The Legacy Program Operating on the principle of “cooperation, not confrontation,” the Legacy of the Cold War Energy, Society And Security Second Russian National Dialogue On Energy, Society And Security Second Russian National Dialogue On Program (otherwise known as “The Legacy Program”) engages in neutral, third-party facilitation of issues related to arms control and disarmament, demilitarization, technology development Green Cross Russia for safe weapons destruction, nonproliferation, military base cleanup and conversion, and socio- economic development of communities impacted by weapons stockpiles. Green Cross Switzerland More specifically, the Legacy Program works to: Global Green USA • Support the safe and environmentally-sound demilitarization of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological – as integral to the implementation of arms control treaties; • Provide access to information for communities near weapons destruction facilities and Second Russian National stockpiles and ensure open channels for dialogue between citizens and authorities; Dialogue On • Promote stakeholder input and involvement in demilitarization-related decision- Dialogue On making processes through citizens’ advisory commissions, public hearings, and national dialogues; • Address the weapons-related health, environment, and welfare concerns of affected Energy, communities by working through schools, hospitals, local government, and the media to promote understanding of weapons destruction processes, encourage emergency preparedness, and support sustainable economies and democratic policies; Society And • Educate legislatures and policy-makers in Russia, Europe, and the U.S. on the importance of international support for demilitarization and organize international gatherings of officials to encourage dialogue, collaboration, and consensus; Security • Collaborate with like-minded groups to advocate for continued funding of demilitarization and nonproliferation efforts, in particular the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative; and • Mediate and facilitate globally to make progress in arms control, disarmament, and 21-22 April 2008 nonproliferation. Saint Petersburg, Russia Global Green USA Green Cross Switzerland Green Cross Russia The Legacy Program spearheads a range of public outreach and education initiatives. In Russia, Global Green USA Green Cross Switzerland Green Cross Russia for example, the Legacy Program maintains 13 public outreach and information centers to educate and support communities near chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear submarine dismantlement sites. The centers are an important resource for residents seeking access to specific information and a channel to communicate with authorities. The Legacy Program also organizes forums promoting frank exchange on weapons and security issues. Two of the most important are the “National Dialogues” on Russian chemical weapons destruction, and on nuclear energy, society, and security held annually in Russia. A similar “Legacy Forum” is also held annually in the U.S. on global weapons demilitarization and nonproliferation.
The Legacy Program is a international effort of Green Cross International managed primarily by Global Green USA (Washington DC), Green Cross Switzerland (Basel and Zurich), and Green Cross Russia (Moscow). More information is available at www.globalgreen.org, www.greencross.ch, www.green-cross.ru, and www.gci.ch.
Global Green USA Green Cross Russia Green Cross Switzerland 1717 Massachusetts Ave, NW 3 Krasina St. Fabrikstrasse 17 Suite 600 Moscow, Russia 123056 8005 Zürich, Switzerland Washington, DC 20036, USA Tel: +7-495-925-6997 Tel: +41-43-499-1313 Tel: +1-202-222-0700 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Green Cross Russia Green Cross Switzerland Global Green USA
Second Russian National Dialogue On Energy, Society And Security
21-22 April 2008 Saint Petersburg, Russia
1 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Editorial Team
Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Editor in Chief: Cristian Ion
Editors: Julia Berg, Wided Khadraoui
Translators: Megan Lehman, Eugenia Tumanova
Photography: I. Petrova
Cover Design: L. Surkova
Page Layout: GRC Direct, A. Shkrebets
Printing: GRC Direct
471 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
This collection includes reports and speeches as well as the question-and-answer sessions that took place at the Second Public Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society and Security, organized and held on April 21–22, 2008 in Saint Petersburg, Russia. The Dialogue participants included Russian federal, regional and local government officials and public organizations, other Russian government agencies, non-governmental and media organizations, as well as representatives from scientific research and design institutes, managers and experts in the country’s fuel and energy sector. International representatives involved experts from governmental and non- governmental organizations in nuclear and alternative energy sources and nuclear nonproliferation, members of the G8 Global Partnership governments. The presentations at this conference provide an assessment of the key risks of civil nuclear facilities and the military facilities that have been phased out (including nuclear submarines) and radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management. They also address options for resolving today’s key problems in the safe use of nuclear technology, including offering policies with regard to the environmental safety of using nuclear energy, and reaching an agreement with the public on various aspects of nuclear and alternative energy developments. Dialogue Organizers: Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA (affiliates of Green Cross International), RosAtom and RosAtom’s Public Council, in partnership with The Stanley Foundation. Dialogue Sponsors: The organizers would like to express their gratitude for financial support to: • AKB Elektronika • Government of Norway • Government of Sweden • Government of Switzerland • International Science and Technology Center • Ploughshares Fund • Rosatom • Rosatom’s Public Council • RosEnergoAtom • SOGAS Insurance Group • TekhSnabEksport • The Stanley Foundation • TVEL • VneshTorgBank Special thanks to the editing and translation team are noted on the last page of the book. The presentation texts and research papers published in this book have been translated and edited into English from original Russian versions, and are the sole opinion of the authors. © Green Cross Russia, 2008 © Green Cross Switzerland, 2008 © Global Green USA, 2008
1 Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA are the Russian, Swiss and American 2 affiliates of Green Cross International Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Foreword
The pace of modern economic development is leading to a rapid increase in energy consumption throughout most of the world. Meanwhile, the limitations of the energy resources used are becoming ever more palpable. Some of the world’s top oil and gas deposits are located in politically unstable regions. The increased use of oil and gas also runs counter to the Kyoto Protocol. The unresolved problem of nuclear waste has made it difficult for nuclear energy to garner broad public acceptance, and there is a need to create a new type of fuel cycle. There are many proposals for alternative energy resources, but none of them can generate energy on the massive scale required, at the moment. The end of the Cold War put an end to the fifty-year arms race and stamped out the threat of a massive nuclear conflict. The ghost of thousands of nuclear warheads crushing out civilization has been supplanted by the belief that a new era of a multipolar world is upon us. The end of the Cold War global conflict has truly reduced the risk of an all-out nuclear war, but, since then, other risks have emerged. Today, Russia must answer a number of nuclear questions of both domestic and international significance. How should nuclear arms systems and their delivery vehicles be dismantled? Where should we put nuclear waste and how should it be transported? What should we do with fissile material and how should it be treated? How can we effectively protect nuclear materials while adhering to the principles of nonproliferation? What role will the atom play in the future of energy? And, probably the primary question: how safe is all of this? After the Kyshtym and Chernobyl catastrophes, the public realized that the right to nuclear and radiation safety is one of man’s main rights. The provision of safety for both the environment and the public is currently the priority when destroying nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as in the widespread proliferation of nuclear energy. None of these problems can be resolved without the understanding and support of the Russian society, or without the approval and recognition of a national strategy. The objective of this Second National Dialogue on Energy, Society and Security is to establish agreement and mutual understanding in our society with regard to nuclear and radiation safety in the Russian Federation in relation to overcoming the legacy of the Cold War and defining potential opportunities for paving the way to the safe development of alternative energy futures.
Green Cross Russia Press Service
3 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Welcoming Address
Sergei Baranovsky President, Green Cross Russia and Member of the Board of Directors, Green Cross International
My name is Sergei Igorievich Baranovsky. I am the President of Green Cross Russia, and a Member of the Board of Directors of Green Cross International. I have the honor today of introducing the organizing team of the second — actually the third — Russian Nuclear Dialogue on Energy, Society and Security. The idea of this Dialogue came after the success of a similar forum on ridding the world of chemical weapons, which Green Cross /Global Green has been organizing for 10 years now. The idea is to — at least once a year — gather together those who deal with nuclear energy, public outreach and the safe use of nuclear energy. A Pilot Dialogue took place in July 2006 at the Uzkoe Estate near Moscow, and, in 2007, it was held in Moscow at the President Hotel in April. Today we begin the another Nuclear National Dialogue — in which four sectors of society, all involved in the nuclear field in different ways, will come together. This includes, first and foremost, the residents of towns near nuclear energy facilities or former nuclear testing sites. The second group is comprised of representatives of Russia’s regions, such as public figures, representatives of civil society, and representatives of local legislative assemblies and administrations. The third sector consists of representatives from federal ministries and agencies, including in this case representatives of the RosAtom state- owned corporation, its Public Council, which is one of the Dialogue’s key organizers, several other organizations that are part of the RosAtom system, as well as representatives of other federal agencies. One very important agency in a country is the Ministry of the Environment. It is a great pity that in our country, like in Honduras, there is no Ministry of the Environment. The formation of an Environmental Committee, for which discussions began in 2000, is still an ongoing process. Without representatives from this agency, it is more or less impossible to resolve environmental problems related to the use of nuclear energy. But we do hope that the new conditions today will result in the emergence of such Ministry, and that its representatives will also attend and take part in our Dialogue in the near future. The fourth group is made up of the global community, our international partners, which are to a great extent our sponsors, particularly when we talk about the destruction of nuclear submarines and nuclear materials. The nuclear field enjoys extensive international cooperation, and the representatives of many countries involved in this process have joined us here today. This idea, to bring together these four groups once per year in order to discuss common issues, is both viable and valid. Each group is equally represented and everyone will have their turn to speak. Before we begin, I would like to thank everyone who made this event possible:
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• The organizers of this Dialogue: RosAtom and its Public Council, Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA (affiliates of Green Cross International), in partnership with The Stanley Foundation. • The Swedish Foreign Ministry • The Norwegian Foreign Ministry • The Embassy of Switzerland in Moscow • The International Scientific and Technical Center • RosEnergoAtom • VneshTorgBank • SOGAZ Insurance Group • AKB Elektronika, OJSC • TVEL, OJSC • TekhSnabEksport, OJSC • The Ploughshares Fund • RosAtom’s National Regional Educational Center. • A number of other small organizations that have contributed to the organization of this Dialogue.
5 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Opening Remarks
Sergey Mironov Chairman of the Russian Federation Council of the Federal Assembly Chairman of Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, Life
Dear organizers, participants, and guests of the Second Russian Nuclear National Dialogue: Energy, Society, and Security, this important forum is dedicated to one of today’s most pressing issues: ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy under the conditions of globalization. Modern economic development is leading to the rapid growth of energy needs in most countries around the world. At the same time, unbridled growth in the consumption of fossil fuels has led to resource depletion and the disruption of the planet’s climate. The world has turned to nuclear energy to relieve the energy situation, but there are many burning unsolved problems, such as the safety of the reactors currently in operation, the management of nuclear waste, and the decommissioning of old nuclear power plants. A safe nuclear energy industry — one that solves the issue of nuclear non- proliferation, that uses a process with the highest level of safety, and that practically eliminates the production of nuclear waste — must become the top priority in the development of Russia’s nuclear industry. I am convinced that constructive dialogue between the Russian government and the civil society on the subject of this difficult and multifaceted problem will both unite Russia’s environmental community and raise our citizens’ level of understanding of the key issues. The dialogue in which you engage today is a tangible, practical step in that direction. I wish all participants a successful and productive meeting.
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Opening Remarks
Hans Reudi Bortis Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland in Russia
It is both an honor and a great pleasure for me to be here today. First of all, I would like to thank, on behalf of the Swiss authorities, Green Cross Russia for organizing this second Nuclear National Dialogue. The first one took place just one year ago, in April 2007, and was very interesting and successful. We remain convinced of the value of such a dialogue and are delighted to co-sponsor again this event, with our modest contribution. The impressive list of participants shows how useful such events are. The Dialogue is a unique opportunity to bring people together who, from a very different perspective, are all concerned with the issue of energy and security. Switzerland has a long tradition of co-operation with Green Cross Russia in a similar area, in the field of chemical weapons destruction, for more than 10 years, since 1997. Switzerland has also supported the Green Cross Public Outreach and Information Offices program in various regions, where big arsenals of chemical weapons are stockpiled. Key priority of this conference is to establish a dialogue between all concerned stakeholders; the authorities and the civil society through public hearings. The importance of access to information, open discussions and transparency cannot be highlighted enough. Green Cross Russia is very successful in the project implementation and we are proud to be associated with their efforts. The cooperation with Green Cross Russia is very pleasant, and, for Switzerland, the Director of Green Cross Russia, Mr Sergei Baranovski, has become more than just a project partner during all these years of our co- operation; he became a friend. So I wish to congratulate him personally in the opening of this Dialogue, and wish him all the best for the work during these two days, and the continuation of his work in general. Thank you for your attention.
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The Most Important Aspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia: A Legislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste
Evgeniy Evstratov
Deputy Director, RosAtom
The level of nuclear and radiation safety at nuclear power plants (NPPs), as well as the companies involved in the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear research facilities in Russia have been evaluated and deemed satisfactory by RosTekhNadzor—a safety regulator. In nuclear energy, quantitative production growth is achieved while maintaining or improving safety indicators.
Figure 1. Electricity at Russia’s NPPs.
In fact, statistics on downtime at NPPs and other large nuclear installations and facilities presenting a radiation hazard have been relatively consistent. There have not been any significant hazardous events since 2003 (INES ≥ 1). Over the last 10 years, the number of breakdowns decreased by 2.5 times. The environmental impact is within permitted standards. Since 2001, personnel have been exposed to average annual radiation doses of less than 3 mSv/year (the standard is 20 mSv/year). Occupational hazards in the nuclear industry are now 3.5 times lower than in all industries combined throughout Russia.
8 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Over the past two years, nuclear power generation has grown by over 7% without the addition of any new facilities. The number of serious breakdowns related to the automatic shutdown of critical condition units is twice as low as the global NPP average. Based on this important indicator, Russian NPPs meet the world’s highest standards. We can notice a positive and sustainable trend in decreased personnel radiation, radioactive discharge and release into the air are sustainable, as is the maintenance of lower occupational hazard indicators. However, if one considers the full range of issues related to nuclear and radiation safety, one will find that there are many pressing problematic areas today (indicated in the darker color in Figure 2). One of the main problems involves the way in which radioactive waste (radwaste) is handled. This is currently the weakest point.
Figure 1. Electricity at Russia’s NPPs.
As a result, despite the generally strong level of safety with regard to actual radiation risks, potential risks are on the rise. For the most part, this is due to the decisions that were made and the approaches that were used in the early stages of the nuclear project. Some of these decisions included: • Keeping liquid radwaste in open storage, and the pollution of the Techa River; • Accumulating enormous volumes of high-level waste in storage tanks; in 1957, an accident at one such storage container led to the pollution of nearly 20,000 square kilometers (1ku/km2 at 90sr) in the South Urals; • Postponing work to phase out operations at first generation nuclear facilities; • Accumulating spent nuclear fuel at NPPs with RMBK, AMB (slow neutron) and GBWR reactors. 9 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
There are also serious problems which continue to grow worse with regard to the management of spent nuclear fuel. For example, the treatment of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is a much slower process than the formation of SNF, and all SNFs are kept in storage ponds. The safe storage period for SNF is limited to 40–60 years. Despite the fact that SNF treatment is a generally simple technological process, the situation remains as problematic as ever: • More SNF is created than treated; • Most low-level and medium-level radioactive waste is not contained; • The number of radwaste storage points is extremely high at over 1,500; • There are no solutions for final radwaste disposal.
Figure 3. Problems with spent nuclear fuel, radwaste, and phase-out of nuclear facilities.
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RADON facilities store less than 1% of accumulated active radwaste. It is clear that continuing down this same path is both discouraging and dangerous. There are major problems involved in phasing out nuclear facilities: • The growing number of nuclear facilities where operations have been stopped, but the facilities have not been phased out; • The degradation of protective barriers at first generation facilities where operations have been suspended; • The lack of global experience in phasing out operations at certain types of nuclear facilities. In 2007, Russia adopted a Federal Target Program (FTP) to ensure nuclear and radiation safety in 2008 until 2015. This was the government’s first decisive step toward creating a radwaste and SNF management system. Most radwaste is stored at one of three nuclear fuel cycle plants: Mayak, Seversk Chemical Combine (SKhK) and the Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK) near Krasnoyarsk. Mayak is located next to the infamous Lake Karachay, where 120 million kilounits of radwaste are stored in the Techa water reservoir system, which holds 360 million m3 of polluted water. Work has basically still not begun on burial sites. The selection and safety validation of solutions for final containment of high-level waste is a complicated scientific and technical task. We are only at the starting point. The fact that the radwaste cycle does present opportunities for change with regard to standards and technological and infrastructure-related aspects means that companies do not have an incentive to treat and dispose of radwaste. Global experience has shown that creating efficient market processes for the safe management of radwaste is both possible and warranted.
Figure 4. Resolving radwaste management problems (RUB 29.7 billion). 11 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
As the FTP is carried out, radwaste management needs to be restructured, the management of a number of different kinds of SNF should be made a less urgent issue, and promising new processing technology needs to be developed. That, however, is just the beginning. As things continue, there will be a need to develop systems for SNF and radwaste management that will facilitate phasing out facilities, final radwaste containment and SNF treatment. In order to ensure that the next steps are taken both by the government and industry, effective legal conditions need to be put into place. A draft law on radwaste management has laid the foundation for this process. Methods also need to be developed within the FTP for the final containment of radwaste depending on radwaste activity levels. The most complex and resource-heavy tasks involve the burial disposal of high-level waste (HLW). The FTP also envisages the creation of an industrial test facility for deep geological disposal in the Kansk-Achinsk coal basin. Furthermore, opportunities to create a similar facility in the GCP excavation will be assessed — that would lower the cost of creating a HLW burial ground. In addition to related mega-projects, the FTP involves measures to be taken on facility premises. International experience has shown that the government should play an active role in creating an effective SNF and radwaste management system but in concert with proactive business participation. However, there is no clear line in our legislation defining the responsibilities of the state and members of the business community, and there is no mechanism that will drive and incentivize companies. All legal issues related to SNF and radwaste management and phasing out facilities need to be regulated by special laws. At present, active work is underway on developing a federal law on radioactive waste management. The bill is expected to be submitted to the Government in June 2008, and then to the Russian State Duma (also in June 2008). Work on the radwaste management law began over ten years ago — there was even a draft of it that was dismissed by the president. There is a new version today that addresses approaches to a number of different issues. Essentially, problems related to radwaste, SNF and phasing out facilities share a great number of similarities in terms of the lack of real interest in taking action and putting efficient financial mechanisms, infrastructural components, and efficient motivational measures into place. So why would we need a separate law for radwaste? One of the key reasons is the large number of participants and their locations, the lack of compliance of radwaste storage with today’s requirements, and the extremely long-term timeframes for creating HLW burial facilities. The goal of the draft law is to put into place a mechanism that will help resolve all of the problems that have accumulated and, first and foremost, prevent these problems from arising in the future. What Is New About the Approaches Being Proposed Today? The fundamental focus of the draft law is on radwaste management in the context of nuclear energy use. As a result, natural radwastes have been removed from the regulatory scope of this law. In the future, they could be included. Another difference from previous approaches is the introduction of a realistic radwaste classification system. The third is the introduction of a national radwaste management operator.
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We believe that the law needs to be tied closely together with issues of liability and property. Further, the draft law presumes the introduction of financial mechanisms and setting clear deadlines for each stage of creating a common radwaste management system. Based on our estimates, passing this law will help bring down financial expenses by an order of magnitude and minimize risks related to radwaste management. At present, the bill is undergoing agreement with agencies. It will be submitted to the Government and the State Duma for consideration in June 2008. The key components of the common system will be: • One government entity responsible for radwaste management, in addition to regulatory bodies for the use of nuclear energy; • A national operator, and • Specialized organizations and radwaste producers. The goal of this law is not to ease or simplify safety requirements, but rather to institute the legal tools needed to motivate radwaste producers to do their part in mandatory and safe final containment and to clearly define the obligations ofthe government with regard to all accumulated radwaste and its ultimate responsibilities in general. The draft law defines the exclusive authorities of Russia as the owner of radwaste and all of its long-term storage facilities and final radwaste containment facilities. Considering the realities of today’s political situation, decisions on a number of issues for official bodies are being made in collaboration with local federal authorities. Progress in radwaste management, right up until final containment, is one of Russia’s financial obligations. Naturally, this includes creating final containment facilities and burial. Financial Mechanisms Are Different for Different Types of Radwaste All efforts to make produced radwaste suitable for final containment are conducted at the expense of those companies that produce the radwaste. Regular radwaste producers allocate funds to the radwaste management fund, while companies that produce radwaste sporadically will make one-time payments to the national operator. Specialized organizations will assist the latter in the process of making radwaste suitable for final containment. Inflation risks affecting the radwaste management fund would be compensated for by the government from budget funds and from the regular review of the amount of annual disbursements for each radwaste producer. Eliminating the problems of the nuclear legacy is done with government budget financing and via the mechanism of the federal target program. At the first stage, a company will only need to assure acceptable safety levels of the radwaste already accumulated. Later, as funds become available under the FTP, companies will treat radwaste in line with the requirements set out in established regulations before transferring them to the national operator. Bringing activated radwaste storage facilities up to standard with long-term environmental safety regulations is another aspect included within the FTP.
About the National Operator The main functions of the national operator would be to plan, organize and carry out radwaste management operations, including the long-term storage and final containment 13 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
(burial) of radwaste. It is important that the national operator be a constituent of the state-run corporation. The national operator would bear the brunt of long-term radwaste storage and final containment facilities. With time, the national operator would
Figure 5. Financial mechanisms. significantly improve the general placement and location of these facilities. Several different options have been reviewed for establishing a market of services at the stages of long-term storage and burial. Considering the idiosyncrasies of the processes and how they are perceived by the public, an option has been selected under which a regulatory body will make decisions on limiting the operations of the national operator based on the level at which this service market is developed (i.e., stages of long- term storage and final containment). In order to provide for practical efforts, the draft law proposes expanding the radwaste classification system. A general outline of the radwaste classification system is shown in Figure 6. Operational and disposable radioactive wastes are currently classified under a common system comprised of three main groups based on activity levels and three groups based on half-value periods. A more subtle structure is proposed and would include other subgroups. Their descriptions and limits would not be set out in the law itself, but in subordinate legislation. In order to demonstrate the importance of this work, let us review radioactive wastes with very low radioactive substance content. Today’s Situation is a Paradox Quantification of the lower limits of radwaste for liquid wastes is based on potable water requirements, using ten intervention levels. But there are also hygiene standards for maximum permissible concentrations of radionuclides in food products. The standards make it seem as if it is completely safe to drink milk with 100 Bq 137Cs per liter — but if
14 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY levels are at 110 Bq/liter, the milk is considered radwaste. Furthermore, in developed countries like Norway, for example, the maximum
Figure 6. Radwaste classification. permissible concentration is 370 Bq/liter for milk, 3,000 Bq/kg for venison, game meats and fish, and 600 Bq/kg for other food products. If we do not eliminate these inconsistencies, we will be surrounded by radioactive waste. In summary, and to emphasize the point once more: a legislative solution to radwaste management will create the conditions necessary first and foremost for an effective solution to the problems that have accumulated, and will prevent them from accumulating in the future, in addition to providing a government guarantee in this field.
What will be the Results of a Federal Law on Radwaste Management? Measures to protect public health and the environment will be included in all stages of radwaste management. The risk of unauthorized use of radwaste, including the use of radwaste for terrorist purposes, will be minimized. The law will also prevent accidents and lower risks related to large, non-contained volumes of radwaste. Moreover, the incompleteness of the cycle will no longer be putting the breaks on developments in the nuclear industry. We will be able to increase exports of Russian nuclear technologies on international markets on legal grounds. By adopting this law, Russia will reaffirm its authority as a technological superpower dedicated to the principles of sustainable development and the requirements of the
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Nuclear Waste Convention. There are two other draft bills in line after the law on radwaste management: one on spent nuclear fuel and on phasing out nuclear energy facilities. Work is already underway, and they are expected to be submitted to the Government and the State Duma in 2008. Thank you for your attention.
Figure 7. The phases of creating a system for radwaste management.
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Resolving Global Environmental Problems through the Acceleration of Nuclear Energy Development
Vladimir Grachev Advisor to the Director of RosAtom, Member of the RosAtom Public Council and Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences
Since mid twentieth century, the degradation of the biosphere has grown at a threatening pace: two-thirds of forest lands have been destroyed, two-thirds of agricultural soil has been lost, the bio-resources of the world’s oceans, seas and rivers have been depleted, and the planet’s biodiversity is threatened: 110 species of vertebrates have disappeared from the face of the Earth, and another 600 species are expected to follow in their footsteps. Mankind is consuming up to 40% of the world’s ecosystems, 10% of which is used directly, and 30% of which is being destroyed. In the last quarter of the 20th century alone, one-third of all natural resources were destroyed. Man produces organic waste more than 2,000 times faster than the entire biosphere. Global environmental pollution in the 20th century has led to global warming. The average annual temperature has increased by 0.3–0.6°С and is expected to rise by another 0.4°С by 2020, up to 1.5–2°С by 2050. This will in turn trigger the mass melting of glaciers, which could lead to a rise of 1.5–2.5 meters in sea levels and the flooding of coastal areas and islands. Global environmental pollution is also accompanied by weakening immune systems and failing health, as well as the emergence of new illnesses. There is a shortage of potable water in many regions. In 2000, 1.1 billion people, or 18% of the world’s population, did not have access to clean water, and that number will increase to 2.5 billion people by 2050. Large cities lack clean air. Natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes have become more frequent. Environmental threats to the existence of human civilization have been recognized at the highest international level (i.e., “The Spirit of Rio” Conference in 1992). Scientific and technological progress has created the conditions for an environmental catastrophe, and the very concept of development is now in question. There is a fundamental need to re-examine human values. Man’s extensive economic activity over the past two centuries has soldiered on without any consideration for global environmental interests and is characterized by the unrestrained growth of both production and consumption, including wasteful consumption of natural resources and energy. The United States alone annually consumes 25% of the world’s oil, over 40% of the world’s gasoline, 30% of fuel. In the next 20 years, consumption of oil and natural gas is expected to grow by 33% and 50% respectively. Russia holds 12% of global oil reserves. In order to live by American standards, Russia would have to purchase as much as it holds, but there are no such resources available. Our consumerist attitude toward nature has brought it to the brink of destruction. The dominant models for production and consumption are leading to environmental devastation, increased risks for human life and health due the decreased quality of the environment. The very foundation of global security is at risk.
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Based on the UNEP Commission’s 2002 report, projected human development through 2032 is distressing. In the next 30 years, irreversible changes caused by mankind will take place on the planet. One way or another, over 70% of the Earth’s surface will be deformed and over one-fourth of the world’s animal and plant species will be lost forever. Clean air, potable water, and pristine lands will be in short supply, while nature’s ability to regenerate after the anthropogenic impact diminishes. The high quality of the natural environment is truly mankind’s greatest treasure and an unquestionable value of the aspects that lie at the heart of global environmental interests. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as much as 80% of all illnesses today are the result of consuming poor-quality water. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 5 million people die each year from diseases related to the consumption of polluted and poor-quality water. Water may become the leading cause of future armed conflicts, taking the place oil holds in today’s conflicts. The world’s environmental problems are all closely tied to the economic situation in certain countries, shown by key indicators such as per capita GDP and energy production and consumption (see Table 1).
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Table 1. Key Energy Statistics by Country: Top Consumers of Primary Energy (2002 Data Unless Noted Otherwise)
Country Population GDP Primary energy Power Annual electricity (millions) (per capita) (EJ/year/per capita) plant consumption (in USD) capacity (per capita) (GWe) TJ/ KWh per Consumption Production yr per person person United 290.8* 37,840* 98.16* 70.16* 953.2* 0.34 94,440 States China 1,284 960 43.60 40.97 356.6 0.03 8,333
Russia 143.7* 3,030* 28.23* 47.00* 216.4 0.20 55,560
Japan 127.3 29,770 22.97 4.11 266.1 0.18 50,000
India 1,042 440 16.59 12.66 108.0 0.02 5,556
* Data from 2003
Table 1 illustrates the fact that energy consumption in developed countries is 11–17 times higher than in developing countries (such as China and India). If all of the countries in the world reach United States consumption levels over the next 15 – 20 years, or even those of Japan’s “conservative” consumption levels, total energy consumption will rise in step with global population, or 15 times from today’s level. Is global energy prepared for such an enormous surge? The planet simply does not have sufficient organic fuel. This leads us to conclusion number 1: Energy production must move toward the use of new, powerful energy sources that do not burn organic fuel. Today, that means nuclear energy. The fossil fuel era will soon be coming to an end (see Figure 1, using data from reference [1]).
19 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Figure 1. The organic fuel era.
The path to resolving global environmental problems is closely bound to the development of renewable energy (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The path to resolving global environmental problems.
20 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
It is all too clear that only a high level of preparedness in the fields of energy resources and energy use will help resolve the world’s environmental problems. There are already some examples to consider. Western Europe has taken a major step on the environmental front, and it would be silly to attribute these achievements exclusively to the development of wind and solar energy. If you remove Europe’s nuclear energy from the map, then the region would find itself in an environmental crisis, garbage would pile high, people would suffocate on emissions, and the rivers and reservoirs would choke on the waste dumped into the water. Continued growth in energy consumption inevitably leads to increased emissions of greenhouse gases. If the current trends continue, annual carbon emissions will rise 60% by 2020, and may even triple by 2050. Although developing countries today produce one-half of the world’s carbon emissions from fossil fuels, by 2020 they will be responsible for 60%, and that trend may continue (see Table 2 for the world’s largest producers of greenhouse gases).
Table 2. The Largest Producers of Greenhouse Gases
Total emissions Emissions (per capita, CO2 equiva- Country (CO2 equivalent, billion tons) lent, tons)
United States 6.93 24.5 China 4.94 3.9 Russia 1.92 13.2 India 1.88 1.9 Japan 1.32 10.4 Germany 1.01 12.3 Brazil 0.85 5.0 Canada 0.68 22.1 UK 0.65 11.1 Italy 0.53 9.2 Global emissions 33.67 5.6
We are observing the rapid growth of natural phenomena resulting in the loss of life and considerable economic damages. These natural disasters, including flooding, forest and peat fires, deforestation, desertification, epidemics, etc., are caused, to a large extent, by humans. In the second half of the 20th century, the number of extreme natural phenomena rose by a factor of six, and the average yearly volume of economic losses increased more than ten times. (see Figure 3).
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In order to solve global climate change problems, we must decrease, rather than increase, fuel consumption. Meanwhile, global energy development forecasts are based on the assumption that fossil fuel consumption will increase (see Figure 4).
Figure 3. Trends in the number of major natural disasters and their consequences.
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Figure 4. A scenario of global electricity production (IAEA, 2003).
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Meanwhile, the global community, at the Kyoto Protocol conference in Bali in 2007, acknowledged that by 2050, CO2 emissions will need to be reduced by 50%. In this case, the forecast for Russia in 2050 (see Figure 5) shows that installed capacity and electricity production at nuclear power plants must be increased by seven times by 2050.
Figure 5. Predicted electricity generation in Russia.
IAEA data shows that, in early 2007, there were 439 nuclear reactors in operation with a total capacity of 367.77 GW. Another 29 reactors in 11 countries are currently in various stages of construction. Today, NPPs produce 16% of the world’s electricity. At the same time, 57% of all “nuclear” electricity is produced by the United States (103 reactors), France (59 reactors) and Japan (54 reactors). The countries that are currently developing most dynamically in terms of nuclear energy are China (6 reactors under construction), India (5 reactors), and Russia (3 reactors). New reactors are also being built in the United States, Canada, Japan, Iran, Finland, and other countries. A number of countries have also voiced their intention to develop nuclear energy, including: Poland, Vietnam, and Belarus. In total, the construction of over 60 new reactors is under consideration. Over 160 projects are currently in the design stage. In Russia, nuclear energy accounts for about 16% of all generated electricity. Nuclear energy represents 30% of all energy in Western Russia and nearly 40% in Northwestern Russia. In 2006, Russia’s NPPs produced 154.6 billion kWh, or 4.8% more than in 2005. NPPs running on PWR reactors generated 83.1 billion kWh or 114.2% of the previous year’s production. NPPs running on RBMK, FBR and GBWR reactors generated 71.5 billion kWh, or 95.7% of nuclear power produced in the previous year. Overall, Russia’s NPPs executed 102.5% of the Federal Rates Service balance. At present, ten nuclear plants in Russia are using 31 reactors with an installed
24 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY capacity of 23,242 MW. Of those, 15 are PWR reactors (9 PWR-1000 and 6 PWR-440), 15 are boiling water reactors (11 RMBK-1000 and 4 GBWR-6), and one is FBR reactor (FBR-600). There are proposals to build another three PWR-1000 reactors in Russia at the Balakovsky, Volgodon and Kalinin nuclear stations by 2010. Furthermore, plans are also in place to launch one fast neutron reactor (FBR-800) by 2010 at the Beloyarsk NPP. In total, according to the federal target program, by 2030 there should be 40 new reactors constructed. That would bring nuclear-produced energy up to 25% of the country’s total energy generation. By 2050, Russia’s NPP capacity should increase even more significantly. However, it will be closer to 2030 that the country will have to deal with fuel reserves for nuclear energy. Analyses show that it is necessary to transition to a new nuclear energy system structure that uses fast breeder reactors with expanded “breeding” capabilities and a closed fuel cycle. As a result of doing so, resource limitations will cease to be a sword of Damocles in nuclear energy production. The consumption of uranium would not exceed the limits of known reserves, and its extraction, just like separation plant operations, could be all but ceased by the end of the century. We will, of course, have to pay in order to see the atom become a quasi-renewable energy source. The price is the development of capacities for reprocessing nuclear fuel, which even in best scenarios must be raised from today’s very restricted level. Making these development scenarios for peaceful nuclear energy a reality sets strict conditions for the rate at which technological innovations must be introduced. These include: 1. A closed fuel cycle based on new fuel reprocessing technologies 2. Reactors featuring efficient fuel breeding and use (fast breeder reactors with a breeding ratio that is considerably higher than one and thermal reactors with a breeding ratio of ~0.9 and plutonium as the reactor fuel) 3. Reactors for producing hydrogen, industrial and residential heat, and freshwater, as well as small- and medium-capacity reactors. The need for a solution to global environmental problems and a sufficient energy supply to meet the needs of human development inevitably leads to more global conclusions concerning the need to use thermonuclear energy. Predictions say this will begin in the mid-twenty-first century. But that is not all. It is also critical to pursue in-depth research on changing the energy precepts for global development. It is always possible that scientific achievements could lead to the discovery of new sources of energy and new methods of gleaning energy by taking advantage of a variety of transformations of matter at the micro- level. Nuclear sources have emerged (separation of isotopes of heavy elements), as have thermonuclear sources (synthesis of isotopes of light elements), and perhaps new practically inexhaustible sources of energy will be found for supporting the sustainable development of mankind. However, neither thermonuclear energy nor new sources of energy, nor today’s alternative resources will fully replace nuclear energy in the next one hundred years. The role of nuclear energy will only grow and the availability of raw materials needed to
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produce it will become the focus of attention. And if today, uranium consumption in Russia is at 3,800 tons per year, and there are 705 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) being produced per year [see reference 2], then by 2050, there will be a need for 16,400 tons of natural uranium to meet the needs of 100 GW nuclear stations, resulting in 3,040 tons of SNF each year. Figure 6 illustrates the nuclear fuel cycle and resulting waste.
Figure 6. The nuclear fuel cycle and waste generation process, using thermal reactors а) at 2008 capacity (23.2 GW); b) at 2050 capacity (100 GW).
Innovative development of nuclear energy must be founded on a closed nuclear fuel cycle (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. A closed nuclear fuel cycle.
Essentially, this is a transition to a renewable energy source. Now, in addition to wind, solar and hydro power, we have an incomparably more powerful source of renewable energy: nuclear energy using a closed nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear renaissance has taken its first steps. Countries planning large-scale development of nuclear energy include the United States (+32 reactors in the next several years), Russia (+33 new reactors by 2020), China, India, Finland, France, Sweden, and others. What are environmentalists saying? Patrick Moore, the founder of Greenpeace, says: “I find it logically inconsistent for people in the environmental movement who say that climate change threatens the very existence of our civilization, and threatens to drive millions of species into extinction, and then they are opposed to one of the most important technologies that could bring about a resolution to that problem — replacing fossil fuels with nuclear energy.” “Greenpeace made a fairly serious mistake by lumping nuclear energy with nuclear weapons, as if all things nuclear were evil.” It is not evil, and for now, there is no other way out. Only the acceleration of the innovative development of nuclear energy can help resolve global environmental problems and support the sustainable development of mankind. References 1. Velikhov, E.P., et. al, Russia and Global Energy of the 21st Century [Rossiya v mirovoi energetike XXI veka]. Moscow: IzdAT, 2006, 136. 2. Asmalov, V. G., Zrodnikov, A. V. and Solonin, M. I., The Innovative Development of Russia’s Nuclear Energy [Innovatsionnoe razvitie yadernoi energetiki Rossii]. Atomnaya energiya. Vol. 103, September 2007.
27 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
RosAtom’s Social and Environmental Program
Igor Konyshev
Director, Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch, Rosatom; and Secretary, Public Council of RosAtom
Dear Dialogue Participants! My presentation will expand on the topic Evgeniy Evstratov touched on in his presentation and will focus on RosAtom’s efforts to address environmental and social problems in recent years. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) disposal has been a problem in Russia since the early days of the nuclear program in the mid-20th century. It is also an issue facing other countries, including the United States. Today we must all work to find a solution to this problem. Of the total volume of accumulated liquid radioactive waste (540 million m3) over half (330–340 million m3) is stored in service reservoirs at the Mayak complex in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. In order to solve the entire range of nuclear, radiation, and environmental safety issues, we need to decide on what approach to take, where the funding will come from, and how we can resolve these issues. Last year, Russia adopted a revolutionary new Federal Target Program (FTP) on nuclear and radiation safety. The FTP has identified two key points: the problems inherited from the Soviet Union in terms of radiation safety and radwaste are separate from the issues that will arise as new power plants are put into operation. We all know that over 90% of high-level and low-level waste is left over from the nuclear weapons program, and so the government accepts the financial burden of any programs that will dispose of those wastes. What is new about this approach is that the government has finally decided who will deal with these issues and how, and determined the funds that will be used. The total funding allocated for the FTP will be over RUB 130 billion. I want to talk about the security problems at Mayak as examples of problems that have been successfully resolved, or are being addressed most effectively. First of all, there are security issues concerning the Techa River reservoir dam, problems specific to Lake Karachai, and social problems, which appeared as a result of operations at Mayak. From 1949 to 1951, the Mayak plant used the Techa River for the final disposal of low- level radioactive waste. This waste disposal method was based on the same principle that was once adopted by the Americans, who used the Columbia River for the same purpose. Unfortunately, in our case there was no such major river next to the complex, so all of the waste classified as low-level was dumped in the shallow Techa River. In 1951, Mayak sharply reduced the amount of radwaste being flushed into the river and started building holding reservoirs. The Techa reservoir system now consists of four ponds and has accumulated around 330–340 million m3 of water containing low-level radwaste. The first problems that emerged were associated with the durability of the 11th reservoir’s locking dam. The first preventative measures that were taken by RosAtom in the last two years were aimed at building up and reinforcing this dam. The dam was
28 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY examined and it was found that as a result of the dam’s several building stages, there were places where the dam’s construction material was decompacting. The decision was made to radically reinforce the dam, and in 2006–2007, a 7–13 m deep trench was dug along its length, metal dowels were driven in, and the space between the dowels was filled with concrete. As a result, the dam was reinforced such that it became a Category 1 structure and can now be compared to a hydroelectric plant dam in terms of durability. By the end of 2007, we had fully secured the entire Techa reservoir system against accidents or other incidents for the long term. At the same time, we reviewed the hydrological and geological studies in the region. We have over 400 boreholes throughout the area through which we are continuously monitoring the migration of the ground waters from the Techa reservoir system. At the RosAtom Public Council, the Gidrospetsgeologiya Institute, which is part of Russia’s Ministry of Geology, presented a detailed report on the subject. Their conclusion was fairly optimistic: there is no significant migration of radionuclides through ground waters from the Techa reservoirs. The second stage of preventative measure involved reducing the load on the Techa reservoir system itself. Every year, Mayak’s facilities flush around 6 million m3 of water into the reservoir system. Around 100,000 m3 contain low-level radwaste, while the rest is regular industrial run-off which could be put directly into the water system after an additional decontamination step. To separate out these two flows and reduce the load on the reservoir system, a facility-wide plumbing water treatment system was installed for the Mayak production site. The first stage will be completed by the beginning of next year. Once the system is operating, it will keep 6 million tons out of the Techa reservoirs. Social problems, which appeared as early as in the 1950s in connection with activity at the Mayak facilities, primarily concerned the communities downstream along the Techa River. Most of these communities were resettled in the 1950s, since the Techa River was taken out of public use. The only major community that was left close to the Techa River was Muslyumovo. The village, in line with Russian law, is one of several where residents have the right to voluntary resettlement. Government programs are not very effective in this regard. In order to help people who want to move away from Muslyumovo, RosAtom and the government of the Chelyabinsk Oblast concluded an agreement to finance the resettlement. Here I would like to clarify one thing: the program initiated by RosAtom and the local government to resettle the residents of Muslyumovo is not a federal government program. RosAtom is the entity providing the funding in the amount of RUB 600 million. The targeted extra-budgetary financing for the social program comes from RosAtom profits. The money contributed by the Oblast is also not coming out of the federal budget, but from the region’s own profits. This is why you cannot use the same measuring stick for this program as you would for federal programs. These are not equivalent under the law. What is Unique about this Program? Before starting the resettlement process, the Chelyabinsk authorities conducted a survey among the residents. It turned out that far from all of the 741 households (over 2,000 residents) wanted to move to a single specified location. Some wanted to move to Chelyabinsk, some others wanted to join their relatives in Bashkortostan, someone else
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preferred to stay in the Kunashir Rayon, where Muslyumovo is located. Considering the fact that we did not find a consensus, we made the decision to offer resettlement on a voluntary basis by paying RUB 1 million for each Muslyumovo household. The goal was not to simply destroy the houses that make up the old village, but to offer real assistance to the residents who actually live there. The environmental conditions on the territory of the village were normal, the soil was clean, and all of the studies conducted up to 2006, as well as the ones conducted with the help of independent experts in 2006, showed that the soil met all safety criteria, including radiation standards. The only contamination noted is in the floodplain of the Techa River. It is obvious that the silt that contains strontium and cesium has contaminated the bottom of the river and its floodplain. Hypothetically, the people that use the river on a daily basis may be subjected to a greater radiation dose in one year than is permissible. No more than 45 people are in the risk zone. These people are primarily herders, their helpers, and people who live right on the riverbanks. If one observes standard hygiene and safety guidelines, there is nothing else there posing a health hazard. Unfortunately, the warning was not heeded by local residents and for 50 years, the residents continued using the river. Essentially, the decision to help people relocate was motivated by the fact that, when there is a river 200–300 meters from home, people can’t help but use it. The following has been achieved by the resettlement project: 410 agreements have been concluded with private individuals. Of these, 170 have purchased apartments in Chelyabinsk (RUB 1 million is sufficient for a 1-room apartment). About 100 families have stayed in the Kunashir Rayon while 70 individuals simply opted for compensation in the amount of RUB 1 million and moved away to live with their relatives. The problem we are now facing in connection to resettlement concerns the abandoned homes in Muslyumovo on privately-owned property.
30 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Press Conference
– Alexander Nikitin: The Federal Target Program for Nuclear and Radiation Safety was mentioned. Why was such an important program kept secret from the public? How can we be talking about this program needing to be made public if it is classified at the same time? – Evgeniy Evstratov: No one classified this Program. The complete information is restricted for internal use, but that’s not classified. The reason there is restricted access is that the Program concerns dual-use facilities. If we removed certain numbers from it, it could be made completely public. – Alexander Nikitin: So let’s take out those numbers and let’s make the info on the Program available to the public! – Igor Konyshev: RosAtom has not received a single request from public organizations asking to comment on the Program. When such a request is submitted, we would be glad to respond to it. – Lina Zernova: I wanted to ask about the fund for decommissioning nuclear power plants. Is this fund still receiving contributions? Where are these contributions coming from? What plans are there for this fund? Who controls it and is it open to the public? – Evgeniy Evstratov: All funds specified in Decrees 576 and 68 of the Russian Government are in operation today. In 2007, a total of RUB 2.5 billion was collected by the four funds. These funds are being used to finance on-going security operations. Before we can create fully functional funds to pay for future decommissioning of nuclear facilities and sites posing a radiation hazard, including nuclear power plants, we need a corresponding legislative framework. This framework does not exist today. We have been working on a law on facility decommissioning. This law would call for contributions to the facility decommissioning fund in the amount that would be needed at the time of the decommissioning, in accordance with project estimate documentation. – Tatiana Artemova, Posev Magazine: We know that Sergey Kiriyenko, the Director of RosAtom, announced in one of his appearances that no NPPs would be built in any parts of the country where more than half of the local population states that it is against the construction of new nuclear power plants. I wanted to clarify: are we talking about some kind of referendum and public opinion survey in a small nuclear city that would be adjacent to the plant, or, in the context of Saint Petersburg, would this include the larger city, even though Sosnovy Bor is not right next to it? – Igor Konyshev: Permission for the placement of a nuclear energy facility would be made by the municipality on the territory of which the facility is to be located. – Victoria, Interfax: I have a question regarding the law on radioactive waste. How is it different from analogous laws that existed previously? And could you also speak about the timeline for the creation of the national operator entity? – Evgeniy Evstratov: The law is scheduled for adoption this year. The national operator would be created in 2009. The main way this law differs from all its predecessors is the recognition by the government of its financial and legal liability for all radioactive waste accumulated during the Soviet era, for the nuclear program of those days. The government has also accepted the responsibility for designating radwaste producers,
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operator companies, and their current financial liability. It also accepted responsibility for retaining ownership of radioactive in the context of long-term storage, which is a period of 50 or more years, and deep geological disposal. – Alexander Shkrebets, Transborder Ecological Information Agency, Saint Petersburg: How much is being done to develop an alternative energy program that does not involve nuclear power? – Igor Konyshev: As the state agency in charge of nuclear energy, we have great respect for development of other sources of energy; however, we do not pursue the development of alternative energy programs ourselves. – Lina Zernova: In 2006, Sergey Kiriyenko stated that, starting in 2008, they will start taking spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Leningrad Power Plant to Krasnoyarsk, where storage facilities will have been built for that purpose. When will this process begin? – Evgeniy Evstratov: Late 2009, early 2010. – Ekaterina Katkova, ITAR-TASS: This is a question about the construction of the Kaliningrad NPP. This is the first time when foreign investors are given access to an NPP construction project? How will this be carried out and how will security be ensured under these conditions? – Igor Konyshev: This is the first time when 49% of the shares of the total capital can be given to private investors, including domestic ones. Here the issues of security and control over nuclear materials are still the responsibility of the Russian government. – Lina Zernova: The power generation capacities of the Leningrad NPP-2 currently being built are being called “replacement capacities.” Is there a timeline for decommissioning the reactors currently in operation at the Leningrad NPP-1? What is it and will it be made public? – Ashot Nasibov: Yes, of course there is a timeline, and it will be discussed in detail in my presentation. – A. N. Frolov, Dom Prirody newspaper: This is a question for the defenders of nuclear energy and nuclear neutrons who say it is the only option. I wanted to point out that U-235, which is being used here, is the only material that can be used in the future for space flights. If we use it up now, we are effectively preventing humanity, for many thousands of years, from using power installations on space flight vehicles. There is nuclear power than can be generated from U-238 instead of thermal neutrons. Do you think that, in an effort to save ourselves from an oil shortage, we will end up confining humanity to staying on Earth in perpetuity? – Igor Konyshev: I believe that the fears are exaggerated. The natural uranium deposits in Russia are sufficient to sustain the nuclear energy sector in Russia at its current rate of growth for at least 100 years. By the time there really is a space flight program using nuclear-powered vehicles, I think there will be some other way uranium would be used in our thermal reactors. - [Unintelligible question from the public television security service] – Igor Konyshev: Because the residents of Saint Petersburg have recently been concerned over the transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride, I will repeat once more, to avoid any alternate interpretations: Russia has never imported, does not import, and has no plans to import radioactive waste. Second point: depleted uranium hexafluoride is not a
32 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY form of radioactive waste. We consider it a raw material that we bring into the country for enrichment. The transportation aspect complies with all technical and security requirements in accordance with applicable regulations, including physical protection. – Sergey Baranovsky: This is why we have gathered here today, to discuss these details: what is safe, what isn’t? What must we do about it? What measures are needed, how much will it cost, and who will do the work? How will the public react: will it take a constructive approach or will it be confrontational? The public has a huge number of reasons to be concerned. People live in environmentally poor conditions, both in large urban centers and any of the regions that have been affected by waste, whether radioactive, chemical, or industrial. System-wide measures are needed, but they require enormous expenditures. The government must spend a great deal to ensure environmental safety. Environmentalists, radical and otherwise, are all in favor of this. We must look for solutions to these problems, but we must do it in a civilized manner. We need to put forward constructive solutions, which were discussed at length at this event. A lot has been done with respect to the Techa River and Lake Karachai, and this has been done for the first time. For many years, during the Soviet years and in today’s Russia, these problems were left unaddressed. These are the first steps in the right direction. We must welcome them and help the government solve these problems. – Igor Konyshev: As for absolute numbers, I can give you a simple example: The effect on the general environmental situation in the region attributable to nuclear facilities and activities is no more than 0.5–3%. If we are talking about the Angar Electrolysis Combine, for example, where nuclear raw materials are brought in for enrichment, its contribution to environmental pollution has been estimated at 0.2%. Coal thermal power plants, oil refineries, and the construction industry are responsible for the remainder of 100%. - Kai Asbern Knutsen, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature: I was sitting at Samson, a local cafe, and both the air conditioner and the heating were running. Do you have any energy conservation programs? The population must understand that, if energy is conserved, then additional nuclear power plants might not be necessary. - Igor Konyshev: That is a bold statement, that if we fully implement an energy conservation program, we would not need to build more power plants. Whether we like it or not, the primary reason there is an increase in energy demand in Russia is household energy use. The growth in that sector is significant: it is 5-6 times greater than the levels observed in the mid 1990s. I agree that energy conservation is one of the most pressing issues around the world. Within the nuclear energy industry itself, we have long transitioned to using energy efficient lighting and other energy conservation systems that let us to significantly reduce our energy use. As regards the general population, where the government and the administrations of major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg are concerned, the issue of energy conservation is already in the public domain. It is not only being discussed, it is also being addressed. - Alexander Shkrebets: If we consider that energy loss in the Murmansk Oblast is at 30%, and if we do the math, we’ll see that the Kola NPP is heating the Far North. Taking this into consideration, the issue of energy conservation ought to be given priority in your work. - Igor Konyshev: There are two sides to the energy conservation issue. From the point of view of the economic development of these territories, as much as we might not like
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the idea, major metal processing plants and other facilities with complex technological processes require the construction of additional power-hungry facilities. We cannot compensate the energy use of an aluminum processing plant by simply implementing energy conservation measures. We can’t do it using wind or tidal energy either. We completely agree that alternative energy technologies are necessary, but they are needed to serve as local energy resources for remote settlements. The energy consumption there is low, but the cost of the infrastructure and the energy loss of those systems would be much higher than the amount of energy actually being consumed. As for major industrial centers, we need a stable energy generation system; nuclear energy is one component of such a system. The best scenarios would be to have the following power supply structure by 2025: nuclear power - 25%, thermal power - 25%, hydropower - 25%, and power from natural gas - 25%. Right now we are favoring natural gas. It accounts for just under half of our power supply today, in terms of total power generated from it. In reality — and Mendeleev said it himself — if you are using natural gas as fuel, you might as well just use banknotes. This is why nuclear energy needs to take over its share in the balance. - Sergey Lisovskii, Ekologiia Society: This question concerns the personnel policy of RosAtom. Kiriyenko said that just 5–7 years are left for the older generation to transmit its knowledge to the new generation. If they don’t make it, the nuclear industry will be left in the lurch. There won’t be people to keep this massive infrastructure work smoothly. To what extend is this issue being addressed? It seems to me that RosAtom does not give it the attention it deserves. It is feeding off of itself instead of trying to prepare people that would understand all aspects of how nuclear energy works. – Igor Konyshev: The personnel issue has always had two parts. Yes, we must train the personnel, but then we need to recruit them and retain them. The nuclear industry is making efforts in both areas and has done a lot to both recruit and retain personnel. In recent years, the average salaries of nuclear industry employees have gone up significantly, especially in the peaceful-use sector. As for the second aspect, we conducted an audit of educational institutions where students who aim to work in the nuclear industry are studying. We were happy with what we saw. The resources we had during the time of the Soviet Union have not disappeared; they have steadily grown. The main challenge is to bring the educational factor closer to the industrial factor, so that these young specialists stay within the industry. This is the objective of the global social programs being carried out within the nuclear sector.
34 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Civil Society and Nuclear Activities: From Risks Perception to a Strategy of Developing our Territory
Marie Kirchner and Anne-Marie Duchemin Members of the Council of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. We are genuinely excited to be here today and to continue our progressive work with Russia. The President of Pays du Cotentin sent us a message to share with you: “Jean-Pierre Dupont, President of Pays du Cotentin, brings you his best regards. Since 2002, personal and fruitful relations have been built with Russian actors in the nuclear field and specifically with the Leningrad Region. These relations were driven by Mrs. Marie Kirchner, who will speak today with Mrs. Anne-Marie Duchemin. They are citizens from Pays du Cotentin, and Members of the Development Council. They will express their personal views, illustrating the diversity of opinions in our territory about nuclear activities. This sensitive topic brings forth various debates inside our territory, where different nuclear industries are implemented, which enables and encourages progression. May your Dialogue be successful and give the opportunity of fruitful exchanges.” The topic for my speech today is identifying direct and indirect impacts that nuclear activities entail on a region, and also how to recognize and comprehend accurate risk perception in creating a workable strategy of development in our territory. The creation of the mentioned strategy of development relies heavily on exchanges of experiences, strengthening the need to for nations to cooperate on various levels. This is not a forum to advocate democratic ideals, because, frankly, we have many political improvements to undertake in France but merely attempting to elucidate on our local experience in exchange for the conception of new ideas and constructs. We are also not specialists with international laws but we can provide a quick overview concerning this topic in relation to our particular work. At the end of my presentation, Anne-Marie Duchemin will enlighten you on the perspective of a grassroots activist organization, which is involved in environment protection specifically. If you have any questions, we’ll be pleased to answer them after the presentations. A nuclear industrial project undertaking always commences with the same imperative step: citizens are asked to give their opinion during a two phase process at
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either a local or a national level. The questions consist of something along the lines of whether or not the citizens are pro or against the general idea, and, where there are any proposals put on the table, citizens can submit their comments for the debate. Some of these pre-existing practices may be seen as stepping stone mechanisms for an already decided agenda and that idea has to also be considered. The question of differentiating who actually has the final decision is very important because during a public debate, the decision belongs to the private owner but during a public inquiry, the decision is made by the State. At the very beginning of a project, the public often has expresses fears about it, and because nuclear projects are not widely understood at a technical level, there are often misconceptions of risks that the public presumes. This hesitant behavior portrayed by the public is normal and frequent and it concerns most projects, not only nuclear, in all ‘high-level risk’ industries, for example, projects with risk of chemical pollution or industrial accident. Let’s remember the principles and values of sustainable development: • Caution: Do not wait for an accident; • Prevention: Better prevent than cure; • Good management: He who takes it slow and steady goes a long way; • Responsibility: He who pollutes pays • Participation: All actors must be involved • Solidarity: Let’s give to our children a better world. The historical participation of citizens in state affairs come from Greece, at the time of Eschyle and Platoon, who described the functioning of the Town of Athens. Here in Russia, we visited the town of Novgorod during our travel in 2005. It is an ancient town, which always uniquely practiced democracy. Yet participative democracy was activated only very recently, and many improvements still need to take place. There are various texts written recently and organizations capable of providing better information and better advice for citizen implication in public life, particularly concerning nuclear industry which should be used. The main point, which must be insisted upon, is openness, that authorities exchange information with the public regularly and provide updates on recent developments. • First of all, at European level, there is the Aarhus Convention. My colleague, Anne-Marie Duchemin will add some comments in a few minutes concerning this Convention. • At State level, there is a Chart and an Environmental Code, a Parliament Office for Scientific and Technical Choices, an independent Authority of Safety, which is a National Commission for Public Debate. Also, a High Committee for Transparency and Information about nuclear safety has been created in March 2008. There were different ideals, primarily openness to more missions, better legitimacy and more independence, transparency and communication. I am merely mentioning these organizations for your broad information, but I’m not qualified to present the different organizations and their evolution. The otherwise isolated citizen is more than welcome in a public debate, but the preference is usually to be represented or to act via various organizations. At a local
36 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY level, in every territory concerned by one or more controlled nuclear areas, there is a Local Information Committee, composed of elected people, scientific members and organization representatives. There are also environmental protection organizations, farmers, tourism actors, trade unions and trade centers. These people are gathered at a national level in an organization called the National Association of Local Information Committees (ANCLI). At European level, there is another organization, called the European Commission of Local Information Committees (EUROCLI) with the same objectives. A Community of Practices Concerning Radioactive Waste Management (COWAM) also exists at European level. Our main local structure is called the Development Council of Pays du Cotentin. It is a forum to provide strong ideas and suggestions to elected officials. It’s composed of 4 chambers that include elected officials, local business owners, various organization representatives, and other qualified people who are not part of the above mentioned categories, such as Directors of universities, hospitals or writers. When the treatment and recycling plant was built between 1964 and 1966 in our region, there was an offshoot of development as well due to an increase in population. Schools were created, the road network was modernized to facilitate mobility, the electricity network was improved, houses and surrounding farms were renovated. Often, one person from each family was working at the plant, which played a role in the increased employment rate in the area. Essentially people’s standard of living improved. This influence of the public is favorable if the health and safety of workers and population are insured. We faced controversy concerning health, for example, from the report from the French Professor Viel about children’s leukemia. Today, we know that there is no influence of the plant on the local health. But the opposite is also a true possibility: a decrease of nuclear industrial activity would have some consequences on the society, such as the closure of classes in schools, decrease of financial compensation, shut down of local, grassroots businesses Moving away from fear and antagonism to an inquisitive yet open attitude requires verbal communication and respectful and constructive exchanges, defined by a balanced relationship. Finding out how to switch from a prolonged and negative situation to a proactive solution, which will be a positive change for the next generations, requires an exchange of experience with other territories. Not all elements in this conversation are positive, of course, and we can talk more about our difficulties later on if you wish. I also fully understand that this is a time-consuming and lengthy process. I also want to stress the possibility of this process despite its’ apparent difficulty. The first step is that facilities must be safe. The public must not succumb to fear and has to understand the main risks and solutions found by the directors of the facilities and other individuals in charge to reduce all plausible risk. A long international reference of experiences exists in different countries. Through these tested techniques risks are now under control, and although they still exist they are more managed. The importance of crises exercises with a population, education in risk management, importance of training, quality of material implemented, facilities modifications, respect of usual operating procedures has to be underlined. There must also be independent controls set up on different levels: internal and external. The results have to be communicated to population in a comprehensive way. Citizens and environment protection associations are aware actors that are concerned about air and water quality and safety.
