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China's Global Power Projection Hit with “Strategic Overdraft”

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China's Global Power Projection Hit with “Strategic Overdraft” Volume 17, Issue 7 May 11, 2017 China’s Global Power Projection Hit With “Strategic Overdraft” By Willy Lam What is Known and Unknown about Changes to the PLA’s Ground Combat Units Dennis J. Blasko Thinking the Unthinkable: Are American Organizations in China Ready for a Serious Crisis? By Matt Brazil The CMC General Office: Recentralizing Power in the PLA By Joel Wuthnow China’s Global Power economic discourse. Xi and his colleagues have taken advantage of U.S. President Donald Projection Hit With “Strategic Trump’s nationalist and anti-globalization Overdraft” stance to emphasize Beijing’s eagerness to pro- vide leadership in combatting protectionism By Willy Lam and promoting free trade. Despite the tough challenges facing the Chi- While OBOR is being given top billing across the nese economy, President and “core leader” Xi gamut of state media, a small number of rela- Jinping is going ahead with ambitious plans to tively liberal Chinese academics are raising mis- project Chinese power worldwide including the givings about the viability and sustainability of landmark One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Xi’s global undertaking. Foremost among these Xi is expected to announce a new series of pro- critics is Renmin University international affairs jects linking China with Asia, Central and Eastern specialist Shi Yinhong (时殷弘), who is also a Europe, the Middle East and Africa at an OBOR counselor or advisor to the State Council. In a international forum scheduled for mid-May Bei- late 2016 article entitled “China Must Guard jing. Xi, who is personally supervising the Against Strategic Overdraft,” Shi pointed out scheme in via the Central Leading Group on that the Chinese Communist Party leadership OBOR Construction Work, apparently hopes to must exercise caution regarding “strategic mili- boost China’s agenda-setting capacity in global tary” (sabre rattling by the People’s Liberation ChinaBrief May 11, 2017 Army) and “strategic economics” (projecting undertaking for building and improving port power through economic means such has un- and railway facilities in eastern Pakistan, have derwriting projects along the OBOR). He argued been underwritten by Chinese financial institu- that China must “prevent excessive expansion- tions. Given that the so-called Chinese Economic ism, which will result in ‘strategic overdraft’” Miracle came to an end early this decade, ques- (战略透支) (Phoenix TV, October 4, 2016; Lianhe tions have been asked about whether Beijing Zaobao [Singapore], September 21, 2016). [1] has the means to sustain its ambitious pro- grams. China’s foreign-exchange reserves, which While Professor Shi is referring to President Xi’s peaked at $4 trillion in mid-2014, has dropped overall foreign policy, which ranges from build- to $3 trillion early this year. With China’s state- ing air and naval bases on reclaimed land in the owned banks already laden with non-perform- South China Sea to improving relations with de- ing loans, the Fitch credit rating agency warned veloping countries by forgiving $60 billion of that these institutions’ investments in OBOR debt, the OBOR game plan could be the best ex- could “create new asset-quality risks for ample of what Western critics call “imperial [China’s] banking system” (CNBC, January 16). overreach” (The American Interest, March 1). The OBOR consists of the Silk Road Economic Belt, There is also the question of whether, in return which stretches from China through Central Asia for its magnanimous commitment to helping to Eastern Europe; and the 21st Central Maritime developing countries in Southeast Asia, South Silk-Road, which extends from Southeast Asia Asia, and Central Asia, China will garner a com- through the Indian Subcontinent to Eastern Af- mensurate level of good will. As Professor Shi rica. Under the “big is better” principle, however, noted, supposed beneficiaries of Chinese lar- there is a tendency for the Xi leadership to sub- gesse all have their “long-term interests in areas sume economic and infrastructure cooperation of sovereignty, self-reliance, and security.” He with countries throughout Europe, the Middle warned that if OBOR strategies do not take full East, and Africa under the OBOR umbrella. As of consideration of these sensitive matters, Beijing early this year, 80 Chinese state-owned enter- investments could “ignite nationalism-oriented prise conglomerates are negotiating infrastruc- political controversies in the internal politics of ture and related items with government officials [beneficiary] countries.” It is notable that coun- in over 65 countries (Sohu.com, April 10; tries such as Sri Lanka and Myanmar have re- HKTDC.com [Hong Kong], May 23, 2016). quested renegotiations of Chinese infrastructure investments largely due to opposition raised by There is no official estimate as to the funds in- nationalists in each two country (Times of India, volved in this gargantuan venture. However, ex- February 16; Transnational Institute [Amster- perts at McKinsey, a consultancy, estimate that dam], July 18, 2016). comprehensive improvement of infrastructure in Asia and Africa alone could cost $2–3 trillion— Apart from using economic means to bond roughly 12 times the financial outlay of the China with a host of developed and developing Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe after WWII countries, Beijing is also confident that OBOR (Channel NewsAsia, April 22; Fortune, December would showcase not only Chinese technology 12, 2016). So far, a number of massive projects but also Chinese companies’ compliance with are already underway, including the $50 billion global standards. However, quite a few of China- 2 ChinaBrief May 11, 2017 financed projects could suffer from similar prob- to build up a “community of destiny” with na- lems that have adversely affected previous tions, particularly those in the developing world. mega-investments made by SOE conglomerates The commentator also noted that the OBOR was in Southeast Asia and Africa, namely that these intimately connected with President Xi’s Chinese projects are built on guanxi (“political connec- Dream, one of whose key goals is that the coun- tions”) rather than globally accepted terms in try would emerge as a superpower by 2049, the fields including fair competition, open bidding, centenary of the establishment of the People’s Western-style auditing and overall transparency. Republic of China (People’s Daily, April 6). There is no denying, however, the fact that the over- Early this year, the European Commission an- arching ambition evinced by the OBOR scheme nounced that it was investigating the 350-kilo- has raised the suspicion of rich and poor coun- meter high-speed railway connecting the Ser- tries alike that it is primarily a Chinese exercise bian capital of Belgrade to Budapest in Hungary. in self-aggrandizement of unprecedented pro- The state-owned giant, China Railway Corpora- portions. Moscow is said to be unhappy that tion will be the main contractor and provider of thanks to Beijing’s generous financial and tech- technology. The Commission is looking into the nological aid to Central Asia, China is about to long-term financial viability of the $2.89 billion displace Russia as the dominant influence railway, and more importantly, whether this pro- among several former client states of the Soviet ject had gone through public tenders stipulated Union. In the eyes of New Delhi, Beijing’s invest- by EU laws (Asia Times, April 4; First Financial ments in civilian and military ports in Sri Lanka, News (Shanghai), March 1; Ming Pao (Hong Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar and the Mal- Kong), February 2). The Belgrade-Budapest rail- dives constitute a “string of pearls” containment road is part of an ambitious China-Europe Land- policy against India (South China Morning Post, Sea Fast Transport Route that will link western March 6; Asia Times, February 2, The Asan Forum Chinese cities all the way to the Greek port of [Korea], December 16). Western Europe politi- Piraeus, which is partly owned by Chinese inter- cians have expressed misgivings about China’s ests (English.Gov.cn, February 8; China Daily, apparent “divide and rule” tactics toward the EU, February 8). Cui Hongjian, a Europe expert at the which could be accomplished through its tight Ministry of Foreign Affairs-administered China embrace of the 16 Central and Eastern European Institute of International Studies, has indirectly countries (European Council on Foreign Rela- attributed the investigation to Brussel’s political tions, December 14, 2016; European Institute for distrust of China. Cui argued that the European Asian Affairs, January 2014). Commission “harbors a relatively contradictory mentality regarding Chinese participation” in Security Overstretch large-scale infrastructure projects in the EU (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], February 22; Global Apart from OBOR, the most obvious area where Times, February 21). Beijing may have gone overboard in power pro- jection is its pugilistic posture in the South China According to a People’s Daily commentary By Sea and the East China Sea. The construction of Zhou Hanmin (周汉民), the OBOR is not only an air and naval bases on reclaimed South China effort to “tell the China story well and spread Sea islets whose sovereignty is contested by sev- China’s message properly” but also an attempt eral ASEAN members has raised the possibility 3 ChinaBrief May 11, 2017 of at least small-scale skirmishes between the from Europe –Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gen- Chinese armed forces on the one hand, and tiloni—will be attending the OBOR international those of the U.S. and its Asian allies on the other. forum. This is despite the fact that Beijing has According to Shi Yinhong, a balance must be issued invitations to the leaders of more than struck between upholding sovereign rights and 100 countries to attend what Chinese media call maintaining stability. The respected academic China’s biggest show for 2017 (Zhejiang Eco- argued that from 2012 to late 2014, Beijing suc- nomic Net, April 19; VOA news, April 18).
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