18
npoq Tov eiTiovxa—Sources and Credibility of De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8
JOHN GLUCKER
How does one ascertain that a saying ascribed to Zeno of Citium represents a genuine philosophical view of the founder of Stoicism? This is no idle question. By the time of Diogenes Laertius at the latest, most people seem no longer to have read the works of the early Stoics. Having completed the biographical section in his Life of Zeno (VII. 1-38), Diogenes proceeds to offer us, not a summary of Zeno's own philosophy, but a Stoic Koivf|. His excuse for this (VII. 38)—8ia to xotixov KxtatTiv yeveoGai if\c, aipeoecoq— is feeble. The Stoics were no Epicureans or Pythagoreans, claiming to carry on and disseminate the "true doctrines" discovered once for all by a divine founder: even Diogenes' own doxography enters, from time to time, into details about disagreements and disputes among the various Stoics. Plato was also the founder of a "school of thought." This does not prevent Diogenes from presenting us with a long summary of Plato's own dpeoKovTa (III. 67-109). When Diogenes' source supplies an account of various dycoyaC within the same school, he has no hesitation in reproducing his source's doxography with all the shades of difference (III.
86-97). It is merely that by his time, very few people were likely to have read the hundreds of scrolls written by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their disciples and followers—or rather, those of them still readily available. Even by the time of Cicero, the ordinary educated man—even a writer on philosophical themes like Cicero himself—did not attempt to read the original works of the early Stoics, but used summaries and doxographies. What about Plutarch? It is not my intention here to deal, yet again, with the whole issue of Plutarch's familiarity with early Stoic sources. Much has been written on
it, from many different angles, often in terms of such generalities and probabilities as "Plutarch, who read so much ..." or "Plutarch must have read his Zeno—he quotes him so often" (the examples are my invention, but they are not pure fiction). I have chosen to concentrate on one piece of
Plutarchean evidence which, I believe, can be treated as a test case. Here, then, is the text of De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8: 474 Illinois Classical Studies, XIII.2
Tlpbc, xov eijiovxa
'\ir\8i SiKTiv 8iKdoTi(;, Ttplv a|a.(p(o |iv0ov aKovorii;'
ocvTeX-eyev 6 Zt|V(dv xoio-uTtp tivl Xoyo) xp^nevoq 'en' ajceSei^ev 6 TtpoTEpoi; eiTicov, o\)K aKovoxeov xov 5EDTepo\) X.Eyovxo<; (jt£pa<; yap exEi x6 ^t|xov)hevov), eix' ouk citieSei^ev (o|xoiov y«P wq ei 5' HTi5' -OTcriKOVGE kA.ti0£1(; f\ wjcaKotioai; exepexioev). tixoi
a.nibeiE,zv f\ ovk anibzi^tv o\)k ciKo-oaxEov apa xov bevxipov kiyovioq.' xovxov bk xov Xoyov tpanriaaq ailxoi; dvxEYpctcpE |iev npbq ir\v TlXa.-c(ovoc, IloA-ixEiav, eX-ve 5e oo(pio|j.axa, koi ttiv 6ia?L£KxiKTiv cbq xomo icoiEiv 5vva|ievTiv ekeXede Jiapa^auPdvEiv
zoxiq |ia0Tixd(;. Kaixoi f\ ditfiSEi^E nX.dxcov ti q-uk drefiSEi^E xd ev 5' xfi IloA-ixEia, Kax' oidiztpov fiv dvayKaiov dvxiypdcpeiv dXA.d Jtdvxtoq icEpixxov Ktti ndxaiov. x6 5' awxo xai JtEpi xSv OCCpiOndxCOV EOXIV ElTtElV.'
A genuine piece of evidence for an "eccentric" Zenonian doctrine? This is the way in which our passage has been regarded by numerous distinguished scholars in the last hundred years or so. A. C. Pearson includes two parts of this chapter, as Fragments 29 (the anecdote) and 6 {eXve—xox>q |j,a0T|X(X(;) of Zeno, in his Fragments ofZeno and Cleanthes?- On the anecdote, he comments: "The argument is couched in the syllogistic form which Zeno especially affected: see Introd. p. 33"^—where the specimens of syllogism he adduces are very different from the disjunctive argument in our passage. What matters, however, is that Pearson takes this chapter of Plutarch seriously as a piece of Zenonian doctrine. So does von
Amim, who has the anecdote as SVF I. 78 (Zeno, Rhetorica), the sentence
concerning Plato as I. 259 (Zeno, Ethica), and the sentence on sophisms as
I. 50 (Zeno, Logica). Nicola Festa regards the anecdote as the only surviving fragment of Zeno's lost work "EXeyxoi 8tjo.'' Alfons Weische
takes it to be an argument against Arcesilaus' practice in utramque partem dispuiandi} Both are quoted by the late Harold Cherniss in a note to his edition of the text—true, without comments, but with an obvious acceptance of our passage as genuine evidence for a Zenonian doctrine.* To crown it all, we have the clear statement of Professor Daniel Babut in his great work on Plutarch and the Stoics:
' Text: Pohlenz-Westman. I have omitted the apparatus, since there are no readings relevant to the argument. ^The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanlhes, with introduction and explanatory notes ... by A.
C. Pearson . . . (London 1891) 80-81; 60-61.
^ Ibid. p. 60.
''Nicola Festa, I frammenti degli Sloici antichi, vol. I (Bari 1932) 1 15-16. ' Alfons Weische, Cicero unddie neue Akademie (Munster 1961) 77-78. * Plutarch's Moralia, vol. Xffl, part H, ed. by Harold Chemiss (Loeb Classical Library 1976) 429, note a. See his Introduction, 373-74. —.