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I am partial to the method of participation of French citizens which consists of the public at large before the debate or public inquiry to maintain a questioning and more importantly a non-aggressive attitude through the debates. We should remember that industrials are citizens. So they need a safe environment for themselves and their families as well, they are also part of our world. So in conclusion, I’d like to offer the audience a question: Let’s think about the conditions which are allowed to perpetuate a democratic functioning. Which guarantee do we have that these conditions will be respected? And now, let me introduce Mrs. Anne-Marie Duchemin, member of Council of Development of Pays du Cotentin, belonging to an environment protection association, who will express her point of view. Aarhus Convention has existed since June 25, 1998 and it was signed by our two countries. Its aims are to give the citizens the right to a healthy environment, information concerning the evolution of their environment and the access to justice, if the above mentioned regulations are not respected. The field of this convention is immense and critical for all of us, but its applications in the French laws are too far slow and absolutely unknown by the population. Thank you so much for giving us such an opportunity to speak to you about these issues. This is quite unusual and I wish we could see this convention more accessible in the future. I’d like to share some examples of the application in France, some positive results and what other fields of thought that they can lead to. Although we are allowed to express our opposition, to criticize, to suggest, as expected in the text, there hasn’t been any tangible real result so far. I’ll tell you some recent examples on our territory. First of all, there is the very sensitive topic of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). The access by public to objective information is reduced by the industry. Through new technologies, organizations driven by private citizens try to share information they have, try to proceed in trial actions and to bring with them the necessary local documents. Another point: the building of EPR, the new reactor in Flamanville, France, illustrates a disregard of the Aarhus Convention. It was voted by our Parliament on May 20, 2004 in spite of the Advisory Commission created the year before by the government, and before a public debate could take place. Now, our associations work with volunteers and scientists who share similar opinions to confirm the noxiousness of Very High Tension Lines. They will be built to transport electricity from the reactor through existing lines. We are confident in the professionalism of nuclear workers from different industries, because we live in the same territory; they share the same risks as us. Our questioning unfurl from the concern of a long term vision about the evolution of chemical and radioactive wastes. Access to information is very important for all of us, as well as how we should use that information in realizing the ability of sustainable development and to respect the health of the citizens of our land today and in the future. Some less sensitive topics open some hope: • The improvement of the management of the drinkable water in the Urban Community of Cherbourg, thanks to a local elected official. His management of water, which is now under the responsibility of municipal authorities, has improved the quality and the price of the service for the citizens.
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• The management of domestic wastes progressed under the pressure of local organizations with a process of gas treatment, coming from the transformation of organic waste into production of energy. This new process called methanization was laughed at some years ago. • Reduction of release in atmosphere. The study of Jean-François Viel ten years ago upset the conscience of The Hague inhabitants. They were in trouble because he admitted the possibility that there were more leukemia cases in children observed for those who often frequented the beaches near the reprocessing plant. This development finally ended in a positive note. The results were not statistically significant, so the local population felt better. Since this incident, important efforts were made by the industry to decrease release in atmosphere. Also, in response, Local Information Committees were created. We are all on the same planet. We are all responsible for what we are doing now and in the future. As far as we are concerned, in France, we have a lot of work to do, if we want the application of the laws concerning the quality of water to be ensured. For instance, one of our goals right now is to achieve the good ecological state of water in 2015 yet important contradictions still exist between the targets of European regulations and existing agriculture practices. If you have any question, I’ll try to answer them if I can, with the eye of a simple citizen open to the world and full of determination, coming from the Pays du Cotentin.
Conclusion Marie Kirchner: Ladies and gentlemen, now it’s up to us to transform each opportunity in a win-win situation in our territories, taking into account the civil society, industry and the interest of future generations. Your future actions, like ours, whatever they are, will impact our planet. Because we understand both the interests and risks, we have to become actors of the strategy of development of our territory. At the beginning, Anne-Marie Duchemin and I had a different point of view concerning nuclear activities. Now, we share the same interests concerning our territory for present and future citizens. I’d like to thank you so much for your kind invitation to share our ideas. Now, if there are any questions, we’ll attempt to answer them to the best of our ability.
39 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY Developments at RosEnergoAtom and Its Public Image
Ashot Nasibov Director, Public Relations Center, RosEnergoAtom
At present, RosEnergoAtom is the operator of 10 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Russia (31 power units, over 23 GW of installed capacity). The company produces roughly 16% of the country’s electricity, and about 30% of electricity in Western Russia (40% in Russia’s Northwest). The events that took place in the late 1980s brought nuclear energy development in Russia to a halt. Right up until 2007, no new construction projects were started, and only power units whose construction was started in Soviet times were put into operation.
The following events took place during 1998–2005: • Construction was completed & operations were launched at Volgodon NPP- 1 and Kalinin NPP-3; • A modernization and service life extension program was initiated at: Novovoronezh NPP-3 and NPP-4, Kola NPP-1 and NPP-2, Leningrad NPP- 1 and NPP-2, Kursk NPP-1 and NPP-2, and Bilibin NPPs 1-4; • Construction of radioactive waste (radwaste) treatment facilities began; • Investments increased from RUB 3 billion in promissory notes in 1998 to RUB 24 billion in 2005.
The following events took place after 2005: • The Russian government adopted the Federal Target Program (FTP) for the Development of Nuclear Industrial Energy in Russia (2007–2010 with an outlook to 2015); • Development of the NPP-2006 project began; • Construction resumed at the Beloyarsk NPP facilities (BN-800), and work is underway to complete construction at Volgodon NPP-2 and Kalinin NPP-4; • New premises were set up at Novovoronezh NPP-2 and Leningrad NPP-2; • Engineering companies were created; • A capacity expansion program was launched at operational NPPs; • Construction of the first floating NPP was started; • Investments in 2006–2008 nearly doubled each year: RUB 35 billion in 2006, RUB 60 billion in 2007, and RUB 120 billion in 2008.
Plans are in place to launch new power units starting in 2009: • One per year until 2012; • Two per year during 2012–2014; • At least 3 in 2015 (4 under the supplementary program); • In 2009–2020, 32 GW will be phased in, while 3.7 GW will be phased out; • By 2020, Russia’s installed NPP capacity will amount to less than 51 GW
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(or less than 59 GW under the supplementary program; currently it is less than 23 GW).
The following expenses are envisaged in the 2008 budget: • Safe power unit operations: RUB 5 billion; • Extending operations at first and second generation units: RUB 17 billion; • Handling spent nuclear fuel and radwaste: RUB 13 billion; • New constructions: up to RUB 80 billion. The nuclear energy Federal Target Program (FTP) presumes expenses of RUB 1.5 trillion between now and 2015. One condition that dictates the need to develop nuclear energy in Russia is the increase in energy consumption, which amounted to 3.3% in 2006 and 3.2% in 2007 (without accounting for seasonal factors). Energy consumption increased 5.5% in January – March 2008. The structure of energy consumption is also changing primarily due to growth in the commercial and residential sectors, in combination with maintained growth in the industrial sector. For example, Dagestan is currently the leader in terms of relative growth: the lack of major industry has resulted in the rapid development of residential construction. Another example is the Moskva Hotel across from the Kremlin. The old hotel was hooked up to a 2 MW power source. Now that the hotel has been reconstructed, it requires 40 MW of power. Since July 1, 2008, after the restructuring process at RAO UES of Russia, RosEnergoAtom became the largest power company in Russia. There is growing interest in the company and its role in business processes. The media are increasingly less interested in the safety or radioactive levels of an NPP, and more interested in its development, expenses and profits. Over the past year and a half, the public ceased to see the company as a component of RAO UES of Russia. RosEnergoAtom is a socially responsible company. In 2007, the taxes owed by the Smolensk NPP to local budgets at various levels amounted to 28% of the budget of the entire Smolensk Region, and those of the Bilibin NPP represented 23% of the Chukotka Autonomous Region’s budget. Over the course of 2007, average worker salaries at the company increased by approximately 40%. For example, monthly wages at the Volgodon NPP increased 56% and reached over RUB 30,000.
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Innovative Nuclear Reactor Projects
Vyacheslav Kuznetsov Kurchatov Institute Russian Science Center
Yuriy Cherepnin Director of Research and Development, Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering
According to published global development scenarios, during 2000–2050, global consumption of energy will increase by an average of 2.5 times, while demand for electricity will rise by an average of 4.7 times (1, 2). At present, there are no universal means of resolving our energy problems. However, we do have a number of realistic opportunities to meet the energy needs for the sustainable development of mankind over the next several decades: • Increasing production efficiency and using electricity based on traditional fossil fuel resources; • Expanding the fields in which renewable energy sources can be applied, such as: wind, solar energy, geothermal energy, and biomass; • Catching carbon dioxide emissions at power plants operating on fossil fuels (coal, in particular); and • Increasing the use of nuclear energy. Most development scenarios predict a major, steady increase in the use of nuclear energy. During its relatively short history, spanning just over the last 50 years, the expectations and predictions about the development and use of nuclear energy in different regions around the world have dramatically changed from enthusiastic assessment to total pessimism. Remarkably, the role of nuclear energy has undergone considerable reassessment, even in a number of countries where it was first used (3). The nuclear energy crisis began much earlier than the Chernobyl disaster. For example, in the United States in the late 1970s, there was virtually zero demand for NPPs. The most obvious reason was the Three Mile Island accident, which made bad circumstances even worse. This was the world’s first serious accident at a nuclear power plant. Its psychological effect on those living near the NPP, and eventually the whole of the Western world, was enormous. The blow was felt by the plant itself and the reputation of nuclear energy in general was tarnished. However, on a global scale, the percentage of electricity generated at NPPs continued to rise, although the growth of the nuclear power sector did begin to slow down. In 1981, the share of nuclear energy in electricity generation reached 9.1%. By 1987, that number grew to 16.2%. Later, the percentage of nuclear energy generation stabilized, as the growth rate fell to equal the global growth rate of electricity generation. Over the past 16 years, the rise in electricity generation at NPPs has kept pace with growth in electricity production as a whole, and, as a result, by the beginning of the 21st century, global nuclear electricity generation came to a stop at 16% of global electricity generation (see Figure 1). According to data from the IAEA, 31 countries around the world operated 442 nuclear reactors with a total generating capacity of 370 GW(e) in 2007.
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Figure 1. The percentage of different energy resources in global electricity generation (Nuclear Technology Review, IAEA, 2007). The United States, France and Japan are three countries accounting for nearly half of the total number of nuclear reactors worldwide and 57% of all nuclear electricity production. The nuclear energy sector is most developed in the United States (103 reactors), France (59), Russia (31), and Great Britain (23). Sixteen countries receive at least 20% of their consumed electricity from NPPs. In a number of countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, South Korea, Switzerland, Slovenia and Ukraine, nuclear energy provides for over one-third of energy needs. The NPPs in Japan, Germany and Finland satisfy approximately 25% of electricity needs. In general, the countries of the European Union (EU) currently have a cumulative 152 reactors producing 31% of all electricity in the EU (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. The percentage of various energy resources in electricity generation in the EU.
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The IAEA predicts that by 2020, the world will have an additional 60 reactors and NPP-generated electricity will increase by 65%. In 2007, 28 new reactors were built. In addition, 62 reactors are currently waiting for construction permits, while another 162 are in the design stage. The NPP fleets in Japan and France are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3. Nuclear power plants in Japan.
Figure 4. A look at nuclear power in France.
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Nearly all of the world’s nuclear power plants outside of Russia are comprised of water-cooled thermal reactors. These are second generation PWR, BWR, and CANDU reactors, including their modified variants. Since the mid-1980s, the construction of NPPs was suspended in the United States and in Western European countries for various, primarily economic reasons. During this period, the construction of nuclear reactors was stopped on the territory of the former USSR, where the growing economic and political problems did not permit the continuation of the large-scale energy program. Accidents at the Three Mile Island (USA) and Chernobyl (USSR) contributed to the slowdown in the development of global nuclear energy. Moderate growth in nuclear generation over these years was observed in Japan, the Republic of Korea and several developing countries. The most developed countries in terms of nuclear energy of North America and Europe have contributed almost nothing to recent growth. Countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienced a systemic decline in development as a result of the economic crisis and the fall of USSR, which became the main reason for suspending nuclear energy development there. Global nuclear generation trends by region are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. NPP capacity growth trends by region (including increased output of operating reactors). After a continued period of stagnation, the early 21st century is marked by the emergence of steady, positive trends in global nuclear energy development (see Figure 6). Meeting increased energy demand will inevitably require the use of more accessible opportunities for energy generation, including nuclear energy, which has huge potential and can help meet future energy demands without increasing carbon dioxide emissions and other pollutants (see Figure 7). A reevaluation of the role of nuclear energy in global energy generation has taken place over the past few years. In many countries, including Russia, the energy deficit has become a reality much more quickly than was expected. Countries where nuclear
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energy is well developed have kept abreast of modernizing reactors (second generation) and the construction, in this period of transition, of third-generation post-Chernobyl NPP designs. These reactors (EPR, AP-1000 and ABWR) meet the appropriate safety and environmental requirements and standards and resolve today’s energy problems. However, they do not fully meet the requirements that have been set out, first and foremost in terms of the cost efficiency, fuel supply, and protection against nuclear proliferation. They must be replaced with new reactors and nuclear fuel cycle technologies (fourth- generation), which will facilitate a gradual transition to competitive and safe energy generation with an unlimited resource base running on a self-generated supply of fissile isotopes (see Figure 9).
Figure 6. Installed capacity of the world’s nuclear reactors over time (MWe).
Figure 7. Relative energy potential of Russia’s natural resources.
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A government strategy for the long-term development of nuclear energy (Russia’s Nuclear Energy Development Strategy in the First Half of the 21st Century) was first developed in Russia (see Figure 10). At present, a number of countries have also developed long-term national nuclear energy development programs. China, for example, is planning the construction of new NPPs that will have a combined capacity of nearly 40 GW by 2020. China is laying in a diversification policy in the nuclear field, which is why it plans to build reactors based on Russian, French, American and Canadian designs, in addition to own Chinese reactors. Japan has developed a baseline scenario for developing nuclear capacities up until 2150.
Figure 8. A comparison of Generation II reactors with simpler Generation III reactors.
Figure 9. A fast reactor using the U-Pu fuel cycle.
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By the start of the 21st century, it had become clear that an option for developing global nuclear energy might become a reality only if it is more cost-effective, if safety is increased, if radwaste is more efficiently dealt with, and if the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reduced. Another important factor is that public policy ought to focus on generating energy that does not result in the formation of carbon dioxide (see Figure 11). International nuclear energy projects under the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and Generation IV Initiative have analyzed measures that are crucial for retaining nuclear energy as a serious alternative to reducing greenhouse gas emissions while meeting the growing demand for electricity. As a result, experts have come to the conclusion that, in order to achieve the successful, large-scale transition to nuclear energy, there are four key issues that must first be resolved:
Figure 10. The Federal Target Program roadmap for developing the nuclear energy industry (RAEPK).
Figure 11. Global nuclear energy in 2007. 48 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
1. Cost. On the free market, the cost of energy generated at new nuclear power plants will not be competitive with the cost of energy produced from coal and natural gas. However, this difference may be reduce d by rationally lowering capital and operational expenses, technical maintenance services, and by reducing the construction period. The trade-off with regard to carbon emissions, for example, if the relevant decision is taken by the government, could give nuclear energy certain cost advantages. 2. Safety. The lessons learned from the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl have forced us to take additional measures to increase NPP safety around the world in order to resolve the problem with the most probable (foreseen) and serious (unforeseen) accidents. Modern reactor design can help minimize the risk of major accidents. Save for reactor operations, we know little about the safety of the fuel cycle as a whole. 3. Waste. The deep geological placement of waste is technically possible, although it needs to be refined and demonstrated in practice. There is no convincing evidence that modern closed fuel cycles, including treatment of spent fuel and long-term waste management, will have any advantages capable of outweighing short-term risks and expenses. 4. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Today’s international guarantee-based non-proliferation regime is not compatible with resolving the security issues associated with the expansion of nuclear energy as envisaged in global development scenarios. The treatment of irradiated fuel that is used today in Europe, Japan and Russia, which involves extracting and treating plutonium, carries the risk of illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The critical factor for the future development of nuclear energy is the fuel cycle selected, including the type of fuel that is used, the types of reactors used to “burn” the fuel, and the methods used to bury spent fuel. The choice of fuel cycle affects all four of the key issues associated with nuclear energy: cost, safety, the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation, and waste burial. At the same time, there are three potential representative options for fuel cycles: 1. Traditional thermal reactors use an open fuel cycle, in which the spent fuel is immediately sent for burial. 2. There are also thermal reactors that use a closed fuel cycle, which means that the waste is separated from unusable fissile materials and is reprocessed into reactor fuel. This includes the fuel cycle that is currently used in a number of countries, in which plutonium is separated from the spent fuel and is then used to prepare a mixed uranium- plutonium oxide fuel (MOX fuel) that is then reprocessed into reactor fuel for one-time use. 3. Another option involves fast neutron reactors using a closed fuel cycle, which means the use of thermal reactors with the widely used open fuel cycle and a corresponding number of fast reactors that destroy actinides which are separated from the spent thermal reactor fuel. Fast reactors and installations for fuel processing and fabrication must be situated in close proximity to one another in the secure nuclear energy fleets of industrially-developed countries. Nuclear energy could become a sustainable source of global energy for many decades, if only it will be possible to resolve the problems we face today. Compared to other energy technologies, nuclear energy possesses important properties which allow
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it to take on a major part of growing energy needs, stabilizing or even reducing demand for fossil fuels: • Nuclear fuel is potentially inexhaustible and offers millions of times more concentrated energy, which will drastically reduce volume and costs in transporting raw materials; • Waste from nuclear energy is produced in relatively low volumes and can be securely contained, while more hazardous types of waste could be burned in nuclear reactors. Global demand for electricity over the next 50–100 years can be satisfied with the help of fourth-generation reactors, which will not have the flaws of their predecessors and will run on an inexhaustible supply of self-generated raw material (4). While there are no such reactor systems in place today, the work has only just begun and is underway as part of the international projects under Generation IV and INPRO, where Russia is an active participant. Today, concepts for six reactors have been selected; these reactors will be capable of meeting the set requirements. One or two reactor systems of these six will be recommended for further development and expansion. It is expected that this selection will be made after research has been completed, no earlier than 2025 (see Table 1). Table 1. A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy System (Source: US DOE, 2002). Range of Fuel Cycle Capacity Uses Neutrons VHTR (Very High Generating electricity, Temperature thermal open average hydrogen, industrial-use Reactor) heat SCWR (Super thermal, open, Critical Water large Generating electricity fast closed Reactor) Generating electricity GFR (Gas-cooled average – and hydrogen, burning fast closed Fast Reactor) large long-lived radioactive isotopes (actinides) Generating electricity LFR (Lead- small – and hydrogen, burning Cooled Fast fast closed large long-lived radioactive Reactor) isotopes (actinides) Generating electric- SFR (Sodium- average – ity, burning long-lived Cooled Fast fast closed large radioactive isotopes Reactor) (actinides) Generating electric- MSR (Molten-Salt ity, burning long-lived thermal closed large Reactor) radioactive isotopes (actinides)
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The outlook for nuclear energy development is closely tied today to nuclear technology based on fast reactors and a closed fuel cycle. The latter means reprocessing spent NPP fuel and using the resulting plutonium. This will help increase the energy potential of nuclear energy fuel resources by 100 times. It is important to note that the unique physical properties of fast reactors also facilitate the combustion of high-level radioactive waste produced by nuclear energy generation, which complicates their burial. That is why fast reactors have been selected for Russia’s Nuclear Energy Development Strategy in the first half of the 21st century and as a promising energy technology under the Generation IV international programs adopted by leading nuclear countries. As a result, the following stages of nuclear technological development can be expected in the 21st century: • Short-term (10–20 years): The evolutionary development of reactors and fuel cycle technologies (LBR, water-based treatment methods), development and test-regime use of improved and innovative reactor technologies and fuel cycle technologies (BN, BTGR, small reactors, dry treatment methods). • Mid-term (30–40 years): Active growth of nuclear energy, expansion of the total scale by 4–5 times, demonstrations and mastering innovative technologies. • Long-term (50–100 years): The large-scale expansion of innovative fast reactor technologies and natural, safe fuel cycle technologies, the expansion of fuel production, closed U-Pu and Th-U cycles, the use of useful isotopes and combustion of hazardous isotopes, the long-term deep geological burial of radwaste, high-temperature reactors, small reactors, the production of hydrogen and water desalination.
References 1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Guidance for the Evaluation of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. IAEA-TECDOC-1362. June 2003. 2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Methodology for the Assessment of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, Report of Phase 1B (First Part) of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), IAEA- TECDOC-1434. Vienna: IAEA, 2004. 3. The Future of Nuclear Power. An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, 2003. 4. A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy System. DOE USA. 2002.
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Efficient and Safe Use of Nuclear Technologies in Russia’s Northwest
Anatoliy Eperin Scientific Director and First Deputy Director, Institute for Nuclear Energy, Saint Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast
Russia is experiencing today a period of rapid growth in its industrial and agricultural sectors. Energy generation forms the basis for this growth and the energy sector must ensure that energy generation levels consistently exceed energy use by at least 13–18%. Considering the exhaustible nature of fossil fuels and the detrimental effect their use has on the environment and human health (i.e., removal of oxygen, release of СО2, acid rain, and radioactive ash), the government is planning a gradual shift to using nuclear power plants (NPPs) to meet the bulk of our energy needs. The transition will take place under the Federal Target Program (FTP) for Developing the Nuclear Energy Industry in Russia from 2007–2010 with an outlook to 2015. The FTP will be followed by the implementation of the Nuclear Energy Development Strategy for the first half of the 21st century, which calls for more efficient use of raw materials for nuclear power generation, as well as the use of a closed fuel cycle using fast neutron reactors, all the while keeping radiation under control. The nuclear energy sectors in the world’s leading countries have mastered the use of large capacity reactors and can eliminate the possibility of major accidents resulting from reactor core damage. Much attention has been accorded to developing a culture of safety and improving the reliability of nuclear power installations. Four reactors will be added to the Leningrad NPP-2 as part of the planned capacity increase. Together with the continued operation of Leningrad NPP-1 reactors, the expected annual output will equal 56 billion KWh, enabling the launch of several industrial projects currently under construction in the Northwest and to lay an undersea cable between the NPP and Finland (EnergoSetProekt has provided a feasibility study). The electric cable will be used to export excess output to Finland, Sweden, and Germany, in a manner analogous to how communication cables are used. At the same time, electric power use around the clock will be evened out with the NPP and thermal power plants operating in normal mode. This will be achieved by: • Reinforcing the electric link between power grids in Russia’s West and East (widely discussed in the press); • Building an electrolysis plant that would operate at nighttime and produce hydrogen (Н2) to be used in place of gasoline (H2 combustion produces Н2О). We have been producing, storing, and using Н2 at the Leningrad NPP for the purpose of generator cooling using electrolyzers for over 30 years; • Building electric boilers that use electric energy during nighttime (the hydro
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unit of the Leningrad NPP has experience with this); • Increasing the number of manufacturing businesses operating at night. As the RBMK-1000 reactor is phased out, in order to continue the production of radioactive isotopes needed for industrial use and other civil applications (the medical field, Cobalt-60, radioactive silicon, etc.), we may consider a recommendation resulting from the international call for tenders held in the 1990s in St. Petersburg. It calls for the construction of a MKER-1000 channel reactor that uses natural circulation and the entire existing infrastructure of decommissioned reactors, cutting costs in half. The number of reactors would depend on production volume. Safety In order to ensure safety with regard to the accumulation of spent fuel from currently operating reactors and those still under construction, we are pressing for the construction of an annex to the wet storage facility where SNF can be prepared and packaged into fuel rods for shipment in dry containers to Krasnoyarsk-26, where the construction of a dry storage facility is nearing completion. The steel containers would be returned to be loaded once again with the fuel rods. The Environment Now, let’s add a few words about the impact of heat pollution in the Bay of Finland on humans and the environment. Water from the bay is used in the turbine condenser cooling circuit and causes about an 8–10°С increase in the water’s temperature. However, in over 30 years of operations at the Leningrad NPP, we have found no factual evidence that the temperature increase has a negative effect on the environment, on fish, or on people. It is no coincidence that NPPs in Finland, Sweden, the United States, Japan, and other countries continue to use water from seas and oceans for cooling instead of cooling towers. It is time to look at the future of the Nuclear Energy Development Strategy using fast neutron reactors, which will enable greater efficiency in the use of the raw materials needed for nuclear power generation (for up to 2,500 years), and closing the nuclear fuel cycle for the purpose of keeping radiation under control. The BN-1800 fast neutron reactor could be placed along the coast between Ust- Luga and the Leningrad NPP, where water depth equals 26–30 meters at the shore and would rule out the chances of the heat-exchange equipment malfunctioning due to an oil spill. This would also prevent a vacuum decrease in the turbo generators during the summer. Using fast neutron reactors also provides the added possibility of generating thermal heat, in addition to electricity, and producing desalinated water similar to the BN-350. Personnel A critical aspect of this ambitious program for the construction of Leningrad NPP-2 will involve attracting and hiring approximately 8,000–10,000 qualified personnel from outside of the St. Petersburg area, including recent graduates of top schools. When the Leningrad NPP-1 was under construction and after operations were launched, specialists were brought in from the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry of the USSR who had been involved in the creation of Russia’s nuclear shield and large-scale nuclear power projects, namely the Chelyabinsk-40, the Tomsk-7, and
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the Krasnoyarsk-26, as well as graduates of Tomsk Polytechnic Institute, Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute, Moscow Power Engineering Institute, and St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, among others. The key to attracting qualified personnel to work on problems of national significance at a potentially dangerous facility is to create elite conditions insmall nuclear towns and to train the employees to develop an internal need for safe working conditions by unfailingly following regulatory and technical documentation. This created the conditions for the establishment of a selection process that attracted the top minds from around the nation who are prepared to work selflessly and produce high-quality results within short timeframes. Today, the residents of Sosnovy Bor, a city of nuclear energy specialists, are ready to engage in the construction of Leningrad NPP-2 in cooperation with external specialists. They have undertaken to deliver high quality results on schedule by relying on the traditions of the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and on Russian state support in addressing the following issues: 1. Reinstitute the “exempt” status from mandatory military service for graduates of top schools and other institutions of higher education that are hired through a selection process by the management of the NPP now under construction and provide new hires with housing in residence halls. 2. Ensure a competitive wage for personnel and account for quarterly increases in the cost of the consumer basket. 3. Reinstate the allocation of funds for social spending equal to 10–20% of construction costs, as was previously mandated by law. 4. Out of safety considerations, reestablish the 30 km exclusion zone on the Finnish side of the border (the “fear tax” as it was once known). I would like to conclude by stating that the ultimate goal of all stakeholders and public interest groups is the same: everyone wants to ensure the well-being of our people. This can be achieved through the growth of industry and agricultural output, which in turn depends on the accelerated development of the nuclear energy sector. That is where the future lies. Only by uniting the efforts of all of the participants of the Leningrad NPP- 2 project and the community leaders of Sosnovy Bor will we succeed in addressing all the “sore spots” that have been identified by local residents.
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Conditions for Building a New Nuclear Power Plant in the Tomsk Oblast
Alexei Toropov
Executive Director, Green Cross Russia Tomsk Affiliate
RosAtom and the management of the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) are discussing the possibility of building a two-unit Seversk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) with two PWR-100 reactors (see Figure 1) on the Seversk restricted access site. Materials promoting the construction of the NPP might lead an uninformed citizen to conclude that the construction of the NPP is the main end goal of both the management of SKhK and the local authorities.
Figure 1. Seversk restricted access zone and Tomsk.
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Main planned stages: 2008: Submission of Declaration of Intention; 2008–2009: Draft proposal, project elaboration, expert evaluation, and approval of feasibility study documents; 2009–2010: Project elaboration, licensing; 2010: Preparation of the site; 2011–2017: Main period of construction work; 2015: Starting of operations of first power unit. The primary stated reason for building the Seversk NPP is that energy consumption in the Tomsk Oblast will have tripled by 2020, and there is a large number of highly qualified personnel for the NPP in the area combined with the need to create jobs for the personnel of the plutonium ADE-4 and ADE-5 production reactors being shut down in 2008. The employment situation for nuclear facility personnel in the Tomsk Oblast can be described through the following points: • The average age of those working at ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors is pre- retirement; • If funding is allocated to dismantle ADE-4 and ADE-5, this will not entail additional lay offs at SKhK; • One of the leading institutions for training nuclear power engineers, Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU), is having difficulty recruiting qualified candidates in the nuclear field. The quality of the applicant pool has degraded each year; • The demand for TPU graduates from Russian NPPs is several times the number of available graduates; • Will we have to invite Iranian engineers to fill in the gap? Building the NPP that we are discussing today in the Tomsk Oblast is not an end in itself. Besides the direct economic effect in the form of state investments in the local economy and moving away from importing electricity from other regions, the Seversk NPP construction project will need to meet the long-term goals for the sustainable development of the Tomsk Oblast and Russia as a whole. Consequently, I believe that we can only consider building the Seversk NPP if the following main conditions are met: 1. An alternate railway that would circumvent the city of Tomsk must be built and put into operation for transporting hazardous chemical and radioactive materials. 2. The design plan must include a process for decommissioning the nuclear power plant and list the sources for financing these costly operations, which, in the experience of certain countries in the West, account for close to half of the required capital investments. 3. All residents in the 30-kilometer zone around the NPP must be insured against potential harm to their health or loss of property in the event of a radiation accident at the NPP. The insurance policy must provide non-claims-based payments and adequately compensate all health or material losses. 4. The residents of Tomsk and Seversk, as well as the residents of other
56 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY communities in the Tomsk area within 30 km of the NPP, must be supplied with modern protective equipment in the event of radioactive contamination resulting from an accident at the NPP (Figure 2). Israel’s system for providing the population with individual protective equipment can be used as an example. 5. The decision to build the NPP can be made only with the condition that the opinions of the residents of Tomsk, Seversk, and those residing in the Tomsk region within 30 km of SKhK, are directly taken into consideration. Nuclear energy that can be embraced by environmentalists includes the following points: 1. An approach that solves the problem of how to handle spent nuclear fuel. Currently, all of the ways to solve this problem can be divided into “sci-fi inspired” and those that simply shift the responsibility off onto the shoulders of future generations. The closed fuel cycle does not solve the problem, it aggravates it.
Figure 2. Modern individual protection equipment
2. An approach that excludes the possibility of an accident at the reactor with consequent radioactive contamination of the surrounding area at the level of a global catastrophe.
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A Local’s Perspective on Peaceful Nuclear Energy: A Heavy Hand
Lina Zernova
Public Advisory Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region, and Chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Green Russia Fraction, Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party
Dialogue organizers and participants—thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak at this important event! I live in Sosnovy Bor and, today, I will be speaking on behalf of its residents. As you know, our town is the site where facilities are being built to replace power generating capacities, including the first section of the future Leningrad NPP-2. Local residents were looking forward to this event, but, lately, they have begun to question what the town may win or lose. First of all, we will lose our recreation areas. The woods where we used to pick mushrooms and berries will be replaced by reactor facilities. A decision had been made, not subject to discussion, that two new reactors will be built. Considering that four 150-meter cooling stacks will also be built next to them, each of which will have its own health protection zone with a radius of 1 km, it is evident that over 10 square kilometers of woodlands will be forever lost. The burden on the environment will also drastically increase. The operation of the Leningrad NPP, according to an environmental impact assessment of the Leningrad NPP-2, has already disrupted the ecological balance of Kopor Bay. The planned cool- ing stacks will add to this by “bombarding” the atmosphere, “spitting out” 200,000 m3 of steam and water every day. Since Kopor Bay is considered to be one of the most polluted areas along the gulf according to data collected by SevMorGeo, the chemical and organic impurities contained in the water will thus be diffused into the atmosphere. We should also remember the issue of radioactive aerosol fallout caused by the emis- sion plumes from the cooling stacks as described in the aforementioned assessment. As horrifying as it may be, Sosnovy Bor finds itself within the fallout zone along with the vegetable gardens of local residents. The problem is further aggravated by an explosion of economic activity never seen before that has gripped the St. Petersburg region with the construction of ports along its shores, railroads, highways, and deep-sea manganese mining. The planned construction of Severny Potok, a natural gas pipeline that would run along the sea floor, is underway, along with the construction of new settlements and towns, and aluminum and metal processing plants. Petroleum shipments have been increasing in number. By 2010, up to 200 million tons of hydrocarbons will be transported through St. Petersburg each year, turning the Bay of Finland into a veritable Suez Canal. The non-governmental organization Zelyony Mir estimates that over EUR 20 bil- lion will be invested in the region between the Estonia border and St. Petersburg, a short 150 km stretch, averaging EUR 100,000 per linear meter of shoreline! All investment propositions will lead at breaking down the traditional way of life of the local population
58 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY and destroying pockets of wildlife. All the while, the local government of the Leningrad Oblast has yet to approve the General Development Plan for the South Shore of the Bay of Finland. Anyone can get their own piece of the so-called ‘Window on Europe.’ The scenic shores of the Bay of Finland today, may become an odious industrial zone tomorrow. By qualifying the new NPPs as replacement plants, the true nature of the project is obscured. We still do not know when the reactors currently operating at the Leningrad NPP will be decommissioned. Two of them have already been given a new lease on life, with the first of the reactors being scheduled for decommissioning ten years from now. However, Valery Lebedev, the Director of the Leningrad NPP, stated at a press confer- ence that the RBMK-type reactors could continue to operate for as long as necessary. Resources are also lacking. Decommissioning a reactor is an expensive undertak- ing that costs as much as EUR 1.5 billion (such was the case of the Ignalina NPP). Furthermore, there is still no funding for the decommissioning of old NPPs, since no corresponding law has been passed. So it turns out that Sosnovy Bor has been given the role of being Russia’s nuclear heavyweight! No other Russian city can claim to have six giant reactors operating con- currently. Here we could add LenSpetsKombinat Radon, the regional burial facility for low-level waste and medium-level waste, where Ekomet-S will bring radioactive metal from around the country for treatment in Sosnovy Bor. The town is also home to the re- actors of the Aleksandrov Research Institute and storage facilities holding spent nuclear fuel and solid and liquid radioactive waste from the Leningrad NPP itself. Meanwhile, RosAtom is making plans to build not two, but six new reactors! Would it be possible for the promoters of nuclear power to consider rewarding the local population with social projects? In 2000, taxes from the Leningrad NPP contributed 68% of Sosnovy Bor munici- pal budget. By 2008 this percentage shrank to 13%. In 2006, the local budget stopped receiving property taxes from the Leningrad NPP and by 2007 it was deprived of col- lecting the land tax from the NPP. Today, the municipal purse received just one third of the taxes from individuals at the Leningrad NPP. The depletion of the city budget is leading to the impoverishment of the city. It can no longer build pools, stadiums, or sports complexes. The city cannot afford to re- pair housing, roads, assure waste management, clean drinking water for its residents, or maintain parks, natural reserves, or beaches. The city is now witnessing housing devel- opment that is increasing urban density and undoing the achievements of the Soviet-era Nuclear Power Ministry, which had built a city that was green and pleasant to inhabit. It is clear that tax legislation was not changed by RosAtom. But we are also aware that there are Deputies in the State Duma representing the interests of the nuclear in- dustry and that the legislation was indeed changed with active participation of its lobby. This is how the 30 km exclusion zone law was repealed, according to which the popula- tion in the zone benefited from a 50% discount off the cost of electricity. In recent years, our local residents have watched any and all economic incentives for living next to the nuclear power plant get stripped away. RosAtom likes to reference its glorious history and the names of its great scientist- dreamers who stood at the origins of the Soviet nuclear complex. Today’s leadership in the nuclear industry would like to think of themselves as similar to these heroic bright minds. In actuality, there is one very significant difference between today’s bureaucrats and their predecessors.
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When building Sosnovy Bor, the Nuclear Power Ministry spent up to one quarter of the annual program budget on social and cultural projects. One of the principle concerns of the agency was caring for their people. Secondly, the Leningrad NPP-1 was built to supply power to the country. These “replacement” NPPs are going to be built for the pur- pose of selling surplus power abroad. We know that, as recently as the 1990s, RosAtom started working on the project to send an undersea cable along the floor of the Bay of Finland to Scandinavia. This is why a half a dozen reactors are being built on our shore and why the working life of four reactors is being extended. Of course, the “natives” will be left with the nuclear and radioactive wastes, a eutrophicated bay, saturated with steam and water emissions of the cooling stacks, an air filled with radioactive aerosols, and a shoestring city budget. The nuclear industry, on the other hand, will get pure profit. So it would be wise to think a little harder before drawing historical analogies. In conclusion, a few words about socially-responsible business. The construction of the Leningrad NPP-2 started with a scandal. The soil removed from the site of the future reactor was initially dumped into the Kovashi fish ponds, just a few kilometers away from Sosnovy Bor. The local government of the Lomonosov Rayon was outraged at the destruction of agricultural facilities. The first pool was completely filled in before the Oblast Governor, Valery Serdiukov, put an end to this lawlessness. Now the dump trucks are taking the soil to the Kingiseppsky Rayon — legally, we’d like to think. And so, does the nuclear industry building these hazardous facilities have a moral right to make such gross infractions and pursue its goals at such breakneck speed? Who will guarantee that the nuclear reactors themselves will be built under better conditions? Local residents have cause to be concerned for their future. In light of what has been said here, below are a number of recommendations: 1. Conduct an in-depth environmental analysis of the future construction site, taking into consideration pre-existing anthropogenic factors, and determine the extent to which the ecosystem of this particular part of the Bay of Finland can accommodate more development. It is important to understand whether the construction of RosAtom’s six new reactors is permissible here. 2. Publish the timeline for decommissioning old reactors and thereby eliminate the ambiguity of the term “replacement capacities.” 3. Scrap the plans for building cooling stacks for the second reactor of Leningrad NPP-2. Direct seawater cooling of the reactor will become possible once the first reactor of the Leningrad NPP-1 is taken out of operation. 4. Introduce mandatory, state-guaranteed health, property, and life insurance coverage in the event of an accident at one of the nuclear installations. 5. Re-establish the legislative status quo ensuring beneficial tax conditions for cities tied to the nuclear industry. 6. Provide local residents with social benefits such as a 50% discount off the cost of electricity. 7. Establish a working group with representatives from RosAtom and commu- nity leaders from Sosnovy Bor, to be tasked with developing mutually accept- able solutions (municipal authorities, as a result of Russia’s idiosyncrasies, are not in a position to engage in an equal-player dialogue).
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Question and Answer Session Paths for the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector
– Dialogue participant: What is the future of the South Urals NPP project? – Аshot Nasibov: The South Urals NPP project has been approved by the government as part of its plan to increase energy generating capacity. Discussions are still underway regarding the exact location of the NPP.
– Valery Menshchikov: Regarding competition for NPP construction and operation: recently RosAtom Director, Sergei Kiriyenko, said that construction costs abroad will grow to USD 5 billion per reactor unit. What is your assessment of nuclear power’s competitiveness? – Yuriy Cherepnin: Right now it is hard to say anything about the competitiveness of nuclear power on the free market. The industry is tightly linked to politics, with its traditional spheres of influence. I don’t think that Russian technologies will be able to enter those markets, which have been traditionally taken up by major companies such as Westinghouse Electric Company, General Electric and Areva. As for the parts of the world where Russia’s nuclear technologies are being used, it is true, we know that the construction of reactors in China and Iran was not priced according to actual prices on the NPP construction market. In Bulgaria, they announced that the bidding price will be higher. It is therefore normal to declare that there is always bargaining between the client and the contractor. Prices have been going up everywhere, including in this industry. I don’t think these two sectors will be in direct competition anytime soon. – Аshot Nasibov: I just have a quick additional comment to make. Russia has entered the NPP construction market in the EU, and the first project is the construction of the NPP in Bulgaria. Additionally, as a competitive environment evolves in the engineering industry (in Russia, most of the companies involved are monopolies in their markets), the price will go down. One example is the creation of a joint venture with Alstom to build low-speed power turbines. The venture, due to start operations in 2010, has already caused Silovye Mashiny to lower prices on its turbines.
– Andrey Ozharovskiy: You raised the issue of civil liability insurance to cover the risk of damage to human health and property near NPPs. I know that in the United States, this issue has not been resolved, which is part of the reason why nothing is being built. We all know that, in April 1993, there was a terrible accident at the Siberia Chemical Combine. Was an assessment made? If this accident had happened when everyone had been insured, what would have been the damage and how much of it would have been paid for by the insurance company? – Alexei Toropov: No assessment was made. We just know that the accident affected an area with low population density and the accident was rated a 3 on the INES scale. However, if instead of being a south-westerly it had been a northerly wind blowing to- wards Tomsk, then the accident would have been a 5 or 6 on the INES scale, requiring the city’s evacuation. – Аshot Nasibov: A quick comment: We already have insurance covering residents liv- ing in close proximity to NPPs. During recent comprehensive safety training, which we
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conducted in September at the Leningrad NPP, an assessment was underway of the com- pensation that would need to be paid to victims and information was posted for victims and evacuees about where to obtain their compensation. And some information for Ms. Zernova: in the last year, the Leningrad NPP made payments in the amount of 1,273,455,000 rubles into local municipal treasuries alone. You should be asking your deputies where the money went.
– Dialogue participant: As a former Director of the Leningrad NPP, what can you say about its impact today? Or do we only have science and numbers to go on? Because, regardless of all the presentations we heard here, the pollution is enormous, especially at Kopor Bay and in Koporye and Nezhnovo, among other locations. – Anatoliy Eperin: The comments we heard about aversion to nuclear power installa- tions were more emotional than objective. I spoke about using seawater and the storage capacity of Kopor Bay. Water is drawn from the bay and heated by 8–10 degrees Celsius. We heard that blue-green seaweed can absorb bacteria and pass on infections, etc. But in fact, the sea depth there is about 5–6 meters, and storms tear the seaweed out and toss it ashore. We haven’t had a single case of illness to this day. The fact that storm run- off from the city is drained into Kopor Bay without prior treatment is a shortcoming. In addition, there are blackwater and other treatment facilities that are also along the shore and have some impact on the environment. So we cannot blame the pollution on heating the water since there is no data or facts to support that claim. I wouldn’t object if environmental scientists started monitoring the sea water. Meanwhile, speaking of monitoring, we have people fishing along the cooling water canal. We have the cages set up. We were farming trout and carp there and using that fish for food. Doesn’t that say something about the quality? As for construction, any urban development or construction of new facilities means that trees will be cut down. Can’t the residents of Sosnovy Bor understand that their town was built in the middle of a forest to begin with? The forest was cut down, but not all of it; efforts were made to preserve it and those efforts were even recognized by a national award. About what lies ahead: I was in favor of the program that was approved by the international tender committee. It involved bringing in all leading countries in the world with an understanding of the topic at hand. Were there recommendations? Yes. They in- cluded a recommendation to build graphite-moderated reactors with natural circulation as the replacement energy generation capacity. These are exceptionally reliable and safe nuclear reactors. Instead of replacing parts and reactor units, the only components that would need to be replaced would be the fuel assemblies. Moreover, these reactors sup- port on-load refueling. It is a unique facility that operates splendidly for over 30 years. The most potentially dangerous projects were not associated with accidents resulting from nominal overload. And still, these reactors could have operated efficiently and continuously for four years at installed capacity. However, due to external pressure, it was decided to use the tried and true PWR-1000 reactor model. As for the effect of the cooling stacks, environmental scientists claim that they do not have a significant effect, and there are studies that prove this. This will be verified after the reactor is put into operation. Right now, they have no data to support their posi- tion, especially given that such cooling stacks have already been built and appear to be working well at other NPPs. We believe that the future is in fast neutron reactors. These
62 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY could be built on the stretch between Ust-Luga and the Leningrad NPP, where the water depth is sufficient. That would make it so that water could be drawn from greater depths for cooling and conditioning the turbines, and heated by 8–10 degrees Celsius. If there is an oil spill in Ust-Luga, which is more dangerous, then the NPP would not suffer as a result, because it will be using water from deeper down and it would still maintain its vacuum. I believe that Sosnovy Bor is a nuclear power city and should continue building nuclear power plants because electricity shortages are already being felt, particularly in the wintertime.
– Aleksandr Nikitin: You showed a table with next-generation reactors and said that water-cooled and water-moderated reactors are not among them. In that case, what sense is there in building 40 reactors that are not next-generation reactors that could operate for 60–70 years at a price of USD 3–5 billion per reactor? Where is the logic? – Yuriy Cherepnin: The reactors of tomorrow are fourth generation reactors, a tech- nology that is being actively developed right now around the world and in Russia, but which will not become available before 2030. Those will be pilot projects that will need to demonstrate that they are qualitatively different from the old generation. But they will only become widely available around 2050. Meanwhile, improved third-generation reactors that fully meet all safety standards are the recommended solution. The second- generation reactors were built without these standards. The standards were developed later, starting in the mid-1970s, while the NPP designs date back to the 1960s. Now those reactors are being upgraded with great difficulty to make them comply with these standards. Third-generation reactors were designed after Chernobyl, and with such great concern for safety that they became too expensive, which is why they are not being built. There are already 3+-generation reactors that use new technologies and are less energy- hungry. This is why we can really start to talk about the cost-efficiency of nuclear power. We’ll need another 30 years to complete research and testing for fourth-generation reac- tors. Right now, there are six directions, of which one or two will be retained, but first this would need to be done, the options compared, and significant funds will need to be invested before the choice of technology is substantiated. This is a field that is very much inertia-driven and we cannot expect quick transfor- mations or miracles from any of the technologies.
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The Untapped Potential of Alternative Energy in Russia
Aleksandr Chumakov
Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia
The way energy production in Russia is currently distributed is irrational. Out of 1 TW of produced electricity, over 65% comes from power plants, of which 18% are hydroelectric plants and approximately 16% are nuclear power plants (NPPs), with all sources of alternative energy accounting for only about 1%. In light of this imbalance, Russia’s Energy Strategy also requires serious rethinking, as it is still focused on the ever-growing consumption of non-renewable energy sources and does not presuppose the development of an alternative energy industry using renewable energy sources.
Figure1. Energy needs and available capacity.
Today, 70% of Russia’s land territory, with a population of around 22 million peo- ple, is not covered by — and ultimately cannot be covered by — a centralized power supply. Over half of Russia’s power grids experience some sort of power shortages, while a quarter of regional power grids experience power shortages for 50% or more of the time (Figure 2). The energy consumption of a rural resident in Russia is twice as low as that of an urban one, which is directly correlated with the low output of the agricul- tural sector and associated industries. Meanwhile, experts have predicted a drop in fossil fuel production levels by 2010 in Russia, starting with natural gas. Assuming that standing export commitments are kept, this would necessarily lead to a significant reduction of fossil fuel supplied to the domestic market and would threaten economic development and national energy secu- rity. Today, over 16 regions in Russia experience power supply shortages. In the coming
64 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY year or two, this crisis will spread to affect most of Russia. The only way to avert the crisis is to introduce new generating capacities using forward-looking technologies, first and foremost those using renewable energy sources (RESs). All renewable energy resources combined offer more than 5,000 times the world’s current energy consumption of 13 TW. It is important to note that these resources are significantly more accessible and more evenly distributed on the Earth’s surface, and therefore throughout Russia itself, than coal, oil, gas, and uranium deposits (Figure 3).
Figure 2. Russia: A forecast of regional power shortages, by region/territory (GW).
Figure 3. Russia: The economic potential of renewable energy sources.
65 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
The performance potential of solar power in Russia is at least 2 TW and approxi- mately twice Russia’s total energy consumption (Figure 4). Until recently, the devel- opment of solar power in Russia was not given due attention. Starting in 2008–2009, Solnechnaya Energetika, a Russian company, will begin production of the main compo- nents for the manufacture of solar panels with a potential annual output of 30–40 MW. Investments between now and 2009 for this project will total $114 million. Technically accessible wind energy resources in Russia are estimated to have gen- eration capacities of 16 billion MW. Russia is among the wealthiest countries with re- spect to wind energy (see Figure 5). It has the world’s longest coastline, a plentitude of flat, treeless expanses, and large water areas surrounding inland seas and lakes, all of which are ideal settings for wind farms. Currently, all of Russia’s wind turbines gener- ate a mere 15 MW. A project is currently underway to create the Lomonosov Northern Hydro/Wind Electrical Power System with a total capacity of up to 10,000 MW, which will be sent to Europe and to Russia’s central regions.
Figure 4. Annual distribution of sunlight on Russia’s territory.
Figure 5. Average annual distribution of wind speed on Russia’s territory.
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Russia’s geothermal energy resource potential equals approximately 1.5 billion TWh (Figure 6). Less than 0.2% of this potential could meet national energy needs for the next 1,000 years. Accessible artesian thermal springs have been found in the Sayano- Baikal mountain range, Buryatia has about 400 thermal springs, while Yakutia, northern Western Siberia, and Chukotka are home to 13 known high-temperature thermal springs. The most promising area is the string of volcanoes on the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka. Kamchatka’s geothermal resources exceed 500 MW. The cost of geothermal power gen- eration is ten times lower than in traditional boiler plants. Three pilot geothermal power plants are currently operating in Kamchatka: Pauzhetskaya, Verkhne-Mutnovskaya, and Verkhne-Mutnovskaya-1. In the coming years, a cascade system will be installed for the power plants/stations with a capacity of up to 300 MW. The European Bank for Recon- struction and Development (EBRD) will contribute to project funding.
Figure 6. Russia’s geothermal energy resources, by region/territory. Since the discovery of fire, biomass, which is solar energy converted to chemical form, has been the most traditional energy resource. Total accessible reserves of biomass in Russia are equivalent to 300 billion kWh (Figure 7). Merely re-processing waste from livestock and plant cultivation could increase Russia’s total energy output by at least 25%. Organic waste produced through the consumption of a standard consumer basket can be reprocessed to produce biogas, thermal energy, or electrical power equivalent to at least 9,000 kWh per person (Figure 8). This energy would suffice for heating and lighting houses, heating water, and would partially meet the energy needs of food pro- ducers. When organic waste is processed into energy, the byproducts are high-yield organic fertilizers, which increase the productive capacity of soil by many times than mineral fertilizer, and without its deleterious effect.
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Figure 7. Russia: Distribution of biomass (t/ha).
Figure 8. Energy-producing potential of waste products generated by the consumer basket (S=9,000 kWh/yr). At this time, vertically integrated companies are emerging among Russia’s major food producers. These companies bring together plant cultivation, livestock farms, pro- cessing facilities, as well as facilities for processing bio-waste into electrical energy, heat, and organic fertilizer. In addition, these companies can create “electrical power farms” and installations for producing motor fuels such as bio-diesel and methanol. The creation of self-sufficient companies of this sort may bring about a substantial social, economic, and environmental gain for both rural and urban populations. The benefits, including larger farm incomes, market diversification, an improved ability to
68 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY compete on the global market, a general boost to the local economies in rural areas, and a reduced environmental footprint, are important reasons for using biomass as a source of energy (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Vertically integrated agricultural companies.
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Alternative Energy in Russia: Meeting Energy Needs While Decreasing Threats to the Environment
Igor Babanin
Coordinator, Project on Resource Efficienc, Greenpeace Russia, Saint Petersburg Office
In order to avert catastrophic climate change, global temperatures must not rise by more than 2°С. We can only reach this goal, if the growth of greenhouse emissions stops by 2015–2020, and if emissions are cut by 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Pattern of carbon dioxide emissions in countries with transition economies by sector, according to the energy revolution scenario (Efficiency = reduced emissions as compared to baseline scenario). The attainability of this goal (without the use of nuclear energy and technologies for the burial of carbon dioxide) was presented in the join report by Greenpeace and the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) titled “The Energy Revolution.” At its basis, it is a comparison of the suggested Energy Revolution scenario to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s scenario taken from a 2004 report on the future development of the world energy sector (see Figure 2). According to the scenario, carbon dioxide emissions in countries with transitional economies will decrease by four times by 2050.
1 The report was contracted to the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and was written in 2006. Source: http:// www.energyblueprint.info.
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Russia is the eighth most populous country in the world, and it is the third biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. Moreover, official strategies and forecasts suggest that en-
Figure 2. Use of primary energy under the Energy Revolution scenario (Energy Efficiency = reduction of energy use as compared to baseline scenario). ergy consumption and greenhouse emissions will continue to grow. According to Russia’s Energy Strategy, primary energy source use will increase by 150% by 2030 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Primary energy source use in million tons of fuel equivalent (“favorable” scenario) under Russia’s energy strategy through 2030 (Gray — total primary energy fuel equivalent; Black — proportion of coal fuel). 71 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
There is an alternative energy scenario for Russia, developed by NGO INFORSE (http://www.inforse.org/europe). The growth forecast for the main indicators of socio- economic development is taken using official values or by extrapolating from current data. By 2050, the indicators will experience growth as follows (compared to year 2000): • Area of residential buildings — 191%; • Industry output — 842%; • Agricultural output — 457%; • Individual motor transport — 265%; • Storage of oil and gas: 52 and 167 times, respectively; Increase in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of energy effi- ciency measures (zero option) will equal 350% by 2050. After 2020, Russia will become a hydrocarbon importer (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Baseline scenario (business as usual): growth in energy use in the absence of energy efficiency measures.
The alternative scenario is based on the use of the following measures for improv- ing energy efficiency: • Increased energy production efficiency by 50.1% by 2050 through the use of combined production (2000 — 20.1%) through the integration of steam and gas technologies; • Maximizing the share of joint production of heat and electrical power; • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 37% by 2050 as compared to the baseline scenario (see Figure 5);
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Figure 5. Implementation of energy production efficiency measures. • Lowering energy consumption for heating buildings from 570 to 165 kWh/ m2 (modern technologies could even completely remove the need for heat- ing — “passive home”); • Creation of the factor four in the industrial and transportation sectors ; • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 as compared to the zero option scenario (see Figure 6);
Figure 6. Addition of energy use efficiency measures: energy-efficient buildings, factor four in the industrial sector, factor two in agriculture, etc.
