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LEBANON 2006: UNFINISHED WAR Jonathan Spyer*

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LEBANON 2006: UNFINISHED WAR Jonathan Spyer* LEBANON 2006: UNFINISHED WAR Jonathan Spyer* The Lebanon war of 2006 failed to resolve any of the issues over which it was fought. Ultimately, the war may be understood as a single campaign within a broader Middle Eastern conflict--between pro-Western and democratic states on the one hand, and an alliance of Islamist and Arab nationalist forces on the other. The latter alignment has as one of its strategic goals the eventual demise of the State of Israel. While such a goal may appear delusional, the inconclusive results of the 2006 war did much to confirm the representatives of the latter camp in their belief that they have discovered a method capable of eventually producing a strategic defeat for Israel. INTRODUCTION sought to view the war and its results through the lens of more conventional strategic The 2006 war between Israel and the assessments.2 Still others view the 2006 war Lebanese Hizballah organization, known in as unique in the Middle Eastern context, in Israel as the “Second Lebanon War,” and in that it saw a conventional state army-- the Lebanon as “the July War,” formed part of a Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--engaged against larger strategic confrontation taking place in Hizballah--a force which was neither a the Middle East. This confrontation places the conventional army in the full sense, nor a United States and its allies in opposition to guerrilla force in the sense in which that term Iran and its allies and client organizations. has usually been understood (i.e. as an Israel is part of the former camp, while irregular agency engaged in low-intensity Hizballah is part of the latter. The 2006 war operations).3 This article will briefly look at was complicated by the fact that the Lebanese the events of the war itself over which the government, which acted as an unwilling host argument is taking place and will close with an to Hizballah, is also an important U.S. attempt to draw some conclusions regarding regional ally. the strategic significance and lessons of the war. The war has been the center of a number of interlinked, heated controversies almost from THE COURSE OF THE WAR the moment of the implementation of the UN- sponsored ceasefire, which brought it to an The Second Lebanon War began on July end on August 14, 2006. The controversies 12, 2006, with the shelling by Hizballah of the have been both between partisans of the sides Israeli border villages of Zarit and Shlomi. in the war--often in basic disputes over the The shelling was intended to act as a diversion facts of the case, numbers of casualties on for the commencement of a cross-border raid. each side, etc.--and on a more conceptual The objective of the raid was the abduction of level, concerning the correct interpretation and IDF soldiers for use as bargaining chips to characterization of the war. secure the release of Lebanese citizens convicted of terrorist acts and incarcerated in Some analysts have seen the war as the Israel. A contingent of Hizballah fighters harbinger of a new type of “post-modern” attacked two armored Humvees manned by conflict--with important implications for the IDF reservists from a combat engineering unit. future effective use of force1 others have Three IDF soldiers were killed, two more Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) 1 Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War injured, and two abducted by the Hizballah villages and towns close to the border, the IDF men and taken back across the border to was unable to utilize fully its advantages in Lebanon. Five additional soldiers were killed, terms of armor, artillery, and air power. and a Merkava tank destroyed, as the IDF attempted to rescue the soldiers.4 The result was a series of bloody encounters between Israeli infantry on the one The IDF carried out air and artillery strikes hand and Hizballah fighters on the other. on targets in southern Lebanon in the course of Hizballah’s ability in tactical maneuvering the day. Israel’s cabinet convened on July 12, under fire was noted, as was the creative effect 2006, in order to decide on Israel’s response to with which the movement used antitank the abductions. On the same day, the cabinet weapons in the infantry combat.8 While Israel authorized the bombing of targets in south managed, after concerted efforts, to gain Lebanon. This included both attacks on ground in these areas, the subsequent Hizballah’s long and medium-range missile withdrawal of IDF forces meant that the capabilities, and strikes on infrastructural village-based Hizballah units were able to targets in southern Lebanon and beyond it. reemerge. Israel’s apparent lack of awareness Over the next few days and weeks, Israeli of the system of bunkers and tunnels built by aircraft struck at Hizballah missile capabilities, Hizballah represented a serious intelligence at Nasrallah’s headquarters in southern Beirut, failure