John Glucker 475
En revanche, De Stoic, rep. p. 1034 E (7) [misprint for 8-J. G.], de port^e beaucoup moins gSnerale, et oil Plutarque semble reproduire presque litt^ralment le raisonnement par lequel Z6non ddmontrait qu'il est inutile dans un proces—ou en debat philosophique—de preter I'oreille aux deux parties ou d'dcouter le point de vue de I'adversaire, doit etre consid6r6 comme une veritable citation, bien que Plutarque n'ait pas pris la peine ou n'ait pas pu indiquer de quel livre elle provenait, et bien qu'U ne pr^tende pas la reproduire mot a mot7
Doit etre considere comme une veritable citation. After all this, one finds it surprising that this piece of "Zenonian doctrine" has not yet found its way into the standard histories of Greek Philosophy or of the Stoa.* But hold. If the argument in our anecdote were to be regarded as representing a genuine philosophical position of Zeno, it would land him, not merely in the contradictions indicated by Plutarch. It would also imply a wholesale rejection of the task of dialectic as described by Zeno himself in SVF I. 48^9—both independent of Plutarch. It would also imply that such Chrysippean fragments as SVF II. 127-29 (all taken from Ch. 10 of Stoic. Rep.) constitute a complete departure from a doctrine of the founder of the school and a total rejection of that doctrine. Let us now consider the form of the anecdote in our chapter. It is a story about Zeno answering with a counter-argument (dvTeA.e7ev), a literary quotation. Whether the hexametric line [iTiSe Siktiv SiKdo-jiq kxX. is Pseudo-PhocyUdes' or Hesiod,^'' it is not very likely that the ancient poet would have been introduced by Zeno as 6 eiticov, and that Zeno would quote him simply to contradict him. Zeno is not Socrates of the "aporetic dialogues." When Zeno wishes to quote poetry—even to alter its order or
its sense—other expressions are used: owExe(; te npoEcpEpETo . . . zohc, . . Ex)pi7ii6o\) oziyip-oc,(jyL VII. 22); lovc, 0* 'HoioSo-o ot{%o-0(; ^ExaypdepEiv ouTco (ib. 25); (pTjol to ek tfi^ Ni6pri<;(ib. 28). No. It is far more likely that what we have here is not a quotation from one of Zeno's own works, in which the ancient hexameter is brought in only to be confuted, but an anecdote about Zeno. Someone, on some occasion, quoted this line of poetry against Zeno. Zeno countered him with his disjunctive argument showing, by the way, in the very act of refuting him that he had listened to the other side: but on this later. What we have here looks far more like the sort of literary anecdote called by ancient rhetoricians xpdcu. A number of rhetorical manuals from
' Daniel Babul, Plutarque et le Sloicisme (Paris 1969) 222-23.
'I find no mention of it, for example, in any edition of Zeller, Ueberweg-Praechter, or Pohlenz. ' Diehl, Anlh. Lyr? 2, p. 98, v. 87—cited in double square brackets. See his apparatus of testimonia to this line. "'Fr.338Merkelbach-WesL —
476 lUinois Classical Studies, XIII.2 late antiquity deal at some length with xpeia as a rhetorical device.'^ Their treatment of this sub-literary form is almost entirely the same, with many sentences and passages repeated virtually word for word (except for the more lengthy discussion of Theon, which is probably his own extension of what he had found in his source). The question of their common source (Hermogenes?) should be investigated elsewhere.'^ For our purpose, it would be enough to quote at random a definition of xpeia offered by one of these late rhetoricians:
Xpeia eaxi Xoyoc, fi Ttpa^i; evaxoxoq koV ovvto^o^, t'iq xi jtpoacoicov dopion-cvov e'xoDoa xtjv ava It may also be of some use for our passage of Plutarch to note that one of these rhetoricians realized that not each and every xpeia has to be serious and to contain a moral: eoxi bk xapiev-ci^eoBai ttiv xpeiav evtoxe \n\5kv E%ovoav PiKxpeXeq.^'' For the rest—as one could expect from handbooks of rhetoric for the instruction of beginners—TtpoyuM-vdoiiaTa much of their discussion is devoted to such exercises as turning a xpe^a from one grammatical case to another; and their standard division of xpeicci is into XoyiKaC, jipaKxiKai, (iiKiaC—a "literary," rather than a "philological" classification. Fortunately, we have an earlier and very " Hermogenes, Progymn. ch. 3; Aphlhonius, Progymn. ch. 3, pp. 23-25 Rabe; Theon, Progymn. chs. 5-6, Spcngel, Rhet. Graeci 2, pp. 96-106; Nic. Soph., Progymn, ch. 3, Spengel 3, pp. 458-63. Modem literature: G. von Wartensleben, Begriffder griechischen Chreia und Beilrdge zur Geschichle ihrerForm (Heidelberg 1901) (with a collection of philosophers' xpnai on pp. 31-124—which does not include our anecdote in the Zeno section, pp. 128-30); Gustav Adolf Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon, Texte und Untersuchungen (Leipzig und Berlin 1909) 247-53; 269 ff.; Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der lUerarischen Rhetoric (>lunchen 1960) vol. I, 536-40. Gerhard supplies numerous references to modem Uterature. Lausberg cites a wide range of ancient sources, both Greek and Latin. For more recent literature, see also Klaus Berger, "Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," ANRW H. 25. 2, 1031-1432, with an extensive bibliography, pp. 1379-1432. (The section relevant to our discussion: pp. 1092- 1110, and bibl. 1092); Robert C. Tannenhill, "Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the Synoptic Gospels," ANRW H, 25. 