprecedented for the past four decades and launched audaciously outspoken attacks on the government, including statements by previously blacklisted writers and journalists. The

Agrarian Union (BANU), the official trade unions, and even the BCP’s own youth wing became independent entities. Numerous new autonomous organizations appeared on the scene—from civic societies to resurrections of old political parties (Nikolaev 1990a). In another major concession, free elections for a new parliament were scheduled for May 1990 and the regime pledged to abide by the electoral results. But the party’s initial steps were directed more at regime liberalization than real democratization.

It is generally recognized that democratization in Bulgaria was initiated by the

Communist regime (see Krumov 1990; Karasimeonov 1995b; Linz and Stepan 1996).

282 Regime change was imposed from the top and not the result of a mass movement from the bottom. A prominent BCP reformer, Atanas Semerdjiev, confirms this conclusion:

In fact the BSP initiated the changes in the country. In Bulgaria there was no opposition against the former regime of the sort that existed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The Bulgarian dissidents were few and they came mainly from the circles of the old Communist party. That is why the changes had to begin and were started by reformers and top people from the Party leadership. The new leaders of the Party established contacts with the opposition right after the 10th of November not because of outside pressure, but because they themselves believed they should do this. The Party leadership declared null and void dozens of articles in the then existing criminal code that had limited civil liberties; in other words, it restored all civil rights of the people... These actions were due to the new Party leaders like Petar Mladenov, Andrei Lukanov, Georgi Atanasov. And as Minister of the Interior, I provided, so to speak, the opposition with telephones and cars. I helped them in every possible way because we understood that without proper material conditions they would be unable to carry out real political activity. By Government decision, the UDF was given two public buildings— one of them on 134 Rakovsky Street and the other—on 39 Dondukov Boulevard. These are nice, spacious buildings. The Party based its policy on the dialogue that was taking place. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

Although lagging behind some of the more radical changes taking place in other post-Communist countries, Mladenov's reforms were nevertheless a demonstration of the party’s sincerity and good will. These initial unilateral steps were designed to build mutual trust and to convince the population that the BCP was serious about revamping the old political system. But these first tentative steps made by the reformist regime were seen as insufficient by a politically aroused public which demanded more fundamental change. As

Huntington (1991: 136-137) suggests, liberalizing regimes are inherently unstable and transitory, because initial reforms provoke mass demands for further, more rapid change rather than the stability that the liberalizers are seeking. The rapid re-emergence of political and civil society in Bulgaria made possible the extensive political mobilization efforts of the

283 anti-Communist opposition, which began to stage mass demonstrations in Sofia and other cities. The period of post-Zhivkov liberalization is said to have lasted only about a month,

“from November 10 to December 14,1990, that is, fi’om the downfall of Zhivkov to the first openly voiced anti-Communist demonstrations” (Todorova 1992: 163). Although initiated by the incumbent regime, the transition to democracy was being increasingly driven forward by extensive mass mobilization by the opposition.

Several independent groups and associations (the Radical Democratic Party; the

Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-Nikola Petkov; the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party; the Ecoglasnost Independent Association; the Independent Society for the Protection of

Human Rights; the Federation of Independent Student Unions; the Podkrepa Independent

Labor Federation; the Federation of Independent Clubs for the Support of Glasnost and

Democracy; the Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience and

Spiritual Values; the Club of Victims of post-1945 Repressions) joined together on 7

December 1989 to form an umbrella organization, the UDF, in order to constitute a well- organized political opposition with a united election platform. Some additional parties, most notably the Democratic Party, fomially joined the UDF in the next few months. The chairman of the Federation of Independent Clubs for the Support of Glasnost and

Democracy, Zheliu Zhelev, emerged as the recognized UDF leader, who could speak for the fledgling democratic opposition (Simeonov 1996).

An important proposition from elite theory is that political leaders must be empowered to negotiate on behalf of their supporters, which requires the presence of accepted leaderships at the head of coherent and institutionalized secondary groups (see

Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992b). For this reason, transitions fi"om authoritarian rule are

284 seen as more favorable to elite agreement and democratization than transitions from

Communist regimes. What is important from a theoretical viewpoint is that the UDF became the commonly recognized opposition organization in Bulgaria with a defined, centralized leadership embodied in its National Coordinating Council. Its leaders were demonstrably capable of mobilizing and, if necessary, restraining their supporters as well as of providing the guarantee that any deals they made with the government would be honored. There was never any doubt that Zhelev, as its respected and undisputed leader, could bargain for and make concessions in the name of the entire anti-govemment opposition (see Simeonov

1996).

Emerging from a long period of repressed pluralism, the young opposition was at first weak, hesitant, and disorganized. But sensing that both the domestic and international situation ruled out a return to the status quo ante, it became bolder and provided a clear political alternative to the regime. The UDF began to press the government to speed up the process of democratization and to fulfil its promises of pluralism and dialogue by engaging in open round-table talks. The BCP was thrown on the defensive, lacking both the ability and the will to rein in an increasingly assertive civil society. With the collapse of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the prospects for Soviet intervention nearly non­ existent, suppressing the organized opposition and a reversion to monopoly rule were no longer viable options for the regime.

Informal dissident groups had begun secret negotiations with the post-Zhivkov leadership only days after the November 10 change. One of the main oppositional leaders,

Petko Simeonov, recalls that the abolition of Article 1, the constitutional guarantee of the

BCP’s power monopoly, was the first issue on the negotiation agenda:

285 ...it was within the ranks of the Communist party itself that the call for abolishing Article 1 was the strongest. We put pressure on them to speed up this abolishment.... The pressure by the informal dissident groups preceded the debates on Article 1. We entered into a dialogue with the authorities, with the totalitarian authorities, right after Todor Zhivkov was deposed and that happened before the creation of the UDF. And they gave us their word they would abolish Article 1 of the Constitution. (Interview with Simeonov Melone 1996b)

When the National Assembly convened on December 14 to repeal Article I, some

20,000 people, mostly university students, formed a human chain aroimd the building. The demonstrators overreacted to news that, for legal-procedural reasons, the legislature had postponed for a month the vote on the constitutional amendment. With the impatient crowd on the verge of storming the National Assembly while it was in session, Mladenov tried to assure the protesters of the government’s honest intentions, but was heckled and booed. It was at that moment that Mladenov made the fateful threat (“Let the tanks come!”) that would come back to haunt him only a few months later. By all accounts, the protest almost ended in a riot, but the unruly demonstrators were restrained and persuaded to disperse peacefully by Zhelev and other UDF leaders. Petko Simeonov, one of the rally organizers, remembers just how explosive the situation was on that day:

On 14 December 1989 the Communist National Assembly, under pressure from the informal dissident groups, started debates on the abolishment of Article 1 of the Constitution on the leading role of the Communist party. The UDF was bom just one week before. A mass rally was organized around the National Assembly and people for the first time in their lives felt free. Well, this new feeling of freedom is very intense and it could become dangerous. There were appeals from the crowd around the National Assembly building to enter by force and to throw the deputies out. Mr. Zhelev, myself, and some other persons circulated around with megaphones, trying to appease the people. We appealed to them not to storm the building. There were others who admonished the crowd to get inside, saying that bloodshed is unavoidable... at that point Mr. Zhelev and the rest of us, Mr. Ivailo Trifonov and Konstantin Trenchev, took to the rostrum in front of the building of the Students’ House of Culture, just opposite the Parliament. From there, Mr.

2 8 6 Zhelev for the first time said to the people that we are for a peaceful transition to democracy; we stand for changing the system through elections, through fi-ee elections. Be patient, he said. We have to advance step by step. So we appealed to the people to disperse and to go home and they did....

Article I of the then existing Constitution could not be abolished by a simple debate in the National Assembly—which took place on 14 December. According to the provisions of the then existing Constitution the people would have to wait an additional month before the abolishment of Article 1 could occur. Therefore, at the 14 December mass rally we were trying to appease the people. We argued that the constitutional procedure should be followed. And indeed, on 16 January 1990 Article 1 was abolished. (Interview with Simeonov in Melone 1996b)

While some UDF radicals still regret the missed opportunity on 14 December, when the opposition could have seized power, Zhelev has defended the decision to restrain the hotheads among the demonstrators:

That would have been a political adventure, which could have ended in bloodshed. In my view, had we allowed violence to take place in the National Assembly Square on December 14, this could have easily become the Bulgarian Tiananmen Square or Timisoara, given the confusion among the ruling circles, who could have resorted to ill-considered, rash actions. (Zhelev 1996:14)

The day after the rally the National Assembly sharply criticized the demonstration as an act of “political intolerance” and “extremism,” but this criticism provoked new opposition protests. The UDF organized several protest marches to the National TV headquarters in

Sofia to denounce its biased reporting of the event and demand the sacking of its BCP- appointed director (Gavrilov 1990a).

Mass political mobilization was the direct result of extensive efforts by the anti-

Communist opposition in support of anti-regime protest actions. The , which received extensive coverage in the Bulgarian mass media, further galvanized the opposition to press for faster and more thorough changes in Bulgaria, while the execution

287 of the Ceaucescus must have compelled the BCP leadership to consider the possible high costs of confrontation. New demonstrations in Sofia demanded the separation of party and state, the immediate resignation of the entire BCP leadership, and the removal of party organizations from work places. Responding to the UDF’s appeals for mass action, thousands of young people formed a new human chain around the parliament building on 15

January 1990, calling for the constitutional clause designating Bulgaria a governed by the working class also to be abolished (Gavrilov 1990a).

The regime reacted to the street protests by offering to begin official talks with the opposition, while still hoping that its early steps aimed at unilateral democratization would enable it to control and direct the transition process. A meeting on the possibility of such talks had been held on 15 December 1989 with the participation of BCP and UDF leaders.

After the meeting, Zhelev called for the beginning of immediate discussions on equal terms.

Podkrepa issued a statement calling for a warning strike on December 27 to be followed by a general strike the next day. This coincided with a statement of the UDF leadership which called for round-table talks to be held early and openly, with detailed reporting to the public.

It also demanded that the talks conclude with a unanimous vote on a final document binding on all parties involved in the negotiating process. Even the BCP’s coalition partner, the pro- govemment BANU, while opposed to a general strike, also called for the immediate convening of a national round table. The numerous protest strikes across the country.

Podkrepa’s threat of a nationwide work stoppage and the protests of ethnic Turks persuaded the BCP to propose round-table talks, beginning in January 1990.

Grassroots mobilization stimulated positive change by pressuring the BCP regime to engage in a round-table dialogue with the opposition. The round-table talks were seen as

288 a “preemptive measure by the BCP” (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996: 181): to opt for a unilateral regime transformation and reject an opportunity to deal with an opposition that was growing stronger and better organized with every passing day would have carried high risks for the government. Negotiation was an even more attractive option for the anti-Communist opposition, which was weak, disorganized, little-known and unsure whether it could sur\ ive any serious confrontation, given the regime’s firm control over the coercive machinery of the state. While nationwide mass action had led to significant regime concessions, it was not nearly sufficient to destabilize the BSP government to the point where it would lose its coercive monopoly and cede power to the opposition without some kind of a formal elite accommodation. Inclusive, face-to-face negotiations were necessary to build minimal trust and understanding between the incumbents and the opposition. Former UDF chairman Petar

Beron recounts the hard realities the newborn UDF faced in those days:

But you must understand the nature of the times. Mladenov was president but the main features of the old regime were still in place. Lukanov and Mladenov were considered, if not revolutionaries, certainly they were regarded as reformers against the old guard, which was even worse. We supported the reform wing of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Now, however, it is very easy to say, ‘You were behaving as traitors, because you were talking with Lukanov....’ But at the time the opposition movement was weak. The army, the police—everything—was in the hands of the Communist party. Now things are quite different.... We had to support the new trend, the new wave, the so-called reformers against Todor Zhivkov and his associates. Step by step we needed to push them out of power. It was not possible to do otherwise. Now it is very easy to exclaim against us but those who accuse us were hiding at the time! We were busy provoking the Communists. But our detractors just sat back waiting to see what would happen. Now everywhere they protest loudly.

So after first establishing the UDF we decided by the end of the year that it was now necessary to create conditions for new elections. We subsequently formed a contact group and created the National Roundtable talks. Today’s radicals regard the Roimdtable itself as an act of treason. They rhetorically proclaim: ‘Why talk with the Communists?’ But we had no choice. There

289 was no other way to solve the problems. They say, ‘Why didn’t you enter the ministries and throw them out?’ It is easy to make such statements today, but I ask why did they not do this themselves? The answer is at the time it was dangerous to do so: 90 percent of the army officers were Communists, the whole police, everything.... The Soviet Union was still in existence at this time. All the treaties were still valid, the Warsaw Pact and so on. They were still valid and nobody knew what might happen if violence erupted... We had to create the Roundtable—it was a correct step. (Interview with Beron in Melone 1996b)

Given the political calculus of possible rewards and punishments over the longer run, the BCP and the UDF chose negotiation and cooperation as the most rational strategy under the existing difficult circumstances. Given Bulgaria’s tragic history and present political realities it was clear what the players’ long-term common interest was: both had to avoid by all means confrontation and possibly civil war, which threatened a very likely return to dictatorship. Direct conflict would have been the most imattractive outcome for both sides.

As Lukanov recalls, the self-interests of the two protagonists, as well as their common social background and shared commitment to democracy, propelled them towards a negotiated agreement:

On the other side at that time the leading positions in the opposition itself were taken by dissidents, who were fighting the totalitarian society. Of course, dissidence in Bulgaria was much weaker than in other ex-socialist countries, but still they were fighting totalitarianism under the slogans of civil society, democratic rights and other personal rights. And we were altogether sincere believers in democracy. The right-wing part of the UDF at that time was not known; it was present but it was playing third and fourth rate roles behind the scene. Many of the front-line dissidents and creators of the new opposition in Bulgaria were themselves ex-Communists. Some of them were Communists even at the time they were forming the opposition against us. They left the party two or three months after the 10th of November. So, in a way they also understood—because of their background—that democracy could not be achieved through repetition of vendetta, through revenge in the form of repression against the other side. (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b)

290 While there was conservative resistance within the BCP to the idea of convening a round

table with opposition participation, it was not difficult for reformist leaders like Lukanov to

subdue it:

...at the time it was not too difficult to overcome it, because first of all there was a general recognition in the society that totalitarian socialism had failed. So, at that time people, who liked to defend it uncritically were rather subdued; they felt that it was not the right kind of statement to make. And our authority was unchallenged absolutely.... So, both within the Party and the general public our support was so great that we could impose our own way of thinking without using any other means than conviction and our own statements as to how things should be done if we want to achieve democracy. So, fi-om that point o f view we had such strong support—public support and internal support within the Party—that it was not a problem. Opposition and discussion came later, when things started to normalize, and after we insisted on transforming the Party itself into a democratic institution, doing away with democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist dogma. Three or four months later we faced opposition from conservatives within the Party. But at the beginning there was no resistance to change—everybody understood that change was inevitable. (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b)

Preliminary negotiations were held on 3-4 January 1990, ending with an agreement to hold the first round of formal discussions on the “problems of national reconciliation” from January 16 to 24. It was also agreed that all decisions at the roimd table would be made on a consensus basis. The participation of the pro-govemment BANU as an independent negotiating parmer represented a concession by the UDF, which had earlier insisted that there should be only two sides in the negotiations, with BANU being part of the “totalitarian bloc” together with the BCP and other representatives of the former power elite (BTA in

English, January 4, 1990).

Even after the regime’s unequivocal decision to begin formal negotiations with the opposition, protests in the streets continued, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister

Atanasov for his role in the ethnic assimilation campaign and the postponement until

291 November o f new parliamentary elections. UDF leaders urged the protesters to keep up the pressure on the regime by holding weekly rallies outside the National Assembly and the BCP headquarters in Sofia (BTA in English, January 16, 1990). Finding itself under escalating pressure from the opposition, the BCP needed an agreement with the UDF that would guarantee its survival in the new conditions (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996). The surging mobilization of anti-Communist forces thus provided a strong impetus for the decision to negotiate. By showing an impressive ability to mobilize supporters and organize mass demonstrations, especially in the capital, the opposition was able to persuade the regime to agree to enter into immediate negotiations on the future of the country. To use Himtington’s terminology, an initial process of regime “transformation,” in which the reform-minded elite in power takes the lead in introducing democracy, was quickly replaced by a process of regime “transplacement” -that is, a democratic transition negotiated between government and opposition elites imder mounting domestic and international pressures for change.

The Round Table Talks

Stable and legitimate democratic institutions most often emerge from negotiation between formerly adversarial elites. As Przeworski observes, democracy “cannot be dictated; it emerges fi-om bargaining” (1991:80). Transitions to democracy usually begin when there is a mutually perceived sense of stalemate between incumbents and challengers, the continuation of which becomes imtenable for both sides (Rostow 1971). Economic problems persist and civil unrest threatens the coimtry. The opposition is tmable to overthrow the regime, nor can the incumbents easily suppress the opposition. Elite accommodation by

292 negotiation is encouraged by the threat of anarchy and chaos implicit in a continued stalemate or in the costs to be incurred by further confrontation:

Protagonists agree to terminate conflicts...because they fear that a continuation of conflict may lead to civil war that will be both collectively and individually threatening. The pressure to stabilize the situation is tremendous since governance must somehow continue. Chaos is the worse alternative for all. .. Political actors calculate that whatever difference in their welfare could result from a more favorable institutional framework is not worth the risk inherent in continued conflict. (Przeworski 1991: 85)

According to Przeworski and others, the transition to democracy is brought on by talks and agreements between reformers in the ruling regime and moderates in the opposition. Nearly all post-Communist transitions in Eastern Europe took the form of negotiated settlements.

The institution of the round table was used as a permanent point of contact and negotiation between reformist Communist governments and opposition forces. Established with the aim of minimizing the risk of confrontation, the national round tables developed into a visible means for the opposition to exercise influence over the incumbent regimes during the process of peaceful democratization (Kusin 1990; Elster 1996). This forum enabled the participants to reach democratic compromises which defined the new rules of the political game (Baylis

1994: 319-320).

Focusing on the role of these extra-parliamentary negotiating mechanisms reflecting popular opinion is necessary for any theoretical effort to grasp the early dynamics of post-

Communist transitions to democracy. Although Gorbachev’s new hands-off policy had put them on the defensive, the governments of most East European countries were politically still strong enough to subdue any open opposition challenge, though less confident about their legitimate moral right to do so. Without the consent o f these ruling elites to enter into negotiations with the anti-Communist opposition, no democratic breakthrough would have

293 been possible, even if all other conditions had been favorable. The Magdalenka agreements

in Poland opened the way for the relegalization o f Solidarity, partially free elections, and the

Solidarity-led government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In Hungary’s “negotiated revolution,”

a modus vivendi between regime and opposition for the period prior to the March 1990

elections was negotiated at round-table talks, paving the way for the country’s smooth

transition to democracy. The round-table negotiations in Czechoslovakia led to the

resignations of Communist office-holders and forged common groimd on such questions as

the election of Vaclav Havel as federal president, the nomination of the Slovak Communist

Marian Calfa as prime minister, and the holding of free elections which brought to power

Civic Forum and . East Germany’s reformist regime of Prime

Minister Hans Modrow was saved from total collapse by round-table bargaining, opening

the door for the opposition’s electoral victory of March 1990 and the coimtry’s speedy

absorption into West Germany. Even in Romania, a roimd-table agreement led to the

formation of Petre Roman’s coalition cabinet of national unity that initially included

representatives from all political parties but was dominated by the National Salvation Front

of (Kusin 1990; Elster 1996).

Of course, the holding of a national round table was never intended as a panacea to

settle all transition problems. In Bulgaria, the round-table talks began as a substitute for the coalition government that the ruling BCP had offered but the militant opposition had

rejected, and eventually became the focal point of the UDF’s campaign for political and

economic change. Partly out of fear that in the absence of negotiations civil unrest might engulf the country and partly in the hope that it would be able to structure the terms of the

2 94 future settlement, the BCP accepted the Roimd Table, taking as a model those East European

countries where negotiated transitions to democracy were taking place

After several delays due to haggling over the UDF’s demands for access to national

TV and radio, the Round Table finally opened on January 22 at the National Palace of

Culture in Sofia. The bargaining process included key government figures and representatives of BANU, the major opposition parties and movements, as well as the trade union and several other public organizations in observer status. The

Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the Communist Youth Union (now renamed the Bulgarian Democratic Youth), the Fatherland Union, the Movement of Bulgarian

Women, the Anti-Fascist Union, the Committee for the Defense of National Interests and several other pro-govemment groups shared the BSP’s quota, while the UDF’s delegation included also the Democratic Party, the Green Party and several independent organizations.

Representatives of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Muslim Council were invited as guests. Only the MRF was excluded in spite of its protests. Not only was the MRF viewed as a government ploy to divide the anti-Communist forces, but the UDF leadership was also determined to marginalize all other parties inside and outside the parliament which might challenge its position as the principal representative of the entire opposition (Simeonov

1996).

Since the National Assembly was seen as unrepresentative, the Round Table came to function almost as a Je facto parliament exercising decisive influence over the course of the transition. Its sessions were broadcast live on radio and covered extensively on TV. The main reason why the opposition demanded that the round-table sessions be broadcast live on radio and TV was to acquire public legitimacy and “politicize” the population (Simeonov

295 1996:92-93). The round-table participants conducted intense negotiations through May that produced agreements on a number of fundamental issues such as adopting a law on political parties and movements; the depoliticization of the armed forces, the police, the court system and educational institutions; the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; and a ban on anti-system parties and groups. While the BCP pressed for a multiparty coalition cabinet, the UDF focused on reaching agreement on the constitutional procedures by which a democratic government could be formed.

The round-table negotiations elicited important political concessions from the regime, making possible the country’s rapid transition to democracy. At the first sessions of the talks which were closed to the media, a series of tacit understandings were reached over how the future democratic game was to be played. All participants, including the BCP, supported a peaceful and prompt elimination of the existing political system. The UDF called for a faster pace of democratization similar to the other East European transitions rather than the slower

Soviet model of reforms. Zhelev demanded that the democratic elections for a constituent assembly to write a new basic law be delayed to give the opposition more time to organize.

The leader of the government delegation, Lukanov, insisted that the BCP is prepared to seek common ground and cooperation with all those who advocate the building of a democratic and law-governed state and civil society in Bulgaria, regardless of their political convictions.

But he rejected calls to reveal the BCP’s assets and its leaders’ incomes, warning that his party would not consent to an anti-Communist “witch-hunt.” He also opposed the postponement of parliamentary elections claiming that this would delay the entire process of democratization. Since the UDF continued to insist on holding general elections in the fall, this was the only issue on which opinions were most clearly divided.

296 Government and opposition representatives agreed to focus on the country’s future

political system, establishing a law-based state, drafting a new electoral law, and dealing

with pressing socioeconomic problems. Contact groups were set up with the task of drafting

reform legislation. It was also agreed that both public and closed sessions would be held and

that a concluding document would be issued covering even those topics, on which no

consensus had been reached. In response to the guidelines issued by the round-table

negotiators, the National Assembly began drafting laws on political pluralism, a multiparty

system, and other democratization measures. Parliament also approved a plan for radical

economic reform, the strategic goal of which was the “transition to a market economy by

allowing pluralism of ownership in all its forms” (BTA in English, January 26, 1990). After

the government ordered the dissolution of BCP cells in the armed forces, all branches of the

BCP in the military, including the Main Political Administration, were disbanded.

Even before the opening of the Round-table talks, the ruling Socialists had offered the opposition to join a government coalition of national consensus:

We invited the opposition to form a coalition government as early as December 1989. Before the Roundtable! Two or three weeks before the Roundtable we said that we are ready to share power; not because we have similar views, but because we think the nation is facing a very difficult transition period with many crises to come. And in these conditions we should try to concentrate on finding a national consensus on basic, fundamental issues. That is why I was insisting all along that we form a coalition government and that we should keep places in the government for the opposition. (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b)

But the UDF declined this offer. Zhelev claimed that his organization did not want to share responsibility for past abuses of power or the looming economic crisis (BTA in English,

January 28,1990). Another reason he mentioned was that the BCP’s two-thirds majority in the National Assembly meant that it could block any opposition reform program. There were

297 other objections as well, especially from the UDF’s largest members, the Social Democrats

of Petar Dertliev and the Nikola Petkov Agrarians ofMilan Drenchev (Krnmov 1995). Even

though both were the only center-left parties in the UDF, they had suffered greater losses

than the other historical parties in the Communist purges of the late 1940s. While the opening of formal bargaining revealed a surprising degree of unanimity among participating party leaders on the future democratic structure of the coimtry, the protagonists could not

ignore the constraints imposed by history and negative memories of the past.

At an extraordinary BCP congress held from January 30 to February 2, Mladenov again proposed a coalition government of national consensus, but there was no consensus on this issue as some delegates proposed a cabinet of experts rather than a cabinet of party leaders to organize free elections and begin implementing immediate economic reforms. Nor was there unanimity on the question of democratic reform. The new leadership came under intense pressure from younger delegates to speed up democratization within the party (BTA in English, February 4, 1990). With its free-spirited debate and open commitment to democratic socialism, the congress was an encouraging first step in the BCP’s transformation into a mainstream democratic party. The election of Petar-Emil Mitev to the Presidium of the BCP’s new ruling body, the Supreme Council, was a clear sign that democracy, civil society and market economy were the goals favored by many in the new leadership. In its political program. Professor Mitev’s faction, the Bulgarian Road to Europe, called on

Bulgarians to emerge from international isolation and re-unite with democratic Europe.

These positive internal changes indicated that the reform-minded party leaders were ready to strike a power-sharing deal with the opposition.

298 At the next round of the round-table talks held on February 6, Interior Minister

A tan as Semerdjiev made another public gesture aimed at reassuring the opposition of the government’s sincere intentions. He testified that the secret police had been disbanded, and personnel at his Ministry o f Internal Affairs cut by 80%. The Interior Minister also assured opposition negotiators that their private communications were not being monitored and apologized to all those whose rights had been violated in the past. Colonel-General

Semerdjiev has explained the reasons for his participation in the round-table dialogue;

My participation at the Roundtable was mainly due to the fact that I was the Minister of the Interior. In the first place, it was quite natural that the security and public order forces were greatly scrutinized by the society and the then existing opposition. One of their main tasks was the disbandment of the security structures. Because of the role the security and public order structures had played in the society and because of their past repressive functions they were considered as one of the pillars of the totalitarian regime. Naturally their restructuring, their democratic transformation, was one of the key factors in the transition towards democracy, a market economy, and a civil society. The Roundtable could not avoid tackling these problems.

I have to say that the former Communist party leadership totally realized the legitimacy of the interest and the insistence of the newborn opposition in knowing what was going on in the security services. And it responded to this request by agreeing that the Interior Minister ought to take part in the work of the Roundtable, that its representative should make a thorough statement at the Roundtable and participate in a wide-ranging discussion. So it happened...by mutual consent. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

The struggle between conservatives and reformers in the regime intensified after the

BCP congress, culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister Atanasov and his replacement by Lukanov. Unlike Atanasov, who had been a Zhivkov protégé, the new premier had a pragmatic image and was praised by Zhelev and other opposition leaders as

“a highly professional, talented, competent politician” (quoted in Engelbrekt 1990b).

Lukanov’s rise marked the end of the conservative contestation of the authority of regime

299 reformers, expanding the latter’s room for maneuver in the round-table negotiations. By effectively marginalizing conservative forces within the regime, BCP reformers were in a position to accept the crucial concessions demanded by the opposition. According to BCP reformer Georgi Bliznashky,

...the key figure during this period was Mr. Lukanov...he may have played the same role here in Bulgaria as Adolfo Suares did in Spain. His is from an old political family: his father and his grandfather were active in politics. His grandfather was leader of the Party in the twenties--he was second in command of the Party here in the twenties. Andrei Lukanov was the man who could make the with the opposition coming fix>m within the Party. He was the same figure as Adolfo Suares who came fi-om the ranks of the Phalanges and forged reform in Spain changing the political system. (Interview with Bliznashky in Melone 1996b)

The new cabinet consisted only of liberal Communists and independents after the

Agrarians withdrew from the government in February, ending their 42-year coalition with the BCP. In his first statement as prime minister, Lukanov offered the Agrarian Union and other independent groups in the National Assembly five ministries as well as a deputy prime minister each, but his offer was turned down. The UDF also refused an invitation to join, thus rejecting the idea of an explicit power-sharing agreement. In spite of the rejection.

Lukanov continued to insist that “our hand of cooperation remains outstretched” to all opposition parties in Bulgaria (BTA in English, February 15, 1990).

A joint declaration read at the round-table talks on February 12 called for an atmosphere of national consensus, mutual trust and responsibility to assure Bulgaria's peaceful and orderly transition to democracy. It announced that a draft agreement had been reached by all sides at the talks on proposed politico-legal changes which would be submitted to the next session of the National Assembly for discussion and adoption. The

BCP agreed that party organizations should be banned from government offices, the

300 judiciary, educational and public health institutions, but it resisted opposition calls to disband its cells in all other work places. The new BCP leader, Alexander Lilov, suggested that party members themselves should vote on whether to disband their organizations or not.

Negotiations were suspended because o f the failure to agree on this particular point, which became a major source of disagreement between the BCP and the opposition. The

UDF threatened to pull out of the talks altogether and call for popular protests if the problem was not resolved by February 16. Only when opposition parties announced plans for mass demonstrations to protest the government’s stalling on this issue, did the BCP finally agree to meet this demand. At the end of March, the National Assembly passed a law which made the presence of any party organizations in work places illegal and permitted them only on a territorial basis. At a party plenum held on February 24, BCP leaders decided to ballot the entire membership on adopting a new party name, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), as a symbolic departure from the Communist past. In response to another opposition demand, they also agreed to postpone parliamentary elections from May to Jime and to invite international observers to monitor the vote. They also proposed that March 3, the anniversary of Bulgaria’s liberation from Ottoman rule, be made a national holiday in place of September

9. the controversial anniversary of the 1944 Communist takeover. This was another highly symbolic measure meant to pacify the opposition, which the National Assembly promptly adopted.

The BCP leadership was imder considerable domestic and international pressure to come to terms with the opposition. The UDF accused the government of trying to turn the

Round Table into a discussion of purely economic and social issues, ignoring its decisively political character:

301 We have been engaged in empty, useless discussions for a very long time now, while the National Assembly has continued to pass legislation to its own liking. But we convened this Round Table precisely because the Assembly is not up to the job of legislating. It has demonstrated for many years now that it is a unfit, unproductive, fake and undemocratically-elected body. It is the handmaiden of the BCP, which has rubber-stamped all party decrees and directives, thereby legitimating its usurpation of power and totalitarian policies. It is quite clear that the Assembly cannot continue to work in its present composition, since we all know how its deputies were appointed, so that the Communists can now have a majority of 67% of the seats. Because the Round Table is a national forum, where all political forces in our country can meet to express their diverse opinions about the present and future problems of Bulgaria, we should have accorded it a higher status than we did. What is happening in practice? From the outset, the Round Table has become a forum for trade unions. Communist Youth groups and women’s groups to read their declarations and other documents and waste our time. In my view, this is a delaying tactic which has continued ever since, given all these amendments, structural changes and what n o t... For instance, the pro-regime Agrarian Union, which has never been independent fi-om the BCP, now wants-who knows why?—to be a “third side” at the Round Table. What do they mean by that? It is time for some people to understand that there can be no “third side.” Moreover, I have the feeling that the BCP delegation is trying to divert our attention to issues of secondary importance. As they did with the senseless delay in disbanding the BCP workplace cells... And the same thing happened with the depolitization of the army and the police ... (Interview with Emil Koshloukov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990:25-26)

The opposition even threatened to suspend the talks imless the BCP promptly signed a comprehensive political agreement on the future of the country (BTA in English, March 8.

1990). UDF leaders called for daily protests to pressure the BCP into making further concessions. In the next few weeks thousands of people participated in demonstrations organized by the UDF leaders to protest what they saw as BCP delaying tactics in the round­ table discussions. The UDF was using this valuable extra-institutional bargaining weapon to make credible threats, demonstrating to the ruling Commimists that it had the capacity to mobilize its mass following against the government to the point of making the country ungovernable, if the negotiating option should fail. Tensions were running so high that at a

302 BCP counter-rally in Sofia party leader Lilov warned the crowd of over 100,000 supporters

that Bulgaria faced the choice of bloodshed, as in Romania, or peaceful reform, as in

Hungary. Lilov denounced the “anti-Communist hysterics” of the opposition and accused

it of unfairly blaming the BCP for all domestic problems (BTA in English, March 10,1990).

In a further blow to BCP’s fortunes, an extraordinary congress of the pro-govemment

BANU at the end of February 1990 confirmed its complete break with the Communists. Its new chairman, Victor Valkov, declared that BANU would become a centrist party and a third side, independent of both the BCP and the UDF, in the round-table negotiations. At the same time, the Alternative Socialist Party, established by prominent reform-minded intellectuals who had broken away from the BCP, held its founding conference in Sofia. On the issue of whether to join the opposition, the majority of delegates voted to remain independent but pledged to support the UDF in its efforts to dismantle the old power structures and democratize Bulgarian society (BTA in English, March 9, 1990). Because the ruling BSP was now without allies at home or abroad and more isolated politically than ever before, its public standing was eroding. In contrast to BSP’s disarray, the opposition forces were gaining in strength, unity and support simply by the recognition that the negotiating process had provided them. The UDF, the six-member Political Opposition Bloc, and five other, non- aligned parties held a conference in March 9-11 aimed at creating a united election front. A joint declaration supporting “unity of action ” was signed by all conference participants (BT A in English, March 12).

As mass protests continued, the bargaining power of the opposition continued to grow, since it could now make plausible threats to revert to a non-cooperative strategy even at the risk of confrontation. Perceiving their own strength, opposition negotiators had become

303 visibly intractable in their demands at the round-table talks. Prof. Alexander Yordanov of the

Radical-Democratic Party even threatened; “The Communist Party can be removed from power even before the elections. This is another option for us” (quoted in Simeonov 1996:

4 10). But in their strategic calculus they, too, faced incentives to reach an agreement, for the government had demonstrated so far that it was able to withstand radical opposition pressure without apparent signs of surrender or breakdown. An internally divided opposition wanted the new parliamentary elections to be held later, but ultimately decided to compromise on this issue. According to Stefan Gaitandzhiev, at that time a prominent member of the UDF, there was strong opposition to this decision:

Milan Drenchev as well as the Social-Democrats took the position that we were still unprepared, that this takes time. .. The proponents of the idea for early elections were mainly those leaders who gathered their information of the general situation by virtue of standing before rostrums at big rallies. (Interview with Gaitandzhiev in Melone 1996b)

Given the shifting distribution of power among the negotiating principals, the regime was equally keen to conclude a settlement. Under mounting pressure at home and abroad, its very credibility and legitimacy depended on the success of the bargaining process. Having neutralized the internal conservative opposition, it could no longer use the danger of a return to repression in order to demand moderation from its negotiating partners and their grassroots constituencies. Nor could it make plausible counter-threats of withholding cooperation or using coercion, given the fluidity and uncertainty of the strategic situation.

