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HI 277 War: Myths and Realities Professor Cathal J. Nolan

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HI 277 War: Myths and Realities Professor Cathal J. Nolan HI 277 War: Myths and Realities Professor Cathal J. Nolan Myths about war are not the same as lies. Myths are summary, shared memories, twisted by the passage of time, distortions of propagandists, and the failures of historians. They are narrow stories told about past wars and the assumed lessons of lost wars, usually from the angle-of-vision of one nation or a lost cause. Some are universal, or nearly so, composed over decades & retold for generations. They simplify as wars recede in time, living memory goes into the grave, and reliable knowledge erodes along with empathy and understanding of what past quarrels were really about. Both victory and defeat conduce to myth-making, the first presuming special virtues and the latter seeking to explain away lost causes. Modern myth-making takes place in a democracy of error. Decision-makers’ memoirs are full of self-exculpation. War movies and war gamer sites impress with powerful images that books can’t dispel. Old ballads and new ones are made into amateur music videos and posted online in a hundred versions, with misleading slide shows. Bloggers rehash lessons of the last war, trying to explain the next one, and failing on both scores. Journalists do 30-second “deep background” fillers on complex issues, and miss the mark. War veterans hurl “I was there” invective at one another in print and on talk shows. TV war junkies write myth-confirming bestsellers. Well-meaning college courses teach war as poetry or pastels or a temporary interruption in the march of culture and emancipation. Distortions amplify, inaccur- acies multiply, deeper meanings simplify with each refreshed upload. This course focuses on the way contemporary understanding of war is shaped by cultural images and ‘memories.’ Sources of myth-making discussed range widely, from state propaganda to feature films and slanted documentaries, to popular counter-factual histories, videos and war gaming, music and online multimedia. The course arms students with tools that enable them to separate truth from myth-making, even as praises popular culture when it gets it right; as in dark visions of total war, the role played in war by religion and secular ideologies, the endless technolgical arms race now into its 20th decade, and wide clichés of soldier training, motivation, tactics and weapons. Office hours: Monday and Tuesday, 630-800 pm. Location: B-13, 725 Commonwealth Avenue. Phone: (617) 353-1165 e-mail: [email protected] Email is best method of contact. Assignments and Grading Participation 10% Unexcused absence will reduce final grade Comparative review, H.G. Wells & Keegan 25% Due February 13 Comparative review, Ledig & Heller 25% Due March 20 Term paper (due last class) 40% Due April 17 (to be returned in last class) The Academic Conduct Code contains the BU definition of plagiarism. Familiarize yourself with it, since it governs all possible charges and penalties. To avoid unintended plagiarism, learn correct citation of sources. NO AMLA@ CITATION. Do NOT cite sources inside the text (e.g., Smith 1995). Use footnotes or endnotes (Chicago). Failure to abide by this rule will incur a 5% penalty. Books and Course Materials: All PDFs are online Gert Ledig, The Stalin Front ISBN-13: 978-1590171646 H.G. Wells, The War in the Air ISBN: 978-0141441306 Paul Fussel, Wartime ISBN-13: 978-0195065770 John Keegan, Face of Battle ISBN-13: 978-0140048971 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 ISBN 978-1-4516-2665-0 Outline Note: We will move through the course material by topic, not by a rigid weekly schedule. Be sure you are read ahead at all times. You will be called upon in class to comment on readings. Watch all film clips (posted to Blackboard) before the relevant class. Myth #1: “It's all about the (olive) oil” Is war always about economics, about material “interests”? What are some other major causes of war(s)? Are wars also fought over intangibles, over religious or cultural or ideological beliefs? PDF Why War? PDF Killer Instincts PDF The First War? PDF Gran Chaco War (‘War of the Poor’) Film clips: Aerial footage, Falklands (Malvinas) War; Jarhead: Oil fires in Kuwait; Iraq War analysis (Interview with British colonel) Myth #2: “Battles win wars.” Is decisive battle the hinge of victory and defeat in major wars? (Note: do NOT read Keegan’s Introduction. It will bore you to tears and is funamentally misguided, as well. Jump right into the book, which is excellent.) Keegan, Face of Battle: Agincourt PDF: Henry V: St. Crispin’s Day speech PDF Nolan, Allure of Battle (Introduction) Film clips: GOT Battle of the Bastards, Lord of the Rings, Helm’s Deep) Myth #3: “Superior technology wins wars.” Is that true? If not, what other factors come into play? Is it true, as most people want to believe, that character still matters in modern industrial warfare? H.G. Wells, The War in the Air (1908) Fussel, Wartime, pp.3-34 PDF NASA and Nazis (Wehrner von Braun) Film clips: Black Hawk Down; BBC on Decision to bomb Hiroshima; Myth #4: “Virtue wins wars.” The idea that superior will or warrior spirit or superior culture wins wars. PDF Nolan, Allure of Battle “Annihilation of Illusions” PDF Van der Waag, The Boer War Film clips: Colonel Collins speech to Irish Guards in Iraq; The Pacific: Iwo Jima Myth #5: “Free citizens make the best soldiers.” Probably the most widespread myth of the current period, enshrined in such films as Saving Private Ryan and Band of Brothers. Is it true? How good were the Waffen SS, the Japanese in WWII, the krasnoyarmeets of the Red Army? Keegan, Face of Battle: Waterloo Fussel, Wartime, pp.52-128 Film Clips: Zulu, Waterloo (online); Full Metal Jacket; Waterloo: Old Guard and Cavalry scenes Myth #6: “It worked for our fathers.” The victory disease problem, or belief that the way to win the next war is to fight it in the same way and with the same tactics with which the last war was won. Keegan, Face of Battle: “The Somme” Fussel, Wartime, pp.129-206 Film clips: China vs. Japan, hilltop battle; Band of Brothers: German general’s speech; Myth #7: “We come as liberators.” Or as an American G.I. put it in Normandy as he left a smoking French town behind: “We sure liberated the hell out of that place.” Was it true about wars in Viêtnam, Central America, Iraq? Heller, Catch-22 (whole book) Film clips: Hamberg Hammered (1943 newsreel); B-17 Raid over Germany (1943); Blackhawk Down combat scenes; Myth #8: “Insurgencies can’t be defeated.” This idea entered popular culture with Viêtnam, and was reinforced by the Wars in Afghanistan and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. But is it true? We examine the Question from petitie guerre to COIN. PDF Peninsular War (Wellington’s Irregulars) PDF Rape, Murder and Genocide (transcript of German POWs talking war crimes) PDF Broyles, Why Men Love War Film clips: We Were Soldiers; Helmetcam footage: Ambushed in Iraq Myth #9: “Soldiers fight for the man beside them.” The “band of brothers” myth that Shakespeare and Tom Hanks have made an article of faith at the popular level, especially in the United States. Is it true for all armies or in modern wars? Fussel, Wartime, pp.207-266 PDF Why I would not kill in war Film clips: Samurai Jack; Iwo Jima: suicides scene, Thin Red Line: “This great evil,” Myth #10: God is on our side. The oldest myth in the history of war. The claim is made in every war, usually by all sides. Why does this key myth persist? What purpose does it serve? Are any wars godly or are all godless? Gert Ledig, The Stalin Front (read all) Film clips: Cross of Iron, The Big Red One .
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