2, pp. 1792-1829 (bibl. pp. 1826-29). Berger has a "taxonomy" of xpEiai in Greek pagan and Jewish sources and the NT, according to "Frage und Aniass der Chrien" and "Struktur der Antwort" (pp. 1096-1 103), which comes close to that of Quintilian, and many of his examples are helpful. On p. 1095, he also refers to literature on Xpeiai in Rabbinic sources. Tannenhill's division of xpEioci according to their purpose ("correction stories," "quest stories," "objection stories," and the like) has more to do with modem literary theory than with ancient technique and practice. I owe the last two references to Professor Frederick E. Brenk. '^This common source is most likely to be later than Quintilian (see below), whose whole treatment is hardly aware of it. The great reputation of Hermogenes in late antiquity suggests that he may be the source. "Nic. Soph. (n. 11 above) 459. '* Theon (n. 1 1 above) 96. See also his discussion of the "jocular" type of xp£i«. PP- 99- 101. John Glucker 477 different discussion of xpeta, clearly independent of these later manuals, which divides xpeiai into more "philological" groups: Quintilian I. 9. 4: Chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est positum in uoce simplici: "dixit ille" aut "dicere solebat"; alterum quod est in respondendo: "interrogatus ille," uel "cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit"; tertium huic non dissimile: "cum quis dixisset aliquid" uel "fecisset." Quintilian goes on to mention also what the later rhetoricians called jtpaKxiKTi xpeia: etiam in ipsorum faclis esse chrian putant . . . This should not detain us. For our purpose, the important type of XP^^^ is Quintilian's second category, in which someone was asked (epcoTn0ei(;) or was told something by someone else (7tp6<; tov einovta), and he responded (EiTtev, ecpT], (prioiv and the like). We shall soon return to this type of chria in respondendo and cast an eye on the numerous examples of it in Diogenes Laertius and some pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegmata. Let us first consider the nature and development of xpeia as a literary form. The derivation of xpeia from the Homeric and Hesiodic aivoq and the Aesopian fables, maintained by some modern scholars,'' seems to me unlikely. A fable employing animals as symbols of human character and behaviour and a story about a clever repartee by some great man—albeit that the purpose of both is "to point a moral and adorn a tale"—are two different things. XpEva starts not immediately after the age of epic poetry but a few hundred years later, and in a philosophical milieu. The books of xpeiai ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope by Diogenes Laertius, quoting Sotion (DL VL 80) are given in a "dissenting list": it is not in the main list of his works, probably derived from the Alexandrian catalogues, which precedes it. Von Wartenslebcn may be right in regarding Metrocles the Cynic (DL VL 33) as the first compiler of a book of xpeiai known to us by title.'^ With Zeno of Citium we seem to be on surer ground. Diogenes Laertius quotes one anecdote about Crates the Cynic, Zeno's own teacher, on the authority of Zt|vcov 6 KiTieuq ev xaTi; xpEiaii; (VI. 91). Aristo of Chius is reported by Diogenes (VII. 163) to be the author of xpei«»v id; and Persaeus (VII. 36) as the author of xpe^wv 5'. It is far from certain that the xpEicc npbq Aiovuaov ascribed by Diogenes (II. 84) to Aristippus of Cyrene is a collection of apophthegms: why the singular? The other work, XpEiSv tpia, is ascribed to him in Sotion's alternative hst (II. 85). It thus appears that the practice of gathering such anecdotes and publishing them arose first in the circles of the Cynics and the early Stoics. By the time we reach the first century BCE, we have five anecdotes ascribed expressly to the Xpeiai of Hecato, the pupil of Panaetius (DL VI. 4; 32; 95; VII. 26; 172), and two '^ Von Wartenslebcn (n. 1 1 above) 8-27; Geriiard (ib.) 247-53. '6 Von Wartenslebcn 29. 478 lUinois Classical Studies, XIII.2 anecdotes likely to have been lifted from the same collection (VII. 2; 181).^'' One can assume that in the three or four centuries which separate Diogenes Laertius from Hecato, such collections of xpeiai must have increased and multiplied as philosophy was leaving its private enclaves and becoming part of a gentleman's education. The pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegms belong to this literary form and most probably to this period. So does much of the material which went into the making of Gnomolo^ium Vaticanum and other gnomologia.'* When we come to Diogenes Laertius, we note, not merely that he recounts innumerable xpeiai of various types—virtually hundreds of them. We would rather have been surprised if he did not. What is more significant is that most of his xpeiai tend to come in series, or in clusters, in one or two places in each life. Since I have not seen this phenomenon noted before, '' I supply here a provisional list of these clusters of xpeiai in Diogenes Laertius: Book I Thales: 35-36; Solon: 58-59; 60; 63; Chilon: 68- 69;77; Bias: 86-87; Cleobulus: 91-92; Periander: 97-98; Anacharsis: 103-05; Myson: 107-08; Pherecydes: 117. Bookn Anaxagoras: 7; 10; Socrates: 30-36; Aristippus: 66- 82; StUbo: 114-18; 119; 127-28. Bookm Plato: 1-5. BooklV Xenocrates: 10; Arcesilaus: 43; Bion: 47 (with the significant introduction: nA-Eioxd xe KaxaXiXoimv {)jio|ivTi(iaTa, aA.Xa Kal d7to(p9eY|J.aTa xpeicbSii TtpayixaxEiav TiepiEXOvxa.)^; 48-51. 12-13. " See Heinz GomoU, Der stoische Philosoph llekaton (Leipzig 1933) 90-91 ; 1 '* As suggested already by Gerhard (n. 1 1 above) 252-53. 1' Richard Hope, The Book of Diogenes Laertius (New York 1930), deals mainly with Diogenes' probable sources for anecdotes in the various Lives (pp. 71, 82-83), and with a literary "taxonomy" of anecdotes according to their purpose and function (pp. 169-74). Eduard Schwartz, article Diogenes Laertius (Diogenes 40), REV (= Realencydopddie, vol. v) (1905) 738-63, finds it sufficient to say: "Dass Diogenes Apophthegmensammlungen vorlagen, sah schon Bahnsch; diese Untersuchungen lassen sich nur auf Grand handschrifUichen Materials weiterfuhren" (758). But why? Bahnsch has not been available to me. I find no reference to Xpetai in our latest book on this theme of the sources, J0rgen Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background, Hermes Einzelschriften 40 (Wiesbaden 1978)—where one might have expected something in the section "Biographies of Philosophers," 90-93. ^Confirming, in similar words, the etymology offered by Theon (n. 11 above) 97: oti HaXXov x the author!") 