The UDF leadership seemed to have been aware of Socialist perceptions of the evolving balance of power: “I don’t believe that extreme repressive measures would be used—this would mean the end of the Communist Party, and the top-ranking Comrades know it well”

304 (interview with Emil Koshloukov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 27-28). Another UDF leader, Roumen Vodenicharov, confirmed this strategic analysis:

The Communists know that if they turn to the right and try to restore their dictatorship, blood would be spilled, including their own. .. Only the extreme Stalinists are inclined to do that, but-thank God!—there are not many of them left. The latter declare: “We seized power through bloodshed and only through bloodshed will we siurender it,” but they wield no political influence inside the party. It is the reform wing of the BCP that is influential now. Some of its representatives tell me: “Don’t you understand that these old Communists and Stalinists would go not just after you, but after us as well... ” (Interview with Vodenicharov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 96)

The opposition, on the other hand, had demonstrated that it could be neither marginalized nor co-opted at the negotiating table, retaining a capacity to veto any proposed settlement that came short of its demands. Should the round-table negotiations fail, the opposition could be expected to foment popular unrest and force a showdown with the regime, which was already facing international isolation. The latter outcome could mean the possibility of a civil conflict, confironting the ruling elite with highly undesirable domestic and international consequences even if it succeeded in suppressing the opposition. There was also powerftil external pressure on the regime to avoid a confrontation with the opposition, as U.S. Ambassador Sol Polansky and other Western envoys were attending regularly, in an unambiguous show of support, all UDF rallies in Sofia. Another major incentive for the ruling elite to face the uncertainties of electoral competition over the grim certainty of civil conflict was its confidence that it could win a majority in early elections for a constituent assembly, thus having a free rein to draft the new constitution and control the next government (Simeonov 1996; Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996).

For these and other reasons, the BSP conceded to opposition demands for the total dismantling of the ancien regime and its institutions. There would be no compromises

305 containing undemocratic components to assure members of the former Communist elite that their vital interests would not be threatened under the new system. All institutional guarantees would be provided by a strong parliamentary democracy, unrestricted by any reserve powers or constitutional devices for minimizing electoral risk and unpredictability.

To this effect, the round-table participants ratified three pivotal agreements at the March 12 session of the talks (see Gavrilov 1990b). The signed documents were: (1) Declaration on the Role and Status o f the National Round Table', (2) National Agreement on Guaranteeing the Peaceful Transition to a Democratic Political System ; and (3 ) Agreement on the Political

System. It was also agreed to create a working group that would draft a program for dealing with economic problems. Only one major difference remained. The UDF had initially demanded that general elections be held no earlier than the autumn of 1990 to give the opposition more time to organize. Having agreed to elections in June, the UDF now insisted that only a constituent assembly should be elected, which would frame a new constitution in time for regular parliamentary elections in November and then dissolve itself, thus giving the opposition another shot at gaining control over the National Assembly (Simeonov 1996).

Because it expected to win the election, the BSP argued that the new legislature should appoint a strong and responsible government that would be able to serve its full term of office and undertake major democratic reforms. After further debate, the resolution of this issue was postponed indefinitely.

The declaration on the role and status of the round table reaffirmed the latter’s function as an instrument of national consensus. It institutionalized the right of round-table negotiators to approve all significant draft legislation proposed by the government prior to its formal consideration by the National Assembly, creating in fact a parallel, extra­

306 constitutional legislature. This allowed the round table to reach crucial compromises on most

basic issues, which were then forwarded to the parliament for final approval. In spite of the

UDF’s public rejection of coalition government with the Socialists, a de facto power-sharing

arrangement between the regime and the opposition was already firmly in place. The

agreement on the peaceful transition to democracy proposed a number of constitutional

changes designed to eliminate non-democratic structures in the country, create an

institutionally weak presidency, and provide for elections for a constituent assembly, the

Grand National Assembly (GNA), which would write a new democratic constitution. The

last of the three documents, the agreement on the nature of Bulgaria’s future system,

affirmed the fundamental principles and rules for guaranteeing Bulgaria’s peaceful transition

to parliamentary democracy. The UDF leadership saw it as the most important one, signaling

that the government “has officially recognized the legitimacy of the opposition ” (Simeonov

1996:433).

The Round Table participants signed three more crucial documents on March 30. The

first was The Agreement on the Principles and Basic Norms o f the Law for the Election o f

the Grand National Assembly. The GNA elections would be based on a mixed electoral

system with half the 400 deputies elected in single-member districts with majority voting and

the other half fi-om multiple-member districts under party lists. This hybrid system was the

result of a compromise between the divergent calculations of each side about what kind of

electoral formula was likely to maximize its parliamentary representation. The Socialists

preferred a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system since they were better organized than the opposition and their leaders had higher name recognition. In contrast, the opposition

307 comprising numerous smaller parties and movements wanted a greater share of the Assembly seats to be elected proportionally.

The second document was The Agreement on the Basic Concepts and Principles of the Law on Political Parties, which declared Bulgaria a parliamentary democracy and established formal procedures permitting parties to be formed and gain ofhcial registration on the basis of little more than a declaration that the party has more than 50 members. The law on political parties, which became effective in April, prohibited, however, parties on an ethnic or religious basis, a controversial ban designed to prevent the formation of separatist organizations among the country’s ethnic and religious minorities. The Agreement also banned parties from receiving funds from foreign states, a ban that would be ignored by both sides, especially the anti-BSP opposition. The third accord was the Agreement on the Basic

Concepts and Principles of the Law to Amend and Supplement the Constitution, which set forth the principles of a freely and competitively elected legislature, a multiparty system, separation of powers, the legality and equal treatment of private ownership, and basic human rights and freedoms. The agreement abolished the old State Council and replaced it with a presidential institution, to which the National Assembly elected Petar Mladenov on April 3

(Gavrilov 1990c).

At the final Round Table session, held on May 14-15, The Agreement on the

Guaranteeing Free Elections was signed, which was designed to facilitate the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections. It stressed the need to ensure a fair conduct o f the election campaign and provide for a level playing-field by balancing the electoral resources of the government and the opposition. On the basis of these rules and norms, the negotiators

308 adopted also a detailed Code ofEthics for the Electoral Campaign, as well as an agreement on the use of public radio and television during the election.

It is obvious that the round-table talks unequivocally initiated a process of democratization, not just liberalization. The formal accords on a new democratic system represented a crucial first step toward democracy in Bulgaria. There would be no confining conditions for the transition. The parties agreed that a popularly elected constituent assembly would launch a genuine democratic process, in which the new constitution would be drafted by democratically elected delegates (see Bell, Gould and Smolka 1990). Without the Round­ table talks, no accommodation between the antagonistic elite factions in Bulgaria would have been possible. The Bulgarian Round Table clearly represented a form of elite settlement, making the transition to democracy possible.

The Founding Election

The most important result of the negotiations was the holding of free elections in 10-

17 June 1990 which were won by the former Communists. The “founding election”—that is. the first democratic election after the end of dictatorship—is usually viewed by voters as a referendum on the former regime (Bogdanor 1990). Post-Communist Bulgaria was no exception in this respect. A self-confident UDF in particular sought to make the elections a referendum on the past 45 years of Commimist rule, focusing in its campaign on the abuses and “atrocities” committed by the BCP during the Stalinist era (Bell 1993: 88). One of the

UDF leaders confidently predicted, “Even we decide to run a donkey against the

Communists, the donkey would still win” (interview with Petko Simeonov in Antova-

Konstantinova 1990: 63-64).

309 But ordinary Bulgarians, much like the Downsian rational voter (see Downs 1957),

did not ignore the competitors’ specific promises for the future. During the run-up to the

vote, the Socialist Party and the UDF had come out with what Todorova describes as

“practically identical programs, despite differences in wording and passionate claims for basic ideological incompatibility on both sides,” with the Socialist program of quick and

fundamental change being in fact “more radical than the program o f the opposition” ( 1992:

164). The BSP was anxious to present itself as a “normal” European political party (Nikolaev

1990c). Its leadership repeatedly declared itself ready to leave office if the party was defeated at the ballot box. At the same time, Lukanov tried to reassure BSP supporters that their party would not share the destiny of the other former Communist parties in Eastern Europe, because it had initiated the process of genuine reforms in Bulgaria. He urged the formation of a post-electoral coalition government enjoying broad-based public support-a move that, in his words, would better suit Bulgaria’s pressing needs (Engelbrekt 1990b). But the UDF was not interested in forming an elite coalition, claiming that to do so would mean that the opposition would have to share with the former Communists responsibility for dealing with the legacy of past mistakes, the exploding economic crisis and unpopular austerity measures.

In the last days of the election campaign, the UDF even refused to sign a pledge of mutual restraint and non-violence that President Mladenov had proposed. The Socialists used successfully this rejection as evidence of their rival’s “extremism.”

An overconfident UDF was totally unprepared for its electoral defeat. Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe had been routed in the first post-Communist elections, so the Bulgarian opposition had expected to receive an unambiguous mandate from the politically mobilized public. After the first roimd of voting gave the BCP an edge,

310 100,000 UDF supporters held a protest rally in Sofia, accusing the BSP of winning by fraud and intimidation. Mass protests took place also in other cities. On June 12, students occupied the buildings of Sofia University and blockaded all adjacent streets to demand that the official media publish full details of what they claimed were manipulations and falsifications of electoral returns. The student strikes and sit-ins launched the so-called “Civil

Disobedience” movement. The permanency of the Round-table accommodation was suddenly in jeopardy, since the radicals in the opposition were clearly rejecting the disappointing election outcome. To reduce tensions, Zhelev announced that the UDF would insist on new elections in districts where fraud had taken place, but he rejected calls by the demonstrators for completely new elections.

The holding of what were indisputably free, fair and open elections meant that the country was already a working democracy, defined by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1989;

XVI) as “meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups.. .”

With the BSP emerging as the clear winner after the second roimd and retaining the status of the largest party in the country, Lukanov again expressed the hope to form a coalition government despite vows by all of the other parties running for parliament not to ally themselves with the Socialists. The ability to maintain mass support within the emerging democratic society helped the former Communists remain a major player in the new system of political pluralism. The degree of political power retained by the BSP was derived from its strong electoral support among significant sectors of the population, who were suddenly frightened by the prospects of introducing free-market capitalism in the country. Lukanov pointed to the UDF’s “political extremism” as another reason for the electoral success of his party:

311 Extremism worked to the disadvantage of the UDF. This was the first time that labels and all kinds of false accusations were used on a massive scale in Bulgarian politics. And we did not do it. We were subdued; we were reasonable. We said to the people: “Let us agree at least on some minimal national goals. We should not quarrel; forget about the civil war; unite to work together for Bulgaria." And this was the winning line, of course, and 1 still think—the right path. We did not take a demagogic line. And I remain a very ardent proponent of national consensus as a must for the transition period. I do not think that fighting one another helps to overcome the crisis and to solve the problems. I think that we had a fantastically successful election fi’om that point of view. Of course, there were some who attempted to nullify the election results. These were people with extreme views or they were monarchists...they understood that if they cannot change the situation, they could instead challenge the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly. (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b)

The UDF faced the choice of either accepting the role of parliamentary opposition or agreeing to Lukanov's proposal to join the government as a coalition partner. Zhelev, who before the elections had said that the UDF might join a cabinet chosen on the basis of expertise rather than political affiliation, now rejected cooptation claiming that a government of experts was no longer a possibility given the BSP’s absolute parliamentary majority. He criticized the Socialist proposal to create a coalition government as an attempt to deprive

Bulgaria of a genuine political opposition, claiming that to do so would mean going against the wishes of the three million or more Bulgarians who had voted against the former

Communists (BTA in English, June 21, 1990). Lukanov at first refused to head a one-party cabinet since it would polarize the country even more. He renewed his appeal for a coalition government representing all political forces in the new legislature, but the other three parliamentary parties again declined (BTA in English, July 27, 1990). Because the opposition had so far refused to reciprocate the BSP’s unilateral gestures of good will, the political scene remained confused, tense and highly polarized. The Round Table agreements

312 were contingent on a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation, which appeared to be woefully lacking in the country.

The Ouster of Mladenov

Given the degree of mutual enmity and distrust, the power struggle did not subside in the aftermath of the founding elections, but escalated to even higher levels of intensity and bitterness. More militant opposition leaders like Trenchev, whose Podkrepa openly refused to accept the election results, blamed the electoral fiasco on the round-table “compromises”:

On the whole the Roundtable was an endless succession of dialogues, aiming, I think, to confuse the opposition, so it could not prepare itself for elections. In fact this was an attempt by the Communists to convince the opposition (or at least its leaders) of the need for a Bulgarian perestroika.... I think our failure at the first election was due to the hesitant and collaborative stand the UDF took at the Roundtable.... Yes, there were too many compromises and the UDF was not militant enough. (Interview with Trenchev in Melone 1996b)

Trenchev also accused the more moderate UDF leaders of unnecessary “passivity” and

“restraint” during the June election, which he attributes to Communist and secret-police infiltration of the opposition:

...the UDF was massively infiltrated by former Communists and secret service men. So, certain militant attitudes were blocked fi-om within. .. I can give you an example to illustrate my point, a scandalous example. We had in our possession a video recording, where President Mladenov mentions something about tanks coming during a protest rally around the National Assembly. 1 insisted upon full publicity of this recording-just to show people how far the Communists are willing to go to impede peaceful protest. The then chairman of the UDF and current president of the Republic, Mr. Zheliu Zhelev, and the head of the electoral campaign Mr. Petko Simeonov, did everything to prevent the showing of the tape; they asked our people to show restraint. The content of this cassette finally became known to the public just after the election.

313 And there is another example. They banned the circulation of an election poster, showing all the concentration camps, created by the Communists. 1 consider this an illustration of a wavering and passive policy. Of course, I am not that kind of militant anti-Communist who recommends that everybody should be shot or imprisoned. But this hesitant position of the UDF was the main reason for our failure in the election. (Interview with Trenchev in Melone 1996b)

As tensions grew, several hundred students reoccupied the Sofia University, while strikes and sit-ins spread across the countiy. A spokesman for the striking students demanded new elections as well as an independent investigation of the videotape showing an exasperated Mladenov threaten demonstrators with the use of tanks during the opposition demonstration on December 14. The students were joined by faculty members and thousands of other protesters, who erected tent encampments called “cities of truth” in Sofia and other cities. Some 70,000 signatories, including many well-known intellectuals, also expressed support for the strikers. An estimated 40,000 people rallied in Sofia on June 25 in support of the demands of the students. Speakers at the rally accused the BSP of falsifying the election results and called for Mladenov’s immediate resignation. Even Zhelev, who had initially expressed satisfaction with the fairness of the election, now claimed that the BSP had “manipulated” the ballot, costing the UDF 10-15% of the vote (BTA in English, June

26, 1990).

In response to mounting opposition pressure, the office of Chief Prosecutor Ivan

Mruchkov announced the opening of an official investigation of these allegations, including

Mladenov’s incautious words, and promised full public disclosure of its findings. Given the political tensions in the country, the Socialists appeared anxious for a compromise to prevent the explosive situation fi’om getting out of hand. The circumstances that led to President

Mladenov’s resignation are still hotly debated in Bulgaria. At first, Mladenov publicly

314 denied making the compromising remarie, accusing the UDF and foreign intelligence

agencies of doctoring copies of the controversial videotape. Even though the original

recording was never produced, protesters and strikers throughout the country continued to

press for his ouster. In a televised address to the Bulgarian people on July 4, the president

indirectly admitted making such a comment by claiming that his words had been “taken out

of context.” He also denounced the campaign against him as a conspiracy by the opposition

and “an important part of the attempt to destabilize society” (quoted in Nikolaev 1990d). In

a conciliatory gesture, Zhelev and BANU leader Valkov initially accepted Mladenov’s

confession and appealed to the students and other strikers to end their protests. When the

strikes and demands for Mladenov’s resignation continued, however, they quickly reversed

themselves, now accusing the president of having been dishonest with the Bulgarian people.

Zhelev openly urged Mladenov to step down: “I think that his situation as head of state is

becoming untenable and he ought to resign” (quoted in Nikolaev 1990d).

Other opposition organizations and the trade unions also joined the chorus of voices

calling on Mladenov to resign. A reformist Socialist faction calling itself the Council of

Initiators for a Radical Change in the BSP, the party daily Duma, and several BSP-led

municipal councils also appealed to the president to quit, blaming him for hiding the truth

and then failing to apologize for his mistake. Other leading Socialists also voiced their apprehension that the country is threatened with civil unrest because of the President’s

reluctance to step down. A commission charged with investigating the videotape declared

it to be authentic. Caving in to public pressure, Mladenov officially handed in his resignation on July 6, citing the controversy surrounding his remark and adding that he did not wish to cause further political tension in an already highly polarized country (Nikolaev 1990d).

315 According to then deputy BSP chairman Alexander Tomov, it was Lukanov who had persuaded Mladenov to resign (Petrova 1990: 8-9). Again, a militant action campaign was used by the anti-Communist opposition to back up its demands and win major political concessions, such as the regime’s surrender of the newly created national presidency. This was the first in a series of direct actions to dislodge the Socialist incumbents from power by means which could hardly be called constitutional or democratic.

In another of the BSP’s now desperate gestures to win over public opinion and gain the confidence of the opposition, the embalmed body of long-time BCP and Comintern leader Georgi Dimitrov was removed from its mausoleum in downtown Sofia and privately cremated, as demanded by the UDF. The BCP parliamentary group voted for a UDF- sponsored resolution requiring all government bodies and political parties to remove

Communist, Soviet, and other “non-Bulgarian” symbols from public view. In another highly visible gesture of symbolic significance, a GNA declaration condemned the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia, in which Bulgarian troops had participated, and offered an apology to its government and people. Lukanov declared that “Bulgaria and its Communists should be ashamed of their part in the invasion,” and parliament observed a minute of silence for the invasion’s victims (BTA in English, August 23, 1990). But the BSP realized that to defuse rising tensions it needed to go beyond such symbolic gestures and offer more substantive concessions to the re energized opposition. The newly-elected Socialist cabinet, unable to coopt members of the opposition into its ranks, was forced to concede the country’s largely ceremonial presidency to its main political rival.

316 The Election of Zhelev

The National Assembly had unanimously elected Mladenov to the newly-created

presidency on 3 April 1990. At that time, the ex-Communist parties in Eastern Europe

viewed presidentialism as an institutional hedge against fickle parliamentary fortunes

(Lijphart 1992). BSP’s control over the presidential institution was an important means of

retaining a measure of influence in Bulgarian politics (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996: 200).

Like in Hungary and Poland, the presidency in Bulgaria which was “designed for the

Communist candidate was eventually occupied by a member of the opposition” (Elster1996:

13).

The UDF officially nominated Petar Dertliev, the veteran leader of the Social

Democratic Party, as its candidate for the president’s office. The Socialists picked Prof.

Chavdar Kiuranov, a sociologist who had been among the original founders of the UDF but now headed one of the BSP’s liberal factions. BANU nominated new party leader Victor

Valkov. After four separate rounds of voting, the GNA failed to elect a president, as none of the three candidates received the requisite two-thirds majority. In a spirit of compromise, the

BSP withdrew its candidate in order to break the deadlock over choosing the new president, which Lilov had called a “destabilizing factor” in the coimtry. Under the revised constitution, if a president was not elected by August 10, new parliamentary elections had to take place, but it was feared that this could only aggravate existing political tensions.

The two remaining candidates competed in a fifth round ofballoting, in which BANU leader Valkov received 257 o f389 votes cast (including those of the Socialist caucus), falling just short of the required majority. At that critical point, Valkov and Dertliev also withdrew from the race, and Zhelev was proposed by a compromise agreement of all parliamentary

317 parties as the only candidate for the post. In a speech to the Assembly, Lukanov praised

Zhelev as “a serious politician who takes to heart the destiny of the people.” MRF leader

Dogan said that Zhelev was a figure who could “rally all forces behind the idea of national

consensus, stability, and security” (BTA in English, August 1, 1990). In the sixth and final

round ofballoting, the Assembly elected the UDF chairman to the presidency. He received

284 of the 389 votes cast. In his acceptance speech, the new president nominated the acting

Minister of Internal Affairs, Colonel-General Atanas Semerdjiev of the BSP, for vice-

president. Semerdjiev, a retired Army Chiefof Staff with well-known liberal credentials, was

elected by an overwhelming majority on a show of hands.

Zhelev's election as president polarized the Socialists, having been opposed even by

party reformers like the liberal editor-in-chief of the party newspaperDuma Stefan Prodev.

who had openly dissented from the decision to back the UDF leader for the presidency (Bell

1991:269). After the vote, Lukanov admitted that the BSP parliamentary group realized that

it would be difficult for many party members and supporters to accept the leadership’s

decision to support Zhelev. The BSP had made the decision, he explained, “in the interest

of national reconciliation and unity” {Duma, August 12, 1990). Semerdjiev confirms

Lukanov’s explanation: “...the Party alone decided not to assume the presidency. Instead, it

brought about the election of Dr. Zhelev for this post. This was done in the name of national

understanding and agreement”(interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b).

It was later revealed that Social-Democratic leader Petar Dertliev, rather than Zhelev,

had been the BSP’s first choice for the presidency. The Socialists reportedly changed their minds, when Dertliev refused in private to give them assurances that, if elected president, he would not support any anti-Commiuiist crusades. Ruen Krumov ( 1995:438-439) writes that

318 behind the back of Dertliev, who was still the UDF’s official presidential candidate, Dimitar

Ludzhev and had privately approached the Socialists on behalf of Zhelev.

Unlike Dertliev, Zhelev agreed to promise the BSP that, as president, he would oppose any

anti-Communist witch-hunts. Interviewed by Adam Michnik soon after his election.

President Zhelev denied that he had struck a behind-the-scenes deal with the former

Communists and claimed that the only concession he had made was to agree to the

nomination of Semerdjiev as his vice-president (Perry and Vinton 1990). But in a later

interview (Radio Sofia in Bulgarian, August 1, 1995), he candidly acknowledged that his

election by the Assembly had resulted fi^om a secret deal between him and the BSP leaders.

He rejected, however, suggestions that the BSP had dictated the conditions for his

nomination. According to Zhelev, the Socialists agreed to his choice only because they

wanted to avoid new parliamentary elections and ftuther political upheaval. Lukanov later

admitted that his party regretted having voted for Zhelev, instead of Dertliev, in the election

for the presidency (see the interview with Lukanov in Vecherni Novini, April 7, 1992).

Zhelev’s elevation to the presidency became another landmark in Bulgaria’s post-

Communist transformation. The election of the UDF chairman as president had a significant

impact on the country’s further progress toward democracy. This was the first time that a real

power-sharing type of arrangement was achieved between the ruling regime and the opposition. Equally important was the figure of Zhelev, who distinguished himself as an

ardent advocate of a “Spanish policy,’’ that is, following the example of post-Franco Spain’s

negotiated transition to stable democracy under King Juan Carlos (Bell 1991: 263). He has

expressed his opposition to the radical view of politics as a zero-sum game. His public motto

is “Dialogue and compromise are the other name of politics” (BTA in English, May 29,

319 1996). At a time when the Communist versus anti-Communist cleavage is still dominant in

national politics and has not spared even the office of the presidency, Zhelev has consistently

advocated a policy of “national reconciliation," which involves more than “forgetting the

past” and requires an entirely new “social contract” in order to build a democratic consensus

in the country (Zhelev 1992).

With the signing of the Roimd Table accords, the holding of a foundational election and the election of the UDF leader to the presidency, the uncertainty over the basic democratic character of the Bulgarian transition was over. The general success of elite negotiations has served as an important stabilizing anchor for democracy, determining the

“evolutionary,” elite-negotiated path of the transition. But a study analyzing the Round T able concludes that its agreements were impermanent, fragile constructs because they were reached by way of “forced or false consensus, bargaining through opportunistic statements, other types of misrepresentation of interests” (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996: 179). The unexpected victory of the ex-Communist in the foimding election led the extremists in the divided opposition to denounce the Round Table compromises and engage in revolutionary anti-regime tactics. As will be discussed in the next chapters, this was the first step towards the politics of semi loyal opposition, which has contributed so much to Bulgaria's transition pattern of intense political confrontation, hatred and historical revenge, resulting in an anemic, incompletely consolidated democracy.

320 CHAPTER 10

GRAND COALITION GOVERNMENT

Formal and informal inter-elite negotiations were held in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria

which, scholars argue, should lead to elite moderation, self-restraint and compromise

necessary for successful democratic consolidation. Given the atmosphere of mutual fear,

hatred and distrust, a negotiated path to electoral democracy was essential in establishing a viable democratic order. The choice of new, democratic rules and institutions involved a process of sustained bargaining and accommodation among major party leaders, which obviously conforms to the logic of the elite settlement model. The progress achieved was all the more remarkable given the tremendous obstacles and convolutions present in the

Bulgarian case. As the available literature on Bulgarian democratization indicates, elite self- restraint and moderation were an important factor in reconciling Bulgaria’s antagonistic elite

factions, ending Communist hegemony and launching democratization. The holding of

Bulgaria’s first truly fi’ee, open and fair elections in the postwar period was a landmark in this process.

But instead of subsiding, political tensions in Bulgaria visibly escalated in the immediate post-electoral period. From the very outset, the new BSP cabinet of Prime

Minister Lukanov found itself under the determined siege of the anti-Communist opposition

(Perry 1991). As Michael McFaul (1993:88) cautions, when the foundational election is held

321 before the total collapse of the old regime, the first post-Communist governments tend to be

polarized and unstable. The results of the founding ballot in Bulgaria did not pacify the opposition. The radicals in the UDF refused to recognize the legitimacy of the electoral verdict. “Politics of the street,” that is, splintering society along the ex-Communist versus anti-Communist fault line, promised to be their most effective strategy for conquering political power. Lukanov was soon forced to resign by a student revolt and a general strike organized by the UDF and the trade unions. The recently established elite consensus broke down in the face of partisan animosities and conflict. Face-to-face contact between rival elites had obviously not led to mutual respect, restraint and civility.

In spite of the serious consensual breakdown, this chapter will also present evidence corroborating some of the predictive insights of the elite-centric approach. Mindful of

Bulgaria’s previously disastrous experiment with democracy which had pushed the country into repeated “national catastrophes,” the badly-divided elite factions negotiated new agreements to share government power, demobilize militant supporters, and promote compromise and consensus-building at the expense of substantive political goals. Their public statements showed that they were keenly aware that the most likely alternative to renewed elite consensus was confi’ontation and the possibility of total regime breakdown. It was clear that there is no more effective route to making a new democracy survive and take root than open communication, conciliation, a culture of political tolerance, and persistent elite efforts to craft and support a system that is both democratic and workable. A power- sharing arrangement became necessary for achieving a negotiated end to renewed elite feuding, for a coalition government of national unity proved essential in heading off the short-term danger of open conflict and violence. More moderate elements such as President

322 Zhelev had to intervene to broker the formation of a broad-based coalition government,

which rescued the deeply split Bulgarian society from further confrontation and a possible

civil war. A potentially dangerous parliamentary crisis following on the heels of the cabinet

crisis was averted only by a series of new elite accords and a grand coalition government led

by a universally trusted non-partisan figure, Judge Dimitar Popov. As member of the Central

Electoral Commission during the June 1990 elections, Popov had won the respect and

confidence of both sides. This compromise solution allowed Bulgaria’s suddenly troubled

and disorderly transition to remain on an even course, but such developments clearly implied

that the country was deviating from the logic of the Spanish (or elite settlement) model,

which many of the Bulgarian players claimed to be following.

The second major step was made at the Political Consultative Council (PCC), a non­ elective decision-making institution of the early transition period, which President Zhelev convened in the fall of 1990 when the BSP government could not “contain the massive pressure which built up against Lukanov in the autumn and it was the exercise of street and trade union power at that time which did much to concentrate Bulgarian political minds and to make possible the moves towards consensus in December 1990 and January 1991"

(Crampton 1993: 27). Chaired by the president, the Council was able to unify all major political forces behind the formation of a broad-based coalition government in December

1990, ending the threat that chaos and anarchy would follow the forced resignation o f the

Lukanov cabinet. On November 29, Lukanov had stepped down, “chased from office by public action on the streets rather than due parliamentary process’’ (Crampton 1997: 220).

Outside the glare of public spotlight, a small group of relatively autonomous leaders were able to reach compromise agreements and resolve their most basic disputes. Faced with the

323 evident breakdown of the round-table consensus, the PCC negotiators signed a detailed

interparty agreement in January 1991, the explicit purpose of which was to ease national

tensions and furnish a peaceful political atmosphere for the democratic transformation of the

country. The extra-constitutional Coimcil thus saved the coimtry from the threat of civil war.

The Ouster of Lukanov

After the founding election, Lukanov was asked by President Zhelev to form a new

government. Deeply disappointed with the electoral returns, the UDF rejected the BSP’s

offer of almost half of the portfolios in a coalition cabinet. The alliance’s two biggest parties,

the Social Democrats and BANU-Nikola Petkov, adamantly refused to participate in a coalition with the former Communists. UDF spokesman Stoyan Ganev announced that the opposition

does not want to be in the same government with persons discredited under the totalitarian regime. It insists that the ruling party acknowledge the disastrous state of the country and clearly assume responsibility for the national catastrophe. (Quoted in Perry 1990b: 2)

The period after Lukanov’s re-appointment showed that national consensus on democratic procedures among Bulgaria’s major political forces forged at the Round Table was more illusory than real. Not only was the democratic settlement partial (a significant political actor like the MRF had been excluded from the negotiating process), but it was also incomplete, insofar as many of the opposition’s leaders and grassroots constituents refused to accept the legitimacy of the democratically-elected BSP government. Instead of defusing rising tensions, the founding election only contributed to renewed political conflict and mass polarization. Lukanov recalls the political difficulties of the post-electoral period:

324 ...the new government was formed only after a great delay. We had served as a provisional government for over three months—from June 10-17 to September 20. But now no party wanted to deal with the issue of economic reform. In fact, the only thing many in Parliament wanted was to blast my government for the job done during its previous term in office. Given the need for reforms, this was a completely unnecessary tactic, whose only motivation was to benefit politically from sniping at the performance of Lukanov’s first cabinet. It was only on September 20 that I was appointed Prime Minister at the head of a one-party cabinet, in spite of my open reluctance. We had wasted a lot of time haggling over program governments, coalition cabinets, and so on. On September 1 ,1 submitted a memorandum addressed to the President and the political parties regarding the need to form a coalition government. It was not my fault that it turned out to be politically impossible to form such a government headed by a Socialist. (Interview with Lukanov in Vechemi Novini, April 7, 1992)

The downtown squares of many Bulgarian cities were occupied by tent encampments, called “cities of truth,” set up by pro-UDF students and intellectuals, where one could discuss , read or display placards with militant, often profane political messages, sign anti-Communist declarations and petitions, watch guerrilla theater, and participate in other, even more brazen displays of civil disobedience and protest (Linden 1990). This display of anti-establishment radicalism and anarchism, mixed with a large doze of vulgarity, nudity and intolerance to political opponents, was reminiscent of the counter-culture and youth revolt in the West some two decades ago, imderscoring the spiritual connection between the

East European and the “insurrectionary ebullience” of the late 1960s (see

Maier 1991).

Political tensions, which had been simmering throughout the summer, exploded on the night of August 26-27, when a unruly mob of several thousand UDF supporters, led by

Podkrepa chairman Trenchev and student leader Emil Koshloukov, stormed and in a spirit of “joyous destruction” looted and set ablaze the BSP headquarters in Sofia (Baskin 1990).

The incident began when a single protestor threatened to immolate himself in protest against

325 the red star atop the imposing building. BSP officials had promised to take it down, but when

the star was not removed on the promised date, angry demonstrators gathered in front of the building. While attempting to stop the rioting and looting, the newly-elected vice-president

Atanas Semerdjiev was roughed up by the rowdy crowd. In spite of such mistreatment at the hands of the demonstrators, he showed extraordinary courage and self-restraint by ordering the arriving police units not to charge the pillaging mob. It was a miracle that there were no casualties on that memorable night. Semerdjiev recounts his dramatic personal experience during this incident:

The Party building, the Supreme Council’s building of the Bulgarian Socialist Party was set on fire.... This was a dramatic night. The people who organized this plot obviously wanted to cause bloodshed. Dr. Zhelev happened to be in Vama at that time. Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov was abroad. So I immediately went to the spot where I spent the whole night. This was a hurricane, a terrible eruption of extremism, mob aggression beyond description. Yet, I did not permit the violence to escalate or for a single drop of blood to be shed. I knew that after the first blood the square would be soaked with it all over. Nowadays there are some people who blame me for my patience and restraint. There are old Party veterans, dogmatics. They call me a traitor.... Because this mob violence represented a gross infringement of public order and there is a reasonable expectation that the security forces should put it down. Indeed, the building was set on fire and the security forces did their best to stop it. But I forbade them to use force, because those people, the provocateurs, were just waiting for this to happen. They were armed with pipes and iron bars; they were blood-thirsty. This is why people blame me: faced with such a brutal infringement of the public order, with an outrage, the police should have performed its duties. But they ignore the fact that this was not purely criminal activity. It had a broad political background and was part of a political plot to cause bloodshed.

There were some arrests and we had an investigation. It lasted for over a year—a year and a half—but yet to this very day the court has not proceeded with the prosecution’s case. .. Some people were arrested on the spot. However, the next morning Mr. Petar Dertliev—I greatly respect him, he is a friend of mine but I disapprove of his behavior in the circumstances—and some other people like Ludzhev intervened and we had to set free those we had arrested. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

326 Semerdjiev attributes the government’s remaricable restraint during this dramatic event to his

own official policy as former head of the Interior Ministry not to use coercion against the

sometimes illegal and violent acts of the opposition:

As Minister of the Interior I decided to avoid and abandon totally the use of force. This happened at a time when the streets and squares were full with tens of thousands of people. There were many meetings, marches, vigils, hunger strikes, occupation strikes. And as might be expected, there appeared all kinds of marginal people: degenerates, anarchists, recidivists, criminals. The forces of public order had to face many provocations. It was our duty to keep public order at huge mass rallies, where over 200 or 300 thousand people gathered. All dining this period the security forces did not harm a single citizen.... And we showed great self-restraint. 1 believed—and my colleagues shared this belief—that the arguments for force, of machine-guns and tanks should be totally discarded. ..

We spared no effort to ...secure a peaceful, bloodless transition to democracy. We sought a well-balanced transition, guaranteed not by the use of force, but through dialogue, through reasonable compromise between the political forces—a civilized transition. And despite the fact that we were pressed to the wall all too often, we did not step back fi’om this approach. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

Speaking the next day before the Grand National Assembly, Lukanov charged that

The sacking and burning of the BSP headquarters is the most serious attempt since 10 November 1989 to torpedo the democratization process of establishing a state of law and a just and civilized society in Bulgaria. This act is a challenge to the Grand National Assembly, the laws, the state institutions, and indeed the people of Bulgaria. It confirms the danger, discussed by so many people in recent days, of a fnghtening relapse into totalitarianism—a new attempt to reimpose a regime of dictatorship and terror in our country. 1 think that we are witnesses to the revival of one of the most reactionary tendencies in our modem political history. We can even speak about the resurrection of fascism in Bulgaria. We are all duty bound to do our best to prevent this fi'om happening again ....

Three things are crystal clear at this point. This arson attack must have been carefully prepared. We cannot talk about some spontaneous and unpremeditated act on the part of most participants in this incident. There was a quick assembly of many people at the September 9 Square, which impeded significantly the activities of the law-enforcement agencies and the fire

327 brigades. There were concrete instigators of this attack, whose names I will not mention here, because they are now under investigation....

The worst thing we could now do is further to deepen our divisions, our polarization and confrontation. On the contrary, we must be united in our assessments and conclusions regarding this dramatic event. We must admit that the climate of hatred which has been deliberately cultivated in our society over the past few months is a fertile ground for such excesses and crimes. .. (Lukanov 1997: 209-214)

At an urgent meeting, the BSP Supreme Council criticized the reluctance to use force to defend the party headquarters from the fury of the mob. Some of the participants in the meeting insisted that the use of force would have been justified in the face of large-scale violence and flagrant violations of the law. Others criticized Semerdjiev's order to withdraw the special anti-terrorist units at the height of the fire. In a book devoted to these events,

Semerdjiev defends his decision not to use force against the Cities of Truth, the road blockades by Civil Disobedience or the vandals and arsonists who stormed the BSP headquarters, claiming that had force been used this would have led to a repeat of the

Romanian bloodshed of December 1989 (Semerdjiev 1996).