2 Weizsäcker, E., Lovins, A., Lovins, H. Factor Four. Doubling Wealth, Halving Resource Use. New Report to the Club of Rome. Moscow, Academia, 2000, 400, or online: www.factor4narod.ru.
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• Leveraging 20% to 100% of the available performance potential of non-tra- ditional renewable energy sources, including currently available performance potential of 20% in wind energy (170 GW found), 40% — geothermal energy, 60% — biogas, about 70% — solar power, 100% — hard biomass and small hydroelectric power plants; • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 89% by 2050 as compared with the zero option scenario; • Share of renewable energy — 53% of the volume of primary energy produced (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Development of renewable sources of energy.
Implementing these measures would lead to a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases by 50% from 2000 levels (about 70% from 1990 levels).
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Development of Renewable Energy in Europe
Reinhard Koch
Managing Director, European Center for Renewable Energy, Güssing, Austria
Güssing is a small town in Austria with 4,000 inhabitants and is also the capital city of the Güssing region, which has a total of 27,000 inhabitants. In the past, Güssing was the most impoverished region in Austria, but with the development of renewable ener- gies, prosperity came to Güssing.
Circuit of Energy Twenty years ago the region of Güssing was compelled to purchase fossil fuel en- ergy sources in addition to energy production mechanisms. This reliance on fossil fuel energy resulted in a drain of about 36 million euros. By implementing changes and uti- lizing our own renewable resources within our own energy production plants and, later, marketing and selling these forms of energy to our local population has lead to an in- crease of revenue circulating within our own region. This model implementing changes and re-investing the profits into the locality is not new; it has been used for decades in Güssing with drinking water and sewage industries. This indicates that people know the benefits of a renewable model and more importantly how to adequately utilize it. The EEE Network
Figure 1
The European Centre of Renewable Energies in Güssing (EEE) established a huge institutional network and essentially became the network manager. The EEE is linked to
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every energy production plant in the whole region, a total of 35 plants and with the two research institutes in Güssing, both the national and international institute. The institute coordinates research work at the plants, provides information on renewable energies to European partners through an education center, works together with various regions of Europe on energy concepts in the services sector that includes more than 100 EU proj- ects with 500 partners, and also organizes the eco-tourism industry in Güssing, which has over 50,000 visitors per year.
The Triangle of Güssing From the beginning, most of the research has always incorporated the development of renewable energies in Güssing. At first, there were Austrian research institutes like the Technical University in Vienna headed by Prof. Hofbauer that were involved in the work to address renewable energy issues. But over the last years, many international research institutes have ventured into Güssing. In a cooperative effort in an industrial-operated research plant, a lot of new technologies were developed, which now have a worldwide implication in potential production and usage. Partners with larger sway power ensure that research grants are brought in and organize their distribution to various research programs each with specializations. In addition, some companies in Güssing sell these developed technologies to interested parties which also generate an added value to the region.
General Conditions The development of renewable energies is moving forward rapidly. During the 1990s, the production of heat out of biomass (district heating) and production of bio diesel out of rapeseed was in the front line of development. Since the year 2000, the focus has shifted to efficient production of electricity out of biomass the main topics were thermal and biological gasification. Many projects were begun, but, unfortunately, a lot of them failed. Yet both field plants developed in Güssing are counted as the best worldwide. Also, at the same time, in 2000, the expansion of wind power was started. Since 2004 the plants have started to use other bio fuels beside the bio diesel, such as bio ethanol. Güssing has a huge PV-production factory. It develops solar power, which has
Figure 2
76 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY become more prominent recently; there has been an increase in thermal energy obtained from solar panels due to further development of the photovoltaic technology used.
Figure 3
The EU member states have started to invest in new fuel technologies because of the increasingly high price of oil and the reality of depleting oil resources. This new reality has enforced new general conditions for decreasing the dependence of oil and natural gas imports in the future. There has been an increasing number of automobiles and trucks in Europe, and it is estimated that there will be twice as many automobiles in the year 2020 than today. This estimation highlights the potential intense increase in fuel production. At the moment, bio fuels (bio diesel and bio ethanol) are not efficient for mass production. There are, not only overall quality problems, but also competition with food production, both of which are intensely criticized. Therefore, we currently have a high financial investment in trying to find new possible alternative energy sources.
Figure 4 Fuels of the Future The disadvantages of bio fuels can be balanced with synthetic fuels. In addition, synthetic fuels can be produced in form of gas (BioSNG) and also liquid (BtL). Synthet- ic fuels are produced out of coal, oil and natural gas worldwide but it is also possible to produce it out of biomass. The bases for this are efficient technologies to convert liquid into gas, as well as cleaning steps and adaptation of existing conversion technologies. Through the use of the whole plant or rather through the use of agricultural and forest waste products, the efficiency is four times higher than that for bio fuels. The clarity of synthetic fuels is higher than that of fossil fuels.
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Figure 5 At the moment there are two strategies in Europe. Shell, Volkswagen and Mer- cedes have vied for advancement through immense plants to deal (500 MW) with the problem of the biomass. However, logistically, the only downfall is the low efficiency of 40%. Güssing chose the way of the local small scale plants (max. 50 MW) but with an increased efficiency of 85%. At the moment the first demonstration plants go into operation for both strategies. We will have to see which strategy will work best. Experts anticipate that, by 2012, the synthetic fuels will displace the biological fuels. Another advantage of BioSNG is that it can be fed into the gas grid and it can be transported discretionary.
Strategy of the Future The strategy in Güssing is to produce local energy only from the available resourc- es (waste materials) of our region. With the help of thermal and biological gasification as a compact energy center, we can produce every form of energy needed in the region after the conversion of biomass into gas, including heat, electricity, synthetic natural gas for the gas grid or for gas stations, liquid fuels, and also hydrogen for the very close future. I would like to conclude by extending an invitation to all of you to visit Güssing, which should give you a good understanding of the future of energy sources.
Figure 6
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Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable Energy Sources on the Kola Peninsula
Nina Lesikhina
Coordinator for Energy Projects, Bellona, Murmansk Office
Over the course of many years, non-traditional renewable energy sources (NRES) — including solar, wind, tidal, wave, hydro and bio power — have not been considered seriously as alternative sources of energy. Today, most of the world’s energy demands are met with oil (38%), coal (26%), natural gas (23%), renewable energy sources (7%) and nuclear energy (6%) (International Energy Outlook 2007, EIA). Climate change, reduced fossil fuel reserves, and the negative consequences and risks related to the use of nuclear energy make the development of all types of renewable energy sources (RES) an urgent need in the 21st century. One of Russia’s regions, where the transition to clean sources of energy is most important today, is the Murmansk Oblast, where the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Kola NPP) poses a threat to the environment both within and outside of Russia. A diagram of power generation in the Murmansk Oblast is shown in Figure 1. There are a number of reasons for using NRES. Unlike fossil fuels, the reserves of which are limited, renewable energy sources are inexhaustible and their use does not deplete natural resources. NRES can be used to ensure safe energy for the region, to provide a stable, reliable power supply for remote regions, and to protect consumers from power outages. Renewable energy is a lucrative sector capable of creating jobs and producing profits. Compared to the nuclear power industry, renewable types of energy are not hazardous to human health, they are environmentally clean, they do not require treatment and they do not pollute the environment. Compared to fossil fuels—the use of which results in emissions into the air and water, and contributes to climate change and chronic pollution of our water—renewable energy is not linked to CO2 emissions and their use does not result in any of said risks.
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Figure 1. Power generation in the Murmansk Oblast. A number of prerequisites for developing NRES on the Kola Peninsula are already fulfilled, including an enormous resource potential and a scientific and technological base. NRES also offer a combination of advantages: sustainability, accessibility, reli- ability, profitability, and environmental cleanliness. Renewable energy may be useful for both consumers on and off the main power grid, and is sufficient to satisfy energy needs today and in the future. Bellona elaborates on these details in its study titled “Prospects for Developing Non-traditional Renewable Energy Sources.”
Solar Energy On the Kola Peninsula, solar energy resources are the most prominent (see Figure 2). However, direct sun light is reduced to 60–70%, due to the typically overcast conditions in the region. Difficulties involve accumulating and storing solar energy in large quantities during the summer months. The most promising use of solar energy is power supply for remote villages, for which fuel-based power supply is costly and complicated. Solar energy is also a promising option for south- ern regions with a more developed infrastructure. Over the past The cover of Bellona’s study: several years, Russia and Norway successfully completed a joint “Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable project on the replacement of radioactive strontium batteries at Sources of Energy on the lighthouses located along the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula Kola Peninsula.” with solar panels. According to data from the Kola Science Cen- ter (KSC) under the Russian Academy of Sciences, solar activity in the outskirts of the village of Umba (pop. 6,500 people) is comparable to the numbers in the small town of
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Ingelstad in Sweden, where solar power stations successfully supply heat for 52 homes. This makes Umba an ideal place to try solar power.
Wind Energy Possibilities for extensive development of wind energy in the Murmansk Oblast are as promising as in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United States. Russia does indeed possess the requisite scientific and industrial know-how for developing wind energy, and has experience in operating pilot wind farms in Vorkuta, Kalmyk and Kaliningrad. Wind resources on the Kola Peninsula are enormous and estimated at 360 billion KWh (see Figure 2). The highest wind speeds are observed in the coastal areas of the Barents Sea, and are measured at 7–9 m/s along the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula. Maximum wind speeds are observed during cold weather and coincide with the seasonal peak of heat and electricity consumption. The highs during winter are in a reverse phase of the annual river flow, i.e., wind and hydro power complement each other well. This creates favorable conditions for their combined use. Under conditions of reduced levels of wind intensity in the summer, the daily high for wind speed is strong enough for the efficient use of wind power, since energy consumption generally tends to be higher during day- light hours.
Figure 2. Wind power potential: average wind speeds over the course of many years (m/s) at a height of 10 meters from the ground on flat lands.
The high suitability of wind power on the Kola Peninsula is due to the fact that maximum wind intensity and maximum energy demands coincide during the winter, and there are 17 hydroelectric power stations with reservoirs that can accumulate water during active wind periods for later use when winds are less active. This creates unique conditions for widespread, systemic use of wind power. The most suitable areas for cre- ating wind farms are on the outskirts of the villages of Dalniye Zelentsi and Teriberka, near the Serebryansk and Teriberka hydroelectric power stations, which are connected
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Figure 3. Promising districts for wind farms. to the Kola power grid and will be useful in supplying large-scale use of wind energy in the region (see Figure 3). There are also a number of good conditions in place for using wind power in order to supply electricity and heat to remote villages without access to centralized utilities, meteorology stations, lighthouses, border posts, and Navy facilities in the north, which receive electricity from stand-alone diesel power generators. Due to their remote loca- tions and poor transport infrastructure, fuel costs are growing. Under these conditions, the use of wind power could help with the conservation of costly diesel fuel. Given favorable wind conditions, wind power installations could free up 30–50% of precious fossil fuel now being used for power generation, while in areas with stronger winds this number could be as high as 60–70%. During extended periods of low winds, special wind energy batteries or auxiliary heating systems can be used.
Power Generated by Small Rivers A small hydroelectric power plant (HPP) has an output capacity that does not ex- ceed 20–30 MW. China is the world leader in terms of the number of small and micro HPPs with over 100,000 plants currently in operation. Russian technology is used to manufacture turbines for these HPPs. The Kola Peninsula has the capacity to generate up to 4.4 billion KWh/yr using small hydropower, of which one-third is deemed as economically viable. A number of factors make the use of small hydropower in the Murmansk Oblast advantageous: there are periodic shortages of fuel, increases in electricity rates, restrictions on building large HPPs due to the negative impact on the environment, as well as progress in automation and remote operation of HPP operations. The areas that would be suitable for building small hydropower plants are located along the following rivers: the Pirenga, the Bolshaya Olenka, the Ura, the Zapadnaya Litsa, the Titovka, the Tumcha, and the Umba (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Promising sites for small HPPs on the Kola Peninsula. Small HPP systems: 1 — on the Pirenga River; 2 and 3 — on the Bolshaya Olenka River; 4 and 5 — on the Ura River; 6 — on the Zapadnaya Litsa River; 7 — on the Titovka River; 8, 9, and 10 — on the Tumcha River; and 11 — on the Umba River. Autonomous small HPPs: 12 — on the Elreka River, and 13 — on the Chavanga River.
The power generated by small rivers could serve as an inexpensive and indepen- dent source of energy for remote areas. At present, roughly 80–100 villages and settle- ments in the region are not covered by centralized power. Their consumption fluctuates from 5–10 to 500–800 KW. There are three isolated villages, which are the primary candidates for small hydropower: Krasnoschelye, Chavanga and Chapoma, in addition to the military border official village of Svetly. Fuel-based power supply in these areas is extremely difficult due to the lack of roads. Hydropower could be used as another source, in addition to diesel stations, during dry periods, and as a backup power source in emergencies.
Tidal Power Tidal Power Plants (TPP) are another source of environmentally clean energy. They do not pollute the environment with hazardous wastes, which is an inevitable result of typical thermal power plant operations. TPP also do not require that a territory be flooded, which is an inevitable condition for building large HPPs. The special features of tidal energy are its regularity throughout the course of a month and its independence from water levels throughout the course of the year. These qualities make tidal flow a powerful source of energy which may be used in combination with river-based HPPs equipped with reservoirs. There are several locations that can be categorized as particularly promising for tidal energy: Lumbovsk with a 320 – 670 MW TPP, the Cape Abramova-Mikhailovsk (the planned output capacity of the Mezensk TPP is 50 billion KWh/yr), and the Dolgaya Bay (the site of the pilot Kola TPP project) (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Potential locations for TPPs on the Kola Peninsula.
Finally, there is the Kislogubsk TPP, which was built in the Kislaya Bay in the 1960s as a pilot project in order to gain the technical and scientific experience required to build larger plants, such as the Mezensk TPP. This plant is currently non-operational. The Sevmash facility in Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast) is currently developing a pilot model of a water wheel for the Mezensk TPP, which will be tested in the Kislaya Bay.
Wave Energy The ocean waves accumulate wind energy as they travel across a vast area. They are essentially a natural form of concentrated energy. Another positive factor of wave energy is the fact that it is everywhere, and as a result is accessible to a wide range of coastal consumers. The average annual potential for wave energy in the Barents Sea is estimated at 22–29 KW/m, which comes close to the figures for the neighboring Nor- wegian coast (25–30 KW/m). As regards the White Sea, the average annual potential of wave energy is considerably lower at just 9–10 KW/m, due to the comparatively small surface area of the sea and ice cover during the winter. Wave energy has one of the highest real efficiency values among non-traditional energy sources. The overall real efficiency of a wave power plant generating electricity amounts to 30–80%. The power generating capacity of wave energy along a 10-kilome- ter stretch of the coast of the Kola Peninsula could amount to 1.2 billion KWh for the Barents Sea and 0.4 billion KWh for the White Sea. Wave power plants in these regions are projected to have capacities of 230 MW and 100 MW.
Bioenergy Resources Compared to other types of RES on the Kola Peninsula, there are relatively few bioenergy resources. In the Murmansk Oblast, the bioenergy resource potential, in-
84 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY cluding agricultural and livestock wastes, amounts to approximately 1 billion KWh/yr. Reprocessing agricultural wastes using anaerobic fermentation will help resolve three problems: 1) the environment — the disinfection of livestock wastes and elimination of pathogens; 2) food supply — the production of high-quality organic fertilizer, which will increase harvests by 10%; and 3) the energy industry — a partial replacement of liquid and gas fuel with biogas. There are now fewer forests in the Murmansk Oblast than in the other Oblasts in Northwest Russia. The potential of bioenergy resources from lumber waste is estimated at just 1.5 billion KWh. That is why small villages and settlements that receive their power supply from local diesel facilities and heat from boilers represent a promising sector for reusing lumber waste. Bellona recommends developing renewable energy sources in order to decommis- sion the obsolete and hazardous reactors of the Kola NPP, and primarily to provide a reliable and safe supply of clean energy which will boost the region’s economic growth. The government must take action as soon as possible in order to remove the legislative, economic and sociopolitical barriers hindering the development of renewable energy. In summary, Bellona is an advocate of the following measures aimed at developing renewable energy sources on the Kola Peninsula: • Developing a federal and regional legislative base establishing specific target indicators for NRES use; • Introducing economic stimuli for developing NRES; • Involving industry, scientific community and public organizations in a strate- gic alliance; • Creating pilot projects in the most promising regions in terms of renewable energy under the Russian Academy of Science’s Kola Science Center; • Ensuring reliable financing by government agencies and financial institutions, involving private investors; • Establishing an agency for the support and propagation of information in NRES development that meets legal requirements and standards. Finally, Bellona hopes that increased profits from oil and gas trades will not lead Russia’s authorities to ignore the value of renewable energy sources as a means of fight- ing against the global problem of climate change.
85 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
The Russian Biofuel Program
Vladimir Kirilin Director, EcoService
Nikolai Zubov Chairman, Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental Union
The goals of the Russian Biofuel Program (RBP) are to: • Create a new environmentally-friendly fuel to support power supply in low- rise apartment buildings in Europe and Russia; • Achieve mass production of high-grade wood pellets; • Create a new industry for the complete, comprehensive and 100% reprocess- ing of hardwoods, such as birch and aspen.
Preamble First. This program is not an alternative to developing nuclear energy in Russia. Nuclear energy is the [best choice for] large cities and industrial centers. What RBP aims to do is supply autonomous power supply for private, low-rise residential build- ings. In its first stage, which is planned for 2009 through 2014, the Program will focus on European countries. During the second stage, after 2014, the Program will apply to new low-rise housing in Russia. Second. This is an interesting factor for nuclear power engineering in Russia. The RBP, given that it is actively developed, will help RosAtom indirectly (i.e., though the help of Europeans themselves) to squeeze out competitors in a number of European countries. As a result, small energy will be lending a helping hand to big energy. Third. Work with this kind of Program may be useful in supporting the “green” image of the Atomic Energy Ministry. RBP truly offers an alternative energy source. We know that a number of countries in Europe have passed laws against the use of nuclear energy. Meanwhile, Western nuclear lobbyists are taking advantage of cli- mate change problems in an attempt to prolong the period during which nuclear reactors remain in operation and are calling for a nuclear power renaissance. One of the main arguments is the absence of large, lucrative projects, which focus on using an alternative source of energy and show that it is capable of replacing nuclear power. We are submitting the Russian Biofuel Program for consideration. This is a major, profitable alternative energy program. The opportunities afforded by the Program are: • Wood pellet fuels could become a key fuel (equal to gas) for low-rise housing power supply in Europe and Russia; • Overall, this Program will provide volumes of energy capable of replacing nuclear energy in a number of European countries; • Given the mass adoption of the Program, the results could be comparable to the annual use of 300–400 million tons of brown coal by 2020–2025; • It could reduce CO2-equivalent emissions by 1 billion tons each year; and
86 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Introduction There is growing talk in Russia concerning mass construction of low-rise housing. Truly, Russia’s expansive territory allows it to move forward with these projects, more so than other countries. So what is the main factor holding everyone back? Today, the obstacle is obtaining land. But there is plenty of land in Russia. Tomorrow, the main problem will be power supply. Canada’s experience could be very useful. There, for most low-rise housing, centralized energy includes only electricity, while water, heat and sewage systems are autonomous. Today, Russia is already feeling the pangs of an electricity and thermal energy defi- cit. There are plans to fill in the gaps using coal-based and nuclear energy. And Russia is not alone; Europe and many other countries are heading down the same path. This solution is fair and realistic, but it requires a great deal of time and money. Tra- ditional power supply systems are based on large thermal power plants, and this means coal strip mines, the construction of enormous thermal power plants, long heating mains, losses due to transfer, maintenance, accidents, and so on and so forth. Compared to high- rise apartment buildings, power supply for low-rise and private housing presumes even greater expenditures for centralized electricity and heating grids.
New Ideas for Small Energy Compared to other approaches, the proposed Russian Biofuel Program presumes the mass use of high-grade wood pellets and is 2–4 times more cost-efficient and energy- efficient, while being in a class of its own in terms of environmental concerns, safety and climate change. EcoService—a firm in the city of Krasnoyarsk—and the Krasnoyarsk Krai Envi- ronmental Union have developed and proposed a fundamentally new approach to mass supply of autonomous, alternative energy for low-rise housing. The approach is based on the concept of reprocessing hardwoods. The first stage of the Program involves the mass production of high-grade wood pellets from birch and aspen, which equals dozens of millions of tons per year. What contributes to the opportunities and practicality of the Russian Biofuel Pro- gram? 1. Today dozens of firms in Europe have developed and are now marketing co- generation and trigeneration systems, which run on wood pellet fuel. These are firms such as: Solo Stirling GmbH, Stirling Power Module, Energieumwandlungsges mbH, Mawera and many others. They have developed a number of autonomous energy installations which supply not only heat, but also electricity and cooling. Modern automated boilers require that the wood pellets be very clean and produce minimal ashes, in addition to a number of other parameters. They are capable of producing 1–10 KW(e) and 5–50 KW(t). These systems make it possible to make residences completely autonomous, safe, and environmentally friendly. The level of convenience is higher than installations run- ning on natural gas. 2. Nearly ten years on the European market has demonstrated the success of wood pellets as a new fuel type. The technologies for producing and burning wood pellets have already been developed. Wood pellets are an excellent source of alternative energy. They are:
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• Renewable; • Safe; • Environmentally clean; • Carbon-neutral; • Convenient. These factors put this new fuel type far ahead of the competition, even compared to gas. Why is it that autonomous energy that uses small cogeneration facilities and wood pellets has not become more widespread today? There is one reason: there is a deficit of quality, i.e., “clean,” wood pellets that do not use admixtures of bark and other pollut- ants. A large amount of wood pellets on the market in Europe and Russia are “industrial- class” pellets, which means they contain bark, and they produce cinder when they are burned and are not suitable for use in small cogeneration and trigeneration facilities. Over 4 million tons of wood pellets, of 5 million tons used in Europe, are burned at large and mid-sized thermal power plants and boilers, while only 1 million tons are high- grade pellets or first-class pellets that are used to supply power in low-rise housing. There is simply no raw material for mass production of quality pellets in Europe. Meanwhile, the power industry in Europe burns roughly 1.5 billion tons of various fossil fuels each year; it is therefore easy to understand how 1 million tons — just 0.07% of all fossil fuels burnt in Europe — is not enough to dictate energy policy in Europe. At the same time, the Russian Biofuel Program would help boost production levels from 30 to 100 million tons of wood pellets over a relatively short period of time (10–15 years) and replace brown coal and other fossil fuels used by energy systems in Europe, Russia and Japan with wood pellets. We compare pellets with coal precisely because burning brown coal causes the most damage to the environment and the climate. The fuel efficiency of wood pellets is twice as high as that of brown coal, and they have proven to be twice more effective in low-rise housing than burning brown coal in large thermal power plants. The lack of any losses incurred in generating, transporting and transferring heat and electricity over distances, of transforming it to electricity, and of accidents all contribute to making wood pellets considerably more energy efficient than brown coal. The safety, cleanliness, carbon-neutrality and sustainability considerably boost the value of wood pellets as a fuel. But how do we produce wood pellets in the volumes needed in Russia, Europe and Japan? The Russian Biofuel Program answers this question and asks power engineers, environmentalists and builders to turn their attention to birch and aspen, which are found in abundance in Russia and for which there is low demand within the Russian industry. Recoverable oil reserves in Russia are measured at approximately 10 billion tons, and gas reserves are estimated at 35 billion tons. There are over 14 billion cubic meters of hardwood reserves, and they are renewable. Moreover, unlike coniferous trees, which can be harvested only after 80–100 years of growth, birch and aspen can be harvested after as little as 40–50 years. That means one plot of woodland can be used twice in a hu- man lifespan. As a result, birch and aspen reserves in Russia exceed oil reserves and are at the very least comparable with gas reserves. The opportunities afforded by advanced processing are considerably better. One of the main problems associated with processing birch and aspen is the waste produced. It is not common knowledge that only 10% of a fallen birch tree is used in the production of plywood. Fifty to seventy percent of the tree is left in the forest. Another
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30–50% is peeled off during the plywood production process. That means 90% of the tree ends up as waste. Over 70% of the tree also ends up as waste when birch is pro- cessed for boards. A minor part of the birch tree is used for cellulose, but not more than 4–5 million cubic meters each year. Birch is only used to produce high-quality paper. Most birch processed in Russia today is exported to China, Sweden and Finland as round timber. Furthermore, of the approximately 240 million cubic meters of annual harvested area, only trees on an area of just 35–40 million cubic meters are harvested each year. The measures taken today by the Russian government to increase customs duties on lumber exports will further push birch harvesting down to 5–10 million cubic meters per year. As a result, over 200 million cubic meters of birch growth are not processed today and are not allocated for processing in Russia in the near future. What is going on? There is no technology in Russia today for advanced processing of hardwoods. The main reason is the large amount of waste created when processing birch and aspen. Mass production of wood pellets from birch and aspen trees can solve this problem. This means using birch and aspen trees will become lucrative, comprehen- sive and one-hundred percent efficient. The approximate consumption of trees under the Russian Biofuel Program is as follows: • Nearly 40–45% of wood (primarily of average quality) would be used for producing wood pellets; • 20% is quality wood which would be used for traditional production: ply- wood, lumber, chopsticks, bonded construction, rounded logs, etc.; • 5–10% will be processed for the pulp and paper industry and biosynthesis products; • 30% would end up as waste (the bark, rot, small-diameter timber, etc.) and will be used by the Program’s participating companies for their own needs to produce heat and electricity. An annual cleared area of 240 cubic meters of birch and aspen trees means the op- portunity to produce 100 million tons of pellets per year. Furthermore, over 70 million cubic meters of aspen and birch would be used for plywood, boards, bonded construc- tions and chopsticks, which increases the profitability of birch processing by 3–4 times. The sizable revenue will be generated by applying biosynthesis and the pulp and paper industry technologies to birch and aspen. Even today, birch and aspen barks are used in a wide variety of medicines and cosmetic treatments. Until recently, it was believed that the properties of birch and aspen were not suit- able for producing wood pellets. Birch is a very dense wood (1.5 times denser than pine and 1.75 times denser than fir). Aspen has very low lignin content. EcoService and the Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental Union have been working on this for over four years. Today, all of the wood pellet production problems associated with birch have been solved. A mass production technology for birch wood pellets has been developed. Equipment has been selected and pilot pellet batches have been produced. The pellets were certified in German laboratories. Their quality is significantly higher than the re- quirements of the DINplus standards, which are the most stringent standards in Europe. Today, negotiations with Western investors on financing the construction of the first factory for wood pellet production are coming to a close. The first factory will have an annual production capacity of 200,000 tons of high-grade wood pellets.
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Meanwhile, work is underway to explore the possibility of producing plywood and biosynthesis products from birch and aspen barks. A site has been selected, along with a felling area and key staff members. The first factory will be located in Krasnoyarsk Krai. This area is ranked first in Russia in terms of birch reserves, which are estimated at over 1 billion cubic meters. Meanwhile, the projected felling area provides over 24 million cubic meters per year, and only 1.5% is cut in the region. Krasnoyarsk Krai is the most convenient starting place for this segment. It is also very convenient in terms of transportation. The distance to European countries and Ja- pan is nearly the same. Complicated transport logistical issues have also been resolved successfully. This production will be profitable. The Russian Biofuel Program envisages the construction of five such factories in Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2009–2014. However, the main point is that birch and aspen resources in Russia and wood pel- let demand in EU countries will help increase the development of the Russian Biofuel Program at any pace. Demand for low-rise housing in Europe and Russia means a need of dozens of million tons of pellets. This market will be in development for 15–20 years. But in or- der to conquer the market, environmentalists in Russia and Europe and their respective governments need to contribute to these efforts. A Russia-EU Program for accelerated introduction of the Russian Biofuel Program in the energy sectors in Russia and Europe is needed. The Program is beneficial for everyone involved: • Russia and Europe (including the government and all involved ministries and agencies); • The hundreds of depressed districts in our country; • The green movements in Russia and Europe. This Program has everything required to become a major component of the Kyoto Protocol and is capable of making Russia a world leader in the production of renewable energy sources within a short timeframe.
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Questions and Answers Session on Alternative Energy Organized by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
– Dialogue participant: You mentioned that wind energy reserves are estimated at over 100 MW. For example, the wind power turbine in Germany with the greatest output produces 5 MW, and it stands 184 meters tall, with three blades, 65 meters each, and a foundation that required 360 m2 of concrete. What kind of funds are needed to pay for the building materials for just one 5 MW turbine and how much power will it generate over the course of its service life? – Aleksandr Chumakov: I’d like to stress that I was talking about potential wind energy reserves and not about power generating installations that would allow us to access that energy. This is the key difference. You are talking about megawatts, and I am talking about megawatt hours. These are different units. – Igor Babanin: You are talking about the potential of wind power generation, i.e., will the wind turbines require more energy than they produce? They’ve run the numbers and found that they do not. All wind turbines produce from 3 to 20 times more energy than was spent on their construction. For comparison sake, an NPP produces twice the energy spent on the entire cycle, and that is probably an over-estimate.
– Pavel Munin: You were talking about reprocessing of birch and the great profits to be made. I don’t mean the pellets; that’s easy. I mean the advanced processing you men- tioned. What exactly is implied by that? – Vladimir Kirilin: About three project stages are involved. The first stage is the basic production of fuel pellets, because the business will need a foundation. They will form the financial, structural/technical, and forestry base. Afterwards, knowing what exact raw materials you have, you do your processing. Mainly, this is plywood and particle board. The third step is more complex. A market needs to be created. But, today, the reprocessing market, the biosynthesis of birch and aspen in Europe and America is very big. I’ll also mention that the birch’s white color is due to betulin, a crystalline substance that our scientists learned to extract from birch bark 30 years ago. This is done with the chaga mushroom, which possesses medicinal properties thanks to betulin. Scientists at the Novosibirsk Institute, Novosibirsk’s Akademgorodok, the scientific research city, and Koltsovo—once Russia’s most classified biological weapon production center— spent over 15 years developing a broad range of medicines containing the mushroom. Its properties include bolstering and strengthening the immune system and making it useful in fighting AIDS, cancer, hepatitis, and other diseases. Similar things can be said about aspen. Aspen is first and foremost, a source of vitamin F—the vitamin of life. Aspen and birch can be used to make at least 100 promising pulp and paper and biosynthesis products.
- Anatoli Matushchenko: Has progress been made in a draft document or can we look forward to the adoption of a law on alternative energy? - Aleksandr Chumakov: The only document currently in existence is Russia’s Energy
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Strategy through 2030, which allots 1% to alternative energy. This is inadmissibly low, so I feel that we will all need to campaign for an amendment to the next energy strategy, the founding document in the field. - Igor Babanin: I’ll add a few words about the legislative aspect and give you Mur- mansk as an example. On April 3, a wind turbine was officially added to the power grid. It started operating in 2001, and the official paperwork was completed in time to connect it to the grid on April 3, 2008. - Aleksandr Chumakov: This happened after legislation was adopted on access to alter- native energy through common power grids. - Albert Gozal: In early November, we held a meeting on alternative energy at the State Duma. We decided to create an international group that would focus on alternative en- ergy. It would include experts from Russia, Japan, and other countries. Last week, there was a seminar at the State Duma, where Mr. Vasiliev talked about the Legacy Program. In conclusion I would like to say that the International Science and Technology Center can help you find partners and programs. We have spent USD 930 million on environ- mental causes over recent years and have found many partners. If you would like to join this group of alternative energy experts, we would be glad to have you.
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What is the Meaning and Danger of Radioactive Disaster?
Anatolii Nazarov Director, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences; Deputy Chairman, Public Council of RosAtom; Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Viktor Letov Institution for Continuing Professional Education; The Russian Medical Academy for Post-Graduate Education; Russian Ministry of Health and Social Development Elena Burlakova Chairwoman of the Scientific Council on Radio-Biology, Russian Academy of Sciences During the long 20 years which separate us from the events at Chernobyl, one con- stantly encounters diverse opinions and definitions on the nature of the catastrophe: was it an accident or a disaster? Articles written by those in the nuclear industry always say it was an accident. Representatives of environmental organizations and health services sometimes say it was a disaster, but more frequently, an accident. It is clear that the ques- tion as to which category this event should be placed in has deep social, philosophical and technical significance, and demands particular attention. From the very birth of the nuclear industry, and at various stages of planning, con- struction and subsequent implementation, the question of how to reduce the risk of ac- cidents in such a new and unusual technical area gained in importance. The military nuclear industry played a leading role. During the arms race (1940–1960), when all talk was of the fate of the state, the safety of personnel and the overall operation of the nucle- ar industry were not among the state’s priorities. The focus was on eliminating technical and engineering faults in nuclear installations and equipment. Accident prevention was seen purely in the context of supporting the creation of nuclear weapons. The possibil- ity of a major accident with the emission of radionuclides into the environment and the problem of radioactive waste was essentially not examined seriously, and even less so the issue of a major nuclear disaster. It was accepted as axiomatic that nuclear energy is the safest and most environmentally friendly in comparison with carbon energy (1). The entry of humanity into the nuclear era from an environmental point of view can be represented by a chain of unending radioactive accidents (2). The fact that many of them unfolded very rapidly excludes the opportunity to localize the disaster during its initial stages. This so-called “window” is a fundamental indicator of the fatal irrevoca- bility of events as they grow into a catastrophe. In the case of the Chernobyl disaster, the “window” during which a technological accident grew into a radiation disaster was all of 56 seconds, making it impossible for personnel sent to avert the disaster to take any combative measures. So a man-made system that has reached an extreme, unstable
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condition and its transition through the “window” towards irrevocable destruction marks the start of a disaster, the impossibility of stopping the process and returning the system to its previous stable condition. An analysis of the events at Chernobyl, Kyshtym, Three Mile Island, Sosnovy Bor, Seversk and a dozen other radiation accidents and disasters and hundreds of man-made accidents, which are closely linked to the increasingly complex nature of technology and its management, shows that the world has entered an era of catastrophe. It is impossible to brush this off and pass by on the other side. It is a threatening reality and demands fundamental scientific investigation in order to develop practical safety measures. Be- cause of this, it is more appropriate than ever to address the often-forgotten works of Georges Cuvier on the theory of catastrophe (3). The scientific concept of catastrophe was developed starting in the 1830s through the 1950s, when the important defining characteristics of the concept were identified. In Cuvier’s opinion, the essential nature of catastrophe is the complete, systemic, and irrevocable loss of organization. A total loss of structural-functional organization, ‘when only wreckage is left of the past.’ In our opinion, the main distinguishing mark of a catastrophe stems from Cuvier’s ideas: the irrevocable development of events. The event vector points in a single direction. The old type of organizational function as a whole is lost. When only fragments are left of the past, it is necessary to transition to a new type of organization of the parts of the whole which have fallen apart. An accident is always local, no matter how severe the consequences. Once the damage caused has been cleared, it is possible to revert to the previous method of orga- nization. A nuclear energy accident, involving the destruction of a nuclear reactor and the emission of a large mass of radionuclides into the environment grows, if the process is not localized, into an irreversible radiation disaster, affecting large parts of the bio- sphere and enormous numbers of people. The distinguishing characteristic of the last fifty years has been the demonstration of the global nature of catastrophe. The disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was of a global nature – the consequences affected almost all continents and countries to the same degree as terrorism and other types of global catastrophes. The disaster at the Chernobyl NPP was not tragic chance, as we are persuaded to believe, nor due to a combination of errors on the part of personnel. Its roots lie much farther back, as the consequences of the disaster affected all areas of the life of society, destroyed its ideology, economy and finances, and laid bare the extent to which the envi- ronment and culture of the already fading Soviet system in Russia had been destroyed. The Commission created by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1989–1991 to examine the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP, and to assess the activity of those responsible in the post-accident period, had the task of performing an analysis of the strategic development of nuclear energy, the study of the direct causes of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP and the problems of dosimetry. Apart from this, the Commission’s tasks also included assessing the medical and biological effects of exposure on the NPP personnel, who led the clean-up efforts, and on the general popula- tion; the genetic consequences of the accident; and a comprehensive investigation into the consequences of the disaster for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as how the accident developed and how it grew into a catastrophe. The first task was closely linked to the social movement of those people who had suffered in the Chernobyl accident and
94 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY those who wished to receive help from the state. A more pragmatic goal was the need to determine the real financial costs of the Chernobyl programs which, according to the government of the USSR, “were excessive.” In addition, society as a whole — not just the experts who were members of the Commission — were worried by the question as to how the consequences of the events at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, only one of 14 active RBMK reactors, should be assessed: as an accident or as a disaster? The Chernobyl disaster, often called the “accident in the fourth reactor,” fundamen- tally changed the way in which the “peaceful” atom was viewed. It was impossible to hide the consequences of such an accident behind a veil of secrecy, as had been the habit of the Ministry of Atomic Energy in previous decades. Action had to be taken on a large scale to liquidate the consequences of radioactive pollution, to take urgent, non-standard action to ensure radiation security throughout the nation’s complex nuclear industry. The scale of what had happened could not be kept secret; it was impossible to hide it, just as it was impossible to return Chernobyl’s fourth reactor to its original functionality and to say that the event was either an accident or a fuzzily-defined “radiation incident” in the history of the evolution of the nuclear industry. The intervention of science involving researchers from the academies and institutes of higher education was required; a historical and history of technology analysis was used as the basic methodology. The relation of the events back to history and, above all, the history of science, is no chance here. Vladimir Vernadsky wrote: “…the history of human civilization is linked to the ‘conscious survival’ of disaster and the ability to overcome such events.” During the first millennia of human evolution, disasters were exclusively natural. The most recent period in the history of humanity – the 19th, 20th, and first half of the 21st century (let us suppose) will be characterized as the era of man-made disasters. This understanding can be seen as part of a wider concept: “catastrophes of civilization.” Moral catastrophes, which reflect the decline of moral ideals, the crisis of the family, marriage, traditional and religious institutions, drug addition, alcoholism, terrorism, and the emerging crisis of the environment, or biosphere, with its unpredictable results, can all be placed in this category. In spite of many dramatic pages in the work of the Commission, (whose activity and disbanding coincided with the departure of the USSR from the world stage) it was able to sum up the efforts of almost 200 experts and present the fruits “of reason’s icy intimations and records of a heart in pain.” But even back then, it was becoming clear that the true causes of the Chernobyl disaster were elsewhere. In the 20th century, Russia has lived through several eras, and the era of social planning was the longest, spanning from 1917 to 1992. Above all, this period was a struggle towards a better life, which was shattered by the Solovetsky Special Camp and the Gulag, and the exile of the country’s brightest minds. There were millions of ruined lives, millions of “slaves” in camps and distorted human fates. However, our task does not include analyzing the project of social reconstruction of the world, which turned into a tragedy for the Russian people with the loss of more than 40 million lives during the Second World War (1941–1945). The building of hydroelectric power stations on the plains of the black earth region can hardly be forgotten. The dismantlement of such cyclopean installations, and the decommissioning of dozens of nuclear power plants demands huge financial investment from society, and it will be a long time before the
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country is ready for that. The great construction projects of Communism and the presumptuous plans to di- vert Siberia’s rivers to the south have definite value. As do nuclear defense, space flights, and the construction of the BAM railway. There were, and are, many positives. And this cannot be wiped from Russian past. But during the era of grandiose social transformation, there was a critical moment – Chernobyl. It was not an accident, as the event cast light on the impending catastrophe of the mighty Soviet system. Inevitably, the words of Nikolai Ryzhkov, then-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at one of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet on Chernobyl, come to mind. He admitted that the country had not been prepared for such a large-scale catastrophe as Chernobyl. Not prepared… Was it really necessary to create nuclear energy in the 1950s? In the opinion of Igor Kurchatov, the leader of the nuclear project, in reply to a question asked by one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the viability and development of nuclear power plants, said that there was none at the current time and that “for the next 30 years, it will be an expensive experiment.” He saw the problem from inside, and understood, as no one else did, the complexity of the tran- sition and how unprepared the country’s economy and science was for the large-scale construction of nuclear reactors. And he knew, as no one else did, that the USSR had invested almost all its financial resources in the creation of nuclear weapons. The prior- ity remained the development of nuclear weapons and the space program. These two programs were closely linked with the defense capabilities of the country. The pioneer RBMK reactors were designed to produce plutonium, while nuclear reactors were cre- ated for nuclear submarines. In the 1960s, these early reactors served as the basis for the design of RBMK and PWR reactors for generating nuclear energy. It should be stressed that the USSR was not the first in this respect: both the US and England were following the same path. These were compatible technologies with a dual aim: to get explosive materials and to get energy to create weapons from the same source. The first major nuclear accidents took place at military installations: at Windscale (in England) and in Russia at Chelyabinsk-40 (the Kyshtym catastrophe). These acci- dents were what started the discussion on how to deal with nuclear waste. At the heart of the USSR’s social planning, and the impressive transformations which took place, was the illusion that large-scale civilian projects corresponded with the level of international engineering achievements. One of these grandiose projects was the nuclear project. The multi-faceted investigation into the causes and consequences of Chernobyl shows that calling this the main reason was impossible (4). It lay in the in- evitability (in the words of Ryzhkov) with which nuclear energy had moved toward this catastrophe. In the opinion of Boris Porfiriev, the social and economic development and progress of science and technology in the USSR, as a whole, created inescapable pre- conditions for such events. One of these was the total secrecy of the military industrial complex, which assured a lack of scientific analysis of technical projects for develop- ing the nuclear industry, and the possible accidents linked to their implementation. The command-and-control system excluded such an approach. Programs for similarly extensive implementation of economic projects with the same directive nature and extreme secrecy from society inevitably led to disaster. As for the causes of the accident, which transformed into disaster, experts came to the conclu-
96 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY sion that the main causes were construction flaws in the reactor cores of RBMK reactors and the system for managing security. These closely intersected with the unintentional errors of personnel who were not party to the design faults of the reactor (5, 6). The fact that the nuclear industry was closed to both the public and to nuclear industry experts did, to a significant extent, cause the logical catastrophic development of events. The example closest in time to the events of Chernobyl was the accident at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant in 1975, where a fuel channel in the reactor core melted down. Back then, it was possible to shut off the reactor, probably due to more technically prepared personnel and happy circumstance. Information about the accident in this type of RBMK reactor was, just as with Chernobyl, kept secret. It did not become a case in point for serious consideration of the reasons at similar nuclear power plants in the country. There were still more than ten years to go till the Chernobyl disaster! Mr. Yadrikhinsky, who worked as a nuclear safety inspector at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, with the same type of reactor design, pointed out the construction flaws in the design of RBMK reactors in 1985 (7). His work at this nuclear power plant averted events, which were then to unfold in the fourth reactor of the Chernobyl NPP a year later. The instability of RBMK reactors should have led to a detailed analysis of the project and served as a warning to nuclear industry workers and regulatory bodies, but the latter chose to ignore this information. This example shows that the disaster could have been avoided. The refusal of GosAtomEnergoNadzor to make changes to the construction of func- tioning RBMK reactors and to take the corresponding management decisions clearly had fatal consequences. But this did not alter the possibility of similar accidents in the future. The causes of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP were systemic, merely the result of deeper social, economic, psychological and historic issues. Still, can Cuvier’s theoretical constructs (Discours sur les révolutions de la surface du globe), which take as their basis material on natural, catastrophic changes to animal and plant life during the history of the planet, be applied to man-made objects, and spe- cifically to nuclear energy? The short answer is probably yes. None of the currently known nuclear disasters happened by chance; each was pre- ceded by irregularities at nuclear installations. Such irregularities were cumulative, re- maining hidden during planning or concealed during implementation and this, over time, had disastrous consequences. The establishment of the nuclear energy industry and its development over a long period of time was an extremely complex task with many unknown factors. The suc- cessful fulfillment of this task a priori assumes a high level of technical knowledge and general culture among project participants with professional training, and a well-devel- oped sense of responsibility. In working with nuclear energy, the danger of irrevocable nuclear catastrophe is entirely real. This is axiomatic in terms of the natural sciences, and even more so under real world conditions in relation to the dangers of man’s industries. Due to this, society is right to place the highest expectations on those working to cre- ate nuclear installations — from researchers to designers to service personnel. On this point, historical-scientific and expert research shows exactly the opposite — a lack of responsibility, low professional and general standards in the design and implementation of nuclear installations, and a corporate caste system operating against a backdrop of a
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lack of willingness and ability to see the broader issues (8, 9). This applies right at the start of the process when sites are selected for nuclear power plants and other dangerous nuclear installations. There is hardly any need to re- peat again how inappropriate the choice of site for the vast majority of Russian nuclear installations was, including that of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, when they were ‘bound’ to geological faults and sinkholes. Many geological and environmental errors were committed in connection with the emission of nuclear waste into hydrologic net- works or the pumping of nuclear waste into underground geologic formations. All the more so if the subject of the results of ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions (approximately 190) is addressed, which were aimed at creating underground reservoirs for pumping liquefied gas, petroleum or the same liquid nuclear waste. All of these projects ended in the radionuclide pollution of significant portions of surface water and ground water watersheds (10). An analysis of the reasons for the errors committed in the construction of nuclear energy installations shows that errors are various, with each covering a range of stages in the creation and implementation of nuclear installations. The main reason for the ten- sion between the designers of technologies and their subsequent implementation in the natural environment (more broadly, the biosphere), was that technical specialists either ignored or were ignorant of the structure and functioning of the biosphere. More often than not, this was a failure to understand that man-made, often dangerous radioactive objects, occupy the space-time of the biosphere and its natural ecosystems together with the original inhabitants. The safety of organisms, and mankind itself, depends on the extent to which these objects are in harmony with the biosphere and its structure. Man-made disasters, particularly at nuclear energy and chemical installations, which are not an inherent part of the biosphere and its organization and its dynamic balance, which has evolved over billions of years, are due to the lack of consideration given by the technical world to the fundamental achievements and laws formulated by natural science and our understanding of the biosphere. Karl Ernst von Baer, one of the outstanding Russian scientists of the 19th century, has the following words which are highly relevant in today’s world: “Widespread knowledge of the natural sciences is of essential importance for Russia in the development of many industries.” The biosphere and its microorganisms, soil, natural gases, water, flora and fauna, climate and penetrating radiation constantly “digests” invading foreign objects. How- ever, the ‘answer’ of the Earth is often not appropriate, often resulting in catastrophic consequences for construction and transport systems and numerous human victims. In spite of the seeming fragility of the biosphere, thanks to its structure it is actually a stable system with many degrees of freedom. At the same time, the degree of freedom offered to man-made objects is vanishingly small in comparison with that afforded to any natu- rally occurring object. And the larger a multi-functional man-made object (a nuclear power plant, a nuclear submarine, a space station) or a radioactive installation that poses a threat, the higher the likelihood of catastrophic events developing. The number of industrial production facilities in the world is growing steadily, and many installations currently in use were constructed using old technologies and are no longer fail-safe. Therefore, an increase in the number of man-made disasters can be forecast over the next two to three decades. The issue of integrating nuclear energy and other radioactive installations which could pose a threat into the biosphere is of crucial
98 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY importance here, as is the need to identify effective ways of mitigating the effect of mod- ern nuclear energy and the radioactive legacy of the Cold War on the biosphere. The issue of the biosphere is part of the broader question of general safety, which to a great extent determines the possibility of a radiation disaster occurring, and how such a disaster unfolds. Even considering the remediation of the consequences is almost impos- sible due to the long half-life of many radionuclides. For instance, Pu239 has a half-life of 244,000 years, and I129 has a half-life of 17 million years. These radionuclides are only created in nuclear reactors – they did not occur in nature prior to the nuclear era. Because of this, the radioactive effect of radionuclides on man and on living organisms of the biosphere will continue to be felt for many generations following a radiation ac- cident. The concept of radiation safety still does not have a single scientific definition, in spite of the fact that its practical importance for society is obvious. However, it has not been the object of holistic examination by fundamental science. The secrecy of the work, connected with the production and testing of nuclear weapons, the development of the nuclear submarine fleet, with ‘peaceful’ nuclear energy and nuclear facilities has distort- ed the system of values, in which nuclear safety was given extremely low priority (1). Going on what has been stated above, the answer to the question as to whether it would have been possible to avert the Chernobyl disaster is undoubtedly an unqualified yes. However, this does not change the causes of possible major disasters in the future, which are part of the social, economic and psychological problems that played a major role in management decisions. The need to restructure the entire nuclear field, together with the associated areas of engineering, materials science, research and development, and address the issue of professional training, was becoming urgent. Incidentally, this applied to activity in all areas of the national economy. Was the Chernobyl disaster a watershed moment in the era of social planning? The authors find it difficult to give an unequivocal answer. To some extent, it was. If we take into account the fact that public consciousness has been significantly raised, which makes it possible to address the danger inherent in the evolution of civilization. Most importantly, the ideological basis of the bureaucratic command system, which lay at the heart of social planning and fettered free thought (and dissidence) for three quarters of a century, has been dismantled. In spite of the fact that the system is no more, many of its characteristics are still in existence, as society is still made up of the same people. Because of this, a contin- ued critical rethinking of the multi-faceted concepts of radiation, and therefore nuclear, safety is important. These concepts are only now starting to be covered by fundamental science and require detailed interdisciplinary research. Striving towards the continued development of the nuclear industry shows just how important a place radiation safety should take in Russia. Does an understanding of the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl disaster guarantee that it will not be repeated in the future? The era of social planning is defi- nitely in the past. However, it has left us a legacy in the form of projects which have already been implemented, and these have to be secured to protect society. Our task is not to forget the past, and using our knowledge as a foundation, solve the issue of how to implement social projects in the future.
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In conclusion, it can be asserted that the history of man entering the nuclear era, can, from an environmental point of view, be presented as a history of radiation di- sasters. Both large and small radioactive disasters are extreme examples of potential environmental consequences. Many of them develop extremely rapidly, making it im- possible to manage the process of containment at the initial stages of the disaster. The environmental consequences cannot be fully liquidated. They make themselves felt after tens, hundreds, and thousands of years (the decay of plutonium, americium, curium, etc.). The effect of radiation on humans and organisms of the biosphere will continue to appear and make themselves felt over several generations. The examination of the environmental problems of the nuclear industry is part of the wider problem of safety, which determines the likelihood of a radioactive catastro- phe developing and its subsequent liquidation. This is why it is vitally important, both in theory and in practice, to study the essential nature of catastrophe. References 1. Porfiriev, B. N. An Analysis of the Strategic Development of the Domestic Nu- clear Energy Industry in the Light of the Chernobyl Disaster [Analiz stretegii razvitiya otechestvennoi yadernoi energetiki v svete Chernobylskoi katastrofy]. With Yu. I. Karya- kin, V. V. Orlov et al. The Chernobyl disaster: causes and consequences [Chernobyls- kaya katastrofa: prichiny i posledstviya], part 1. Minsk: Test, 1993. 13–42. 2. Mityunin, A. V. The Atomic Penal Battalion. The National Specifics of Liquidat- ing the Consequences of Radiation Accidents in the USSR and Russia [Atomnyi shtraf- bat. Natsionalnye osobennosti likvidatsii posledstvii avarii v SSSR i Rossii]. The Nuclear Strategy of the 21st Century [Atomnaya strategiya XXI veka]. January 2005. 21–24. 3. Cuvier, G. Discours sur les révolutions de la surface du globe [Discourse on the Revolutions of the Surface of the Globe]. Zhukovskii, D. E trans [French to Russian]. Borisyak, A. A., ed. Moscow: Biomedgiz, 1937. 4. Conclusions of the Expert Subcommittee of the State Expert Committee of the State Planning Committee of the USSR on State Programs of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR for the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 1990–1995. Nazarov, A. G., Burlakova, E. B., Florensky, P. V., Firsova D. S. et al. Moscow: Gosplan USSR, 1990. 52. 5. Burlakova, E. B., Nazarov, A. G., Firsova, D. S., Nesterenko, V. B., Shechenko, V. A., Osanov, D. P. et al. The Chernobyl Disaster: Causes and Conclusions (Expert Conclusion) in Four Parts. Nesterenko, V. B., Firsova, D. S., Burlakova, E. B., Nazarov, A. G. et al. editors. Minsk: Test, 1992–1994. Separate edition in 1995. 875. 6. The Chernobyl Disaster: Causes and Consequences (Expert Conclusion). In Four Parts. Part 1. The Direct Causes of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nesterenko, V. B., ed. Minsk: Test, 1993. 216, illustrations. 7. Yadrinsky, A. A. Nuclear Safety of RBMK Reactors. Gospromatomnadzor at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant [Yadernaya bezopasnost reaktora RBMK. Institut Gospro- matomnadzora na Kurskoi AES]. Kurchatov, 1985. Also, The Nuclear Accident at the Fourth Reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the Safety of RBMK Reactors [Yadernaya avariya na 4 bloke Chernobylskoi AES i yadernaya bezopasnost reaktorov RBMK]. Kurchatov, 1989. 8. Moiseev N. N., Nazarov A. G., Burlakova E. B., Florensky P. V., et al. An Expert
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Assessment of the Program for Liquidating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident (in Russian and English). Moscow: Kniga, 1991. 178. 9. Nazarov A. G, L’vova M. S, Starodubtseva S. A. et al. Radiation Disasters and Their Consequences: Environmental-Psychological Motives in Decision Making (Us- ing the Example of the Chernobyl Disaster) [Radiatsionnye katastrofy i ikh posledst- viya ekolo-psikhologicheskie motivy prinyatiya reshenii (na primere Chernobylskoi katastrofy]. The Environment and the Development of Character [Ekologiya i razvitie lichnosti]. Nazarov, A. G., PhD and member of RAN of Natural Sciences, ed. Stupino: 2001. 223–242. 10. Bulatov, V. I. Radioactive Russia [Rossiya radioaktivnaya]. Novosibirsk: Ts- ERIS, 1996, 265.
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The Impact of Low Doses of Radiation: Why is it Controversial?