4, line 22 ff. John Glucker 479 BookV Aristoteles: 17-19; Demetrius: 81. Book VI Antisthenes: 3-9; Diogenes: 22-28; 30; 33-69; 80; 91. BookVn Zeno Citieus: 16; 19-26; Aristo Chius: 163; Cleanthes: 171-74; Chrysippus: 182-84. BookVm Pythagoras: 9; Theano: 43. Book DC Zeno Eleaticus: 27; Pyrrho: 64; 66; 113. Whether Diogenes compiled these large clusters of anecdotes from various collections available to him, or copied them from one or two gnomologia which already existed in his time, is a moot question. We simply do not know about the structure of these early collections of xpeiai. Some of the later gnomologia which have reached us are arranged in a "doxographical" manner, by themes; some are arranged by philosophers.^' The existence of clusters of xpeiai in Diogenes, and his general manner of work, would suggest that such a collection of xpeiav arranged under the names of individual philosophers (Hecato's?) was employed. What is of far greater interest to us is the very large number of xpeiai in Diogenes and other sources which employ the formulae cpcmriGeii; or 7tp6<; tov eiitovTa in their "protasis," and etpri, einev (or the like) in their "apodosis": Quintilian's chria in respondendo. Again, I have not seen this issue of the formulaic structure of xpeiai treated anywhere in this particular fashion. I therefore supply here another provisional list of three types of xpeicti: the plain dixit or dicere solebat, Quintihan's first category; interrogatus ilk, his category II. 1; and cum hoc ei dictum esset, his II. 2. I have taken my examples, for what is, after all, a provisional list, from Diogenes Laertius, and from the pseudo-Plutarchean 'Ano(p9eY|ia-:a PaoiXecov Kal otpaxTiYcbv (BI) and 'Ano(fQiy\iaia AaKcoviKcx (AA). I. dixit; dicere solebat (ecpTi, eXeye, ecpaoKe and the like). DL I. 35; 58; 63; 69; 77; 86; 87; 91; 103; 104; 105; 108; II. 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 36; 67; IV. 48; 49; 50; 51; V. 18; 19; VI. 3; 5; 6; 8; 27; 28; 30; 33; 35; 38; 46; 49; 51; VII. 21; 22; 23; IX. 64. n. interrogatus ilk . . . respondit (epcotTiGei; and the like . . . e ^' Some, like the famous Gnomologium Vaticanum, are arranged by "doxographical" headings. Since doxography started with Theophrastus, it is not impossible that even some of the earliest books of xpeiai may have been arranged in this manner. But it appears that this literary form began in Cynic and Stoic circles. Disciples of the early Cynics and Stoics were at least very likely to arrange their collections by names of philosophers, to glorify their own masters. For a recent discussion of gnomologia, with copious references to manuscript material and modem research, see Dimitri Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia, American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn. 1975) 9-35. 480 Illinois Classical Studies, Xin.2 DL I. 35; 36; 58; 59; 68; 77; 86; 87; 103; 104; 105; H. 10; 33; 68; 69; 70; 72; 73; 76; 80; m. 38; IV. 48; V, 17; 18; 19; VI. 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 27; 47; 49; 50; 51; 52; 54; 55; 56; 60; 62; 63; 67; 68; 69; Vn. 23; 24; 26; 172; Vm. 43; IX 113. BZ 176D; 184C; 185A; 190D; 194A. AA 210E; F; 212C; 213C; 215D; 216C; 217D; 218F; 220A; F; 222E; 224D; 225D; 227B; C-D; 231F; 232B. in. cum hoc ei dictum esset . . . respondit (jcpoq xov eijtovxa . . . ecpti and the like). DL I. 35; 36; 63; H. 7; 10; 35; 36; 71; 74; 75; 76; 79; 80; 81; 1 19; 128; IV. 49; 50; V. 19; VI. 4; 8; 9; 33; 34; 36; 39; 42; 45; 49; 52; 54; 55; 59; 60; 61; 64; 68; VH. 19; 20; 21; 23; 171; 172; 174; Vm. 182; K. 113. BI 175C; D; E; 176D; 182C; 186E-F; 189E; F; 190D. AA 208B; 217D; E; 218C; F; 221D-E; 224D; 228A; D; 229E. A note of warning. I have not included here Quintilian's third category, cum quis dixisset aliquid uelfecisset. The number of xpeiai of this type is roughly the same as their number in the other categories—with a slight preponderance of it in the Cynic Lives of Diogenes, as one could only expect. Nor—since this is merely a provisional list—have I given the numbers of xpeiai of each type in each paragraph of Diogenes or Stephanas page of Plutarch. Many xpeiai of the same category tend to come in twos or threes in the same region of the text, just as groups of xpeiai of the same category tend to cluster together within a wider area. It may well be that Quintilian's classification represents divisions and chapter-headings already existent in collections available to him—and to Diogenes later. This should be further investigated. For my present purpose, suffice it if I have shown that xpeiai beginning with the formulae epto-rnSeiq and npo^ xov EiTtovxa are as frequent in some of our major sources as are plain maxims or sayings. I shall not weary the reader with specimens of xpeiai beginning with Ttpoq Tov eiTiovxa. Almost any of the dozens in my list will do. But our particular xpeia in Plutarch has two unusual characteristics: a) instead of the usual beginning of the "apodosis" with ecpri, einev or the like, Plutarch has here a.\xiXzytv, b) the "protasis" is no mere saying or question by someone, but a literary quotation. It is true that avteAjEYev is unusual. I have found no other example of it in xpeiai I have checked.