Given the outbreak of street violence and the deep political polarization in the country, there was a real threat that Bulgaria’s “gentle revolution” may turn violent. In the next few days, tensions were compoimded by rancorous mutual recriminations between the

BSP and the UDF, each blaming the other for the tragic incident and for endangering the country’s transition to procedtual democracy. Socialist leader Lilov blamed the fire on

Trenchev’s Podkrepa, the radicals of Civil Disobedience and Sofia’s City of Truth, as well as on “right-wing people in the opposition, who seek to block Bulgaria’s peaceful road to democracy” {Duma, August 28,1990:2). An embarrassed but imapologetic UDF responded with its own counter-accusations, alleging that members of the BSP-controlled security

328 forces had acted as agent provocateurs in an attempt to discredit the opposition and re­ establish a Communist dictatorship. Dropping out of sight, Trenchev went temporarily into hiding. Koshloukov took advantage of a foreign educational grant to study political science abroad. Not only did this Walpurgisnacht drama reveal the government’s inability to maintain law and civic order, but it also underscored its growing loss of authority and legitimacy. It also demonstrated once again the opposition’s readiness to defect from the negotiated settlement and resort to street violence in order to humiliate its arch-rival and obtain its political goals.

In the end, reason and the recognized need to defend a brittle new order prevailed over raw emotions and narrow-minded partisanship, but not without the urgent intervention of President Zhelev. Zhelev, who had been away from Sofia during the night of the attack, publicly condemned the riot and sternly rebuked those who had participated in it. After several days of intense behind-the-scenes consultations under the president’s aegis, the country’s two main parties closed ranks to adopt a strongly-worded parliamentary declaration, which denoimced the storming of the BSP headquarters as a “shameful act’’ of vandalism, a “,” and a “serious political crime” perpetrated bylumpen elements in the opposition:

...the torching and vandalic sacking of the Headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party in the capital Sofia is a serious political crime. Absolutely nothing could exonerate the persons who instigated, organized and perpetrated this shameful act. (Quoted in Lukanov 1997: 214-215)

Decrying this “barbaric act” as a blow to parliamentary democracy, the joint document

(which was adopted by the Assembly with only three votes against and three abstentions)

329 also declared that the tense situation in Bulgaria required “not hatred and violence but

political maturity and civil peace.”

In the wake of the GNA’s explicit condemnation, the campaign of civil disobedience

was suspended, the Cities of Truth throughout Bulgaria promptly folded tents, and Lukanov

was re-appointed a prime minister. The united stand of all parliamentary parties against

anarchy and violence was a victory for Bulgarian neodemocracy, reaffirming the legitimate

authority of the new political institutions and upholding the values of tolerance and

moderation. But this temporary triumph of reason and sanity over hatred and intolerance only prolonged the crisis, rather than resolved it. Even though this latest political confrontation had been defused and a tit-for-tat conflict averted, the tone of partisan discourse, especially by opposition supporters, continued to be acrimonious and inflammatory, revealing the deep polarization of Bulgarian society into two antagonistic camps. At a major opposition rally in Sofia in mid-September that drew about 30,000 participants, the speeches were virulently anti-Communist and anti-government. One UDF speaker after another angrily declared that the BSP “does not have the right to hold power and must leave the political scene” and that

“all remnants of Communism must disappear if Bulgaria is to become democratic” (BTA in

English, September 20,1990). The Social Democratic Party of Petar Dertliev even published a list with the names of about a himdred former and current top government officials to be put on trial for past abuses o f power.

On 21 September 1990, Lukanov finally formed a cabinet composed of Socialists and independent technocrats. In a gesture designed to reassure the opposition, the incumbent

Minister of Internal Affairs, General Stoyan Stoyanov of the BSP, was replaced by a politically unaffiliated lawyer, Pencho Penev. Penev, who had been Minister of Justice in the

330 previous Lukanov government, became the first civilian to hold this position since 1946. In early October, the Socialist cabinet submitted to parliament its program for the “Further

Democratization of Society and the Accelerated Transition to a Market Economy.” Lukanov warned that the transition to a market economy would erode the present standard of living and that unemployment and inflation would grow. He asked that the document, which was based on the recommendations of U.S. experts and had been approved by the IMF, be adopted by parliamentary consensus.

Even though President Zhelev had recognized that “Lukanov’s program is in many ways similar to the economic program of the UDF,” it failed to obtain parliamentary approval. Lukanov complained about the lack of understanding and support for his program:

...a significant number of my own party colleagues in parliament did not support the program that I had presented. It was not to the liking of many Socialist politicians and their supporters. But it was the only realistic program. Let me remind you that it was submitted on time—two weeks after the new government had been formed. 1 presented a program, which immediately drew international support. 1 suspect that this is what fiightened my political opponents. They became scared that the Socialists had submitted a program, which enjoyed international support and may receive financial backing. Which meant that the Socialist program may succeed. .. (Interview with Lukanov in Vechemi Novini, April 7, 1992).

Nora Ananieva, then leader of the BSP parliamentary group and Deputy Prime Minister in the Lukanov cabinet, has deplored what she considers to be the politically motivated rejection of Lukanov’s program:

It was rejected in Parliament not because of its content, but because of Lukanov. .. But the Lukanov Program was quite good. Today, most of its ideas are the basis of the country’s whole economic reform. If you now read this program three years after it was first presented to Parliament you will see that the whole economic and financial strategy is contained there. (Interview with Ananieva in Melone 1996b)

331 Unable to bring members of the parliamentary opposition into the government, the

BSP faced a deepening domestic crisis of govemability. Three months after the June 10-17

ballot, public opinion surveys showed that only a quarter of the population still supported

the Socialists. According to the Center for Public Opinion Research, if new elections were

held in early October, 38.2% of likely voters would have voted for the UDF, 25.6%—for the

BSP, 7.3%—for BANU, and 5.8%—for the MRF. Taking advantage of growing unrest throughout the country, the opposition chose to rely upon mass political pressure to destabilize the cabinet, rather than enter into a coalition government or otherwise cooperate with the ruling Socialists. Pro-UDF students reoccupied the Softa University and most other universities across the coimtry and presented new radical demands, including the immediate resignation of Lukanov. In vain did President Zhelev appeal to the striking students to end their occupations. He urged members of his Federation of Independent Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy to back the idea of a coalition government, given the urgent need to build bridges between opposing parties at a time of extreme polarization in Bulgarian society, but ideological divisions between Bulgaria’s Left and Right proved to be unbridgeable. Tensions were running so high that even the personal safety of elite members could no longer be guaranteed. Unknown assailants firebombed Lukanov’s home, burning down the fi-ont door and the car garage. Zhelev, Dogan, Tomov, Ludzhev and other prominent politicians warned that the emerging government crisis may create conditions for a parliamentary crisis and chaos in the country.

On November 3, the new UDF chairman Petar Beron announced at a protest rally in

Sofia his conditions for UDF participation in a coalition with the BSP. This was the first time that the anti-Communist opposition had expressed a desire to enter a coalition government

332 and work with the former Communists. But so extreme were the conditions for participation that the BSP could hardly be expected to accept them. Beron demanded for the UDF the premiership and all key ministries, leaving the remaining posts to the Socialists and other parties in or outside the parliament. Otherwise, he warned, a parliamentary crisis and new elections would be inevitable and tensions would escalate. The Confederation of Independent

Trade Unions (CITU), a formerly pro-BCP organization which had now become aligned with the opposition, endorsed these demands, saying that a strong coalition government was needed, in which the UDF would control the key ministries, while the issue of the political affiliation of the premier should be decided through negotiations between the parties.

Emerging fi"om hiding, Podkrepa chairman Trenchev urged the removal of the Lukanov government, appointment of a non-BSP caretaker cabinet and the holding of new general elections.

Lukanov rejected Beron's demand for the premiership in a UDF-dominated government, even though he admitted that the stalemate might force new elections. More moderate deputies representing different political forces in the Grand National Assembly declared that they wanted to avoid a parliamentary crisis and new elections which they feared might lead to a civil war. Even Zhelev distanced himself from the far-reaching demands of the opposition. On November 11, he stressed the need for a strong government, saying that this could be either a coalition government or a program-based cabinet of experts dominated by the Socialists, given their current majority in parliament and ultimate responsibility for the current crisis. At a press conference, deputy BSP chairman Alexander Tomov complained that “1 am at the very least perplexed that the political forces with whom we are negotiating agreements in parliament subsequently decided to carry their actions into the

333 streets” {Duma, November 14, 1990). The BSP Supreme Coimcil issued a declaration appealing against political “extremism”:

We warn the organizers and participants in the antigovemment street rallies about the danger of uncontrolled activities that could develop, despite the unwillingness of the political forces. We remind the organizers and initiators of actions that could develop into riots, of the great responsibility they assume. The bitter experience of the BSP headquarters fire as well as the historical lessons are a warning about the mortal danger that could jeopardize democracy and civic peace. {Duma, November 15, 1990: 1)

Beron refused to budge from his demand for a UDF-led cabinet capable of implementing its own economic plan and policies (BTA in English, November 11, 1990).

At a UDF rally held on November 18, he and other speakers insisted that Prime Minister

Lukanov, BSP leader Lilov and former Defense Minister Dzhurov must be arrested and brought to justice. He even set a deadline for the government’s resignation, “The opposition gives Mr. Lukanov until November 22. It would be a mockery if he again disregards parliament because the opposition will vote against the government’s budget. .. I don’t expect Mr. Lukanov to use force in order to stay in office. They didn’t do that in any East

European country” (BTA in English, November 19, 1990).

Intense power struggle had replaced political dialogue, with no immediate hope for compromise given the climate of extreme polarization and confrontation in the country.

Public opinion continued to be sharply divided, though increasingly leaning toward the opposition. According to public opinion surveys, 44% of Bulgarians supported a UDF- dominated coalition government, while 21% favored a BSP-led coalition. Some 22% of the respondents wanted a government entirely formed by UDF members, while 3% favored a one-party Socialist cabinet (BTA in English, November 9, 1990). Given the hardening position of the UDF which was actively encouraging mass discontent and making the

334 country increasingly ungovernable, the BSP found it impossible to remain in power

(Nikolaev 1991a). Its membership had dwindled from almost a million party members in

June 1990 to some 250,000 by mid-December. Despite the Socialist majority in the legislature, Lukanov failed to gain parliamentary support for his cabinet’s political and economic program. In early November, a group of 30 Socialist deputies led by Boris

Dimovski, Bulgaria’s most famous political cartoonist and Zhivkov-era dissident, announced the formation of their own parliamentary caucus called the BSP Parliamentary Group for

National Consensus, vowing to follow only their own conscience in voting. These Socialists supported the proposal for an opposition-dominated government provided it guaranteed that

BSP members will not lose their job because of their party affrliation (BTA in English.

November 19, 1990). Even the ruling party’s absolute majority in parliament was now in question. The government barely survived by a single vote a parliamentary vote of no- confidence submitted by the united opposition. After the vote, Beron announced that the

UDF would boycott all future sessions of parliament until Lukanov stepped down.

As opposition to the BSP cabinet continued to grow, a general strike was called by the two trade union for November 26 to protest the country’s mounting economic problems and compel the resignation of the BSP cabinet (BTA in English, November 19,

1990). Calls for Lukanov’s ouster came from all over the country, including from striking students from more than 50 universities. In a replay of the anti-Allende protests in Chile, middle-class women demonstrated in the streets of Bulgarian cities, banging empty pots and pans. Anti-BSP protesters in Sofia occupied the entire downtown area and blocked all central streets to traffic. The government was forced to use army trucks and buses to make up for the absence of public transportation. As strikes and other protest actions spread throughout

335 the country, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (CITU) organized a signature campaign demanding that the constituent assembly be dissolved and a program-based government be appointed under the auspices of the presidency. According to a public opinion poll, only 12.9% of Bulgarians were satisfied with the work of the GNA. while 62% expressed dissatisfaction with it. The CITU leader. Professor Krustiu Petkov, claimed that about half a million Bulgarians had signed in support of the demand for immediate dissolution of the GNA. Podkrepa leader Konstantin Trenchev also took a hardline position, claiming that the balance of forces in the parliament already did not correspond with the political realities in Bulgaria.

In reaction to the barrage of daily protests and strikes, the BSP official daily charged that “there can be no question of disobedience, but rather of a coup attempt, the start of a most flagrant dictatorship. .. This is not a strike, but the use of force” (Duma, November 28,

1990: 2). Other political forces also were alarmed that the continuing crisis might lead to confrontation and bloodshed. The Agrarian Union criticized “extreme methods such as the organization of a general strike at a crucial moment for our country when the peaceful transition of our state to democracy is at stake,” emphasizing that “such a step can only be disastrous for Bulgaria.” Rejecting CITU’s demand for disbanding the legislature, BANU leaders called instead for “a widely representative government based on national consensus which would be a true government of national salvation” (Zemedelsko zname, November 27,

1990:1 ). Even the neonationalist parties issued a joint declaration calling for civil peace (see

Duma, November 28, 1990: 3). The anti-BSP opposition, however, was actively involved in the widespread strikes and street protests, especially in Sofia. The National Coordinating

Council of the UDF came out openly in support of the nationwide political strike:

336 The past three days of nationwide protests against the passivity of the government, organized by the Union ofDemocratic Forces, demonstrated our united political will. The government of Andrei Lukanov must resign. This is an expression of the people’s dissatisfaction. The UDF categorically declares its readiness to assume responsibility for our motherland, which has suffered so much during the decades of communist totalitarianism. (FBIS- EEU, November 21, 1990: 5)

At the same time, Beron rejected new parliamentary elections, insisting that “it would be suicidal to draw these embittered people into a new election campaign.’’ It appeared that the radicals in the opposition were taking advantage of the deepening economic and social crisis to destabilize the inciunbent government through political strikes and other street actions in spite of the BSP’s freely given democratic mandate from voters. President Zhelev deplored as “imjust” the protestors’ demands for the resignation of the government and expressed sympathy for Lukanov who, he said, “is paying for the sins of his own party and has become the victim of all this public negativism ” (interview with Zhelev in Debati, November 20,

1990). Predicting that the continuing cabinet crisis might lead to a parliamentary crisis and new elections, he warned about the possible dire consequences

Given the current situation in the coimtry, this would lead only to chaos and unrest. A civil war and would be very likely. Some people dismiss this as exaggerated fears, but these are very real concerns. Only countries with a stable, unshakable economy that is unaffected by the dramas unfolding in the political sphere can afford to have cabinet and parliamentary crises without fearing catastrophic consequences. This is not the case in Bulgaria. The country is in a transition, the economy is highly unstable because of the transition; indeed, we are in a deep crisis, which makes the link between politics and the economy closer and more direct. Every mistake and every political tension have a direct impact on the economy. That is why I do not share the undue optimism of some people, who believe that the situation is not so dangerous, that my fears are unjustified and exaggerated, or are motivated by some ulterior political motivations. (Zhelev 1995: 47-48)

337 A spiraling economic crisis and a nationwide wave of protests and strikes meant that a major change of some kind was all but inevitable. On November 29, Lukanov and his ministers resigned. Addressing the Grand National Assembly on this occasion, Lukanov blamed the opposition for the government crisis;

We are told that what the country needs now is not another one-party cabinet, but a new government of trust and national consensus. .. But I have worked steadfastly and tirelessly, if 1 may say so, precisely to bring about a government of national consensus. If we still do not have such a government today, it is not the current Prime Minister or his party who bear the responsibility for this. Nor can a government of national consensus be achieved through street violence, pressure, blackmail or political bluff. We will have a government of national consensus only when we return to the spirit of the Round Table, to the spirit of dialogue, agreement and honest compromise. (Lukanov 1997: 385)

He also tried to put the best face on what, to many Socialists, amounted to his capitulation to the opposition, suggesting that it was the meeting of leaders from all parliamentary parties and movements held the previous night that convinced him to step down:

The...reason for my resignation was the session of the Political Consultative Council, held yesterday at the initiative of the President of the Republic. There is hardly somebody among you who doubts that the goal of all of my efforts in the past few months was to bring about the appointment of a coalition government in one form or another, a government capable of reconciling and uniting our nation during the extremely difficult period we are now undergoing, namely the transition to democracy and market economy. These efforts of mine have found fruition in the agreements among the political forces concluded at the Council’s meeting yesterday. 1 could not care less about who will head the new government. What matters to me is that we have achieved this desirable outcome which is vitally important for our nation. This has allowed me to annoimce yesterday my decision to resign. 1 hope that my decision will be correctly imderstood by all, because it allows the political forces to continue, with redoubled energy and without wasting any more time, the dialogue they started yesterday. 1 must tell you that this was the most constructive meeting among representatives of the major parliamentary parties that I have attended in many months.... (Lukanov 1997: 417-419)

338 Zhelev expressed open relief at the news of Lukanov’s resignation, “I hope that all this is for the best, and that everything will end without violence, excesses, and bloodshed”

(Trud, November 30, 1990: 1). But Solomon Pasi, a parliamentary deputy from the UDF- affiliated Green Party, remarked that “the greatest blunder of the UDF was the removal of

Andrei Lukanov as prime minister: this brought the country on the verge o f civil war” (BT A in English, December 30, 1990). It appeared that an open conflict between the ruling party and the opposition had been averted at the last moment by the self-restraint and common sense of the Lukanov government, which refused to use force or legal coercion against the illegal political strikes and blockades.

The PCC Agreements

It appears that President Zhelev, while trying to restrain the opposition protestors, was also actively engaged in behind-the-scenes mediation. In his resignation speech to the

Assembly, Prime Minister Lukanov claimed that he would not have resigned ifan inter-party agreement on a new national government intent on a peaceful transition to democracy had not been reached the previous night. According to Lukanov, the tense situation in the country had finally helped the political forces realize that it was imperative to reach national consensus.

On the eve of Lukanov’s resignation, Zhelev had convened an informal meeting of a special consultative body, the Political Consultative Council (PCC), which included all the parties represented in parliament, and the president himself. First proposed in a presidential address on 5 August 1990, the Council was basically a continuation of the National Round

Table under a different name. This extra-constitutional and extraparliamentary creation

339 played a crucial role in ending the threat that the fledgling Bulgarian democracy might dissolve into anarchy and total chaos. On the night of November 28-29, twenty-nine of

Bulgaria’s foremost politicians took part in an all-night session of the Council, chaired by

Zhelev, which renegotiated the existing power arrangements. The participants included the leading members of the BSP, the UDF, the MRF, and BANU. Vice-President Semerdjiev was also present, as was the deputy speaker of parliament Ginyu Ganev and presidential spokesman Valentin Stoyanov.

Opening the meeting, Zhelev described the political situation in the country as explosive and about to spiral out of control. To avoid a social explosion, he proposed as a compromise solution replacing the BSP cabinet of Andrei Lukanov with a coalition government of national unity:

There is only one acceptable solution, namely the resignation of the government and the immediate formation of a new government of national unity or national salvation, which would require an agreement among the political forces. Since it is demanded by all anti-govemment strikes, rallies, marches and demonstrations, the resignation of the Lukanov cabinet would immediately reduce political tensions and would become the basis for beginning negotiations with the striking students and the trade unions to call off the strikes, as well as for restarting the work of parliament. O f course, we must, no later than today, also conclude political agreements among the major political forces.... (Lukanov 1994)

Zhelev suggested that while holding new elections would be the proper thing to do constitutionally, this would be politically risky imder the existing circumstances. Praising

Prime Minister Lukanov as one of the “great politicians of modem Bulgaria,’’ the President diplomatically concluded that “Regrettably, events have imfolded in such a manner that he became the target o f all the social and political hatred of the moment” (Lukanov 1994).

340 Everyone present at the meeting accepted in principle the President’s compromise proposal, even though BSP leader Lilov deplored the fact that the country was again in turmoil in spite of holding free elections and having a working legislature. Lilov also rejected as “politically dishonest” the intemperate attacks against Lukanov and his cabinet made by some of the participants in the meeting. Acceding to the need to appoint a new government, he proposed what he called a “parliamentary” solution of the crisis:

The most worrisome thing is that all this is taking place after holding a free election and having a fimctioning Parliament. And what is even more dangerous is that the crisis is escalating. Clearly, we must find a way out. My party believes that holding entirely new elections would be no doubt the most radical and honorable solution, that is, it would determine democratically, by means of democratic elections, who must rule the coimtry. At the same time, we are fully aware what a new election could mean for the coimtry, that it may add very dangerous elements to the situation. Now is clearly not the time for new elections. In our view, the best solution is the parliamentary one. Parliament must find a solution to the economic and political crisis, in which the coimtry finds itself....

I must point out that my party has already made a lot of compromises after the last election, which by the way my party won. Too many and too serious compromises, indeed. I shall not mention all of these compromises. Suffice it to mention the one regarding the presidency. That is why we can only accept...the parliamentary way as the only dignified, sensible and mutually acceptable solution. Otherwise, we could not provide any assurances concerning how the situation may unfold, because there is a real danger that part of the population would not accept and would resist any other solution. 1 speak most responsibly about this issue. There is a risk that we may tear the country apart. That is why we must find an honorable and mutually acceptable parliamentary formula for forming a new government. (Lukanov 1994)

Lilov suggested more specifically the “formation of a government of the peaceful transition, composed of the major political forces and entrusted with the mission to draft the most urgent laws, adopt a new constitution, and organize free elections.” While admitting that he had not consulted his party’s governing bodies, Lilov pledged his wholehearted

341 support for this compromise measure. But he demanded that the major parties and

movements represented in parliament sign a comprehensive political agreement guaranteeing

Bulgaria’s peaceful and orderly transition to democracy. The BSP leader warned that

without such an agreement the Socialists would not accept any compromise on the question

of replacing Lukanov:

It would be impossible to reach a compromise without concluding a comprehensive political agreement with clearly defined provisions, which could not be misinterpreted by anyone in their own interest. I declare most categorically that without reaching such an agreement we would not consent to the proposed changes. .. As far as the next prime minister is concerned, I think that...under the circumstances he could belong neither to the UDF, nor to the BSP. We must find a respected, politically-neutral prime minister, if we wish to form a government that could normalize the country and guide it through a peaceful transition. Otherwise, we may find another crisis on our hands very soon, since a dangerous precedent has already been set.

In conclusion, 1 wish we could all agree that if we have free elections, a democratically elected parliament and a functioning cabinet, there should be no room for overthrowing governments through extraparliamentary methods and pressures. This is a dangerous precedent because it tends to repeat itself. Finally, I believe that we need solid guarantees for the rights of citizens belonging to all parties, as well as of the parties themselves. Without such guarantees, we could not accept the proposals put forward here. (Lukanov 1994)

Prime Minister Lukanov, who spoke last at the meeting, readily joined the emerging

consensus on forming a coalition government of national unity backed by a political pledge

by all parliamentary parties and movements to engage only in peaceful and legitimate forms

of politics for the duration of the transition. On behalf of his party, he stressed that this is

“what we have always wanted to accomplish, namely, ensuring the peaceful, civilized and

lawful nature of the transition” (Lukanov 1994). But he disagreed with Zhelev s analysis that

the current government, rather than the confrontational behavior of the opposition, had become a destabilizing factor in the coimtry. He went on to praise the “civilized and

342 constructive spirit” of the meeting, which he said was reminiscent of the heady final days of the Round Table. Lukanov also expressed full support for the inter-party agreements just reached, adding that “I think we can speak now o f‘agreements’, because there have been no objections whatsoever raised at the meeting today” (Lukanov 1994).

Having thus committed themselves to a compromise solution, Lilov and Lukanov strongly defended the PCC accords at stormy sessions held the next day in the BSP’s

Supreme Council and parliamentary caucus. In the face of harsh criticism from many members of those two bodies, both Lilov and Lukanov assumed personal political responsibility for their actions and threatened to resign if the compromise was not accepted.

During a meeting that lasted eight hours, Lilov urged the Supreme Council to endorse the

PCC accords and appoint anad hoc group that would take part in drafting the proposed inter­ party agreement. At least half of the Council members opposed the government’s resignation and some even accused Lilov and Lukanov of “treason.” In the end, though, the Supreme

Council voted overwhelmingly in support of their position, with 67 votes in favor, only 1 vote against, and 4 abstentions. The vote dispelled existing doubts about whether the BSP leaders would be able to deliver their party’s consent to the political compromise.

The GNA adopted a resolution on November 30 that endorsed the accords reached within the framework of the Political Consultative Council. Only 43 deputies, all of them from the BSP, voted against and 16 abstained. In a televised address on December 4, Lilov urged BSP supporters not to overdramatize Lukanov’s resignation since the party would continue to be a factor in the democratization of the country. At a press conference held the next day, he confirmed that the BSP welcomed the formation of a coalition government, since a single-party cabinet could not implement economic reforms that required national

343 unity, political consensus, as well as a strong government fully backed by parliament {Duma,

November 6, 1990: 1,2).

The UDF leaders had easier time persuading their component parties to shift the alliance’s strategy from confrontation to cooperation and to accept power-sharing through a coalition government. They began calling for the restoration o f public law and order, while muting their previously harsh criticism of the BSP. Beron, who during the crisis had taken an intransigent line, was forced to resign the UDF chairmanship, when President Zhelev announced to be in possession of documentary evidence showing that Beron had collaborated with Zhivkov’s secret police. After the PCC’s midnight agreement, a tacit UDF-BSP alliance necessary for regime transplacement to occur was firmly in place, ready to set the basic terms of the new constitution.

At a critical stage of the democratization process when unrest threatened to engulf the country, the PCC accords imited all major political forces in Bulgaria behind a new elite consensus, including on power-sharing and the formation of a broad-based coalition government. Unlike the Round Table, the PCC talks were genuinely inclusive and consultative of all major parties, including the MRF. But while the participants in the round­ table talks consulted extensively with their key grassroots constituents, no consultation occurred prior to agreeing to the PCC accords. In the absence of live radio and TV coverage, there was also little of the public posturing which had characterized the National Round

Table. The agreement replicated the power-sharing formula, first used in the election of

Zhelev and Semerdjiev as president and vice-president, respectively. Acting as a multipary consultative body, the PCC mandated a government of national imity in which every major elite actor (save for the still reluctant MRF) would participate, have seats in the cabinet, and

344 be bound by collective cabinet responsibility. By stabilizing the transition process, the behind-the-scenes elite agreement was a major step forward in Bulgaria’s transition to democracy. Its only major flaw was that it was neither discussed nor voted on in the GNA

(Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996; 202).

The decision to form a coalition government was also partly aimed at demobilizing militant grassroots constituents and ending the revolutionary stage of the transition. The increasingly politicized masses, who had been a useful weapon for the opposition to prevent a return to authoritarianism during the round-table negotiations and to gain control of the presidency, began to be a potential risk that threatened to get out of control and plunge the country into civil war. The events surrounding the fall of the Lukanov cabinet made it clear that, once mobilized, mass action is not easily controllable by the opposition leadership.

Especially after the torching of the BSP headquarters in Sofia, it was feared that Bulgaria’s

"gentle revolution” might descend into violence. According to an observer, by far the most important achievement of the PCC agreement was the mass demobilization in the country so that “political power had been effectively transferred from the streets to the parliament”

(Crampton 1993: 32).

Only a renewed elite agreement providing for a broad-based coalition government could ensure that political and social unrest would not plunge the country into a catastrophic civil conflict. There was a growing consensus that uncontrollable protests and street actions should not be allowed to get out of hand. Rejecting inflammatory slogans such as “Exile the

BCP to Siberia” and “Death to all Communists,” Zhelev admonished the radicals in the opposition: “Many people forget the simple truth that we can build democracy in Bulgaria only through democratic means” (interview with Zhelev in Kontinent, April 17, 1992).

345 The Grand Coalition Government

The nomination of a coalition government was preceded by further inter-party

negotiations resulting in a written agreement among all the parties participating in the

Political Consultative Council. The agreement was initialed on December 14 but was subject to various amendments that delayed its ratification until the following month. The draft document focused on political and civil liberties, property rights, the future legislative agenda, the responsibility of the BSP (BCP) for the abuses of the previous regime, the BSP’s property and archives, resolution of social conflicts, the issue of ethnic minorities, as well as the guarantees demanded by the BSP that no Bulgarians would be persecuted for their past or present party membership and political convictions. The explicit purpose of this detailed document was to reduce tensions, stabilize the political process, and provide a peaceful atmosphere for the democratic transition.

On 3 January 1991, the inter-party accord was officially signed by all political forces represented in the legislature. T\\& Agreement among the Political Forces Represented in the

Grand National Assembly on Guaranteeing the Peaceful Transition to a Democratic Society provided for an extremely ambitious legislative agenda that would finalize democratic institutionalizion. Within three months the Assembly was to draft and adopt not only a new constitution, but complicated and disputed legislation on land restitution, national security, privatization, foreign investment, the management of public radio and television, etc.

Parliamentary elections were to be held before the end of May 1991, but only after the completion of this intensive legislative schedule. The Socialists agreed to reveal their assets and to open the party’s archives to the public, as well as to take full political responsibility for their 45-year rule. The Chief Prosecutor was to bring charges against those BCP/BSP

346 leaders who were personally guilty of criminal offenses. A moratorium on public

demonstrations designed to defuse political tensions and demobilize militant supporters was

also included, despite strenuous objections by the more militant leaders of the opposition

who for this reason signed the document with reservation.

The December 14 agreement made possible the formation of a grand alliance

government involving all the political forces represented in parliament except for the MRF,

which still rejected participation in coalitions. A similar power-sharing arrangement in West

Germany, Die Grosse Koalition o f1966-1969, had incorporated the previously oppositionary and Marxist-leaning Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the country’s ruling structure. Dimitar

Popov, a 63-year-old retired judge with no political or party affiliations, was nominated by

President Zhelev and approved by the GNA as prime minister. On 19 December 1990, he presented what he had termed a “government of hope” which was to serve until new elections were held for an ordinary assembly. The prime minister and parliamentary leaders were at great pains to emphasize that the new cabinet was a working body consisting of experts who were expected to place national interests before narrow partisan considerations.

But it was impossible to deny the fact that the opposition parties were participating in a government of national unity, in which their main ideological opponent, the BSP, was now a major coalition partner.

The composition of the new government was another compromise hammered out during intensive consultations among members of the BSP, the UDF, and the Agrarian

Union, as well as the premier-designate. The cabinet included three deputy prime ministers, each representing the BSP, the UDF, and BANU. Seven of the 17 cabinet members were

from the BSP, three were from the UDF, two were Agrarians, and five were independents.

347 The Ministry of Finance and the powerful Ministry of Industry, Conunerce and Services went to the UDF, while BANU took the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Who would become minister of the interior remained throughout the elite negotiations the apple of discord between the BSP and the UDF. The leaders of both parties insisted on having one of their members head the Ministry of the Interior, which had control over the national police and other internal security forces. The Socialist delegation even offered to give up in exchange other key ministries such as Defense, Justice, and Foreign

Economic Relations, which were to be headed by Socialists. But the UDF delegation vowed not compromise on its demand for the Interior portfolio until the “totalitarian structures” in the country had been completely destroyed. Various alternative proposals were made in the course of the consultations, including the so-called “sandwich approach,” whereby the

Minister of the Interior from one party would be supervised by a Deputy Prime Minister and a Deputy Minister of the Interior, both from the other party (Nikolaev 1991b).

President Zhelev sought to facilitate moderation and a compromise on this issue, suggesting that its importance was being exaggerated by the contending parties since the controversial ministry was now far from being the omnipresent secret police of the past.

Chavdar Kiuranov claimed that the BSP’s bid to retain the Interior Ministry was motivated mostly by the fact that it was the Socialists who had begun serious changes in this ministry and were to a large degree responsible for its changed image {Duma, December 16, 1990:

1 ). But Nikolaev (1991b) suggests another likely reason, namely, that the BSP sought to keep control of the ministry in order to ensure that sensitive files would not fall into the hands of the opposition, which might discredit Socialist leaders with past connections to Zhivkov’s

348 secret police. In the end, a compromise was foimd by appointing Khristo Danov, a politically unaffiliated retired lawyer, who was acceptable to both sides.

In a sign of constructive continuity, seven of the new ministers had served in

Lukanov’s last cabinet. The fact that Prime Minister Popov apparently did not hesitate to reappoint them indicated a conciliatory attitude on his part and an effort to avoid a complete repudiation of his predecessor’s policies. Zhelev praised the new government as being very similar to the program-based cabinet that he had proposed in early September. That there was a certain continuity of policy rather than a complete break with the past was confirmed by the economic reform program submitted by the new cabinet in January 1991, which, although based on the UDF election platform, was not very different fi-om the one presented by Lukanov the previous October. A list of recommendations drafted by an American advisory team, led by U.S. Chamber of Commerce Deputy Chairman Richard Rahn, had served as the basis for both programs, but Popov’s economic program was seen as more radical than the one submitted by Lukanov (Nikolaev 1991c). While economic experts from the UDF had advocated the need to subject the Bulgarian economy to Polish-style “shock therapy,” the BSP cabinet members resisted a radical laissez faire approach, fearing that their party would lose popularity with voters if it accepted it. In the end, the continuing deterioration of the economy (GNP had already fallen by 10.7% compared with 1989) made the adoption of the more radical remedy imavoidable (Nikolaev 1991c).

The political accord among Bulgaria’s main parties was soon followed by an accommodation between the government, labor and business to share the costs of necessary economic adjustments. An Agreement on Social Peace was signed by the cabinet, the major labor union confederations, and representatives of the employers’ associations on January

349 8, 1991. The trade unions pledged not to strike until the end of the year, the government undertook to provide a safety net for those adversely affected by economic reforms, while management promised not to implement reforms at the expense of workers. The tripartite agreement included provisions to combat growing inflation and unemployment, indexed wages to price increases, and agreed on a reduction of government spending to meet stringent

IMF conditions (see Thirkell and Tseneva 1992). The social peace agreement contributed to the transition by making it possible to bring the extra-parliamentary forces, especially the trade unions, in the consensus worked out at the end of 1990, but international factors also played a role since “these moves toward consensus, particularly in the economic sphere, were encouraged to no small degree by the need to comply with conditions which the IMF had laid down” (Crampton 1993:28). An outgrowth of the round-table accord on social policy of 15

March 1990, the tripartite agreement also established the quasi-corporatist Council for

Trilateral Cooperation (CTC) with the task of monitoring the government’s social and economic policies.

Bolstered by the political and social peace agreements just concluded. Prime Minister

Popov was confident that his government’s program would receive broad support in parliament in spite of the sharp polarization of political forces in Bulgaria. The coalition character of the new cabinet and the compromises reached between all party elites helped his reform program obtain the parliamentary approval, which had eluded his predecessor.

The implementation of the inter-party agreement and the formation of a grand coalition government under a politically neutral premier stabilized the regime and became another critical step in the structural integration of the divided elite factions in Bulgaria. Not only did bickering party elites have to negotiate and cooperate with each other, but now they

350 were also bound to work closely together in jointly governing the country. As BSP leader

Lilov stressed at a press conference on 9 January 1991, “What matters most now is to work together” {Duma, January 10, 1991). The negotiated transition to a democratic government in Bulgaria became a fait accompli even before a new constitution was drafted and adopted.

Prime Minister Dimitar Popov emphasized the important role that his coalition cabinet played in the peaceful and orderly transition to democracy:

My government marked the beginning of the process of peaceful transition from a totalitarian political system to an entirely new system. This process started after 20 December 1990, when I was appointed Prime Minister, with the adoption of a historically unique, comprehensive political agreement signed by the major political forces. Today some people tend to forget this fact; others even say that this represents a negative page in our modem history, which shows how much they understand politics. The initial stage of the transition had demonstrated that the transition was impossible without a coalition government. This is what I still believe today. When we launched the transition, our thinking was informed by a constructive spirit and political will. We enjoyed public support even when we had to adopt unpopular measures. (Interview with Popov in Duma, July 9, 1996)

With the signing of the new inter-elite agreement, the initial period of revolutionary turmoil was over. This compromise might have proven impossible given the mobilization of radicalized opposition supporters, who only months earlier had brought the country to the brink of political disaster. Once the new democratic institutions had been in place and tested in a severe political crisis, however, there was greater confidence in their effectiveness and continued functioning in the future, even before constitutional negotiations in the GNA were completed and a democratic constitutional settlement was officially ratified.

