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Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on UROPEAN UROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. EUROPEAN INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY EUROPEAN Cadmus, 3 on 0001 University Access 0021 European Open 1763 0 Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SCIENCES SOCIAL POLITICAL OF DEPARTMENT on BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI) University Banking Structures in 19th-Century Europe, Access North America, and Australasia EUI Working Paper EUI SPS Working Paper No. 96/3 European Gerschenkron on his Head: Open D a n ie l Author(s). Available The V 2020. © erd ier in Library EUI EUR WP WP 3S0 the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access No ofpart this paper may be reproduced in any form European Open without permission of the author. Printed Printed in Italy in March 1996 I I - 50016 San Domenico (FI) European University Institute Author(s). Available All rights reserved. The © Daniel Verdier 2020. BadiaFiesolana © in Italy Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European University Institute. which this paper is based was financed by the Research Council of the European paper was delivered at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the generouslyAmerican responding Political to Science my requests for documentation. A Banca revisedCommerciale Italiana, version and Dr. of Sbacchi this from the Credito Italiano for kindly and from the Institut für Bankhistorische Forschung E.V., Dr. gestions. Francesca PinoI also thank Mr.from the Nougaret from the Crédit Lyonnais, Dr. Gabriele Jachmich Mastanduno, and Herman Van der Wee for their valuable comments and research sug I am pleased to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Elizabeth Paulet. I Association, The Chicago Hilton, August 31-September 3, 1995. The research on thank Lawrence Broz, Robert Gilpin, Peter Hertner, Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, Michael Institute. Banking Banking Structures in Europe, 19th-century North America, and Australasia Cadmus, on University Access Department of and Political Social Sciences European Open European European Institute University Gerschenkron on his Head: Author(s). Available Daniel Daniel Verdier The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European European, North American, and countries. Australiasian Gerschenkron's aon hypothesis timing-of-industialization crossnational dataset including 15 periphery was too weak, the fragmentation condition was not met, whereas when it was too function function ofthe degree of centralization of polity. the The present hypothesis is tested against strong, the central banking condition was not met. Universal banking was an inverted U- agrarian, antistatist periphery co-existed close in balance. In contrast, where the agrarian were simultaneously met in regimes where industrial, the center, state-building and the industrialization. I argue, instead, that banking universal rested on two necessary conditions: a others, like Britain, France, the timing ofor the United States, banks—by had specialized fact that some countries like Germany and Italy Europe—the had universal banks, whereas fragmented fragmented deposit and market the existence ofa liquidity guarantee. These two conditions Institute. Alexander Gerschenkron explained variations in banking structures in century 19th Cadmus, Banking Banking Structures in Europe, 19th-Century North America, and Australasia on University Access European Open Gerschenkron Gerschenkron His on Head: Author(s). Available The ABSTRACT 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European degree of of specialization national banking structures. complete absence of specialization—as in Germany, where all these brokers, activities and banks, savings the almost each were engaged in distinct financial activities—and banks, colonial banks, clearing banks, issuing alization. banks, discounters,They varied in between jobbers,extreme Britain, specialization—as where merchant stock Institute. independently from political markets. The theoretical challenge is to assess the impor and borrowers (firms) bore the cost of solvency, whereas in non-specialized structures cash reserves. Banking structures differ as to how they distribute the cost of solvency. assets can be realized. To guard against that risk, banking systems vency. must build costly Banks must guard against the risk ofinsolvency-when liabilities are due before consequences as well. At stake in banking regulation is who pays for the cost ing of capitalsol from industry at large. Second, expense banking of smaller structuresones. have redistributionalbanking, Specialized in contrast, has been blamed for divert celebrated and blamed for channeling capital to large, concentrated ingindustries atstructures the have distributional effects. Universal banks have been alternatively indifferently handled by all large banks. My purpose is to explain variations in the tance tance ofthis traffic: were differences in banking structures mostly shaped by variations account of their dis- and redis-tributive effects, capital markets are unlikely to function such costs were unloaded on the unorganized groups of taxpayers and depositors. On As we shall see in this study of the nineteenth century, in specialized structures banks Cadmus, Most modern banking structures were cast during nineteenth century industri Banking Banking structures is a topic worth ofconsideration for two reasons. First, bank on University Access Banking Banking Structures in Europe 19th-Century European Open Gerschenkron on His Head: Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised 2 Repository. in economic fundamentals, or did they merely reflect the relative political power of dis similar coalitions of interests? Research Alexander Gerschenkron pointed to an economic fundamental.1 For him, bank- firm-state relations reflected capital availability at the time of industrialization. Institute Although it has been faulted for its empirical imprecision, Gerschenkron's theory is still dominant. The proposition that industrial capital shortage made continental bank University ing less specialized than British banking is widely shared among economic historians. Even political scientists now and then rely on Gerschenkron's theory to account for dis European similarities in political institutions among capitalist countries.2 The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative explanation. Rather than Institute. derive banking structures from an economic fundamental—the timing of Cadmus, on industrialization—I propose to derive banking structures from a political fundamental- University the extent of state building. Rather than variations in the timing of industrialization, Access dissimilarities in political institutions shaped banking structures. Industrial capital scar European Open city reflected, rather than caused, bank-firm-state relations. More precisely, I argue that universal banking rested on two necessary condi Author(s). tions: a fragmented deposit market and the existence of a liquidity guarantee. These Available two conditions were simultaneously met in regimes where the industrial, state-building The 2020. © center, and the agrarian, antistatist periphery co-existed in close balance. In contrast, in where the agrarian periphery was too weak, the fragmentation condition was not met, Library whereas when it was too strong, the central banking condition was not met. Universal EUI banking was an inverted U-function of the degree of centralization of the polity. the The paper begins by defining, and offering a measure of, the dependent variable- by the degree of banking specialization—as well as recalling Gerschenkron's timing-of- 'Gerschenkron 1962, 1968, 1977. produced 2Katzenstein 1977, pp. 295-336. Kurth 1979, 1-34. Zysman 1983. Snyder 1991. Haggard, Lee, and Maxfield 1993. version Digitised 3 Repository. industrialization hypothesis. The paper then develops the argument, first offering a typology of political structures, and then developing successively how each political Research structure fared with respect to the two requisites for universal banking, market frag mentation and the liquidity risk respectively. The paper ends by testing the political Institute structure hypothesis against Gerschenkron's timing-of-industrialization hypothesis. University Banking Specialization: Definition and Measure The dependent variable is the degree of specialization achieved in the banking European sector—whether banks specialized in certain product lines or were jacks-of-all(- Institute. financial)-trades. In specialized banking systems some bankers lend long whereas Cadmus, on others