^^ This may be due to Plutarch's literary art, ^The same anecdote is reported with the same words in some MSS of the scholia on Lucian Cal. 8 in Jacobilz' edilio maior, vol. TV (Leipzig 1841) 232-33, beginning with the words TlXodtapxoc, ev xm itepi Lxcoikcov evavxicondxcov. It is therefore of no independent value. I cannot see why v. Amim should cite this scholion at the end of SVF I. 78, as if it were a different source. JohnGlucker 481 wishing to emphasize that, despite the matter of his argument, Zeno did listen to the other side and refuted it. Or he may have wished to emphasize that Zeno's refutation was couched in the "antilogistic," disjunctive form. We shall return to this. As to xpeiai with literary quotations, they are not all that rare. Here is a partial list of some such xpeiai in Diogenes Laertius: II. 78; 82; 117; IV. 9; 46; 47; VI. 36; 44; 50; 52; 53; 55; 57; 63; 66; 67; 104; VII. 172; IX. 59. Of all these, perhaps the nearest in form to Plutarch's story of Zeno is Diogenes Laertius' anecdote concerning Diogenes of Sinope and his master Xeniades (VI. 36): Tm Jtpianevtp aiizbv EevidSri (ptioi, "aye onac, to Ttpoo- xaxTOnevov jiovnoEii;." xoii 5' eiTtovToi; avco ncnajimv xcopovoi itayai, "ei 5e iaxpov ejtpito voomv, ovk av," (ecpn)^^ "avxS etceiGo-o, dX,X.' tlntc, av oji; avco noxantbv xtopovoi Jtayai;" Plutarch himself was not unaware of the nature of xpei«- At least in one passage of his writings, his view of its value is far from complimentary. In Chapter 7 ofProgr. Virt., Plutarch speaks of those who begin to apply themselves to the study of arguments (Xoyoi)—and begin, usually, by choosing one of the wrong types of arguments. Those who begin by collecting anecdotes are the last on this list (78F): . . . evioi 5e XPeio"; "^c'l Icxopiaq dvaXEyo^Evoi jtEpuaoiv, uojtep 'AvdxapOK; E^eyE xm vonionaxi Jtpoq ov5ev ti to dpi9nEw XpconEvoix; opav zo\>q "EXXr\y/ac„ ovxcoq xoiq A.6yoi<; Jtapapi0|iovn£voi Kai TtapapvGnovvxei;, aXKo 5' o\)8ev eii; ovtioiv dji' a'uxmv xi0E|iEvoi. Not that Plutarch himself is above using some xpeiai when it suits him. At least in one place in his Lives (Demosth. 11. 2-7), he recounts some xpeiai of Demosthenes, ending with the words (7), dXka nepl ^ev xo-oTwv Kal exepcov yzXoiatv Kaiitep eti nXtia Xiyeiv exovxei;, evTavGa 7ia\)o6|X£0a. This sounds almost as though Plutarch had a collection of xpeTai before him. He could not resist the temptation to tell some of them; but being a serious writer of "morality biographies," he soon checked himself and remembered his real task. He continues: xov 5' aXXov avTov xpojiov Kal to 'f\Qoc, anb i&v npd^EOJv Kal xr\q noXixeiaq GecopeioQai SiKaiov eoxiv. It is clear that Plutarch knows what a xPEia is, and that he attaches no great value to it as a source of serious information and edification either to ^ Supplied by Stephanus and obviously right, as the fonnula of the "apodosis." . 482 lUinois Classical Studies, Xin.2 the historian or to the philosopher. Did he, then, simply slip and forget all he knew about this sub-literary form and its value when he came to our story about Zeno? Or did he, in his zeal to amass as many Stoic contradictions as possible, overlook the fragile nature of this kind of source? Since we can only guess where he may have found this particular xpeia (Hecato, or one of the early compilations by a pupil of Zeno?), and since it is not unlikely that when he wrote the work before us, he was already relying on his own notes and excerpts rather than on his sources,^ we can only guess. This is not the end of our enquiry. Having told his anecdote, Plutarch continues: xouxov 6e tov Xoyov epcoTTjoaq kzX. Cherniss translates: "after having propounded his argument (1034E)." But is epcotav simply "to propound an argument?" Nor is it simply "to pose a question," as translated by Amyot ("& ce pendant luy mesme qui faisoit cest d^mande" . .) and translators who follow him. Zeno poses no question in Plutarch's story. It has a more technical sense, some traces of the history of which are indicated in LSJ, s. v. epcmaco II. 2: In Dialectic, opp. demonstration, question an opponent in order to refute him from his answers, Arist. APr. 24" 24; xi ib. 42" 39; hence later, submit, set forth, propound an argument, Xoyov Gal. 5. 257 : —Pass., 6 ^yoq . . TipcoTTioSai (paivexai Arr. Epict. 2. 19. 1; ep(oxr|9EVTO(; xou ao Even this is to simplify matters. It is true that Sextus frequently uses the combination Xoyov epcoxav (epcoxav and variants). But he always uses this expression for a refutation, usually in the form of a syllogism, of a "dogmatic" position. The refuting 'koyoc, offered by Sextus is more often than not a plain syllogism, but sometimes it is a disjunctive argument in the form of "either . . . or", concluding with "neither . . . nor" at the point of final refutation. Here is a provisional list: Plain syllogistic refutation: Pll I. 20; 33-34; H. 134; 239; 248; 250; 254 (where it is distinguished from o6 Disjunctive refutation: PH H. 185 (+ M Vm. 465); 186; HI. 76; 127; 163; 239 (referring back to 172); M X. 94; 110. What is, perhaps of greater interest is that in most of these places, Sextus applies this expression, epcoxav Xoyov and variants, to the Pyrrhonian's own refutation of his "dogmatic" opponent Diodorus Cronus is mentioned more than twenty times by name in Sextus' works. Only at ^ See Chemiss (n. 6 above) 369^401, who argues for the use of "note-books" containing excerpts made by Plutarch himself, as his main immediate source for passages quoted in his Stoic boolcs. John Glucker 483 X. 87, 94 and 110 does Sextus apply this expression to a disjunctive argument by Diodorus—in all three cases, to the same argument against the existence of motion. Yet it is precisely to Diodorus Cronus and his Megaric friends that we must turn if we are to trace the origin of this peculiar expression— which, by the time of Sextus, has been watered down to imply any "structured" argument used in refuting an opponent. Of Euclides of Megara, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 106): . . . Kal oi dtjt' ouTov MeyapiKol TtpooTiYope-uov-co, eix' epiaxiKoi, ijoxepov 5e diaXeKxiKoi, ovq ovtoaq covonaoe Ttpwxo^ Aioviiaioi; 6 XaXioidovioi; 5ia x6 Jtpoq epcoxTioiv Kal dnoKpioiv xovi; Xoyo-oi; 5iaxi0ea9ai.