351 CHAPTER 11

NEW CONSTITUTION

Constitutions are very important as instrumentalities of democratization. Linz and

Stepan (1996) consider the issue of constitutions and constitutional formulas to be a significant, if neglected, aspect of democratic transition and consolidation. They offer a classification of six different possible constitution-making environments, ranging fi-om those that present the most confining conditions for consolidation to those that present the least:

( 1 ) the retention of a constitution created by a nondemocratic regime with reserve domains and difficult amendment procedures; (2) the retention of a “paper” constitution which has unexpected destabilizing and paral>-zing consequences when used under more electorally competitive conditions; (3) the creation by a provisional government of a constitution with some de jure nondemocratic powers; (4) the use of a constitution created under highly constraining circumstances reflecting the de facto power of nondemocratic institutions and forces; (5) the restoration of a previous democratic constitution; (6) fi-ee and consensual constitution-making {ibid. : 81 -83). According to them, the least constraining constitutional context is the last one, that is, “flee and consensual constitution-making”:

This occurs when democratically elected representatives come together to deliberate fi-eely and to forge the new constitutional arrangements they consider most appropriate for the consolidation of democracy in their polity. The constituent assembly ideally should avoid a partisan constitution approved by a “temporary majority” that leads a large minority to put

352 constitutional revisions on the agenda, thereby making consolidation of democratic institutions more difficult. The optimal formula is one in which decisions about issues of potentially great divisiveness and intensity are arrived at in a consensual rather than a majoritarian manner and in which the work of the constituent assembly gains further legitimacy by being approved in a popular referendum that sets the democratic context in which further changes ...take place. (Linz and Stepan 1996: 83)

The round-table agreements and the PCC accords were important milestones leading to institutional bargaining in the Grand National Assembly and the crafting of a democratic constitution, which became the foundation for establishing a democratic political system in

Bulgaria. Despite sharp elite disagreements regarding the timing and nature of the constituent process, the political forces represented in the GNA became the first in transitional Eastern

Europe to reach a constitutional settlement, setting the country on a course of political democratization.

But the adoption of the new constitution was accompanied by serious political opposition and controversy. There was strong resistance by hardline members of the anti­ communist minority in the constituent assembly, who did not want the new fundamental law to be shaped by the BSP’s “temporary majority,” because such a “partisan” constitution would not, in their view, eliminate completely the power and influence of the former

Communist party. The monarchists rejected the new basic charter, because it retained the republican form of government, while they preferred a return to the Tumovo Constitution of 1879, which had declared Bulgaria a constitutional monarchy. For its part, the MRP disagreed with the constitutional clauses dealing with the important issue of minority representation. Nevertheless, the political consensus reached in the earlier elite agreements carried over into the constitution-writing process. Those radical UDF deputies—and there was a significant number of them—who demanded the immediate dissolution of the GNA and

353 new parliamentary elections, because they wanted the constituent process to be on their own

terms, were a minority that failed to win the support of either their colleagues in parliament or of the population at large. The controversial attempt to disrupt the constituent work of the

Assembly failed, but the constant pressure of the parliamentary opposition led the Socialist majority to choose the “free and consensual” constitution-engineering formula. However, the constituent process fell short o f the “optimal” ideal solution, suggested by Linz and

Stepan: the new constitution was adopted in a “majoritarian” rather than “consensual” manner, it was not approved in a popular referendum, and the deeply divisive republic- versus-monarchy issue has remained open-ended. While the adoption of a democratic constitution enhanced the legitimacy and authority of the new political institutions, it did not solve Bulgaria’s consolidation problems. This chapter deals with the constitution-making process and environment in Bulgaria during the formative phase of its new democracy..

The Constitutional Settlement

Bulgaria’s democratization process began on 10 November 1989 when President

Mladenov promised to turn Bulgaria into a state governed by law rather than by more or less arbitrary executive decrees of the ruling party. A broad consensus seemed to be emerging among the political forces that a new constitution was necessary to complete this process.

BSP leader Lilov was among those, who insisted at the Roimd Table that “Our state needs a new, profoimdly democratic constitution” (BTA in English, March 29, 1990). Public pressure for democratic reforms led the Round Table negotiators to agree to a totally free constitution-making formula. It was to this end that the parliament elected in June 1990 was given the special status of a constituent assembly. It had been agreed at the round-table talks

354 that the Grand National Assembly would prepare a new basic law and new elections would take place only after its adoption. The political agreement signed by the parliamentary parties on 3 January 1991 reaffirmed their commitment to pass essential reform legislation, including a new, democratic constitution for the country. Ginyu Ganev, deputy speaker of the GNA and chairman of the parliamentary committee for the drafting of the new constitution, has emphasized the important linkage between the round-table talks and the decision to adopt a new basic law:

In fact it was at the Roimdtable talks that the decision to have elections for a Grand National Assembly was made. In accordance with Bulgarian constitutional and political tradition, such an assembly is called only when it is thought crucial changes in the governing of the coimtry are necessary. The political opposition stuck to this idea very persistently indeed. Originally, the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Agrarian Union—the pro- Communist one—lacked the understanding why it was important to convene a Grand National Assembly. Initially, they were not convinced that it was necessary to call a Grand National Assembly. Indeed, I was among the three non-party representatives at the National Roundtable who thought it was unnecessary to start the democratic changes by electing a Grand National Assembly and by enacting a new constitution. 1 admit that this idea was alien to me....

It was Mr. and his circle who came up with the idea that what we need is a Grand National Assembly to create a new Constitution and by this to start the overall democratic process in the country. 1 had many discussions with Mr. Zhelev and his people about this issue. So 1 know for sure who was the father o f this idea. In the end, none of the Roundtable participants opposed the decision to hold elections for a Grand National Assembly that would create a new Constitution. We could have gone the other way—to follow the Hungarian experience, for example: there is a working Parliament, bills are passed and the existing Constitution is constantly amended to suit the requirements of political development. (Interview with Ganev in Melone 1996b)

But many in the anti-Communist camp were opposed to the idea of convening a

Grand National Assembly to write and adopt a new constitution. Ivan Glushkov, leader of the right-wing Christian-Agrarian Party and member of the Agrarian delegation at the Round

355 Table, considers the constitutional work of the GNA, of which he was a deputy speaker, a

“waste of time” and a “mistake”:

Bulgaria made a mistake by electing in 1990 a Grand National Assembly, whose task it was to create a new constitution. Even now the leaders of the UDF are unable to explain to their followers where this idea to create a Grand National Assembly originated.... 1 still believe that we would have gone much faster towards democratization and market reform if we had spent our time in the Grand National Assembly creating laws necessary for the transition, instead of creating the Constitution. Such laws were really essential. For example, taxation laws, laws regulating the structural changes in the economy—we still do not have them—or privatization laws. In other words, we should have acted like Hungary and the Czech Republic. They kept their old constitutions and altered their provisions to such an extent that, as the anecdote goes, the only thing left from the Hungarian Socialist Constitution is the name of the capital city, Budapest. They did not waste a year or more producing a new constitution. Some people here say it would have been fatal to carry on with the old, . But we could have changed a number of articles in it. Formally, it looked very democratic. We should have concentrated our efforts on changing the system and we should have taken the power from the Communists by means of the law. And by this we would have sped up the transition of property ownership from state to private. This process is still deadlocked. We should have changed many more articles in that way! (Interview with Glushkov in Melone 1996b)

In the first months o f 1991, the representative elites recruited through the founding

June 1990 election engaged in prolonged public and private negotiations over the contours of the new basic document. No confining conditions were ever imposed on the constitutional work in the Assembly. But the growing ideological polarization in the country had set the stage for a sharp political conflict over the terms of the new constitution. As soon as a compromise draft emerged from the parliamentary Commission for the Drafting and

Approval of the Constitution and its subcommissions, the constituent process ran into trouble, partly focusing on the only unresolved issue in the roimd-table deliberations, namely the timing of the next elections for an ordinary Assembly. Ideological disagreements

356 between the BSP and the UDF, as well as within the UDF itself, contributed even more to this conflict.

The UDF’s governing body, the National Coordinating Council, issued a statement on 21 March 1991, criticizing the BSP parliamentary majority for being deliberately slow in drafting the constitution, and warning that any delay in holding new parliamentary elections would endanger the entire democratic process. The UDF leadership called for the constituent assembly to complete its work by mid-May so that general elections could take place in June, as the PCC accords had stipulated. Its more aggressive and self-confident stance was bolstered by opinion polls which showed that more than 40% of the respondents agreed that the current parliament should be replaced by a more democratic one and that, if new elections were held, the UDF would get about 32% of the vote, the BSP 25%. the

Agrarians 10%, and the MRF 8%. Another poll taken by the Bulgarian Association for Fair

Elections in mid-April gave the UDF 36.4% o f the vote, the BSP 17.5%, BANU 10.3%, and the MRF 7.2%. But the Socialists remained opposed to holding elections before a new basic law had been adopted, and the UDF itself was divided on this issue (Engelbrekt 1991a).

In a repeat of their successful anti-govemment strategy of the previous year, the more radical members of the UDF began holding weekly rallies to press for early general elections.

These mass protests were backed by student strikes and sit-ins throughout the country. The demonstrators demanded the dissolution of the Assembly by April 19, even if no constitution was adopted by that date, and the holding of new elections in late June. UDF leader Filip

Dimitrov announced that

In a democracy, the legislature should be the representative of the nation. If it does not properly represent the people, it should be dissolved. .. Let us not forget to ask whether it is really in accordance with moral standards that the

357 party that refuses to admit the guilt of a totalitarian political organization, such as the Bulgarian Communist Party, and which refuses to restore to the people their own property, which was stolen from them under the communist regime, whether this party is entitled to determine the image of the Assembly that is expected to adopt the new constitution? (Interview with Dimitrov in Demokratsiya, April 8,1991: 1, 2)

Claiming that the legislature is “Red,” the UDF National Coordinating Council called for the dissolution of the GNA and endorsed the declared intention of 47 hardline UDF deputies to leave parliament:

The Grand National Assembly repeatedly proved that its composition does not allow it to adopt the laws that are so necessary to change the system and for a really democratic constitution. We call upon the UDF members of the Grand National Assembly to walk out of the legislature by 19 April, and for President Zhelyu Zhelev to declare new elections on 23 and 30 June 1991. {Demokratsiya, April 9, 1991: 1)

But this hardline position proved to be very controversial among the major parties in the UDF, a loose coalition whose ideologically diverse groups were held together only by their shared opposition to Communism. The two largest members, the Social Democratic

Party and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-Nikola Petkov, which together constituted a 52% majority of the UDF card-carrying membership, announced the formation of a new coalition, the UDF-Center. Condemning extremism inside the UDF, which enabled “a group of aggressive people to manipulate the organization,” and demanding that a new, democratic constitution be adopted as soon as possible, the leaders of the new faction said they would seek to defend democratic principles against the attempts of the “rightist and monarchist forces to divert the UDF from its initial goals” (BTA in English, April 17, 1991). The new group was particularly critical of “the emerging monarchist right wing” in the UDF, which the UDF-Center accused of using “the Bolshevik tactics of conquering the coalition organization from within” (BTA in English, April 10, 1991). BANU-Nikola Petkov leader

358 Milan Drenchev declared that “it would be a crime to demand the dissolving of parliament

before it has adopted the constitution” (BTA in English, April 17,1991). He and other UDF-

Center leaders were convinced that the “rightist and reactionary forces” who were calling for

the dissolution of the GNA before the passing of the constitution were directly manipulated

by the exiled king and that their ultimate goal was the restoration of the monarchy and the

enthronement of Simeon U.

Fellow UDF members Ecoglasnost, the Green Party, and Zhelev's Federation of

Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy formed another splinter group, UDF-Liberals, which

declared its support for the moderate stand of the UDF-Center. For all practical purposes, the

anti-BSP opposition had become divided between a radical and a moderate wings with

conflicting ideas about the nature of the new constitution, when the writing of a new

fundamental law should be completed, and whether Bulgaria should have a republican or

monarchical form of government (Engelbrekt 1991b). Right-wing Agrarian Ivan Glushkov explains the reasons for this internal split:

A couple of months after the start of the Grand National Assembly disunity began to show. I believe that the first differences that became prominent had their formal cause in issues siuroimding the Constitution. But the real cause was that part of the democratic forces wanted a harder, more definite and decisive stand against the Bulgarian Socialist Party. To put this more clearly- -this was the time when the UDF split. The decisive issue was whether it should accept some kind of “collaboration approach” toward the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The justification for this approach was to complete the work on the Constitution. But in the process it would be necessary to make more concessions. The other faction stood for a tougher stand and was against any concessions to the Communists. These differences took initially the form of sharp debates within the UDF and its parliamentary group. .. Finally, these disagreements took its most outright form with the decisions of the 39 MP’s, in fact there were 40, fix>m the UDF’s parliamentary group. They decided to leave the Grand National Assembly and to go on a himger strike.

359 The Bulgarian Socialist Party had an absolute majority in the Grand National Assembly. But the BSP was lacking the required qualified majority of two- thirds of the total vote to ratify the Constitution. So if the UDF parliamentary group had stayed united until the end, the Constitution could not have entered into force. (Interview with Glushkov in Melone 1996b)

The dissension in the UDF ranks became open on May 14, when 39 radical deputies of its parliamentary group walked out of the Assembly to protest its slow pace of work and the domination of the Socialist majority, which they accused of writing a flawed, “pro-

Communist” document. But a majority of UDF deputies, led by BSDP leader Dertliev and

BANU-Nikola Petkov chairman Drenchev, disagreed with the walkout and remained in parliament. In their own defense, they stated that the Socialists could be controlled more effectively within than outside the GNA, because the BSP lacked the required two-thirds majority necessary to structure the constitution in accord with its own preferences and therefore needed to secure a broad constitutional consensus.

Rejecting such arguments as excuses for “collaboration” with the ex-Communists, the Group of 39 called for the Assembly’s dissolution and demanded that new elections be held no later than July. Their boycott was backed by the UDF National Coordinating

Council, in which the many small, so-called “phantom” parties held a majority of the votes due to the principle of equal party representation— that is, one party, one vote. Most of the participants in two UDF strategy-planning conferences agreed with the striking deputies that a more conciliatory attitude toward the BSP risked depriving the opposition of the mass of its supporters. The conferences obligated all UDF deputies who remained in the Assembly to call for its immediate dissolution. If this demand was not accepted by the Socialist majority, the remaining UDF parliamentarians should walk out and refuse to return before an early date for elections had been set. Many members of the UDF’s parliamentary caucus

360 publicly disagreed with this decision and were promptly expelled from the coalition, making the breakup of the UDF final and official (Engelbrekt 1991b).

President Zhelev was also opposed to the parliamentary walkout of the hardliners and the idea of scheduling elections before a new constitution had been ratified. At a meeting with the president on May 22, the leaders of the parties remaining in parliament accepted

Zhelev’s compromise proposal to hold parliamentary elections in late September. They also called for the adoption of a new constitution, a new electoral law, as well as draft laws on the economy essential for reform, before the GNA dissolved itself. To speed up the constituent process. President Zhelev endorsed the July 17 deadline set by the non-striking Assembly deputies for the new constitution to be finally ratified (BTA in English, June 22, 1991).

The protest wave that the UDF hardliners had hoped to mobilize on behalf of their militant demands fizzled out for lack of strong mass support. There are several reasons for the failure of the militants to repeat their successful anti-govemment campaigns of 1990, but the main one seems to be that the population at large appeared to be satisfied with the way things were going in Bulgaria at that time. Opinion polls taken in 1991 showed that strong majorities of Bulgarians supported the policies of the reform coalition government of Prime

Minister Dimitar Popov as well as the extent and pace of democratic changes. As evidenced by the 1991 Time-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll, respondents approved of the performance of the Popov cabinet by a margin of 2.5:1, and also endorsed the political and economic reforms taking place in the country by a margin of nearly 2:1. The boycotting deputies could not rely on sufficient grassroots support for their pressure tactics, even though mass rallies, student demonstrations and sit-ins did take place. Without the backing of a new mass mobilization wave, the UDF extremists had no real leverage over

361 other elite members, including their own more moderate colleagues, save for symbolic gestures of protest and defiance.

In a final, desperate attempt to block the passage of the draft constitution, 23 radical

UDF deputies went on a hunger strike on July 10. They camped out in the open near the parliament building and called for an immediate dissolution of the Assembly and a firm date for the next elections. Petko Simeonov, who had initially joined the Group of 39, but later renounced their protest action and returned to Parliament, sheds some light on the rationale behind the controversial hunger strike;

When they left the Parliament, I also followed suit, because 1 was greatly dissatisfied with the slow-down in the work of the Grand National Assembly and with those decisions imposed by the majority. And when they left, 1 was with them. But when this protest took the form of a hunger strike, when they started to proclaim revolutionary slogans, 1 dissociated from them and stated outright that the Constitution should be signed, because this represents a step forward. 1 was tom to pieces for taking this stand. (Interview with Simeonov in Melone 1996b)

Another opponent, Social-Democratic leader Petar Dertliev, saw the hunger strikers as motivated mostly by their secret pro-monarchy sympathies: “The reason was that the monarchists cannot declare that they do not want to have a republican Constitution. .. It is all demagogy. They wanted to make political profit but they did not succeed” (Interview with

Dertliev in Melone 1996b).

Some of the striking parliamentarians were eminent UDF figures, such as the deputy chairman of the Green Party Filip Dimitrov, Democratic Party leader Stefan Savov, Radical

Democratic Party leader Elka Konstantinova, the co-chairman of the United Christian-

Democratic Center Stoyan Ganev, the chief editor of the UDF daily Demokratsiya Yordan

Vasilev, and his wife, poetess Blaga Dimitrova, (who was to become Zhelev’s vice-

362 president), all of whom soon formed the nucleus of the “dark-blue” UDF-Movement.

Another of their demands was that the constitutional text be subjected to a popular referendum, as proposed at the roimd-table negotiations. But, as GNA Deputy Speaker Ginyu

Ganev recalls, the referendiun option had been ruled out by the round-table principals:

True, such ideas were around. But we decided upon an approach that is closer to the traditions of Bulgarian constitutionalism. The first constitution of the newly liberated Bulgaria from the Turks, the so-called Tumovo Constitution of 1879, was enacted by a majority of the deputies in the Grand National Assembly and not by referendum. By contrast, the 1971 Constitution of T odor Zhivkov was enacted by referendum. Our memories of the referendum for Todor Zhivkov’s Constitution are not associated with democracy. Because of this, it was agreed that the new Constitution shall be passed by a two-thirds majority from the total number of all deputies in the Grand National Assembly. In the context of the Bulgarian tradition and the actual representation at the Grand National Assembly this meant a great number of people, because the Grand National Assembly had 400 deputies.(Interview with Ganev in Melone 1996b)

Since it received scant public support, the hunger strike did not prevent the legislature from passing the new constitution on July 12. As Speaker announced the final result, all deputies in the Assembly chamber rose to their feet and enthusiastically chanted to the tune of the national anthem: “Bulgaria, democracy!” (BTA in English, July 12,1991 ).

The adoption of a new, fully democratic constitution made Bulgaria the first post-

Communist nation with a constitutional basis for the transition to democracy. Under the new

Constitution, Bulgaria became a parliamentary democracy, in which there are no state institutions whose power does not derive from democratic procedures. But unlike the

Tumovo Constitution of 1879 which had been approved by all representatives in the

Constituent Assembly regardless of their ideological differences, only 309 of the 400 deputies signed the 1991 fundamental law (Tzvetkov 1993:475). The over one himdred UDF deputies and the two MRF deputies (Miroslav Darmov and Yuli Bakhnev) who signed it

363 soon paid the political price for their courage, as they were ex-communicated from their respective parties. From the standpoint of institutional design and regime durability, this was by no means a very hopeful start for a new democracy, where all important elite players must be part of the consensus on a new democratic constitutional order.

Because of this lack of unanimity, Bulgaria’s democratic charter was adopted by a

“majoritarian,” rather than “consensual” approach to constitution-making. While not a single party represented in the Assembly openly rejected the basic democratic principles and institutions set forth in the new Constitution, this lack of unanimity was a sign of deep disagreements within the political elite over such issues as the scope of minority rights in the democratic constitution or the republican form of government. Although the freedoms listed in the Constitution are extensive and minority dissent is tolerated, all constitutional provisions refer to individual rights and the very term “minority” is omitted. The MRF’s opposition was less fundamental, since the abstention by most of its deputies was due only to their disagreement with the constitutional provisions dealing with the recognition of minority parties based on ethnicity or religion, but was not a rejection of the constitution’s democratic or unitary principles (Engelbrekt 1991c). The himger strike of the hardline UDF deputies, on the other hand, was motivated not just by a desire to force early parliamentary elections, which the UDF expected to win, but also by a more fundamental opposition to constitutional clauses defining Bulgaria as a republic and a “social-welfare state,” as well as to constitutional limits on the future prosecution of BCP leaders. Petko Simeonov believes that it was mostly the republican character of the new Constitution that provoked the hardliners’ opposition:

364 The issue originally was that the Grand National Assembly worked with great difficulty. Then, some of those who left started to proclaim revolutionary slogans. Simultaneously, they began to explain their behavior to the people by saying that they left the Parliament and that they are in a hunger strike because they disagree with the new Constitution. But this was, so to speak, just a pretext. The heart of the matter, the basic motive of their actions, which was not stated openly, is that they disagreed with the Constitution because it is a republican one. They were monarchists.. those of them, who were the leaders as well as the behind-the-scene abettors. Because acceptance of the new constitution would mean closing the door for the eventual return of the Tumovo Constitution...which proclaimed Bulgaria a monarchy . . [T]hey wanted to go back to the Constitution of 1879. And the Communist Constitution created in 1947 was an illegal act fi'om their point o f view. .. They did not say, “We want the tsar back,” they said instead, “We do not want this Constitution, it is a Communist one,” or sometimes they said, “We want the Tumovo Constitution,” which in fact meant that they also want the monarchy. But this was said under their breath.... What they wanted was the restoration, to get back to the status quo of the prewar days. (Interview with Simeonov in Melone 1996b)

Dertliev, the BSD? leader widely credited with being the “father” of the new basic document, confirms that it was mostly the monarchists who were stirring up opposition to the new Constitution which, according to him, was in no way pro-Communist;

The documents we signed, including the Constitution itself, have no Communist features at all. The Constitution is based on the example of all modem European constitutions: separation of powers and balance between them and guarantees for their proper function. Like every other human deed, the new Constitution is not perfect. Moreover, everyone has his own subjective judgment about what is good or bad about the Constitution: the president wants more power for himself, while the National Assembly wants this power, too. But, on balance, I consider this Constitution a good one. And one of the greatest achievements of the Social-Democratic Party is that it was able to convince most UDF deputies at the time to stay in Parliament and to create this Constitution. There was an opposite opinion that if the Communists participate in the creation o f the Constitution it is undoubtedly a communist one. But even now it is impossible to have a Constitution bypassing them because we need a two-thirds majority. But these claims against our involvement in the making of the Constitution were simply a demagogy bom out of petty partisanship. The basic reason for such behavior was the monarchists’ desire to bring the old Tumovo Constitution back. (Interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b)

365 It must be pointed out that there is a serious danger implicit in such a majoritarian constitution-making process, especially if elite members opposed to the constitutional text subsequently rise to leadership positions in their own parties. As we shall see in Chapter 13, this risk emanates from the fact that such elite members would always see the constitutional arrangement as somewhat illegitimate and having been imposed on them by a temporary ruling majority representing an ideologically antagonistic elite. As Linz and Stepan (1996:

4) emphasize, such basic disagreements may create questions about the legitimacy of the new democratic government and indeed the future of the new political system.

The signing fhistrated the radicals in the anti-Communist opposition who had waged an intense campaign for several months to thwart it. But in spite of the heated debate and futile theatrics outside the National Assembly, there was no open challenge to the new constitutional order from inside the legislative. Most members of parliament praised the

Constitution as a result of reasonable compromises, called it a guarantee of the irreversibility of the democratic process, and agreed to the new system of rules ensuring the uncertainty of future electoral prospects and alternation in power. In his address to the Assembly, President

Zhelev hailed the document as “a reliable basis for the implementation of democratic change” (quoted in Engelbrekt 1991d: I). Speaking after the vote, Georgi Avramov, leader of the parliamentary group of the UDF-aligned Ecoglasnost, agreed, “The Constitution that we have adopted is not perfect but is better than many European constitutions.” BSDP leader

Dertliev also spoke highly of the new fundamental law, “The Constitution is neither

Communist nor Social-Democratic nor Agrarian; it is a constitution for the Bulgarian people as a whole and is good enough for the transitional period we are living through” (BTA in

English, July 12, 1991). Five years later, Dertliev will call the new Constitution “the only

366 significant gain during the transition since 10 November 1989" (interview with Dr. Dertliev in Duma, July 12, 1996). Ginyu Ganev, the influential deputy speaker of the GNA, has equally praised the new Constitution:

I am more aware than many others that this Constitution could have been more sophisticated, but it is in no way a bad Constitution. It is by no means a communist Constitution—I state this openly and clearly in my capacity as chairman of the parliamentary committee for the drafting and approval of the Constitution. (Interview with Ganev in Melone 1996b)

In spite of the vehement opposition of those hardline deputies who refused to vote for the new constitution, the compromise and accommodation among the contending political forces that had gone into the constituent process produced a set of legitimate democratic institutions that have so far withstood recurrent political crises and severe economic breakdown. The Constitution opened the way for the post-Communist politics of pluralistic contestation within the new democratized rules of the game, including the peaceful turnover of power by the ruling BSP elite. The adoption of a new fundamental law was thus an important step in establishing a democratic political framework and cooperative parliamentary habits. Despite all the fits and starts of the transition process, the formation of a grand coalition government and the adoption of a democratic constitution completed the institutionalization of the new democracy.

But the majoritarian manner of constitution-making has had long-term negative consequences for Bulgarian neodemocracy, as the radicals opposed to the signing of the constitution, known as the “dark ,” soon came to dominate the UDF leadership. This circumstance explains the ambivalence and even disrespect, with which some former and current UDF leaders have occasionally treated the provisions of the new basic charter.

Nevertheless, the institution-building phase of Bulgaria’s democratic transition was

367 successfully concluded, resolving in varying degrees the most difficult constitutional issues, one of them being the monarchy-versus-republic controversy.

Monarchy versus Republic

A particularly divisive constitutional issue Segmenting Bulgaria’s political consensus is the debate on restoring a monarchy that in the pre-Communist past was a major obstacle to true democracy and democratic consolidation. According to Prof. Chavdar Dobrev, there is support for the monarchy

First of all, among individual monarchist parties and movements, which refuse to accept the republican form of government. They want to restore the Third Bulgarian Kingdom under the new conditions and defend the representatives of the Coburg-Gotha dynasty, especially Boris III, all of whom they worship as saints. They take advantage of the personal qualities of Simeon II in Madrid in order to persuade Bulgarians that only the restoration of the monarchy could make possible the completion of democratic reforms in our country.

Secondly, it is the UDF as a whole, which in its last election campaign has demonstrated for the first time its loyalty to the idea of restoring the monarchy in Bulgaria. The UDF thus hopes to increase its prestige among the population and to turn Simeon II into a guarantee for its future political domination of the country. The high public rating of the Spain-based aspiring monarch has convinced them that mass discontent with our catastrophic economic situation can be used to promote the idea of “saving” the country through the triumphal return of the monarch to the throne.

Thirdly, there is a significant number of prominent individuals from the ranks of the former Communist party, who find the return of the monarchy to be quite a convenient way of improving their lot. .. I would call such people “monarcho-communists.” (Dobrev 1998: 182-183)

As early as January 1990, monarchist groups such as the Christian Republican Party and the Democratic Monarchist Party had called for the return of Bulgaria’s number one political emigre. Tsar Simeon II, and for a plebiscite on whether Bulgaria should be a

368 republic or a monarchy (see BTA in English, January 17, 1990). The prevailing opinion among the opposition parties was that the Communist regime had manipulated the 1946 referendum abolishing the monarchy and many of them rejected the legality of its results.

The monarchist groups and some conservative parties within the UDF publicly declared their adherence to the Tumovo Constitution of 1879, which had defined Bulgaria as a constitutional kingdom, and demanded the country’s reversion to . From his exile in Madrid, the king was openly encouraging the activities of the royalist groups by advertizing the “advantages” of constitutional monarchy over the declared by the 1991 Constitution:

That the new Constitution has been greeted with mixed feelings—to put it mildly—speaks for itself. I have no degree in constitutional law, so 1 make no pronouncement, but the Tumovo Constitution is more liberal than this first attempt [of Bulgaria] to become a state of law. Constitutions in any democracy may be amended, so this is the line along which our legislators should proceed. As far as political parties are concerned, the King in a constitutional monarchy can be of exceptional assistance to guarantee and foster political life by acting as a moderator. .. Particularly in such a transitional period as this, I feel that no other democratic system can replace the advantages o f monarchy, its alternatives, and its elasticity. Theory aside, in my own case I have had Western upbringing...I have the advantage of being related to all the European royal families, and with these connections monarchy in Bulgaria stands an even better chance. National unity, reconciliation, and a new sense of dignity are obvious elements in a constitutional kingdom.... 1 shall not reiterate the advantages of monarchy, which coincide with what I can achieve, provided my people give me a chance. (Interview with Simeon II in Ward 1992: 8-9)

But the ruling Communists were vehemently opposed to the idea of restoring the monarch. Not only did the BCP cabinet insist on the validity of the 1946 decision, but it also criticized Simeon II for a series of interviews, which appeared on TV and in the national press in early 1990. An official government statement claimed that there was no room for royalist ideas in republican Bulgaria and that the king’s ambition for a role in national

369 politics was “unacceptable” (BTA in English, February 12, 1990). A high-ranking BSP official stressed the party’s firm opposition to restoring the abolished monarchy, given its discredited historical record:

My opinion of the monarchy’s possible return is that we shall never again abandon our republican status. The Coburg dynasty brought on us the national catastrophes of 1919 and 1944, and I cannot believe that our people can forget these things. (Interview with Krum Pastarmajiev in Ward 1992: 13)

The stage was set for political mobilization and confi*ontation over this major constitutional issue. Bulgaria is described as the most favorably inclined to the idea of restoring the monarchical institution among the countries of Eastern Europe that were formerly monarchies. Several reasons have been cited for this unexpected tendency. First of all, the Communist regime is said to have failed in erasing the nation’s “positive ” memory of the late King Boris III who died relatively young in 1943, thus escaping full responsibility for the wartime catastrophe. His exiled son, a very successful businessman living in Madrid, is well-educated, intelligent, articulate, and fluent in Bulgarian. In his appearances on

Bulgarian television, Simeon had reportedly made a very favorable impression on the

Bulgarian public. The prestige and popularity of the exiled monarch are also said to be a measure of the public’s discontent with the grave economic situation and the chaotic political scene. Exasperated by the privations and hardships of an economically troubled transition, many Bulgarians are said to have pinned their hopes on Simeon to lead the country out of its present predicament (Nikolaev 199Id). Other explanations have been suggested for the sudden popularity of the former king. According to Chavdar Dobrev, a major reason was that

nostalgia for the monarchy...is fed by the disappointment of the mass population with the chaos, the failed promises of theperestroika leaders, and

370 the advent of Wild-West capitalism brought on by individuals who used to belong to the former nomenklatura class. (Dobrev 1998: 182)

Another reason, in his view, was the perceived comparative advantage of the suave and debonair Simeon over “the peasant philosopher from the village of Vesselinovo,” that is,

the comparison between the presidential qualities of Zheliu Zhelev and the potential advantages of the exiled King in Spain. There are not a few Bulgarians who, faced with such a choice, give their preferences to the elegant demeanor and balanced thinking of Simeon II. (Dobrev 1998: 183- 184)

As a consequence, monarchical parties and movements, which were skillfully campaigning for the king’s return, gained some popularity in the early transition period (see

Devlin 1990). But republicanism has continued to enjoy broad support, not only among the ex-Communists, but also among the Social Democrats and the Agrarians, two traditionally anti-monarchist parties which in 1990-1991 were by far the largest groups in the UDF with roughly 100,000 members each. Public opinion polls have repeatedly suggested that, while the king himself is widely respected, a clear majority of the population is not prepared to welcome back the monarchy as a national institution, even though pro-monarchist sentiments seem to be stronger in Bulgaria than anywhere else in post-Communist Europe except for

Yugoslavia, according to the New Democracies Barometer V (see Rose and Haerpfer 1998).

Nor have the monarchist parties fared particularly well in electoral politics. For example, the largest monarchist group, the Kingdom of Bulgaria Federation, won barely 1.4% of the popular vote in the December 1994 parliamentary election. Even ex-monarchists like Dragan

Tenev, a prominent anti-Communist writer and former officer in the king’s Royal Guard, have argued against a return of the monarchy:

I did my military service in the Royal Guard, as a lieutenant, and I was decorated with the Cross of Courage in 1944, the third successive generation

371 of my family to have been decorated for valor...[but] I don’t believe the monarchy will ever return to Bulgaria. Though Simeon II has mar\'elous contacts and is a wise and great person, those who surround him are careerists and the people will not trust them. We remember the suffering that King Ferdinand brought to Bulgaria, and the suffering that Boris brought, and it is difficult to remain objective in these circumstances. If he becomes a constitutional monarch he would become a symbol merely, and we have no need for such symbols. (Interview with Tenev in Ward 1992: 175-176)

But at the start of the transition pro-monarchist sentiments seemed to be finding

support among the rightist parties, in addition to the more outspokenly monarchist groups.

Within the UDF, opinions on the matter were clearly divided. Supporters of King Simeon

II pointed to the very constructive role which King Juan Carlos had played in Spain’s democratization as well as to Simeon’s own highly commendable personal qualities. Anti- royalist opponents, however, were not swayed by such arguments. One of the main reasons why the Social Democrats split from the UDF was precisely because of what they claimed was the alliance’s “flirtation with monarchism. ” BSDP leader Dertliev firmly rejected the monarchists’ desire to restore the old Tumovo Constitution of 1879:

At the time when we were creating the new Constitution, the monarchists were not brave enough to come out in the open. This subtle monarchism began to manifest its true nature only very recently. The Tumovo Constitution, which they want to restore, is a document created right after the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks. And it represents a marvelous achievement of the Bulgarian free spirit. But it contains an internal contradiction due to the timing of its creation. One the hand, there are guarantees for basic human rights, while, on the other hand, it constitutes a monarchist regime; and all three monarchs, who reigned over Bulgaria since its Liberation, infiinged those particular rights. (Interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b)

President Zhelev has also supported the republican form of government, insisting that historically the monarchy was “imposed from abroad” {Duma, May 3,1991). In contrast to

372 the UDF’s right-wing parties, he and other centrist leaders recognize the validity of the 1946 vote in favor of the republic and oppose the resurrection of the discredited monarchy:

Some people maintain that the 1946 referendum was illegal because it was held under undemocratic conditions. Therefore, it must be repealed now and the Tumovo Constitution should be restored, together with the monarchy.... But I am absolutely sure that, despite all manipulations and falsifications which, no doubt, accompanied it, the 1946 referendum reflected the will of the vast majority of the Bulgarian people. And this is easily understandable... since the Coburg-Gotta dynasty was responsible for the two national catastrophes of 1913 and 1918, then it plunged Bulgaria in a third national catastrophe by siding with the Axis Powers during the last war. It was also involved in coups d’etat, autocratic government, political assassinations, violations of the Tumovo Constitution, and so on. I am not surprised that immediately after the war Bulgarians—like the Italians, the Romanians and the Hungarians—placed their hopes for a better and more democratic future on the republican form of government. (Zhelev 1996: 201-203)

During the 1990-1991 republic-versus-monarchy debate, Zhelev even wamed that a return of the monarchy might lead to a new national catastrophe, while conceding that it was entirely up to the elected constituent assembly to decide what form of government Bulgaria would have (BTA in English, January 16, 1991). He suggested that the question of the monarchy should be decided by a new referendum, an idea that was eagerly embraced by the monarchists.