on Israel’s part, which further benefited and also bombed the Rafiq Hariri International Hizballah’s efforts. Airport and roads leading out of Lebanon.5 The Israeli decision to concentrate in the Hizballah leaders were undoubtedly first part of the war on an air campaign, surprised by the extent and ferocity of the accompanied by what were in effect large- Israeli response. However, once its dimensions scale raids into populated areas of southern became clear, the movement was able to Lebanon, also enabled Hizballah to maintain a mobilize according to prior existing plans and constant stream of short-range rockets onto to await the Israeli ground assault. In the populated areas of northern Israel. No clear following days, the movement reinforced the response to the threat represented by short- border villages, moving in elements of its range rockets deployed south of the Litani regular force. At an early stage, however, the River existed--other than a large-scale ground Israeli political leadership chose to rule out a incursion. Since the political leadership did major ground assault to the Litani River. not order such an incursion, the result was that Instead, an intensive air campaign Hizballah was able to maintain a steady stream commenced. of Katyusha rockets throughout the war, through to the ceasefire. Hizballah would fire Limited ground operations began only on just under 4,000 rockets in the course of the July 17, 2006, with the entry of IDF troops fighting, with over 200 rockets a day fired in into Marun al-Ras.6 The task of the defenders the final days of the war.9 Hizballah was not was made much easier by the Israeli decision able to adjust or coordinate its rocket fire in a to concentrate its attacks in a very narrow sophisticated fashion, and hence the rockets area. This enabled Hizballah to reinforce the were employed in essence as a terror weapon, area under attack with forces from adjacent designed to produce panic and disorientation sectors. This pattern was repeated in the among Israel’s civilian population in the north. coming days in other towns such as Bint This appears to have been precisely the Jubayl and Ayt al-Sha’b.7 The Hizballah units intention of Hizballah, which places stress on were also able to benefit from an extensive what it considers to be the weakness of Israeli storage, tunnel, and bunker system put in place society and its susceptibility to casualties. The prior to the war. Due to Israel’s decision to idea, in line with the classic aim of both concentrate on confronting Hizballah in the strategic bombing and terrorism, was to use 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) Jonathan Spyer civilian casualties and the resulting public employment of antitank missiles. The unrest as a tool to pressure the government of organization used these not only against Israeli the enemy country. armor, but also employed them in a creative way in the infantry combat in built-up areas. However, the IDF also enjoyed notable The missiles themselves were Russian successes in the early stages of the war. The systems, purchased by Hizballah from Syria Israeli Air Force was able to commence with Iranian funds.14 Hizballah used AT-3 swiftly its air campaign and succeeded in Sagger missiles to collapse buildings in which destroying a substantial part of Hizballah’s IDF forces were sheltered, as well as against medium and long-range weapons capability tanks. Meanwhile, the AT-14 E Kornet during the first two days of the war. Israeli missile, one of the most advanced Russian defense sources claim to have destroyed anti-armor systems, took a considerable toll on around 80 percent of this capability.10 Israeli armor in the confused, sporadic ground war that raged close to the border. Hizballah Hizballah forces within the populated areas also employed the RPG 29, the AT-4 Spigot, consisted mainly of part-time “village guards” the AT-5 Spandrel, and the AT- 13 METIS-M mobilized for the war. Hizballah forces were systems. In all, around 40 tanks were damaged also aided by fighters representing its rival for in the course of the war, resulting in the deaths the loyalty of Lebanese Shi’a--Amal. In of 30 tank crewmen--25 percent of the IDF’s addition, smaller factions such as the Lebanese entire combat losses in the war.15 Of the 40 Communist Party, the Popular Front for the tanks damaged, however, the great majority Liberation of Palestine-General Command were not totally destroyed and were withdrawn (PFLP-GC), and the Syrian Social Nationalist and repaired. 16 Party also took part.11 Hizballah ground forces were organized into teams of seven to ten Together with the air campaign and the war men, and these groupings appear to have on the ground close to the border, the Israeli operated with a large degree of autonomy , navy imposed a blockade on the Lebanese making full use of their knowledge of the local coast, which Hizballah proved unable to area, as well as of the system of bunkers and dislodge--despite its early success in hitting an tunnels available to them.
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