Vladimir N. Sorokin Professor, United Institute of Energetics and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus
The concept of low doses of radiation is controversial in the scientific community, because experimental data on the impact of small doses of radiation on the body, from studies conducted in countries around the world, have contradicted fundamental prin- ciples of modern radiobiology. The latter traditionally applies the fundamental principle that states that “for all types of high-energy particles, which ultimately give rise to a biological effect, there are the tracks of these high-energy particles passing through the nucleus of the cell.” This is why “an empirical assessment of the consequences of tissue exposure to small radiation doses should be conducted based on epidemiological expo- sure data relative to the number of tracks per cell nucleus.” Meanwhile, precise experimental data shows that, first of all, a radiation effect can take place in irradiated cells, if there are no tracks through their nuclei (1). Second, radiation effects may take place in cells neighboring those that have been irradiated, but through which tracks have not passed at all (1). Third, in the range of doses of ion- izing radiation from close to zero to 10 mSv, where the number of tracks is minimal, the effects of radiation per unit of dose is higher than under large doses of exposure; furthermore, in this dosage range, the effects of radiation per dosage unit are higher as we approach zero and as the number of tracks also gets closer to zero (2). Fourth, given one and the same dosage and the same ionizing radiation dosage rate (i.e., approximately equal numbers of tracks received by a person), the radiation effects will not only differ hundreds of times over, they will also demonstrate fundamental differences — radiation hormesis. Five: the impact of ionizing radiation on humans may take place even in the absence of any sources of radiation in the area in which they live. In other words, there could be no dose of radiation, while radiobiological effects are nonetheless observed among the public (the border territory effect) (4). In the 1930s, radiobiologists had accepted the theory of the indirect radiobiological impact of ionizing radiation. The key principle was the concept that the primary radio- biological effects are caused chiefly by the products of water radiolysis: OH, H, -O2-, eaq- (a hydrated electron), and H2O2 (5). But in the 1980s, this theory was rejected by most radiobiologists, as they could not provide an explanation for several facts that were established by experiments, such as: • Why, in the low-dosage range of up to 10 mSv, the relative biological effect increases as the dose decreases; • Why the relative biological effect of low doses of ionizing radiation increases as particle energy increases given the same dosage values and rates; • The role played by “negligible” (less than 10–13 M) amounts of chemical
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compounds synthesized by ionizing radiation; • The integral mechanism behind the indirect radiobiological effects of ionizing radiation. As a result, most radiobiologists have returned to the concept of the direct impact on the human body of low dose radiation. Today, the most outspoken opponents of the indirect impact theory are the very same people who supported and promoted the theory before the 1980s. At the same time, a minority of radiobiologists remained proponents of the indirect impact theory and continued to work on it. In particular, they include Sergey Stepanov and Vsevolod Byakov, who added the hydroxonium (H3O) radical (5) to the list of wa- ter radicals and made a significant contribution to the theory of the indirect impact of radiation on the human body. However, no explanation for any of the five experimental results named above was discovered. At this time, foreign journals began to publish articles with descriptions of toxic and carcinogenic substances, the concentrations of which increased in organisms that had been exposed to radiation. Most of these sub- stances were identified in Japanese studies. In order to examine the formation patterns of carcinogenic substances in both living things that had been exposed to radiation and in an environment with radionuclides, the proponents of indirect impact selected nitroso compounds as the control group substances. Nitroso compounds cause malignant tumors in the liver, kidneys, intestines, lungs and other organs. These tumors emerge during the appearance of nitroso compounds in the body from external sources, and from their synthesis from precursors in the body itself (6). In 2001, the National Russian Committee for Standardizing and Measuring certi- fied nine methods for identifying nitroso compounds in drinking water and natural water, the air, the soil, food products, industrial raw materials, and flora and fauna (7–15). By using these certified methods, a systemic analysis was conducted of the actual nitroso compound and nitroso-precursor content in the air, water, soil, food products, industrial raw materials, animal fluids and tissues, as well as in tissues and bodily flu- ids of the residents of territories that are not polluted by radionuclides in Russia (the Yekaterinburg Oblast) and Belarus (the City and Oblast of Minsk and in the Berezinsky Biosphere Reserve). The same studies were also conducted on territories that are pol- luted by radionuclides, and with varying degrees of pollution (the cities and Oblasts of Gomel and Mogilev). Data from thousands of measurements was used to establish quantitative patterns of endogenous synthesis of nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) in the absence and in the presence of a radiation factor. The main conclusions of the analysis measuring NDMA content in fluids and tissue samples from organisms that have been exposed to radiation and those who have not show that first of all, the energy of ionizing radiation or the radiation dose is spent on changing the structure and composition of the original amine and nitrite molecules and supporting HDMA synthesis. Second, radiation synthesizes the same carcinogenic substances in organisms that form with background radiation from the very same precursors, but in a larger quantity. The measured amounts of NDMA in the environment (soil, air, water and plants) was noted at higher levels when the radiation pollution level was higher, and signifi- cantly higher relative to its content given background dosages. As a result, experimental evidence has been obtained of the formation in the environment of molecules with new
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properties due to the energy of ionizing radiation, including molecules with toxic and carcinogenic properties (radiotoxins). With food products, water and air, these radionuclides may enter a human body and other biological organisms. Thus, an impact is indeed observed from ionizing radiation of polluted territories on the people residing in non-polluted territories, but located near polluted areas. Patterns in the synthesis of carcinogenic and toxic substances under the effect of ionizing radiation on humans and other organisms have been studied by researchers in many countries. Using these experimental data as a reference point, we can address the fundamental questions named above as follows: 1. For all types of high-energy particles of ionizing radiation, the final agents that produce a biological effect are toxic and carcinogenic substances that are generated by their energy. 2. An empirical assessment of the consequences of exposure of tissues to low dose radiation should be conducted based on examination of epidemiological exposure data with ratios of the number of toxic and carcinogenic substances generated by the radiation dosages exposed to a cell. 3. The above two principles will be supplemented by the experimental data named above, i.e., that the energy of ionizing radiation or a dose of radiation to which a living organism is exposed is spent on activating molecules and changing their structures and/or composition. 4. The energy of ionizing radiation in the environment is spent on activating molecules and changing their structures and/or composition. We then have the fundamental principles of today’s radiobiologists. The concept of the indirect impact of ionizing radiation via the synthesis of toxic and carcinogenic substances tackles the five paradoxes addressed above (in addition to another eleven) by modern radiobiologists (16), by transforming them into obvious confirmations. In line with the fundamental principles of today’s radiobiology, the effects of low dose radiation on the human body is a function not of two parameters — the dosage level and the dose rate — but of at least eight different factors. Three of these are named by the UN’s Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (SCEAR): the selection of food products, lifestyle, and the level of anthropogenic pollution. These indicators significantly change the level of the negative impact of low radiation doses. That is why the problem of the transfer of low dose radiation risks present in one geographical region to other regions remains unsolved. Given equal dosage and dose rate, the radiation effect is higher if the radiation energy is higher, and that means that the energy of photons and high-energy particles as well as dosage ranges must be considered. The most important factor determining the effects of low-dosage exposure in the body is a person’s level of antitoxin immunity. When a high-energy particle or a quantum moves through the tissues of a living organism, it results in molecule activation and ionization. This activated state may be transferred to neighboring molecules located away from the track — first in the cell through which the track passed, and then into neighboring cells. These waves of activa- tion result in the chemical transformation of some of the molecules with the correspond- ing bond strength with neighboring atoms and change in the way molecules interact.
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Transformations in activation waves have the property of slowing down and stopping once the molecules capable of a reaction have run out. Estimates have shown that up to 90% of new molecules synthesized as the result of low dose ionizing radiation form under the effect of waves of activation. The molecules that develop are peculiar in that they form not based on the genetic code of the body’s cells, but in line with an induced, external factor. As a result, some of them turn out to be toxic and/or carcinogenic for the body. On the other hand, the radiation-induced toxins and/or carcinogens take shape from precursor substances con- tained in the cell. As a rule, a certain concentration of identical toxins and/or carcinogens exists in cells even without being exposed to radiation. One may speak of the synthesis of harmful substances in addition to those that already exist without any exposure to ionizing radiation. The known carcinogens hydroxonium and NDMA are examples of these substances. Considering these facts, we can consider the following way in which low dose radiation affects the body: ionizing radiation leads to the synthesis of the additional amount of toxic and carcinogenic substances that affect the body and cause a variety of consequences. Based on this low-dosage mechanism, it is possible to explain a multitude of phenomena that were previously mysteries. The likelihood of ionizing particles hitting their target (in this case, the DNA) in the context of low dose radiation is lower than the likelihood of DNA being damaged by coming into contact with toxins and/or carcinogens. It is the other way around for large doses. Correspondingly, the nature of the harmful effects of radiation from low doses is mediated by the composition of the cell’s substances. This is why, first of all, given the same dosage and dose rates, the amount of synthesized toxic substances varies from person to person. Second, groups of people with different amounts of synthesized sub- stances present very different reactions. Third, the impact of ionizing radiation is pos- sible even without any exposure to radiation due to the appearance of radiation-induced toxins in the body from external sources. In order to perform a quantitative analysis of the effects of low doses with regard to the proposed system of fundamental principles, it would be advisable to consider the processes of ionization and the activation of low energy levels of complex molecules separately. The boundaries for classifying processes are unclear, and for ionization en- ergy levels around 0.1–1 eV, and 0.01–0.1 eV for activation, are typical. On the one hand, one of the channels for relaxing ionization energy is activation, while on the other hand, multiple consecutive activations can lead to ionization. Activation can move within a molecule and from one molecule to another and impact, including selectively, the speed and direction of the reactions taking place. As the absorbed dose grows, the relative effect of activation decreases while ionization increases. Let us assume that the effects of low dosages are the result of activation. A model built upon this thesis presents a wide range of representative possibilities. Figure 1 il- lustrates the relationship between activation effectiveness (Ei) (in relative units) and the absorbed dose (D) of gamma radiation of different energies. Given equal doses, the radiation of the greater amount of energy generates a greater number of activated mol- ecules. As the absorbed dose grows, the activation effectiveness rapidly decreases. Activated molecules of precursor substances enter into chemical reactions that gen-
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erate some toxic and carcinogenic products. The biological action of these toxic and carcinogenic substances explains the effect of low doses of radiation. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the effect of low dose radiation (E) (in relative units) and the absorbed dose (D) of gamma radiation of different energies. Given equal doses, the radiation of the greater amount of energy generates the greater effect. As the absorbed dose grows, the effect of the dose rapidly decreases. Line number 4 (in red) reflects the contribution in the ionization process.
Figure 5. Potential locations for TPPs on the Kola Peninsula.
Figure 2. The effect of small radiation doses.
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Comparing Figure 2 with the data cited below (17) demonstrates that the proposed model accurately reflects the actual observed effects of small doses of radiation.
Table 1. The Number of Deaths from Leukemia over 105 Years
The Number Absorbed of Deaths from Radiation Site Reference Dose (mSr) Leukemia over 105 Years Pilgrim, 1983–1988 2 3.6* 31 Operating UKAEA, 20 (20–50) 4.3* 28 1946–1979 Pilgrim, 1979–1983 20 14.4* 31 Oak Ridge National 21 10.4* 29 Laboratory The US Nuclear Regula- 33.1 5.6 29 tory Commission Hanford 27 6 29 The US Department of 27.6 2.5 29 Defense The Population of Japan, 30 5.1 15 Group I Operating UKAEA 50 5.22 28 Rocky Flats 35 4.0 29 The Population of Japan, 80 1.4 15 Group II Operating UKAEA 100 3.0* 28 Sellafield 139 4.2 29 The Population of Japan, 150 5.7 15 Group III
The Population near the 176 3.8 30 Techa River, Group I
The Population near the 180 6.9 30 Techa River, Group II
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Figure 3. The dependency of the number of deaths from leukemia over 105 years on radiation doses (the numbers of the points in the Figure match the numbers in the table above.
References 1. Little, D. B. The Nonlinear Effects of Ionizing Radiation: Conclusions with Regard to Low-Dosage Impact [Nelineiyniye effeckty ioniziruyuschikh izlucheniy:vyvodi primenitelno k nizokodozovym vozdeystviyam]. Radiation Biology. Radioecology. 2007. Vol. 47, No. 3, 262–272. 2. Malenchenko, A. F., Sushko S. N. The Formation of Tumors Due to the Com- bined Effect of Low Dose Ionizing Radiation and Chemical Carcinogens [Opukhleo- brazovaniye pri sochetannom deystvii malikh doz ioniziruyuschego izlucheniya i khi- micheskogo kantserogena].. Izvestiya of the National Academy of Science of Belarus, Biological Science Series. 2002. No. 3, 77–81. 3. Yarmonenko, S. P. The Crisis of Radiobiology and What Radiation Hormesis Means for the Future of the Field [Krizis radiobiologii i yeyo perspektivy, svyazanniye s izlucheniyem gormezisa]. Radiation Biology. Radioecology. 1997. Vol. 42, No. 2, 5–10. 4. Burlakova, E. B., et al. The Effects of Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation and Chemical Pollutants on Humans and the Ecosystem [Deystviye maloi dozy ioniziruy- uschego izlucheniya i khimicheskikh zagryaznitelei na cheloveka i biotu]. Atomnaya Energiya. 1998. Vol. 85, Issue 6, 457–462. 5. Byakov, V. M., Stepanov S. V. Toward the Mechanism of the Primary Biologi- cal Effects of Ionizing Radiation [K mekhanizmu pervichnogo biologicheskogo deyst-
108 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY viya ioniziruyuschikh izlucheniy]. Ushpekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 2006. Vol. 176, No. 5, 531–547. 6. Zhigunova, L. N. The Formation Patterns of Nitroso-Compounds in the En- vironment [Zakonomernostic obrazovaniya nirozocoyedineniy v okruzhayuschei srede]. Priodopolzovaniye. 1996. Issue 1. 43–48. 7. Report 01.03.082/2001: “Drinking Water and Natural Water. Identifying Ni- trite Ions Using Spectrophotometry and Applying the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Voda pitevaya i prirodnaya. Opredeleniye nitritionov spektrofotometricheskim metodom s primeneniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya]. 8. Report 01.14.165/2001. “Drinking Water and Natural Water. Identifying Ni- trosodimethylamine.” [Voda pitevaya i prirodnaya. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina]. 9. Report 02.14.167/2001. “Air in Our Atmosphere. Identifying Nitrosodymeth- ylamine.” [Atmosferny vozdukh. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina]. 10. Report 03.03.081/2001. “Soils: Identifying Nitrite Ions Using Spectrophotom- etry and the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Pochvy. Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofoto- metricheskim metodom s primeniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya]. 11. Report 03.14.164/2001. “Soils. Identifying Nitrosodimethylamine.” [Pochvy. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina]. 12. Report 04.03.080/2001. “Food Products and Raw Materials. Identifying Nitrate Ions Using Spectrophotometry and the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Pischeviye produkty i prodovolstvennoye syryo. Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofotometricheskim metodom s primeniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya]. 13. Report 04.14.163/2001. “Food Products and Raw Materials. Identifying Ni- trosodimethylamine.” [Pischeviye produkty i prodovolstvennoye syryo. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina]. 14. Report 09.03.083/2001. “Biological Organisms. Identifying Nitrate Ions Us- ing Spectrophotometry and the Griess-Ilosvay Reagent.” [Biologicheskiye obyekty. Opredeleniye nitrit-ionov spektrofotometricheskim metodom s primeniyem reaktiva Grissa-Ilosvaya]. 15. Report 09.14.166/2001. “Biological Organisms. Identifying Nitrosodimeth- ylamine.” [Biologicheskiye obyekty. Opredeleniye nitrozodimetilamina]. 16. Sorokin, V. N. Theoretical Analysis of the Concept of Low Doses [O teoret- icheskom analize kontseptsii malikh dozi]. Proceedings of the Russian Nuclear National Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society and Security. Moscow, April 18–19, 2007. Mos- cow: Green Cross Russia, 2007. 133–135. Or, see: www.green-cross.ru/FORUM-rus-fn. pdf. 17. Burlakova, E. B., et al. The Idiosyncrasies of the Biological Effects of Low Radiation Doses [Osobennosti biologicheskikh deystivya malikh doz oblucheniya]. Bur- lakova, E. B., ed. The Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe: Human Health. Moscow: Rosselkhozakademiya, 1996. 149–182.
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Report on the Joint Agreement on Techa River Floodplain Rehabilitation between RosAtom and the Chelyabinsk Oblast Government Svetlana Kostina Deputy Minister, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast Tatyana Meshkova Department Head, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast
In November 2006, Sergei Kiriyenko, RosAtom Director, and the Chelyabinsk Oblast Governor Pyotr Sumin signed the Agreement on Funding Projects to Rehabilitate the Techa River and Provide Social Assistance to the Muslyumovo Village and Station. The Agreement provides for the joint funding of a corresponding range of projects, including the rehabilitation of the floodplain of the Techa River within the village and station limits, resettlement of the residents of Muslyumovo and some of the residents of the Muslyumovo Station (ul. Tselinnaya, junction [raz’ezd] 101 km) in the Kunashak Rayon of the Chelyabinsk Oblast. The plan includes the resettlement of 741 households, of which the expenses for 593 households will be covered by RosAtom, and 148 would be paid for out of the Chelyabinsk Oblast budget. Abandoned residences would be lev- eled. RosAtom has agreed to allocate RUB 600 million in 2006–2007 on corrective so-
Figure 1. Public discussion of the program with Muslyumovo residents. cial and environmental projects to address the aftermath of Mayak plant activity. The allocation includes: • RUB 7 million for Techa floodplain rehabilitation within village limits; • RUB 593 million for the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents, 593 house- holds in all. One million rubles is allotted per household to be used either for the construction of new homes, housing purchases, or monetary compensation.
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For its part, the Chelyabinsk Oblast government has agreed to: • Finance the construction and modernization of utility systems and the social infrastructure of the new village and the Muslyumovo Station in 2007–2008 in the amount of RUB 450 million; • Oversee the completion of construction and modernization of the power supply system, water mains, the drainage system, telephone lines, and gas mains to the village and Station; • Oversee the reclassification of lands in Old Muslyumovo from the agricultural land category to reserve lands; • Oversee the rehabilitation of the Techa River floodplain within Muslyumovo village limits. RosAtom has created a special fund to administer the fulfillment of its responsibili- ties. The Fund has approved the Position Statement that identified several possible volun- tary resettlement options for the local population: • Monetary compensation upon proof of other housing (a share of living accom- modations); • Independent purchase of housing or construction of a new home at a different location; • Payment of costs of construction of a private home in the new division at Mus- lyumovo Station. By March 15, 2008, the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents followed the geo- graphic distribution showed in the table and in Figure. 2.
Monetary compensation, 17%
Bashkortostan, Kurgan, 1% Chelyabinsk,
Other Rayons 29% in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, 11% New division Kunashak at the Rayon, 20% Musliumovo Musliumovo Station, 14% Station, 8%
Figure 2. Geographic distribution of resettled Muslyumovo residents.
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Table 1. Geographic Distribution of Resettled Residents (March 15, 2008)
Resettlement Number of Resettlement Number of Location Families Location Families
Chelyabinsk 120 Etkul’skii Rayon 1 The Kunashak Rayon 78 Kopeisk 13 Muslyumovo Station 32 Metlino 1 New Division at 54 Emanzhelinsk 3 Muslyumovo Station Argayashskii 3 Zlatoust 1 Sosnovyi Rayon 6 Korkino 2 Krasnoarmeiskii 8 Bashkortostan 2 Rayon Ozyorsk 1 Kurgan 3 Monetary Com- Kasli 1 69 pensation Novogornyi 1
Figure 3. Housing construction in New Muslyumovo.
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Currently, 153 new private homes are being built in the new division at Muslyumovo Station, along with utilities, a communications infrastructure, and roads (Figure 3). This new division will draw its water from four wells. A water main and a water tower have also been built. Construction has begun on the water supply system to individual sites. In all, 6,110 linear meters of water pipes have been laid. Water supply to Muslyumovo as a whole will be improved thanks to these efforts. Biological wastewater treatment will be used for the new division and it has been designed to accommodate the increased load from the new division. Works on the gas main started in 2007 and this year, the first set of homes in the new division will be connected to the main. In all, the gas mains will measure 9,927 meters. Road construction was also started in 2007. Road foundations were laid (gravel and crushed rock) measuring 6.9 km. In 2008, the road building will continue. After the utili- ties are connected to the new division, the roads will be paved. In 2008, ten transformer sub-stations are scheduled to be built and homes will be con- nected to the power grid. Radio links and telephone lines will also be installed.
In fulfillment of the Position Statement, the Oblast government has initiated two proj- ects: 1. The rehabilitation of the floodplain of the Techa river within Muslyumovo Sta- tion limits (approval of the State Expert Commission Directorate of proposal documentation and regional plans submitted by the Oblast obtained on 02/18/08 No. 129/2-552/07).
Main project goals: • Preparing gravel in an open pit for conducting rehabilitation projects (needed volume – 244,593 m³); • Repairing the road to the open pits from Muslyumovo Station for transportation of the gravel; • Shaping the Techa riverbed to prevent repeat contamination of the floodplain along four sectors all together measuring 2 km; • Laying down isolating materials that prevent the effect of capillary action in the floodplain; • Planting trees and shrubbery on the rehabilitated lands of the Techa floodplain on either side of the riverbed measuring 3,900 linear meters and numbering 16,580 plants; • Conducting radiation monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of the re- habilitation effort. Total estimated cost of rehabilitating the area in 2008 prices will be RUB 146,078,480. The planned floodplain rehabilitation efforts will help lower the risk of negative ra- diation effects on local residents and will improve the environmental conditions of the contaminated sectors of the Techa River within Muslyumovo Station limits (see Figure 4). This will be achieved by: • Containing contaminated river gravels and sediment in the Techa floodplain by covering the contaminated materials with radiation-free gravel and shaping the riverbed by creating gravel and stone banks; • Lowering the radiation exposure rate to the maximum permissible level di-
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rectly on the floodplains; • Lowering the contamination level of the flora on the sectors of the floodplain being rehabilitated to permitted levels (to prevent the negative effects associated with isolated instances when cattle is left to graze in the area); • Lower public access to the river banks for the purposes of fishing, relaxation, hay preparation, or cattle grazing by using steep gravel and stone river banks and densely planted trees and shrubbery, except on grass meadows.
2. Rehabilitation of the Muslyumovo territory (approval of the State Expert Commis-
Any locally obtained gravel to Piled gravel/rock — 0.5 m interrupt the layer of crushed rock — 0.3 m Crushed stone — 0.3 m
Elevation of water Clay layer — 1.0 m 3 Q0.1= 143 m /sec Elevation of water i=0.001 3 Q0.1 = 226 m /sec
Collector ditch Layer of contaminated Pre-existing riverbed gravel
Contaminated Natural river Contaminated floodplain bottom floodplain
~20.0 ~20.0 Figure 4. Cross-section of the shaped Techa riverbed.
sion Directorate of proposal documentation and regional plans submitted by the Oblast obtained on 02/18/08 No. 173/2-606/07). Main project goals: • Preclude the return of the current residents to their current location; • After all residents are resettled, level all structures and buildings remaining on the grounds measuring 186,600 m³; • Bury all resulting building rubble; • Compact the disturbed ground to make it level; • Prepare gravel in an open pit for rehabilitation projects; • Deliver gravel; • Remove, transport, and distribute gravel and soil to the grounds under rehabili- tation; • Plant over an area measuring 329.94 hectares for the purpose of increasing for- est cover, improving the eco-health of the area, protecting soil from erosion. The total estimated cost of rehabilitation of the area in 2008 prices will be RUB 187,721,150. After the completion of rehabilitation efforts on the former site of Muslyumovo Vil- lage, and partially on the grounds of Muslyumovo Station, the following will be accom- plished: • Residents will not be allowed to move back into homes on the former village site
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or use the Techa River floodplain for agricultural purposes; • Radiation risks will be lowered for local residents living at Muslyumovo Sta- tion; • Environmental conditions will be improved thanks to rubbish burial; • Forest cover will be increased with resulting protection of land from erosion thanks to reforestation.
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Environmental Surveys and Inspections of Plots of Land for the Construction of Single-Family Housing at the New Muslyumovo and Old Muslyumovo Resettlement Zones Vladimir Kuznetzov Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia; Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Academy of Industrial Ecology; and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council
In 2007, the staff and experts working on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Pro- gram of Green Cross Russia conducted three environmental surveys (inspections) of land plots, on which single-family housing will be built in New Muslyumovo, in ad- dition to the resettlement zone of Old Muslyumovo. The surveys were commissioned by a non-profit organization called the Resettlement Assistance Fund for Residents of Muslyumovo, Kunashak region, the Chelyabinsk Oblast. The study being discussed today was conducted from February to November 2007. The first inspection was conducted February 26 to March 1, the second inspection took place on May 15–19, and the third on November 21–23. The work was performed by the Radiation Monitoring Laboratory in collaboration with the Heat and Energy Com- plex [TEK] Business Support Center [TsPB], a Federal State Institution [FGU], (Fed- eral Technical Regulation and Metrology Agency Accreditation No. 41761-2006 dated 06/05/06). The inspections used the following measurement methods: • SRP-88N scintillation radiometer, factory No. 0933, verification certificate No. 19/120-2005 valid through 08/08/07; • MKS-01R-01 radiometer dosimeter, factory No. 1005, verification certificate No. 03-13 0380 01 valid through 08/17/07; • DBG-06T dosimeter, factory No. 3505, verification certificate No. 19/485- 2006 valid through 02/15/07; • DBG-01N dosimeter, factory No. 1287, verification certificate No. 03-13 0380 03 valid through 08/17/07; • URS-71 specialized gamma-ray spectrometer assembly using a semiconduc- tor detector, verification certificate No. 42010.7F539 valid through 05/25/08; • KAMERA-01 multifunctional measurement suite for radon monitoring, factory No. 0609, verification certificate No. 03 13 6124-256 valid through 05/18/07. Site Information and Conditions of the First and Second Inspections Land registered for agricultural purposes was inspected. Observations: level ground, vegetable gardens belonging to local residents, isolated clusters of trees, household garbage and construction debris dumps were identified, area equals 51 Ha. Meteorological conditions: • On 02/27/07, air temperature -12°С (10.4°F), no precipitation;
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• On 02/28/07, air temperature -10°С (14°F), no precipitation; • On 03/01/07, air temperature -7°С (19.4°F), no precipitation; • On 05/15/07, air temperature 2°С (35.6°F), brief precipitation: rain and snow; • On 05/16/07, air temperature 16°С (60.8°F), partly cloudy; • On 05/17/07, air temperature 24°С (75.2°F), no precipitation. Conclusions: 1. The external gamma-ray exposure dose at the building site does not exceed the value of 0.3 microsieverts per hour as established by Municipal Radiation Safety Territorial Construction Standards TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6). 2. Specific activity of naturally occurring radionuclides in the soil does not ex- ceed the value of 370 Bq/kg established in Radiation Safety Standards NRB- 99 (par. 5.3.4) and in the Basic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation Safety OSPORB-99 (par. 5.2.3). Displaced soil from the site can be used in agricultural activity without restrictions. 3. No radiation anomalies identified. 4. Radon flux density at soil surface at the site does not exceed the values estab- lished in OSPORB-99 (par. 5.2.3) for limit values at residential building and community/consumer facility construction sites.
Recommendations: 1. Moderate anti-radiation protection of buildings should be used during con- struction by a subcontractor. 2. Control measurements of radon activity should be taken along the footprint of the buildings under construction. 3. Implement radiation checks of property and building materials being taken out of the zone by the residents in order to prevent repeat contamination of the territory. Site Information and Conditions of the Third Inspection The purpose of the third inspection was to obtain a threat assessment of contaminat- ed building materials, household equipment and facilities, stocked animal and bird feed, pets. Other materials included other property being removed from the zone by its inhab- itants either during the process of resettlement to their new place of residence in New Muslyumovo or in the form of items sold during the process of property liquidation, as well as a general assessment of radioactivity of the plots of land being abandoned. The inspection covered farmland associated with the village residences. Observa- tions: level ground, vegetable gardens belonging to local residents, isolated clusters of fruit-bearing trees, residential homes and accessory structures are located on the plots. Meteorological conditions: on 11/21/07: air temperature -8°С (17.6°F), no precipi- tation; 11/22/07: air temperature -12°С (10.4°F), gusty winds, partly cloudy; 11/23/07: air temperature -4°С (24.8°F), partly cloudy, no precipitation. Conclusions: 1. The external gamma-ray exposure dose at the ground surface of a number of properties in Muslyumovo exceeds the value of 0.3 microsieverts per hour established by Municipal Radiation Safety Territorial Construction Standards
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TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6). 2. Wood components of houses, sheds, etc. that can be disassembled or are being taken down, can be used by the owners without restrictions. 3. Stocked animal feed can be used by the owners without restrictions. 4. The external gamma-ray exposure dose from foundations and brick ovens of a number of houses in Muslyumovo exceeds the value of 0.3 microsieverts per hour established by Municipal Radiation Safety Territorial Construction Standards TSN PB 2003 MO (par. 5.6).
Recommendations: 1. Prior to relocating house materials and related objects from the contaminated zone, it is advisable that control radiation measurements be taken of the prop- erty, building materials, etc. being taken out of the zone by the residents, with particular attention to rubble stone taken from foundations and bricks taken from ovens. 2. Prior to re-cultivating the abandoned land plots, control measurements need to be taken of the gamma-ray exposure dose for soil. 3. Conduct a radiation inspection of pastures parceled out to the residents of New Muslyumovo and set control levels for the gamma-ray exposure dose and radionuclide content in grass and hay. 4. Compile and submit to the administration of New Muslyumovo a schematic map of nearby areas with an indication of external gamma-ray exposure doses and levels radionuclide content in the soil. 5. Submit to the administration of New Muslyumovo and inform the residents of the results of prior technical and environmental inspections conducted at the site of the new village during construction. 6. Representatives of the Chelyabinsk Oblast RosPotrebNadzor—the Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection Rights and Welfare—together with village administration must conduct an information campaign with the local residents, declaring the entirety of the floodplain zone of the Techa River off-limits for any household or business purposes. 7. Develop a set of visual aids and information materials discussing the details of living and household management in polluted territories with the goal of reaching all population groups. 8. Initiate systematic radiation monitoring of food products produced by the residents of New Muslyumovo, especially dairy and meat. Local sanitation control agencies must be brought on-board. 9. Replace fencing marking the floodplain of the Techa River as an off-limits zone; put up new radiation hazard signs. 10. Expedite protective measures such that the residents of the settlements along the Techa River stop considering the flood plain lands as attractive for agricul- tural or other business activity.
118 Registration of Dialogue participants.
Exhibition stand detailing the work of RosAtom’s Public Council. Natalya Brysgalova, Director of the Russian Ecological Congress, reads the greetings to Dialogue participants from Sergei Mironov, Chairman of the Russian Federative Council.
The panel at the opening of the Dialogue. From left to right: Evgeniy Evstratov, Deputy Head of RosAtom; Vladimir Grachev, Advisor to the Director of RosAtom, Member of RosAtom’s Public Council, and Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Sergey Baranovsky, President of Green Cross Russia; and Igor Konyshev, Director of RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s Public Council. Conference participants just before the start of the Dialogue.
Ms. Ola from Novgorod Slaviya TV and radio station prepares her material for broadcast. Marie Kirchner (left) and Anne-Marie Duchemin, Members of the Council of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France presenting during the plenary session on “The Current State of and Development Prospects for Atomic Energy.”
Evgeniy Evstratov, Deputy Director of RosAtom, presenting his report: “A Legislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radwaste: the Most Important Aspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia.” Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the Bellona Environmental Foundation, St. Petersburg, addresses a question to the panel.
Press conference: Ms. Artyomova, from the Posev magazine asks a question. Igor Konyshev, Director of RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s Public Council, answers questions from the audience.
Ms. Katkova from ITAR-TASS asks about RosAtom’s plans for the development of nuclear energy. Behind a photographer, Mr. Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom (on the left) and Ms. Ulanova, from the AtomProf press office (on the right), lead the press conference.
Mr. Frolov from the Dom Prirodi magazine addresses a question to the panel. Everyone took advantage of the opportunities of the Dialogue in their own way. While most participants used the opportunity to get first-hand information and make the necessary contacts for their work, the group EcoZashita preferred to use their usual communication form to protest.
Filming the Dialogue, for the Security Service TV station. Ms. Yudina, Special Energy Correspondent for the Tribuna newspaper (in the left foreground), listens closely to answers at the press conference.
Kai Asbern Knutsen, from the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature, asks about RosAtom’s plans to implement an alternative energy program (to include wind, solar, tidal, etc.). Mr. Shkrebets, of the Transborder Environmental News Agency (right).
Panel presenters (from left to right): Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council; Yuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research and Development, Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering; and Mr. Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom. Yuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research and Development at the Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering.
Foreground from left to right: Andrey Ozarovskiy, Project Coordinator at EcoZashita, Ms. Fufaeva, Correspondent from the Bereginya newspaper, and Igor Babanin from Greenpeace Russia, St. Petersburg. Ms. Androsenko, of Zhizin Bezopasnost, Ekologiya Publishing, St. Petersburg.
At the podium – Aleksandr Chumakov, Vice President of Green Cross Russia. Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Remediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh Basin
Valery Bulatov Professor, Yugra State University, Khanti-Mansiisk
Introduction The impact of the nuclear industry on the environment, despite the considerable scope of research that has been done, has still not been fully examined. We cannot be sure about all of its negative consequences, nor do we have an objective assessment of the prospects for this type of natural resource management. There is a constant genera- 85 41 239,240 129 241 tion of ‘global’ ( Kr, radiocarbon C, tritium T2), ‘perpetual’ ( Pu, I, Am) and simply long-lived radionuclides such as cesium, strontium, and technetium, among oth- ers. The harmfulness of tritium is universally recognized, and its high levels in water reservoirs near all major nuclear fuel cycle facilities, such as Mayak, exceed the global level 3–10 times over. This is evidenced by data on the plutonium remaining after nucle- ar tests at the Semipalatinsk test site and the plutonium that gradually accumulates in the natural environments surrounding nuclear hubs. Unfortunately, today’s level of knowledge does not allow us to fully assess all of the consequences of radionuclides in the biosphere. The direct consequences of the ab- sence of objective information are, on the one hand, disregard for the true dangers of living in a zone of heightened radiation risk, and a staunch fear of radiation on the other hand. Our many years of experience in evaluating the knowledge level in conditions of restricted information speak to these drawbacks (1, 2). Examples include the contradic- tions between published data on victims of nuclear incidents, risk levels, health statistics for the employees of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, and many other aspects. It suffices to compare two of the most recent general publications in Russia, such as those of Vladi- mir Kuznetsov and Anatolii Nazarov (3), and Mikhail Tikhonov and Mikhail Rylov (4). All information on radioecology in nuclear regions must be made accessible. The Ob-Irtysh Basin as a Subject of Radioecological Research. The Ob-Irtysh basin covers essentially the same large area known as Western Si- beria. In line with the principles of spatial analysis and the goals of radioecological research, the basin, the Gulf of Ob, the Kara Sea and the Novaya Zemlya archipelago should be considered part of the same territory. This meets the principles of aquatic- territorial differentiation and integration of the north of Eurasia, a once popular view of the so-called Middle Region, which included all of Western Siberia and the correspond- ing section of the Arctic, the Kazakh Uplands and Central Asia, with its mountainous terrain. In fact, we are really introducing a new concept of a radioecological region. It is common knowledge that a region is, essentially, not something administrative, but rather
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a natural, historic concept that unites entire natural, territorial and historical regions, basins, natural zones that define the idiosyncrasies of different ethnic lifestyles, the way they are formed, they way they develop, and the way in which different ethnicities mi- grate. Dividing up a region into federal districts and economic districts without any account for the features of the biosphere can only produce temporary, transitory results, which is confirmed by recurring talk of administrative reforms. Anthropological activity constitutes one integrating factor; in our case this means the varying degree of radio- active impact and related environmental, geographical, technical, energy-related, bio- logical, medical, political and economic manifestations and influences on the biosphere and society in the region and at the level of the basin. Environmental management in line with ISO-14001 involves the analysis of the spatial organization of human activity, which is impossible without accounting for the existence of geological systems of river basins and beds based on topographical planning and zoning methods. The universal recognition of the basin approach is based on the functional role of water ecosystems and water as a component of the natural environment that sustains life, much like the role blood plays in the body. The Ob-Irtysh system is unique, because it is the first territory used for nuclear testing and where industrial production of radioactive materials was initially based. It is also the first to experience a nuclear accident. The timeframes are as follows: the Semi- palatinsk test site — 1949–1989; the Novaya Zemlya test site — 1954–1992; Lobnor (located outside of the region) — 1964–1995; Totsky (one nuclear test) — 1954; Mayak — since 1948; Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) — since 1953; Novosibirsk Chemi- cal Concentrate Combine (NZKhK) — since 1949; Urals Electrochemical Combine — since 1949; Ulbin Metal Processing Plant — since 1949; Beloyarsk NPP — since 1984; and, underground nuclear explosions — 1970s–1980s (see Table 1 and Figure 1). From the viewpoint of a geo-radioecological topographical analysis, the territory has the following distinguishing features: • Surrounded by three nuclear test sites that underwent many years of use: Novaya Zemlya, Semipalatinsk, and Lobnor (see Figure 2); • Two world-scale nuclear centers with both active and inactive nuclear reac- tors: Mayak (7) and SKhK (5), an accumulation of manmade biohazardous radioactive waste (radwaste) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with activity mea- sured at several billion Ci; • The area also features major uranium metal processing, nuclear fuel, and highly enriched uranium plants: Urals Electrochemical Combine (city of Novouralsk, the Sverdlovsk Oblast), Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Combine (Novo- sibirsk), the Kazakh Virgin Mining and Chemical Combine (Stepnogorsk) and Ulbin Metal Processing Plant (Ust-Kamenogorsk);
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Table 1. Pollution of the Ob Basin, by Republic and Region RF Constituents / Country Reservoir Area Polluted Lands km2, in thousands % km2, % pollution thou. level, % Republic of Altai 92.6 3.0 0.8 0.3 0.9 Altai Krai 169.1 5.4 10.2 4.3 6.0 Republic of Bashkortostan 1.9 0.1 0.6 0.2 31.6 Kemerovo Oblast 95.5 3.1 30.0 12.7 31.4 Krasnoyarsk Krai 94.0 3.0 11.5 4.9 12.2 Kurgan Oblast 71.0 2.3 8.9 3.8 12.5 Novosibirsk Oblast 178.2 5.7 18.8 7.9 10.5 Omsk Oblast 139.7 4.5 26.1 11.0 18.7 Orenburg Oblast 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Perm Oblast 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Sverdlovsk Oblast 164.0 5.3 40.3 17.0 24.6 Tomsk Oblast 316.9 10.2 3.7 1.6 1.2 Tyumen Oblast 161.8 5.2 6.6 2.8 4.1 Republic of Khakasia 15.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.3 Khanti-Mansiisk Autono- 523.1 16.9 5.8 2.4 1.1 mous Okrug Chelyabinsk Oblast 57.0 1.8 24.9 10.5 43.7 Yamalo-Nenets Autono- 111.1 3.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 mous Okrug Russia 2,194.4 70.7 188.6 79.7 8.6 Kazakhstan 784.1 25.3 47.7 20.1 6.1 China 123.0 4.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 Total Basin Territory 3,101.5 100 236.8 100 7.6
• Operations at nuclear weapons facilities: Zlatoust-36 (city of Trekhgorny, Pri- borostroitelny Factory), Sverdlovsk-44, Sverdlovsk-45 (city of Lesnoi, Elek- trokhimpribor Plant), and Snezhinsk; • The Beloyarsk NPP (3 reactors) and potential construction of stations in the Chelyabinsk and Tomsk Oblasts; • Mining and processing of uranium and other minerals (the Sverdlovsk Oblast, Novogorny), North Kazakhstan (Stepnogorsk), the Kurgan Oblast (Dolmatovo) (exploration); • Use of ionizing radiation sources and accumulation of low- and mid-level wastes at the regional Radon combines: Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, and Chelyabinsk; • Underground nuclear explosions: the Orenburg Oblast – 5; the Khanti-Mansiisk
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Figure 1. Location of key nuclear fuel cycle facilities and radioecological impact on the region.
Autonomous Okrug, Yugra – 5; the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 2; the Kemerovo Oblast – 1; the Tyumen Oblast – 1; the Semipalatinsk Oblast and the Ust-Kamenogorsk Oblast in Kazakhstan (outside of the testing area at the Azgir site – 5); • Scientific research centers and institutions with nuclear reactors and installa- tions: Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novosibirsk; • Radiation accidents and incidents: Chelyabinsk (1950–1951 in Techa, 1957 in Kyshtym and 1967 in Karachayevo); Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), Altai (1949), Tomsk (1993), on-site at the 1980 Angara underground nuclear explo- sion (2001–2002, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, Yugra); • Accumulated natural radionuclides as the result of oil extraction in the form of oil slime, polluted formation water, salt sediments (up to 5% of deposits dem- onstrate anomalous emissions), continual contamination of industrial equip- ment and pipes, clumping of natural radionuclides associated with mining and combustion of black coal (drilling waste disposal sites, ash disposal sites); • The creation of manmade, unauthorized burial sites during geological survey and exploratory works; • The transfer of radionuclides in rivers to a point of concentration via the Salekhard and further to the Ob Bay and the Kara Sea, which during the Cold War was transformed by the military into the largest burial site for both liquid and solid radwaste. The south is a zone in which the following materials are actively transported: fissile material, fuel assemblies, SNF, and warehoused nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the north
122 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY is where the nuclear fleet and nuclear submarines are active (the Kara Sea, the Novaya Zemlya test site, the Ob Bay, and Yenisei Bay). Furthermore, the proponents of acceler- ated construction of new nuclear icebreakers ought to hurry up, as the ice in the Arctic is melting quickly; icebreakers will not be needed at all by 2020.
Figure 2. The Novaya Zemlya test site. Another important issue is the emergence of objective data on the presence of cause-and-effect relations between radionuclide pollution and the appearance of malig- nant tumors in the regions affected by nuclear testing and areas where nuclear installa- tions are located (Altai Krai, Tomsk, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, the Orenburg Oblast, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and North Kazakhstan). The results of public health and medical and biological analyses show that to a large degree, the impact radia- tion has on health strengthens the influence of poor public health factors. This requires allocating additional funds for fundamentally improving the living conditions and qual- ity of life for those who live in polluted areas.
Pollution and Radioecological Conditions in the Region Let us begin with an analysis of the radioecological conditions in the Arctic North. Research in the Kara Sea conducted by Russian and Norwegian expeditions have pro-
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duced data indicated marked local pollution at 137Cs, 90Sr and Pu in all areas where radio- active waste was submerged, in particular the submersion of a nuclear reactor containing SNF in the Novaya Zemlya trench. Additionally, research confirmed the radioactive pol- lution of the mouths of the Ob and Yenisei rivers from past activity of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Siberia (see Figure 3). Studies show that radioactive pollution levels in the Kara Sea are much higher than in the eastern section of the Barents Sea. These studies are still underway (5). The use of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) at waterway facilities (radio beacon stations) and autonomous weather stations began in the 1970s. General activity levels of the RTGs launched in the USSR (roughly 1,500), including 90Y, amount to nearly 100 million Ci. Based on the most recent data, levels in the Arctic are at 381, 303 along Northern seaway, of which about 100 in Taimyr, 153 in Northwest Russia (the Barents and White Seas), and about 100 in the Kara Sea. These are used by the Russian Navy, Rosgidromet and the National Hydrographical Company of the Russian Ministry of Transport, which services the northern seas. They run based on 90Sr with an activity level of 5,000–170,000 Ci. There is a great deal of information about the problems re- lated to lost, unclaimed, spent and broken RTGs, and adding some order to this particular aspect is one of the key factors in rehabilitating the territory. Now let us examine the continental north of Western Siberia. An inadvertent in- crease in the general ionizing radiation background on large territories may cause chang- es in the genotypic makeup of human populations, a phenomenon of which we were forewarned by Nikolai Timofeyev-Resovsky, a Soviet geneticist. One example here comes from research by the Novosibirsk Science Center under the Russian Academy of Science branch in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which leads to the following conclusions (6): 1. Study of radionuclides and heavy metals content in the ecosystem on an area of over 230,000 km2 (1/3 of the territory of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) has shown that long-lived radioactive isotopes of global, regional and local fallout from nuclear testing at USSR and US sites, the largest and most frequent of which were con- ducted in the 1960s, constitute a key factor in anthropogenic pollution. The proximity of the Krasnoselkupsk and Purovsk districts in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug to the Novaya Zemlya test site gives reason to believe that it is the main source of artificial radionuclides on the surveyed area. In general, strontium and cesium activity levels in the ecosystem of northern West Siberia are higher than in the south of this region. That fact does not fit neatly into the universally recognized concept of lower pollution levels in Russian territories close to the Arctic compared to regions along lower latitudes. The contribution of forest fires to secondary radionuclide and heavy metal migration, result- ing in the pollution of new areas, has also been proven. 2. Strontium and cesium were found to be present everywhere in venison, which is a key element in the lichen–deer–human food chain for the indigenous population, and as a result it was and continues to be subjected to chronic internal exposure to radia- tion (although to a much lower degree). Cytogenetic research both in the representative group of indigenous residents (tundra and forest Nenets, Selkup and Komi peoples) and the group of migrants who settled in the North long ago have shown a considerable sta- tistically reliable increase both in the general level of chromosomal aberrations as well as specific radioactive impact markers (ring and dicentric chromosomes). 3. Indicators gleaned from general blood analysis together with cytogenetic and im-
124 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY munological (secondary immuno-deficient conditions) are similar to those of residents of areas directly affected by radiation. Especially pessimistic indicators have been noted among the older generation, which may be explained by short-lived radionuclides that dealt the main blow in terms of exposure during the years of active nuclear testing. 4. The detection of circulating cesium in biological cultures, including from breast milk, placentas and urine samples from the female population (1–44 Bq/kg) demon- strates that a growing fetus, even at the earliest stages of development, is affected by ionizing radiation, which could result in serious consequences for the gene pool of the future generations of the indigenous peoples. This is evidenced by an increase in the fre- quency of fetal developmental defects and dysmorphogenesis. Also on the rise are vision problems and the incidence of nervous and psychological disorders. Indigenous women are experiencing a higher rate of pregnancy and labor complications (6). Lost sources of radioisotopes are scattered throughout the oil and gas regions of the north and middle areas of Western Siberia. In Yugra alone (Khanti-Mansiisk Au- tonomous Okrug) over 200 plutonium and beryllium sources of isotopic radiation had been left inside exploratory and survey wells (7). Their total number in Western Siberia, based on estimates, is already over 1,000, and they are primarily concentrated in the oil and gas regions (see Figure 3). A source of increased anomalous accumulation of natural radionuclides is the combustion of black coal at the heat power plants in major cities. The south and central areas of the Ob-Irtysh basin are encircled by emissions from the Siberian Chemical Combine in the southeast, and Mayak in the southwest. Their convergence and accumulation in the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, where the Ob and Irtysh Rivers join, has only been examined in recent years (8). Calculations have been prepared of radionuclide migration and accumulation in bottom sediments. Each year, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug receives 480 GBq of 137Cs by way of the Ob River, and 41 GBq through the Irtysh River. For 90Sr those indicators are 15,744 GBq and 920 GBq, respectively. Total radioactivity levels in the Ob and Irtysh Rivers, are 2–3 times lower than public health standards, but even then we can speak of the trans- regional transfer of radionuclides, namely through the Techa-Iset-Tobol river system. Concerted efforts are required to neutralize this phenomenon. Rivers, small waterways and lakes close to nuclear centers suffer from relatively high levels of pollution, which is substantiated by no small volume of data. In addition to the rivers mentioned above, the Shagan River (near the Semipalatinsk test site), the Chernilshchik waterway and the Ro- mashka River (Tomsk) are the other affected rivers in the Trans-Urals. The appearance of radionuclides from Kazakhstan in adjacent areas of Russia is essentially cross-border transfer. Intergovernmental-level agreements are needed to resolve the issue of pollution transfer along the Tobol, Ishim, Irtysh and other rivers. The Irtysh River, which passes through the territories of three different countries, is unique in this regard.
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Figure 3. Lost sources of radionuclides in boreholes (Yugra, the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug).
The Siberian Chemical Combine: Operations at the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) generated a large amount of liquid and solid radwaste and aerosol emissions. Radwaste activity levels are estimated at 1,130 million Ci, of which 404.4 million cubic meters are liquid radwaste stored in underground beds (900 million Ci). There are also pulp storage facilities, storage pools, and reservoirs, for a total of 50 storage facilities. The polluted area is estimated at 1,039 hectares. The impact of atmospheric emissions has been recorded within a radius of 30–40 kilometers from the Combine. Soil and plant samples have yielded measurements of U, 239Pu, 137Cs, 90Sr and 90Y that greatly exceed background radiation levels. Furthermore, the accumulation level is steadily moving upward (9, 10). The components of the Nizhniy Tom ecosystem have been found to include 35 anthropogenic radionuclides of activated and fission-fragment sources; the water and the flora and fauna feature both long-lived and short-lived anthropogenic ra- dionuclides (11). The activity levels of the SKhK radwaste that is pumped to a depth of 280–400 meters to the upper sediment layers of the lower Paleogenic era is measured at 900 mil- lion Ci and forms a complex hydro-geotechnical system, a detailed description of which is available (12). The great optimism of the authors with regard to the stability of the system is challenged by the interconnection of buffer beds, poorly sealed injection wells, escaping gas, and radioactive liquid seeping to the surface over the years, accompanied by high-temperatures generated by waste burial sites, polluting rivers. The accumulation of nuclear hazardous fissile nuclides in reservoir beds means the possibility of critically high concentrations and the possibility of spontaneous chain reactions of fissile materi- als under autocatalyst conditions (3).
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Mayak: The overall radioactivity of the waste produced at Mayak exceeds 37 EBq (1 bln Ci) and the increase in active waste, one-third of which are high-level liquid wastes, amounts to 4×106 Ci per year. Since 1948, 1.8×1017 Bq (0.9×107 Ci) radionu- clides have been introduced to the environment, and almost half a million people have been exposed to elevated radiation dosages. According to Bellona’s data, the polluted Mayak site measures 452 km2, and if you include the surrounding territories, that in- creases to 25,000 km2 (13). Other sources say that 1,680 km2 of Mayak territory is pol- luted. The geological medium of Lake Karachai, which covers an area of 2,700 m2, is massively polluted. Four million cubic meters of bedrock at depths of up to 100 meters are polluted, and the water lens is flowing toward the Mishelyak River. More precise data should be included in the total remediation plan for polluted territories, but it has never been included in the Ministry of Nuclear Energy’s informa- tion, nor is it included in current RosAtom’s concepts or regional programs. The funds allocated for rehabilitation in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, which have been increasing over the past several years, primarily concern the social infrastructure: housing, hospitals, roads and endless complaints about the lack of funds on the part of the key guilty parties of this tragedy. Some cities are suffering from comparatively heavy pollution. In Novosibirsk, for example, on the premises of the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Combine (NZKhK), 19.8 hectares are polluted. The radioecological conditions in many cities require con- stant attention in relation to the use of ionizing radiation sources, the storage of hazard- ous wastes, and the proximity of hazardous industrial production, such as in Novoaltai, Ozyorsk, Tomsk, and other areas (1, 9, 10). It is known that radioecological problems, such as radionuclide transfer, are trans- border problems. That is why attention must always be focused on North Kazakhstan, as it comprises the southern underbelly of the radioecological region. The area of the mining industry, balanced ores, and reprocessing tailings here cover an area of nearly 30 km2, and their mass is measured at approximately 200 million m3. The Akmolinsk Oblast (in the Stepnogorsk Rayon) stands out among other administrative regions, as it features 800 hectares with 45 million tons of fine-grained radioactive pulp that turns to dust without constant water supply. This pulp has activity levels of 150,000 Ci. The following data have been found for the Semipalatinsk test site, which is now in the Eastern Kazakhstan region: the volumes of debris and soil amount to 12.3 mil- lion tons, and the activity level of the surface pollution was measured at 11,600 Ci, un- derground cavities formed by contained underground nuclear explosions (220 of them) measured 12.87 million Ci. The volume of the most hazardous plutonium-polluted areas is measured at 5,000 m3, including surface sediments on the sites of former thermo- nuclear tests. As much as 100 km2 of surface grounds require recultivation. Meanwhile, only 40% of the entire test site has been examined in detail for pollution (3). A considerable volume of radiobiological and radioecological research on the test site was carried out by the Institute for Radiation Safety and Ecology under the National Nuclear Center of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Institute was established in 1993. The unique features of this facility, a former test site, is that it provides an opportunity to study the natural population, the ecosystem, hydromorphic and water ecosystems under conditions of constant exposure to small doses of radiation, the migration of radionuclides in the soil and plant system and through the food chain.
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An assessment of the consequences of nuclear tests on the surface and subsoil waters is underway, with a special focus on the appearance of tritium in the Irtysh ecosystem, beyond the Semipalatinsk test site. An assessment of the radioecological conditions at Balapan, Degelen, Opytnoye Polye, and Atomnoye Ozero sites are of special interest (14, 15).
Remediation Programs As regards remediation programs, they should be defined according to their scien- tific, technical, industrial, territorial and social aspects, in terms of improving health and the quality of life for local residents. This is well demonstrated in the example of the long-term National Comprehensive Target Program for social and radiation rehabilita- tion of the public and territories of the Urals region affected by operations at Mayak. This program began in the mid-nineties and faces the same tasks today, confirming En- gels’ words that once we have committed a crime against nature, we will be forced to perpetuate it forever. A testament to this is the fact, for example, that since 1996, not one radioecological problem faced by the South Urals has been resolved. These problems have been discussed and written about, including by the author [of this presentation] in his monograph entitled Radioactive Russia, published in 1996. Russia’s liquid radwaste situation is only growing worse and warrants attention (16). As Kuznetsov and Nazarov have noted, the problems of supporting today’s level of safety and long-term safety in storage pools and reservoirs for this waste is a question for science. A few of them have been listed below as examples. 1. Detailed studies [have been conducted] of qualitative and quantitative radionu- clide made-up of liquid radwaste in storage pools, as well as their morphologi- cal, hydrological and biological properties. An analysis has shown that plant operators do not have sufficiently complete information about liquid radwaste storage pools. Data about their accumulating activity levels, the different types of activity demonstrated by different types of radionuclides, and radionuclide content in water and floor sediments have not been examined sufficiently, and contradictory data can be found in a variety of sources; 2. Research on the behavior of radionuclides in radioactive nuclide storage pools, including studies of the radiation and chemical reactions of the macro- components of liquid radwaste and radwaste in floor sediment, research of the migratory paths of radionuclides from reservoirs into the environment; 3. Research of the processes that bring radioactive aerosols that form on the sur- face of the water in liquid radwaste storage pools into the surface level of the atmosphere and the wind processes that carry radionuclides away from the banks of their storage facilities; 4. Forecasting of long-term behavior of artificial and natural barriers, as well as the potential radiation consequences given closed liquid radwaste storage facilities under normal conditions and given unfavorable scenarios (3). The scientific and technical set of issues should include the development of methods and installations for reprocessing and conditioning liquid radwaste accumulated in storage pools, including floor sediments and water, as well as methods and technolo- gies for phasing out these storage facilities, determining the methods and parameters of radiation control at all stages of the phasing-out process for liquid radwaste storage pools, and subsequent monitoring.
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But when the conditions are such that there are no opportunities to simply shut down operations and remove the facilities, solutions must be found in order to accom- plish three main tasks, which are (3): 1. Accident prevention and employee protection, protection of the public and the environment against the consequences of potential accidents. The actions that are taken should be based on a hazard (risk) analysis specific to liquid radwaste storage pools and optimization studies (assessments of the impact of alternative options on safety and the environment) aimed at lowering risks. 2. Ceasing dumping into liquid radwaste storage pools. A thorough analysis should be conducted of the sources of the waste, and detailed programs must be designed for lowering the quantity of waste until it is eliminated altogeth- er. Remediation of territories housing liquid radwaste storage pools and subjected to the impact thereof involves two main, related tasks: • Taking short-term and mid-term measures to rehabilitate the environment in order to lower, or if possible eliminate, the most significant hazards (risks), for example those related to the dispersal by wind and migration of radionuclides in soil and subsoil water; • Taking long-term measures to resolve problems concerning the management of accumulated radwaste and radioactive waste that forms during remediation efforts. These rehabilitation principles are repeated in dozens of publications on the Southern Urals, a world leader in terms of radioactive pollution. The territorial and social component of the program includes several positions (17). The following measures have been proposed: lowering the level of public exposure to radiation and making agricultural production meet radiation contamination standards; step-by-step rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive pollution, bringing ter- ritories back up to agricultural standards; lowering the risk of forest fires and the transfer of radionuclides from more polluted areas; increasing production of vitamin-rich food- stuffs with preventative and medicinal properties, lower vitamin deficiencies, strengthen immunities, improve public health; gradually return radionuclide-polluted forest lands to productive use; ensure the best and fullest use of forest resources on polluted territo- ries with account for radiation safety requirements; isolate areas with the highest levels of radioactive pollution in the Techa River Valley, and cultivate pastures and meadows along riverbanks and degraded land areas. Other practical measures are planned to, first and foremost, ensure continuous mon- itoring of the state of environmental pollution, the levels of radioactive impact on the public in the Urals region, and monitoring of the local diet, drinking water, and food and produce from local farms and businesses. Next, actions should be carried out in order to lower the risk of future radiation accidents at Mayak, thus preventing any possible future radioactive impact on the public or environment. Third, we must lower the level of social and psychological tension among those living on or near radiation polluted territories. The federal- and regional-level target programs for social and radiation rehabilita- tion of the local residents and the territory of the Urals affected by Mayak’s operations would be of a compensatory nature. To fully restore life-as-normal, conditions must be created for improving investment activities and developing the local economy. This also requires some additional research in order to deal with the economic advisability of ex- tensive agricultural use of lands, forests, and reservoirs experiencing different degrees of
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radionuclide pollution. It is advisable across all levels to begin to search for and consider alternative options for resolving this massive, complex problem (17). The need for these measures, which are absolutely correct, is voiced constantly at all different levels of management and scientific support for remediation. But how does the implementation of these measures look in reality? We can look to the example of the resettlement of Muslyumovo village on the Techa River. These actions are being taken now: 50 years too late. General Scientific, Financial and Social Aspects of Rehabilitation Many scientific proposals, models and concepts are not used in assessing the nucle- ar industry’s contribution to destabilization of the environment. At the Russian Academy of Sciences alone, nearly 400 projects on radiation and the environment are underway, but many environmentally significant works are traditionally not made accessible to the public. There have been almost no studies done on the real economics of the nuclear industry, while talk of the low-cost of nuclear energy is for the simpletons. There is no research on external factors, the negative environmental and economic consequences which have not been taken into account by the main players in these operations. The widespread use of nuclear energy in a number of countries has made it a rel- evant issue on the international arena in terms of its demand for natural resources. The topic at hand is the composition of national and regional “environmental legacies,” i.e., what is needed to provide sustenance for each person, and biological productivity in specific areas, including in basins and radioecologically defined regions. Since the ecosystem possesses minimal abilities to assimilate nuclear energy waste, their accu- mulation directly demonstrates the need to search out sustainable energy alternatives. Environmental footprint numbers rise sharply in accident situations, and this is where we make our nuclear environmental footprint, including the accumulated levels of activ- ity per capita, the area of affected land, and nuclear risk figures. On the other hand, one must consider the lack of CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gasses that represent a major drawback of traditional energy. These calculations still have yet to be completed, including as a part of the Global Environmental Footprint network. Any rehabilitation efforts, especially in such a complex and dangerous field, must have a strong scientific and material basis. Scientific aspects have been covered above, let us now address the financial aspects. Considering the regional principle of building budget relations, it would be appro- priate to say that radioecological problems in the territories of Russia and Kazakhstan near the Ob-Irtysh basin have reached an urgent, critical point (see Table 2). The cost of these measures as a whole is given in USD at an exchange rate of 25 rubles to the dollar. The following have been used in order to determine expenses: the author’s materials (18), Bellona’s data (13), information from the monograph (3), and actual expenses for clean-up efforts in the areas affected by the Angara underground nuclear explosion in Yugra (19). In total, the rehabilitation efforts will require nearly USD 1.4 billion, which is com- parable with the cost of one nuclear reactor, and the program for nuclear energy devel- opment (the NPP Roadmap) already envisages about 15 new reactors. Overcoming the legacy of the Cold War requires expenses – this holds true for all.