The first article of the draft constitution, which was approved by the GNA on 29 May

1991, defined Bulgaria as a parliamentary republic, but pro-monarchist deputies strongly objected to the adoption of this formulation. Due to the sense of urgency dominating the whole constituent process, the Assembly decided to settle the monarchy-versus-republic debate by means of a popular referendiun. This proposal emerged within the context of the compromise reached by the legislators on the date of the next parliamentary elections. On

May 28, the GNA decided to schedule a national referendum on the issue of the monarchy

373 for July 6. This decision had been proposed by Dertliev, the staunchly anti-monarchist leader

of the Social Democratic Party, and was backed by BANU-Nikola Petkov and the BSP. The

Socialists and the Agrarians accepted Dertliev s proposal believing that a referendum at this

time would not reverse the 1946 vote. The idea of resolving this issue by means of a

plebiscite also seemed to correspond to the expressed wishes of Simeon II himself, who in

interviews for the Bulgarian media had said that he was willing to return to Bulgaria only if

the nation wanted him back (Nikolaev 199Id).

But in the week following this decision, public opinion, as reflected in mass polls and

numerous press interviews, appeared mostly opposed to a return of the monarchy. Sample surveys showed that republicanism was much more deeply rooted in Bulgaria’s political culture than pro-monarchist sentiments, since many Bulgarians stated that having an unelected and dynastic monarch as head of state would be imdemocratic. According to an opinion poll taken in late May 1991, 78% of the respondents favored a republican form of government, while only 8% supported the monarchy (BTA in English, May 25, 1991).

Sensing inevitable defeat given the prevailing public mood, even groups that wished

Simeon to return to the throne began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of having a referendum at this time and Anally rejected the idea. The monarchist parties complained that the referendum had been scheduled too soon, as the early date proposed by Dertliev was clearly designed to pre-empt any attempt by the exiled king to organize a nationwide campaign in his own favor. But the main argument against bringing up the republic-versus- monarchy debate to a popular vote was that it would divert attention from the more pressing issue of flrmly establishing a democratic system of government. The referendum’s

374 opponents, such as Zhelev, also emphasized that it risked further polarizing a nation already

divided by political, socioeconomic, ethnic and other problems (Nikolaev 199Id).

Declaring triumphantly that there could be no doubt about the legitimacy of the

republic since “all those who wanted a referendum have now recanted,” Dertliev urged that

the referendum decision be put to a new vote and revoked by the Assembly (BTA in English,

June 5, 1991). This is exactly what the GNA did on June 9, thus putting the issue to rest, at

least for the time being. Reactions to the cancellation of the referendum confirmed that the

idea of restoring the monarchy lacked national consensus. President Zhelev praised the

parliament for reversing a decision which, he claimed, “put in question legitimately elected

institutions so lightheartedly.” Even Simeon announced from abroad that he was glad that

“the untimely and unnecessary referendum” had been called off (BTA in English, June 6,

1991). A new poll conducted on June 15 confirmed that a strong majority of Bulgarians

(76%) favored keeping the republic, while only 15% of the respondents said that they would have voted for the return of the king (BTA in English, June 21, 1991). Having realized that their cause lacked mass appeal, the monarchists temporarily suspended their efforts to bring back the monarchy. Their early defeat has not only ensured the democratic character of the transition, but it also confirmed that Bulgaria’s New Right was politically too weak and divided to impose its will on this important constitutional issue.

Although it may not disrupt the process of entrenching Bulgarian democracy, the controversy over the monarchy is not dead. There are nearly forty parties and organizations with monarchist platforms, seeking to repeal the 1946 referendum, restore the 1879 Tumovo constitution and bring back the exiled king to the throne. The most significant among them are the Kingdom of Bulgaria Federation and the Confederation for the T umovo Constitution-

375 Kingdom of Bulgaria. Many prominent UDF politicians also extend overt or covert support

for the monarchy (Andreev 1996: 39). For example, the cabinet of Prime Minister Kostov has officially asked the Constitutional Court to repeal the 1946 referendum, claiming that its results were rigged by the Communist regime. Such a move could potentially pave the way for the restoration of the monarchy, which continues to enjoy some political support.

In spite of the 1991 referendum setback, Simeon has not given up his ambition to return one day to Bulgaria as king. He continues to insist that a constitutional monarchy is the best form o f government for a country in transition like Bulgaria. Nor have Simeon’s detractors, such as Zhelev, ceased to criticize his self-promoting efforts to be restored to the

Bulgarian throne—with or without a popular referendum:

He has one idee fixe—io become a king. From a personal point of view, I can understand his ambition, because I know what a great human drama this must be for him. But that is all. Personally, I cannot accept his attitude towards the Bulgarian state. Afier all, the Bulgarian people are not a horse, nor is the Bulgarian government a saddle, which anyone, who wishes to, can mount or pass on to his children. Nor can I easily accept his ambition given what his dynasty brought upon Bulgaria. .. (Zhelev 1995: 170)

In spite of such public criticism, Simeon continues to be one of the most popular political figures among Bulgarians, which was evident during his imofficial trip to Bulgaria

In May-June 1996 at the invitation of over 100 leading Bulgarian intellectuals. His triumphant private visit demonstrated that the ex-monarch continues to enjoy widespread popularity not only among the mass public, but also among many top politicians who sought to meet privately with him. Reuters reported that as many as half a million people turned out to welcome the king on his arrival in Sofia on May 26. Recent opinion polls have suggested that, while less than 20% of Bulgarians want the monarchy restored, some 40% wish the ex­ monarch to assume an important political role in national affairs. His eldest son. Prince Kiril,

376 has already made his debut in Bulgarian politics, having been appointed senior economic advisor to President Stoyanov.

During his 1996 visit to Bulgaria, Simeon II boldly declared that he does not recognize the results of the 1946 referendum and that he is still officially the king of all

Bulgarians. He again spoke strongly in favor of a constitutional monarchy, which he recommended as a "flexible and pragmatic form of government" (BTA, June 16,1996). Such statements were one of the reasons why the royal visit proved to be so controversial among the anti-monarchist parties, such as the BSP, the BSDP, and the Agrarians, whose leaders avoided all contact with the visiting king, insisting that his presence deflected attention from real issues and that it could further divide the already splintered nation. Despite holding a reportedly cordial private meeting with Simeon, Zhelev has remained equally opposed to enthroning a dynasty which “brought upon Bulgarians three national catastrophes and two of the most horrible political assassinations in otu" modem history—the murders of Stambolov and Stamboliisky” (Zhelev 1996: 131).

Opinions on the future role for the exiled king are clearly divided within the political elite. Assen Agov, one of the current UDF leaders, has declared that the 1946 referendum results are “illegal,” thereby giving a boost to Simeon’s hopes ofbeing eventually enthroned in Bulgaria:

We have always declared that the 1946 referendum was illegal. We believe that the Bulgarian people was given no free choice in 1946. That is why the question about Bulgaria’s future form of government and the validity of the Tumovo Constitution remains an open one. (Interview with Agov in Duma, February 9, 1996)

Obviously, there is no elite consensus on the status of the exiled king or what to do with the abolished monarchy. As British historian Richard Crampton argues, the republic-versus-

377 monarchy debate in Bulgaria remains open-ended mainly because of the disastrous failure of the post-Communist reforms and the anarchic domestic situation (Crampton 1996).

Since Simeon II insists that he seeks an important role in Bulgarian politics in order

“to create a climate of consensus that would allow everyone to work together” (interview with Simeon in Trud, August 14, 1996), it is not clear how his political ambitions and the persistent cleavage between monarchists and republicans on this issue will affect the consolidation process in Bulgaria. At this point, the republic-versus-monarchy debate remains unresolved, awaiting the results of a possible new referendum, the holding of which the UDF and other rightist parties have openly supported. President Stoyanov, for instance, has declared that as head of state he favors a popular vote on reintroducing the monarchy, because the Tumovo Constitution was abolished when Bulgaria was “under the occupation of a foreign military power,” but in other interviews he has been more ambivalent on this issue. Simeon II continues to reject the 1946 referendum and the republican Constitution of

1991, insisting that he is prepared to return to Bulgaria as a king, because he can offer the country “fifty years of experience, objectivity and tolerance, things that nobody else can offer in the political battles” (BTA, January 7, 1999). Given the total disillusionment of most

Bulgarians with the country’s current parties and politicians, his chances of regaining the throne should not be underestimated.

The controversy over the monarchy has revealed the significant scope of continued political divisions over a fundamental constitutional issue. Recurrent attempts to bring back the monarchy have failed because of its low historical legitimacy and strong opposition from anti-monarchist members o f the political class. The strongest attempt so far, the intense pro­ monarchy campaign of 1990-1991, foundered because the former king lacks a strong base

378 of public support in the country that he could use to pressure politicians opposed to his restoration. Attitudinal evidence indicates that in spite of the intense pro-monarchist propaganda, restoring the otherwise widely popular Simeon II on the throne is rejected by a majority of ordinary Bulgarians who see the monarchy as a vestige of the past and an anachronism incompatible with the workings of a modem parliamentary democracy. It is on this mass-level basis that the restoration of the king has been successfully contested by the anti-monarchist parties and politicians. But the ongoing debate on this issue also shows that reaching a consensus on fundamentals in Bulgaria remains an illusive goal. The republican- versus-monarchist division has added another dimension to the country’s deep ideological cleavages and partisan animosities.

379 CHAPTER 12

POTENTIAL CHALLENGER ELITES

The focus on politically relevant elites in this chapter is premised on the assumption that, at least historically, elite actors in Bulgaria have been a major obstacle to democratization. Elite groups in Bulgaria have traditionally tended to support and sustain democracy only to the extent that it has served their basic interests, including the acquisition or preservation of political, economic, cultural, social and other valued resources and status.

As Chapter 4 suggested, the deliberate actions or inactions of elite factions were the main behavioral reason for the failure of Bulgaria’s unstable attempt at democracy prior to 1934.

It is for this reason that those who study the problems of frail and unconsolidated democracies, such as the Bulgarian one, need to scrutinize elite attitudes, orientations and behaviors with some extra caution, for there is a direct link between democratic breakdown and elite motivations and actions. Nancy Bermeo points out that

The image of democratic “collapse” is misleading. Democratic political systems do not simply break down from exhaustion or from some set of structural maladies. They must be deliberately assaulted and disassembled. Some of the agents who contribute to this process may do so unwittingly, but ultimately democracies are disassembled by actors with power who think they have a better idea and organize to implement it. (Bermeo 1994: 159)

As already discussed in the Introduction and subsequent chapters, political elites are believed to play a determinative role in democratic transitions and consolidations. In addition

380 to a mass public which is generally supportive of the regime, democracy is also said to require a liberal-minded political elite which is both willing and able to sustain it. Moderate, pragmatic and tolerant leadership always plays a vital role in promoting and perpetuating democratic rule.

In the most crucial test to determine if the Bulgarian neodemocracy is progressing towards some degree of consolidation, the observable behavior and attitudes o f the most likely elite challengers will be examined in this chapter, given their questionable record as well as their capacity to make substantial political trouble and pose a direct threat to the durability of the newly established democratic order. The most important among these potential elite challengers are the former Communists; the largest ethnic-religious minority party, the MRF; the controversial neonationalist groups; and the historically influential military establishment. The closer scrutiny of these four elite players is also warranted by the fact that various critics have at various times questioned the abiding loyalty o f the ex-

Communists and the military to representative democracy, the commitment of the ethnic

Turkish minority to the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state, or the ethno-linguistic and of the neonationalist parties. Not entirely without justification, these four critical political actors are usually seen as most likely to challenge democratic norms and institutions.

From the following brief analysis of the party profiles of these four potential challenger elites, it is clear that there are no major anti democratic or clearly neo-totalitarian parties and movements that openly question the legitimacy of the democratic political institutions or regularly violate the fimdamental norms of political behavior. Unlike Bulgaria of the interwar years, all political actors—the major parties, the military, and other influential

381 sectors—have accepted, at least in their rhetoric, procedural democracy as the framework for

regulating their political conflicts. In spite of political and economic instability, the basic democratic consensus among contenders for political power and the lack of hard-line opponents of democratization have improved the long-term viability of the new order. The

lack of clearly differentiated social classes and cleavages inherited from the Communist era may also reduce the danger of political exclusion and extremism among elite members. The general absence of any clearly anti-system or semiloyal parties with significant levels of electoral support underscores the staying power of the new Bulgarian democracy.

While there is no open elite dissensus about democratic rules and institutions, these hopeful developments are marred by the lack of mutual moderation, trust, respect, and cooperation among the squabbling political parties and politicians. The deep economic crisis, the irresponsible feuding between party elites and the confrontational style of political behavior on the part o f the UDF and the BSP have led to disillusionment among the general public, which may pose a future threat to democratic legitimacy through the rise of extremist parties and politics. The popularity among the population of possible alternatives to the present regime, such as a retirni to Communism, strong-man authoritarianism, or direct army rule, could make such non-democratic options attractive and available to future anti-system elite dissenters.

The Ex-Communists

The success of democratization in post-Communist countries depends to a large degree on the behavior of the ex-Communists, given their relatively large numbers and their political prominence and economic clout (Rose 1996a). With some 380,000 card-carrying

382 members registered in 1994, the Bulgarian Socialist Party is the largest political party in

Bulgaria. Although older rank-and-file members are reportedly nostalgic about the country’s former Communist regime, the BSP leadership renounced early on single-party rule and the use of coercion as a means of winning or holding on to political power (Nikolaev 1990c).

With the USSR, the principal patron of Soviet-style Communist parties, gone from the international scene, Bulgaria’s ex-Communists have embraced the ideology of democratic socialism. This self-transformation, though rarely recognized abroad, is very favorable to keeping the country on a steady democratic course. The Socialist Party now claims to be in the democrats’ camp, insisting that the demise of neo-Stalinist Communism has made it clear that the socialist ideal cannot be reconciled with authoritarian politics or restrictions on fundamental human rights (Lukanov 1992b). Nora Ananieva, an influential member of the

BSP Supreme Council, attributes this radical change to her party’s return to its pre-

Bolshevik, social-democratic roots:

...the Party was founded as a social-democratic party.... It is coming back to its roots... One fourth of the party comes from the former Communist party. A third of our Party are persons who joined after the change. A third of our membership is new. (Interview with Ananieva in Melone 1996b)

The process of profound change within the party began with the 14th Congress of the

BCP in January 1990 (Nikolaev 1990c). The so-called “Congress of Renewal” sacked most of Zhivkov’s close associates and adapled a. Manifesto on Democratic Socialism to serve as the party’s interim program. The manifesto, asserting that socialism without democracy is no socialism at all, called for the BCP to transform itself into a modem Marxist party of democratic socialism. It recognized the legitimacy of organized ideological currents and factions within the party, such as the Association for , the Road to Europe.

383 the Marxist Platform, the Democratic Forum, the Club for Radical Change, the Alternative

Socialist Alliance and others, guaranteeing their right to express their views freely and openly. The manifesto supported political pluralism, liberal democracy, market economy, and the legalization of all forms o f property ownership. The Congress proposed changing the party’s name to Bulgarian Socialist Party as an important symbol of its break with the

Communist past. A referendum was held in April 1990, in which this change of name was approved by an overwhelming majority of party members. The Fourteenth Congress also elected a prominent dissident from the Zhivkov era as editor-in-chief of the party’s newspaperRabotnichesko delo (Workers’ Cause), which was now renamed Duma (Word).

The party declared a total break with the neo-Stalinist model of socialism and its centralized methods of rule, committing itself to “democratic and humane socialism ” which, according to the documents of the congress, is the only system that can guarantee economic progress, social justice and intellectual development. One of the prominent delegates to the

Congress, General Atanas Semerdjiev, summed up its main achievements:

At its 14th Extraordinary Congress on the 31st of January, and the 1st and 2nd of February 1990, the Party rejected all the theory and practice belonging to the past. It accepted a new system of political values and a new political platform, based, so to speak, on an European system of values. It abandoned democratic centralism.... (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

At its next congress held in September 1990, the BSP continued the process of renewal. The 39th BSP Congress (the very name was meant to indicate a continuity with pre-

Bolshevik, social-democratic party traditions) adopted a platform that acknowledged responsibility for past “distortions in every sphere of social life,” endorsed its self- transformation into a modem, left-wing party of democratic socialism, and explicitly rejected the Leninist principle of “democratic centralism” as well as any aspiration to a monopoly of

384 State power (Lukanov 1990b). But the democratization of the BSP was taking place amidst signs of internal turmoil and disarray as the party was divided between reformist and conservative factions. The Alternative Socialist Party (ASP), whose program called for more radical democratization, soon split from the BSP. Divisions in party ranks were particularly evident during the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow. While BSP reformers criticized the coup, party leader Alexander Lilov refrained from any comment, claiming a lack of information. However, Lilov reassured Bulgarians that a similar coup attempt could not take place in Bulgaria, because “the BSP is determined to play a decisive role in the democratization of Bulgaria”(Perry 1991b).

The conflict between reformers and hardliners continued during the 40th BSP congress, held on December 14-16,1991. Neither the incumbent leader Alexander Lilov nor the reformist challenger Georgi Pirinski mustered the necessary absolute majority of votes.

A little-known compromise candidate, 32-year-old economist Zhan Videnov, was elected party leader. Once again, two different formulas, a “modem ” and “European social democracy” were presented at the congress as competing concepts for the BSP’s future ideological path (Engelbrekt and Nikolaev 1992). Although control of the party passed to the younger, post-Zhivkov generation, many of the leaders of reformist factions were defeated in elections to the BSP’s 101-member Supreme Council. Most of the leading reformers decided to continue to work for change within the party, but later many of them left to join the European Left, a splinter group foimded by ex-BSP reformer Alexander Tomov in late

1996.

Increasingly, there was a split between the reform wing led by Lukanov, Pirinski,

Alexander Tomov, Chavdar Kiuranov, and other like-minded reformers and an anti-reform

385 faction led by Videnov, Lilov and other conservatives. Silent since the beginning of the transition, the hardline rearguard of the party now began to reassert itself, taking advantage of the grassroots backlash against the transition’s turmoil and economic hardships to criticize the new system and defend the Communist past. Before passing away in August 1998,

Zhivkov became the extremely popular spokesman for conservative “true believers” who were accusing the post-Zhivkov leadership of betraying the socialist ideal and the interests of working-class Bulgarians.

Nor did the next party congress held in June 1994 settle the question of whether the

BSP is a center-left, social democratic party or a modem neo-Marxist party of the democratic

Left (see BSP 1994). The report of the 41st congress announced for the first time that social democracy will be the basis for futiu’e party policy (Videnov 1994), but this formulation was resisted by many delegates and the reference to “democratic socialism” was not omitted from party documents. Moreover, several leading members of the reformist factions lost their seats on the party’s top bodies. Nevertheless, the centerpiece of the new party program presented for discussion at the congress was the BSP’s unequivocal acceptance of political democracy and market economy, emphasizing once again the democratic nature of its new ideological stance:

The new element in the political culture of the BSP is the acceptance of democracy not only as the most progressive form of government, but as a human value as well. Today Bulgaria must avoid the deterioration of domestic democratic processes, strengthen its democratic institutions, leam from the democratic experience of advanced coimtries, and build a new democratic political culture. The BSP will contribute to the achievement of these goals. .. For this purpose, the BSP

- renounces the dictatorship of the proletariat and rejects in principle and in practice any kind of dictatorship. The way to achieve democratic society in Bulgaria is through strengthening political democracy, not through its

386 restriction or suppression. We are in favor of parliamentary democracy and a republican form of government. We support the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. In this transition period, the fate of democracy in Bulgaria depends on a responsible, broadly representative and effective parliament, a strong and effective democratic executive, and an independent, authoritative judiciary serving the law;

- supports the rule of law and an increased role for civil society. The democratic polity must be governed by legitimately elected state institutions capable of upholding the law and guaranteeing the rights of all citizens. Not only does civil society...exercise control over the state, but it represents in and of itself an autonomous factor contributing to the deepening of democracy. We must further strengthen democratic institutions at all levels and encourage the full development of civil society;

- is committed to transforming the command-administrative economic system into a social market economy. .. Solving national economic problems and ensuring the welfare of all Bulgarian citizens requires a market economy coupled with state economic policies of socially just taxation, welfare, social protection, conservation of the environment, and a fair redistribution of the GNP. The goal of economic reforms in Bulgaria should be the building of a modem, socially and ecologically sound market economy;

- supports the unitary character of the Bulgarian state. We are categorically opposed to any effort to violate the territorial integrity of the country or divide the Bulgarian people. But we are equally opposed to efforts to incite ethnic and religious enmity among Bulgarian citizens and we are committed to ethnic and religious tolerance;

- supports political pluralism. The authoritarian nature of one-party power monopoly is among the bitterest lessons which the BSP has learned from the past. We support the multiparty system and we favor a dialogue between all political parties and movements. Only free democratic elections can provide, or withhold, the consent of the citizenry for any political party to assume governmental executive power;

- favors a civilized political discourse. .. The assumption and exercise of power, as well as stepping down from it, must be peaceful and based on democratic procedures. Political rivalry among the parties must not be allowed to degenerate into “tribal warfare.” Differences should provide a choice among politicians and political altematives, rather than lead to suppression of political pluralism and party opponents. What Bulgaria's democratization needs today is not just democratic parties and democratically-minded politicians, but also more civil relations among the party elites.

387 It is obvious that the BSP is undergoing a process of profound democratization of its political culture. We are reviving the best democratic traditions of our party which is over a hundred years old. We are overcoming the legacy of dogmatic theory and practical mistakes, while we are learning from the very best of the world’s democratic experience. The new element in the political culture of the BSP is that Bulgarian Socialists are now, above all, democrats. Democracy is the method which the party will use in pursuing its goals and values. The BSP’s new conception of government and society is based on democracy understood not just as a method but as a social value in and of itself... (Supplement toDuma, August 17, 1994)

On the eve of the 41st Congress, the Center for Historical and Political Research of the BSP Supreme Council conducted a survey among Socialist office-holders (mostly at the municipal level). The survey data (see Mizov 1994) convey a rather contradictory picture of the political attitudes and orientations of the influential mid-level party elite. There is obviously no consensus on fundamentals, as a large majority (71.8%) of the 437 respondents supported electoral democracy in one form or another, 23.3% favored Gorbachevian democratic socialism, while just 3.6% preferred old-style Communism. In response to a question tapping their ideological orientation, less than a tenth of the respondents indicated a preference that the BSP should be a “revolutionary” party. Furthermore, only 4.0% of the respondents stated that the social basis of the BSP should be the working class or the poor, while almost half said that the BSP should not be a class-based political party. Marxism was the choice of only a small minority (10.7%) of the respondents, nearly a third favored social democracy, while more than half (51.9%) preferred the ideology of democratic socialism.

At the 42nd congress of the Socialists held in December 1996 under conditions of deepening economic and political crisis in the country, controversial party leader Videnov resigned under heavy pressure from the delegates, promising not to seek high party and government posts in the future. He was replaced by his more liberal deputy, Georgi

388 Purvanov, a 39-year-old historian. Widely blamed for the disastrous economic failures of his cabinet, Videnov was not elected to the new BSP Executive Bureau, but his removal did not signify a total victory for the more factions which had opposed him and his unpopular policies. Many leading members of the liberal Association left the BSP soon after the party congress to join the European Left party of Alexander

T omov. Some of these latest defectors publicly complained of resurgent in the BSP, in which reformers were derisively referred to as perestroichiki (that is, proponents of Gorbachev’s perestroika).

The 43rd party congress held in May 1998 reaffirmed the BSP’s strategy of moving closer to the political center, its new social-democratic credentials and the moderate leadership of Purvanov. The congress also reaffirmed the party’s commitment to the ideological platform of the Socialist International, whose delegation was enthusiastically greeted by the congress participants. The delegates approved overwhelmingly a resolution on a new “BSP Policy of Uniting All Leftist and Centrist Forces for the Creation of a New

Left in Bulgaria,” which denounced the “authoritarianism” of the UDF incumbents and called for close cooperation with all democratic forces in the country, including Dertliev’s

Social Democrats, Drenchev’s Agrarians and Tomov’s European Left. Even though prominent reformers were elected to the new party leadership, the BSP remained divided between “hardliners” grouped around Videnov and “soft-liners” loyal to party leader

Purvanov.

Although a sort of political unification of Bulgaria’s left-of-center parties has been promoted since 1998 by the Socialist International (particularly the German Social

Democrats), it is far from certain that all factions within the BSP support this new policy. For

389 example, Mincho Minchev, leader of the hardline Marxist Platform faction, attended the so- called re founding of the in March 1999, in spite of Purvanov’s explicit opposition to such participation on the grounds that it may alienate centrist voters and the BSP’s potential partners.

The dualistic nature of the BSP’s ideological stance is reflected also in its ambiguous electoral behavior. In all elections following the upheaval of 1989, the BSP has campaigned as a populist left-wing party. Although pledging its support for political democratization and pro-market reforms (see Lukanov 1990a), the party remains ideologically divided over the extent and pace of the privatization of the economy. The Socialists have opposed more radical economic changes, such as “shock therapy, ” monetarism and the closing of unprofitable enterprises, as impoverishing the great majority of the Bulgarian population

(Lukanov 1992a). They have focused on the dangers of high unemployment, inflation, mass poverty, social inequality, crime and other maladies of a free-market economy, offering to minimize the negative side effects of the transition through a more gradual, evolutionary approach.

The Socialist leadership has accepted a market economy in principle, but has also emphasized the need for what it calls a “capitalism with a human face. ” The BSP has campaigned on a populist platform of defending social justice and popular welfare programs.

It has criticized the social consequences of unfettered capitalism, advocating a “socially oriented,’’ state-regulated market system similar to Germany’s “social-market” economy. In formulating its political and economic platform, the party has taken into account the interests of its mass electorate which has far more elderly people, pensioners, peasants, and low- educated, imskilled manual workers than the UDF (Andreev 1996: 35). As a result, the BSP

390 has repeatedly clashed with the economically more market-oriented UDF over the kind of capitalism that should be built in Bulgaria. Opposing the market-driven division of the population into “winners” and “losers,” the Socialists accuse the UDF of blindly following the IMF’s prescriptions which, they claim, are de-industrializing Bulgaria and transforming it into a cheap source of labor, agricultural produce and raw materials. Charging that macroeconomic policy is dictated by the West, BSP leaders have criticized Prime Minister

Kostov’s neoliberal economic policies for favoring the interests of international creditors and surrendering the economic sovereignty of the country.

Socialist leaders also advocate a neutral, non-aligned status for Bulgaria and publicly oppose its admission into NATO, claiming that such a move would imperil the country’s long-term relations with Russia, China, and the Third World. They are especially opposed to the local stationing of NATO troops, bases and nuclear weapons, pointing out that under the Communists there was no foreign military presence in Bulgaria. Claiming that a majority of Bulgarians agree with its anti-NATO and pro-neutral stance, the BSP has demanded the holding of a popular referendum on this issue. This proposal has been rejected by the UDF, which insists that the April 1997 election represented a referendum on Bulgaria’s NATO entry. Only in March 2000 did the Socialists officially relax their opposition to NATO membership. While the UDF has taken a strongly pro-Western stand on international issues, the BSP has condemned U.S. actions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. During mass protests against the war over Kosovo, BSP members and supporters repeatedly demonstrated in the streets, denouncing NATO and accusing the ruling UDF of being “American lackeys. ”

Socialist politicians have deliberately sought to profit from nationalist sentiments in order to boost their own public standing. Beginning with the general elections of October

391 1991, the BSP has used all available resources to attract the nationalist vote and to exploit

the heated debate on ethnic issues. It has presented a nationalist image by joining the

campaign against Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks and Gypsies, opposing the registration of the

MRF, insisting on incorporating nationalistic language in the new Constitution, and voting

against the teaching of Turkish in Bulgarian public schools (Troxel 1993: 196). On the eve

of the October 1991 vote, it formed a pre-election union with several parties with an

unmistakably nationalist agenda and later entered into a long-term cooperation agreement with the largest of them, the Fatherland Party of Labor. Through its electoral alliances with chauvinistic parties, the BSP has secured the solid backing of the majority of Bulgarian nationalists. Its efforts to have the MRF outlawed on constitutional grounds indicate that, at least for a time, the BSP was a semiloyal democratic player.

The Socialists won the December 1994 elections by convincing voters that they had abandoned past authoritarianism, but the style of behavior of the BSP cabinet of Prime

Minister Videnov was ideologically rigid and politically uncompromising, aggravating the bitter bipolar confrontation between Left and Right in the country. While not challenging the legality of the MRF, the Videnov government’s conflict with the opposition UDF posed a growing threat to the sustainability of elite consensus and civil peace in Bulgaria. Many

Bulgarians also blamed the Socialists for the catastrophic deterioration of the economy during their two-year rule and expressed their economic dissatisfaction through strikes and street protests. But Prime Minister Videnov never reverted to openly undemocratic forms of government in spite of the disastrous failure of his economic policies and the subversive tactics of the anti-govemment opposition.

392 The party that introduced Soviet-style Communism in Bulgaria half a century ago has clearly altered its ideological and programmatic orientations, transforming itself into a democratic force with a wide populist appeal. It is now a catch-all rather than ideological party, representing a broad and heterogenous coalition of values and interests. Therefore, the

BSP should no longer be considered a disloyal player or a threat to democracy. BSD? leader

Dertliev explains the reason for the changed public perceptions of the ex-Communists:

The Communist party changed much during the fifty years of its rule. When they took power, they were almost entirely illiterate revolutionaries. But gradually the necessities of life made them reliant upon professional, well- qualified people for positions in the government. And because of changes in Russia brought about through Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Bulgarian Communists realized that the era of communism is nearing its end, and if it is to preserve its influence it needs to adapt. O f the socialist parties all around the world, formerly the so-called “socialist camp,” I believe the Bulgarian Communist Party was, perhaps, best able to adapt to the new social changes. It was very quick to declare its rejection of the communist ideas and adopted, at least formally, democratic and even some social-democratic values. Of course, if you have lived with a totalitarian heart and mentality for quite a long time, it is not easy to become a democrat overnight. They were successful in keeping united the old hardcore Bolshevik guard, and the Party’s intellectuals who know much about democracy, the market economy, and so on. This explains why they participated at the Roundtable with us, although not very enthusiastically, in the first democratic changes. .. Because of their willingness to institute democratic reforms we agreed to work with them—without compromising—and we achieved democratic changes at the Roimdtable, which were incorporated in the new Constitution. (Interview with Dertliev in Melone 1996b)

The generally democratic and tolerant behavior of the former Stalinists is something of a pleasant surprise in the context of recent Bulgarian history. The BSP’s self- transformation, as well as constructive, restrained stance in the face of the extraparliamentary, sometimes violent and semi-loyal attacks from the right-wing of the

UDF has been crucial for the survival of the new system. At another level of analysis, this more optimistic conclusion regarding the democratic credentials of the BSP is consistent

393 with the research of Richard Rose (1996a), who has found no major differences between ex-

Communists and non-Communists in terms of mass-level support for the new democratic and market institutions in Bulgaria.

The Ethnic Turkish Party

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is the largest and most influential ethnic minority party in Bulgaria. The Movement, which represents the interests of the sizeable

Turkish commimity, began its activities openly on 4 January 1990, claiming to have previously existed in secret under the name of the National Turkish Liberation Movement.

It also claimed to be behind the anti-govemment protests of May 1989. Founder and leader

Ahmed Dogan was a yoimg philosophy professor in 1986, when he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for involvement in underground activities. It must be pointed out that neither the MRF, nor its nemesis, the various ethnonationalist groups, pose any serious and immediate anti democratic threat. While Gypsies, Turks and even Pomaks face some ethnic hostility on the part of the Bulgarian majority, for the most part they have not responded with destabilizing demands for political and territorial autonomy and separatism, thus precipitating a stateness crisis, similar to the one created in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo province by the forces o f Albanian irredentism.

While Turks and Bulgarians had lived together peacefully for much of this century, tensions between them flared up in the winter of 1984-1985 when the Zhivkov regime initiated a drive to Christenize Turkish names. The “national revival” campaign culminated in the summer of 1989, when 340,000 o f Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks fled to neighboring Turkey to escape cultural and linguistic assimilation. According to Dogan,

394 Prior to the ‘revival’ process, understanding, neighborliness, and a common way of life existed between the various ethnic groups. This act raised a real wall between them, and it is now difficult to eliminate the consequences and restore the old relationships. It might take a generation to accomplish this. (Interview with Dogan in Duma, November 5, 1990)

After the Zhivkov regime collapsed, discrimination against Bulgarian Turks was banned and at least 140,000 came back from Turkey (Engelbrekt 1991a; Feffer 1992; Nedeva 1993).

With over 100,000 active members in 1993, the MRF is a secular organization, strongly supporting the principle that without democracy there will be no solution of minority problems. Its political platform is based on strong defense o f the rights of

Bulgaria’s large Turkish and Muslim population. The MRF has demanded legal protection for the Muslim community in conformity with international norms, political and civil rights. active participation in all levels of government, and guarantees for its cultural and linguistic identity. The Movement has sought to defend the rights not only of ethnic T urks in Bulgaria, but also of Bulgarian Muslims, known as Pomaks:

According to us, every Bulgarian citizen should have the right to belong to any ethnic or religious group: it should be a matter for the individual conscience. By this token, the Pomaks are seen as a Muslim minority. (Interview with Yunal Lutfi in Ward 1992: 22)

From this perspective, it has sharply criticized the new Bulgarian constitution for inadequately protecting minority rights and especially for banning political parties on grounds of religion and ethnicity. A target of its strong criticism has also been the lack of

Turkish-language instruction in public schools. Dogan insists that “anyone who neglects the liberties of citizens and the ethnic minorities inevitably places a question mark over the security of the entire community and the whole of civil society” (interview with Dogan in

Duma, November 5, 1990). In this way, the MRF has been able to articulate the interests of

395 ethnie Turks and other Muslim groups in Bulgaria, successfully mobilizing their nearly

unanimous electoral support.

While insisting on collective rights and limited cultural autonomy, the MRP has

opposed the idea of political and territorial autonomy for ethnic minorities, declaring it

dangerous for the unity of the nation as well as for the struggle of Bulgarian Muslims to

preserve their ethnic and religious identity. Dogan, one of Bulgaria’s most skillful and

shrewd politicians, maintains that the rights of minorities can be safeguarded only if the

rights of all Bulgarian citizens are guaranteed (Nedeva 1993: 136-137).