^' Of Eubulides of Miletos, Diogenes writes: . . . oq Kal noX.A.o'uq ev 5iaA,eKxiKti Xoyowi; ripcoxTiaE, xov xe \|;E\)56nevov kzX. (H. 108; Giannantoni IIB'. 13, p. 53; Muller 64, p. 31). Muller translates properly: "arguments de forme interrogative." This is confirmed by an anonymous comic fragment—most probably by a contemporary of Eubulides—cited by Diogenes in the same passage: ovpioxiKoq 5" E\>Po\)Xi5tii; Kepaxiva^ epcoxuv Kal vE'uSaAxx^ooiv XoyoK; xovq prixopaq KvA-itov kxX,. This is not the place to discuss in any detail the seven paradoxes of Eubulides counted in this passage of Diogenes.^ But it should be fairly clear by now that some, at least, of these arguments were counched in the form of disjunctive questions, the answer to any of which is "yes" or "no." A good example—probably the nearest we have to the original form—of this Megaric practice, is supplied by Diogenes Laertius (II. 116), in the form of a xpeia about Stilbo of Megara: xovxov (paoiv Ktpi xf\<; 'ABriva^ zt\<; xot> OeiSiov xoiouxov xiva Xoyov epcoxfiaai- "apd ye r[ zo\y Aioq 'AGtivo Geoi; eaxi;" One notes the expression Xoyov epcoTTjoaq. A similar expression, avvepcoxa Xoyov, is employed by Sextus in reporting the disjunctive ^ I cannot see why Gabriele Giannantoni, Socraticorum Reliquiae vol. I (Naples 1983) 129, quotes the last part of this sentence only in HP 3 (Dionysius Chalcedonius). Robert Muller, Les Migariques, Fragments el limoignages (Paris 1985) 25, quotes the whole passage as 31, the first fragment in Section IC, "Developpement et situation dans lliistoire de la philosophic de I'ecole issue dTiuclide." For the latest detailed discussion, with the relevant sources (alas, in translation only!), see MuUer Oast n.). Annexe I. 75-90, and his notes to Frs. 64-65, pp. 113-19; 193 (n. 128)-196 (n. 168). 484 Illinois Classical Studies, XIII.2 argument of Diodorus Cronus against movement {M X. 87; repeated with TiponfioSai (paoiv ibv Xoyov at 94, and TjpcoTriKe 5e 6 AioScopoq xov . . . ^.oyovat 110). If Diodorus was the inventor of so many Fangschlilsse, he was, according to Diogenes Laertius, still no match for Stilbo of Megara. The story of how Diodorus died of shame because he could not solve dialectical problems put to him by Stilbo is well-known today: it has been spread around by logicians who, even if they would not go as far themselves, look with envy on the serious manner in which those ancient Megarians took their logic. Fact or fiction—this should not detain us here.^ What is of greater importance is the language (DL II. 1 1 1): ovxo; jtapa IlxoXenoiq)^ x^ IcoTfjpi 5iaxpiPcov Xoyo-oi; xivai; SiaXcKxiKovi; tipcoxt|6ti Jtpoq ZxiXTtcovoq- Kal nil Swdnevo? Jtapaxpnua 5iaX.ii)oao6ai kxX,.^' We have already seen one epcoTTjOK; of Stilbo. Diogenes Laertius II. 119 supplies us with two more of this sort. These epcoxtioeic; are so similar in nature to the long string of Fangschlilsse reported by Diogenes at VII. 186-87, that I am inclined to think they may well be also Stilbonian in origin. Diogenes reports them with the opening sentence 6 5ti (piA.6oo "See Muller 128, on Frs. 99-100—who also rightly remarks: "On note, d'autre part, a propos de la dialeclique en g6n6ral, que ces fr. offrent I'avanuge de contcnir explicitement plusieurs des traits characteristiques £voqu6s ailleurs: les arguments en forme de question, I'obligation de repondre sur le champ, et aussi le charactere de jeu de soci6t6 que r6vetait volonliers un entretien dialeclique." (My emphasis). ^ Misprinted ITpoXenaicp in Long's OCT. ^ Pliny the Elder, NH VII. 1 80, translates the report he must have found in a similar Greek non source: . . . pudore [obiit] Diodorus sapientiae dialecticae professor, lusoria quaestione prolinus ab interrogatione Stitponis dissoluta. A reader of this Latin testimonium alone would have to guess hard in order to arrive at the terminology of its Greek Unlerlage. Both Greek and Latin passages: Giatmantoni n F 1-2, vol. I, pp. 73-75. ^ Von Amim, SVF U. 279, p. 92, with the "man in Megara" argument—of all things—in spaced letters signifying genuine Chrysippus. Giannantoni HI B 13, p. 53, referring to this SVF fragment in evidence of Chrysippean origin. Muller 65, p. 31. John Glucker 485 Diogenes himself, who may have found this passage among his notes for his Chrysippus book, without indication of the source. Why not? // est capable de tout. If there is any truth in Heraclides' report (DL II. 120; Giannantoni II 4; Muller 167) that Stilbo was also a pupil of Zeno of Citium, one possible explanation is that a string of epcmfioeK; formulated by Stilbo, and perhaps "solved" by Chrysippus, found its way into some late doxographic source concerned with Chrysippus. It may have been truncated in that source—or it may be Diogenes who copied only the "juicy" paradoxes. But enough of this. That the Megarians were not only, or chiefly, logicians, but first and foremost dialecticians—this has been noted (although not as often as it should have been) by some historians of logic, and by the latest editor of the Megaric testimonia. They also note that these Megaric epcoTTioeii; were originally couched in the form of alternative questions to be answered with "yes" or "no."^^ But almost all the Megaric epanrioeK; which have reached us are already formulated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism—in fact, in the form of a Stoic disjunctive argument, using fj or lixoi as the disjunctive particles.