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Table 2. Critical Radioecological Problems in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan in Areas Located in the Ob-Irtysh Basin.
Estimated Region Key Problems and Efforts Expenses
Remediation of land affected by nuclear Altai Krai and the Republic testing at the Semipalatinsk test site; USD 4 mln of Altai clean-up efforts at (containment of) the beryllium storage facility. Rehabilitation of dumping sites with The Kemerovo Oblast USD 1 mln naturally-occurring radionuclides from mining and burning coal. Upgrading the Radon combine. Conser- vation of tailings storage facilities, clean- The Novosibirsk Oblast USD 6 mln up efforts at industrial sites and public health zones at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Combine. Phasing out nuclear facilities, elimina- tion and conservation of radwaste storage The Tomsk Oblast USD 400 mln facilities, rehabilitation of industrial sites of the Siberian Chemical Combine and the Tom River floodplain. Conservation and clean-up of under- ground cavities caused by underground The Orenburg Oblast USD 12 mln nuclear explosions, decontamination of oil and gas equipment, deep burial of radwaste. Phasing out nuclear and radiation facili- ties that present hazards, closing down or conserving radwaste storage facilities, open reservoirs with liquid radwaste, re- habilitation of industrial areas and public The Chelyabinsk Oblast USD 890 mln health zones near Mayak, the premises of the Russian National Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, the rad- waste storage facility in Trekhgorny, and modernization of Radon. Modernization of the Radon specialized combine, phasing out nuclear material The Sverdlovsk Oblast USD 10 mln storage facilities and the radwaste com- bine in the city of Lesnoi, conservation of monazite storage facilities.
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Land remediation and monitoring at underground nuclear explosion sites; decontamination of oil and gas equipment The Khanti-Mansiisk Au- contaminated with natural radionuclides, tonomous Okrug and the USD 6 mln deep burial of radioactive waste, monitor- Tyumen Oblast ing the transport of radionuclides in the Irtysh and Ob rivers from Mayak and the Siberian Chemical Combine. Conservation and monitoring at under- The Yamalo-Nenets Au- USD 5 mln ground nuclear explosion sites; decon- tonomous Okrug tamination of gas and oil equipment. Survey and neutralization of nuclear Kara Sea and the Gulf of USD 15 mln installations and radwaste disposed under Ob water, general monitoring. Rehabilitation of the Semipalatinsk test site, underground nuclear explosion sites, North Kazakhstan USD 30 mln tailing storage facilities at the Step- nogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine and the Ulbinsk Plant. Creation of a common basin system of radioecological monitoring and accident Total Ob-Irtysh Basin area USD 8 mln prevention (the EU’s TACIS project and Typhoon, Russia).
As regards rehabilitation programs, one should bear in mind plans to develop a nuclear complex along the borders of the Ob-Irtysh radioecological region: the Road- map includes plans for construction of a South Urals NPP near Mayak, a nuclear heat- ing plant in Seversk, and new reactors at the Beloyarsk NPP. In connection with those plans, there are also plans for a plant to manufacture MOX fuel at the Siberian Chemical Combine and uranium mines in the Kurgan Oblast, the Pripolyarny Urals, etc. We won’t discuss the pressing environmental issue of radiation monitoring in the Ob-Irtysh basin (see Figure 4), although this international project is actively underway at the Russian and EU levels, which is why it is included in the summary table above.
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Figure 4. The sites of future radioecological monitoring stations.
In conclusion, I would like to mention the need to include a radiation component in all regional Russian and North Kazakhstan nature conservation programs and agree- ments on the protection of water resources, including intergovernmental agreements. It would be interesting to think through a potential Intergovernmental Ob-Irtysh Basin radioecological agreement on a scientific level, integrating the efforts of the scientific community, independent experts and representatives of the public.
References 1. Bulatov, V.I. Radioactive Russia [Rossiya radioaktivnaya]. Novosibirsk: Ts- ERIS, 1996. 270. 2. Bulatov, V.I. Tasks of Geography and Geoecology under Conditions of Grow- ing Radioactivity in Russia. Questions of Radioecology and Interdisciplinary Topics [Zadachi geografii i geoekologii v usloviyakh vozrastaniya pressa radioaktivnosti na territorii Rossii]. Issue 11. Zarechny, 2008. 130–156. 3. Kuznetsov, V.M. and Nazarov, A.G. The Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War. Historical and Scientific Research Experience [Radiatsionnoye naslediye “kholodnoi voiny.” Opyt isotriko-nauchnogo issledovaniya]. Moscow: Klyuch-S Publishing House, 2006. 720. 4. Tikhonov, M.N. and Rylov, M.I. A Comprehensive Assessment of the Nuclear and Radioactive Legacy in Russia. Problems Facing the Environment and Natural Re- sources. An Overview [Kompleksnaya otsenka yaderno-radiatsinnogo naslediya Rossii. Problemy okruzhayuschei sredi i prirodnikh resursov. Obzornaya informatsiya]. 2007. No. 3. 77–110.
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5. Environmental Studies of the Kara and Eastern Section of the Barents Sea [Issledovaniya okruzhayuschei sredi Karskogo i vostochnoi chasti Barentsoeva Morya]. Bulletin l. Programs, Nuclear and Radiation Safety. 1999. No. 3. 16–18. 6. Osipova, L.P., Ponomareva, A.V., and Matveyeva, V.G., et.al. As assessment of the impact of manmade radionuclides on the genetic pool and health of the northern peoples [Otsenka vliyaniya tekhnogennikh radionuklidov na genofond i zdorovye sever- nikh narodov]. Radiation Safety in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): Materials from the 2nd Republican Scientific Conference, Yakutsk, YaFGU Russian Academy of Sciences Publications, 2004. 134–168. 7. Starikov, V.D., Merino, V.I. Radiation Ecology [Radiatsionnaya ekologiya]. Tyumen: Tyumen Printing House, 2007, 400. 8. Trapeznikov, A.V., Korzhavin, A.V., Nikolkin, V.N., et. al. Radioecological and hydrochemical monitoring of the Ob-Irtysh river system along the boundaries of the Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug [Radioekologicheskikh i gidrokhimicheskiy moni- toring Ob-Irtyshskoi rechnoi systemy v tranitsakh Khanty-Mansiiskogo avtonomnogo okruga]. Questions of Radioecology and Interdisciplinary Topics. Issue 10, Nizhnevar- tovsk, 2007. 76–102. 9. Yazikov, E.G. The Ecological Geochemistry of Urban Territories in South Si- beria [Ekogeokhimiya urganizirovannikh territoriy yuga Zapadnoi Sibiri]. Monograph: doctoral dissertation. geological sciences. Tomsk, 2006. 47. 10. Arkhangelskaya, T.A. A Retrospective assessment of the radioecological situation based on the results of studies of trees [Retrospektivnaya otsenka radioeko- logicheskoi situatsii po resultatam izlucheniya godovykh kolets sresov derevev]. Mono- graph: doctoral dissertation, geological sciences. Tomsk, 2004. 23. 11. Toropov, A.V., Accumulations of manmade radionuclides by ecosystem com- ponents in Nizhny Tom [Nakopleniye tekhnogennikh radionuklidov komponentamy eko- systemy Nizhnei Tomi]. Monograph: doctoral dissertation, geological sciences. Novosi- birsk, 2006. 22. 12. Zubkov, A.A., Rybalchenko, A.I., Rumyantsev, V.G., et. al. An analysis of the geotechnological monitoring system on the site of deep geological burial of liquid radwaste from the Siberian Chemical Combine [Analiz systemy geotekhnologicheskogo monitoringa poligona podzemnogo zakhoroneniya zhidkikh radioaktivnikh otkhodov SKhK]. Mineral Resource Survey and Conservation, 2007, No. 11. pp 56–61. 13. The Russian Nuclear Industry: A Need for Reform [Rossiiskaya atomnaya promiyshlennost: neobkhodimost reform.]. Bellona Report No. 4, 2004. 207. 14. Sarsenbayev, K.N. Research conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site by the Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology [Ob isseldovaniyakh, provedeyonnikh na Semipalatinskom ispytatelnom poligone Institutom radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti i ekologiya]. Transforming Socioeconomic Space and the Outlook for Sustainable Devel- opment in Russia: Materials from the international scientific conference. Barnaul, 2006. 235–243. 15. Subbotin, S.V., Lukashenko, S.N., Sarsenbayev, K.N., Pestov, E.Y. On Tritium Pollution of Surface Waters of the Shagan River and Radioactive Pollution of Subsurface Waters on the Degelen Site of the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site [O zagryaznienii triti- yem poverkhnostnikh vod reki Shagan i radioaktivnoye zagryazneniye podzemnikh vod na polschadke “Degelen” byvshego Semipalatinskogo ispytatelnogo poligona]. Trans- forming Socioeconomic Space and the Outlook for Sustainable Development in Russia:
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Materials from the international scientific conference. Barnaul, 2006. 255–243. 16. Bulatov, V.I. Liquid Radioactive Waste in Russia. Science for Democratic Ac- tion. Vol. 7. No. 4. July 1999. р. 1, 15-16. 17. Mayak: Rehabilitation for the Public and the Land. Civil Protection [Reabili- tatsia naseleniya i territorii]. 2007. No. 3, 4. 42-43. 18. Bulatov, V.I. Russia: The Environment and the Army [Rossiya: ekologiya i armiya]. Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1998. 152. 19. A preliminary assessment of the state of radiation safety in the areas in which underground nuclear explosions were held on the territory of the Khanti-Mansiisk Au- tonomous Okrug and the Nature of the Measures for Ensuring Radiation Safety [Pred- varitelnaya otsenka sostoyaniya radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti v rayonakh provedeniya podzemnikh yadernikh vzryvov na territorii Khanti-Mansiiskogo avtonomnogo okruga i kharakteristika mer obespecheniya radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti naseleniya]. St. Peters- burg: RadoMir Scientific Research Center, 2002. 12.
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Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and the Occurrence of Leukemia in Children under Five Years Old1
Andrey Ozharovskiy Project Coordinator, EcoZashchita Public Organization, Moscow
Leukemia in children could be caused by proximity to a nuclear power plant (NPP). Researchers in Germany have ascertained a 200% increase in the number of leukemia cases among children living in close proximity to NPPs. Politicians have promised to verify these results and draw the necessary conclusions. According to a study funded by the German Federal Office on Radiation Protec- tion2, the frequency of childhood leukemia cases among children under five years of age increases the closer the subjects live to one of Germany’s 16 operating NPPs. Although Germany has made the decision to stop the use of nuclear energy, certain NPPs have been permitted to continue operating until they have completed their service life. New evidence has become available indicating that even NPPs operating without incident pose a grave threat to human health. The research results were published in specialized medical research publications, including the European Journal of Cancer and the International Journal of Cancer in January and February 20083. A statistical analysis showed that the risk for developing leukemia among children under the age of five — when children are most sensitive to the effects of radiation — increases the closer they live to one of Germany’s operat- ing NPPs. Data was collected and analyzed from 1,592 children with cancer and 4,375 healthy children, living in 41 districts near the 16 NPPs in West Germany from 1980 to 2003. This is the first study that takes into account the exact distance from the subject’s place of residence to a reactor. For example, of the 77 children diagnosed with cancer living near one of the nuclear power plants, 37 were diagnosed with leukemia. If these children had been living far from the plant, then the statistical incidence of cancer would have equaled 48, with 17 cases of leukemia, or half the observed level. The conclusion therefore is that nuclear power plants are directly responsible for 29 cases of childhood cancer, including 20 cases of leukemia among children under five. Furthermore, studies show that the increased occurrence of cancer cases is noticeable at a distance of up to 50 km from operating NPPs. Sigmar Gabriel, the German Minister of the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, announced that his Ministry intends to carefully verify the results of the study and make a decision with regard to future actions. It is expected that direct
1 Based on articles published in the European Journal of Cancer. 2 Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, www.bfs.de. 3 Kaatsch P., Spix C., Schulze-Rath R., Schmiedel S., Blettner M. “Leukemia in young children liv- ing in the vicinity of German nuclear power plants.” International Journal of Cancer. 2008 Feb 15; 122(4):721–6.
136 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY proof of the harm caused to the health of the population by normally functioning NPPs could serve as an additional argument in favor of shutting down all NPPs in Germany and may even accelerate that process. The studies were conducted by the Institute of Medical Biostatistics, Epidemiology and Informatics4 at the Clinical Center of Mainz University starting in 2003. For each of the 16 NPP locations, the researchers selected three adjacent districts and studied the associated data. The source data used was taken from the official German Childhood Cancer Regis- try. The study was essentially a way to verify statistical trends observed previously that established a connection between various types of cancer with the presence of different kinds of nuclear power plants. One such earlier German study conducted in 1997 uncovered a significant (22– 36%) increase in the incidence of cancer among children under 14 years of age and an especially great increase (54%) in the number of cancer cases among children under five living within 5 km from an NPP. The 70% increase of the number of leukemia cases among children under five was especially stark. More thorough studies have indicated that leukemia cases were twice as likely. The same studies have shown that boiling water reactors are more dangerous than pressurized water reactors. The connection between radiation and the increase in the number of cancer cases in the population is known and has been confirmed by numerous studies. Internal radiation is particularly harmful, which happens when radioactive material enters the body. For example, in Belarus, according to the data gathered by specialized clinics in the Gomel Oblast, the increase in leukemia cases among children and adults in this region is 50% higher than before the Chernobyl catastrophe. In another example, the incidence of a number of cancers (leukemia, lymphoma, cancer of the kidneys, and others) among Rus- sian personnel involved in the clean-up effort following Chernobyl is 50% higher than in the general Russian population. Experts believe that a number of cancers can take up to 20–30 years to appear. The German studies confirm that beyond radionuclides released during an acci- dent, everyday, “permissible” radioactive emissions of a normally functioning NPP are also hazardous. The technological process of any NPP involves the continuous emission of radionuclides, which are the products of fission and activation of radioactive noble gases, radioactive iodine, and tritium (“heavy-heavy hydrogen”), into the environment. In the case of a Russian PWR-1000 reactor, during regular operations at nominal capac- ity, radioactive emissions through the vent stack can total up to 20 TBq per day (see Table 1). We won’t go into a detailed discussion here of the isotope make-up of the “al- lowable” emissions. The German studies once again produced inarguable evidence of the mortal danger presented by even the smallest doses of radiation. We’ll simply note that in light of the latest results of these studies, the very practice of allowing nuclear power plants to produce daily emissions containing dangerous radionuclides appears to be entirely unethical.
4 www.imbei.uni-mainz.de.
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Table 1. Radioactive Emission Values for Inert Radioactive Gases and Aerosols at Russian NPPs for 2006 (Source: RosTekhNadzor Annual Report 2006)
Inert NPP Radioac- I-131 Co-60 Cs-134 Cs-137 tive Gases TBq (%) MBq (%) NPPs with PWR-1000 and PWR-440 Reactors Balakovo 0.2 (0.2) 94.8 (0.5) 3.5(0.05) 1.8(0.2) 4.4(0.2) Kalinin 21.7 (3.1) 913 (5.1) 5.5(0.03) 0.4(0.04) 2.2(0.11) Novov- 45 (6.6) 1,900 (10.6) 290(3.9) 38(4.3) 71(3.6) oronezh Rostov 0.2 (0.03) 37.4 (0.2) 2.6(0.04) 0.2(0.02) 0.4(0.02) Kola 0.7 (0.1) 18.8 (0.1) 80.5(1.1) <3.7(0.4) 8.2(4.1) NPPs with RBMK-1000 Reactors Kursk 336.3 (9.1) 2,585 (2.8) 178.9 (7.2) 9.6 (0.7) 62.8 (1.6) Leningrad 656.5 (17.7) 889 (1) 195.6 (7.8) 37.2 (0.9) 169.5 (4.2) Smolensk 16.1 (0.4) 516.7 (0.6) 133.9 (5.4) ≤ 0.01 (0.001) 11.7 (0.3) NPPs with AMB-100, AMB-200 and a BN-600 (fast neutron) Reactors Beloyar 12.2 (1.8) ≤ 0.1 (0.001) 0.2 (0.003) ≤ 0.01 (0.001) 57 (2.9) NPPs with GBWR-6 Reactors Bilibin 354.9 (17.8) ≤10.8 (0.1) ≤ 14.56*
* The Bilibin NPP emissions contain minimal trace amounts of Co-60, Cs-134 and Cs-137, therefore the table shows aggregate activity of long-lived radionuclides in the emissions.
An increase in the number of childhood cancer cases should be expected near each of the ten operating NPPs in Russia. Children living within 5 km of an NPP are exposed to the highest risk. One such example is the town of Udomlya near the Kalinin NPP. A significant increase in the number of cancer cases should also be expected near NPPs with RBMK reactors, such as the Leningrad and Kursk NPPs, as well as those located in the restricted access areas of Seversk, Ozyorsk, and Zheleznogorsk, located close to military or dual-use production reactors. Unfortunately, the availability of health statis- tics in Russia is low due to efforts by the nuclear lobby to cut off access to researchers. We should not hold out hope that the relevant government entities in Russia will ap- prove data collection and analysis of cancer incidence in populations living in proximity to NPPs. This is despite the fact that it is entirely clear that the developments near the German NPPs must also be taking place in Russia and that, consequently, the continued
138 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY operation of NPPs in Russia is leading to an increase in the number of cancer cases among children under five. I would like to thank Dr. Alfred Körblein for his assistance and for providing the illustrations.
Brief Remarks on the Issue of Uranium Tailings: Depleted uranium hexafluoride (uranium tailings) is the by-product of the uranium enrichment process that takes place during the production of fuel for an NPP. This by- product is toxic and radioactive. In a reaction with water (including moisture in the air), the tailings produce a toxic agent: anhydrous hydrogen fluoride. Russia and other coun- tries have accumulated millions of tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride. There are no plans to use the material in the near future, as it is a kind of radioactive waste. Under Russian law, radioactive waste cannot be brought into the country. Nonethe- less, uranium tailings are being brought in under RosAtom contracts with Urenco, a Ger- man, British, and Dutch company, and with Eurodif, a French company, among others. Waste is delivered to the Saint Petersburg port and then sent to Seversk (Tomsk Oblast), Angarsk (Irkutsk Oblast), Zelyonogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Krai), and Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk Oblast) (see Figure 2). Uranium hexafluoride turns into gas at 54°С, and upon depressurization, escapes from its container in the course of several minutes.
Figure 2. Monitoring radioactive materials in transit
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Question and Answer Session Radiobiological Concerns, Rehabilitation of Affected Territories
– Vladimir Kuznetsov: This is a question for Valeriy Bulatov. Could you please explain why there is such a large number of ionizing radiation sources found in oil and gas extraction operations? – Valeriy Bulatov: This is due to the fact that logging is done in each borehole. This is fairly labor-intensive work and is done in parallel with drilling. There is no borehole without logging; i.e., no geophysical measurement can be done without it.
– Vladimir Kuznetsov: So they are not taken out afterwards? – Valeriy Bulatov: No. They are on a cable and are torn off once used.
– Dialogue participant: Did you also measure the distance from harmful chemical sub- stances? Did you examine just one factor or many? There are a lot of industrial opera- tions there that produce heavy metals, which are also carcinogenic. – Andrey Ozharovskiy: When such shocking information was obtained, before it was published, people tried to find explanations other than the proximity to the NPP. How- ever, they did not find other shared properties between areas where cancer morbidity rates spiked besides the presence of an NPP. Secondly, what they did was specifically measure the distance from the place of residence of each child to the NPP and looked at the correlation to this distance. The correlation is statistically significant and is apparent at a distance of up to 50 km. Below 50 km, the incidence was twice the normal rate.
– Dialogue participant: How do you explain the absence of a similar increase in leuke- mia cases, since relative to natural background radiation, this is a very small increase? Why don’t large doses have the same increase in leukemia morbidity as this small in- crease over the natural background radiation level? – Andrey Ozharovskiy: There are different explanations offered; for example, the “per- missible” emissions. The NPPs have stacks that release substances in amounts within allowed standards. These standards are most likely unfounded. They should be signifi- cantly stricter, so that this effect could not occur. A second explanation is tritium. Here things are complicated, because the correlation is based on distance, and the emissions from the stacks, I imagine, would go further. So, there is no clear understanding. What’s important is that the trouble stems from nuclear power. That much we understand and it is one more bit of evidence that nuclear power kills.
– Dialogue participant: You used data for Germany, but here in the Chernobyl area there are 1.5 million residents in Russia alone, and as many in Ukraine and Belarus. There are national registries monitoring the health of the population, including the health of children. Do you have data from these registries? Do they demonstrate the same increase in morbidity rates? – Andrey Ozharovskiy: The shocking information about the German statistics is that they concern the effects of a properly functioning NPP. Chernobyl is another matter.
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– Anna Vinogradova: Why do you think the conclusions of radiobiologists mentioned by Burlakova and Koragodina do not apply to regulations on the adoption of new health and radiation safety standards? The second question is for Vladimir Sorokin. Were the conclusions drawn from your studies taken into consideration in regulations? – Anatolii Nazarov: The idea of small doses is relatively new. Also, to prove the effect of any radiation factors, it is very important to include the genetic factor and the impact on heredity. All of the instructions from the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and other international organizations state that there are no grounds for asserting that heredity is affected. So far, there is no proof – too little time has passed. But experiments on animals are very disconcerting. And the great break- through happening now with the human genome indicates that at some point, usually the 7th or 8th generation, the generation disappears entirely. The genetic material is then weakened or genetic abnormalities appear. But no one can prove this right now, although we definitely have data. The very concept of “small doses” is not explicit. One interpre- tation relates it to cancerogenesis, to the appearance of those carcinogenic effects that exist in addition to radiation. – Vladimir Sorokin: The data of the studies we conducted could not be included in regu- latory documents because radiobiologists follow a different, though incorrect, dominat- ing concept.
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Improving Public Outreach Using the Radiation Monitoring and Emergency Response System Being Created in the Arkhangelsk Oblast
Vladimir Nikitin General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, Severodvinsk
Anatoly Shepurev Deputy Chief Engineer, Zvezdochka Shipyard
Nikolai Shcherbinin Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk
The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Framework Agreement came into force in April 2004. The objective of this agreement is international collaboration in the safe management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear submarines in Russia’s Northwest region. The funding for the Program is provided through the Northern Dimension Environ- mental Partnership (NDEP), which collected the funds from European donor countries, Russia, and Canada. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) manages the fund. One of the first tasks facing NDEP with regard to nuclear and radiation safety in Russia’s Northwest region was the development of a Strategic Master Plan (SMP). Pri- orities were set during the first stage of that process. These include the creation of site- based and regional monitoring and emergency response systems for the Arkhangelsk Oblast.At this time, the Oblast is home to several sites that present a radiation threat, including sites where nuclear submarines are stored and dismantled, and SNF and rad- waste treatment sites. The largest of these are: • Zvezdochka Shipyard; • Sevmash; • Mironova Gora, a solid radwaste storage facility. The existing emergency response system is outdated and in need of repair. The Rus- sian Institute of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy (IBRAE), together with other organizations, has developed a proposal for a modern monitoring system. On February 8, 2008, this proposal was discussed at a roundtable event by the Oblast administration and received the approval of scientists, experts, and the scientific and environmental protection communities (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The roundtable discussion on improving the radiation safety system in the Arkhangelsk Oblast, February 8, 2008.
The main goal of the project is the creation of a modern radiation monitoring sys- tem that will issue an early warning to personnel and the general population in the event of radiation accidents at sites where waste disposal and environmental rehabilitation work is conducted. The creation of an effective emergency response system that will also minimize consequences in the Arkhangelsk Oblast and adjoining territories is also needed. The system will meet the requirements of Russian law and follow international practices in the way radiation monitoring and emergency preparedness systems are de- signed. Project Components: • Creation of a Regional Crisis Center for the Arkhangelsk Oblast; • Creation of Crisis Centers in Severodvinsk; • Creation of site-specific automated regional monitoring systems for- Zvez dochka and Sevmash; • Creation of the Arkhangelsk Territory Automated Radiation Monitoring Sys- tem; • Creation of mobile radiation detection laboratories; • Research and technical support for entities overseeing accident prevention in the Arkhangelsk Oblast provided by IBRAE and the Krylov Institute; • Creation and maintenance of communication lines and channels; • Personnel training and education; • Accident prevention drills involving all components of the emergency re- sponse system.
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Figure 2. The Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring and emergency response system (2007 Proposal).
Figure. 3. The Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring and emergency response system (2008).
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The project’s main goal is to ensure that the public and the government entities at all levels can obtain comprehensive information on radiation conditions in the Arkhan- gelsk Oblast. The project will make the following possible: • Continuous radiation monitoring of the environment; • Taking measurements when short-term projects that may pose a radiation haz- ard are conducted at the sites; • Obtaining data on radiation dose levels in the area on request from local resi- dents and nongovernmental organizations. The project will ensure adequate monitoring of any radioactive nuclide during dis- mantlement, disposal, or environmental rehabilitation operations at the sites, effective preventative planning in case of emergency situations, and the necessary execution of planned measures, as well as early warning and emergency response for managing radia- tion accidents and protecting personnel and residents. A smoothly operating monitoring system will help solve the problem of public ac- cess to information on anthropogenic radionuclides in the region. It will also allow all interested organizations to provide accurate information to the public regarding radia- tion issues. The following entities have expressed interest in obtaining information on radia- tion in the Oblast at observation zones belonging to sites where nuclear submarine dis- mantlement and SNF and radwaste processing takes place: • Enterprises that are part of the Russian State Center for Nuclear Shipbuilding (GRTsAS): Sevmash, Zvezdochka, Onega; • Local administrations and governments; • Government oversight and control agencies; • Citizens and civic organizations, international nongovernmental organiza- tions; • Local and federal press services.
Figure. 4. Zvezdochka Shipyard.
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The 2007 proposal for improving the Arkhangelsk Oblast radiation monitoring and emergency response system included the creation of data analysis centers at Sevmash and Zvezdochka, and to build a special training and education centers in Severodvinsk that would have been used to prepare personnel for both the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts. Due to limited funding, these parts of the projects have been removed from the proposal. Although the accepted proposal does not include special entities for conducting public outreach, any of those interested can do so using existing public outreach ser- vices. The office responsible for interregional and public communication within the city administration, for example, could take on this role.
Figure. 5. One of the sites where radiation monitoring sensors would be placed.
Figure. 6. The Coastal complex for unloading SNF from decommissioned nuclear submarines at Zvezdochka.
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Both local authorities and GRTsAS enterprises will have access to needed data for sites that pose a radiation hazard once the radiation monitoring system is in place. Information must be provided to the public on a regular basis. This work can only be performed by a continuously operating data analysis center. Experience at the Severod- vinsk GCR Public Outreach and Information Office (POIO) in its public outreach work on nuclear submarine dismantlement has shown that even with minimal funding and a staff of three, it is possible to organize a dialogue between experts from the nuclear in- dustry and the public. The GCR POIO in Severodvinsk carries out its work as part of the commitment of the GCR office to the local population. The GRTsAS enterprises and the local authorities should have the same level of commitment to the local population.
Figure. 7. Liquid radwaste storage facilities. Under market conditions, efforts to sway the opinion of those who are prejudiced against nuclear technologies will require financial investment.
Figure. 8. A liquid and solid radwaste treatment facility at the Zvezdochka Shipyard.
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It is obvious that the overhead costs, when building any nuclear energy facility — whether it is a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP), a nuclear submarine dismantlement facility, or a SNF and radwaste treatment facility — should include expenses associated with public outreach to explain the goals and potential consequences of site operations. The history of the nuclear industry and the nuclear energy sector indicates that there is a real likelihood of radiation and nuclear accidents. In addition, there are the concerns of the population regarding potential radiation hazards. Public anxiety increases when information from various official entities or the press is contradictory and disorganized. The era of secrecy has ended; it is time to make the information available to the public.
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Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Facilities And the Role of the Public in Countering Them
Igor Khripunov Associate Director, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia
The general public is an important stakeholder whose vital interests are consistent both with the prevention of terrorist attempts to attack nuclear power infrastructure and appropriate mitigation of their consequences if they occur. Such terrorist attacks can easily bring about systemic disasters characterized by a series of uncertain; intercon- nected and disruptive events that would affect the population at large and vital societal institutions. Hence, the public must no longer be looked upon only as potential victims or panicked masses but rather as an important contributing factor for better nuclear se- curity throughout all stages of a potential incident. In this sense, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism which came into force in July 2007 provides a solid international legal basis for the public in pursuance of this objective. Russia acted as the driving force behind this convention and was one of the first to sign and ratify it. Specifically, under this convention, an offense is defined as acts by any person to use or damage “a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material” with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment. The emerging threats of terrorism increasingly elevate security including physical protection to a more independent and unique status beyond traditional safety-security synergy. First, the difference between safety and security breaches is that terrorist at- tacks have the potential to increase significantly the impact of an accident, making rou- tine safety procedures inadequate. Second, as adaptive adversaries, terrorists not only have the ability to change tactics as an attack unfolds but also are capable of concurrent and/or subsequent multiple attempts against infrastructures. Third, terrorist attacks are criminal acts and, as such, include the additional complications of securing a crime scene and conducting an investigation during the response phase. Fourth, malicious acts in the nuclear field aggravate the psychological impact on the population. For effective risk communication, safety and security must be explained and presented to the public as two sides of the same process which is trouble-free operation of the nuclear power infrastructure under any conceivable circumstances (see table 1). Hence, by getting the public on-board and recognizing it as an important stakeholder, a meaningful risk com- munication strategy can achieve five interrelated missions.
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Table 1
1. Reach a common risk assessment enabling the public to be educated and prepared. For most professionals and experts, risk is the likelihood of an event multi- plied by its estimated consequences, ranging from mild to catastrophic (risk = probabil- ity x consequences). The magnitude of a risk to laypersons varies depending on their background and objectives leading to different interpretations of risk and vulnerabilities. Since the public often tends to base its views of risk on personal experience and prior knowledge, their perception of risk is much more emotionally driven. Factors that may influence public attitudes include the perceived magnitude of the consequences, igno- rance about the nature of the hazard, distrust of the institutions attempting to manage the hazard, the level of media attention devoted to an event and others. Even within a given population, risk perceptions are not uniform and may vary depending on experience, gender, social status and world view. Risk communication is vital in the process of achieving a common risk perception. It can be defined as a two-way process of information exchange that includes multiple types of information with multiple purposes. As an important benefit, risk communica- tion has the potential to build public trust and resilience in times of crisis. These are serious impediments, however, in the way of developing an effective risk communi- cation strategy in the security domain, especially in Russia. First, most information, compared to the safety domain, is classified and there is little, if any, tradition of sharing even generic information with the public. Second, the Russian public is largely split 50/50 regarding the desirability of expanding the national nuclear power infrastructure. Third, the public has been consistently treating the likelihood of terrorism as a low pri- ority “personal concern.” According to the January 2008 survey by the Moscow-based Levada Center, only seven percent of the respondents characterized terrorist threats as high on their priority list while most others prioritized rising prices, impoverishment, drug addiction, poor medical service, environmental degradation and other items on the personal agenda. It is hardly surprising for Russia as a country in transition from one socio-economic system to another. Still, public support is critical but requires a realistic portrayal of risk that is ac- curate and draws a fine line between hyping the threat to spur people to action and
150 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY trivializing it to provide them false reassurances. Preparedness would provide a way for the public to translate this new level of risk awareness into action and can consist of a range of activities, including developing and practicing contingency plans, such as communication, evacuation, or sheltering. Preparedness also serves as a bridge between risk education which occurs in advance of an event and taking protective actions during a crisis.
2. Encourage a well-informed and well-motivated public to contribute to a healthy nuclear security culture, not only at the nuclear plant and other associated unit level but also nationally. Security culture at the facility level can be defined as a linked set of characteristics that together ensure that the workforce pays sufficient atten- tion to nuclear security. Shared beliefs, assumptions, principles which guide decisions and actions, and patterns of behavior hospitable to security represent the ordered and hierarchical set of characteristics that make up nuclear security culture. It is important to understand that most members of the nuclear plant workforce are part of the com- munity adjacent to the site. They have families there and socialize with local citizens on a regular basis. Hence a strong commitment to nuclear security on the part of the local community heightens the public visibility of security-related issues, indirectly improv- ing the motivation of the staff that operates that site.
3. Build up public vigilance, persuading citizens to cooperate more closely with law enforcement. This vigilance will manifest itself in reports of unauthorized ef- forts to gain access to sensitive infrastructure sites or breach the site’s boundaries. There is a niche for a security conscious public to fill. An engaged public will even report suspicious people or activities near the site. A small portion of local citizens could be trained to perform such functions on a voluntary basis, particularly in sparsely populated and difficult-to-monitor areas. Training of local citizens, when and if it is deemed neces- sary, must be a well thought-out, stably funded, and widely publicized campaign. Russian leadership has been sending positive signals regarding the public involve- ment in preventing and combating terrorism. Speaking at the September 13, 2004 cabi- net meeting, President Vladimir Putin supported the idea of establishing a voluntary structure among the public which would assist in information gathering and monitoring reports from the population regarding the preparation of criminal acts or their actual commitment. The Russian legal basis explicitly authorizes the participation of the pub- lic in this activity. Federal Law on Countering Terrorism (No 35-FZ) of March 6, 2006 provides a set of incentives and rewards for people who help law enforcement agencies prevent and investigate acts of terrorism, while Law of St. Petersburg Municipality (No 561-57) of November 25, 2002 provides financial, legal and organizational support for those who volunteer to cooperate to this effect with the city law enforcement authori- ties.
4. Reduce the immediate and long-term physical and psychological impact of a terrorist incident by fencing off panic, boosting morale, maintaining credibility, and providing guidance. This emphasis is especially important while counter-terrorist actions are underway or other terrorist acts are likely. These post-incident arrangements consist of steps that individuals and communities can take to save lives and reduce losses
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when an event occurs. The ultimate test is their effectiveness in a real crisis when traditional societal institutions tend to unravel. Such actions include forms of shelter- ing, evacuation, and quarantine as well as using individual protective equipment and a variety of medical countermeasures. Ultimately, it all comes down to creating a more resilient and prepared population in the face of terrorist adversaries. Resilience is usu- ally defined as the ability to handle disruptive challenges, characterized as emergencies that can lead to or result in crisis. Technical solutions and competence can contribute to resilience but ultimately real resilience is about attitude, motivation and will. Engender- ing such attitudes requires a cultural change and more focus on the mindset of people. Resilient citizens will be more than bystanders in the effort to deal with terrorist acts – be it nuclear power infrastructure or any other target – and will be less prone to fear and anxiety before and during crisis situations. Resilience-building and other public-related campaigns, however, cost time and money, and they have to be sustained over the long term. Careful forethought should go into the planning and execution of such campaigns in order to reap maximum benefits.
5. Integrate acts of nuclear terrorism into the general scheme of All-Hazards approach. Despite the obvious and important differences among all types of terrorism, all of them require similar measures at the community level throughout the prevention, preparedness, emergency response, and post-disaster periods. Community education and training, resilience building, vulnerability and risk assessment, communication, and hazard-control mechanisms are common. Including nuclear terrorism in this aggregate model can yield some benefits. Perhaps the most important is placing radiation and the fears associated with it on the same level as dangers that are equally life-threatening but more easily intelligible. Also, this option would be more cost-efficient in terms of time, effort, money, and other resources because it would mobilize a wider range of disaster management groups, including the public, and create a more powerful constituency for the process. Any effort to promote higher standards of nuclear security must place heavy em- phasis on Russia’s general public, a largely untapped stakeholder in the campaign to strengthen nuclear security. The success of this campaign would depend on the public’s ability to develop a balanced and realistic understanding of the risk. To this end, it is imperative to use as many public channels as possible, reaching groups that differ educationally, socially, professionally, and politically. Ultimately, public involvement in the efforts to improve nuclear security and their understanding of the importance of this mission must be regarded as part-and-parcel of building a civic democratic society in Russia.
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Overcoming Contention between the Authorities and NGOs in Regional Radioecology Public Outreach
Svetlana Krasnoslobodtseva Junior Scientific Collaborator Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Governments, Urals Academy of Public Service
In today’s society, the problem of information and, more importantly, informing the public, about any given topic has become the cause of clashing interests between the authorities, political parties, non-governmental organizations, and different public and private constituencies. Meanwhile, a paradoxical situation has developed: the general volume of information is growing exponentially, while the level of public education in terms of relevant information is either falling or remaining the same. This is the result of an increased volume of information that is dumped into the public consciousness, which considerably expands the opportunities to manipulate various public groups and society as a whole. This contributes to the creation of a virtual world comprised of more or less reliable information from which the public mind is meant to extrapolate other bits of in- formation that seem true but are not accurate. In this case, access to reliable information is closed off to rank-and-file citizens, especially if the information in question concerns the interests of large and powerful organizations, in particular the government. Under today’s circumstances in Russia, the government has the exclusive rights to information, and an individual has no way of obtaining accurate information except by uniting with others in a non-government organization (NGO). NGOs include public groups and organizations; they do not join just to increase personal profit. In each of the country’s different regions, there is always a clear hierarchy of topics of particular local importance. The Chelyabinsk Oblast, for example, gives priority to information about the state of radioecology. The Oblast is home to especially hazard- ous nuclear industrial facilities in the cities of Ozyorsk, Snezhinsk and Trekhgorny. The gravest harm to the region’s environment was caused by weapons-grade plutonium pro- duction technology at Mayak during its first two decades of operation. The northeastern region of the Oblast, where dozens of towns and villages are located, was subjected to radioactive pollution. At least 200,000 people suffered from radiation exposure. The clearest example of radioecological damage was the nuclear accident on September 29, 1957, which led to the formation of the Eastern Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT), which measures 23,000 square kilometers. The most important source of information about radioecology in the Oblast is the Ministry of Radiation and Environmental Safety, which dedicates a great deal of atten- tion to educating the public and using a wide variety of formats and methods to do so. Information is provided regularly and promptly on the state of radioecology in the region on the Ministry’s website. Periodically, the Ministry publishes overviews, monitoring data, and analytical summaries about the government’s actions in the Oblast in terms of
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organizing efficient control over radioecology in the region and the measures planned for remediation of polluted areas under the Federal Target Program. A considerable volume of information is contained in almanacs published annually by the Ministry. The almanac contains informative articles from the managers of Mayak and other key experts in radiation ecology, medicine and biology. Interesting and edu- cational material was packed in the almanac published in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 1957 nuclear accident. In 2008, its pages were filled with exclusive information about Mayak’s sixty-year-long history. An international seminar was held in November 2006 under the patronage of the Ministry, in addition to a scientific conference in September 2007 dedicated to the 1957 catastrophe and an analysis of the experience of dealing with the consequences of the accident. At the Ministry’s suggestion, non-governmental environmental organizations based in the Oblast played an active role in these events and led discussions on some of the most relevant problems facing those who suffered from radiation exposure. Before the conference, some of these NGOs organized a demonstration demanding better socio- economic support for affected districts. As a result, over the past few years the Ministry has published a large amount of ac- curate information in a variety of formats on many important aspects of the state of radi- oecology in the region. However, this information cannot fully satisfy non-government organizations representing the interests of the people who have suffered from radiation. The public has yet to receive a founded answer to the questions about the reasons for the systematic and lengthy radiation pollution in the area emanating from Mayak during its first decade of operation. Would it have been possible to prevent the first two catastrophes at the first indus- trial reactor, or at least put filters in place to reduce the radioactive level of gas emissions not in 1958, but before the first reactors were even launched? It might seem as though this question is no longer relevant, but that is not so. The public wants to know to what extent past experience is acknowledged. If the main reason today behind radiation pol- lution lies within the new technologies for industrial production of plutonium, then that will not hold as an argument. In today’s conditions, having quality information means seeing the hierarchy of the cause-and-effect connection of past events; it means having comprehensive knowledge, and it means understanding the history of a question, seeing where this issue fits in among the other problems in the region. According to the sociological studies conducted by the Chelyabinsk Institute un- der the Urals Government Service Academy, the region’s residents do not trust the in- formation that is provided to them by the Oblast Government on this issue, and they reasonably presume that much information is still kept secret. The people also put no confidence in information coming from the managers or experts at Mayak; confidence was ranked at just 8% for the former, and 12% for the latter. The public trusts what it sees on television, apparently as the result of the fact that alternative points of view are broadcast on television. The most authoritative sources of information for the public are non-government environmental organizations, such as Green Cross and Kyshtym-1957, and others, as they are the only ones who advocate public interests. It is clear that the public’s lack of trust in information about radiation and the envi- ronment from the authorities is related to a deep-seated and steady distrust in all levels
154 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY of government, from federal to regional. Russia’s political and socioeconomic develop- ment over the past 20 years demonstrates that the authorities are perceived by the public as a ruthless exploitation machine, a system that does not have anything in common with the interests of the average citizen. In this situation, NGos should serve as the link be- tween the public and the authorities, and not — under any circumstances — exacerbate the contention between themselves and those affected by radiation, on the one hand, and the authorities on the other hand. That is why the Commission for Government and NGO Collaboration has been formed in the Oblast. The Commission has set out the first steps to be taken toward pooling efforts in providing the people with comprehensive and accurate information about the state of radioecology in the region.
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Negotiation Power: The Significance of the Public as Demonstrated by Public Hearings on the Creation of Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Management of Unsafe Vessels
Sergey Gavrilov Dekom Technologies, Moscow Mikhail Rylov Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, St. Petersburg, and Vice President, Green Cross Russia Vyacheslav Khatuntsev Senior Lecturer, Northwest Academy of Public Service, Severodvinsk Nikolai Scherbinin Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk The global economy’s high level of dependency on energy resources is one reason why Russia’s Northwest and the north of Europe are currently in the center of attention. Development of new, large-scale oil and gas projects will begin in these regions in the next 5–10 years along the continental shelf of the Barents Sea. Today, in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 394 (03/21/2007), the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) will be created, and a Federal Target Program (FTP) for developing civil ship-building up until 2015 at the shipbuilding holding in the in- dustrial district of Severnaya Dvina will be drawn up and included in the 3-year budget. Furthermore, work is underway on establishing a manufacturing cluster for carrying out shipbuilding and submarine projects for the Russian Navy. Other projects include developing civil shipbuilding, developing the continental shelf and the international sea cargo market, and retaining competitiveness on global markets. The federal state-owned franchises that play the most important roles today in the region’s economy will be transformed into open joint-stock companies. Work is in prog- ress to transform the Sevmash Plant and the Zvezdochka Shipbuilding Center into the Northern Shipbuilding and Repair Center (1). This structure will become a constituent of the OSK, which is being created in order to retain and tap into the scientific and in- dustrial potential of a united industrial corporation, ensure national security and defense capabilities, and pool intellectual, industrial, and financial resources (2). One promising new project for Severodvinsk and the Northern Shipbuilding and Repair Center is the construction of a small-capacity nuclear thermal power plant. The design has been finalized, all of the relevant conclusions have been prepared, and neces- sary licenses and assessments have been obtained and conducted, including a govern- ment environmental study and the main government assessment. Ideally for RosAtom, the large-scale construction of small nuclear power plants (NPPs) will involve a separate federal program with its own line of funding. The project was included by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development’s list of government-level projects and will be fi- nanced with government capital investments under the FTP in 2006–2008. According to
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Mr. Zelensky, the Director of Malaya Energetika, “units with KLT-40S reactors with a capacity of 70 MW(e) and 140 Gcal(t) have enormous export potential.” The conclusion of an on-site meeting of the Commission for National Intellectual Potential under the Public Chamber of Russia, which was timed to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the submarine fleet, was that this project will assure many of the country’s industrial companies in the high tech sector. Local power plants will reduce dependence of the remote North and the Far East regions on the supply from the North. Furthermore, floating NPPs might be used to desalinate sea water. Demand on the inter- national market for desalination in coastal areas is increasing rapidly and by 2015 will reach USD 12 billion per year. Interest in the project remains high among the environmental community. In July 2005, Greenpeace Russia published a report on the dangers of this project in terms of terrorism and piracy in Southeast Asia, and submitted this report to Russia’s Federal Se- curity Service (FSB) (4). Southeast Asia is an active location for terrorist groups, includ- ing Al-Qaeda. Mr. El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, has said that Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups want to get their hands on nuclear weapons. In terms of piracy, in 2003, 445 attacks were launched, 88 sailors were injured, 359 were taken hostage, and 71 others have gone missing. Information from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) states that the most pirate attacks against ships in 2003 took place in Indonesian waters (121 of 445). In 2005–2006, the design of the small NPP project was completed and KLT-40 reactor installations were modernized to use 19% enriched uranium in place of 40% enriched uranium as fuel in the reactor core, which makes it impossible to use for weapons purposes. This proves that by using a variety of methods, from informal networks to threats against reputation on the international arena, public associations are capable of influencing the decision-making process of government bodies both during preparatory stages and at the final stages. The subject of this presentation, in light of relentless scrutiny, is an analysis of methods used to take public opinion into account with regard to project feasibility, anal- ysis improvement, and the risks of using it (5). The Sevmash territory features an open stretch of land along the coast (unused and without any structures) between the shallow and industrial seafronts. The depth of the waters here reaches 7.5 meters, and this area could be an excellent location for a floating nuclear power plant. For thermal transmission to be economically viable, the small NPP must be located no more than 5 kilometers from the consumer. The floating NPP is a flush deck, rectangular, non-self-propelled, barge-mounted facility with an advanced multilevel superstructure to house energy equipment in the bow and waist of the ship, and lodgings in the stern. The length of the floating NPP is 144 meters, the width is 30 meters, the height is 10 meters, the draft is 5.52 meters, and the displacement measures 21,000 tons. The floating NPP will carry two KLT-40S naval propulsion reactor installations with PWR reactors and steam turbine installations with thermal turbines and electricity generators, each with a capacity of 35MW(e) and 25 Gcal/hr(t). The installations are kept in a durable, thick protective casing designed to contain accidents in which connec- tions with the primary circuit conduits are cut off. By law, one of the stages of discussion of any project must be a public environ- mental impact assessment (EIA) (6). In order to identify environmental preferences and
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get the public involved in discussing this particular project, Malaya Energetika—the developer—organized preliminary public outreach efforts via regular publications and informative television programs, starting from the declaration of intent to build a float- ing NPP with KLT-40S reactors. The Severodvinsk office of the National Russian Public Green Movement, with support from the Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Environmental Fund, acted as organizer and coordinator of the public EIA and submitted the related materials for dis- cussion by the scientific community and the public at large. A method for reinforcing the negotiation power of the public, which was proposed and approved in 2001–2003, was used when it was time to consider investment options (see Figure 1) (7). The Severodvinsk community, the Russian Government Center for Nuclear Ship- building (GRTsAS), and the residents of Arkhangelsk Oblast were informed via print media about the accessibility of information on the design documentation of the small NPP project. In order to evaluate and account for the opinion of the “unorganized” pub- lic and residents, several information materials and design documentation were made available from December 2001 through April 2002. The design paperwork covered the project specifications and was made available at the following addresses: 100 Lomonos- ova Street at the Gogol Central Municipal Library in the town of Severodvinsk, and 18 Popova Street in the regional Department of the National Russian Nature Conservation Society (VOOP) in the city of Arkhangelsk. Sociological studies on environmental is- sues in Severodvinsk were conducted in December 2001 (the first stage) and in March 2002 (the second stage) (8).
Figure 1. Strengthening the negotiation power of local residents when reviewing investment in the construction of facilities that present a radiation hazard at GRTsAS companies.
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A summary of the opinions and comments on the small NPP project, its declaration of intent and other materials related to the project (the feasibility study and investment substantiation) were published in the magazine “Your Opinion” [Vashe Mneniye]. Given the possibility of approving the public environmental impact assessment commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources as part of the main govern- ment assessment summary, the nomination and appointment of experts to carry out the assessment were to be carried out in strict compliance with Article 30–34 of Russia’s law on environmental assessments, with due consideration for professional capacity. Expert groups were put together to assess the risk involved with the main factors presented in the design documentation (see Table 1). An assessment of the significance of these factors with regard to environmental risk was carried out based on a 6-grade scale, where 1 represents the highest level of significance.
Table 1. Construction of a Small NPP: Environmental Risk Factors
No. Factor Positive Impact Negative Impact - Low income among the population (1.1–1.3 times lower - High level of competition in the than average Russian higher education sector; income levels); - High level of social protec- 1 Socio-demographic - High cost of living tion for company employees (a (1.5–2 times higher developed network of medical than average Russian treatment institutions) cost of living); - Outflow of working- age individuals - Weak coordination between GRTsAS and the municipal - Political stability administration; 2 Political - High professional level of - High level of depen- experts in administration dency of the decision- making process on the federal center - Dependence of power supply on im- - Existence of economic con- ported raw materials; nections with countries in the - Low investment 3 Economic Barents Sea region; activity; - Possibility of obtaining a gov- - Mono-industry ernment order structure of the economy
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- High level of depreciation of fixed assets and engineer- ing infrastructure (an - Existence of enormous indus- 4 Technological aggressive environ- trial potential ment, ageing); - Unreliable equip- ment performance
- Low level of seismic activity; - Low probability of flooding; - Marshlands; 5 Geographical - Proximity to the borders of - Extreme north northern European countries
- Presence of natural resources; - Low temperatures; - Steady circulation of air and - High relative hu- 6 Natural climate distinguished seasonal patterns midity; - Storm winds
A list of documents dealing with the environmental impact factors of the small NPP construction project is shown in Table 2. The expert assessment of environmental risks was based on the results of an expert consensus on the impact of various factors and the weight of each factor. The experts attributed a level of importance for each factor independently of one another by ranking the factors.
Table 2. Documents Addressing Environmental Impact Factors in Connection with the Construction of a Small NPP
Document Name Factors (see Table 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 A substantiation of the selection of the construction + + + + + + site for a small NPP General Provisions. Project Description. Book 1 (En- + + + + + + vironmental Impact Assessment - EIA) A description of the natural environment in the area of + + + - + + the small NPP construction site. Book 2 (EIA) The current environmental and socioeconomic condi- + + + + + + tions of the residents of the area of the construction site. Book 3 (EIA)
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An assessment of the radiation and other factors on + + + + + + the environment and the public in connection with the operations of a small NPP. Book 4 (EIA) An assessment of the impact of the construction of a + + + + + + small NPP on the water. Book 5 (EIA) An analysis of the socioeconomic implications of + + + + + + completing the small NPP project. Environmental Monitoring. (Appendices 1–6) Book 6 (EIA) A small NPP radiation monitoring program for the city + + + + + + of Severodvinsk. The radiation hazard category of the small NPP on + + + + + + Sevmash premises. A radiation and health-based substantiation. Development of a health protection zone and an obser- + - + + + + vation zone in the area near the premises of the small NPP in Severodvinsk (a technical report) An overview of safety at the small NPP in Severod- + - + + + + vinsk. Books 1 and 2 (sections 1–6) Details of the seismic conditions for the district, area, - - + - + + and the premises of the small floating NPP built in Severodvinsk and a calculation of the seismic impact on archival and other materials. Books 1 and 2. Substantiation and assessment of the parameters of + + + - + + projected seismic impact
The environmental assessment commission for design documentation for this proj- ect was registered in line with standard procedures. It was established to verify com- pliance of planned operations with environmental requirements, as well as to prevent possible negative environmental implications of the operations involved in the project, and any related social, economic or other consequences (9). The experts included representatives of the scientific community (“specialists”) and public organizations and movements (“public”). It was important to involve highly- qualified experts specializing in scientific fields that were not already represented by the scientific centers in the Arkhangelsk Oblast or the city of Severodvinsk. As a result, the “Moscow Group” was formed and included seven highly qualified specialists: three doc- tors (medicine, physics and mathematics, and geographical science) and four doctoral candidates (physics and mathematics, geographical technical and geological and mineral sciences). The Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk experts were represented in the Severod- vinsk and Deputy expert groups. The work was split up and represented by 5 groups. In order to ensure that the dif- ferent views of the groups retained a measure of consistency, the Kendall coefficient of concordance was applied.
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Where: n is the number of analyzed factors (=6) m is the number of expert groups (=5) Rij is the rank of the j factor, which is assigned by an i expert Li is the number of links, and ni is the number of elements in the i link for the j expert group.
The results of the expert assessments are shown in Table 3. The groups were formed in line with the assessment of factors based on the criteria shown in Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, this allowed for links, i.e., equivalent values. Using the RANK PP statistical function in Excel, we move from the survey matrix to the converted ranks (Table 4), where a number’s rank is determined relative to the other values in the list.
According to the table of critical values, when significance level equals 0.05, the critical value of the coefficient of concordance is equal to 0.4169 (10). Thus, the coefficient of concordance is W>0.6, and its value is greater than the critical value (W>0.4169); correspondingly, the level of consensus among the experts is fairly high. In other words, the factors most likely to pose an environmental risk are the socio-demographic and technological factors. The experts’ assessments are shown in Figure 2.
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Table 3. Expert Assessment Results
Expert Groups (i) Average Factor Assess- Signifi- ment cance Factors Public Special- The The The (j) ists Moscow Severod- Deputy Group vinsk Group Group 1 6 5 6 4 5 5.2 1 2 4 3 2 3 1 2.6 4 3 3 3 5 3 4 3.6 3 4 5 4 4 5 3 4.2 2 5 2 1 1 2 2 1.6 6 6 1 2 3 1 3 2.0 5
Table 4. Rank Matrix
Expert Groups (i)
Factors Public Special- The The The (j) ists Moscow Severod- Deputy Group vinsk Group Group 1 6 6 6 5 6 132.25 1 2 4 3 2 3 1 20.25 4 3 3 3 5 3 5 2.25 3 4 5 5 4 6 3 30.25 2 5 2 1 1 2 2 90.25 6 6 1 2 3 1 3 56.25 5 Num- 0 1 0 1 1 - ber of links (Li) Link 0 2 0 2 2 - size (ni) Tj 0 6 0 6 6 -
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Figure 2. An expert assessment of environmental impact risks
Based on a summary of individual conclusions, a final conclusion on the key as- pects of the small NPP project was drafted and signed by all experts participating in the public environmental assessment. The experts’ comments and suggestions have been summarized and included in the text of the final report. The materials of the public environmental impact assessment have been submitted, in compliance with the law, to the governmental Environmental Impact Assessment De- partment of the Chief Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Arkhangelsk Oblast, Malaya Energetika (the primary client), and the Administra- tion and Municipal Council of Severodvinsk. As a result of discussion of the public EIA materials, discussions in the press and round table discussions, the following were adopted recommendations from deputy hearings in Severodvinsk (11), from a ruling of the Municipal Council of Severodvinsk (No. 28, dated 03/21/02) (12), from recommen- dations from deputy (parliament) hearings in Arkhangelsk (13), and from a Decree of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Deputy Assembly (14). The results of the participation of the public, experts and the administration of the city of Severodvinsk in the EIA and discussion of the project and the feasibility study of the construction of a small floating NPP have received high marks by the governmental EIA team, which also included Dr. Petrov. Dr. Petrov has a Ph.D. in physics and math- ematics, and has also worked on the public EIA. From the recommendations and proposals from the public environmental impact assessment that were included in government commission’s environmental impact as- sessment report (15): “During the construction and operations of the small floating NPP, it will be necessary to organize a full-time public outreach center in order to pres- ent objective information about environmental conditions and the plant’s impact on pub- lic health.” I would also like to draw the attention of participants to this Dialogue today that this requirement of the governmental EIA has yet to be met. In fact, this work is being tack- led by the city’s environmental community and Green Cross Russia’s Public Outreach and Information Office for nuclear submarine decommissioning issues.