Therefore, the MRP’s priority of defending minority rights has not been at odds with

the struggle to build a democratic order in Bulgaria. The Movement has in effect become the party of human rights, an imderstandable position for a minority party. Miroslav Darmov,

a former MRP parliamentary deputy, has explained that

The Movement strives to unite the Bulgarian people and resolve the problems remaining from totalitarianism. The main task is to bring the rights and freedoms of different communities up to international standards. .. We are a universal organization defending the rights of Bulgarian citizens. Now, we are accentuating the rights of Islamic groups in Bulgaria because their rights are in the most desperate condition. We want their rights to be at the same level as other Bulgarian citizens. We had a separate list in the elections because both parties, UDF and BSP, did not accentuate the rights and freedoms of various Bulgarian minority groups.... (Quoted in Feffer 1992: 236)

The MRF has often drawn suspicion among ethnic Bulgarians because of its alleged

links with the Turkish government, as well as media reports of its pressures to persuade

Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) to declare themselves Turks. But the Movement has generally avoided ethnic confrontation by pursuing a patient, long-term policy of defending minority rights based on strict loyalty to the national independence, sovereignty and territorial

396 integrity of Bulgaria. This pragmatic approach is motivated partly by the fact that demands

for political and cultural autonomy have met with intense opposition on the part of Bulgarian nationalists, some of whom have accused the MRF of being Turkey’s “fifth column” in

Bulgaria, as well as the implicit threat that the Movement may be outlawed under the new

Constitution.

According to Mehmet Hodja, a former leading member o f the MRF, the key to the

Movement’s political success is the fact that it never forgot that it has to pursue its political agenda in the Balkans, a region where inter-ethnic relations are heavily permeated with national , prejudices and animosities (Nedeva 1993: 144-145). For this reason, the MRF’s strategy has been cautious and constructive without any hint of extremism, separatism, or bias in favor of Turkey. The Movement had to demonstrate from the outset that the promotion of ethnic minority rights will be achieved only by peaceful means and with due regard given to the rights of the Bulgarian majority. Former MRF vice-chairman

Yunal Lutfi insists that

...the Movement will do all it can to secure a firm place for Islam as the second after the Orthodox Church. At the same time we have to recognize as peaceful and friendly citizens that the Christian majority must be approached and treated with common sense and tact, because all minorities must co-exist without favoritism. (Interview with Lutfi in Ward 1992: 23)

Ethnic co-existence and cooperation in Bulgaria are possible because the extent of ethnic nationalism and religious fanaticism is quite limited. Very few ethnic Turks in

Bulgaria fear that they may suffer the tragic fate o f other minorities in the Balkans. Yunal

Lutfi has predicted that “The situation will never explode here as it did in Bosnia, because

397 Bulgarians and Turks are not extreme nationalists or fanatics. They have a tradition of peaceful coexistence” {Economist, April 1, 1995: 45).

Following this cautious line of behavior, the MRF has disassociated itself from the extremist and pan-Islamic Turkish Democratic Party of Adem Kenan, which demands the creation of a Bulgarian-Turkish federation in Bulgaria. Thanks to its moderate and flexible approach, the MRF leadership has managed to avoid a serious conflict along ethnic and religious lines. The Movement is a significant force in Bulgarian politics and has even played a broker role, holding the balance o f power in the badly divided National Assembly between

1991 and 1994. The fact that it was able to nominate a minority government headed by the politically independent Lyuben Berov shows that it has become part of Bulgaria’s new political establishment. Its political influence may be declining, however, as tens of thousands of its loyal supporters are emigrating to Turkey driven out by the worsening economic and social situation, while another large group, led by Mehmet Hodja, has split from the party to join the UDF.

Neither the MRF’s ideology nor the policies it advocates have deviated from the prevailing consensus about the basic system of government and economy appropriate for

Bulgaria. As Dogan has stressed from the very beginning, his Movement

is not interested in turning Bulgaria into a second Lebanon. .. We have not taken a destructive position on a single issue and there can be no question concerning separatism. Quite the contrary, we are striving to contribute to the positive development of the renewal. (FBIS-EEU, November 7, 1990: 8)

In this respect, the MRF’s constructive attitudes and tolerance could serve as an example for the KLA of the Kosovar Albanians and other separatist organizations. The activities of

Bulgaria’s largest and most influential ethnic minority party do not jeopardize the stability

398 of the new democracy, nor are they an immediate threat to the integrity of the Bulgarian

polity. Like the BSP, the MRF is an actor quite unlikely to challenge democratic norms and

institutions, especially since the Turkish minority is a major beneficiary from the effective

and unimpeded functioning of democracy in Bulgaria.

The Neonationalists

There are a number of purely nationalist parties and organizations on the Bulgarian

political scene, which have been bom out of episodic ethnic tensions and the dark fears of

many Bulgarians, particularly those living in ethnically mixed areas. Even though the

familiar Left-Right dimension is regaining its traditional relevance in partisan identification,

it is impossible to describe these groups as being on the far Right (as has often been done by

foreign observers), especially since nearly all of them espouse leftist, social-protectionist and pan-Slavic ideologies. Moreover, the party platforms of the neonationalists focus on preserving Bulgarian national identity and territorial integrity, rather than on open discrimination of ethnoreligious minorities or the redrawing of Bulgaria’s postwar borders.

The most prominent of these organizations are the Committee for the Defense of

National Interests (CDNI) led initially by Dobromir Zadgorski and now by Roumen

Vodenicharov, as well as its former political arm, the Fatherland Party of Labor (FPL). Bom out of the mass protest movement against the government decision to restore the rights of ethnic Turks in December 1989, CDNI is the strongest grassroots nationalist organization, which was even included in the BCP’s quota at the round-table talks. Its weekly Zora has reportedly condoned Zhivkov’s assimilation campaign by trying to convince Bulgarian

Muslims that their ancestors had been forcibly ‘Turkified” and “Islamisized” during the five

399 centuries of Ottoman rule (Engelbrekt 1994). Ever since joining ranks with the Socialists in

the October 1991 elections, the FPL has always managed to get representation within the

BSP parliamentary group in the National Assembly.

The are several other openly nationalist parties such as the National Radical Party,

the National Democratic Party, the Constitutional Forum-Civic Movement of Prof. Nikolai

Genchev, IMRO-UMS, the Union of Thracian Societies, the Will for Bulgaria Movement, and others. The most influential and hardline among them is the National Radical Party

(NRP). In the October 1991 election, the NRP garnered 1.13% of the vote and, in contrast to the other nationalist parties, it appears to have since retained most of its sympathizers. In

1994, its leader. Dr. Ivan Georgiev, claimed a party membership of 34,800. The NRP has also maintained contacts with nationalists in other European coimtries. Since 1991 it has been a member of the European National Union, which includes such extremist parties as the

German Republican Party and the French National Front (Engelbrekt 1994). It signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian Liberal Democratic Party o f Vladimir Zhirinovsky and even invited Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the far-right French National Front, to visit

Bulgaria. Zhirinovsky’s controversial visit to Bulgaria in December 1993 attracted attention to another nationalist party, the Bulgarian Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). Under the leadership of Veselin Koshev, the Bulgarian coimterpart of Zhirinovsky’s RLDP has since its creation in late 1989 maintained a staimchly nationalist attitude (Engelbrekt 1994). The removal of Koshev leader in mid-1994 led to the BLDP’s evolution into the rhetorically more moderate Bulgarian Liberal Democratic Movement, but the party has generally maintained its nationalist-oriented agenda.

400 There is even one genuinely extremist group, the Bulgarian Revival Movement, which advocates legal discrimination against the Roma and Turkish minorities. Father

Georgi Gelemenov, a priest and leader of this small group, openly supports a new “process of revival” to restore the Christian names of Bulgaria’s Turks and Gypsies (see the interview with Rev. Gelemenov in Trud, December29,1993). Unlike militant far-right groups abroad, however, the Bulgarian Revival Movement has so far refrained from the use of racial or political violence, confining itself mostly to verbal abuse of Bulgaria’s Gypsies.

It must be noted that the openly nationalistic groups have gained scant electoral support. Nor does the chauvinistic political ideology of the Bulgarian nationalists amount to a direct political challenge to the democratic system since most of their leaders have found it necessary to publicly commit themselves to support for democracy. For the most part, the nationalists have avoided openly anti-system behavior and have attempted to achieve their goals mostly within the framework of the democratic system. Except perhaps for the

Bulgarian Revival Movement of Father Gelemenov, none of their organizations can be accused of pursuing openly disloyal goals. For example, Roumen Popov, the ex-leader of the

Fatherland Party of Labor, has indicated that his organization, while strongly devoted to the ideal of a centralized and unitary nation-state, also favors adopting social democracy and state-regulated capitalism in Bulgaria where the interests of capital and labor would be equally protected. He described the FPL as a democratic center-left party of all patriotic- minded and loyal Bulgarian citizens (see the interview with Popov in Duma, January 23,

1995). Similarly, Ginyu Ganev, one of the most respected Bulgarian politicians and leader of the Patriotic Union, an alliance of several nationalist formations founded in 1994, has categorically stated;

401 From time to time I hear some people suggest that Bulgarians are not yet ready for parliamentary democracy and that a strong hand is needed to straighten things out. And sometimes appeals are made to this effect. I find no words strong enough to express my belief that constitutionalism and democracy are established and defended exactly in order to discredit the theory as well as avoid the practice of strongman rule. For this is but another name for dictatorship. If we are imhappy with the activity or passivity of those in office, we should vote them out of office, rather than denigrate institutions because of the officeholders. Officials and parties in control of the institutions can and should be replaced through electoral procedures rather than via street protests or the intrigues of would-be rulers. (Interview with Ganev in Duma, September 1, 1994)

Furthermore, these generally pan-Slavic, left-leaning parties have little connection to the interwar nationalistic, pro-fascist Right in Bulgarian politics. Troxel (1993: 197) describes nationalism in Bulgaria today as defensive and inward-looking, while nationalism prior to World War II was bent on aggressive territorial expansion at the expense of

Bulgaria’s neighbors. This kind of outward-oriented, expansionist nationalism is believed to have little support among Bulgarians today. One of the most popular nationalist leaders,

Roumen Vodenicharov, confirms this conclusion:

First of all, I believe that in Bulgaria there is no substantial difference between the terms “patriotism” and “constructive nationalism.” Today Bulgarian nationalism is more internally focused and less outward-looking; it is not oriented beyond the borders of the lands left to us after several national catastrophes. (Interview with Vodenicharov in Duma, September 10, 1994)

The leader of the neonationalist Will for Bulgaria Movement rejects the very idea that extreme nationalism may exist in any form in present-day Bulgaria,

Zhirinovsky’s visit seems to have caused some fellow writers to raise the specter of extreme nationalism but, in my opinion, it can never take root in Bulgaria. I totally rule out the possibility that extreme nationalism may acquire such political legitimacy here as to become one of the leading ideological trends. There is no historical, social or psychological basis for it. The National Radical Party, which is a more aggressive nationalist party, has been active for four years now but is still quite insignificant. One should not

402 draw simplistic parallels with other countries. The Serbs, for example, have cultivated their nationalism for more than a century.... But this has nothing to do with our way of life or with our national character. (Interview with Yordan Velichkov in Duma, January 17, 1994)

Another reason for the limited success of the neonationalists is that while some of these groups appear to have strong organizational structures, none of them seems to command a great deal of mass support (Troxel 1993: 195). At the height of the anti-MRP campaign in 1991, the National Radical Party had no more than 38,000 members; the

Fatherland Party of Labor—5,600; and the National Democratic Party—only 1,500

(Englebrekt 1991b). At its 1995 party congress, the leadership of the Fatherland Party of

Labor candidly admitted that party membership had dwindled to a hard core of about 1,200.

Nor have the nationalists received—as many of them may have expected—the blessing of the badly divided Bulgarian Orthodox Church which, unlike the Catholic Church in

Poland for instance, has stayed out of politics as required by the constitutional separation of church and state. They also had difficulty imiting their various parties and organizations under a single banner. Only in 1994—four years after the emergence of the first independent nationalist groups—did efforts to this effect succeed through the formation of the so-called

Patriotic Union, an electoral alliance of several different nationalistic organizations.

Interestingly, the alliance seems to be more moderate in its rhetoric and tactics than many of its constituent members. Its leader Ginyu Ganev claimed that the Patriotic Union is a democratic center-left organization with 541,240 due-paying members, which is committed to the new Constitution, political and civil rights, social welfare, as well as to a “unitary

Bulgarian state, national unity and accord” (see the interview with Ganev in Duma, May 25,

1994). A group embracing such a non-radical, even conventionally mainstream political

403 agenda can hardly be described as anti-system. At most, it may be considered a semiloyal player because it has consistently opposed the right of another democratic organization, the

MRP, to compete for central executive power or even legally exist.

Bulgarian neonationalists have been unable to come up with a home-grown version of Russia’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Romania’s George Funar, Hungary’s Istvan Csurka or

Slovakia’s Jan Slota. George Ganchev, a self-proclaimed political savior with an unambiguously nationalist stance, is considered by some a prime candidate for such a role.

A charismatic demagogue with considerable oratorical skills, Ganchev has fared very well in public opinion surveys ever since his imexpectedly good showing in the 1992 presidential ballot. His Business Bloc gained enough votes in the 1994 and 1997 legislative elections to be represented in parliament. Pollster analyses after the 1996 presidential election indicated that the nationalist vote, which previously went to the BSP, has now shifted to Ganchev. For this reason, some have become wary of his nationalistic proclivities, describing Ganchev as a “dangerous” phenomenon and even comparing him to Jean-Marie Le Pen (Koinova 1996).

But most observers have rejected such fears as imfounded, noting that in spite of chronic ethnic tensions and political instability, "Bulgaria has not seen the emergence of a demagogic, authoritarian movement; there is, as yet, no Bulgarian Le Pen ” (Crampton 1993 ;

32). Ganchev is generally dismissed as a harmless, clownish eccentric, as most Bulgarians tend to reject any comparison with Zhirinovsky (Engelbrekt 1994). Due to irreconcilable internal splits, his party disintegrated and lost its parliamentary presence in 1998.

404 The Armed Forces

The role of the armed forces is significantly affected by a country’s history, political culture, and military tradition. As Chapter 4 shows, Bulgaria has a long history of military intervention in politics. The Bulgarian military played an active role in the pre-Communist era, staging four of the five successful coups d’etat between 1881 and 1944. With the active encouragement of the monarch and the conservative parties, army-backed coups overthrew civilian governments in 1886, 1923, 1934 and 1944. Several alleged plots by disgruntled army officers against Zhivkov’s autocratic rule, the most serious one in 1965, were suppressed shortly before they were to be carried out. The strong army involvement in the

1965 conspiracy was thus in keeping with Bulgaria’s pre-Communist tradition of a politically active military establishment. At the same time, Bulgaria was never ruled by a military dictator such as General Jozef Pilsudski of Poland, Admiral Miklos Horthy of

Hungary or Marshal Ion Antoanescu of Romania, so the Bulgarian military is more tolerant in its attitudes toward civilian supremacy. Nor was the Bulgarian military ever seen as an independent social institution, as in many Latin American and Southern European countries.

A “praetorianist” tradition of politically ambitious military is not propitious for democratic consolidation. As Dahl notes in an influential study, democracy is “of course impossible unless the military is sufficiently depoliticized to permit civilian rule” (1971:50).

It is clear that this condition has been sufficiently met in post-1989 Bulgaria. Opinion polls show that although the military inspires a higher degree of popular trust than almost any other institution in the country, relatively few Bulgarians would welcome the armed forces taking over the government. A military coup scenario is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, for the military high command has rejected any political role for the Bulgarian armed

405 forces. Even though a major reorganization of civil-military relations has been undertaken only under Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, the supremacy and control of the civilian political elite over the heretofore compliant armed forces seems secure and is based on a firm legal framework. Therefore, there is full and unquestioning military submission to civilian rule.

This is largely a legacy of the Communist era, when the Bulgarian army was subject to an extraordinary degree of political supervision and tight party control (Ashley 1989). The military was thoroughly penetrated and monitored by a large political officer corps loyal to the Commimist regime. Organizationally separate troops imder the Interior Ministry’s command were responsible for guarding borders and for maintaining domestic law and order, including putting down attempted military coups. While the military in Latin America and

Southern Eimope have often intervened, directly or indirectly, in the democratic process in order to safeguard their vital interests, including the preservation of their autonomy and power, this has not been the case in the post-Communist countries of Europe (see Barany

1992). No national army in the region exerts an influence on democratic politics that is remotely comparable to the dominant role of the military in many Latin American countries.

Even in Romania, where the army played a decisive part in the overthrow of Ceaucescu’s patrimonial regime, the military remains firmly imder civilian control. It is a distinctive feature of the transition to democracy in all East European countries that the armed forces have not played a major political role in this process, even though the Bulgarian minister of defense. Army General Dobri Dzhurov, was reportedly instrumental in the peaceful ouster of Zhivkov. Former Army Chief of Staff Colonel-General Atanas Semerdjiev explains this more recent trend of military non-intervention in politics:

406 I am totally convinced that the Army will not interfere in politics. The Bulgarian Army has never been in a position to interfere in the internal affairs of the [Communist] state. .. [A]n army performs two functions. They are external and internal: namely, defense against the foreign enemy and inside the country—neutralization, so to speak, of forces that attempt to change the social order...to safeguard the existing political system. After World War Two there was no reason for the Bulgarian People’s Army to perform any internal functions. This was due to two factors: first, there were Soviet troops stationed here until 1947. And secondly, the new regime of the people’s democracy was widely accepted by a great many people. This is not a distortion of the truth, but a fact of life. As far as the existence of an opposition here, it was not strong and it was suppressed. Its suppression was conducted by the forces of law and order like the Interior Ministry, the courts and the public prosecutors. It was not necessary for the Army to play the role of an instrument for the suppression of an internal opposition. We in the Ministry of Defense were convinced that because of the postwar pattern of behavior and the new socio-political situation that the internal functions of the Bulgarian Army were defunct; the Army had no internal functions any more. It is in this spirit that the current officers have been reared; they were taught that we have just one task—to guarantee the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of Bulgaria. So there was only the external function left. (Interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

The Bulgarian Army has not engaged in direct participation in the democratic political process. In the immediate post-Zhivkov period, the transition to multiparty politics brought strong pressure, both from within and outside the military, to depoliticize the armed forces. The National Assembly in January 1990 repealed the section of Article 1 of the 1971 constitution that had institutionalized the dominant political role of the BCP in the army.

This step was followed by a presidential decree removing Commimist political organs in the

BPA and ordering complete depoliticization of the military. The Military Administration

Department in the BCP Central Committee and the Main Political Administration in the

Defense Ministry were abolished. The decree effectively eliminated control by the BCP

(BSP) over the military by removing political officers and party cells from the armed forces.

Political officers had either to retrain as regular officers or leave the service altogether (Curtis

407 1993: 238-239). The “depolitization” law enacted on 24 October 1990 prohibited membership in political organizations of all military officers and soldiers. It also required the armed forces to be responsible to the presidency rather than the ruling party. Military personnel welcomed this move, as they had been among the most vocal advocates of the need for their ranks to be shielded from political control and influences (Nikolaev and Perry

1990).

In response to these measures, the military high command began a process of shifting from a highly politicized military service to a depoliticized one. As in the Soviet Union and other Soviet-allied countries. Communist party membership in the officer corps of Bulgaria had exceeded 80% (Volgyes 1982). But by the end of 1990, 98% o f all military personnel had reportedly relinquished their membership in political parties in accordance with the law.

Those who refused to do so were discharged from the service. Military personnel are also legally prohibited from running for or holding elective office. In the 1996 presidential vote.

General Stoyan Tsonkov was barred by the Central Electoral Commission and the Supreme

Court from running as a vice-presidential candidate on the grounds of being an active-duty member of the armed forces. In 1991, the Defense Ministry had even campaigned unsuccessfully for banning the military from voting in elections. As part of the military hierarchy’s depolitization strategy, the content of military education has shifted from emphasizing the defense of international Communism to protection of the homeland without regard to political considerations. Defending national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity became the primary mission of the new Bulgarian military.

Professionalism has replaced political allegiance and reliability as the most important measure of officer qualifications (Curtis 1993: 239).

408 Since the beginning of the transition, no cases of attempted coups, conspiracies or

unrest among the military have been officially reported. In 1996, Army General Tsvetan

Totomirov, Chief of the General Staff, dismissed rumors of a possible army coup, promising that “As long as I am Chief of the General Staff, the armed forces will fulfill their duties...and will not be involved in solving domestic political problems” {Standart, August

7,1996). During the political crisis in early 1997, General Totomirov reiterated that the army will not become involved, as the constitution does not permit military interference in the solution of internal political matters (BTA in English, January 11, 1997).

That military-civilian relations are relatively tranquil today is therefore due to the

Bulgarian military’s status of total subordination to civilian authority which, though largely inherited from the Communist period, is also a direct result of the post-1989 depoliticization measures. An important contributing factor has been the introduction of civilian administration of the armed forces in 1991. The Bulgarian minister of national defense was traditionally a professional officer usually bearing the rank of army general. In 1990, the round-table reformers called for a civilian defense minister to ensure civilian control over the military. The army leadership resisted such demands, insisting that the defense minister must be a professional officer because a civilian would lack the required military expertise and experience (see Narodna Armiya, December 13,1990: 1 ). But in the UDF cabinet appointed in 1991, Dimitar Ludzhev became Bulgaria’s first civilian minister of national defense since

1934. His immediate successors, Alexander Staliisky, Valentin Alexandrov and Georgi

Ananiev, are also civilians. The only exception was Dimitar Pavlov, a retired rear admiral, who served as defense minister in the BSP government of Zhan Videnov.

409 The official policy of keeping the military establishment legally depoliticized, politically neutral and under firm civilian authority was codified in the 1994 National

Security Act, in which the National Assembly stipulated the institutional procedures for exercising civilian control over the military. President Zhelev was particularly anxious to limit the possibility of military interference in politics:

I have always insisted that the armed forces should be depoliticized. And I have been forced to remove top military commanders as soon as they became too close to some political party. Dividing the military would be the most dangerous thing. We have two Orthodox Church synods, two Muslim muftis, three Social-Democratic parties (I am not saying that this is good at all), but we caimot have a divided military. (Zhelev 1995: 264)

It must also be pointed out that most of the Bulgarian officer corps have accepted and now openly embrace the post-Communist changes in the country, including in daily military administration. Many Bulgarian officers, especially among the junior ranks, have advocated genuine depoliticization and democratization of the armed forces (Nikolaev and Perry 1990).

As Colonel-General Semerdjiev recalls, a poll of the Bulgarian armed forced conducted in

Apri 1-May 1990 showed that

approximately 80 percent of the officers of lower military ranks-up to the rank of captain, between 50 and 60 percent of the senior officers—from major upward—and over 60 percent of the sergeants and soldiers categorically supported the law for depolitization of these structures, (interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b)

The Georgi Sava Officer Legion was founded in early 1990 to promote professionalism in the Bulgarian armed forces and to campaign for the democratic rights of those in uniform. Unlike the militant and highly politicized Union of Russian Officers of

Stanislav Terekhov, the Bulgarian Officer Legion is a non-partisan and staunchly pro- democratic professional organization, whose leadership has declared its commitment to non­

410 interference in civilian politics, unswerving loyalty to the new Constitution, and strong support for the democratic system (Zhelev 1995: 146).

The depolitization of the military establishment has been facilitated by a dramatic generational turnover in the officer corps. The age cohort of high-ranking officers who served under Zhivkov, consisting primarily of wartime guerilla fighters and graduates of

Soviet military academies, have been entirely replaced since 1990. Some 1,000 senior officers had been retired in 1993 alone. Over 3,000 commissioned officers were forced into early retirement in 1994, including all those with the rank of full colonel. General Lyuben

Petrov, the Chief of the General Staff, and Major-General Lyubomir Vassilev, an army commander, were unceremoniously sacked by President Zhelev on 2 September 1994, after they had publicly complained about sharp cuts in defense spending and the “shock” retirement of thousands of senior officers.

In the midst of even sharper reductions in defense spending and military personnel.

Prime Minister Kostov has stated bluntly that “the fairest way for all officers who do not accept the reform of the army is to resign.” He warned that his cabinet “will be uncompromising to everyone who sabotages the reform in the armed forces, which means disciplinary dismissal” (BTA in English, March 18,1998). Kostov was referring to General

Angel Marin, commander of the Missile Forces and the Artillery, who had criticized the government for “abandoning the army” and the “rush” to join NATO. President Stoyanov subsequently fired General Marin, as well as General Radoslav Peshleevski, commander of the Construction Troops, who had openly attended a BSP rally protesting the disastrous state of the armed forces. That traditional military interests can be assaulted in such an unceremonious manner and the top brass treated with far less than customary respect and

411 honor—without provoking any reaction from the active-duty ranks—highlights the total submission of the Bulgarian military establishment to civilian authority and control even in areas that are considered strictly defense-related.

In behavioral terms, the Bulgarian armed forces are obviously an apolitical, stabilizing factor in the peaceful transition to democracy. This has facilitated the firm assertion of civilian supremacy and the draconian reduction in military expenditures and personnel. Military tolerance for the democratization process has been all the more remarkable given the unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil in the country.

Therefore, no political actors in Bulgaria can hope to obtain their alternative objectives by summoning the military in violation of the democratic rules of the game. And history shows that no Bulgarian political faction has ever been able to stage a successful coup d’etat without the involvement of the armed forces.

412 CHAPTER 13

STYLE OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The style of political behavior is no less important for democratic consolidation and

indeed for the proper functioning of any political system. It can vary from a militant,

uncompromising and confrontational behavior to a more flexible, accommodative and consensual approach. For a new democratic regime to consolidate, inter-elite relations must become less ideological and more moderate and pragmatic. In behavioral terms, democracy becomes consolidated when elite orientations and behaviors shift from extremism, confrontation and polarization to consensus, compromise and accommodation.

For democracy to survive, party leaders need to act in manner generally consistent with the rational-actor model of Anthony Downs (1957), who assumed that most politicians seek power for the rewards and spoils of political office rather than in pursuit of ideological visions and models. Instrumental rationality and enlightened self-interest make office- seeking, vote-maximizing politicians more likely to advocate reasonable principles and policies that the majority of voters would be willing to support and vote for. Democracy also requires that party leaders who are out of power behave as self-restrained democrats rather than anti-regime radicals who are trying by all possible means to subvert and destabilize a government that has come to power as a result of legitimate elections. As Diamond, Linz and

Lipset write:

413 Democracy requires loyal opposition which commit themselves strictly to the constitutional pursuit of power, reject the use of violence, eschew collaboration with anti-system parties or extra-constitutional appeals to the armed forces, and emphatically refuse to condone, excuse, or tolerate anti­ democratic actions of other participants. (1988: 29)

A closer look at the behavior of major party elites reveals the highly conflictive and

still unconsolidated natiue of the democratic process in Bulgaria. Instead of seeking

reconciliation, mutual understanding, compromise and consensus which are indispensable

for democratic consolidation, post-Communist Bulgaria’s two major parties have pursued

policies of ideological conflict and sectarian discord. Whereas both parties have publicly

committed themselves to political consensus, once in power they have avoided engaging the

opposition in any constructive dialogue or meaningful consultations and have relied instead

on a majoritarian, winner-take-all style of government, making the entrenchment of

consensual democracy more difficult, if not impossible. In turn, the political opposition,

especially on the anti-Communist Right, has often displayed openly semi-loyal attitudes and

behavior. Instead of showing respect for the opinions and interests of the other side, the

ideologues in both parties have contributed to a polarized political climate of mutual distrust,

hostility and unprincipled struggle for power, which has prolonged the transition and

prevented the new democracy from gaining widespread popular legitimacy.

Both sides bear equal responsibility for the dangerously antagonistic policies of the

transition period, but observers tend to blame the UDF more than the BSP for the destabilizing confrontation. James F. Brown, for instance, concludes that “The former communists (now socialists) were not the ones most to blame; instead ‘totalitarian’ anti­ communists had threatened to run riot” (Brown 1994: 113). According to John Bell, from the very beginning the hard-line faction in the anti-Commimist coalition

414 adopted a far more strident tone, frequently referring to the BSP as “murderers” and a “Mafia,” giving the impression that the UDF would conduct a wholesale purge of the government if it won. Both the BSP and some members of the UDF referred to this as a policy of “McCarthyism.” (Bell 1990b: 427)

Brown writes that the first UDF government of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov “was probably the most ideological leadership in all of East Europe,” which

had a callow, primitive air—principled, certainly, in its determination to get away from communism, not all that aware, however, of what the democracy toward which it claimed to be moving was really about. (Brown 1994: 108)

The UDF’s “core activists and leaders thus did not overcome their anti-institutional orientation conceived in their struggle against an overpowering BSP in 1990, even once democratic rules of competition were in place” (Kitscheltet al. 1999: 124). Juan Linz and

Alfred Stepan came to the same conclusion, namely, that

Possibly the most dangerous attitudes for the legitimacy of democratic institutions involved the reluctance of some members of the UDF to accept the legitimacy of a “formal democracy” led by the BSP. A faction of the UDF (called the “Dark Blues”) in opposition to what was originally the mainstream of the UDF party, the “Light Blues,” protested the moral legitimacy of the formal majority of the BSP to write the constitution for the new democracy. Their protest tactics included walking out of the constitutional debates in the National Assembly. They were particularly enraged that the constitution made it difficult to prosecute former regime officials for acts that were not illegal when they were committed. In numerous interviews in the press and with Stepan, this group questioned whether formal democratic constitutional procedures should have precedence over the moral imperatives of justice. In terms of our categories, at times the Dark Blues were only semiloyal democrats in opposition in 1990-91. Even in the 1991 -92 period, after the UDF had won the general election in October 1991 and a Dark Blue militant, Filip Dimitrov, had been prime minister for a year, they engaged in some semiloyal activity. (Linz and Stepan 1996:341 )

Because of its rhetoric stressing Westem-style democracy and free-market liberalism, the UDF leadership enjoys the strong support of Western governments and international lending institutions, even though its aggressive anti-Communism and intolerance of political

415 opponents have fostered a domestic climate of polarization and confrontation, producing a

sharp regime divide between anti-Communists and ex-Communists. Its stance in opposition was one of defiance, rejection of compromise and even incitement to political violence, bordering on semiloyalty to law and constitutional order. Its policies in office have included

legal reprisals to silence critics and to intimidate rival parties as well as the widespread purges of state officials who do not share its views. If semi-loyal conduct was to be expected

from the ex-Communists, what accounts for the semiloyal stance and controversial actions of Bulgaria’s “democrats”?

The Triumphant Militants

The UDF is undeniably the political force most strongly committed to Westem-style democracy and free-market economy in Bulgaria, but it is also the party largely responsible

for the intense antagonisms, turbulence and instability of the transition period. Why is a party, whose very emergence on the Bulgarian political scene was greeted with so much public enthusiasm, jubilation and hope, viewed nowadays with widespread feelings of skepticism, ambivalence and even suspicion?

The controversial style of behavior on the part of the UDF has been a disappointing, but hardly unexpected phenomenon, given the unenviable record of ideological divisiveness and sharp political conflicts marking modem Bulgarian history. In a prophetic article published in late 1990, Zakhari Zakhriev, a liberal BSP reformer, warned that the hopes of the “organizers of the takeover on November 10” for a kind of “Spanish variant” of the transition were dashed by their failure to cultivate a loyal, respectful, civil and well-behaved political opposition. The efforts of the anti-Communist opposition to assume the reigns of

416 government at any cost led to a dangerous polarization and confrontation in the country.

According to Professor Zahariev, this allowed all kinds of amateurs, careerists, and adventurists in politics to join the UDF, many of them putting their personal ambitions, lust for power or desire for revenge above civic virtue or moral and political responsibility. In addition to political gamblers thirsting for power, revenge-seekers, and “even persons with pathological tendencies and criminal inclinations,” the opposition was also joined by numerous members of the former Communist elite, who had decided that the time had come to abandon the sinking ship and position themselves at the head of the new nomenklatura.

Zakhariev predicted that the new, “hardening” UDF would lay the foundations for a “new totalitarianism” in Bulgaria. New leaders would “very soon” sweep aside “the old ones who have common sense, a sense of responsibility and a constructive approach.” The pressure exerted by the aggressive newcomers on the founders and other “honest and competent” veterans of the pro-democracy movement would endanger not only the UDF itself but also the success of Bulgaria’s democratization project (see FBIS-EEU, November 26 ,1990:20).

In hindsight, some of these darkly Cassandrian predictions have proved to be at least partially justified, given the continuing conflict over the evaluation of the Communist past and the desire to avenge the wrongs of the old regime. As a veteran Social Democrat testifies:

Bulgaria’s big problem is no longer the former Communists, who call themselves the Bulgarian Socialist Party, but the former Communists now in opposition, who include many members of the former nomenklatura: the families who enjoyed such trappings of power as fine villas, access to hard currency, big cars, holidays abroad. They want to eliminate the old Communists in the BSP and start a “new” nomenklatura which is really the old one with a new guise. (Interview with Ruen Krumov in Ward 1992: 201)

417 All founder members of the UDF, including its first chairman Zhelev, were gradually purged from the coalition. The new UDF became aggressive and ideologically intolerant, refusing to work with the other major party in the country, the ex-Communists. Bulgaria was engulfed by acrimonious partisanship, hatred and conflict. Before being expelled from the UDF and assaulted by a “dark-blue” mob in the street, former Radical-Democratic Party leader Elka

Konstantinova (who abandoned her political career in 1994) was among the first to sound the alarm about this new danger to the democratic project;

Some people are confused about the meaning of democracy. I am extremely worried about this explosion of political passions and partisanship. I see this in individual politicians, as well as in certain parties and movements, and it scares me a lot.... I think it is due to strictly personal motives-namely, vanity and aggressive instincts, which were repressed in the past. (Interview with Prof. Konstantinova in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 18)

There are many different reasons for this unfortunate turn of events. Some UDF founders have attributed it to the fact that the revolutionary upheaval inadvertently opened the door to many unprincipled, over-ambitious people who were lusting after power:

This is our Balkan syndrome. .. New people are entering the political scene, some of whom want to have more power and are now playing the game of democracy. These people are hardly any different from the Communists who have been ruling our country. Therefore, 1 am very skeptical about some representatives of the Bulgarian opposition, who only shout loudly in the microphones, but in fact have absolutely nothing constructive or positive to offer our people. 1 see this even in my own organization [the UDF-aligned Independent Society for the Defense of Human Rights], in which there is a group of people who are doing nothing else but criticizing everyone and everything. At the same time, they refuse to do any work—like investigating the cases of mistakenly convicted people or the existence of political prisoners in our country, discovering facts and documents relating to the so- called “blank pages” in our recent official history...their “work” is confined only to hurling invective and accusations. .. As you well know, from day one the opposition has been tom asunder by charges against one or another of its leaders [which is] another expression of our Balkan complexes. If we fail to rid ourselves of these complexes, we would never move forward. (Interview with Roumen Vodenicharov in Antova-Konstantinova 1990: 90)

418 According to UDF founder Petko Simeonov, another reason for the intense political confrontation was that from the beginning the UDF and the BSP had very different conceptions of what a “peaceful transition to democracy” means:

The BCP had to be removed from the political arena through our joint efforts, because this was an organization which had played a negative role in our history. In our view, BCP leaders had to help us in this process (the way Gorbachev did in the Soviet Union)...but the BCP’s strategy did not coincide with our plans. While we in the UDF had formulated the goal of “peaceful transition to democracy,” for us this meant that the BCP should exit the political scene quietly and peacefully, opening the way for a multiparty system. But the BCP understood the “peaceful transition” slogan quite differently: they wanted to move quietly and peacefully from a constitutionally-guaranteed “leading role of the Party” in politics to guaranteed control over the national economy. That is why confrontation became the dominant trend since the spring o f 1990. (Simeonov 1996: 186- 187)

Contrary to the initial rosy expectations of the opposition, the ex-Communist party did not disappear from the political scene, as has happened in some other post-Communist countries. Not only did the renamed Communists win the first democratic election, but they continued to dominate national politics until their dramatic ouster from power in early 1997, when the UDF finally gained the long-sought dominance over all political institutions in

Bulgaria. Because of the unanticipated Commimist persistence and prominence in politics, the frustrated anti-Communist opposition employed tough extra-parliamentary tactics more suited to revolutionary political warfare than a negotiated elite settlement. Thus, the UDF’s

“march across the institutions” had little in common with a Spanish-style policy of behind- the-scenes bargaining, mutual compromises and consensus-building. Lukanov often complained about the opposition’s “line of confrontation”:

Because the way the Bulgarian opposition was formed they were opposing everything. This is one of the ways to set up an opposition. But to establish themselves they had to divide the nation; they had to say that others are bad

419 and they are good. They drew the dividing line in a way that made Bulgarian political life more confrontational than is healthy for such a transition period. (Interview with Lukanov in Melone 1996b).