^2 Why, then, call them eponriaEK;? A clue to this problem may be found in two versions of the same syllogism, ascribed by Diogenes Laertius to Diogenes of Sinope. In both versions, the argument is almost word for word the same—^but the opening formula is distinctly different. Let us have the two: VI. 37 VI. 72 ovveA^i^exo 5e koI ovzcoc,- jtavTa xav oo xwv Gecbv eoxi Ttotvxa- Tidvxa xwv 0ewv eoxi- itdvxa dpa eoxi xwv oo The variations in wording are insignificantly small. But when, at 37, Diogenes Laertius presents this argument as a plain syllogism (ouvEXoyi^exo), he says plainly ovzcoc,. When, at 72, he presents it as an epcbxTioK;, he uses a more careful language: xoiouxovq X-oyovg epcoxSv oiou(;—indicating that this is not the exact form of Diogenes' original ^' Carl PranU, Geschichle der Logik im Abendlande. Bd I (Leipzig 1 855) 42 ("cponav ist der slehende Ausdruck"), Uking such passages as Isocrates 15. 45, aXXoi 8£ xive^ nepi xct? £p(BTT|aei(; sal xcti; dnoKpiaeic; ye^maaw, ou(; avxiXoyiKOxx; KaX^uoiv, Arist. Soph. El. 17. 175b ff.; 176al4 ff; Top. Vn. 7. 160a32; Alex, ad Soph. El. 50 ff, to refer to the Megarics. One could add to this Polemo's warning against some dialecticians of his age, including the words Kotxa (lev ttiv epamioiv 6a\)nd5ea6ai, DL IV. 18. Michael Frede, Die sloische Loeik (Gottingen 1974) 19-23, esp. 20-21. Muller. loc. ciL n. 27 above, and 1 13. ^^ Frede Oast n.) 93-96. —— 486 Illinois Classical Studies, Xni.2 epcbrnoK;. I do not accuse Diogenes Laertius of such fine distinctions. He must have found them in his sources. Such language is not restricted to this particular passage. Stilbo's epcotTjOK; at II. 116—although it opens with a proper question (but carries on with two plain oD^Jiepdo^axa) is also prefaced with xoioutov tiva A-oyov epcoxfiCTai. So is the string of EpcoTTjoeii; at VII. 186-87, just discussed. It opens with xovo-oxouq xwac, Tipcoxa Xoyovic,—and indeed, these are already couched in plain disjunctive form. These are only a few traces of such a distinction. By the time of Sextus Empiricus, epcoxav had already lost its original sense and was merely used for any refutation—disjunctive or plainly syllogistic. A formula like eponaxai 8e Kal ouxcoq (e.g. M VII. 340) or ouTwq ovvEpcbta (X. 87) is quite regular. At X. 110, Sextus can even say of Diodorus Cronus Tipa>Tr|Ke 6e 6 AioScopoq xov cKKeinevov ^oyov—referring back to the argument of 87 (xov TiEpicpoptitiKov auvepona Xoyov . . . Xeycov followed by a plain disjunctive argument) and 94 (o-cav Xeyri 6 Av68copo<; followed by the same disjunction). But could one assume that the more careful formulation, using xoioti-co(; and variants in the passages cited in our last paragraphs (and one can add, e.g., DL VI. 69), is an indication of an earlier practice, at a stage when reports of Megaric EpcoTr|aei(; were ab-eady being "translated" into the forms of Stoic syllogisms, but when the "translators"—to indicate that this was a reformulated version of the original dialectic argument, used a cautionary xoiovxo^ rather than a plain ovxoq? It is, in any case, not without interest that in our passage of Stoic. Rep., Plutarch opens his story with the cautious xoiouxra xivi Xoyco xpw^Evoq, although he follows it at the end with xovxov 5e xov Xoyov ipan-qaac,. Is it possible that what he found in his source was xoiovxoi; in both cases and that Zeno had couched his refutation, in the original setting, in the form of Megaric EpcbxTiou;?^^ How exacdy did Zeno do that? In our passage of Plutarch, he asks no questions: he already uses die "translation" into a disjunctive argument. Almost all the epcoxfiaei(; ascribed to the Megarics and Diogenes of Sinope have also reached us in such "translations." The only exception I know is the opening question of Stilbo's argument at DL II. 1 16, beginning as it does with apd yE. Yet we have a number of such EpcoxTioEii;, beginning with apa or apd yE, ascribed by Aristotle (Soph. El. 20. 177bl0-26) to Euthydemus. The immediate context (177a33 ff.) is that of Xoyoi jiapd xV 6ia£pEaiv Kal ouvSeoiv. But the wider context (175al^ ff.) is that of aTtoKpioEiq to ^' That Plutarch is not invariably careless may, perhaps, emerge from a comparison of Stoic. Rep. 16. 1041C-D, •coio-oxouq rifxiniKe XoyoD^ (where the original arguments may have been disjunctive and put in the form of questions—tut where, in any case, Plutarch may simply have changed and shortened the various stages of the original syllogisms), with 10. 1036A, where the quotation from Chrysippus is followed by tocuti yap aiixai? Xe^eaiv eipntEV. John Glucker 487 Sophistic ip(oxT\iiaza.^ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described in Plato's Euthydemus (e.g. 272b) as experts in the epioxiicn xexv-q. Their mode of investigation and refutation is clearly that of posing a question of "either . . . or" (e.g. 275d: Jtotepoi eioi tSv dvGpconcov o'l ^avGdvovtei;, 01 oocpol fi 01 (ina9Ei<;;) to which the other side can only answer with one of two alternatives. The refutation (in this example, 276a-b) is conducted in terms of questions, some of which naturally begin with apa. These questions are so often called epcottioek; or epcoTrmaxa in that dialogue, that one need not bring any reference. That Socrates himself also poses epanrniaxa (e.g. 278e), and some of his own questions begin with apd ye (ibid.), is only part of the whole purport of this dialogue, pointing out the difference between Socrates' questions and refutations, which lead to some positive advancement, and those of the eristics, aimed merely at an easy refutation. The main point is that, at the hands of such Sophists as Euthydemus and his brother, this technique of refutation by a series of questions with alternative answers is clearly described as eristic—the very name given to the Megarians in DL II. 106. We can draw some support for these antecedents of the Megaric eristic in that famous passage of Meno (80d-e), where Meno poses to Socrates two questions, each of which can be described as potentially disjunctive. Socrates, identifying Meno's argument as epioTiKoq X6yo<; (80e2), proceeds to "translate" them into a proper disjunctive argument. Euthydemus' arguments, all beginning with apa questions, as reported by Aristotle in Soph. El. 20, are very similar in type to the Megarian kpiovqaEic, we have discussed. Whatever the part played by the Eleatics, and especially by Zeno of Elea, in the formation of the dialectic, both of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and their like and of the School of Megara—and this is not the place to enter into this old problem—it is clear that one can draw a fairly straight line from the question-and-answer technique of refutation of the two brothers to the technique of Megaric eparcriOK;.