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I believe it is appropriate to discuss this situation and the proposal of the First National Dialogue last year regarding the need to hold a conference or seminar on this subject in Severodvinsk with the community and representatives of the authorities, as well as industry representatives. The public hearings were attended by representatives of the community’s environ- mental movements and organizations (Ekologiya Severa, Raduga, the Forpost Fund, Arkhangelsk VOOP, the Council of the Severodvinsk Green Movement), the media (Argumenty i Facty in Arkhangelsk, Korabel, Korabelnaya Storona, Troitsky Prospekt, Severodvinsky Rabochii, Pravda Severa, Volna) including Severodvinsk city radio and the television channel TVTs Arkhangelsk), the chief agencies for natural resources and environmental protection under the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the city of Severodvinsk, the municipal and Oblast Centers for State Health and Epidemiologi- cal Monitoring, the Arkhangelsk Oblast Chief Department for Civil Defense and Emer- gencies, the Severodvinsk Inspectorate of the National Nuclear Monitoring Services of Russia, scientific research and design institutes, the Onega Scientific Research and Design Bureau, the Institute of Environmental Problems of the North, the state-owned franchise VNIPIET, the United Construction Bureau for Machine Building (in the city of Nizhny Novgorod), Kurchatov Institute Russian Science Center, Rosgidromet, the state- owned franchise Zvezdochka, the state-owned franchise Sevmash Industrial Associa- tion, AtomEnergo, Arktika, the administrations of the Arkhangelsk Oblast and the city of Severodvinsk, the deputies of Severodvinsk and the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assembly. Overall, the community and the administrations of the city and the Oblast spoke in support of the construction of a small, floating nuclear power plant on the selected site in Severodvinsk.
References 1. Korotkov, O. Sevmashpredpriyatiye on the Road to Going Public. A Develop- ment Strategy [Ha puti k aktioninrovaniyu Sevmashpredpriyatiya. Strategiya razvitya]. Korabel. No. 27, April 8, 2008. 1–2. 2. The website of the Northern Shipbuilding Corporation, www.sevska.net/ssil- ki.php 3. Evglevskaya, R. Under Whose Flag? The Continental Shelf and FNPP. Is the Public Council Supporting Russia’s National Priorities? [Pod chimi flagami osvaivat shelf i PEB. Obschestvenniaya palata – za natsionalniye prioriety Rossii]. Severnyi rabochii. June 25, 2006. 3. 4. Greenpeace Press Service in Russia 11/17/05. Zelyony Mir. No. 7–8 2006, 29. 5. Federal Law No. 174-FZ on Environmental Impact Assessments / SPS Kon- sultant Plus. 6. General Post-Dialogue Discussions. The Nuclear National Dialogue on Nu- clear Energy, Society and Security. Proceedings from the Dialogue, Moscow, April 18– 19, 2007. Green Cross International, RosAtom, RosAtom’s Public Council, Green Cross Russia. 2007. 286–287. 7. Gavrilov, S.D., Khatuntsev, V.V. Community Participation in Making Deci- sions on the Location and Construction of Hazardous Facilities: Ensuring Safety and Improving Effectiveness [Obschestvennoye uchasiye v prinyatii reshenii po razme- scheniyu i sooruzheniyu opasnikh obyektov: obespecheniye bezopasnosti i povysheniye
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effektivnosti]. Foundations of Government Security Policy. Security and Emergencies. 2007. No. 4 (July–August). 14–24. 8. Dubinin, G.L., Khatuntsev, V.V. Considering Public Opinion in the Decision- Making Process for Building a Floating Nuclear Power Plant On-site at Sevmashpredpri- yatiye [Uchyot mneniya obschestvennosti pri prinyatii reshenii o stroitelstve plavuchei atomnoi stantsii na FGUP PO “Sevmashpredpreiyatiye”]. Modern Development Trends in a Single-Industry City in the Russian North: Problems and Prospects: Proceedings from the Regional Science Conference. Editor-in-chief: Russova, O.N. Severodvinsk. St. Petersburg MGTU Sevmashvtuz Severodvinsk Branch. 2007. 55–63. 9. Decree No. 552-r dated 11/01/01 issued by the Mayor of Severodvinsk on State Registration of the Application to Conduct a Public Environmental Impact Assess- ment. SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk. 10. Baturin, L.A., Kokin, A.V. The Economics of Natural Resource Management under Conditions of Sustainable Development [Ekonomika prirodopolzovaniye v uslovi- yakh ustoichivogo razvitya]. Government and Municipal Administration. Papers of the North Caucasus Presidential Academy of Civil Service. 2001. No. 4. 81–87. 11. Recommendations from Deputy Hearings in Severodvinsk on building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). Minutes of the Hearings, 03/13/2002. SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk. 12. Ruling No. 28 (03/21/2002) of the Municipal Council of Severodvinsk (Arkhan- gelsk Oblast) on building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors. Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk. 13. Minutes from Deputy (Parliament) Hearings in the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assem- bly of Deputies on 05/27/2002 on building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). 14. Decree No. 279 (05/28/2002) of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Assembly of Depu- ties on support for building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT- 40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast). SPS Konsultant-Nord. Arkhangelsk. 15. The Conclusion of the Government Environmental Impact Assessment con- ducted by the expert commission: a feasibility study of the building a small floating nuclear thermal power plant with KLT-40S reactors in the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhan- gelsk Oblast). Approved by Decree No. 447 (07/18/2002) issued by the Russian Minis- try of Natural Resources.
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A Strategy for Eliminating Threats Stemming from Decommissioned Facilities of the Russia’s Northern Nuclear Fleet
Ashot Sarkisov, Member, Russian Academy of Sciences Leonid Bolshov, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences Sergei Antipov, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Valentin Vysotsky, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Prof. Remos Kalinin, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Pavel Shvedov, Engineer, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Vladimir Shishkin, Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering The 20th century saw the birth of nuclear energy, and most people today see it as a promising source of reliable, environmentally safer energy at this historically significant point in time. However, the use of nuclear energy (even if we forget nuclear weapons for a moment) has presented mankind with new threats related primarily to the emergence of a great number of long-lived radionuclides; as a result, we now face both natural and anthropogenic radiation exposure. These threats are new in terms of their source, but as 50 years of experience in nuclear energy has shown, these threats are much less dangerous than the consequences of using fossil fuels. However, the threats related to nuclear energy stand out. They are currently relatively easy to control and manage during a nuclear reactor’s service life, when the radioactive fission fragments from fuel and material with induced activity levels are found beyond several safety barriers. They grow and remain intact for an extensive period of time after the service life of a reactor or other equipment that used nuclear or radioactive substances. The completion of their life cycle is related to the need to extract nuclear and radioactive material from facilities, store and transport them across long distances, consolidate solid radioactive wastes and reprocess liquid radioactive wastes. Until now, the idiosyncrasies of nuclear energy for many countries, including Russia, included the lack of a specially-designed storage facility for the permanent storage of the high-level radioactive wastes that are the by-product of nuclear reactor operation and that cannot be put to further use. As a result, one very common radwaste management approach (also used with several types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is to arrange long- term storage in specially-designed surface storage facilities for a period long enough to arrange final containment. Based on the experience of a number of countries, such as Sweden, the construction of underground storage and facilities for the containment of radioactive waste and SNF over hundreds of years requires a great deal of funds and time (50 years or more). Consequently, the most complex problems in providing
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nuclear and radiation safety have less to do with a reactor’s service life as with the period during which facilities are decommissioned (nuclear power plants, ships and vessels with nuclear power installations, coastal bases, radwaste and SNF storage facilities, and other elements of the nuclear infrastructure). Table 1 lists key facilities left from the Cold War. Table 1. A List of Top Problems Inherited from the Cold War No. Main Hazard Sources Qualitative Indicators
Decommissioned nuclear submarines that 1 15, including 11 with SNF have yet to be destroyed Decommissioned ships with nuclear power 2 1 installations and SNF yet to be extracted Reactor units that need to be sliced into 3 79, including 2 with SNF reactor compartments Retired reactor cores (containing SNF and PWR) now in temporary storage at Over 130 with an activity 4 Andreeva Bay and Gremikha, in nuclear level of (A) > 3.6 × 1017 Bq submarine reactors and reactors from ships with nuclear installations Reactor cores in temporary storage at Gre- 10 with activity levels at 5 mikha and in No. 910 and 900 liquid metal nearly 2.5×1016 Bq fuel reactors 51,000 m3 with activity levels 6 Total volume of solid radioactive waste at approx. 7×1016 Bq 7,200 m3 with activity levels 7 Total volume of liquid radioactive waste at approx. 4×1016 Bq Nuclear and radiation hazard assemblies 17,000, including 3 nuclear 8 dumped in the Arctic seas (nuclear subma- submarines with SNF rines, ships, reactors, containers, etc.) 28, including the Lepse float- 9 Nuclear service ships ing storage base 10 Toxic waste rated at hazard classes 1–3 Approx. 160 tons At the temporary storage Territories and waters that require remedia- 11 sites at Andreeva Bay and tion Gremikha
There is another aspect that deserves special attention in terms of ensuring safety during the use of nuclear energy. This aspect is related to the state of public opinion on nuclear and radiation safety. People have had fairly calm reactions to the many increases in emissions standards for toxic car exhaust fumes. At the same time, when radiation background numbers exceed the standards even slightly, this causes great concern among
168 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY the public, even if the figures remain considerably below maximum allowable concentrations (MACs). There are a few reasons for this, ranging from the “Chernobyl Syndrome” to insufficient public education about the nature of the impact of radiation on humans and the environment, as well as the actual radiation conditions in one region or another. At the close of the 20th century, the most pressing problems related to SNF and radwaste emerged in Northwest Russia in connection with the mass decommissioning of nuclear submarines and other nuclear infrastructure elements. During the Cold War, this was the very site where a powerful fleet of nuclear submarines, ships and coastal maintenance and storage facilities was established. Of the more than 260 nuclear ships and ships with nuclear power installations built in the Soviet Union — including icebreakers — over 160 were based in Russia’s Northwest. International efforts to dismantle the legacy of the USSR’s nuclear fleet began over 25 years ago. The first example of international cooperation within the Global Partnership and cooperative threat reduction was the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (aka. Nunn-Lugar Program), which was initiated in 1991. Starting in 1996, collaborative efforts were underway through the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Program. Under a variety of AMEC projects during that period, Norway contributed USD 10 million, the United States contributed USD 25 million, and Russia donated USD 6.5 million. Over the years, international aid, earmarked for environmental problems in Russia’s Northwest, and comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and environmental remediation of former fleet sites, increased due to expanded bilateral efforts not only with the United States, but also with Norway, Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, Japan (in the Far East), and other countries. Some of the most important projects that have been and will be completed through international cooperation are: • Streamlining the industrial infrastructure of ship repair facilities that also dismantle strategic nuclear submarines specifically under the US-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program; • Increasing production opportunities in the technological transportation system for removal and management of SNF, as well as conditioning solid and liquid radwastes under bilateral agreements between Russia, the United States, and Norway; • Restoring the infrastructure of the Andreeva Bay temporary storage point under bilateral agreements between Russia and Norway; • Dismantling multipurpose nuclear submarines under bilateral agreements between Russia, Great Britain, Norway and Canada; • Creating a land-based long-term storage point for reactor compartments in Sayda Bay under an agreement between Russia and Germany; • Searching for an ideal means of handling SNF and solid radioactive waste at coastal maintenance and storage facilities under bilateral agreements between Russia, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden; • Creating innovative technologies for the temporary storage of SNF, conditioning
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solid radioactive waste, creating a system for radiological monitoring (PICASSO), the buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines in waterborne storage, as well as their safe transport to dismantlement sites (under the AMEC Program). One special form of international cooperation in this field is the development of a Strategic Master Plan for the comprehensive dismantlement in Russia’s Northwest, initiated by RosAtom and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in early 2004. By late 2007, a group consisting of Russian experts from Russia’s leading organizations in the field (including the RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, the Kurchatov Institute, the Dollezhal Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering, among others) developed the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) with input from international consultants. This plan envisages the completion of a series of tasks toward ensuring the safe dismantlement of vessels in Russia’s Northwest fleet by 2025; these efforts are to include the removal or safe long-term storage of SNF and radioactive waste. At the core of the SMP is a strategy for achieving a complex end goal that takes into consideration the multi-faceted aspect of the problem at hand such as: • An integrated review of all hazardous nuclear and radiation facilities in the region; • Risk minimization; • Disposal and environmental clean-up efforts that have been completed and that are currently underway in the region; • Economic feasibility and many other factors. The SMP is comprised of two stages. The first and preparatory stage (SMP-1) was completed in late 2004. The most important results of SMP-1 include not only the development of all of the requisite baseline data and methodological foundations for further work, but also the development of a list of priorities for the immediate future. In early December 2004, the final SMP-1 report was approved by the Assembly of Donor Countries, approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the NDEP, and brought into force by a Decree issued by Russia’s Ministry of Nuclear Energy (12/01/2004). On the recommendations of SMP-1, several priority projects were funded (such as a project to streamline the radiation monitoring system and emergency response system in the Murmansk Oblast). SMP-2 proceeded in a very different way from SMP-1. Three leading organizations in the field were involved with SMP-1. In contrast, SMP-2 was assigned to a program development group, which comprised leading specialists representing a number of organizations in the field. This group was formed under the Environmentally Safe Energy Fund of the RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy. Yet another important difference between the two project phases was the appointment of the international consultant comprised of representatives from Fluor and BNG. In line with technical specifications, the Consultant performed the functions set out for each of the tasks. Specifically, the role of the Consultant was to serve as reviewer and consultant and to transmit the latest Western experience in a wide range of issues related to development of the SMP. The parties were to discuss several specific tasks, the completion of which facilitated the finalization of the SMP and its main components. As a result, the SMP was presented
170 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY as a package of different components, the central of which is the Comprehensive Dismantlement Program (CDP), which includes a schedule of priority projects. The following factors distinguish the CDP from other programs in dismantlement and environmental rehabilitation of decommissioned vessels: • A focus on achieving strategic goals; • Review of all sources of hazard and decommissioned Northwest fleet vessels posing a radiation hazard without exception; • An inventory of all key interrelations during strategic planning stages; • A substantiation of priorities and the ability to use an information system for CDP management; • The maximum use of modern quality assurance and risk minimization procedures. As confirmed in an analysis of current conditions, despite the large volumeof work that has already been completed, the CDP’s goals require a substantial amount of time and money — much more than was previously devoted to remediation in Russia’s Northwest. Table 2 shows estimated figures on the volume of work that has yet to be completed under the CDP as a percentage of total work volumes. It is clear that only progress in nuclear submarine dismantlement exceeds 70–75%. For most other types of vessels (nuclear maintenance and repair services, ships with nuclear installations, and the Andreeva Bay and Gremikha temporary storage points) as well as the storage and burial of solid radioactive waste, work required to achieve the final goals is only about 10–15% completed. As part of the SMP, an analysis was conducted and data has been presented on the current technical conditions of the following (dismantlement, environmental rehabilitation, and infrastructure): Table 2. Estimate of Work Remaining under the CDP (% of total) Unit Nuclear Subs Nuclear Vessels Storage Ships with nuclear installations Gremikha Andreeva Bay SNF Removal Radwaste management % 25–30 85–90 ~95 85–90 85–90 50–60 80–90
• 23 nuclear submarines, including 18 with SNF; • 97 reactor blocks, including 1 with SNF; • Gremikha and Andreeva Bay temporary storage points; • 28 nuclear service ships; • 1 ship with nuclear installations (heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser). The main focus at the start of SMP development was preparing a substantiation for the strategic goals. The goals were formed based on current concept-based decisions made by RosAtom and with consideration for Russian and international experience in the field.
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In brief, the goals are: 1. By 2015, all nuclear submarines, reactor units, ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships should be dismantled, and their reactor compartments (onboard reactor facilities and service ship storage bases) containing solid radioactive waste are to be stored at the Sayda Bay long-term storage facility (70–100 years). 2. By 2025, the former coastal temporary storage points in Andreeva Bay and Gremikha should be rehabilitated to conditions that are not harmful to people or the environment and make it possible to continue to use these territories for purposes to be determined by the Government of Russia. 3. By 2018, reprocessed, conditioned and defective SNF from PWR reactors should be safely removed and transported out of the region to Mayak. 4. By 2015, all SNF that has not been treated should be rendered safe and placed in long-term storage until a final decision is made. 5. By 2025, most radwaste should be appropriately contained and stored in safe, long-term storage facilities and be prepared for subsequent transfer to final containment. The Comprehensive Dismantlement Program includes an extensive list of projects aimed at achieving these strategic goals (see Figure 1). Based on an analysis of baseline data, the above principles and the results of strategic studies for the entire set of tasks were drawn up into a high-level, integrated strategy. The strategy addresses all of the vessels and locations to be dismantled and rehabilitated, and also addresses the management of spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and solid wastes for the entire Northwest region of Russia. The integrated strategy is founded on the following key decisions: 1. All fuel from nuclear submarines with PWR is to be transferred to Mayak — this is a priority. 2. All U-Zr SNF will be collected for storage at AtomFlot for a period of at least 50 years. Units that are decommissioned and dismantled and that hold liquid metal will be assigned to temporary storage at Gremikha until a final decision is made regarding technology for further management. 3. After the dismantlement of vessels, the radioactive waste from nuclear submarines, heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers and SNF storage facilities from nuclear service ships will be transferred to long-term storage facilities in Sayda Bay, where they will stay for at least 70 years. 4. All other solid radioactive waste will be put in a regional center for conditioning and storage in Sayda for long-term storage over the same duration. During that time, a decision will have to be made on the location and methods for final radwaste containment. 5. It has been proposed that the transfer of high-level waste (HLW) be minimized by conditioning of HLW in Andreeva Bay, where most HLW is located. 6. Low-level waste (LLW) obtained by rehabilitation of Andreeva Bay and Gremikha will be transferred to specially designed containers located in their respective areas. This integrated strategy has become a foundation for developing strategies for managing different objects of dismantlement and rehabilitation efforts as well as special
172 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY strategies for SNF, radioactive waste and solid waste management. The environmental rehabilitation of the Gremikha temporary storage point serves as one example of a separate strategy for a specific facility. This facility is one of the most complex coastal facilities in the environmental rehabilitation program for Northwest
Figure 1. The strategy under the Comprehensive Dismantlement Program.
Russia. Gremikha is home to 130 containers of PWR SNF with a total potential radiation dose of ~5.2х1015 Bq, nearly 2,500 m3 of a variety of solid radwastes, and about 300 m3 of liquid radwaste.
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Handling Alpha class decommissioned nuclear submarine reactors presents a special problem. There are eight decommissioned and removed components that are stored in a “frozen” Pb-Bi alloy, and they carry a total potential radiation dose of ~1.7х1016 Bq. Individual buildings and section of the territory, including the water area, are polluted with radionuclides. Planning and carrying out the work is complicated by the lack of accurate information about the contents of many containers that are located in an open- air solid radwaste storage facility. The Gremikha rehabilitation strategy, like the strategy for Andreeva Bay, comes down to resolving issues in four key areas (see Figure 2):
Figure 2. Strategy for the Gremikha temporary storage point for SNF and radwaste.
1. Creating an Infrastructure • Completion of a thorough study in order to establish baseline data on radiation conditions and the conditions of buildings and structures; • Modernization of general infrastructure (roads, berths, building repair, etc.); • Creation of a special infrastructure (measurement technology, robot technology, decontamination methods, and temporary storage conditions for decommissioned components, etc.). 2. Spent Nuclear Fuel Management • Conditioned PWR SNF will undergo accelerated transfer on the Lotte to Murmansk (AtomFlot) and later to Mayak along the standard route. • Defective PWR SNF will undergo repackaging in special containers and will then be transferred first to Murmansk on a specialized container ship before final transfer to Mayak.
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• In order to determine the feasibility of further treatment of SNF and liquid metal coolant, there are plans to conduct an additional feasibility study, the results of which will be used to prepare and remove the radioactive components to a treatment facility to be determined. The timeframe is 2010–2015. 3. Radioactive Waste Management • Solid low-level waste (LLW) and medium-level waste (MLW) will be sent to the Sayda center, while HLW and a reactor monitoring and protection system will be sent to Andreeva Bay for conditioning. • Liquid LLW will be reprocessed on-site at respective installations, while secondary solid waste will be sent to Sayda. • Liquid MLW and HLW will be reprocessed at mobile facilities from the Sayda center. • Solid LLW resulting from the rehabilitation process will be buried on-site under an agreement with federal and regional authorities. The timeframe for this aspect of the program is 2010–2023. 4. Rehabilitating Buildings and Land Rehabilitation of buildings, land and water areas will be carried out gradually as buildings and land are needed for SNF and radwaste management purposes. The timeframe for rehabilitation is 2008-2025. The next step after establishing a foundation and adopting a strategy for all of the different objects of dismantlement and environmental rehabilitation (including SNF, radwaste and solid waste management) was to develop a functional system toward achieving the final strategic goals of dismantlement and rehabilitation for all CDP facilities. The plan includes a list of all of the actions to be taken and in what order to achieve the final goals for each item under the CDP. The final planning stage was the development of the Comprehensive Dismantlement Program based on functional diagrams. Using computer software, the CDP was presented in the form of a Gantt chart. The chart shows the start and progress of all multi-part and macro-scale projects, as well as all of the phases of each project. The timeframe and order in which the projects are to be completed were aligned with the previously compiled set of functional diagrams. The Gantt chart also illustrates the technological connections between different projects (see Figure 3). The second phase of SMP development, including the CDP, was the first result achieved in the integration of strategic planning for a variety of large-scale, long-term tasks related to the destruction of facilities remaining in Northwest Russia after the Cold War. The subject of the strategic planning was the management of decommissioned Russian Naval vessels that presented radiation hazards during their dismantlement (environmental rehabilitation), as well as management of the infrastructure, SNF, radwaste, and solid wastes. The following tasks were completed during SMP development: • Baseline data was standardized for over 150 radiation hazards from the fleet and elements of the infrastructure located in various parts of Northwest Russia (in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts);
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Figure 3. Achieving the final strategic goals for all of the components of the Comprehensive Dismantlement Program
The following tasks were completed during SMP development: • Baseline data was standardized for over 150 radiation hazards from the fleet and elements of the infrastructure located in various parts of Northwest Russia (in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts); • The final strategic goals for managing the facilities specified in the CDP have been substantiated; their achievement will either eliminate threats for personnel, the public and the environment, or reduce threats to acceptable levels; • Roadmaps have been drawn up to lead us from today’s conditions to the achievement of the final goals for all of the elements in the program without exception. In particular, the development of the SMP took note of the results of strategic studies on determining rehabilitation criteria for temporary storage points, the introduction of new categories for solid radioactive wastes — LLW, management of defective and unprocessed SNF, and other factors; • When forming a baseline for the CDP, the past experience of Great Britain was used and adapted for Russia. This experience included the development of strategic programs for decommissioning nuclear facilities and radiation hazards, as well as strategic planning and project prioritization procedures; • The international consultations and consideration of international experience in implementing similar projects contributed to the development and adaptation of an assessment methodology and lowering risks that may arise during completion of the CDP; 176 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
• The international consultations and international and Russian experience in developing the CDP contributed to the implementation of quality assurance procedures while meeting ISO 9001.2000 standards; • Preparations for the program’s baseline took into account all of the most significant industrial, technological and organizational connections among the facilities to be dismantled and the resources that could be provided by the infrastructure, which helped create an integrated, long-term plan of action. A total of 236 projects were defined in the CDP’s baseline. These projects set out the tasks for 11 subprojects to be competed in 2007–2025. Over this period, the following results will be achieved: • Over 3,100 cases of dry fuel assembly with a total activity level of approximately 4×1017 Bq will be unloaded from nuclear submarine reactors and heavy nuclear-powered missile carriers; • A total of 9 decommissioned Alpha class nuclear submarine reactors with a total activity level of approximately 7×1016 Bq will be removed from the region; • Roughly 70 TUK-120 casks with unprocessed SNP will be unloaded from storage facilities at temporary storage points and floating service bases, which have been prepared for long-term controlled storage, will be unloaded and transferred to storage at AtomFlot for a period of up to 50 years; • A regional center for conditioning and storage for various categories of solid radioactive waste will be built in Sayda Bay; • All of the vessels decommissioned from the Russian Navy, nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear installations and nuclear service ships will be dismantled. Long-term storage points will be established for 120 reactor compartments, 2 reactor rooms and 6 storage facilities with solid radioactive waste; • All spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (save for LLW) will be removed from temporary storage points, and brownfield land will be formed in order to ensure the radiological and technical use of these facilities; temporary storage points will have storage facilities for LLW. The waters at temporary storage points will be decontaminated. • One main condition for carrying out the CDP’s baseline is funding. Calculations show that the total program costs for 2007–2025 will amount to EUR 2 billion. A breakdown of funding by year is available. • During the prioritization procedures, 50 projects and mega-projects were scheduled for 2011. The cost of these priority projects amounts to over EUR 800 million. • A project management system was designed during the development of the SMP. The use of this program will help monitor and promptly adjust the program as changes arise. • The CDP is not a program for direct action and does not presume securing target funding. It should be useful to RosAtom as: • A point of reference for launching short-term target programs, including the Federal Target Program for the dismantlement and environmental rehabilitation of decommissioned Russian Navy vessels; • A substantiation for making strategic decisions on the most important aspects when it comes to project funding in this field;
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• A basis for making choices in international collaboration and cooperation with donor countries. For international organizations and donor countries, the CDP should serve as a foundation for determining which projects should be funded, in addition to paving the road for international cooperation in the comprehensive dismantlement of the nuclear submarine fleet of Northwest Russia.
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Radiation Safety in the Region Affected by Radioactive Contamination from Operations at the Mayak Complex
Vladimir Novosyolov Professor, Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service
Safety is the top prerequisite for human well-being. Any threat, even the smallest, to their safety, makes people stressed and afraid and creates conditions for aggressive behavior. This is why our sense of safety to a large extent depends not on true safety but on our subjective feelings and emotions, which may or may not be well-founded. Radiation safety at the Mayak complex is a reality, made possible by the concerted efforts of the industry leaders, several enterprises, and numerous intermediary organizations. The enormous progress made in ensuring the radiation safety of operations at Mayak is so obvious in the eye of an expert that further discussion might seem like a waste of time. Considering the persistence of Mayak’s management in continuously improving the radiation safety of the technologies used, in completely controlling radiation levels at each point in the chain of production, in implementing 24-hour automated monitoring on the territory adjacent to the facility, and in providing online accessibility of radiation safety information at the plant, one might think that there is sufficient evidence that a high level of radiation safety at the facility has been achieved. However, while experts might believe this is the case, sociological studies show that the absolute majority of residents of the areas that have been directly affected by radiation believe the exact opposite. Consequently, there is a patent discrepancy between reality and the perceptions of the affected population. One dangerous fact is that the residents of Chelyabinsk Oblast do not have the same understanding of whether Mayak poses a heightened threat to radiation safety. Mayak’s own experts believe that they have done everything possible to ensure that the accident of 1957 would be impossible today. Meanwhile, one-third of the residents of Ozyorsk who do not work at the facility stated that it would come as no surprise to them if a significant breakdown took place, accompanied by uncontrolled radiation discharge into the air or water. In the Kunashak and Argayashsk districts, 50% of respondents believe that nothing can protect them from radiation. The absence of radiation safety has resulted in just 8% of the population in the contaminated regions who consider themselves healthy. In addition, 42% consider the psychosocial environment to be highly stressful, and 75% of the population considers Mayak to be first and foremost a radiation threat for the entire area. However, 20% of respondents did recognize the major role Mayak has played in the defense potential of their country and that the facility is a natural product of scientific and technological progress. An overwhelming majority of the population (85%) is convinced that current operations at Mayak are having a negative effect on the environment, and hence on the
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local population as well. This is one indication that public opinion of Mayak is negative. It has been noted in a number of recent publications that the negative perception of Mayak by the residents of the affected areas is the result of distorted facts. To a certain extent, this is true. But it is far from being the only reason. The radiation phobia of the local population is in large part due to the very low quality of life there. Radiation safety will only enter the consciousness of the South Urals population when economic security and other forms of stability are achieved. It is an illusion to think that people can understand the concept of radiation safety when almost all of their other basic needs are not protected. At the same time, it should be noted that the concept of radiation safety exists in the human mind ungoverned by the rules of rational thought. Studies have shown that being saturated with information on the dangers of radiation in the past could lead to the development of radiation phobia. This is why we need to develop methods to sway public opinion using information that has been broken down in a specific way. The mass media —television especially — can play a considerable positive role here, because it is trusted by over 50% of people who have been victims of radiation. Mayak’s reputation could be improved through a series of special television programs or films that would relate the most captivating and instructive stories from the plant’s past and modern-day activities. The local population does not know about any of the most distinguished Mayak contributors and does not even understand why there is a monument of Igor Kurchatov in Chelyabinsk. Instead of taking a passive stance and isolating itself in Ozyorsk, Mayak must become involved in the local civic community so that it may gradually supplant its negative image among the people of South Urals. Ultimately, it isn’t knowledge alone, but positive sentiment and gratitude for the personnel of Mayak, based on that knowledge, that are needed to replace the current mindset, to stop people from saying, as they do now, without mincing words, that the government subjected them to a scientific experiment to test survival rates and must be held accountable. Just 9% of the population feels that Mayak is fully in compliance with today’s environmental laws, which is why individual residents have demanded that the plant’s operations be halted, or that the plant be demolished. However, half of the population of the affected areas is in favor of building good neighborly relations with Mayak. A study found that if the facility helped create jobs for men, contributed to children’s health in the region, ensured access to education for young people, improved access to information for all residents, and undertook the rehabilitation of contaminated areas, etc., it would drastically reduce local population’s perceived level of the radiation threat posed by Mayak. The current radiation phobia observed among those living in the areas that were affected by radiation contamination from operations at Mayak is simply unfounded. The subjective grounds for fear of Mayak could, to a significant extent, be overcome by creating close and permanent social and economic ties between the two sides.
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Russia and the United States: Renewing the Strategic Dialogue
Matt Martin Program Manager, The Stanley Foundation
The Stanley Foundation is happy to be co-sponsoring this conference. It fits in well with core Stanley values and goals. First, the Foundation’s programming is focused on promoting and building support for what we call “principled multilateralism,” that is, based on the understanding that many issues in the international arena require the cooperative efforts of many to find regional and global solutions, based on widely held beliefs and accepted practices. Secondly, The Stanley Foundation promotes public understanding and constructive dialogue on critical international issues. Our work recognizes the essential roles of both the policy community and the broader public in building sustainable peace. Both of these approaches are directly relevant when discussing nuclear issues. Thank you for your participation in these two days, and for the opportunity to discuss some of the work and concerns of the Foundation with you here today. We have heard much so far in our discussions regarding the future of nuclear energy in Russia and around the globe and Russia’s role in creating and promoting that future. We all want a future that is safe, healthy, and provides a sustainable energy path while protecting our natural environment, even if we may at times disagree on how to get there. The Stanley Foundation is engaged in a set of programming looking at various nonproliferation concerns surrounding nuclear energy (such as fuel cycle policies, nuclear fingerprinting, and the role of UN bodies, such as the 1540 Committee), and it’s clear that any potential global future with nuclear technology in the mix—whether for energy, for agriculture, for medicine, for basic or applied research—will need to be a secure future in which we can be confident that dangerous material is not siphoned off to be turned into weapons, nor that advanced know-how cannot be used to support clandestine weapons programs. We will not achieve this secure future, though, without keeping the related issues of nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control and disarmament, the critical strategic relationship between Russia and the United States, and the important connection between nuclear energy, our ongoing nonproliferation cooperation regarding Cold War remnants, and nuclear weapons disarmament in the forefront. During the Cold War, we in the United States and Russia could telegraph our strategic assumptions and intentions through the ether of the superpower standoff. We built up dizzying stockpiles of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on the one hand, while creating and monitoring strict nonproliferation and arms control on the other. In the nonproliferation realm, these efforts came to quintessential fruition in 1968 with the drafting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a multilateral agreement on a global nuclear framework that remains the basis for the entire nonproliferation
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regime that defines and balances the benefits and obligations on states regarding nuclear issues. Now nearly 40 years later, the NPT is under great strain, due to a wide variety of factors, and we see the US-Russian strategic relationship suffer because of it. While Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts continue their invaluable work on the nonproliferation side of the issue, disagreements over issues such as missile defense, NATO expansion, and the use of outer space, threaten to overwhelm our common interests and cooperative efforts. Without dismissing those real concerns, let us turn our attention to the significant work that Russia and the United States can still map out together in the strategic areas of nonproliferation and bilateral arms control. While the NPT is under strain, the basic concept remains relevant: nuclear weapon states must steadily move toward nuclear disarmament and provide civilian nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapon states, as long as they themselves forego nuclear weapons development. The concerns that have arisen over the years—concerns over adherence to disarmament obligations, break-out of a nuclear weapons capability, and access to sensitive fuel cycle technologies—point to a need to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime, not eliminate it. Particularly if we envision a global society that greatly expands its civilian use of nuclear technologies, we must be willing to look with a creative eye to means of strengthening and tightening the carefully-balanced provisions of the NPT, so that we encourage a safe and secure common future. Many have discussed the dangers associated with unfettered access by all to the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Whether this is handled by the active denial of these sensitive technologies, or, more preferably, by incentivizing the non-pursuit of these sensitive technologies at a national level, these approaches will be strengthened if the nuclear weapon states—and moreover specifically Russia and the United States—work together. This cooperation will be important both on the fuel cycle issue itself, as well as on the disarmament front, where stronger adherence will provide evidence that the nuclear weapon states are living up to their end of the NPT bargain, thereby pressuring non-nuclear weapon states to do the same. The second large area of critical cooperation between Russia and the United States, besides pursuing our common nonproliferation goals, is in the area of the Russian-US strategic arms control dialogue. The history of Russian-US agreement and progress on nuclear weapons arms control and disarmament issues shows great successes achieved through concerted diplomacy and technical dialogue, even in times of strain in the overall strategic relationship. During the Cold War, Russia and the United States negotiated several landmark treaties: SALT I, SALT II, and START. During the transition period moving out of the Cold War, unilateral actions by both the United States and the Soviet Union dramatically reduced tensions at a moment of tremendous change. The United States returned all of its naval surface- and air-based tactical nuclear weapons, while simultaneously withdrawing most of its tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled overseas. In a reciprocal action, the Soviet Union ordered the removal of all categories of nuclear weapons from deployment to “central storage facilities,” while between one-third and one-half of the weapons removed from deployment was scheduled for elimination. The relationship that developed between presidents Putin and Bush reflected a new era in the strategic relationship—one that sought to move past the engrained rivalries
182 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY of the past by foregoing the formal apparatus that defined the Cold War relationship, in the spirit of one state dealing with the other as partners, if not allies. The “Moscow” Treaty signed between the two leaders was indicative of this attitude, outlining some changes, but leaving each state to implement the terms of the treaty in its own manner, without explicit oversight and implementation measures. The treaty did produce some new achievements, counting the nuclear warheads themselves instead of using delivery vehicles as a proxy for the first time; and the treaty reduced deployed strategic weapons down to roughly 2,000 weapons on each side. However, critics argued that the large numbers still possessed by each side and the significant supporting infrastructures demanded more explicit transparency in accounting and verification. As well, the treaty failed to declare a total warhead count for each side, as the drafted-then-abandoned START III framework envisioned. Now the challenge is how to move forward, combining the positive aspects of past agreements in a manner which is mutually reassuring and that strengthens the bilateral relationship. The recent Russia-US strategic framework declaration from just several weeks ago in Sochi, Russia on April 6th is just such a positive statement: “We acknowledge that today’s security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. We must move beyond past strategic principles, which focused on the prospect of mutual annihilation, and focus on the very real dangers that confront both our nations.…[W]e reaffirm that the era in which the United States and Russia considered one another an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We reject the zero-sum thinking of the Cold War when ‘what was good for Russia was bad for America’ and vice versa. Rather, we are dedicated to working together and with other nations to address the global challenges of the 21st century, moving the U.S.-Russia relationship from one of strategic competition to strategic partnership.” Without ignoring the impediments to better relations and the points of contention between Russia and the United States, it is notable that in a larger sense, we are at a moment of ripe opportunity. As evidence of this, look at the political situation among the P-5: Russia will have new leadership in two weeks with the inauguration of President Dmitry Medvedev. Similarly, in nine short months, there will be a new president in the United States as well. At the same time, we also have new leadership in the United Kingdom and France. Finally, China, while not transitioning to new leadership, has long been a strong proponent for progress on disarmament measures, being open to strategic reduction talks as US-Russia talks make progress themselves, supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and maintaining a reserved nuclear doctrine of minimal deterrence. Strategically speaking, this is also an opportune time to renew and strengthen the Russian-US strategic relationship regarding nuclear weapons. Increasingly, few in the United States see a role for nuclear weapons in US security strategy beyond the ultimate purpose of existential deterrence, leaving significant strategic space between the current and the ideal strategic posture. The key will be moving toward this new strategic reality in a manner which promotes international stability and security. The Sochi declaration provides the rhetorical background and now the challenge is to match words with deeds.
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Let me outline some specific options for Russian-US consideration. A number of immediately apparent opportunities for US-Russia strategic cooperation exist. START, which is the latest treaty to contain verification provisions, expires in 2009. While the Moscow Treaty agreement surpasses START in terms of reductions, losing the verification and accounting of START would end a valuable strategic communication link between the two countries and leave each much more in the dark regarding the other’s activities. This unnecessarily dangerous outcome should be avoided, by a bilateral extension of these specific provisions. Negotiations on such an extension have begun, but it is likely that the final outcome will wait until a new US administration. Work should continue on setting the stage. Another immediate opportunity is presented by the upcoming NPT Review Conference, which will take place in the spring of 2010. Cooperative efforts on some of the points raised above, such as in mutual agreement on fuel cycle questions and continued bilateral progress on disarmament (most clearly enunciated in the “13 Practical Steps” outlined and approved in the 2000 NPT Review Conference), will go a long way toward ensuring a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference was a worrying indication of the fissures in the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, and a successful conference five years later could do much to reassure the global community. Looking beyond the “low-hanging fruit” opportunities that present themselves, a series of additional measures could be pursued to improve the bilateral Russian-US strategic relationship: • A US-Russian strategic dialogue to recognize new realities could provide the setting for discussing these issues, using the Sochi declaration as the jumping- off point. • Hearkening back to past arms control attempts that did not come to fruition, several components of the draft START III agreement could be resuscitated: • Disclosure of overall strategic stockpile inventories; • Increased transparency of doctrines and strategic deployments; • Discussions over tactical stockpiles transparency. • Continued progress could be made on the withdrawal of forward-based weapons – NATO tactical weapons on the US side, and western border deployed weapons on the Russian side. • In the manner of the previous unilateral actions of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin, new unilateral actions on the part of the United States and/or Russia could help break the current inertia, while safely maintaining the strategic concerns of each: • Further reductions below the roughly 2,000 warhead level outlined in the Moscow Treaty; • Doctrinal changes, such as in declaratory policy (moving away from hair- trigger alert status) and regarding negative security assurances (promises to refrain from nuclear attack excepting as a response to a nuclear attack). • Broader engagement could improve along the lines of several related issues: • Multilateral fuel cycle arrangements may provide a way out of the trap encompassing the complete fuel cycle debate.
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• As Russia has suggested, it could act as regional fuel provider for regions as dispersed as sections of Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. • Russia’s offer to provide a long-term physical repository for spent fuel could be considered and evaluated. • Presenting a united front on the thorny issues of Iran and North Korea, with Russia and the United States agreeing on overall principles would go far in moving the global community toward a new conceptualization of the nonproliferation and disarmament framework. Many wait to see where the global situation will go, and while change is always certain, now seems like a particularly fluid time. Russia’s new President Medvedev will soon have the opportunity to show his conceptions of Russia’s place in the global community and to develop a working relationship with the United States. In several weeks, the NPT Preparatory Conference will meet in Geneva for its annual preparation for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Today in Pennsylvania, US voters are going to the polls to participate in choosing the Democratic nominee for President. As in all transitional periods, it is a time of great challenge, but also great opportunity. May the leaders of our two great countries—Russia and the United States—seek greater peace and security not only for ourselves, but for our increasingly interdependent world, by recognizing the role that improved bilateral strategic relations can play in bringing about that secure future.
Thank you.
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The New US Nuclear Posture Review: A US Perspective
Jeffrey Lewis Director, Nuclear Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation
The United States is in the midst of a substantial debate about the future of its nuclear weapons policy. This change is driven by a number of factors. First, a new President will assume office in January 2009. The new President will be accompanied by significant changes in staff, including new officials at the Departments of Energy, State and Defense, as well as the staff of the National Security Council. Second, the US Congress has refused to fund several programs proposed by the Bush Administration, including plans to develop a new generation of replacement nuclear warheads and plans to modernize the nuclear weapons complex. Congress is currently withholding some funds for the national laboratories, including Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, on the grounds that many programs cannot be evaluated without a clear statement of US nuclear policy. Congress has created a “Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States” that will be co-chaired by former Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and James Schlessinger. Congress has also mandated that the next President conducts a so-called “Nuclear Posture Review” in 2009. Although the Bush Administration has submitted unclassified and classified statements on US nuclear posture to Congress, in all likelihood Congress will continue to withhold funding for many programs until the completion of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. Third, the United States is in the midst of a serious debate about taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, led by former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, Secretary Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn. Although I do not expect the elimination of nuclear weapons in the near-term, the United States is seriously considering dramatic changes in its nuclear posture for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Past Nuclear Posture Reviews Nuclear Posture Reviews are a recent phenomenon in US defense planning. The 2009 Nuclear Posture Review will be the third comprehensive review of US nuclear strategy. Reviews were also conducted in 1993 and 2001. They were, however, very different from each other. The 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an effort by the Clinton Administration to conduct a comprehensive study of US nuclear posture after the Cold War – a complement to the so-called “Bottom-up Review” of US military capabilities. The 1993 Nuclear Posture Review is widely seen as unsuccessful. President Clinton did not, for example, sign new presidential decision on the U.S. nuclear strategy. Instead the Reagan Administration directive would remain in place until November 1997. The November
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1997 presidential directive was written after an internal review led by the White House at the urging of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. STRATCOM – the command responsible for US strategic force. The military argued that they could not meet the terms of the outdated Reagan guidance if the United States and Russia reduced nuclear forces below the limit of 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads set in the START II treaty. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review is rooted in this decision. President Clinton intended to unilaterally meet the START II limits although, at the time, Russia had not yet ratified START II. The Republican Congress, in an effort to prevent the President from unilaterally implementing reductions under START II, required that the next President conduct a nuclear posture review before any further reductions could be made to US strategic forces. That President, of course, turned out to be George W. Bush. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review is also seen as having been unsuccessful. Congressional Republicans, eager to see its concept of the so-called “New Triad” created a Commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense to review the implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review. The two reviews, therefore, were very different. The 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was proposed by the Clinton Administration as a voluntary measure to enable further nuclear reductions. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was proposed by Congress to delay further reductions, until after President Clinton left office. The 2009 Nuclear Posture Review The 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, like the 2001 version, was conceived by a Congress in opposition to the President’s nuclear policies – although in this case, it is a Democratic Congress unwilling to fund programs such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Congress has set three requirements:
• Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. A Congressionally empaneled commission with six Democrats and six Republicans, selected by the House and Senate, and chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Perry and Schlessinger that will complete its work in December 2008. This date will slip until March 2009. • Nuclear Policy Review. A review, led by the National Security Advisor, to consider the purpose and role of nuclear weapons, to be complete by September 2009. • Nuclear Posture Review. A review, led by the Secretary of Defense, to consider the size, posture and planning for U.S. nuclear forces to be complete by March 2010. Each exercise is designed to feed into the next. Although the 1993 and 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews were widely seen as being unsuccessful, there are reasons to think the third review may succeed where the others failed. First, the United States must make a number of important decisions about US nuclear weapons in the next few years. Congress must decide whether to fund a number of programs, while the next Administration must mount a diplomatic effort to secure a successful 2010 Review Conference of the NPT. I am fond of noting that November 2009 will be the 20th Anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The President will have to go to Berlin. He will be expected to say something about nuclear weapons.
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Second, and most important, there is a widespread sense among both Republicans and Democrats that the United States should dramatically change its nuclear posture to reflect the threats we face today. These threats are largely related to terrorism and other problems that cannot be met with nuclear weapons. The bipartisan nature of this sense is illustrated by the Wall Street Journal op-ed and Congressional actions. Third, and finally, policymakers appear to have learned the lessons of the failed 1993 and 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews. The Strategic Posture Commission and the Presidential Review, if conducted wisely, should lay the foundation for significant changes in U.S. posture. Russia will play an important role in these discussions. In particular, a key question will be whether Russia is interested in a follow-on treaty to the 2002 Moscow Treaty. I look forward, therefore, to our continuing dialogue during the questions and answers session and the rest of the conference.
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Plenary Discussion on the Topic of International Cooperation and Global Partnership in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of WMDs
– Paul Walker: My first question has to do with the disposal of waste from nuclear submarines. You were telling us about demilitarization and the destruction of old strategic Soviet nuclear submarines and that about EUR 2 billion must be spent on demilitarization before 2012. What is the situation these days? How many nuclear submarines were there and how many will be destroyed? I would like to find out how important Western funding is for this process. When we first started working together 15–16 years ago, our Russian colleagues said they needed funding to dismantle nuclear submarines. Over the time that the United States have been providing financial assistance, possibly 40 submarines have been dismantled in Russia’s Northwest and Far East. Could you tell us the amount of Western assistance and how much of those EUR 2 billion needed for submarine dismantlement and radwaste management will be funded by Russia and how much will be supplied by partners and sponsors? – Remos Kalinin: I’d like to point out that I spoke about the future and did not aim to analyze the past, so I do not have the numbers with me regarding who paid for what and how much. But I’ll say that international assistance has made a big impact in this sphere of activity. It started with the Nunn-Lugar Program, as was duly noted, but at the time, the main objective was Russia’s demilitarization, the reduction of its military potential, and a joint threat reduction effort. We were dismantling completely new submarines, forgetting that we had old nuclear submarines that were rotting away and no one had time to worry about them. But, in general, the numbers you mentioned are close to reality. Thanks to this assistance, a lot got done. – Paul Walker: One more issue that deserves to be discussed here is international cooperation. It was started six years ago and planned for ten years through 2012. The United States and twenty Western nations pledged close to USD 20 billion to an assistance fund to help Russia destroy its WMDs. All of this must be completed within these ten years. The demilitarization of nuclear submarines will continue for four years and I believe that if we were to take into consideration the environmental threat and the danger posed to society, this program must continue after 2012. The West will continue providing assistance to Russia and Russia will undoubtedly continue its cooperation with the West.
– Paul Walker: As far as I understand, there were many problems communicating the dangers of radiation exposure to the local population. Do the residents of the Chelyabinsk Oblast sufficiently understand the risks? – Vladimir Novosyolov: Sociological studies conducted by our Institute starting in 1997 indicate that anxiety is constantly in the back of people’s minds, both for the residents of Muslyumovo, a backward rural area, and in the large urban context of Chelyabinsk. The slightest unconsidered communication is negatively interpreted by the population and it takes little for panic to ensue. This is why the authorities are right in being very vigilant in how information is provided to the public to avoid serious consequences of widespread panic. People have a sense that something could happen at any moment and a difficult situation could arise. Some, especially the residents along the Techa River,
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are constantly saying that they were used in experiments without being told, and that there is insufficient access to information. Exactly half of survey participants believe that no one truly wants to find a solution to their problems. Meanwhile, the problems there are not radiological; they are social and economic issues. Those regions where the nuclear project was based were poor and already dying out. A stark contrast revealed itself between Chelyabinsk-40 (Ozyorsk), where the Communist ideal was close to being achieved, versus the surrounding areas, where people were living in very poor conditions. This created the conditions for envy and hatred. The locals feel that they are kept in the dark, being told the wrong information or not being told anything. This is why there is anxiety.
– Andrei Frolov: The discussions at conferences always focus on Russia’s efforts toward its goal of destroying nuclear and chemical weapons. It is true that the Soviet Union created more chemical weapons, nuclear arms, and nuclear submarines than the rest of the world. However, the stockpiles in the United States were also significant. It is unfortunate that we did not hear anything about the disarmament efforts that are underway in the United States. – Dialogue Participant: First, with regard to the weapon stockpiles. This information is unfortunately classified, but some general information is available. The Bush Administration states that by the end of the year, the nuclear stockpiles will be reduced to half or a quarter of the number of weapons that existed at the end of the Cold War or under Eisenhower. I believe that at the end of Eisenhower’s administration, there were about 5,000 warheads, and in November there was a planned reduction of 15%, equaling 800 warheads. In my opinion, there is no need to classify this information, and any American citizen should be able to obtain information about their country’s nuclear arsenal. General Habiger, the former Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Command, has been taking steps in that direction. As for reducing armaments, I believe that the Treaty of Moscow must include the total number of armaments, not only strategic weapons. We have to consider the total number, and there is no reason for this number to be greater than one thousand. This does not mean that the current administration did not reduce armaments. It may have been done in a way that was not transparent for the public, but still such actions were taken. As regards delivery systems and placement of armaments, including the stationing of nuclear submarines, the treaty on strategic offensive reductions was a very significant breakthrough. The reduction applies not only to strategic delivery systems, but also the warheads themselves, and this is a very important step that makes it possible to resolve specific issues and these will have an indirect effect on the reduction process. However, there are certain side effects that are not sufficiently positive. Just last month, President Sarkozy of France announced that a new generation of submarines would be put into operation and this is an important step in furnishing means of deterrence — nuclear weapons being one such means of deterrence. Another 15–20 years will be needed before the conditions are right for examining delivery systems as a topic of negotiations over their reduction.
– Dialogue Participant: More than once during the revision of the US nuclear strategy, the press brought up the idea of using nuclear weapons in localized conflicts. Do you
190 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY believe that this issue was properly framed? – Jeffrey Lewis: I read the documents relating the 2001 revision process, and insofar as they accurately describe the revision, I believe that limited use is not part of it. The press incorrectly interpreted the position of the new strategy. There is also a different problem: the current administration was unable to formulate what role nuclear weapons have today, twenty years after the end of the Cold War. Since the administration did not speak up or take any measures to make its position public, the press interpreted this with a predictable measure of suspicion.
– Dialogue Participant: In your opinion, what would be a good systemic approach to the issue of radiation safety from the point of view of public relations? How can this be incorporated to achieve a breakthrough in informing the public of radiation safety? – Vladimir Novosyolov: Here’s the problem: the government and the general population have different interests at stake. The government will never be as open as we would like — or as the people would like, as far from power as they are. This conflict of interest is a fact and cannot be overcome. This is why we have to approach the issue by way of compromise. We must work through non-governmental organizations, and they must work together with those in power and look for areas in which there is agreement. Society should keep the pressure on those in power so that they think on their feet. To do that, we must know what we need to ask of those in power: we need normal relations between the government and the civic organizations that represent various groups in society. Whenever RosAtom representatives come to visit, or just looking at the situation from Moscow, they think that the main radiation safety measures in the Techa River area have been taken. However many more generations will continue to fear radiation in the same way, and for them the accident is not over, it will perpetuate itself in their children, grandchildren, and future descendants. This is something that we must bring to the attention of those in power and keep reminding them of it. It is not enough to find a technical solution to the issue of radiation safety. We must also change people’s minds. To do so, we need nongovernmental organizations and people who are persistent, respected and have the people’s trust. We must make sure that ideologues do not take leadership of this movement and discredit it, as often happens. The leaders must be people with nothing personal at stake. – Igor Khripunov: Sometimes experience can give us a framework for how to act in the future. I consider myself a veteran of the Cold War. I was in the thick of it with arms control and disarmament since the early 1980s. The point of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States was a question of priorities: disarmament or trust- building measures? At the time, both sides believed that it was necessary to engage in arms control and that this would improve relations and build trust. The decision of the United States was this: trust-building measures must be taken first, and they will lay the foundation for significant reduction in nuclear arms and delivery systems on both sides. Last year and this year we saw a situation that reminded us of the past: NATO expansion and the placement of missile defense systems in Europe. Russia’s leadership is responding with the use of new weapons and its withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. We should ask, what is more important? Continuing to move forward with arms control or engaging in stronger trust-building measures? What role should society play? Is there a third approach we could take to ensure that an environment
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conducive to arms reduction is established? – Marie Kirshner: I would like to respond to the question regarding the exchange of information, when we don’t have the same kind of information. In truth, numbers have no meaning. There is a global threat and we have felt this threat for many years and I am very glad to be participating in this Dialogue and discussing these issues. This is very important for the future of our planet. The second question was regarding the choice between disarmament and strengthening trust building measures. These are two sides of the same coin: we must continue the disarmament process and engage in building trust at the same time. China and Tibet are in a situation where two sides are in opposition. The free world must work to develop measures for a safer environment. We must all work together to make things better. Thank you so much for organizing this conference as it will help improve the situation. – Paul Walker: I wanted to respond to what Igor Khripunov and Marie Kirshner said. So, what is more important? Disarmament or building trust? We’ve come to a strange place in our journey. President Bush, at the beginning of his first term, and President Putin looked each other in the eyes and found that they could trust one another and work together. One of the side effects of the rethoric was that nuclear disarmament issues were given separate attention. I cannot be the judge of how much of that is true, but these two processes carried on separately until the current problems emerged, and now we are in a place where these two questions are tightly bound to one another. It is impossible to achieve progress in one area without making headway in the other one. I also would like to say that we are now in a good place in terms of disarmament. There are certain measures in place that were used in 1991–1992 that could be taken unilaterally on both sides and that would not affect the parties’ strategic security and would not have any consequences, but a step would be taken in the direction of creating and building trust. However, we must wait for new opportunities that the new leadership of the two countries might have. We all agree on one point: good, transparent collaboration between the United States and Russia is very important and it looked like all presenters were of this opinion. Nobody wants a new Cold War. It is far too expensive a venture and it would be foolish to start it.
– Anatolii Nazarov: First I would like to echo the question brought up by my Russian colleague. This is indeed the second such Dialogue. At the last one we brought you a huge volume titled “The Radioactive Legacy of the Cold War” along with other documents that are now freely available. It is good that any American citizen can obtain this information in the United States, but it would also be good if, for the next Dialogue, we could have some corresponding documents here so that any Russian citizen could have access to that information. That is my first request to the American side. The second question is for Jeffrey Lewis. You presented a brief historical analysis of the new disarmament doctrine, and, at the same time, you said that the Bush administration has yet to formulate it. What do you think would be the significance of the new doctrine? It doesn’t matter if a new President takes his place. We now have President Medvedev, but we can say with 100% certainty that there will be no fundamental change in Russia’s doctrine, that much is obvious. So what is the point of revising the new doctrine? – Jeffrey Lewis: The new revision will essentially be based on the 2001 revision,
192 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY because it is initiated by Congress, as an excuse for not approving funding for several programs proposed by the administration. Congress has made the decision that the Bush administration should not be trusted with the nuclear doctrine and that funding should be put on hold. The reason for this is that we need to wait for it. I was only speculating as to what actions might be taken by the new administration. Everything will depend on which candidate is elected President. I believe that because the Wall Street Journal article that was mentioned discussed parts of the new doctrine, and a new nuclear weapon nonproliferation treaty conference necessitates a revision of the new doctrine. A new bipartisan commission would be created. As for content, it is likely that a significant reduction of the nuclear arsenal would be on the agenda. The new President may announce new plans to halve the arsenal and set the number of warheads to 1,000. The issue of the doctrine would be more complicated. I noticed that there are no bilateral agreements concerning the reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, though I would personally welcome any efforts in that direction. We can talk about the use of nuclear weapons only as a response measure, especially at this time. Russia has not taken on any obligations of this sort, but of course these issues could be discussed. – Dialogue Participant: I would like to add that, at this time, financial concerns are often the deciding factor. The war in Iraq is a very expensive undertaking and Congress is constantly asking: What purpose do nuclear weapons serve? Nuclear weapons are losing their priority status in the eyes of the US military. Nuclear weapons are almost a sign of weakness rather than of force. I believe that the United States, like Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom, must seriously look at ways to significantly decrease their stockpiles and other countries should join them in this process. However, it is hard to convince North Korea and Iran that they should not pursue the development of their own nuclear arsenals if our countries continue to have them. Jeffrey is right that this issue was raised and significant reductions will be made. Maybe in Russia this has gone unnoticed, but US Congress refused to fund the development of new warheads, which is a very significant change in US policy.