The anti-Communist crusade required revolutionary type of cadres very different in

personality and modus operandi from the group of moderate and idealistic reformers, the preponderant majority of them reform Communists, who had originally set up the UDF at the Sofia Institute of Sociology. Most of the dissident intellectuals who founded and led the pro-democracy movement in 1989-1990 were unceremoniously pushed aside to make room

for supposedly “more pragmatic” newcomers. The organization’s founders were gradually replaced by less idealistic and more ambitious leaders, including many opportunists and office-seekers, who relied on an overly aggressive, uncompromising brand of anti-

Communism as their most effective strategy to obtain and maintain political power. Many of the original members of the UDF found themselves outcasts in the political wilderness.

Veterans of the anti-Communist opposition such as Petar Beron, Petar Dertliev, Petko

Simeonov, Milan Drenchev, Stefan Giatandzhiev, Alexander Karakachanov, Elka

Konstantinova, Roumen Vodenicharov and even Zhelev were replaced either by ex-

Communists or by people with close hereditary ties to the pre-September 9. 1944 monarchical-fascist regime. As one of those expelled recalls, “In the end, all the founding formations of the UDF were thrown out by an internal coup” (interview with Petar Dertliev in Melone 1996b).

What united most of the newcomers was a shared determination to take a hard line against the ex-Communists. Instead of promoting moderation, dialogue and accommodation, the “dark-blues” began to display incivility and intolerance for their political opponents, including their own former comrades. The first split within the coalition was precipitated by

420 the divisive debate over the adoption of the 1991 Constitution as well as the question of the

UDF’s relations with the BSP. Because of their participation in the constituent process, the

two largest coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party and BANU-Nikola Petkov, were ousted from the UDF by the hardliners and the hunger strikers vehemently opposed to the

new basic document. The two expelled parties had formed the so-called UDF-Center, which opposed the idea of reprisals against ex-Communist officials and sought to promote political compromise over confrontation and polarization. They were soon followed by other founder parties such as Ecoglasnost, the Green Party, the Social-Liberal Party, and Zhelev s

Federation of Independent Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy. This latest group of defectors, who advocated a policy of moderation and eventual reconciliation with the Socialists, formed the UDF-Liberals, which ran separately in the October 1991 elections. Because the UDF-

Center and the UDF-Liberals failed to join forces, neither breached the 4% electoral barrier.

As a result, Dertliev, the leader of the Social Democratic Party and “father” of the new Constitution, Drenchev, head of BANU-Nikola Petkov, Simeonov, leader of the Social-

Liberal Party, and many other prominent veterans of the pro-democracy movement failed to make it into the 36th National Assembly. The UDF leadership was taken over by a more radical crop of leaders, such as Filip Dimitrov, Stefan Savov, Georgi Markov, Stoyan Ganev,

Ivan Kostov, Alexander Staliisky, Alexander Yordanov, Yordan Vasilev, Blaga Dimitrova,

Stefan Sofranski, Svetoslav Luchnikov and others. Most of them were relatively new faces in the pro-democracy movement:

...they played no role whatsoever in the democratic processes before and immediately after November 10, so they lack democratic legitimacy deriving from an early and categorical rejection of totalitarianism. They appeared on the political scene late into the transition and from the very beginning their efforts were aimed not at fostering a democratic style and norms of political

421 behavior, but at carrying out an intraparty coup inside the UDF and using the democratic wave largely associated with the Union to seize political power by any means necessary and for as long as possible. (Lukanov 1993: 313)

They were passionately anti-Communist, but lacked the charisma, integrity, political talents, organizational skills or popular appeal of the original leaders. The parents and grandparents of some of the new leading figures in the UDF were members of the pre-Communist bourgeoisie and a number of them, who had served in the interwar and wartime fascist governments, were convicted by the postwar People’s Courts. Calling themselves the UDF-

National Movement, the new, “dark blue” majority of smaller, so-called “phantom” parties took over the parent organization’s name, Sofia headquarters (located at 134 Rakovski

Street), official newspaperDemokratsiya, nationwide structure, as well as its most loyal electorate.

Under its new leadership, the coalition turned into a radicalized organization seeking historical revenge against its Commimist adversaries and the restoration of the pre-

Communist status quo ante in Bulgarian society, especially the restitution of nationalized property. A former colleague now turned into a bitter opponent, Prof. Petko Simeonov has denounced the new generation of UDF leaders as right-wing extremists with restorationist aspirations:

There is nothing romantic in their motives. They seek only mercantile interests or they desire to restore their former positions in the system of power. They believe in some absurd things. For example, they call the anti­ fascists “bandits.” They claim fascism never existed in Bulgaria. So I asked at a press conference, I appealed to the gentlemen from the current UDF to kindly inform the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and France that they believe that Roosevelt, Churchill and de Gaulle were bandits and criminals. (Interview with Simeonov in Melone 1996b)

422 According to Simeonov, the UDF-Movement’s “aggressive anti-Communism...was

welcomed by the pre-September 9,1944 restorationist groups, the small ‘phantom’ parties,

adventurers, overambitious individuals with obscure pasts, and nihilists of all kinds who rejoyce at any act o f destruction” (Simeonov 1996: 165).

The “second generation” of UDF leaders were openly hostile to former allies and colleagues, such as Simeonov, Dertliev, Beron, Drenchev, Roumen Vodenicharov and other original UDF founders, derisively referring to them as “pink-blues” and openly accusing them of being Commimist agents, collaborators and infiltrators. The late Democratic Party leader Stefan Savov, a hardliner who was himself later expelled from the UDF, describes the first waves of dismissals and the motives behind the purges:

The first split, or I should put it rather differently, the first big purge in the UDF occurred because of the ratification of the Constitution. This happened during the Grand National Assembly. Then people like Mr. Dertliev, Mr. Drenchev, Mr. Petko Simeonov, who were in fact among the grand figures in the UDF, made moves which led practically to collaboration with the Communists. .. Now, during the term of this National Assembly there has been, if I may say so, a second purge and further division in the UDF. A second splinter group of about 25 people emerged in the UDF after our Government had been toppled ft'om power. It needs to be pointed out that these were mainly representatives of one very peculiar and ludicrous organization, the so-called Social-Liberal Party. It was created under the name of the Alternative Socialist Party (ASP). It was formed not only by former Communist members, but also by secretaries of the former Communist party. .. I regard our internal divisions as typical for the underdeveloped democracies. But it is also a result of a certain “bad blood” in our national character. It manifested itself even when we had a period of democracy in our political life. The problem is that there are always too many overambitious people who are keen to become leaders. And, of course, this also leads to disimity, friction and infighting. (Interview with Savov in Melone 1996b)

Slavov accused the ex-Communists and their “pink-blue” sympathizers of infiltrating and sowing disunity within the anti-Communist opposition:

423 ...they do not just exploit certain opportunities, they inspire disunity. The Communists are renowned masters at this. By using infiltrators, by suggesting certain ideas The Communists are very tricky; they are masters of conspiracy. (Interview with Savov in Melone 1996b)

But Beron, a fi-equent target of such accusations, rejects the charges of collaboration with the

Communist authorities or of secret-police infiltration of the dissident groups and

organization that formed the original UDF:

...there are different stories about how these organizations were created. Some people claim that all these organizations were created by the State Security, that they were just the tools of the Communists. As a member of one of them, I can say that there is some truth in this...but it is not the absolute truth. It is truthful in part because with all that was happening in this and other countries the State Security would not just watch what was happening ft'om the sidelines. They would intervene because it was their duty to take precautions. And they certainly tried to introduce some people in these organizations.

But it is not true, as some people may tell you, that all of them, all of the fathers of the UDF were police or Communist agents, and that the UDF was created by the Communist party and by the State Security. This is not true. The UDF was created by the genuine need of all these organizations, including the newly formed or restored political parties, to fight together, to create a common umbrella organization. I had talks with Lukanov and with Petar Mladenov on some occasions. They were very much opposed to the idea of having this opposition umbrella organization. They were asking us not to form it. But we did form it. (Interview with Beron in Melone 1996b)

That the new leadership adopted an uncompromisingly hard-line policy towards its erstwhile colleagues and allies is confirmed by Trenchev, who accused the “new” UDF of being hostile to his own Podkrepa, the MRF, President Zhelev, and even the Bulgarian

Orthodox Church:

The second generation of UDF leaders consisted of vociferous anti­ communists... The first thing the UDF did when it came to power was to smash its two main supporters—one was Podkrepa and the other was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. They also attacked the institutions of the Orthodox Church; they created tension with the president, who was by the way their candidate in the presidential elections. Overall they fought battles

424 on many fronts against all the real structures in society. They blamed every one but themselves for their own failures. They blamed us for our eagerness to have reform programs. They also blamed us for our desire for dialogue— Podkrepa wanted a tripartite (social) dialogue. (Interview with Dr. Trenchev in Melone 1996b)

The implacable enmity between the old and the new leaders of the coalition severely affected relations between the UDF and President Zhelev. During the 1992 presidential election, Zhelev received only lukewarm support from the new UDF leadership, even though he had accepted their choice as his running mate in exchange for the coalition’s endorsement of his candidacy. That controversial choice was former dissident poetess Blaga Dimitrova, a UDF hardliner who had publicly castigated the signers of the new Constitution with the now infamous phrase “May the hands be petrified o f all those who sign this

Constitution ("After the election. President Zhelev found himself politically isolated and vilified by his former comrades in the UDF who accused him of surrounding himself with

“pink-blue” appointees and of being “soft on Commimism.” The “dark-blue” cabinet also began to strip the presidency of some of its constitutional authority, beginning with its control over the intelligence agencies. This was the opening salvo in Bulgaria’s notorious

“war of institutions” waged over the constitutionally ambiguous separation of powers among the president, the cabinet, the legislature, and the judiciary. As relations between Zhelev and the “dark blue” leadership grew even more antagonistic in the summer of 1993, Blaga

Dimitrova abruptly resigned the vice-presidency with ominous warnings of some imminent danger to democracy coming from the President.

The pattern of internal splits and purges plaguing Bulgaria’s pro-democracy movement thus fits the theoretical model of historian Crane Brinton (1965), who argued that all political revolutions tend to follow a more or less imiform path. In the initial stage.

425 moderates in the anti-regime opposition seize control of the government and pursue gradualist, middle-of-the-road reforms. But their cautious policies are rejected as too slow and timid by more zealous revolutionaries, who accuse the moderates of betraying the goals of the revolution and compromising with the forces of the ancien regime. More ruthless and better organized, the hard-liners eventually oust their moderate comrades from power. Once in command, the radicals pursue extremist policies aimed at destroying all remnants of the old social order. In their fanaticism, the militants seek to crush not only the surviving members of the former elite, but their former revolutionary colleagues as well: “the revolution devours its children.” According to Brinton, the final outcome is deep ideological confrontation, polarization, political instability, administrative turmoil and economic decline, resulting in a loss of popular support for the original goals of the revolution.

The declared priority goals of the “dark-blue” UDF were a militant search for historical justice and the total “decommimization” of the country, an idea borrowed from the “denazification” campaign in postwar Germany. This move was all the more unexpected given the fact that many of the Bulgarian “decommunizers” were themselves members of the former Communist nomenklatura. As ex-Interior Minister Atanas Semerdjiev testifies,

“...over a half or even two-thirds of the UDF MP’s are former members of the Communist party and were in the nomenklatura” (interview with Semerdjiev in Melone 1996b).

One of the first legislative measures of the Filip Dimitrov government was a law expropriating the property of the Socialist party and its former satellites such as the official trade unions, BANU, the BCP’s own youth wing and other pro-Communist organizations, all of whom had their bank accoimts, party buildings and other valuable assets confiscated by the state. The aggressive new Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tatarchev brought to trial and won

426 convictions against dozens of government and party leaders from the Zhivkov era, including

Zhivkov who drew a seven-year sentence. The parliamentary immunity of former Prime

Minister Lukanov and BSP chairman Lilov was lifted by the UDF-MRF majority so that they

could be prosecuted for Communist-era abuses. Jailed for six months, Lukanov condemned this act as a political vendetta Bulgarian-style, violating the norms of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law (Lukanov 1993: 305-306).

The National Assembly also denied pensions and other old-wage benefits to everyone who had served in the BCP apparatus or the Communist-era security services. The enactment of the Panev and Kapudaliev Laws widened the scope of the purge, as former high-ranking members of the BCP and its satellite organizations were barred from holding jobs in the state bureaucracy, the mass media or the academia, from which thousands of officials were fired.

Diplomas issued by Soviet educational institutions were declared invalid, even though this measure proved to be controversial within the UDF itself, as a number of its own leaders had earned advanced degrees in the former USSR. The virulent anti-Communism of the “second- generation” UDF is illustrated by a case described by Petko Simeonov: when the U.S.

Cultural Center in Sofia requested that the street where it is located be named after Dr.

Martin Luther King Jr., the local UDF officials adamantly refused, claiming that “King was a Communist” (Simeonov 1996: 609-610).

The BSP parliamentary group began to boycott those Assembly sessions, at which lustration laws were discussed or voted on, depriving the majority of the necessary quorum.

Accusing the Socialists of planning a pro-Communist coup d’etat, the “dark blue” parliamentary group demanded that the BSP be banned from politics—a step openly opposed by President Zhelev and the UDF’s parliamentary ally, the MRF. As domestic tensions

427 escalated, Lukanov detected in the sharp partisan confrontation between Left and Right the

persistent legacy of Bulgaria’s history of conflict and animosity:

My conflict with the new totalitarians would not have provoked a significant public reaction, were it not a reflection of a tragically familiar tradition in Bulgarian politics since the Liberation. Unfortunately, in our political history normal political competition has all too often degenerated into a fight to physically exterminate one’s opponent, which compels politicians to struggle for their physical survival. Brutal political customs and cannibalistic political instincts have turned out to be especially stubborn and persistent not only because of some defects in our political culture and certain peculiarities of our national character, but mainly as a consequence of the civil war waged between Bulgaria’s Left and Right for more than seventy years now. When ideological and political confrontation goes well beyond the restraints of civilized dialogue and mutual tolerance, when civil war is deliberately provoked, this produces grave deformities in national mentality, political behavior and even the functioning of state institutions. This also accounts for the numerous manifestations of political violence in Bulgarian public life, for which there can be no rational explanation save for the macabre logic of tit- for-tat. It is a paradoxical yet undeniable fact that under the conditions of democratic changes begun after November 10, 1989 Bulgarian society has found itself threatened once again with a return to violence, lawlessness, and police-state terror. This all too real threat can be averted only if Bulgaria’s civil war is ended once and for all, if the warring factions abandon the logic of revenge and reprisals, and if they embrace without reservations the rules and norms of the democratic game. (Lukanov 1993: 306-307)

In another controversial move, the new legislature posthumously rehabilitated the

officials of the wartime fascist governments, who had been convicted of war crimes by the

People’s Courts, allowing their surviving descendants to reclaim state-confiscated property.

This hotly-disputed decision was criticized by foreign governments and the European

Parliament, which proclaimed that Bulgaria’s judicial exculpation of convicted WWII criminals was calling into question the sincerity of its commitment to democratic principles and values .

A radical “shock-therapy” economic policy and a hastily passed “restitution”

legislation restoring nationalized property to its former owners antagonized organized labor

428 and the rural constituents of the MRF. The former consensus achieved during the Round

Table and the work on the new constitution was replaced by a “confrontational bipolar model” of party relations (Karasimeonov 1996: 263). At his “Boyana Meadows” press conference held on 31 August 1992, Zhelev accused the UDF of harboring restorationist tendencies and waging “war against everybody.” He insisted that the government should abandon confrontation and seek compromise and mutual understanding with all political forces in the interest o f democracy (Zhelev 1995: 126).

Relations with the MRF, the UDF’s junior partner in parliament, also deteriorated due to sharp disagreements over economic policy, legislative tactics, and relations with the presidency and with the Socialists. When on October 28 Prime Minister Dimitrov called for a vote of confidence over a relatively minor foreign-policy dispute, he was defeated by the emerging new BSP-MRF parliamentary majority, backed by UDF defectors. A month later, the new legislative coalition voted down a UDF-sponsored proposal to reinstate Dimitrov as prime minister. In separate statements, Filip Dimitrov and Edvin Sugarev publicly blamed the fall of the “dark-blue” cabinet on “Communist agents” planted by Zhivkov’s secret police and the K.GB within the ranks of the UDF, without producing a shred of evidence to back such claims.

With the votes of the BSP, the MRF, and a UDF breakaway faction called the New

Union for Democracy, the Assembly approved the MRF-nominated “non-party cabinet” of

Professor Berov on 30 December 1992. Even though the new cabinet vowed to cooperate with the UDF, the “dark blues” rebuffed its peaceful overtures and consistently obstructed

Prime Minister Berov’s policies. Because Berov had been Zhelev’s senior economic adviser prior to his nomination to the premiership, the UDF accused the president of having

429 masterminded behind the scenes, in collusion with Dogan, the ouster of the Filip Dimitrov government. Claiming that Berov was “recommunisizing” Bulgaria, the “dark blue” leadership expelled those UDF members, known as the “blue ants,” who had voted for or accepted posts in his cabinet and initiated a series of unsuccessful censure votes in parliament. Pressing for early parliamentary elections, the UDF began to boycott key plenary sessions of the Assembly. When Zhelev, a staimch supporter of the new cabinet, criticized the boycott as irresponsible and aggravating political tensions in the country, he was branded a “traitor” and “Communist stooge,”and ousted from the coalition. This was followed by a wave ofUDF-led protests and marches, including Edvin Sugarev’s widely-publicized hunger strike, which demanded that Zhelev resign the presidency. Unlike Mladenov, however,

Zhelev ignored the demonstrations and the public burnings of his books, refusing to step down.

After several failed votes of no-confidence, the UDF caucus aruiounced in early June

1994 a total boycott of all future legislative sessions until new general elections were held.

The parliamentary paralysis resulting from the boycott forced the cabinet to resign three months later, finally putting an end to Berov’s non-party interregmun. In their relentless quest for power, the “dark blue” opposition toppled the Berov government in a manner which, though not entirely unlawful from a constitutional perspective, was hardly democratic or conducive to political moderation and national reconciliation.

March Across the Institutions

With the change of government following the BSP’s victory in the December 1994 elections, the “war of institutions” became even more intense and acrimonious. The

430 predictable outcome of the fierce constitutional conflict pitting President Zhelev and a

largely sympathetic judiciary against the BSP-led cabinet and legislature was a political

stalemate, policy immobilism, administrative paralysis, economic disarray and social chaos.

Little, if anything, of substance was done to address the multitude of problems rapidly

accumulating in the course of the transition. The ruling Socialists proved totally incapable

of resolving the problems which the country faced, such as a disastrous economic situation.

endemic corruption, organized crime, alarming social conditions, and the erosion of national, cultural and moral values. Bulgaria was sliding into a deeper crisis which was genuinely dangerous and destabilizing for a frail young democracy.

The controversial ouster of the discredited BSP cabinet that took place in early 1997 was to a large extent a replay of the street insurrection that had brought down Prime Minister

Lukanov in November 1990. The anti-Communist opposition took advantage of the deepening economic crisis to mobilize its supporters for anti-govemment mass protests.

Once again did the LTDF use “the power of the street” to launch a campaign of political disorder and defeat its main ideological opponent outside the representative political

institutions. The militant strategy of the opposition was first announced during the UDF

National Conference held in late March 1996. At the conference, UDF leader Ivan Kostov denounced the widely impopular policies of the Democratic Left cabinet and called for its

immediate resignation. He was backed by deputy UDF chairman Asen Agov, who declared that the UDF was withdrawing from the consensus of the round-table accords:

Instead of restoring the Tumovo Constitution, the Round Table led us down the road to the Grand National Assembly and the adoption of a Constitution, which we all must now obey willy-nilly. That is why we renounce the agreements of the Round Table! We say NO— now and forever— to all those who were part of the Round Table! Today we are proposing a new contract

431 with Bulgaria—a contract between the Bulgarian people and the UDF. {Duma, March 28, 1996)

The strategy-planning conference ended with an ultimatum to the Videnov cabinet to agree to early general elections. Given the delegates’ stridently anti-govemment rhetoric, there is little doubt that the opposition intended to retire prematurely the incumbents.

Soon after the UDF conference, a vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly failed only narrowly. As the economic crisis deepened, the united opposition’s presidential candidate Petar Stoyanov promised to seek early parliamentary elections, if elected. Only a month after Stoyanov’s election to the presidency, there was a nationwide wave of opposition-organized protests, demonstrations and political strikes, further destabilizing the country. After controversial BSP Prime Minister Videnov resigned in disgrace in December

1996, the cabinet crisis escalated into a parliamentary crisis, sparking a dangerous political confrontation in the country. Frustrated that parliamentary elections were not due until

December 1998, the anti-BSP opposition declared that the Socialists have lost the people's trust and should face a new vote as soon as possible.

According to Evgeni Bakardjiev, who was in charge of the protest actions of the united opposition in Sofia where he was chairman of the local UDF organization, the

“popular uprising” against the Socialists erupted on 12 December 1996, a day after the UDF had issued a Declaration for the Salvation of Bulgaria calling for the disbanding of the current parliament and the holding of early general elections {Duma, January 24, 1998: 1 ).

In fact, the opposition organized the first major anti-govemment rallies and demonstrations only on 19 December, demanding that the BSP majority in parliament approve the UDF declaration in question. Shaken by these events and stung by intraparty criticism, Videnov

432 tendered his resignation on 21 December. At an emergency session held on 3 January 1997.

the National Assembly debated the UDF declaration, but postponed a vote on it until January

10. In the meantime, the Political Council of the United Democratic Forces had issued a new ultimatum to the effect that it would refuse to negotiate with the BSP unless the latter agreed to new elections.

New demonstrations were staged around the country on January 3, beginning with a protest rally and march in Sofia organized by the united opposition and the trade unions.

On January 10, after the parliamentary majority of the Democratic Left had voted down the opposition’s “national salvation” declaration, Ivan Kostov announced that the UtdDF is permanently walking out of the National Assembly to protest the inaction of the government.

On the night o f 10-11 January 1997, a crowd of opposition supporters laid a 10-hour siege to the Assembly, trying to storm the building, inside which Democratic Left deputies had barricaded themselves (see Prodev 1998). The attack was launched immediately after the

UtdDF legislators had walked out in protest and large torchlight processions of opposition demonstrators had converged on parliament from three different directions. As the policemen on guard failed to keep the protests under control, anti-terrorist units had to be brought in to repulse the assaults of the crowd armed with home-made weapons (BTA in English, January

11, 1997).

While President-elect Stoyanov tried in vain to restrain the crowd, some opposition leaders, armed with megaphones, urged the rioters, many of whom were drunk, to break into the Assembly building. Police buses arriving at the scene after midnight took the besieged parliamentarians out of the building. While the deputies were fleeing under a hailstorm of stones, cobbles, bricks and bottles, the embattled policemen defended themselves with

433 shields and batons. The riot resulted in a large fire and heavy damage to the Assembly building. Over 300 people were seriously injured and hospitalized, among them many BSP and UDF deputies, including ex-prime minister Filip Dimitrov. One Socialist deputy.

Professor Todor I. Zhivkov (no relation to the former Communist dictator), was taken to hospital in a coma from a smashed jaw, but later recovered. Miraculously, no one was killed during this historically unprecedented assault on the Bulgarian legislature. The next day the disturbances spread to other parts of the capital, resulting in numerous pitched battles between protestors and riot policemen (BTA in English, January 11, 1997).

This serious incident had been preceded by mass rallies and demonstrations, at which opposition politicians delivered ultimatums and openly incited the crowd against the govenunent. In what could only be interpreted as an implicit call for violence, UDF leader

Ivan Kostov warned the Socialists that “the policy of outstretched hand” had been replaced by “policy of the clenched fist.” At an opposition rally, he claimed that “The Socialists violated basic human rights and we have the right to ask them to step down” (BTA in

English, January 13, 1997). The protestors were also encouraged by a group of far-right

Italian parliamentarians led by Antonio Taiani, adeputy of the neo fascist Forza Italiana, who assured the demonstrators o f their ultimate triumph as well as of the full support of his party capo Silvio Berlusconi (BTA in English, January 9, 1997).

In an address broadcast on national television on the eve of the attack, outgoing

President Zhelev had appealed for law and order, declaring that “I do not approve of violence and destruction; it does not serve democracy.” But Zhelev also stressed that he supported the protests o f the people who

434 go into the streets of the Bulgarian cities, after being reduced to this miserable and humiliating state. .. I was in front of the Parliament building. I went inside. Many young people gathered there are demanding early parliamentary elections and change. I have been warning for a year now that, j udging by what is happening in Bulgaria, events may get out of control. This has already happened; it is a fact. It is the parliamentary group of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) form of governance of this country that are to blame for this. (BTA in English, January 10, 1997)

While justified by the dire economic circumstances, this anti democratic, almost

putchist behavior was in sharp contrast to the more responsible conduct of the opposition during the first large anti-Communist demonstration on 14 December 1989, when Zhelev,

Beron, Simeonov, Karakachanov, Trenchev, Roumen Vodenicharov, Ivailo Trifonov and other “first-generation” UDF leaders had restrained the crowd from storming the National

Assembly.

In the next few days, there was the usual exchange of charges and counter-charges between the government and the opposition. The BSP accused the UntdDF of attempting to stage a “street coup d’etat” and overturn the incumbents through stormtrooper tactics, while the opposition responded with the accusation that the whole incident had been staged by the government and that plainclothes policemen had provoked the onslaught of the crowd (BT A in English, January 15,1997). While it is impossible to verify the truth behind these mutual recriminations, there is little doubt that democratic consensus and national reconciliation were sacrificed on the altar of narrow-minded partisan interests and passions. Despite the acute economic crisis, there was no justification for the all-out confrontation and the use of street violence by the anti-govemment opposition.

On January 11, the Consultative Council on National Security met to discuss the protests continuing in Sofia and throughout the country. The emergency meeting, convened

435 by President Zhelev, was attended by representatives of the outgoing cabinet, the UDF, the

MRP, the Popular Union, and the Business Bloc. UDF parliamentary leader Yordan Sokolov declared that “We believe that the President should not ask the Socialists to form a new government, because the situation is explosive.” In this situation, he insisted, early elections are inevitable and the Socialists know it. Sokolov also stressed that opposition protests will continue “indefinitely.” On behalf of the united opposition, he proposed a declaration on the holding of early elections as well as the start of negotiations among all parliamentary forces on setting an election date. His Socialist counterpart Krassimir Premianov rejected the proposal, arguing that early elections would only aggravate the crisis. He also announced that the Democratic Left will not give up its mandate to form a new cabinet.

President Zhelev suggested that early parliamentary elections would be the best solution to the present crisis. He was supported by most of the participants in the meeting, including the BBB and independent deputies. Zhelev defended his failure to appoint Nikolai

Dobrev of the majority BSP to form a cabinet, claiming that the Constitution does not impose any deadline as to when he should do so (BTA in English, January 11, 1997). After protracted but futile debate, the deeply divided representatives failed to come to any agreement. Unlike the Council’s “midnight session” of 28-29 November 1990, this time there would be no inter-elite accords to form a coalition government of national salvation.

In spite of his promises to request the legislative majority o f the Democratic Left to form a new cabinet, as legally required under the Constitution, outgoing President Zhelev never did so.

In a televised address to the nation. President-elect Stoyanov condemned the street violence but also warned that Bulgaria would sink deeper into crisis without early

436 parliamentary elections. The presidential speech did not prevent the three main labor union

confederations from staging a nationwide strike to protest the economic catastrophe and

impoverishment brought on by the incumbents. At a protest rally in Sofia, Popular Union’s chairwoman Anastasia Dimitrov-Mozer declared on behalf of the entire opposition, “We are

for early parliamentary elections as soon as possible. Bulgaria has no time to waste. If the

Bulgarian Socialist Party continues to waste Bulgaria’s time it is not because it wants to save

Bulgaria but because it wants to save itself’ (BTA in English, January 24, 1997).

New emergency talks between the Democratic Left majority and the opposition held at the office of the newly sworn President Stoyanov ended without agreement. Stoyanov announced that it is “almost impossible” for the Left to realize its intention of forming a coalition government of experts on a broad political basis. But Socialist leader Georgi

Purvanov expressed the hope that the negotiations would continue until a mutually acceptable compromise is reached. Purvanov also stressed “the need to have a government formed by the National Assembly which would be a task force consisting of experts and enjoying broad public and political support” (BTA in English, January 24, 1997).

Starting on 1 February, barricades were erected to block street traffic in Sofia and other Bulgarian cities, resulting in numerous scuffles between demonstrators and motorists.

Although the new constitution bans general and politically motivated strikes, over the next few days the entire country was paralyzed by anti-govemment protests and work stoppages.

All major transportation arteries such as international railroads and highways, airport terminals, seaport facilities on the Black Sea and the Danube River, border check-points, and other transportation hubs were blockaded by the strikers. The residents of Sofia and other cities were left without public transport, while street barricades made impossible the use of

437 privately-owned vehicles. A year later, Evgeni Bakardjiev, the reputed mastermind behind

the opposition’s protest tactics, bragged from the rostrum of the National Assembly that by

Februar>' 3 Bulgaria had been “totally cut o ff from the rest of the world” {Duma, January 24,

1998: 1).

Large-scale violence seemed unavoidable, given the very tense and uncontrollable situation. Desperate to prevent a social explosion which could plunge the country into civil war, the BSP proposed forming a coalition cabinet led by an opposition politician and new elections by the end of the year. The deteriorating situation and the Socialist proposal to form a multiparty coalition government was strikingly reminiscent of the political crisis of

November 1990, which toppled Prime Minister Lukanov and brought to power Dimitar

Popov’s coalition cabinet. But this time the opposition rejected the BSP proposal for a new grand coalition government and pressed its demand for new elections.

The UDF, the Popular Union, and the MRF announced a parliamentary boycott, vowing not to return to parliament imtil the Socialists declined to form a new cabinet and accepted early elections. There is little doubt that the UDF-led rebellion was no ordinary protest tactic but a deliberate, well-coordinated street action aimed at bringing down the incumbents. The spirit of mutual trust and cooperation essential for an elite agreement failed again, as the selfish logic of the opposition’s zero-sum strategy dominated the politics of the day. Given the explosiveness of the situation, on February 4 premier-designate Nikolai

Dobrev declined the mandate to form a new BSP cabinet, declaring that he did not want to see Bulgaria “descend into a new civil war ” (BTA, February 5,1998). On the same day, the president’s office hurriedly announced the date for new elections. Speaking on Bulgarian

National Radio several months later. President Stoyanov acknowledged that “on February

438 4 we faced a situation that, in my view, could really have led to civil war" (interview with

President Stoyanov, Radio program/T/ror/ron/, November], 1997). As Bakardjiev admitted in a speech to parliament on the occasion of the first anniversary of the crisis, had a second

Socialist cabinet been approved by the National Assembly, the opposition supporters “would not have allowed the new ministers to leave the parliament building” {Duma, January 24,

1998: I). He sought to justify such a blackmail tactic, which constituted a clear threat to the physical safety of political opponents, by claiming that a second BSP government would have imposed martial law in the coimtry, thus implicitly invoking the popular right to

Lockean self-defense of democratic freedoms against an impending dictatorship.

Under the threat of more disturbances and violence not only did the BSP accept the proposal for scheduling early elections but, in another humiliating concession, it also agreed that the ballot be organized by an opposition-led caretaker goverrunent appointed by

President Stoyanov and headed by Stefan Sofiansky, the UDF mayor of Sofia.

A Nation Divided

The landslide opposition victories in the presidential vote of October-No vember 1996 and the parliamentary elections of April 1997 resulted in a dramatic reversal of partisan fortunes. The anti-Communist opposition is now in total control of all central state institutions. But its use of extraparliamentary, Bolshevik-style tactics has lefi Bulgarian society bitterly divided. For the third time since the transition began, a change of incumbents was achieved through street pressure and political violence.

After this less than peaceful tiunover of power, the UntDF cabinet of Prime Minister

Ivan Rostov decided to make a new start by replacing the old militant slogans “Death to All

439 Communists” and “No to Cooperation with the BCP” with populist appeals for national

consensus in favor of market reforms, the efforts to rescue the national economy, and the bid

to join NATO and the EU. But renewed sharp polemics between the Socialists and the

incumbents indicated that much of the coimtry remained deeply polarized. The precarious

economic situation, the BSP’s willingness to exploit economic hardships to foment popular

opposition to the government, and the UDF’s own single-minded determination to remain

in power at any cost soon revived the politics of intolerance and confrontation. Politically-

motivated purges in the state administration and the state-run mass media were followed by

the administrative replacement of legitimately elected mayors and other local officials. New

lustration bills were enacted by parliament, banning former BCP members fi’om holding state jobs for five years. The UDF-led parliamentary majority even passed a law which made the

Communist regime “illegal” and “criminal.” In response to criticism equating such lustration

measures with “McCarthyism” and “witch-hunting,” Minister of State Administration Mario

Tagarinski replied: “As long as there are witches in Bulgaria, there will be also witch-

hunting” {Kontinent, December 18, 1998). The new government has clearly failed to leam

from the costly mistakes of its Democratic Left predecessors that it should function on the

basis of loyalty to the democratic Constitution rather than self-serving partisanship and

revanchism.

The extra-constitutional tactics and “permanent revolution” strategy of the self-styled

“talibans of democracy” have fostered a dangerous ideological polarization in the country,

which is politically divisive and economically self-destructive. Like ’s right-

wing Democrats in conflict-torn Albania, Bulgaria’s new “revolutionaries” appear unwilling

or incapable of recognizing that democratization can be accomplished only through

440 reconciliation, compromise and social peace, rather than confrontation and the division of society into irreconcilably antagonistic camps. Thehx Drang und Sturm approach to politics has prevented the formation of a broad, mature consensus on achieving a stable transition to consolidated democracy and mixed economy in Bulgaria. Obviously, the old spirit of enmity, distrust and refusal to cooperate or compromise is alive and well among Bulgaria’s current politicians. Mutual intolerance and conflict along the old ideological fault lines have spread throughout civil society, leaving few of its institutions and symbols unscathed. Even the

Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which has traditionally unified Bulgarians and helped them preserve their national and during the five centuries of brutal Ottoman , is now badly split (see Raikin 1998). It remains bitterly divided between the supporters of Patriarch Maxim, the head of the Holy Synod since 1971, and a group of rebel clergymen forming an alternative church leadership with strong UDF backing.

Ironically, the continuing bitter feud between Left and Right in Bulgaria is not entirely about ideology, political principles or economic policy. Far from it. What on the surface looks like a struggle over the direction of the transition has degenerated into a scuffle over the spoils of power and the ill-gotten gains from the privatization of the economy. As

Podkrepa leader Trenchev has observed.