^^ The technique of "translating" Megaric epcoxTjaEK; into Stoic syllogisms—first, with a cautious toiovto(; and variants—may well have been instituted by the Stoics themselves, in order to facilitate logical refutation. What is clear is that the Stoics studied such Fangschlusse and ^ In Rhel. U. 24. 1400a28 ff., Aristotle reproduces the "trireme in Piraeus" Epc6xT)ai?, as well as some other EpayrnaEii; of Euthydemus, in shorthand syllogistic form. But then, in his Rhetoric, he is not concerned with the questioning technique of the dialectician, but rather with depicting the same fallacy, to 8ii;ipTmEvov cwxiGevxa Xiyciv f\ x6 ovyKEiHEvov 8iaipo«vta {1401a25-26) as employed by the orator in "straight" speeches. '^Muller, 113, on 64-65, notes that no argument ascribed to Eubulides in our sources appears in Plato's Euthydemus, while two of his paradoxes are presented in Aristotle's De Sophisticis Elenchis. This would strengthen the assumption that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—some of whose arguments, as we have just noted, arc reported by Aristotle independently of Plato—were indeed "eristics" in their own right. One can, therefore, also assume that their techniques may well have influenced the Megarians. — 488 Illinois Classical Studies, Xin.2 employed the whole armoury of their own dialectic to refute them. The zeal of Chrysippus and his disciples in refuting such MeyapiKot EpcoTT||xata or oocpiojiata is richly attested in SVF II. 270-87, assembled by von Amim from such diverse sources as Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, Lucian, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus, Epictetus and some of the commentators on Aristotle. But we remember that even in our chapter of Plutarch ( = SVF I. 50), we are told of Zeno: tXvt 5e oocpionaxa Kal tt|v 5iaA,eKTiKTiv aq xovzo Ttoieiv 5vva|iEVTiv ekeXe-oe ktX. From SVF II. 271 (Plutarch), and especially from 272 (Galen), it seems clear that such oocpionaxa are mainly those Megaric paradoxes. It is not unlikely that such Megaric paradoxes were the main preoccupation of Chrysippus' TtEpi tcov oo(pio|ia-c(ov npbq 'HpaK^EiSTiv Kal UoXXw (DL VII. 198 = SVF II. 16). Yet we have seen that in our chapter of Plutarch, Zeno is made to employ precisely this type of Megaric oocpio^a to refute his unfortunate opponent. Plutarch had noted as much as that, and accused Zeno of contradiction. Should we? Of course not The anecdote as we have it is no piece of philosophical doctrine, taken out of one of Zeno's serious books, but an amusing xpeia. in which Zeno is reported by someone else as refuting an adversary who thinks he is "too clever by half," and he does this by using precisely that sort of Megaric dialectic which he spent much of his time refuting. Moreover, by listening to the other man's argument and spending some time in answering it with a counter-argument (Plutarch's emphatic ocvteXeyev),^^ Zeno shows in practice that he has, in this case, listened to the other side. If our xpEia is a genuine anecdote, recounting something which really happened to Zeno—and we must remember that Plutarch is our only source—^^onc can now use one's imagination and reconstruct roughly what may have happened. Zeno was most probably expounding in public some of his own ideas and referring with contempt to those of someone else, which he described as "not worth listening to." Someone in the audience challenged him by quoting the hexametre line, to the effect that one should listen to the other side. Zeno—far from not listening to the other side—even bothered to refute him. In his refutation, he used—quite consciously, I would guess the Megaric mode of refutation which, as a teacher of dialectic, he did his best to confute. Those of his proper pupils standing around must have realized—and most probably enjoyed—^both the fallacious nature of Zeno's argument, and the "refutation in practice" offered by his very action. But ^If Prantl (n. 31 above) is right in regarding Isocrates 15. 45 as a reference to the Megaric technique—and the similarity in terminology to passages we have examined, where the Megarians are explicitly mentioned, is compelling—ihen the term avxeXcyev in our passage of Plutarch echoes avTiXoyiKoi of Isocrates, thus confirming our suggestion that in the original form of this anecdote, Zeno was depicted as using a Megaric Epamiai<; technique. " See note 22 above. — John Glucker 489 here was a clever piece of repartee. It would be a pity not to record it. Someone did. It found its way into some collection of xpeioii. where when he was collecting materials for his books against the Stoics—Plutarch found it. By the time he came to write Stoic. Rep., Plutarch most probably had forgotten his source. He either paid no attention to the obvious form of this xpeia. or forgot (what Theon, at least, knew) that a xpeia can sometimes be a mere joke. In his zeal to refute Zeno, he treated this clever little joke as a serious piece of Zenonian doctrine. Unfortunately, he has been followed in this by modem scholarship. Tel Aviv University