– Anna Vinogradova: My question might seem of minor importance in light of the questions being discussed, but it concerns a matter of great importance for regular people. The general public is frequently accused of radiophobia. In my opinion, the best way to combat radiophobia is to give regular people open access to monitor radionuclide content and accumulation in their own bodies. I am talking about the people who live close to facilities that pose a radiation threat. All our inquiries at all levels of power, requesting equipment needed to conduct such examinations of the residents of Balakovo, to reassure them that the NPP is safe or, if it isn’t, to take some kind of measures, have been met with refusals. The authorities justify their refusal by saying that there have been no cases of radiation-related illnesses, and so this equipment is unnecessary. Do the people living near nuclear installations in your countries have open access to such examinations and the ability to monitor their health this way? – Paul Walker: This will be discussed at other sessions, so let’s answer this question a little bit later.
– Rita S. Guenther: I represent the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., and wanted to respond to several questions that were asked here. I am very pleased to
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note that we have been working with the Russian Academy of Sciences for 25 years now. Currently we are working on a third project, and Dr. Sarkisov is the Co-Chairman of this project. We are studying the nuclear fuel cycle and Dr. Nikolai Laverov is working on it on the Russian side. We work very closely together, because this is an opportunity for our Russian colleagues to obtain valuable information from American scientists. This information is published in Russian and American publications and is publicly available. I also wanted to address another issue. Dr. Khripunov mentioned that trust- building measures and disarmament must have priorities, because otherwise it is unclear how we can find a solution to this issue. In our experience, NGOs workin tandem with other organizations. There are groups of citizens, experts, and these groups create the opportunities for developing the measures for building trust and cooperation with government bodies. This happened in the case of disarmament, and when we were organizing the collaboration between the two academies of science. How do you see the role of NGOs and citizen groups, and how can these groups use or benefit from the destruction of weapons, nuclear submarines, and so on? Is this considered in the context of increasing security measures? – Paul Walker: As the head of an international program managed by nongovernmental organizations, I know that this is very important. I am very grateful for your question and believe that there are many ways to engage in a dialogue on international security with Russia. First of all, the contacts through national academies are critical, as well as contacts between the national laboratories, which are very important for relations between Russia and the United States. This is one of the reasons why nuclear disarmament discussions are continuing, despite the fact that conditions are not always favorable. One area of concern is that in the course of progress made in several areas, as a side-effect of sorts, we are losing some of the personal contacts in the United States and relationships that were established over many years among various individuals, at different levels. The difficulty in maintaining those relationships and the decreased interest in and attention being accorded to nuclear disarmament are among our biggest challenges. It is necessary to partake in the international dialogue, to improve the relationship and communication between individuals, between government entities and the scientific community, in order to ensure that the dialogue continues with the United States at the official level. We are grateful that we are able to participate in this dialogue now. In the United States we often hear a very dangerous saying: “friends should not sign contracts.” One of my friends is a lawyer. He is constantly signing contracts that specify law-abiding behavior. I believe that official intergovernmental agreements, like a dialogue, are very important. They help provide a clear solution for how to fulfill certain commitments and all aspects of the agreement must have official approval. I would also like to add that I represent Global Green USA, which has been involved in this process for over 12 years, and I consider the dialogue between the Russian and American sides extremely useful, as it continues within the framework of these agreements. There is also what we call hidden diplomacy. I would be the first to say that much was achieved in the last decade and we can thank the nongovernmental organizations that this was made possible. This helped build trust between Russia and the United States as well as between Russia and the West in general.
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– Sergey Baranovsky: Now I would like to conclude this session, which I believe has been the most successful at this conference. First, because we had the perfect number of presenters: two from Russia and two from the United States. Unlike the first day, we immediately had a great discussion with Paul Walker’s help. One concrete suggestion made was the request directed at Global Green USA and the Stanley Foundation to prepare a plenary report on the state of nuclear-related affairs in the United States for the next Dialogue, which I am sure will take place. We are openly discussing the situation here in Russia and know nothing about what is happening in the United States. Tell us how you are dismantling nuclear submarines, how you are destroying your nuclear warheads, your public outreach efforts, and how the public feels about these issues.
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Tracking and Monitoring Radioactive Substances and Nuclear Materials: Achievements, Challenges, and Solutions
Viktor Petukhov Senior Scientific Collaborator, Scientific Institute for Shipbuilding Technologies, Saint Petersburg
Mikhail Rylov Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, Saint Petersburg
Thirteen years have passed since the adoption of the Federal law on the use of nuclear energy in 1995 (1). Article 22 of the law states that Russia must possess two government-managed centralized tracking systems: one for nuclear materials (NM) and another for radioactive substances (RS) and radioactive waste (RW). Both systems deal with NM and RS intended for peaceful uses and therefore are based on a set of internationally accepted principles of material checks and balances. State tracking and monitoring of NM, RS, and RW is conducted with the following goals in mind (2–4): • Determine their actual quantity at the sites where they are located, storage, or buried; • Prevent loss, theft, or unauthorized use of NM, RS, and RW; • Provide NM, RS, and RW inventory and transmit information to government agencies overseeing nuclear energy use, nuclear safety, and environmental protection; • Provide information to federal and local authorities for the purpose of making decisions on how to handle these materials to ensure the radiation safety of the population and the environment. The goals of both systems, as defined by law, are fully aligned with one another. A significant effort has been made to create a set of standards to streamline the tracking and monitoring systems and ensure the physical protection of both NM and RS. In a relatively short time, dozens of documents have been developed that effectively lay the foundation for standards for the safe management of these substances. The progress that has been made was in large part made possible by the technical and financial support we received from the US Department of Energy. These funds were received as part of a joint effort to reduce the nuclear threat and improve NM tracking and monitoring systems and the physical protection of nuclear sites. One notable step was the introduction, in 2006, of revised federal standards and rules for tracking and monitoring nuclear materials (NP- 030-05) and radioactive substances (NP-067-05). The main challenge in improving NM tracking and monitoring systems and the physical protection of nuclear sites has always been the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Much national and international experience has been gained in this field and it has been incorporated into the revised standards. However, the growing threat of international nuclear terrorism is associated not only with the possible use of NM to build
196 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY explosive devices, but also with the potential use of RS to build so-called “dirty bombs,” which are considered a type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). It is worth noting that only in recent years the international community has begun to truly understand the danger of radiation terrorism, since the development of a nuclear device requires the involvement of highly-qualified experts and the use of advanced technologies; meanwhile, all it takes to build a dirty bomb is access to radioactive substances and an insignificant quantity of explosives (5). An action plan for the non-proliferation of WMD and securing radioactive sources was adopted during the 2003 G8 Evian Summit. Considering modern terrorist threats, the goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear WMD must go hand in hand with the goal of preventing the proliferation of such weapons using radioactive substances. However, to this day, there have been significant differences in how NM and RS tracking and monitoring systems are designed and what set of standards they follow. This in turn has caused the cost of such systems to go up, without making them more effective. One good example is the transfer of NM to RW status. RosTekhNadzor has developed the NP-072-06 Standard, which defines the procedure for this process. The document does not prescribe specific procedures and mechanisms for the transfer, with the exception of a brief description of the work of the commission that would be in charge. Here, nuclear materials must leave one system while radioactive waste must appear in the other system. If either system breaks down, radioactive or nuclear materials may be lost either on paper or in reality. The main document for tracking and monitoring nuclear materials is the Russian Federal Standard NP-030-05 (Basic Rules for Nuclear Material Tracking and Monitoring). The standard indicates that substances in the smallest quantities are subject to government tracking and monitoring (235U and Pu — 15 g, 241Am — 1 g, 252Cf – 0.001 g). However, all experts are perfectly aware of the fact that there are sources of ionizing radiation out there that contain quantities of nuclear materials in excess of the indicated values. For this reason, the standard automatically included the following exception: these sources are not tracked as nuclear material — if they were, they would need to be included simultaneously in both tracking and monitoring systems. Depleted uranium in particular is a constant headache. According to NP-030-05, the government nuclear materials tracking and monitoring system must include depleted uranium weighing over 500 kg, while smaller amounts of depleted uranium are tracked in the RS and RW system. However, there is yet another significant exception (a common trend with federal documents of this sort): defense technologies are exempt from such tracking regardless of weight. The authors also forgot that the keels of sailing yachts are frequently made out of depleted uranium (6, 7). Consequently, according to our laws, nuclear materials are crossing into Russia without the knowledge of oversight or customs agencies. Meanwhile, depleted uranium is not as harmless as we’d like to think. It has been shown that under certain conditions, it can be used to build a dispersing device (8). Let us turn out attention to cases where radioactive substances slipped through the cracks in the monitoring system. In Russia, from 1996–2004, 180 instances were reported where sources of ionizing radiation disappeared (9). However, it turns out that sources of ionizing radiation are frequently misplaced even in countries where a robust RS tracking and monitoring system has been in place for years. Over the period 1993–2006 in the United States, there were 1,080 cases where
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radioactive substances were stolen or lost in amounts sufficient to create a dirty bomb (10). Of these, 275 cases involved criminal activity and 15 cases involved the attempted sale of radioactive substances. Commenting on the results of an investigation, Jim Turner, a Member of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives of the United States, stated that the disappearance of radioactive substances posed a significant danger, since the potential acquisition of a dirty bomb by terrorists was a clear threat (11). According to 2005 data, there are two million units of radioactive materials in the United States that could be used to build a dirty bomb (12). The materials are stored at a total of 21,000 sites. In the last several years, there were 375 reported cases of theft and disappearance of these substances (107 cases in the last six months). According to Dr. Richard Meserve, the [former] Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) responsible for the security of nuclear materials, despite the fact that cases of lost or stolen radioactive materials are constantly reported, for the most part, the amounts are too small or their form is not suitable for the purposes of a dirty bomb (12). In Europe, radioactive materials are stored at close to 30,000 sites; about 70 radioactive sources disappear each year. This is also evidenced by a statement made by the IAEA at the International Conference in Vienna in March 2003. The report on the “Security of Radioactive Sources” admitted that 100 nations have no effective system for monitoring radioactive sources due to lack of an appropriate infrastructure. It should be noted that the frequency with which radioactive sources are disappearing is constantly growing: 2005 — 102 sources, 2006 — 150 (13). At this time, the IAEA has a database (created in 1995) on the illicit trafficking of radioactive substances. However, only 91 nations submit information to this database. In addition, the IAEA only records data on illicit radionuclide trafficking that is freely provided by nations. But why would they want to incriminate themselves? It should come as no surprise that there are many discrepancies between the data reported by various organizations regarding the number of radioactive sources that have escaped the tracking system. For example, according to the EEC, 790 radioactive sources regularly escape monitoring in Europe (15). According to the IAEA, over 10,000 medical devices and radiotherapy equipment of types are produced around the world each year and up to 12,000 new industrial radiography sources (16). Once again, you have to wonder how all of this is in open circulation and is not rigorously controlled by some international entity. These facts clearly indicate both the need to adjust the standards now in use and the country’s need for a centralized system to track and monitor NM, RS, and RW. Let us consider how such a government system would operate, since historically, the storage of nuclear materials has always been accorded due attention, while the storage of radioactive substances and radioactive waste has become a matter of concern only in the last two decades. The government system for tracking and monitoring radioactive substances and radwaste depends on a network of agency-specific and regional data analysis centers. Regional centers are dedicated to obtaining integrated information on nuclear and radiation safety relative to the presence and transit of radioactive substances and RW in the region. Meanwhile, agency centers monitor radioactive substances and RW specifically at enterprises within a given industry (see Figure 1). This is a very relevant issue for defense industries.
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Agency data analysis centers for tracking and monitoring RS and RW are an important component of the government system, since they are linked to both RosAtom centers and a federal agency. It is worth noting that Russia’s current system of RS and RW tracking and monitoring benefits from a solid legal basis and operates in accordance with a set of special federal laws and other national legal instruments. From RosAtom’s point of view, practically all radioactive waste is located at enterprises and entities within the nuclear industry and just 2% is located within other industries (17). This is how practically all RW in Russia is located at enterprises overseen by just a handful of federal agencies: RosAtom, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transportation, and RosProm. The particular way RW is stored at shipbuilding enterprises is also worth mentioning: a large proportion of RW (solid radioactive waste, specifically) is stored inside reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear submarines that are kept in floating storage.
It is important to note the high level of radioactivity of the sources and waste products being kept at the enterprises.
Figure 1. A diagram of the government RS and RW tracking and monitoring system. According to the requirements of NRB-99 Standards, it is recognized that “... radiation exposure in the amount of 1 person-sieverts (SI) leads to potential damage equivalent to the loss of 1 human-year of life in the population (18). The monetary equivalent of the loss of 1 human-year of life in the population is estimated at ...no less than one per-capita income.” The data on per-capita income in Russia is disparate, but we can use the average figure for our purposes (19–23). The average annual per-capita income in Russia equals USD 5,000.
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The existing system of RS and RW tracking and monitoring would both help avoid the unauthorized use of radioactive substances and also help forecast radiation conditions at enterprises in the event of an accident. Let us consider the case of unauthorized use of an un-tracked closed source of ionizing radiation (24). Most of these types of sources are used at industrial engineering and shipbuilding enterprises that use the isotope 192Ir for gamma ray defect detection and have an activity level over 1,012 Bq, i.e., high-level sources of radiation. The equivalent dose rate from one of these sources at a distance of 1 meter equals N = 10-4 Sv/s (25). Consequently, in one month, the equivalent dose would be almost 240 Sv (due to the short half-life of 192Ir, it is not useful to consider longer exposure periods). Thus, the potential damage from unauthorized used of just one source in an area where people are constantly present would have the economic cost of USD 120,000. It is much harder to evaluate the economic cost of the unauthorized use of RW. Relevant literature primarily discusses large-scale accidents, such as the Chernobyl catastrophe, or hypothetical NPP accidents (26–29). However, it is possible to use the studies of these accidents to determine the monetary cost equivalent of unauthorized RW use. What exactly is the “cost” of an accident or the unauthorized use of RW? Naturally, it is determined by the amount of money (expenses) that would be required to restore affected or damaged portions of the infrastructure to their original state. Even if damages are compensated to all affected persons in the form of monetary payments, this does not means that the compensation has been paid in full to the society as a whole. The consequences of unauthorized use for society include the following factors: • Implementation of a set of organizational and technical measures to reduce radiation effects on personnel and the general population; • Consequences of radiation exposure on public health; • Psychological impact; • Effect on the operations of the enterprise in question; • Effect on macroeconomic indicators; • Impact on national income and employment rates; • Long-term social and political consequences; • Environmental consequences. It is clear that accounting for all of these factors is a complex task that must involve research organizations within various government entities. Nonetheless, it is possible to provide some worthwhile assessments of individual factors here. In line with international assessments, we picked 137Cs at 15 Ci/km2 (5.55 × 104 Bq/m2) as a deactivation threshold, which corresponds to the definition of a “stringent radiation monitoring” zone used for areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. According to the UN’s most recent studies of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, “... radiation monitoring and safety measures inside these regions were usually very successful at maintaining the annual effective rate below 0.5 rem/yr….” This value corresponds to the NRB-99 Standard, which sets the main dose thresholds. However, American experts have found that in order to maintain the indicated effective dose, the total cost per capita equals USD 50,000–100,000 (28). The main expense is the cost of waste decontamination and disposal.
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Let us consider the unauthorized use of 10 m3 of unaccounted-for liquid radwaste (LRW). As part of their production processes, enterprises that handle NM generate low- level and medium-level radwaste (average activity А = 108 Bq/m3, primary radionuclide – 137Cs). An area measuring 200–400 m2 can be contaminated, meaning a minimum level of contamination of 2.5 × 106 Bq/m2. The cost of waste disposal alone (surface soil layer 15 cm thick + site cost) would be USD 300/m3 for a total of USD 18,000. If we take the cost of decontamination and any potential compensation payments to the local population or to the personnel, the costs would at least double in size. All of the other factors listed above, including the health consequences of radiation exposure to the local population and personnel, are difficult to assess and they are not discussed in this paper. In order to ensure security control over RS and RW at each concerned enterprise, the relevant government agencies and local authorities, and consequently the local data analysis center, must collect and track the following information: • Information about the enterprise, including any licenses and permits required to use nuclear power; • Data on the number of sources of ionizing radiation, RW, storage points, including the protection/containment methods used, and RW processing facilities; • Data on radionuclide contaminated grounds and bodies of water within the perimeter of the monitored zone; It is worth noting that the government tracking and monitoring system includes 8–20 indicators for each facility or site being monitored, and many of the indicators include verbal descriptions (names of chemical elements, etc.). This approach makes it more difficult to complete the forms, the number of errors goes up, and the size of the database also increases. In order to provide RS and RW tracking information in real time, modern computer systems that can perform the following are needed: • Comply with state and agency standards; • Ensure the company’s data security; • Allow easy retrieval of information on request from federal agencies; • Be compatible with the nationwide tracking system; • Have a straightforward, user-friendly interface; • Be capable of eventually assuring electronic document processing on a national scale. A study of information flows in RS and RW tracking was done both at a national level and by RosProm data analysis centers (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. A diagram of information flows on a national scale.
Information from individual enterprises that use prescribed forms arrives at agency data analysis centers, where it is verified and then submitted, in its entirety, to the central RosAtom data analysis center. If questions arise regarding the submitted forms, a query is sent to the enterprise. If an error is identified, the enterprise must resubmit the corrected form as soon as possible. Each form must be approved by the enterprise management. The RS and RW tracking documentation process comprises the following: initial inventory, statistical reporting, and routine reporting. For each of these components, there is a separate information processing procedure. This system is based on an initial inventory compiled when the enterprise is added to the national tracking system. This initial inventory contains complete information on the presence of RS and RW at the enterprise and how they are stored. From these data, the nuclear and radiation conditions at the enterprise can be deduced and the consequences of potential radiation accidents can be forecasted. Once a year, enterprises submit the 2-TP radioactive substances form and 2-TP radioactivity form as part of statistical reporting, but the data is cumulative. Routine reporting is the most detailed source of information and is submitted to the relevant data analysis centers within 10 days of when an activity involving radioactive substances or radwaste is completed. Data analysis center programmers have developed the necessary software, but it does not meet the specific requirements of NM tracking, while the software development for tracking NM cannot be used for tracking radioactive substances. Unfortunately, ever since 1994 when efforts to develop software for automated tracking and monitoring systems began, and to this day, there has been no coordination for these projects. There have been numerous proposals to integrate Russia’s information systems into a single system by analyzing and selecting several of the most developed,
202 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY ready-made systems to build a unified information system, as our American colleagues started doing as early as 1998. These proposals have been met with little positive feedback. The integration of experts are various organizations in the development of such a unified information system would make this is less costly problem to solve (30). The lack of coordination among experts, together with the shortage of targeted funding, is not having a positive effect on how NM and RS are handled in Russia.
Conclusions 1. The current NM, RS, RW tracking and monitoring systems can help prevent the unauthorized use of these substances and can also forecast radiation conditions at enterprises in the event of accidents. 2. At this time, the approaches used to design the NM and RS tracking and monitoring systems and the set of standards they follow still differ considerably, raising the cost of these systems and preventing them from achieving optimal performance. The existing set of standards, including the revised IAEA recommendations, are seen as having been designed to ensure safe management of radioactive substances, but not to prevent their proliferation. 3. Further improvement and unification of the standards governing the systems for nuclear material and radioactive substance tracking and monitoring is needed in Russia, as part of the effort to develop a better understanding of the need for safer NM and RS management practices and greater NM and RS security. 4. Judging by the commonalities between the goals of preventing NM and RS proliferation, it appears necessary to unify the standards governing the two tracking and monitoring systems. The revised standards should be based on the concept developed by the international community for NM, including the principles of a checks and balances system and the structure of a materials balance zone, quantitative criteria of appeal and significance, physical inventory, tracking and reporting procedures, etc. Unifying the relevant standards would require developing unified international criteria to assess effectiveness and support the replacement of existing approaches used to build these system with a unified approach that is more in step with today’s realities. 5. In order for there to be a greater awareness of how NM and RS should be handled, and for the cost of tracking and monitoring systems to go down, our experts need to pool their efforts to develop and maintain automated software systems for tracking and monitoring and develop a new generation of software systems based on approved solutions. These software systems must be adaptable to the needs of any national entities using them, whether large or small, including those where there is only one radioactive source.
References 1. Federal Law No. 28-FZ on the Use of Nuclear Energy (10/20/95, as amended on 02/10/97 ). 2. Rules No. 746 Governing the National Nuclear Materials Tracking and Monitoring System (Russian Government Decree issued 07/10/98). 3. Resolution No. 962 on National Nuclear Materials Tracking and Monitoring (Russian Government Decree issued 12/15/2000 ). 4. Rules No. 1298 Governing the National Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste Tracking and Monitoring System (Russian Government Decree
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issued 10/11/97). 5. Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA Director General, as quoted in Argumenty i fakty, No. 15, April 2004. 6. www.enci.ru, Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, entry on Radioactive Waste. 7. NEWSru.com, Novosti mira, report by the Belgian Nuclear Control Agency, 01/13/01. 8. Petukhov, V. V., Issues in Tracking Depleted Uranium [Problemy uchyota obednyonnogo urana], Novosti FIS, No. 6, 2006, Moscow: TsNIIAtominform. 9. CIS Commission on the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes. Report on conducting an inventory and disposing of sources of ionizing radiation on the territories of CIS states, 06/23/05. 10. www.un.org, UN News Center, 09/11/07. 11. NEWSru.com, Novosti mira, 11/11/03. 12. nuclearno.ru, Russian non-proliferation website, 06/27/02 and 09/14/07. 13. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter, IAEA 14. news.nbc.com.ua, Novosti, 06/26/02. 15. www.iaea.org, IAEA, Nuclear Safety Review for 2004. 16. Proceedings of the First Russian National Seminar “State Radioactive Substance and Radioactive Waste Tracking and Monitoring System [Sistema gosudarstvennogo uchyota I kontrolya radioaktivnykh veshchestv I radioaktivnykh otkhodov], 07/05–08/04, Saint Petersburg. 17. Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99). Saint Petersburg: 2.6.1. 758–99. Russian Ministry of Health, 1999. 18. Sakovich, V. A. Risk Reduction for Nuclear Energy Use—Is it Necessary? [Nado li snizhat risk pri ispolzovanii atomnoi energii]. 19. Second International Seminar “Issues in Risk Reduction for Nuclear Energy Use [Problemy snizheniya riska pri ispolzovanii atomnoi energii], 09/07–06/04. Moscow, IBRAE. 20. Goskomstat of Russia, Social status and quality of life of the Russian populations [Sotsialnoe polozhenie i uroven zhizni naseleniia v Rossii]. Statistical publication. Moscow: 2000. 21. Avramova, E. M. et al. Middle Class in Russia: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessments [Srednii klass v Rossii: kolichestvennye i kachestvennye otsenki]. Economic analysis bureau. Moscow: TEIS, 2000. 22. Proceedings of a Russian-American joint seminar on “Inequality and Development in Russia” [Neravenstvo i razvitie v Rossii], 10/10/03. 23. Maleeva, T. The Middle Class in Russia: Economic and Social Strategies [Srednie klassy v Rossii: ekonomicheskie i sotsialnye strategii]. The Carnegie Moscow Center, 2004. 24. Rubtsov, P. M., Romanov, D. E., Musorin, A. I. Radioactive Source Categorization and the Provision of Adequate Security in the Context of the Drafting of Technical Security Regulations for Commercial Sites where Radioactive Sources are Present [Sootvetstvie mezhdu kategoriei radioaktivnogo istochnika i obespecheniem ego sokhrannosti pri razrabotke tekhnicheskikh reglamentov dlya regulirovaniia bezopasnosti na radiatsionnykh ob″ektakh narodnogo khozaistva]. Vestnik GAN, No. 1, 2004.
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25. Mashkovich, V. P. [Zashchita ot ioniziruyushchikh izluchenii]. Handbook. Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1982. 26. Margulis, U. Ya. Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety [Atomnaya energiya i radiatsionnaya bezopastnost]. Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1988. 27. J. Beyea, E. Lyman, F. von Hippel. Damages from a Major Release of 137Cs [into] the Atmosphere of [the] United States. Science and Global Security, v. 12, 125– 136, 2004. 28. D. Chanin, W. Murfin. Estimation of Attributable Costs from Plutonium- Dispersal Accidents. Sandia National Laboratories, SND96-0957, 1996. 29. Kovalevich, O. M. On Assessment of Risk [K voprosu ob opredelenii “stepeni riska”]. Vestnik GAN, No. 1, 2004. 30. Rumyantsev, A. N. Nuclear Energy, vol. 101, issue 3, 2007.
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Russian Federation Regulations Governing the Management of Radioactive Waste
Andrei Talevlin Chairman of the Board, For Nature Charity Fund, Chelyabinsk; and Senior Instructor, Civil, Land, and Environmental Law Dept., Law School, Chelyabinsk State University
Broad tracks of land and large bodies of water are still contaminated by dangerous long-lived radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants. These include wastes produced by both military and civilian nuclear installations. For the generation of people who were involved in contributing to this contamination, this is a very serious matter. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, protects the right of all citizens to a clean and healthy environment. How can we ensure and guarantee the health of future generations, clean land and water resources, and ecosystems for thousands of years to come? In order to obtain the desired results and ensure that our resources are well spent, we must take great care in the selection of the scientific tools used to evaluate the health of future generations. A scientific approach must take into consideration past experience, which shows that the memory of past contamination is erased in government institutions every few decades. Laws and regulations change over time. The risks associated with specific substances and combinations of substances and their effect on human health are reassessed regularly. Official assessments in the last few decades have increasingly concluded that the danger of radiation per exposure unit is in fact higher that was previously thought. Environmental protection standards have become more stringent and public support for environmental protection measures has grown. The highly complex issue of nuclear power and its use is only beginning to be considered in a comprehensive manner. Now there is an effort to find a complete solution, instead of one that addresses selected concerns. One of the top issues is the management of radioactive waste (RW). Here, the real issue is identifying appropriate legislative steps that can be taken to regulate this field. In describing Russian legislation on radwaste management, we can identify a number of idiosyncrasies. First, the pertinent standards are scattered across legislation in different areas: use of nuclear power, environmental protection, natural resources, civil, administrative, criminal, and other areas. Second, most of the standards that govern radwaste management are contained in subordinate regulatory acts. Third, a number of guidelines for radwaste management developed within different legislative branches contradict one another. Fourth, the legislative standards for radwaste management form a separate legal institution that plays an important role when it comes to legislation on the use of nuclear power. There is no comprehensive legislative act in Russia that governs radwaste management, which makes it impossible to systematize laws in this field. Legal terminology in the field of nuclear power has its shortcomings, which negatively contributes to effective regulatory efforts. There is no single definition of
206 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY the concept of “radwaste” across all Russian legislative acts. Before a more detailed definition for the concept can be determined, the concept of managing radwaste must be finalized, but it has not been fully developed in Russia. One example of shortcomings in nuclear power-related legal terminology is the use of the term “irradiated heat- generating nuclear reactor assemblies” rather than “spent nuclear fuel.” Based on the current scientific approach to managing the nuclear fuel cycle in Russia, for regulatory purposes, it has been suggested that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) be recognized as one type of radwaste. It is the author’s opinion that the designation “spent nuclear fuel” should be used for nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in a reactor core, removed from it, and is now subject to safe disposal. Russian federal law does not offer a mechanism that protects the safety of the population or the environment in the context of radwaste management. The law contains only general principles. Legal regulation of radwaste management displays two trends that are common in environmental law. Amendments are made that weaken environmental protection requirements applicable to those holding natural resource management rights. Government oversight is weakened when the government’s role of environmental control is combined with a role in resource management, curtailing the authority of environmental protection agencies and their access to financial and administrative resources. Amendments to radwaste management legislation are often dictated by political and economic goals to legalize specific, pre-existing legal relations concerning the import of foreign SNF, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances, and by customary practices in radwaste management at Russian nuclear fuel cycle enterprises. Due to the economic changes in Russia over the last two decades, we should assign greater importance to the use of a market mechanism to regulate environmental protection. If a polluting market player does not find it economically viable to continue making a negative impact on the environment, it will quickly cease any of its own practices that pollute the environment. Of course, not all economic methods used to control radioactive contamination agents can be used. For example, charging fines in compensation for negatively impacting the environment would not be an option. Consequently, we must institute a system for the compensation of environmental damages as a primary method that stimulates the natural resource managers to be economical and generally make efforts to protect the environment. In today’s world, a regulatory mechanism combining economic and legal components in environmental protection and the use of natural resources, together with a system that enforces responsibility under the law, will make it possible to enforce environmental protection measures. In today’s Russia, there is no systematic approach to dealing with radwaste management issues in legislative regulations; a system of legal standards governing radwaste management has yet to be created. Today’s legislation sets out general requirements to ensure that waste management does not pose a threat to the environment or human health, but it is not aligned with modern regulatory requirements for the management of waste that requires special safety measures. In order to establish a regulatory system for radwaste management, a special waste management regime and rules will be needed. There are rules in place and reinforced in Russian legislation for the management of foreign SNF, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances. These regulations permit leaving all waste resulting from the treatment of the abovementioned materials and substances on Russian territory and the
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long-term storage of foreign spent nuclear fuel. This does not protect Russia’s people or future generations of Russian citizens from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. A solution to this problem using the legal framework would involve the introduction of standards into federal legislation on nuclear power prohibiting the import of foreign SNF, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances for the purposes of storage and/or burial, and prohibiting other countries from leaving radwaste from the treatment of abovementioned materials and substances on Russian territory. The legal standards for radwaste management form a separate legal institution that plays an important role in nuclear power regulation. Certain rules for radwaste management that already exist in different legislative branches need to be reconciled. We must eliminate all regulatory contradictions with regard to radwaste burial. Along these lines, it is proposed that the Russian Subsoil Management Law, the Water Code, and a number of subordinate legislative acts be brought into compliance with the Russian Federal Environmental Protection Law, which prohibits the burial of radwaste.
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Dismantlement of Nuclear Service Ships in Northwest Russia: Environmental Problems and Solutions
Sergei Zhavoronkin Secretary, Murmansk Oblast Public Council on Nuclear Energy Safety and Expert, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia Murmansk Affiliate
Overview The USSR surpassed all other countries — including the United States — in terms of the number of nuclear ships and vessels it built. During 1955–2000, the USSR and Russia built 5 nuclear ships, 260 nuclear submarines, 9 nuclear-powered icebreakers, and one 1 nuclear-powered bulker. In terms of their construction and number, they have been categorized as either mass-produced or one-off constructions. Over 30 different types of ships and vessels were designed as part of the main projects. In order to maintain them, an auxiliary fleet of nuclear service ships (NSS) was built. This fleet is made up of specialized vessels that were built for the maintenance of nuclear-powered ships and vessels or reequipped for these purposes from mass-produced tankers, dry cargo bulkers, lumber carriers, and barges. Today Russia has more nuclear service ships than any other country in the world. The reason is the great number of bases in this large country with an insufficiently developed (or in places even completely absent) transportation infrastructure (roads and railways) in places that serve as bases for nuclear ship repair. In addition, coastal infrastructure for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is poorly developed. Before 1992, NSS that came to the end of their service life — most of these being Russian Naval vessels — were, as a rule, buried (sunken) in the sea in areas that were specially selected for that purpose. Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure for reprocessing solid radioactive waste (SRW), they were loaded with as much solid waste as possible. The burial was conducted in six areas of the Northern seas and four areas in Far Eastern seas. In total, nearly 60 different vessels were buried in Russia’s coastal waters. This was the only way to dispose of NSS — if you can call that “disposal.” At present, a general concept and program for the dismantlement of nuclear submarines has been developed and involves financial assistance from Western investors. The program is already underway. However, no concept has been developed yet for the dismantlement of NSS. There are individual examples of dismantlement (conversion) performed because the ship in question posed a hazard, needed to be decommissioned, or additional quantities of radioactive waste needed to be placed on it. For some NSS, preparatory efforts have been made (unloading SNF and radioactive waste and preparing the ship for decommissioning) based on these reasons.
1. Description of the Problem Most NSS were built or converted in the 1960s and 1970s during a period of mass
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construction for the military and civil nuclear fleets. The technical conditions of most of these ships, primarily those in the Navy, are unsatisfactory, and many are considered unsafe.
Types of NSS 1. Floating technical bases (FTB) are used to recharge (unload and load) nuclear fuel, and temporarily store SNF. This type of ship carries and stores liquid radioactive waste (LRW) and SRW during the recharging process. Extensive work has been done with specialized loading and unloading equipment to ensure that nuclear ships and vessels are equipped with everything they need (special-purpose water, filter sorbents, etc.). 2. Special tankers designed to transport liquid cargo. These are facilities for collecting, storing and transporting LRW. 3. Storage ships and barges are designed to store SRW. 4. Ship radiation monitoring systems (SRMS) are used to arrange boarding on nuclear ships and vessels during recharging, personnel decontamination, and radiation monitoring (including individual radiation dosage monitoring). In the Northern region, various estimates say that the number of NSS ranges from 40 to 70. Currently 39 ships are based here, and 26 have been decommissioned, declared unsafe, and are scheduled for dismantlement. Unsatisfactory technical conditions (i.e. unsafe conditions) are determined primarily by operating conditions. By using the same kind of ships all made in the same year by the Russian Navy at Murmansk Sea Shipping, it is possible to determine standard technical conditions, even for veteran ships such as the Volodarsky (1929) and the Lepse (1934) (these ships were converted into NSS in 1961). The second condition determining the technical condition of NSS is the continued, long-term period during which it was common practice to dump LRW and bury SRW in the Northern and Far Eastern seas. The absence of any coastal infrastructure for reprocessing radioactive waste stimulated the practice of rapid collection of these wastes for subsequent dumping and burial in sea waters. Meanwhile, principles that are critical to ensuring safe operating conditions and waste storage, as well as waste sorting and safe containment, were not observed. As a result, it became common practice on NSS — especially those under the Russian Navy — to mix different types of LRW with various physical and chemical properties in the same tank. In some cases, due to poor technical operations, when sea water and decontaminated water enter SNF containers, the result is an increased amount of high-level LRW and the corrosion of storage casks, including those containing SNF.
2. Conditions Determining the Environmental Risks of Dismantlement The key conditions that determine the environmental risks of dismantling NSS are: • The existence and state of SNF onboard the ship; • The quantity and state of SRW and LRW; • The technical condition of the ship; • The radiation conditions; • The availability of modern technical means of delivering other infrastructure elements to the dismantlement sites: tugboats and docks;
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• The SNF and radwaste management structure; • The structures allowing environmental monitoring, including radiation monitoring; • Monitoring and control over the work as it is performed.
The Existence and State of SNF Onboard the Ship The existence of SNF on a ship determines radiation conditions, and SNF removal should be the first step in the dismantlement process. On the Lepse service ship, for example, the activity levels of the SNF held in storage containers currently measures approximately 2.5×1016 Bq (680,000 Ci), which is comparable to the activity levels of emissions from the 1957 Mayak accident. Calculations show that the fuel contains a total of 260 kilograms of uranium (235U), 156 fission products and 8 kilograms of fissile radionuclide plutonium (239PU). The force of the gamma rays in the storage container and in adjacent premises exceeds the natural radiation environment by hundreds of thousands of times. A considerable amount of SNF on NSS due for dismantlement has begun to corrode, change in shape, and the fuel composition has begun to disintegrate, which rules out any possibility of extracting spent fuel assemblies out of storage using the existing technological procedures. Unloading defective fuel is an operation that is implicated in the radionuclide pollution of the nuclear service ship itself, loading and unloading equipment (technical base ships and coastal structures), the territory and premises of facilities, health and protective zones and, in adverse conditions, villages and towns. Removing SNF is a complex technological, hazardous operation that requires the preparation of individual rules for each different ship. Special equipment needs to be used and decisions need to be made with regard to transport plans in the management process, including for the temporary storage of defective fuel and its subsequent transport. In order to complete this type of work on the premises of a company that deals in disposal and dismantlement, the necessary infrastructure needs to be put in place.
3. Solving Spent Nuclear Fuel Problems When it comes to dealing with management of spent nuclear fuel, especially defective fuel, during the nuclear service ship dismantlement process, it is important to prepare and review at least two options: one that includes unloading the fuel, and one that does not. One current example is the dismantlement of the Lepse, a technical base-type nuclear service ship that has been prepared both technically and financially for dismantlement. This is an international dismantlement project. As the project was prepared and subsequently underwent all requisite procedures, both of the aforementioned SNF management options were considered and analyzed.
The SNF is not unloaded from its storage container This option involves the creation of additional barriers to facilitate the safe, long-term storage of the fuel in the container. Such barriers would take into account calculations of the heat that would be generated. In this situation, the entire frame of the ship is sliced into segments and the SNF storage block and other large components
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are taken out and are moved to a coastal storage facility for nuclear submarine reactor compartments at Sayda Bay. The construction of this facility is currently in progress thanks to contributions from Western investors (Germany). The second phase of the process involves building a storage facility for bulky components from auxiliary ships (NSS). Once the technical aspects are determined, the SNF may be unloaded directly from the storage block, including at coastal locations (the back-up option).
The SNF is unloaded from its storage container This option involves removal of the fuel from the storage container and the dismantlement and disposal of the ship in line with a part of the approved project. A different problem altogether in this option is the research and grounds for safe storage of so-called leaked SNF, which specialists say is already an issue and will continue to form during the removal, especially the removal of defective fuel. At the feasibility study stage, a decision needs to be made about which dismantlement option to choose. It is ideal to first consider all of the aspects of all project options during project development. It is important to bear in mind that spent nuclear fuel management and ship dismantlement are related processes.
The Work Site From an environmental point of view, the site where dismantlement of a nuclear service ship and the removal of SNF are performed is of the utmost importance. It is also important to assess previous experience in removing SNF from Russian Naval ships in the Far East (unloading Russian Naval technical base ships: PM-80 and PM-32) and pilot SNF removal efforts on the Lepse. There should not be any secrets, nor should any information be withheld from the specialists or officials who play a role in the decision-making process. If radiation pollution does take place on a company’s premises and spreads beyond the health protection zone, these occurrences must be analyzed thoroughly and used as a foundation for risk assessment in project development. Several experts believe that the best place to conduct SNF removal from the Lepse would be a company located far from large cities, rather than AtomFlot, which is right on the edge of Murmansk, a city with a population of 400,000.
The Quantity and State of SRW and LRW The presence, quantity and state of solid and liquid radwaste constitute the second determining environmental factor for the dismantlement of NSS. The radiation conditions on NSS that do not have SNF storage facilities are determined by the contents of the storage tanks and montejus. Over a long period of time it was common practice on NSS, particularly those operating under the Russian Naval system, to mix different kinds of LRW. As a result, radioactive sludge would form on the bottom of the tank accompanied by the accumulation of radionuclides, increasing the radiation level at adjacent premises as well. The collection of both alkaline and acidic waters in one tank also leads to a tank’s corrosion. Oil products from fuel tanks also turned up in LRW storage tanks. The removal of LRW from NSS in poor technical condition and considered unsafe increases environmental risks, particularly in relation to additional radiation exposure for staff and pollution of the environment. Another environmentally important task is the
212 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY disposal of LRW storage tanks with high-level radioactive sludge. The removal of this radioactive sludge from the tank has been linked to radiation exposure among facility staff, but allowing this substance to accumulate and failing to unload it will lead to increased formation of SRW. The removal of LRW and efforts to decontaminate tanks and montejus and remove the accumulated radioactive sludge from the tanks are all operations that constitute radiation hazards and require the development of an individual management plan for each nuclear service ship. In some cases, low-level LRW, tanks holding LRW, and containers storing SRW sometimes contribute to the biological protection of crew members against SNF and other equipment onboard ship with higher radiation levels. This fact must be taken into account when decisions are made about which tasks take priority. When tackling radioactive waste issues, it is crucial to consider the technical conditions and the properties of the casing used to contain the SRWs that will be unloaded, arrange for an appropriate site for their safe, temporary storage, and prepare them for long-term storage.
A Ship’s Technical Conditions Some NSS were built under special projects (series), while others were reequipped and converted into NSS from mass-produced tankers, bulkers, icebreakers, and barges. Most became operational in the 1960s–1970s. Every third ship is now unsafe. A total of 80% have already expired service lives and are due for dismantlement. These conditions make it impossible to use the equipment that is currently available to transfer radwaste, especially liquid wastes, using the standard system and mechanisms (pipes, pumps, etc.). This means that temporary systems and mobile facilities have to be used, which in turn means increased anthropogenic and environmental risks. The wide variety of ships does not make it possible to fully unify all of the equipment or create a standard coastal system. Lifting fully and partially immersed ships has been connected to risks of spreading radiation as containers and pipes lose their water-proof properties. Lifting ships is also connected to the radionuclide pollution of the equipment that is used (pontoons and tug boats) and the spread of pollution beyond nuclear service ship facilities. The technical conditions of ships that are used to store SNF (technical bases) pose environmental risks when the SNF is unloaded. This includes decommissioned equipment (both primary and auxiliary equipment) and decontamination systems, ventilation systems, etc. Another problem concerns the conditions of the protective casing of structures on the nuclear service ship (the deck, bulkhead, and deckhead), and equipment (tanks, piping, containers, etc.). These circumstances significantly increase the risk of spreading radioactive pollutants and increasing the amount of secondary radwaste. Considering that, as a rule, radionuclides are found in places where protective casings are damaged, the risks of radiation exposure increase (both external and internal) at all stages of the nuclear service ship dismantlement process.
Radiation Conditions The existence of SNF and radwaste and a ship’s history will determine its radiation conditions. The levels of gamma rays and radionuclide pollution of ship premises and
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equipment are not uniform onboard. The ship has designated “clean” and “dirty” zones. The “clean zone” includes premises and equipment that are required on any kind of ship: crucial units like the engine, electrical equipment, fuel tanks, life support supplies for the crew (drinking water and water for cleaning, sewage water collection tanks). The “dirty zone” is used to house SNF and radwaste storage containers and auxiliary systems, such as: decontamination, collection of radwaste that is a by-product of the ship’s operation, the “dirty” zone ventilation system, etc. The gamma ray dosage in the storage compartment onboard the Lepse and adjacent quarters on the ship exceeds the natural radiation environment by hundreds of thousands of times and has reached 3–80 μR/hr. High levels are also found beyond the boundaries of the ship: 110–2000 μR/hr (reaching the sides of the ship) and the berth area at AtomFlot measures 110–1500 μR/hr (radiation streaming). The radioactive pollution of the premises, which formed over the course of many years on NSS, is often found under a thick layer of paint (indelible pollution) in areas that are difficult to reach for decontamination purposes. That is why during dismantlement, the quantity of SRW in the form of contaminated scrap metal increases considerably. Also, as ships are dismantled using torch cutting, the risk increases that radionuclides with increased radiation exposure will enter the bodies of staff workers or pollute the environment. Recommendations for radiation environment normalization or the containment of radioactive pollution should be carried out at the initial stages of development of the ship dismantlement program based on technical and financial calculations after an in-depth investigation of radiation conditions using standardized methods (including the use of proper tools and laboratory facilities), and in line with set procedures, and submission of standardized report data. This is crucial, first and foremost for the detailed preparation of recommendations and in order to reduce the level of radiation exposure to staff members and to minimize the environmental pollution risk.
Modern Methods for Delivering NSS to Dismantlement Sites and Related Infrastructure for Dismantlement The availability of modern technology for delivering NSS to their dismantlement sites is an important factor in the dismantlement process and contributes to lowering environmental risks.
Tugboats and Docks As noted above, the condition of the overwhelming majority of NSS is unsatisfactory, and many of them are fully or partially immersed, making the delivery of these ships to their respective dismantlement sites a very important issue. The disappointing experience thus far in transporting the K-159 submarine to its dismantlement site is a clear confirmation of that fact. Bellona believes that a floating transport dock designed for these purposes is required in order to ensure safe transport in the North and the Far East (Figure. 1). The technical conditions of NSS and the potential radionuclide pollution of the environment dictate that dismantlement be carried out on floating docks that are equipped with the requisite infrastructure: a decontamination room, a radiation monitoring station, a physical protection system, conditions for the temporary storage of polluted scrap metal, and equipment that is safe for crew members and the environment.
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The decision to supply this infrastructure, in our opinion, should be made only after stronger radiation and technical monitoring is put into place for NSS in the regions and in agreement with the relevant regulatory bodies.
Figure 1. Floating transport dock.
The Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radwaste Management Structure Modern technologies for SNF and radwaste management at dismantlement facilities constitute one of the key conditions in keeping the nuclear service ship dismantlement process safe; they help lower environmental risks both during the dismantlement process itself and for the long term. It is our opinion that all SNF and radwaste storage and containment for storage needs to be standardized for different agencies. The casings used to store high- and medium-level SRW should take into account long-term storage periods in regional storage facilities. Their design should be based on environmental and financial criteria. Environmental Requirements include the total containment of SRW in isolation from the outside environment over an extended period (at least 100 years). Financial Requirements include maximum capacity for the best possible price as well as weight, total dimensions and simplicity. Casks used to store SRW should be prepared in the region in which NSS are to be dismantled in order to lower costs. It is this absence of modern, quality infrastructure for SNF and radwaste management seen in the Russian Navy in the 1970s–1980s that created the environmental problems that Russia is currently working to resolve with financial aid from foreign investors. The company that is assigned to dismantle NSS must have standards that are aligned with current regulatory documents and the proper licenses from RosTekhNadzor.
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Environmental Monitoring, Including Radiation Monitoring Companies that are commissioned to dismantle NSS should operate under an environmental management system that facilitates monitoring industrial factors on the premises, health protection zones, and other monitored zones, including radiation monitoring. Laboratories participating in the administration of such a system should be accredited and prepared to work under normal and emergency conditions. They should be well equipped with modern tools and staffed with qualified experts. It is the lack of tools and qualified staff that has led to radiation accidents that resulted in the baseless radiation exposure suffered by staff members working to rehabilitate the Russian Navy base in Gremikha.
Dismantlement Monitoring and Control From the very beginning, work on a wide range of tasks for the comprehensive dismantlement of the nuclear fleet involved many agencies and organizations. These include RosAtom, the Russian Navy, RosProm’s Shipbuilding Industry Department, the Russian Ministry of Transport, RosTekhNadzor, the National Department for Monitoring Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the Russian Ministry of Defense, and others. The interests of these agencies, unfortunately, do not always coincide, and in some cases there are obvious clashes. We support the conclusions of the authors of the Strategic Master Plan, which state that RosAtom’s position should serve as a point of reference in terms of a comprehensive approach, both for the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and other environmentally hazardous facilities: nuclear ships and vessels, NSS, and coastal technical bases. Furthermore, we believe that transferring the supervisory functions for nuclear service ship dismantlement to RosTekhNadzor would be both logical and advisable. Practical experience in supervision could be gained in implementing the Lepse dismantlement project in the near future. Rostekhnadzor has already gained sufficient experience in continuous supervision with this particular vessel.
4. Nuclear Service Ship Dismantlement Experience Before 1992, NSS with expired service lives — the most common type operating under the Russian Navy — were, as a rule, buried (sunken) in the sea in areas that were specially selected for that purpose. Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure for reprocessing SRW, they were loaded with as much solid waste as possible. The burial was conducted in six areas of the Northern seas and four areas in Far Eastern seas. In total, nearly 60 different vessels were buried in Russia’s coastal waters. These vessels hold over 20,000 cubic meters of SRW with total activity levels at over 5,000 Ci, which amounts to over 40% of the total quantity of all of the SRW buried in Russian seas. Other examples of partial disposal or conversion of NSS have also taken place under the Russian Navy. This was primarily dictated by the unsafe state of vessels or the need to prepare them for long-term inactive stationing (such as the Amur and TNT-5 tankers). The civil nuclear fleet has achieved what is perhaps the only example of comprehensive dismantlement of a nuclear service ship at AtomFlot: the dismantlement of the ship radiation monitoring system (PKDP-5) that previously belonged to Murmansk Sea Shipping, from project development right through breaking the ship down into scrap
216 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY metal (Figure 2). The dismantlement of the ship was carried out in line with current regulatory documents and began after the project details were approved by all regulatory bodies. Supervision of the project was carried out by Russia’s Maritime Register, GosAtomNazdor, GosSanNadzor, and other organizations. It bears mentioning that a thorough radiation inspection of the ship preceded the development of the project, and the most contaminated structures of the ship were removed before dock-based work began.
Conclusion Russia’s Northwest currently has approximately 40 NSS of varying types. A total of 26 of these ships have been decommissioned. Nearly all of them have already reached the end of their service lives and are due for dismantlement. Every third ship is in unsafe conditions. However, a concept has not yet been developed for the dismantlement of NSS. Furthermore, environmental risks are on the rise in places where NSS operate or are taken out of service. These risks are primarily related to potential pollution of the land and water where they are stationed.
Figure 2. A view of the dock after the dismantlement of an NSS.
The dismantlement of several types of NSS — and primarily technical base ships used to store SNF — is connected to substantial environmental risks, more so than the dismantlement of nuclear submarines.
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The following factors are crucial to developing a concept for the dismantlement of NSS and other projects: 1. Determine criteria for decision-making with regard to priorities and project stages (decommissioning, conversion, inactive stationing, and dismantlement). Priorities ought to include SNF and radwaste management and the conditions of ships. First and foremost, unsafe vessels must be dismantled (those that are fully or partially immersed). 2. Identify a specialized company in the area to conduct dismantlement and create an industrial dismantlement base on-site. The company must have the necessary infrastructure and an effective environmental management system. 3. Transportation to dismantlement sites should also be a priority. Unsafe ships should be transported using floating docks, where most of their dismantlement should be performed. 4. During the development of projects for the dismantlement of NSS with SNF, two options should be considered for SNF management: unloading the SNF, and not unloading the SNF. The key criteria for making decisions should include environmental risks, such as baseless exposure to radiation and environmental pollution. 5. Dismantlement projects should envisage total, step-by-step dismantlement of the ship. 6. Standardized casing for the transport and long-term storage of primarily high- and medium-level SRWs needs to be designed. 7. Companies that deal in dismantlement should be equipped with the proper equipment and facilities for SRW compression to reduce their volume as much as possible. 8. Burial grounds for radioactive waste need to be established in dismantlement areas; 9. It would be wise to transfer supervisory functions for naval nuclear service ship dismantlement to the local office of RosTekhNadzor.
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Submersion of Materials that Constitute Nuclear and Radioactive Hazards: Past, Present and Future
Yuri Sivintsev Senior Scientific Collaborator and Professor, Kurchatov Institute
Submerging radioactive wastes (RW, or radwaste) accumulated by the nuclear superpowers over the decades became a widespread practice in an attempt to dispose of nuclear and radioactive hazards. The considerable depths at which these items are submerged and the relatively low level of movement of the waters (compared to air) has provided additional protection of the public against the potential radiation impact of disposed RW. Preliminary studies helped select the areas that were best for dumping liquid and solid radioactive waste (LRW and SRW), determine allowable activity levels and the frequency of dumping and discharge, methods for keeping inventory of disposed radwaste, allowable concentrations of fission products and actinides, and monitor the content of radionuclides in sea water and bottom sediments.
The Past: 1946–1993 The United States was the first to use the sea to dispose of RW at locations close to the Pacific Coast in 1946, and then moving on to the Atlantic Coast in the 1950s. The confidence in the safety of these operations was so solid that no data was recorded about activity levels or the radionuclide content of the RW. A few decades later, when the United States needed to include this data in a national register, it could not be found. A very similar situation developed in Russia during the earliest operations to dump LRW and submerge SRW. Soon, other countries also resorted to submerging RW in the seas. These included Great Britain (in the Northern Atlantic starting in 1949), New Zealand and Japan (close to their respective shores in the Pacific Ocean starting in 1954–1955) and Belgium (in the English Channel starting in 1960, near the coast of France) and many other countries. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took the first steps toward developing a new methodology for the safe disposal of radwaste in the sea. In 1975, the London Dumping Convention of 1972 came into force, which permitted and regulated the submergence (dumping) of wastes, including radioactive wastes. In 1983, the member countries of the London Dumping Convention, primarily due to pressure from the green movement, decided to voluntarily suspend dumping radwaste in the sea. At the same time, this document was renamed the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. This convention was supplemented with recommendations issued by the IAEA meant to ensure radiation safety in areas where RW had been disposed of in the sea (3). During 1946–1982, a total of 14 countries dumped radioactive wastes in 47 areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. According to general data from the first inventory conducted by IAEA experts in 1991, 1.24 MCi (46 PBq) of radwaste had
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been dumped into the world’s ocean over the course of 36 years. The overwhelming majority is concentrated in the northwest Atlantic. This area comprises 15 sections in which a total of 1.22 MCi (45.31 PBq) was buried, primarily SRW from Great Britain (77.5%). The United States is responsible for most of the radwaste dumped in the Pacific Ocean (97.1%). In the Far East, save for the RW dumped by New Zealand and Japan as mentioned above, radioactive waste was also dumped by South Korea, close to its own coasts, and the Sea of Japan (Figure 1). The papers from the first inventory conducted by IAEA experts did not contain data about dumping along the coasts of the USSR. Russia, during 1959–1993, conducted operations to dump LRW and submerge SRW in the Arctic (the Barents and Kara Seas) and in the Far East (in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, as well as the northwestern Pacific Ocean). This involved RW
Figure 1. The results of the first inventory of radioactive waste dumping (not incl. the USSR. IAEA, 1991).
produced by nuclear submarines and icebreakers. This RW was disposed at specially designated areas of the sea that do not see heavy shipping traffic or fishing operations (see Figures 2 and 3).
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Figure 2: A map of the areas where SRW has been dumped in the Arctic: 1 – The Novaya Zemlya trench; 2 – Sedova Bay; 3 – Oga Bay; 4 – Tsivolki Bay; 5 – Stepovy Bay; 6 – Abrosimova Bay; 7 – Blagopoluchiya Bay; 8 – Techenii Bay. Roman numerals I, II, III, IV, V designate areas where LRW was dumped. Nuclear and radioactive hazards that were submerged by the USSR and still lie on the bottom of the sea are: • 1 nuclear submarine; • 5 reactor compartments; • 1 nuclear reactor from nuclear submarine No. 421; • 1 container with a screen assembly from a nuclear ice-breaker; • 19 ships with SRW onboard; • 735 radioactive structures and reactors; • Over 17,000 containers with radioactive waste.
Figure 3. A map of the sites where RW was submerged in the Far East (LRW was dumped at site numbers 1–5 and 7, SRW was dumped at site number 8, and both LRW and SRW were dumped at site numbers 6, 9, and 10).
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The launch of these operations was preceded by scientific research on allowable activity levels, the ideal frequency of the dumping activities and selection of the best sites for dumping in the Arctic and Far East seas. Results were used from hydrophysics studies, in particular regarding the speed at which radioactive substances diffuse in sea water and the accumulation of radionuclides in the sediments of the seabed and the sea’s flora and fauna. At this stage, the maximum allowable concentration (MAC) was determined — both theoretically and experimentally, including test dumping— for long-lived radionuclides in sea water and in seabed sediments. In Russia, the limits on radionuclide dumping in the sea were based on the requirement that the radius of the polluted zone of water with a radioactive substance concentration higher than the MAC could not exceed one kilometer. The MAC was set at 0.37 Bq/L, while the activity concentration of naturally radioactive 40K amounts to roughly 10 Bq/L of sea water. Calculations have shown that in order to meet the baseline conditions, the emissions levels of 90Sr at the outset should not exceed 35 mCi/hr (1,300 MBq/hr) or 300 Ci/yr (11 TBq/yr). Under these conditions, the contaminated water zone with MAC amounts over 1 would measure roughly 3 km2, sea water within 1 kilometer from the dumping point will contain radioactive contamination at concentrations that do not exceed 1 MAC, while water at a distance of 5 kilometers will measure 0.1 MAC, water at 20 kilometers will measure 0.01 MAC, and water at 50 kilometers will measure 0.001 MAC, or almost the natural radiation background. Limits have set the allowable dumping volume at 90Sr within 100 Ci/year (3.7 TBq/yr) or the equivalent quantity of other radionuclides. The health requirements of 1960 set out extremely strict and baseless limits for total activity levels at radwaste dumping sites at 10 Ci/yr. Considering the calculations and field studies that were conducted, these permissible levels were raised in 1966to1 kCi/yr, and again in 1982 to 5 kCi/yr. Remarkably, much later, IAEA experts who had been commissioned by signatories to the London Convention estimated the amount of allowable radwaste dumped into the sea at an average of 1000 Ci (37 TBq) per year. That coincides with the figure that Russian Navy experts adopted at the earliest stages of radwaste disposal preparations, which demonstrates the similarity of the approaches used by different countries. During 1959–1993, the USSR/Russia disposed of radwaste in 18 specially designated areas of the Arctic and the Far East seas amounting to approximately 400,000 m3 of radwaste with total activity levels of 1.08 MCi (40 PBq) per year. Due to radioactive decay, the activity level fell to 164 kCi (6.07 PBq) by 2000. The radwaste dumped into the Arctic included spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which is distinguished by very high activity levels. As a result, the sites in the Arctic represent 97% of the radioactivity of all dumped LRW and SRW. In 1993, Russia saw the publication of an official report on the disposal of radwaste in the seas bordering Russian territory, also known as the Yablokov Report or the White Book (1). This information, in addition to new data about SRW and LRW dumping operations, determined the IAEA to conduct another inventory of the sources of radionuclide pollution in the world ocean. These efforts were completed in 1999. We emphasize that, for the first and second international IAEA inventories, and the 1993 White Book, the total activity levels of dumped wastes were derived from their initial figures, usually without accounting for radionuclide decay before subsequent operations. If this factor is taken into consideration, then we get a different picture of the distribution of dumped radwaste among the sites in the world ocean (see Figure 4).