The struggle in Bulgaria is not a struggle to restore communist principles. Rather, the struggle centers around the issue who will become the capitalists. And the Communists want to transform themselves into this social group. .. Nobody wants to restore the communist principles. (Interview with Trenchev in Melone 1996b)

The predictable consequences from this unhealthy and unprincipled approach to the problems of the transition are now tragically evident. As Kitschelt writes, “because of

Bulgaria’s deep regime divide that crystallizes intense political emotions around coping with

441 the past and settling open scores resulting from experiences under communist rule...Bulgarian politics encounters serious problems of political governance” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 388). Domestic turmoil has eroded the state’s ability to maintain law and order, crack down on crime and corruption, revive the economy, create new jobs, collect taxes and customs duties, and reform the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy (see Daskalov 1998). The economy is still mired in crisis because the feuding politicians are unable to provide direction, secinity and certainty for producers, investors and markets alike. In terms of the general progress of its democratic transition and consolidation, Bulgaria now lags behind the so-called “front-runners” in post-Communist Europe, namely the Czech Republic. Hungary,

Poland and Slovenia. The fragmentation and fierce polarization of its political life are undermining public support for democracy. Mass dissatisfaction with how democracy works and nostalgia for the “good old days”of Zhivkov are widespread among Bulgarians embittered by poverty, unemployment, corruption and crime (see Carpenter 1998). The longer the coimtry continues to oscillate between chaos and semi-authoritarianism, the longer the future of Bulgarian democracy will remain uncertain.

442 CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter I summarize the discussion of earlier chapters and focus on possible implications for theory and for future research. This case study is the first to offer an in-depth analysis of the pitfalls, successes and failures of Bulgaria’s latest democratic experiment. It attempts to explain the various reasons, both contextual and procedural, why this “incomplete” democracy has failed to become fully consolidated, or even genuinely democratic. In a departure from conventional democratization theory characterized by closed models with too few variables, it offers a more complex, multivariate approach to the problems of democratic transition and consolidation. An analysis like this has to be multi- causal, if it is to avoid the so-called “omitted variable bias” (see King, Keohane and Verba

1994: 168-182). Comparative theory forces us to consider democracy and democratization in a more complex, holistic fashion, because political behavior is always the result of multiple causes. Multicausality needs to be considered theoretically when the dependent variable is the outcome of historical and sociopolitical contingencies. The Bulgarian case is, if anything, overdetermined.

443 Theoretical Implications

This analysis argues that post-Communist Bulgaria has become democratic in accordance with the minimal, formal-procedural definition of democracy, but has by and

large failed to consolidate. The breakdown in law and order, the ubiquity and impunity of official corruption, and the growth of organized crime are eroding state authority and effectiveness and undermining democratic legitimacy. While significant progress has been made in meeting the institutional and attitudinal criteria for democratic consolidation, the consolidation process has fallen short in behavioral terms. Although there are no significant anti-system parties and movements, the rancorous and destructive tone of political discourse, and the frequent recourse to extraparliamentary mobilization and street violence by anti-

Communist militants constitute clear evidence that the operational definition of democratic consolidation is not met. Party elites have not lived up to the absolute imperative of inter­ party cooperation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a PR electoral system. What are the reasons for the democratic transition’s incompleteness? While not straying from the elite-theoretic approach, this study tries to provide a broader-gauged explanation for the outcome of Bulgaria’s democratization.

To begin with, one cannot fully understand Bulgaria’s incomplete consolidation without an analysis of the deep historical roots and antecedents of its contemporary political conflicts. The historical context exerts powerful influence on elite behavior and all other variables in this model. It is clear that the conciliatory, flexible and accommodating elite behavior needed for the long-term survival of democracy is not easy to achieve in Bulgaria given the inflammatory effect of a violent, tragic history upon the political emotions and passions of today. Historically, Bulgaria lacks a tradition of democratic consensus and

444 toleration. Its modem history is characterized by a pattern of violent elite struggles, political intolerance and personal vendettas leading all the way to the deep partisan divisions and polarized politics of the present. This includes widespread calls for retribution and settling scores from the past, which has been a source of political tension throughout the transition period. It is obvious that the politico-cultural legacy of the past does not provide an auspicious basis for democratic support and endurance. It is this legacy of conflict, authoritarianism and merciless crushing of the intemal opposition that Bulgarians must now overcome if the new democratic regime is to succeed. The tasks of consolidating the institutional foimdations of democracy, resolving socioeconomic problems, and creating legal conditions for the population to exercise fully its new constitutional rights and freedoms require national reconciliation, elite consensus, mutual restraint and constructive political dialogue, which are absent today due in no small part to the continuing politicization and manipulation of history. For example, the on-going militant campaign of

“” necessarily means continued political conflict, dramatic elite discontinuity as well as revenge and witch-hunting by implacable opponents.

The Communist past has affected most directly popular evaluations of the democratic present. The experience of four decades of Commimism included mass apathy, passivity, cynicism and political acquiescence described by some as “totalitarianism by consent.” But what most cultural-determinist interpretations of democratization fail to mention is that the controversial historical legacy of Communism is less than unambiguous. While instituting wide-ranging civic and political liberties, the new democracy has largely taken away the extensive economic and social rights that Bulgarians took for granted under Communist rule. The current climate of social chaos, mass impoverishment and economic insecurity has

445 become the basis for popular disenchantment, nostalgia for the Communist past, and

widespread cynicism about democracy and its practioners. To many pauperized Bulgarians,

traumatized by the privations of the present and fearful of the uncertain future, the

Communist past now seems like a “golden age.”

The evidence also supports predictions about the political influence of past exposure

to democracy. Bulgaria has a relatively short experience with democracy and a weak

tradition of democratic political culture. Negative elite solidarity, rhetorical partisan

demagoguery, class antagonisms and political violence have dominated national politics for

more than a century. Those who blame current consolidation problems on the Communist- era legacies forget that an authoritarian political culture took root long before the BCP ruled

Bulgaria. As culturally-inclined scholars argue, political traditions are not easy to change.

An antidemocratic historical heritage is a breeding ground for new hatreds, rancor and animosities. It may take many years, if not several generations, to imdo these rigid political traditions and mores. While political behavior and attitudes are not set in stone, the transition has been hampered by the difficulty of resocializing a society, in which civic virtues and more tolerant orientations are still overshadowed by the polarizing values of narrow-minded partisanship, personal vendettas and ideological intolerance. Historical and politico-cultural

factors were clearly not determinative in bringing about the transition to democracy, nor are they likely to facilitate its consolidation.

Despite a tortured political history and fragmented political culture, partial empirical corroboration is found for theories which posit that some previous experience with democracy is conducive to democratic transition and elite accommodation. Though controversial and politically divisive, the past has also laid the groundwork for the new

446 democratic infrastructure. Party revivals, especially of the so-called “historic” parties like the

Agrarians, the Social Democrats, the Democrats, and the Radical Democrats, has contributed to the restoration of Bulgaria’s multiparty system, even though the traditional cleavages that led to the formation o f those parties have disappeared with the radical socioeconomic and cultural changes that Bulgarian society underwent under the Commimists. While the longer and more recent exposure to authoritarianism has dominated the political socialization of the great majority of adult Bulgarians, the memory and example of a shorter, intermittent and more distant democratic experience, coupled with an old parliamentary tradition, has had a beneficial effect on the current democratic project. Public reverence for the parliamentary and electoral traditions of the pre-1934 democracy, as well as for the democratic values and legal culture of the T umovo Constitution, has contributed to the present commitment to more tolerant and less violent behavioral norms and practices.

As postulated by Lipset and other modernization theorists, there seems to be a positive relationship between economic development and democratization. Larry Diamond claims that there are strong methodological and theoretical grounds for concluding that the association between these two variables is causal in nature. The Bulgarian case provides more empirical evidence confirming the hypothesized linkage between socioeconomic modernization and democracy. The Communist regime sought to modernize postwar

Bulgaria through rapid economic growth, industrialization, improved education, mass literacy, urbanization, and promoting rational-secular over traditional-religious values.

Zhivkov was especially successful in fostering a combination o f material progress and social equality leading to a relatively high level of socioeconomic development. The narrowing of income inequality led to the disappearance of mass poverty and the attenuation of class-based

447 divisions and conflicts. The policy of industrial development reduced the size of the

traditional peasantry and produced a large urban-based working class. As result of the state-

guided “revolution from above,” Bulgaria became a post-traditional society, in which a large

majority of the population no longer lives in rural settings or is employed in agriculture-

related jobs. It would be implausible to argue that objective conditions in pre-transition

Bulgaria were not yet sufficiently ripe for democracy.

Urbanization and the increase in both mass education and communications engendered a degree of political and cultural awareness that facilitated the political mobilization of the population. As the number of persons with higher education grew dramatically, the regime had to deal with new social groups created and empowered by the process of modernization. Similarly to the rest of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria’s accelerated industrial development, educational progress and social mobilization gave rise to a large, well-educated but politically and culturally dissatisfied intelligentsia, which assumed a key position in the cultural and socioeconomic life of the country. The intelligentsia’s resistance to ideological, cultural and artistic conformity gave impetus to widespread demands for political, civil and personal freedoms. A by-product of the process of modernization, the ascendant middle class exerted pressure for democracy, forcing the Communist regime into political concessions and democratic reforms. The Bulgarian case thus attests to the positive relationship between economic development and political democratization.

The case of Bulgaria adds yet another instance supportive of the modernization hypothesis. It further confirms and strengthens the structuralist argument that modernization has a causal influence on democratic transformations. Democratic change seems to be linked to the dynamics of material progress, industrialization and other developmental variables,

448 with the relationship being mediated by the mechanisms of social and cultural transformation, especially the rise of a strategic social group such as the intelligentsia.

Socioeconomic development was therefore a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for democratization. While facilitating the transition, modernization alone is not sufficient to consolidate the new Bulgarian democracy.

This case is theoretically interesting also because it provides some contradictory evidence regarding the hypothesized causal influence of economic variables. As an analytical tool, political economy focuses on the profoimd influence of economic factors in shaping political events and attitudes and supporting democracy. The sharply negative socioeconomic setting has rendered the post-Communist elite’s task of consolidating a meaningful democracy in Bulgaria even more difficult and complicated. The national economy is in a crisis; unemployment, poverty and income disparity are surpassing even pre-Communist levels. The transition to democracy is increasingly questioned by a mass public traumatized by the severity of the economic sliunp, giving rise to destabilizing demands for immediate economic relief and social justice. Post-Communist Bulgaria’s economic collapse and dire social circumstances remain an obstacle to the consolidation of the regime, making the process of transition even more problematic.

The national economy has nearly disintegrated, the per capita GNP is sharply down, the social safety net has all but disappeared, and the physical survival of many Bulgarians, especially the elderly, the sick, the unemployed, young families with children, the Gypsies, is in serious peril. Pressure by an impoverished population for job security, wage concessions and social welfare, as well as mass resistance to the rigors and income disparities of the marketplace, may still derail the entire process of economic reform and privatization. Matters

449 have been made worse by the regime’s massive debt burden, managerial incompetence,

“” and widespread corruption. Crime has emerged as a major societal problem, exposing system inefficacy and fueling mass dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. If socioeconomic conditions and the crime problem continue to deteriorate, there is no doubt that the new regime will be threatened.

Desperate economic circumstances and a precipitous drop in living standards have become an impediment to democratic legitimacy and sustainability. The economic slump with its sharply negative macroeconomic indicators has created a climate of social tensions and conflict which has resulted in sporadic acts of political violence. The analytical distinction between diffuse system support and specific evaluations of government outputs may not be fully applicable to a new democracy, where the accumulated reservoir of trust and goodwill is low and where strong economic growth is necessary to build system support and confidence in the new democratic institutions. By undermining mass-level attachment to the new democratic order and preventing support for the new political regime from becoming entrenched in society, Bulgaria’s economic and social crisis remains a serious long-term obstacle to democratic consolidation.

On the other hand, there has been no democratic breakdown, even though the country continues to be in serious economic trouble. According to economic determinists, the influence of the economic setting should be a primary factor in how one views the political regime, yet an ailing economy and sharply negative economic evaluations have not determined political judgments among the population. Continued public support for democracy raises questions about the strength of the relationship between economic performance indicators and democratization outcomes. Obviously, attitudes toward

450 democracy cannot be reduced to the effects of social structure and economic conditions. Pre­ transition socioeconomic conditions such as modernity and relative prosperity facilitated the crossover to democracy, but they cannot not be seen as prerequisites for democratic survival, especially at a time when Bulgaria’s economic output and living standards have been declining faster and with more painful social and psychological consequences than in most other post-Communist countries.

The Bulgarian case thus illustrates the gap separating political and economic evaluations of new democracies. In the 1996 New Democracies Barometer, for example, j ust

23% of Bulgarians approved of the new economy, while fully 66% endorsed the existing political regime. If theories of economic determinism that assume that macroeconomic conditions shape political attitudes were valid, then democracy in Bulgaria would have collapsed some time ago, given the fall in living standards and real reduction in the quality of life during the transition. Depressed standards of living especially have lowered popular assessments of the regime’s economic performance, but appreciation for expanded individual rights and freedoms has partly made up for economic disaffection, contributing to sustained popular commitment to democracy, at least in the abstract. Political discontent at the mass level has so far focused on specific governments rather than the democratic regime itself.

When tested under the strains of the economic crisis, the new democratic institutions have not collapsed, as deterministic theories would lead us to expect.

Even though economic efficacy obviously does not determine democratic legitimacy in attitudinal and behavioral terms, the regime’s disastrous economic record has sharply diminished public satisfaction with democratic performance and trust in the new pluralistic institutions. Poor regime effectiveness in the economic area that has bitterly disappointed the

451 population’s initially high expectations explains why there is only partial conformity with

the attitudinal criterion of democratic consolidation in Bulgaria. The evidence presented in

this dissertation confirms that economic conditions can influence political attitudes and behavior, but are not determinative of regime legitimacy and democratization outcomes.

In accordance with theoretical expectations, problems of social distress and mass-

level disaffection with disastrous economic performance and crime often pale in comparison to those generated by cultural conflicts involving ethnolinguistic and religious minorities.

Minority problems are another obstacle to democratic consolidation. Bulgarians are particularly sensitive on the subject of ethnic minorities in politics because of their long history of Turkish domination and oppression, the country’s ethnic and religious fragmentation, and the tensions still surrounding the ethnic Turkish community. As a result of Zhivkov’s attempted of Bulgaria’s Muslim Turks, the new democracy inherited a legacy of inflamed feelings of animosity and distrust between the two ethnic communities. The country’s historically centralized and unitary state organization, relatively undifferentiated social structure, and general absence of developed and autonomous civil society have made ethnic politics an especially attractive and effective means of mobilizing voter support. Immediately after the fall ofZhivkov, the MRF emerged as an important and controversial force representing minority interests and grievances.

Similarly to most other countries in the region, ethnic conflict became a persistent and disruptive influence in the early stages of democratization, when Bulgarian nationalists felt the need to resist what they perceived as the MRF’s separatist political agenda.

Because of its highly visible ethnic fiictions, Bulgaria acquired the image of a conflictual and potentially violent society, which did not fully correspond to empirical

452 reality. For this was a conflict largely provoked by past repression rather than one stemming

from current policies or the existing cultural environment. The ethnic issue did not evolve

into a stateness challenge, because no significant cultural minority in Bulgaria is seriously

contesting national unity or the legitimacy of the new regime. In spite of ethnic divisions and

tensions, particularly in the initial transition period, the coimtry has avoided a stateness crisis

comparable to that experienced by neighboring Yugoslavia, since only minor political groups

claiming to represent the coimtry’s various ethnic minorities have presented what might be

considered a challenge to the territorial integrity of the nation-state.

Things might have been different, however, had the large ethnic Turkish commimity been excluded from the political arena by non-democratic methods, as the neonationalists have advocated. The electoral system has played an important part in protecting cultural minorities, including the political representation of their demands and interests, without compromising the principle of majority rule. Like most of the new East European democracies, Bulgaria has adopted a proportional representation system to elect its legislature, thus avoiding the pitfalls of minority underrepresentation or non-representation inherent in first-past-the-post majoritarian electoral systems. Thanks in part to the inclusiveness of the PR electoral system, not only has the Turkish-dominated MRF been represented in every democratically-elected parliament since the founding election in June

1990, but it was even able to nominate a minority government of “non-party experts” which ruled Bulgaria for almost two years. The appointment of Lyuben Berov’s cabinet was a consequence of the dynamics of the UDF-BSP competition, as each party was determined to prevent its rival from assuming power. The largest ethnic minority party became an integral part of the new political establishment only imder very fortuitous circumstances, but

453 this fact nonetheless indicates that ethnic cleavages in Bulgaria are neither so deep nor so cumulative in nature as to be of greater salience than ideological and partisan considerations.

Paradoxically, by undertaking the thankless task of governing a country in severe distress, the MRF-nominated cabinet also prevented a brewing confrontation between the previously ruling UDF and the opposition BSP, which had threatened the prevailing democratic consensus in the country.

As the Bulgarian case suggests, it is not necessarily inevitable that ethnicity problems and virulent nationalism will overwhelm the new regimes in post-Communist Europe, in spite of strong contrary evidence presented by the interethnic wars in parts of the former

Soviet Union, Yugoslavia’s violent break-up or the Czech-Slovak “velvet divorce” Political bargains and compromises are possible even in plural societies, for pluralism in ethnicity, religion and culture does not have to lead ineluctably to “stateness” problems that can fatally undermine nascent, fragile democracies. There are currently few signs of particularly detrimental effects of Bulgaria’s ethno-religious fragmentation. If the fundamental problems of national unity and national boundaries are successfully resolved, persistent ethnic frictions need not turn into a serious anti democratic threat. But the potential for conflict remains potent, as most Bulgarians still oppose the idea of granting territorial and administrative self- rule or even substantial cultural autonomy to ethnic minorities, especially the ethnic Turks.

While exploring the influence of structural and contextual factors, this study follows the actor-oriented approach by suggesting that no consensual transition to democracy can be fully understood without examining elite behavior and interactions. Sharply negative historical memories, a severe economic downturn, growing social inequalities, an intolerant political culture, ethnic tensions, and other structural or cultural challenges are sufficient to

454 abort any transition unless it is skillfully steered by a responsible national elite which displays political wisdom and maturity, using imaginative institutional engineering and innovative political action to overcome such impropitious circumstances.

Bulgaria’s new democracy has weathered serious political crises and a devastating economic slump without any signs of immediate breakdown. There are many hopeful signs pointing to elite moderation, tolerance and conciliation as the main reason for the regime’s survival and durability. In spite of their democratic inexperience and predisposition to fragmentation and feuding, all politically significant forces in Bulgaria verbally support the democratic system of government and a due process of law. The party of power under the previous undemocratic regime, the BSP, has undergone important ideological and programmatic change by converting into a democratic catch-all party, formulating a very moderate party platform, and presenting a public image designed to maximize its mass appeal to a broader section of the Bulgarian population. Its conversion into a democratic force has been motivated by strategic office-seeking concerns, but also by the genuine desire of the ex-Communists to democratize the country. Unlike transitions in Latin America,

Southern Europe or even Asia where the armed forces have retained some “veto” power, the transition process in Bulgaria is completely free from the threat of military intervention, since there is full military submission to civilian rule. The new democratic order in Bulgaria is not threatened by any parties representing significant ethno-religious minorities with openly separatist agendas, nor is the sometimes intolerant and semiloyal behavior of the neonationalist groups a direct challenge to democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.

The present study highlights the specific conditions that have contributed to a democratic agreement imder the difficult circumstances of the Bulgarian case. Despite the

455 numerous problems, obstacles and conflicts encountered along the path of democratization, a measure of procedural consensus was achieved among the major political forces, laying the foundations of a new democracy. This was accomplished through intense negotiations producing a series of political accords and understandings. Given the mutual suspicion and intolerance of opposing party elites, their rather reluctant acceptance of compromise, consensus, self-restraint, and respect for democratic proceduralism was a rational-choice strategy designed to avoid further polarization and political confiontation. The old governing elite desperately needed to legitimate its rule by democratic procedures and ensure its continued political existence at a time when the opposition mobilization generated by the high citizen expectations for democratic change could have sparked civil conflict (the danger of violence and bloodshed was imderscored by the explosive nature of parallel developments in neighboring Romania and Yugoslavia). For their part, the large number of opposition parties and groups filling the new space for political action wanted negotiations because they were neither politically strong nor secure enough to remove the regime and institutionalize their elite status by other means. That is why the Bulgarian transition is the outcome of both opposition mobilization from below and reforms from above by a governing elite pursuing a rational strategy of survival.

The major protagonists of the Bulgarian transition tried deliberately to follow the

Spanish path of elite negotiations andpactada. At the National Round Table, explicit agreements on the democratic nature of the new regime were reached by the BSP government and the political opposition, from which only the MRF was excluded. The partial settlement represented by the roimd-table agreements—a series of explicit elite understandings over the specific rules, norms and procedures of how the parliamentary game

456 of politics is to be played—established a democratic regime in conformity with Linz’s minimal-procedural type and fostered a significant degree of procedural consensus among

Bulgaria’s largest political forces. Electoral democracy essentially was in effect with the

“founding” election of 10-17 June 1990.

The December 1990 accords concerning the peaceful transition to democracy constituted another partial settlement. These inter-elite accords, first brokered at the famous all-night session of President Zhelev’s Political Consultative Council, contributed substantially to the behavioral acceptance of democracy. They reaffirmed the commitment of nearly all major political actors (save for the nationalists who were among those signing the inter-party agreements with reservations) to a democratic fiamework for structuring and regulating politics in Bulgaria. They also promoted structural elite integration by making possible the formation o f a grand alliance government, from which only the MRP was excluded. The institutionalized unpredictability of democracy obviously creates its own incentives for elite actors to remain committed to the new constitutional order and democratic politics, but direct negotiation, mutual guarantees, and some power-sharing arrangements like a consociational “grand coalition” government seem to make that commitment stronger and more likely in the first place.

Even though it was based on a “majoritarian” constitution-making formula and received far from unanimous support in parliament, the subsequent constitutional settlement concerning the democratic regime’s basic charter was conducive to the institutional consolidation of the new democracy. The settlement of constitutional issues shaped the new representative institutions and formalized the rules of the political game much earlier in

Bulgaria than in any other East European transition. Even though heated opposition by a

457 significant parliamentary minority almost derailed the majority-dominated constituent

process, Bulgaria became the first post-Communist country to adopt a democratic

fundamental law, which legally precludes a return to authoritarian rule. While the issue of

constitutions and constitutional contexts has received inadequate attention in the

democratization literature (Linz and Stepan 1996), this analysis focuses on the important

institutional contribution that the negotiation and adoption of a new basic document has

made to the success of the transition process. In spite of some serious political resistance,

particularly over the still unresolved issue of what to do with the abolished monarchy and

the exiled former king, the constituent assembly reached a constitutional settlement in a

manner similar to the “fi’ee and consensual constitution-making” formula of Linz and Stepan.

The formal promulgation of a new constitution delineated the new, democratic rules of the

game, under which all political actors must accept regular, fi-ee, fair, open and binding

elections as the only legitimate method of winning or maintaining political power.

These successive democratic gains have resulted in limited elite consensus supportive of the institutions and procedures of political democracy. The opposing elite factions in

Bulgaria agreed to eschew political violence, even as they disagreed on many of the divisive substantive issues, such as how to interpret the recent past, punishment of Communist-era top officials, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria, the extent and speed of privatizing the national economy, foreign policy commitments, etc. These procedural agreements have contributed to a consensus among all politically significant groups and movements that democracy represents the only political system appropriate to Bulgaria’s contemporary circumstances.

458 From a procedural point of view, one must emphasize the role of direct negotiations

in bringing about consensus and cooperation between party elites that were very suspicious

and distrustful of each other. Communication in the form of direct, face-to-face negotiations

appears to be the optimal solution to a type of strategic situation, where two antagonistic

forces may stumble into a confrontation, in which both sides are bound to suffer heavy

losses. The negotiated mode of transition was crucial also because the transitional agenda for

elite negotiation was uniquely extensive, affecting all spheres of political, social, economic

and cultural life, thereby involving “nothing less than the creation of the very building blocks

of the social order” (Bunce 1995: 121). Within the frameworks of the Round Table, the

Political Consultative Council, and the GNA’s constitutional talks, the negotiating process between adversarial politicians became the primary vehicle for institutional bargaining and democratic institutional change. As the Bulgarian example confirms, elite negotiations are the most effective path to competitive politics and sustainable electoral democracy. Save for

Huntington’s “regime replacements” where the ancien regime collapses (e.g.,

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the Soviet Union), there is no other peaceful way to remove an entrenched elite from power, while at the same time minimize the risk of violence and bloodshed, reach a comprehensive democratic agreement, and construct viable democratic institutions.

Many characteristics of the Bulgarian transition thus follow the logic of the elite settlement model—that is, direct negotiations, mostly behind closed doors, between all significant party leaders leading to a formal agreement and consensual unity. But, as discussed in previous chapters, democracy has failed to consolidate. As I argue in Chapter

13, it is the frequently disruptive, semi-loyal behavior of key political elites that is at the core

459 of the explanation of why the consolidation process has remained incomplete. Theorists of democratic transition and consolidation write that for consolidation to occur elite rhetoric and antagonistic partisan positions must imdergo a process of convergence toward greater moderation once the regime has been democratized. While some programmatic and ideological moderation has indeed occurred, elite rhetoric and actions in Bulgaria have fai led to converge towards more moderate, consensual stances. Party elites, whose interactions must lay the groundwork for elite consensual and structural unity necessary for consolidation, exhibit relatively weak support for the behavioral norms of democracy and are riven by personal distrust and deep partisan animosities. They compete ferociously not just for power, but also for the direction of the transition. Their feuding has prolonged and deepened the historical schism of Communists versus anti-Commimists in Bulgaria. In the main partisan confrontation of the transition, ex-Communist reformers have faced off anti-

Communist revolutionaries in their determined march across the constituent institutions of the state. In the words of the late Socialist Prime Minister Lukanov, the systemic change in

Bulgaria is more akin to a Spanish corrida than to Spain’s transition to democracy.

All post-Commimist party governments in Bulgaria have often engaged in an arbitrary or intolerant manner of rule. The behavior of opposition parties has been openly semiloyal and at times even disloyal, demonstrating a lack of behavioral moderation and restraint. Mutual recriminations, invective, threats and ultimatums are regularly exchanged between the government and the opposition. In non-electoral situations, the anti-Communist forces have failed to play by the existing constitutional rules, mobilizing substantial resources to pursue anti-govemment, zero-sum strategies. In their vehement opposition to

Communism, the more “fimdamentalist” UDF factions have taken a radical position,

460 rhetorically challenging the legitimacy of elected BSP office-holders and even the right of the ex-Communists to remain active on the political scene after having dictatorially ruled the country for 45 years. Such radicalism is held by students of democratization to be a threat to the establishment of consolidated democracy insofar as it can mobilize radical and disaffected sectors of the population into active opposition to the government of the day.

Extra-parliamentary action, signifying a lack of conformity with the norms of democratic behavior, presents a particular threat to consolidation. Militant factions of the anti-Communist opposition in Bulgaria did not accept the legitimacy of the Socialist electoral victories in the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and December 1994. They launched highly polarizing and confrontational political attacks against the former

Communists and mobilized their supporters into active opposition to the elected Socialist governments, thus increasing the possibility of deconsolidating an already poorly performing political system. Radical rhetoric and revolutionary tactics have led to acts of physical intimidation and violence in the streets, such as the sacking and torching of the BSP headquarters in August 1990 or the attempted storming of the National Assembly in January

1997. Under sharply deteriorating social-economic circumstances, street revolts forced the resignations of two BSP cabinets in November 1990 and February 1997, respectively. Mass protests compelled President Mladenov to step down in July 1990 and almost toppled

President Zhelev in the summer of 1993. A three-month-old parliamentary boycott forced

Professor Berov’s minority government to resign in September 1994. Such zero-sum strategies are clearly subversive of the existing institutional order and may become a potentially serious obstacle to successful consolidation. As illustrated in the substantive

461 chapters, they may signify a return to the divisive politics of the past, threatening the new democracy and precluding future regime consolidation.

What makes the socioeconomic crisis especially threatening to democratic survival is the fact that it is taking place against the backgroimd of a deep political split, even fragmentation, in the society as a whole. The antagonisms and ideological polemics between the BSP and the UDF, as well as their failure to transcend the sharp divisions and conflicts inherited from the past, appear to be a major impediment to democratic consolidation, contributing to a political climate that is highly conflictive and sharply polarized between

Left and Right. The historical tradition of mutual enmity, bitter feuding and political violence has prevailed over constructive, consensus-seeking politics. As a result, the post-Communist political discourse is characterized by populism, demagoguery and electoral incitement. Lack of mutual trust and respect, rejection of partisan dialogue and cooperation, the use of extraparliamentary tactics and street violence are some of the common manifestations of an irresponsible and destabilizing disloyalty to democracy and constitutional-legal order.

Successive party governments have refused to cooperate with the official opposition and have tried to repress political opponents. In turn, opposition parties rarely wait out the constitutional term of office of the government of the day. They have used polarizing rhetoric and obstructionist tactics, taking advantage of the crisis situation to ease out the incumbents by means of street riots and forced early elections. The resort to parliamentary boycotts rendering successive legislatures and cabinets impotent and fi-agile indicates a lack of consolidation of the parliamentary rules of the democratic game. Obviously, the concept of loyal opposition is yet to take root in post-Communist politics. Until intense bipolar confrontation gives way to a new commitment to pragmatism, national conciliation, dialogue

462 and cooperation, the prospects for democratic consolidation in Bulgaria will remain uncertain.

What are the implications of such empirical findings for our understanding of democratic transitions and consolidations? This case study contributes to the theoretical debate about democratization by confirming that elite integration and behavioral moderation essential for consolidated democracy are not easy to achieve, even when elite actors are predisposed to settle their differences in a negotiated, consensual manner. First of all, an inter-elite agreement is not a guarantee of elite self-restraint and cooperation. While antagonistic elite factions did engage in direct negotiations and formal accords, the inter-elite agreements proved to be unstable and fragile due to the turbulent, crisis-ridden nature of the transition. At first, it appeared that Spanish-style face-to-face negotiations between rival party elites may have promoted elite consensual and structural integration, a diffuse sense of unity and mutual respect, which are requirements for democratic consolidation and stability. But mutual toleration and civility quickly broke down in the face of acrimonious elite disputes over questions of power sharing, the historical guilt and future trustworthiness of the former Communists, responsibility for the economic crisis, and the very desirability of allowing the BSP to remain in power. Elite collaboration and compromise were replaced by hostile and confrontational behavior which is polarizing and potentially destabilizing.

Elite consensual agreements are fragile and impermanent constructions which may come apart if the carefully crafted compromises ensuring reformist elements of the old regime a legitimate place in the new order is accepted only for tactical reasons. This condition, which is a key to a peaceful transition to democracy, may be challenged by the militants in the anti-Communist opposition who are likely to prevail in the long run over the

463 more moderate elements. If democratic politics is seen by the radicals as a zero-sum game,

in which the elite of the old regime has to be crushed and subjugated, then democracy will

not take root, may decay and never become consolidated. Dictatorship may be replaced by

a fragile and unstable quasi-democracy lacking effectiveness and popular legitimation.

Where structural and contextual conditions are highly unfavorable and populations are

polarized ideologically, party elites may not moderate their political stances in order to win elections and become the government. In other words, the rational-choice, vote-maximizing

motivation behind programmatic and ideological moderation may be inoperative in transitions under more stressful objective circiunstances. Bargaining and pacts may not necessarily lead to elite collaboration, moderation and compromise on fundamental divisive issues, which is essential for establishing a viable, consolidated regime.

A second crucial point to emerge from this analysis is that democratic transitions are not entirely different from other political revolutions and there is always the implicit danger that they may follow the uniformities described by historian Crane Brinton. The calculus of pragmatic considerations can always change, and the self-interests of elites may not remain as enlightened or civic-oriented as they were at the time of the democratic opening. The oppositional elite group that negotiated the democratic transition may be replaced by a more militant, less accommodating group, which rejects the moderation of garantismo compromises and converts the democratic project into an anti-Communist crusade. This is more or less what happened with the radicalization and fragmentation of the main group in the democratic opposition, the UDF. Since Bulgarian society was socially homogenous at the beginning of the transition, there were no differentiated social classes whose group interests could be represented by the new political parties. From a spokesman of all pro­

464 democracy and pro-market forces in Bulgaria, the badly split UDF was gradually transformed from within into a mouthpiece of the heirs and surviving members of the pre-

September 9, 1944 traditional Right.

Given such democratically ambiguous elite behavior, the case of Bulgaria further indicates that there is no certainty that an oppositional elite will not use extreme situations like an economic crisis or ethnic tensions to adopt radical, semi loyal positions. Under conditions of stress, general chaos and threatened regime breakdown, subjectively rational calculations may in fact encotu-age extraconstitutional politics and the pursuit of maximalist strategies. Selfish, zero-sum rationality may replace the cooperative, positive-sum logic, necessary for ending elite conflict and full democratization. Even though elite negotiations were held and several comprehensive political agreements were signed, the leaders of the main political parties have piu"sued the individually “rational” strategy of maximizing the

“benefits” of power domination while minimizing the “costs” of any compromises and concessions to the opposing side, thus leading to the collectively “irrational” outcome of polarization, fierce partisan competition and confrontation. A uncooperative, zero-sum strategy may have facilitated the anti-Communist opposition’s “march across the institutions” but has at the same time led to immoderate ideological infighting and a fundamental disruption of the consolidation process. At several critical points in the transition, the coimtry was on the verge of civil war, the danger of which was only narrowly averted. On the basis of these empirical findings, this study moves us a little closer to understanding the causal relationship involving environmental constraints, the behavior of political actors, and democratization outcomes.

465 Implications for Future Research

But how widely can such single-case findings be generalized? Since neither of these explanations is case-specific—that is, distinctly Bulgarian—they obviously have wider applicability. We need to assess their importance and to analyze their implications for present and future work. By focusing on the pattern of developing trends and tendencies in a single democratization instance, this detailed case study has also addressed some questions that have remained largely unanswered in regard to the general category of post-Communist transitions. Is Bulgaria’s democratizing experiment a success, a costly failure, or something in between? Should post-Communist reforms, which are part and parcel of the “Third Wave” global revolution in favor of democracy, be seen as fundamentally a case of democratic success or, as some writers argue, of predictable performance failure under conditions of extreme economic pain, social privation, and cultural conflict? As more evidence becomes available, there is perhaps increasing empirical justification for the failed democracy proposition. While many observers would disagree with this pessimistic conclusion, at least in Bulgaria the transition to democracy is in danger of remaining precarious and largely unconsolidated for some time to come. At the time of writing, the future of some of the region’s other democratic hopefuls seems no less indeterminate. What accounts for this disappointing, if not entirely unanticipated outcome? What are the sources of systemic fragility in the post-Communist world? What roads to democratization are to be recommended or rejected? From a theoretical perspective, the questions raised here are interesting and important enough to justify further empirical research.

Given the limitations inherent in a single-country study like the present one, a larger number of post-Communist transitions need to be examined as case studies in order to assess

466 more fully the merits and shortcomings of various explanations of democratization and its successes and failures. The results from more case studies, applying similar sets of explanatory variables to other instances of post-Communist democratization, can be used to test theoretical generalizations drawn from previous cases of democratic transition and consolidation. But it is not entirely implausible that post-Commimist transitions may prove to be unique experiences that are unlikely to fit existing theoretical models.

The next logical step would be to imdertake an innovative comparative study of post-

Communist transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using essentially the same set of causal theories and hypotheses. A large-scale analysis can combine the insights and rich contextuality of an individual case study with the advantages of large-n techniques, increasing the number of empirical observations. In what may be considered a “full replication”of the single-coimtry analyses, either most similar or most different systems designs can be used to measure variations in both the independent and dependent variables.

Such an area study would be indispensable for reevaluating the conceptual imderstandings and empirical-theoretical findings of the democratization literature, as well as exploring and identifying other important explanatory variables that have been either overlooked or considered exogenous in earlier studies.

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