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Actually, the lowest activity levels are demonstrated by the radioactive waste that was dumped in the Arctic: the radiation burden in the Arctic Sea is four times less than that of the Northern Atlantic, while the highest activity levels are demonstrated by SRW that was dumped or lost in accidents in the Far East region (see Figure 5).
Figure 4. Changes in the activity levels of radwaste dumped in the Arctic, incl. short-lived (curve 1) and long-lived radionuclides alone (curve 2).
Figure 5. Total activity levels of SRW dumped and lost in accidents in the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Far East. 223 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
The different curves in Figure 4 are due to the fact that experts assessing the activity levels of submerged facilities reviewed different groups of radionuclides. For the International Science and Technology Center project 101, it was decided that only long- lived radioecologically significant fission products, actinides and active radionuclides would be included, while the IAEA’s International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP) also took into account short-lived radionuclides with a half-life of 1–3 years. Years of experience have justified these decisions and confirmed the practical radiation safety of the radwaste submerged in the sea. It suffices to say that over the entire period during which operations were conducted to dump LRW and SRW, and for over 20 years after these operations were conducted, no radiation incidents have been recorded, nor have any accidents been observed, and there has not been any cases in which fish were caught with radionuclide concentrations exceeding international standards or domestic (Russian) standards for radiation safety. There has not been any increased radiation impact on the public that consumes seafood near the area, or from those who reside near the areas where the radwaste was dumped. Exposure levels for these “critical” groups of people barely differed from the natural radiation background and global fallout. Based on the results of the international CRESP and IASAP projects, which were carried out by the EU and the IAEA, respectively, the potential radiation hazard presented by the submerged RW is negligible. What deserves special mention is the fact that facilities with SNF were waterproofed prior to being submerged: this is an important stage that involved filling available reactor spaces with a hardening radiation-resistant preservative which will prevent contact between nuclear fuel and sea water for at least 100 years. As a result of these measures, the radionuclides from SNF are not entering the environment. The concentration of long-lived, anthropogenic 137Cs in the Kara Sea is comparable with the levels that are characteristic of the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan; it is several times lower than the level in the Black Sea and dozens of times lower than the levels in the Baltic Sea and the Sea of Ireland (see Table 1 and Figure 6).
Table 1. A Comparison of 137Cs Levels in Surface Waters in the 1990s
Sea 137Cs Bq/m3 pCi/L Kara Sea, 1992–1994 3–9 0.08–0.24 Black Sea, 1991 22–37 0.59–1.0 Baltic Sea (central),1991 120 3.2 Sea of Ireland (western), 1990–1997 40–92 1.1–2.5 Mediterranean, 1990–1993 4–6 0.11–0.16 Sea of Japan, 1994 2.8–3.6 0.08–1.0 Pacific Ocean, coast of Guatemala 1995–1997 2.2–2.7 0.059–0.073 [Per-98]
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Despite these figures, in 1993, the member countries of the London Convention prohibited the dumping of any type of radwaste into the sea. An exception was made for dumping LRW from Western European plants that reprocessed SNF in Great Britain (Sellafield, in the Sea of Ireland) and France (Cape la Hague, in the English Channel). Furthermore, it was taken into account that intensive work is underway to lower the activity levels of disposed LRW, while current operations at these plants will not lead to extreme radiation hazards for the people of nearby countries or for the ocean’s flora and fauna.
Figure 6. The yearly average concentration of 90Sr in surface waters of the Barents Sea at the meridian of the Kola Bay. In 1993, radwaste dumping operations were ceased, and LRW dumping operations were cut back significantly, and continued only in Great Britain and France. The OSPAR-93 international convention envisages that by 2018, dumping radwaste and chemical substances into Europe’s seas will cease altogether.
Key events in radwaste dumping • 1946: The first radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the Pacific Ocean (United States). • 1949: The first radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the Northern Atlantic (Great Britain). • 1959: The first facility without SNF was submerged (United States, the reactor shell from the Seawolf nuclear submarine, the Atlantic Ocean). • 1965: The first dumping operations of facilities that did contain SNF were conducted in the Arctic (the USSR, reactor compartments from nuclear submarine No. 901, Novaya Zemlya). • 1975: The London Dumping Convention came into force (aka. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter). • 1981: The last operations involving the dumping of facilities with SNF were conducted in the Arctic (by USSR). • 1982: The last radwaste dumping operations were conducted in the Northern Atlantic (by OECD countries). • 1993: The last LRW dumping operations were conducted in the Sea of Japan (by USSR). • 1993: The signatories to the London Dumping Convention of 1972/1975 prohibited all radioactive waste disposal at sea.
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The Present Radiation conditions in the areas where LRW and SRW were dumped (including submerged nuclear submarine reactors with SNF) are no different from the anthropogenically altered radiation background caused by natural radionuclides (40K in sea water) and global fallout. Global fallout is caused by atmospheric nuclear testing. Even the first test of the nuclear bomb, which was conducted by the United States in the summer of 1945 in the Alamogordo Desert, caused a global radiation impact: clouds of fission products and active radionuclides reached the stratosphere and encircled the Northern hemisphere twice over before dispersing into the air. This was followed by the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and the first test of the Soviet nuclear bomb in August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test field. In total, in the 1950s and 1960s, over 500 nuclear tests were conducted in the atmosphere, outer space, and over and under water (see Table 2). This was accompanied by emissions of a great deal of artificial radioactive substances (fission and activation products) into the stratosphere, as well as a significant amount of long-lived alpha-active substances: uranium and plutonium that did not react during the nuclear explosions. According to data from the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (SCEAR), which publishes regular reports, approximately 27,000 MCi (27 GCi), or 1 million PBq (1,000 EBq) entered the atmosphere (primarily short-lived fission products). In addition, approximately 1% of the air was affected by long-lived beta emitters such as 3H, 14C, 90Sr, and beta-gamma emitters, in particular 137Cs, in addition to the alpha-active uranium and plutonium that did not undergo reactions (4). These particles were carried into the atmosphere across the entire Northern hemisphere by the constant stratospheric winds, and eventually made their way to the Southern hemisphere. Radionuclides that fell with the rain joined creeks and rivers, and those that did not settle in the bottom sediments ended up in the ocean. The planet experienced the appearance of artificial long-lived radionuclides in the biosphere and the ubiquitous growth of background radiation levels. The content of anthropogenic radionuclides in the environment turned out to be irregular both in terms of time and space. Immediately after the atmospheric tests, the concentrations of artificial radionuclides increased in the stratosphere, and then in the troposphere and finally to the atmospheric layer closest to the Earth. The intensity of radioactive fallout rose sharply. As a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests that were conducted, the concentration of long-lived fission products increased around the world, in particular 90Sr and 137Cs. According to SCEAR data, during the period of the most intensive atmospheric nuclear tests in the 1960s, the annual radiation dosage reached 140 mSv, or 14 millirem, due to global fallout. This is a minor amount compared to the dosage caused by the radiation background, which in our day measures 2400 mSv or 240 millirem (see Figure 7).
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Table 2. Nuclear Tests Conducted in the USSR and the United States in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Over and Under Water Nuclear testing method Number of tests Number of tests (USA) (USSR) Atmospheric 177 83 Ground 32 84 High-altitude and space 5 9 Over and under water 5 41 Total tests 219 217 Total energy release (Mt) 247 142
Notes: 1. England, France and China conducted 21, 45, and 23 atmospheric tests, respectively (total 89). 2. This table does not include data on the most numerous underground nuclear tests (496 with 750 explosive charges in the USSR and 839 with 934 explosive charges in the United States), as they have had practically no impact on pollution of the biosphere. These tests also demonstrated significantly lower energy releases, with approximately 38 Mt in both the USSR and the United States. England, France and China conducted 24, 147, and 18 underground tests, respectively (total 189).
Figure 7. Average individual annual radiation dosages per person due to atmospheric nuclear tests; the peak in 1986 was caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe (1). After the Moscow agreement on the cessation of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in 1963, space and the Earth’s waters began to cleanse themselves naturally from the products of the tests and gradually, the density of global fallout decreased. Their
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contribution to the dosage of anthropogenic changes in the natural radiation background currently does not exceed 0.4% according to SCEAR (5). The primary source of additional radiation is the use of ionizing radiation in diagnosing and treating illnesses, not the use of nuclear energy for military or peaceful purposes. Natural radioactive substances have always been part of the ocean bed, bottom sediments, sea water, as well as the flora and fauna of the world ocean. Among natural radionuclides, the largest contributors to the radiation background are the long-lived isotopes of chemical elements such as potassium, carbon, hydrogen, uranium, radium, thorium and polonium, which can be found all over the Earth and in the world ocean. Although potassium is categorized as a biological macro-element, it does not play a major role among stable chemical compounds present in sea water and represents just 0.04% (see Table 3). Meanwhile, it is potassium that is of special importance as a source of natural radioactivity in the ocean, bottom sediments and all of the ocean’s flora and fauna — from whales to plankton and everything in between that makes up the ecosystem of the seas (see Table 4).
Table 3. The Chemical Composition of Sea Water with 35% Salinity Concentration Absolute (g/kg) Relative (%) Anions and molecules Cl‾ 19.35 45.09 2 SO4 ¯ 2.70 4.64
HCO3¯ 0.14 0.19 Br‾ 0.07 0.07 F‾ 0.001 0.01
H3BO3 0.03 - Total anions: 22.291 50.00 Cations Na+ 10.76 38.66 Mg2+ 1.30 8.81 Ca2+ 0.41 1.68 K+ 0.39 0.82 Sr2+ 0.01 0.03 Total cations: 12.87 50.00 Total anions and cations 35.16 100.00
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Not all potassium is radioactive (it is primarily composed of the stable isotope 39K), only some of it, due to the 40K radionuclide. The radioactive potassium isotope 40K is a natural beta-gamma emitter with an enormous half-life of 1.28 billion years — compare that with the Earth’s age of 4.5 billion years. Similar to other long-lived radioactive elements toward the bottom of the table of elements — uranium, thorium, radium and others — 40K was not able to decay since the era of the initial synthesis of atoms, which occurred at the various stages of the formation and development of stars. Although a tiny amount of 40K is present in natural potassium isotopes (just 0.012%), it is the source of almost all of the natural radioactivity in the ocean. The radioactivity of potassium manifests primarily in the form of beta particles and less often as gamma rays. A comparison with data on anthropogenic changes in the radiation background due to global radioactive fallout and natural radionuclides can help provide us with a qualitative assessment of the impact of nuclear and radiation hazards on the environment.
Table 4. Average Concentrations of Natural Radionuclides in the Ocean and the Oceanic Ecosystem, Bq/L or Bq/kg of Green Weight Radionuclide Sea Water Ocean Crustaceans Mollusks Fish Flora 40K 11–13 90–350 40–240 60–270 90–150 87Rb 0.14 ** ** ** ** 234U 0.05 1–2 0.25–0.5 0.5–1.5 0.03 238U 0.04 0.8–1.9 0.2–0.4 0.4–1.2 0.03 ЗH 0.01–0.11 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.1 0.01–0.1 14/~> 0.007 11 22 18 15 210Pb 0.003 4–26 1.5–2.5 0.2–0.4 0.2 (0.1–4.8) 210Po 0.002 15–63 40–100 15–41 2 (0.1–53) 226Ra 0.001 0.7 0.1 0.1–1 0.1 ** = levels too low to detect
In the 1990s, international sea expeditions were conducted out to the sites where Russian radwaste had been submerged in the Arctic and Far East regions. These included, in particular, three Russian-Norwegian expeditions in 1992–1994 in the Kara and Barents Seas, three Korean-Japanese-Russian expeditions in 1993–1995 and 1997 in the Sea of Japan and other waters in the Far East, among other international expeditions. Most of these expeditions were conducted with the participation of staff members from the IAEA’s Marine Environmental Laboratory, which specializes in studying radioactivity levels in the ocean. In all of these cases, it was established that there was no additional radioactive impact on the environment caused by the submerged wastes. References to the results of these and other international expeditions in the 1970s–1990s to the sites
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where SRW and LRW were dumped in the North Atlantic, the Arctic and the Far East have been included in the second inventory published by the IAEA. According to these data, the concentration levels of anthropogenic radionuclides, particularly 14C, 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 239+240Pu 241Am in samples of water, bottom sediment and oceanic flora and fauna taken from areas near the dumping sites are minimal and are no different from those caused by normal global fallout. Although in some areas of the Arctic and Far East close to RW dumping sites, some spots have been identified with increased radionuclide content due to nuclear and radiation hazards; even so, the maximum concentration levels at these areas are 137Cs – 630 Bq/kg (17.5 pCi/kg) and 60Co – 50 Bq/kg (1.4 pCi/g) below allowable standards and do not present any danger. Today’s radioecological conditions in the ocean do not give any reason for concern. This is the conclusion that was reached by groups of international experts working under the Marina projects run by the Coordinated Research and Environmental Surveillance Program (CRESP) for the North Atlantic and the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP) for the Arctic. The radiation dose for those who live in countries near the radwaste dumping sites is much lower than the maximum allowable standard for humans. Periodic radiation monitoring of the RW dumping sites is conducted, and some areas have been found to demonstrate increased concentrations of radionuclides, including radwaste with total activity levels of 1.08 MCi (40 PBq), which the USSR and Russia disposed of in 18 areas of the Arctic and the Far East in 1959–1993. These levels do not have a significant radioactive impact on the environment and do not pose any danger for the residents of nearby countries or the ocean’s ecosystem.
The Future The probability of the submerged radwaste presenting a radiation hazard is minimal. These conclusions were made based on extensive Russian studies and the results of numerous international scientific projects and sea expeditions. The projected assessments of the radioecological impact of radionuclides leaking from RW dumping sites has shown that increased radiation exposure among sea fauna may only take place locally (in a radius of 10,000 cubic meters). For natural habitats in the ocean, this small volume is not capable of causing any changes in the natural equilibrium in the oceanic biosystem. The expected increased dose in typical local population groups caused by the dumped RW is extremely small (less than 1 mSv/yr) and does not exceed 0.1% of the dosage due to modern anthropogenic changes in the radiation background. For quantitative assessments of the impact of potential accidents in the radioecology, forecast calculations are used based on an analysis of physical, chemical and hydro- physical interaction processes of the submerged nuclear vessel (nuclear ice-breaker or submarine) with the environment. Along these lines, it should be mentioned that the potential radiation hazard of the nuclear military fleet is often overestimated. To a large extent, this is due to the fact that the number of reactors on Russian nuclear submarines alone is larger than the total number of power reactors at all of the NPPs around the world. However, quantitative analyses show that the activity level of radionuclides that have accumulated in nuclear submarine reactors is several times lower than that caused by the operation of power reactors at NPPs (see Figure 8). This is due to three key reasons. First of all, the capacity of reactors used on ships is several times lower than power reactors (for example, the
230 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY thermal power capacity of a RBMK-1000 is 3200 MWt, while the capacity of reactors used on ships, specifically first and second generation Russian nuclear submarines, is 70–90 MWt). The second reason is that power reactors are generally kept operating at the highest possible capacity, while nuclear submarine reactors rarely operate at full capacity. Finally, the third reason is that ship-based reactors spend much less time in operation than NPP reactors.
Figure 8. Typical data on the activity levels of long-lived radionuclides in the SNF of the Kursk nuclear submarine and a NPP reactor (PWR-1000), MCi. Generally, for the reasons noted above, there has been barely any radioactive impact on the environment from the six submarines that sank in 1963–2000. These were two nuclear submarines from the US Navy, three nuclear submarines and one diesel submarine with nuclear munitions onboard from Russia’s Navy. It is possible that in the distant future, these sources of long-lived radionuclides may trigger local radioactive pollution of the ocean environment, although quantitative assessments have shown that the radioecological impact of these sources is negligible at most. The Komsomolets (1989), Kursk (2000) and K-159 (2004), all sunken nuclear submarines, have not had any significant impact on radioecological conditions even in the areas close tothe wreckage sites, and they have not had any impact on the ecosystem of the Arctic seas or the residents of the coastal regions. This conclusion indirectly confirms the results of many years of observations at the sites where the US nuclear submarines Thresher (1965) and Scorpion (1979) had sunk. In a number of cases, radiation accidents involving ship-based nuclear power installations were accompanied by the radioactive pollution of the environment. The maximum emissions were recorded in 1985 resulting from the reactor explosion onboard the K-431 nuclear submarine from the Pacific fleet in Chazhma Bay. This incident involved predominantly short-lived radionuclides, and the radioecological impact was of a local nature and did not affect the public. Atmospheric emissions of long-lived
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fission products did not exceed 0.8 Ci (30 GBq), and the radioactive trail in the coastal zone of the Bay was primarily due to 60Co. Of course, the potential radioecological consequences of an accident with a submerged vessel or vessels with radionuclides onboard, especially containing SNF, are characterized by considerably heightened background levels of natural radioactivity in the sea water and bottom sediments. An assessment of the radioactive hazards for sea creatures is being carried out and compared with data from actual measurements and observations of the oceanic ecosystem in natural conditions during (and after) nuclear tests and in special research laboratories. Submerging nuclear-powered icebreakers or submarines becomes potentially dangerous due to the presumed simultaneous removal of barriers restraining radioactive substances, causing radionuclides to enter the ocean with the water flowing over and around the object in question. In this hypothetical scenario, a trail of radioactive pollution in the sea water appears, and the initial volume of water flowing over the object will contain the highest concentrations of radionuclides (although it would be localized as compared to the entire area of polluted water). The initial volume of water in the trail containing heightened initial concentrations would not be greater that several times the volume of the object itself. Even for an object as large as a nuclear-powered ice breaker, that is no more than 50,000 cubic meters, or less than 10,000 cubic meters for smaller reactor compartments used on nuclear submarines. It is known that a trail of turbulence will form in the wake of most movable facilities. The area of the cross-section of this trail at a distance from the object equal to the length of the object itself is roughly double the area of the cross-section of the object and amounts to at least 100 square meters. The water flows around the object at the speed of 0.1–1 m/s. From that data, it follows that the volume of the water in the trail directly following the facility is at least 10 m3/s. This estimated amount of sea water in the trail was used for assessing localized (highest) concentrations of radionuclides in sea water. As a starting point for a hypothetical accident, scientists used an external impact as a result of a direct side blow against an ice breaker at the junction of two compartments by a cargo ship or a collision with an iceberg (including underwater ice formations such as a grounded hummock, an iceberg that ran aground in shallow water). This external blow could create a hole in the two adjacent compartments, filling them with water and causing the ship to sink to the bottom of the sea. On-board reactors are then automatically switched off and enter a cool-down regime. Presumably, an external blow would lead to the pipe of the primary cooling circuit tearing away from the body of one of the reactors. As a result, sea waster would come into contact with the fuel assembly contained inside the reactor. Before the pressure inside and outside of the primary circuit is normalized, liquid will flow out of the primary circuit, and then sea water will gradually flow into the primary circuit and into the nuclear reactor. This hypothetical scenario presumes that contact between sea water and the surface layers of the fuel elements that are under an internal load from the accumulation of fission products would lead to fissured corrosion under stress. It is assumed that one month later we would see a major exposure of fuel element cores and the process of their destruction would begin. Based on the results of a long-term experiment with fuel assemblies from ships with nuclear power installations in sea water, the speed at which fuel elements containing nuclear fuel are destroyed is 1% per year.
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There is no steady water flow inside the nuclear reactor or the primary circuit. These are blind volumes with air and gas pockets. Changes in hydrostatic pressure caused by the periodic ebb and flow of sea water result in cross flows of water that replace one another from the outside of the reactor compartment and into the nuclear reactor, and then back from the reactor to the reactor compartment and into the water containing the submerged vessel. The flow of water into the sea is accompanied by the evacuation of radionuclides (see Figures 9 and 10). It is supposed that the accident would take place during the final stages of fuel consumption as the result of continuous operation of the ship’s reactor at an average thermal capacity of 80 MWt over a period of 25,000 hours. In line with the details described above, it is assumed that the volume of water at the bottom of the sea that would wash over the body of the submerged vessel would measure 10 m3/s at the initial section of the trail. In the event of such an accident, radionuclides would begin entering seawater 30 days after the vessel sinks. Calculations show that the accidental leakage of radionuclides into the sea over the first year would amount to roughly 1,600 TBq of beta emitters, which exceeds the amount of allowable emissions of beta-active radionuclides from Sellafield just four times over (400 TBq/yr) and is several times lower than actual emissions in 1974–1980. The leakage of alpha-active nuclides into the sea over one year would exceed Sellafield’s standards for allowable emissions by just 1.4 times. The expected baseline concentration of beta-active radionuclides in sea water at the initial section of the trail amounts to approximately 17 kBq/L, and later it would quickly drop as the result of dilution and radioactive decay. The concentration of alpha-active nuclides in sea water does not exceed 5 Bq/L, which is lower than the allowable levels (90 Bq/L) in water flows that are dumped along pipelines into the Sea of Ireland from the Drigg Company, which is adjacent to the Sellafield radio-chemical plant.
Figure 9. To assess radioecological implications of the way radionuclides enter sea water from submerged facilities, such as a reactor compartment from a nuclear submarine. The diagram below shows the way water is exchanged between the sea and the contents of a reactor on a submerged ice breaker. 233 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Figure 10. How water may interact with a reactor compartment.
In order to assess the radioecological implications of the release of radioactive isotopes into the seawater, one important parameter is the level of radiation exposure received by a critical group of the population that consumes radioactively polluted seafood, as well as by other elements of the oceanic ecosystem. Assessments of these crucial amounts also demonstrate that they are very minimal — even in the event of an accident such as the loss of a nuclear-powered ice breaker. These levels are also low when radwaste is submerged. In all of the scenarios that were considered, it had been shown that none of the external or internal events involving a nuclear-powered ice breaker, nuclear submarine or submerged radwaste would lead to radiation implications for the oceanic ecosystem or the residents of nearby regions exceeding allowable standards. As noted above, in the early 1990s, contradictory statements emerged regarding the allegedly serious radiation implications of storing Russian radwaste in the Arctic and Far East seas. More reliable information has been provided since in the Yablokov Report (1). Unfortunately, this report contains information only about the total radwaste activity levels, and there is no subsequent comparison with levels of natural radioactivity, global fallout or quantitative criteria for radiation hazards with regard to people and the oceanic ecosystem. Furthermore, the report contains a number of major errors. These gaps have been remedied in the 2000 White Book, which is dedicated to a detailed quantitative analysis of the radioecological implications of using the sea to dispose of radioactive waste (2). This monograph contains reliable, official data about radwaste that has been submerged by the USSR and Russia, and provides an objective description of the actual and forecasted radiation and environmental effect caused by the dumping. The book is written by leading staff members at Russia’s National Environmental Commission, the Kurchatov Institute, the International Center for Environmental Safety, Lazurit, Typhoon, the Dollezhal Institute for Power Engineering, and the Russian Academy of Science Institute for Safe Development of Nuclear Energy,
234 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY with support from the Ministry of Nuclear Power and the Russian Navy (the names of these agencies are included as they were during 2000 White Book preparations and publication). The translation of the 2000 White Book into English was conducted with support from the IAEA and the NRPA. The IAEA has published the English and Russian versions of the White Book on CD. An important part of this report is the quantitative analysis of real and potential sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the Arctic and Far East seas and radiation threat presented by radwaste submerged in these areas. By using information about the mass, enrichment and burn-up rates of SNF, as well as neutron flux levels that has been registered within the nuclear reactors, experts were able to assess radionuclide composition and total activity levels of the radioactive substances in potentially hazardous facilities that have been submerged. Comparisons with similar data on real sources of anthropogenic radionuclides have allowed experts to define a range of relative radiation danger, the measurement of which resulted in the total activity levels of long- lived radionuclides. These data are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12.
Figure 11. Actual and potential sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the Arctic seas bordering Russia.
Figure 12. Actual and potential sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the Far East seas bordering Russia.
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In comparing information for the Arctic and Far East regions, one should bear in mind that the total activity levels of nuclear and radiation hazards submerged in the Arctic is significantly higher than in the seas of the Far East. As was noted above, the main reason for this discrepancy is that the Sea of Japan and the area close to Kamchatka was used to submerge containers with radwaste and the bodies of ship-based reactors that did not contain SNF. On the other hand, the bays of the Eastern coasts of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and along the Novaya Zemlya trench in the Kara Sea were used to dispose of facilities that did contain SNF. The key conclusion made based on reliable archives and the calculated and experimental materials included in the 2000 White Book is basically that the radioecological implications of using the sea to dispose of radwaste produced by the Russian Naval Fleet were minimal, and these operations did not result in a true radiation hazard for the public or the environment. It is important to note that based on the assessments, the construction of additional protective barriers near submerged radioactive waste is not worthwhile, as it would not lead to any significant decrease in the already low amounts of exposure (2). Natural silting forms an additional protective barrier.
Figure 13. Anthropogenic Radionuclides in Russia’s Seas. Radioactive waste disposal in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation (2000 White Book).
References 1. Facts and Problems Related to the Storage of Radioactive Wastes in Russia’s Seas [Fakty i problemi, svyazanniye s zakhoroneniyem radioaktivnikh otkhodov v moryakh, omyvayuschikh territoriyu Rossii]. (Report by the Government Commission for Issues Related to the Storage of Radioactive Wastes in the Seas, prepared by Presidential Decree No. 613-rp (10/24/92). Office of the President of the Russian Federation. Moscow: 1993. 2. Sivintsev, Y. V., Vakulovsky S. M., Vasilyev, A. P., Vysotsky, V. L., Gubin, A. T., Danilyan, V. A., Kobzev, V. I., Kryshev, I. I., Lakovksy, S. A., Mozokin, V. A., Nikitin, A. I., Petrov, O. I., Pologikh, B. G., Skorik, Y. I. Anthropogenic Radionuclides in
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Russia’s Seas. Radioactive waste disposal in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation (2000 White Book) [Technogenniye radionuklidi v moryakh, omyvayuschikh Rossyu]. Moscow: IzdAT, 2005, p. 624, illustration p. 64. 3. Information Circular INFCIRC/205/Add/1/Rev.1. The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter [Konventsiya po predotvrascheniyu zagryazneniyz moray sbrosami otkhodov i drugikh materialov].. The definition required in line with Clause 6 of Appendix I to the Convention and recommendations required in line with Section D of Appendix II. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1978. 4. Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation. 1988 UN General Assembly Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (SCEAR) Report, with appendices (two volumes). Translation from the English [referenced in the original Russian text] Kulakov, V. M. and Rozhdestvensky, L. M., eds. Moscow: Mir, 1992. 5. Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. 2000 UN General Assembly SCEAR Report with appendices (four volumes). Translation from the English [referenced in the original Russian text] under Editors Ilyin, L. A. and Yarmonenko, S. P. Moscow: RADEKON. 2002.
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A Unified Federal System for Radioactive Waste Management: A Prerequisite for the Development of Nuclear Energy
Oleg Muratov Executive Secretary, Northwest Branch of the Nuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg
The primary way in which human activity impacts the environment is through industrial solid and liquid waste and emissions. Today, of the 120 gigatons of fossil substances and biomass that are used in the world’s economy each year, only 9 gigatons (7.5%) are converted into useful output. Industrial waste on Earth continues to be generated at an exponentially growing pace. Each year, 85 gigatons are added to waste rock dumps, junkyards and landfills. The creation of nuclear weapons, the development of nuclear energy, and the broad integration of nuclear technologies in all scientific fields have brought about a completely new type of waste product in the form of radioactive waste (radwaste), which cannot be safely destroyed or buried due to the radionuclides it contains. Although the volume of radwaste, as compared to other anthropogenic waste, is extremely low—the volume of radwaste produced each year comprises ≈ 0.5% of total industrial waste—its disposal calls for the development of special technologies and the use of particular methods to ensure human and environmental safety. In the early stages of development of these technologies, which had exclusively military purposes, radwaste was considered to be a special case, part of the general problem of environmental pollution caused by waste generated by human activity, making it an issue of secondary importance in all countries. The accumulation and storage of radwaste was conducted without any accompanying measures to protect the environment, resulting in sites that are now polluted with radioactive waste. In Russia, Lake Karachai is the poster child for the shortcomings of early radwaste disposal methods. In the 1940s and 1950s, liquid waste with activity exceeding 4.4×106 TBq was dumped into the lake (1). The safe management of radwaste is a major challenge that affects the scale and pace at which the nuclear energy sector can develop, and the rate at which nuclear and radiation technologies can be implemented. The problem of final burial of radwaste has not been definitively resolved anywhere in the world. The incompleteness of the radwaste isolation process has been the main trump card played by the opponents of nuclear energy and various “green” organizations. Throughout the world, the challenge of effectively managing radwaste is made more difficult by the legacy of the arms race, which left numerous polluted sites in its wake (Hanford, Sellafield, Ozyorsk, and others). For example, there are 114 sites in the United States where pollution can be tied to government nuclear weapons programs. Hanford, like Mayak, was the site of several reactors for the production of weapon-grade plutonium. Three of these used once-through water cooling and were placed along the
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Columbia River. Liquid radioactive waste from the radiochemical processes was also flushed into the Columbia River (similar to Russia’s Techa River). Radwaste is produced in a number of ways: through the operations of the operating military nuclear complex, by NPPs generating energy, through the operations of nuclear energy installations for the transportation sector, and the use of radioactive substances and sources of ionizing radiation. In recent years, the widespread use of nuclear submarines has made a large contribution to the accumulation of radwaste. At this time, sites belonging to RosProm Shipbuilding Agency are storing 3.8×103 m3 of liquid radwaste with total activity of 2.5×1012 Bq and 2.5×103 t of solid radwaste with activity of 4.8×1014 Bq. A significant quantity of radioactive waste is also created in non-nuclear industries such as heat and power engineering, medicine, geology, and others. Today, sources of ionizing radiation in Russia are being used by more than 15,900 entities. Some of the sources behind the accumulation of a large amount of radwaste are coal, oil, and gas extraction operations due to the concurrent removal of natural radionuclides from the Earth. The volume of contaminated metal exceeds 1.5 million tons. The list of radwaste sources is extensive: • Uranium mines; • Natural uranium production; • Natural uranium enrichment operations and nuclear fuel production; • Radiochemical enterprises; • Nuclear power plants; • Nuclear research centers; • Nuclear weapon test sites; • Peaceful underground nuclear explosion sites; • Contaminated sites of accidents in Kyshtym, Chazhma Bay, and Chernobyl; • Nuclear submarine and nuclear cruiser bases belonging to the Russian Navy; • The AtomFlot service base; • Shipbuilding and ship repair plants conducting the construction, repair, and dismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships, and vessels with nuclear energy installations; • Radioactive isotopes produced by ionizing radiation sources used in the industrial sector and in medicine; • Sites and junkyards for military equipment and equipment used by research institutions working with radioactive substances; • Oil and gas extraction operations; and • Ash dumps from coal power plants. According to data from Russia’s government tracking and monitoring system for radioactive substances and radioactive waste, sites belonging to various federal ministries and agencies in Russia are storing close to half of the world’s total radwaste and its activity has exceeded 5.96×1019 Bq (Table 1).
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Table 1. Volume of Liquid Radioactive Waste and Solid Radioactive Waste in Russia Kind and Type of Radwaste RosAtom Other Total Industries Liquid Radiation 4 4 (m3) High-level waste (HLW) 3.66×10 — 3.66×10
Medium-level waste (MLW) 2.04×106 3.37×103 2.04×106 Low-level waste (LLW) 4.13×108 8.32×103 4.13×108 Solid Radwaste 4 3 4 (tons) HLW 5.24×10 5.93×10 5.83×10
MLW 6.12×105 6.57×104 6.77×105 LLW 7.25×107 2.36×105 7.8×107
Accumulated radwaste is stored at 69 sites in 33 regions across Russia: • European Russia: in 21 subjects (including regions, rayons and oblasts) of the Russian Federation, at 42 sites; • Urals: in 3 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 10 sites; • Siberia: in 5 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 10 sites; • Russian Far East: in 3 subjects of the Russian Federation, at 7 sites. The total volume of radwaste in Russia, its types, categories, and storage locations are provided in Table 2 (2). Radwaste management is governed by federal laws on the use of nuclear energy, nuclear safety of the general population, the protection of the environment, as well as other regulatory documents, federal norms and guidelines. All of these documents were developed in line with the following IAEA documents: the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and The Principles of Radioactive Waste. These documents provide guidelines for ensuring the safety of personnel, the general population, and the environment, the reliable isolation of radwaste from the biosphere, the protection of present and future generations, biological resources. They also forbid the submersion of radwaste in the world’s ocean, dispatching radwaste into the outer space, or dumping it into surface or underground water reservoirs. It is currently recognized that all produced radwaste must be stored for 30–50 years with the possibility of extending this timeframe. This approach does not culminate in a definitively safe solution to the issue of immobilizing radwaste and calls for significant expenditures for storage facility operations, without a clear plan for their elimination. Despite the fact that the requisite level of radiation safety is assured, as confirmed by RosAtom’s annual radiation safety reports and by documents published by RosTekhNadzor, and that this level meets the requirements of the Joint Convention, we are seeing a rapid accumulation of problems in the field of radwaste management.
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Table 2. Radioactive Waste Stored at Russian Government Agency Facilities (1,3) Radwaste Radwaste Volume Activity Agency Source Type (m3) (Bq) Storage site Extracting and Sludge and processing rock debris 1.0×108 15 Tailings storage and uranium and 6.7×10 rock debris piles thorium ore (LLW) Uranium Liquid and Tailings storage, enrichment and solid waste 1.6×106 1.5×1014 warehouses, nuclear fuel production sites production (LLW) Liquid 5 15 Containers, NPP concentrates 1.5×10 1.6×10 storage facilities (MLW) NPP operation Solid MLW 1.6×104 1.0×1013 NPP storage facilities Solid LLW 1.2×105 1.0×1013 NPP storage facilities RosAtom Containers at GKhK, Liquid HLW 2.5×104 2.1×1019 SKhK, and Mayak
Reprocessing Mayak vitrified spent nuclear Vitrified 3 18 (HLW) 9.5×10 7.4×10 radwaste storage fuel and facility production Liquid and of weapons- 8 19 Containers, pulp (MLW, 4.0×10 2.6×10 reservoirs, and pools grade nuclear LLW) materials Open air and surface Solid MLW 8 4.4×1017 storage facilities at and LLW 1.0×10 GKhK, SKhK, and Mayak
Operation Liquid LLW 1.4×104 12 Coastal and floating 6.7×10 bases Ministry of nuclear of Defense submarines and Coastal storage nuclear-powered Solid LLW 1.3×104 3.0×1013 facilities and open ships air site Coastal storage Operation 2 10 Naval of nuclear Liquid LLW 3.9×10 2.2×10 facilities and floating and River icebreakers bases Craft and the lighter Agency Solid LLW 1.4×103 12 Coastal storage carrier 8.1×10 facilities Construction, 3 13 Coastal and floating repair, and, Liquid LLW 2.5×10 1.9×10 bases dismantlement of nuclear RosProm submarines, Solid LLW 1.5×103 12 Storage facilities and nuclear-powered 3.7×10 open air sites ships and vessels
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Receipt and processing of all types of Liquid and radwaste and solid waste, spent sources 5 16 Radon storage RosStroi of ionizing spent sources 2.0×10 7.4×10 facilities radiation from of ionizing institutions in radiation non-nuclear sectors
The resolution of the problem of accumulating radwaste, which is being left to future generations, is directly linked to the entire history of how the nuclear power industry developed. The operation of nuclear power plants was conducted under the conditions of a centrally planned economy that did not plan for the creation of specialized enterprises or individual entities for radwaste management. It was presumed that in the future, these problems would be resolved according to plan and paid for by the central government. The direct outcome of this policy of “deferred decisions” is the negative public opinion of the nuclear power industry. Radwaste storage facilities were created taking into consideration the particular needs of the enterprise and the technologies used, resulting in a dearth of standard waste storage solutions. The storage of solid radwaste uses over 30 types of facilities, most of them specialized buildings or spaces located inside main facilities, trenches, bunkers, containers, and open air sites. Liquid radwaste is placed in over 18 different types of forms of storage. These are primarily free-standing containers, open water basins, pulp storage tanks, etc. Existing radwaste storage facilities were not designed to be securely insulated from the environment for the long term. Most of these facilities do not meet safety requirements and do not have the necessary service equipment. Storage designs did not consider phasing facilities out of operation or rehabilitating the surrounding areas. The radwaste management industry lacks standard solutions for radwaste treatment and burial. The technologies for radwaste treatment and conditioning, and therefore also treatment facilities themselves, were built specifically for the kind of radwaste that was being produced at each individual enterprise, and most are not unified or universal. The radwaste facilities are not efficient and suffer from design and technological shortcomings. A variety of government agencies and other entities have become involved in radwaste management. Table 3 provides a list of the main radwaste “generators,” besides RosAtom, in Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast (3). A single industry has been tasked with disposing both radwaste from past defense programs and radwaste produced by commercial activity. The rapid development of the nuclear sector in the 1950s was entirely dedicated to defense purposes; choices were
242 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY made that were problematic in terms of modern safety requirements and posed a serious threat to the environment. This conglomerated industry makes it difficult to effectively take advantage of international efforts to dispose of the radioactive legacy of the arms race. The treatment of spent sources of ionizing radiation requires a particularly educated and safety-minded approach. Currently, there are over 115,000 expired units of this type of radwaste accounted for in the country, according to oversight agencies. In addition, there have been cases of sources that have been unaccounted for. During the process of privatization and business reprofiling, a large number of these sources of ionizing radiation were lost. This has resulted in constant discoveries in different parts of the country of spots with localized radioactive contamination.
Table 3. Government Agency Affiliation of Institutions Institution Agency Affiliation Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute RosProm (Federal Agency on Industry)
St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University Federal Education Agency
St. Petersburg State Technical Institute Federal Education Agency
Engineering Center for Environmental Studies St. Petersburg Municipal Government Russian Scientific Center for Applied Chemistry (RNTs Prikladnaya Khimiya) None Scientific Research Center for System Safety (NITs BTS) Ministry of Defense Ministry of Health and Social State Roentgenology and Radiology Institute Development
St. Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics Russian Academy of Sciences
RADON Leningrad Specialized Combine Federal Agency for Construction
EKOMET-S Joint-stock company
To collect, store, and treat radwaste produced by entities that were not part of the nuclear industry, GosStroy (aka. RosStroi), the Soviet-era agency for construction, had set up special Radon waste management facilities in the 1960s. Currently, 14 of the original 16 Radon facilities on Russia’s territory are still in operation. The facility in Grozny was destroyed by bombing during hostilities there, and the facility in Murmansk, which serviced about 70 clients in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, was closed when its storage facilities became full beyond capacity and due to non-compliance with current RF safety regulations. Despite all of the agency-level and government changes, all Radon facilities, with the exception of the Moscow facility (which is managed by
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the Moscow municipal government), are managed by GosStroy, for which radwaste management is not the main line of business and for which the agency uses unallocated funds. An important factor complicating safe radwaste management concerns the changes in the property status of the enterprises involved. When state enterprises were auctioned off, only the parts that were most likely to be profitable were privatized, while storage facilities for radwaste and sources of ionizing radiation, mines, etc. were left in the government’s hands. At the same time, no single government entity is responsible for these facilities. The problem has not been addressed through legislative means and calls for speedy resolution. As you can see, radwaste management is a multifaceted and complex problem that has to be addressed on many levels and involves not just RosAtom, but nearly all industry, science, and medicine sectors. In our search for a solution, we must consider many factors, including the possible increase in the costs of electricity produced by NPPs and the products offered by enterprises as a result of new requirements for radwaste storage and management, the use of specialized radwaste management technologies, depending on its specific activity, physical and chemical properties, radionuclide composition, volume, toxicity, and safe storage and burial conditions. Ensuring the long- term environmentally safe management of radwaste is a top factor contributing to the development of nuclear energy technologies. In recent years, much has happened in radwaste management. Twenty-five RosAtom enterprises are operating 35 management systems for different types of radioactive waste, including 26 installations for managing liquid radwaste — immobilization of HLW with cement, bitumen, vitrification, evaporation, fractioning, etc. — and nine installations for treatment of solid radwaste: incineration, compacting, smelting. RosAtom enterprises annually process around 3.8 million m3 of radwaste with specific activity of 1.3×1018 Bq (Table 4).
Table 4. Radwaste Accumulation, Generation, and Treatment Accumulated by Generated in Category 01/01/07 2006 Treated in 2006 Activity х Activity х Activity х Vol. 1015 Bq Vol. 1015 Bq Vol. 1015 Bq Liquid Radwaste (thousand m3) LLW 461 486 6.5 3,509 0.6 3,782 0.6 MLW 15,051 22,900 174 244 16 1.3 HLW 35 21,400 13 1,330 13 1,280 Total 476,573 44,306.5 3,696 1,574.6 3,811 1,281.9 Solid Radwaste (thousand tons) LLW 76,255 6.3 1,195 0.303 7.7 0.0004 MLW 1,099 313 10 0.636 0.6 0.139
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HLW 61 14,700 1 48.8 0.003 27.4 Total 77,415 15,019.3 1,206 49.739 3.3 27.54
In comparison with 2000, the annual volume of treated radwaste has increased by more than 200%. Treatment of high-level and low-level liquid radioactive waste has been particularly effective. Table 4 shows that almost all liquid radwaste in these categories is being treated and it is not being accumulated. Furthermore, thanks to improved technologies and the implementation of new equipment, we have seen a significant drop in the generation of radwaste of all types and categories in recent years. For the sake of comparison, Table 5 shows the accumulated volumes of radwaste for 2004. At the same time, it should be noted that the rate at which radwaste is being treated is still insufficient. Although less radwaste is being generated, the total volume of accumulated waste is growing. Through the program for decommissioning nuclear submarines with international assistance at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, a liquid radwaste treatment facility was built and put into operation. In the Far East, in the town Bolshoy Kamen, Landysh, a floating liquid radwaste treatment facility was built.
Table 5. Accumulated Radwaste in 2004 Reporting Liquid Radwaste Solid Radwaste Entities 3 Volume (m ) Activity Volume Activity (Bq) (tons) (Bq) RosAtom 5.0×106 3.7×1018 3.6×106 4.1×1017
Nuclear Submarine 3 11 Dismantlement 1.0×10 3.7×10 No data No data Radon Facilities 2.0×102 1.9×1011 2.4×102 7.4×109
Russia’s only specialized metal radwaste treatment and disposal plant, EKOMET-S, is successfully operating in Sosnovy Bor. This enterprise’s main lines of business is treating low-level metal radwaste in order to reduce the volume of solid radwaste to be buried, and recycling metal for further unrestricted use. The facility can treat up to 5,000 tons of low-level waste per year. The start-to-finish process developed at EKOMET-S for metal radwaste processing can be used for carbon steel and stainless steel as well as non-ferrous metals and alloys and reduces the volume of solid radwaste that would otherwise be buried by a factor of 80. The method, which involves melting down scrap in the final step of the metal radwaste treatment process, fully complies with federal standards OSPORB-99 (Basic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation Safety) and SPORO-2002 (Health Standards and Regulations for Radioactive Waste Management). A general analysis of radwaste treatment has shown that the specifics of radwaste management and the variety of waste types has resulted in a large number of unique radwaste management technologies and, for the most part, there exist methods for the safe management of radwaste. However, despite the significant progress made in terms
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of developing modern radwaste management technologies and greater attention being accorded to the problem of radwaste disposal, primarily by RosAtom and the Ministry of Defense, the solutions for many radioecological problems, on the scale required to put an end to the continuing accumulation of radwaste, are unsatisfactory. The large volumes of radwaste, the shortcomings of radwaste management technologies, the insufficiencies of the federal system for tracking and monitoring radioactive substances and radwaste, the need to ensure the physical security of the storage facilities, the increasingly stringent international requirements with regard to safe radwaste management, the shortage of funding for radwaste management operations, and other contributing factors, indicate that radwaste is not, and cannot be, the sole burden of just one or even a few government entities. Radwaste management is a matter of national importance and must be addressed through the creation of a unified government system to oversee all radwaste management activity and, first and foremost, through the passage of a law on radwaste management. The absence of a common government radwaste management system has caused the treatment of radwaste from past defense programs and waste from ongoing commercial activity to be conflated within one treatment complex along with the near-complete lack of coordinated efforts among the government entities involved, numbering close to 20 and including RosAtom, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Regional Development. Each entity has its own development programs, funding, vision, and priorities, which results in the duplication of solutions for standard problems, and little to no use of cutting-edge technologies, etc. The lack of coordination among the various entities is demonstrable in the ill-fated law on radioactive waste, the draft of which was already under consideration by the Supreme Soviet in the early 1990s. The ineffectiveness of radwaste disposal is also in many ways a result of the shortcomings of the existing system of standards and regulations. One example is the unwarranted increase in stringency of Russian standards for allowable amounts of radiation exposure. Consequently, a large amount of funding has been spent on reducing radioactive substances in water, air, and materials where the excesses are minor. The allowable radionuclide concentration in water is calculated based on the one-time consumption of two liters of this kind of water, while tritium content limits are 80 times lower in Russia than in the United States. Another very important shortcoming of the current system of standards and regulations is the way in which radwaste is categorized and classified. The simplified radwaste classification system (LLW, MLW, HLW) makes it so no changes can be made to the structure of accumulated radwaste or the basic pattern of “generation–treatment– final isolation” when making any financial or material investments. Currently, 358 million m3 of low-level liquid radwaste in the Techa reservoir system accounts for 77% of all accumulated liquid radwaste in this category in the country (Table 5). Naturally, the LRW contained in reservoirs should be put into a separate category with its own rules and safety requirements. There is a similar situation with solid radwaste (SRW). The majority of low-level SRW are tailing dumps resulting from uranium mining with activity levels of no more than 104 Bq/kg. The introduction of a “very low-level radwaste” category with specific activity level of less than 1.0×105 Bq/kg for artificial radionuclides and less than 5.0×105
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Bq/kg for natural radionuclides (similar to France and some other countries) would make it possible to apply simplified procedures when treating this particular radwaste category. The “very low-level radwaste” category could include industrial waste containing small quantities of artificial and natural radionuclides (waste from oil and gas extraction operations) that currently are not covered by any radwaste category but cannot, under current regulations, be treated like ordinary industrial waste. With the creation of this radwaste category, the volume of solid LLW requiring conditioning and placement in final isolation facilities would be reduced to ~3,300,000 tons (a reduction of 95%) and the positive change of the basic pattern of “generation–treatment–final isolation” could be made possible with large but reasoned and justified allocation of funds (4). In addition, this would put a large volume of valuable expensive materials back into circulation. The resulting situation, as well as the shortcomings and contradictions of the current system of standards and regulations for radwaste management, provides yet more proof of the urgent need for a unified government radwaste management system that would include, as its most important step, the final isolation of radwaste. This is confirmed by the experience of other countries, with well-developed nuclear energy and nuclear industry sectors, which have addressed the radwaste management issue at the industrial level and which made the decision to create unified government radwaste management systems. The only missing link in the safe development of the nuclear energy sector is the issue of final radwaste isolation. The Federal Target Program (FTP) for Assuring Nuclear and Radiation Safety for 2008 and through 2015, adopted in 2007, was designed to fundamentally change the current situation, resolve the problems that have accumulated, and assure the sustainable development of nuclear energy technologies. The primary goals of the FTP include the comprehensive resolution of nuclear and radiation safety issues associated with radwaste management, the decommissioning of facilities that pose a nuclear and radiation threat, and the modernization of nuclear and radiation safety support and control systems (5). For the first time in the 60-plus-year history of the nuclear industry, funding in the amount of RUB 131.82 billion has been set aside from the federal budget to pay for the execution of the FTP, which calls for creating a radwaste management infrastructure, creating radwaste treatment, storage, and transportation capacities, and ensuring the safety of previously accumulated SNF and radwaste. In terms of radwaste management efforts, which are receiving RUB 29.7 billion in funding, the FTP envisages the following measures: • Construction of SRW storage facilities measuring 165,000 m3; • Renovation of temporary radwaste storage facilities for the purpose of transforming them into near-surface burial facilities; • Creation of new technologies and installations for radwaste treatment and immobilization; • Research and development of the methodology and economic mechanisms for the safe operation of the government radwaste management system, national and regional long-term radwaste storage facilities and radwaste burial sites; • Scientific and analytical support in the field of safe radwaste management. The first stage in the implementation of the FTP between now and 2010 can be defined as the time needed to develop the solutions for the main radwaste management
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issues and, most importantly, for the adoption of the federal law on radioactive waste, which would define the legal framework for radwaste management activity and set out radwaste management principles, approach, and procedures. The primary goals of this initial stage include: • Optimization of radwaste categorization and the development of standards for methods of final radwaste isolation; • Development of unified technical requirements for radwaste packaging for storage and for final isolation; • Selection of sites and start of operations for the creation of a national (for HLW) and inter-regional (for MLW and LLW) sites for final radwaste isolation. At the present time, RosAtom has developed and distributed to all interested organizations a new draft of the law on radioactive waste. The law will regulate the creation and functioning of a unified system for the management of radwaste created at all stages of mineral extraction and processing, nuclear materials and radioactive substance production. It will also regulate the operation of nuclear installations and storage sites, the use of radioactive substances for industrial purposes, scientific research, medicine, and defense, assure government control and regulation of safe radwaste management, and structure the funding of radwaste management projects. The primary goals of the unified government radwaste management system according to the draft law are: • Implement a national policy with respect to radwaste management; • Uphold the rights of the citizens under the Constitution to the protection of their health, access to a clean and healthy environment, and reliable information regarding its condition; • Ensure sustainable development and protection of national interests with respect to radwaste management; • Implement a government-sponsored scientific, investment, and information policy with respect to radwaste management; • Take a variety of technical, environmental, health protection, and organizational measures for the protection of citizens and the environment at all stages of radwaste management. A unified radwaste management system will make is possible to assess the cost- efficiency of such an enterprise and optimize technological solutions in the nuclear power industry in a way that would take into account radwaste disposal costs, determine the financial responsibility of companies that produce radwaste and the responsibility of the government for legacy radwaste from past defense activities, and improve the efficiency of research and development in the nuclear power industry. A significant step towards ensuring that such a system would function properly is the introduction by this law of the concept of “legacy radwaste,” defined as the waste that has been accumulated by a certain point in time, which falls under the responsibility of government. This category would include radwaste from defense activity as well as waste generated by enterprises during the era of centralized planned economic activity. At the time, radwaste disposal was not accorded proper attention and later the solution of these problems was also planned centrally using budgetary funding. As a result of that approach, unlike in countries with market economies, no dedicated funds were established for building up the financial resources that would be needed for radwaste management.
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In order to finance a unified government radwaste management system, a dedicated fund must be created to ensure the accumulation of financial resources and oversee their expenditure on radwaste management under government control. The fund would receive allocations from the federal budget, consumers and producers of radionuclide products, radwaste producers upon the transfer of radwaste to the responsibility of the government, and international environmental projects. The central entity of this government corporation would be a joint stock company (JSC) with 100% government capital ownership, which would have a natural monopoly and the status of operator. Regional facilities for final radwaste isolation and companies specializing in radwaste treatment, conditioning, transport, and burial site construction could be JSC subsidiaries. The JSC would have the following responsibilities: • Develop a system of standards and regulations for all aspects of radwaste management; • Track and monitoring radwaste and the condition of radwaste storage facilities and final isolation sites; • Provide method-based guidelines for the selection of final isolation sites for all types of radwaste, developing a database of natural barriers and their specific traits present at final radwaste isolation sites; • Coordinate efforts to develop standard technologies for the final isolation of all types of waste, the optimization of technical solutions for all related operations in the concluding stage of radwaste management, the assurance of the safety of regional radwaste burial sites, analysis of existing liquid and solid radwaste storage facilities at individual enterprises, and the justification of local radwaste burial sites; • Organize competitive bidding for radwaste management system improvement projects and oversight of such projects (R&D, construction, etc.); • Coordinate of public outreach efforts to inform the public of power radwaste management in compliance with Russian law; • Participate in international radwaste management projects. The creation of a unified government radwaste management system that would oversee the last stages in the lifecycle of fuel used in nuclear power generation and radiation technologies is the key condition for further development of the nuclear energy and industrial sectors. This system would prevent the continued accumulation of radwaste, improve the cost-effectiveness of the nuclear industry, and ensure greater safety of handling radioactive material at all states of its lifecycle, would significantly improving the environmental situation in the country. The development of efficient radwaste management will also enable Russia to become an exporter of leading radwaste immobilization technologies, enter the international market for safe radwaste management services, and apply the resulting know-how to finding solutions for the management of other toxic and chemical wastes.
References 1. Tikhonov, M. N., Rylov M. I., A Comprehensive Assessment of Russia’s Nuclear and Radioactive Legacy. Topics in Environmental Protection and Natural Resource
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Management [Kompleksnaya otsenka yaderno-radiatsionnogo naslediya Rossii. Problemy okruzhaiushchei sredy i prirodnykh resursov], 2007, No. 3, 77–110. 2. Muratov, O. E., Dovgusha V. V., Tikhonov M. N., Radioecological Aspects of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Management. Expert Environmental Assessment [Radioekologicheskiye aspekty obrascheniya s radioaktivnymi otkhodami i obluchennym yadernym toplivom. Ecologicheskaya ekspertiza], 2007, No. 6, 2–15. 3. Muratov, O. E. The Need for a Unified Radioactive Waste Management System: Safety [O neobkhodimosti sozdaniya edinoi sistemy obrascheniya s radiaktivnymi otkhodami. Bezopasnost zhiznedeyatel’nosti], 2007, No. 12, 16–22. 4. Linge I. I. Main Directions in SNF and Radwaste Management for 2008–2015. Environmental Safety [Osnovniye napravleniya rabot po obrascheniyu s OYaT i RAO na 2008–2015. Bezopasnost’ okruzhaiushchei sredy], 2007, No. 4, 111–114. 5. Agapov, A. M., D’yakov S. V., Bobrov N. G., et al. Main Directions in SNF and Radwaste Management for 2008–2015 [Osnovniye napravleniya rabot po obrascheniyu s OYaT i RAO na 2008–2015]. Proceedings of the Second International Nuclear Forum, Oct. 2–5, 2007. Saint Petersburg, 2007, 237–239.
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Proposal for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in Russia
Alexander Nikitin Director, Bellona Public Organization, St. Petersburg
Problems in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (radwaste) management have accumulated for decades in the USSR, and later in Russia. According to RosAtom, Russia does not currently have a long-term official adopted and confirmed concept for SNF management; consequently, there is no effective approach to dealing with these problems. In late September 2007, the RosAtom Board reviewed and adopted a framework for a concept, which nonetheless has not been made available to the public. We believe that SNF problems are critical from the standpoint of environmental safety and public health, and propose that the public should not be left on the sidelines during discussions of these issues.
An Overview Russia’s Ministry of Nuclear Energy prepared and approved a strategy for the development of nuclear energy in Russia during the first half of the 21st century. This strategy includes a section on SNF and radwaste management, which states that “…the strategic development of nuclear energy in Russia is moving towards closing the nuclear fuel cycle…” There are currently no other adopted or approved documents addressing the strategy and concept of SNF management in Russia. It is common knowledge that Russia uses mixed fuel cycles in: • PWR-1000: open fuel cycle; • RBMK–1000: open fuel cycle; • PWR–440: tandem (partial); • FBR-350 (600): tandem (partial); • Transport and research nuclear reactors: closed cycle (under specific conditions). In order to fully close the fuel cycle for all types of reactors, we need to first justify the political, technological, and economic grounds and other needs behind this decision. There are currently no such grounds, and we believe that it would be impossible to prepare a substantiation due to the following reasons: • Technological installations for closed fuel cycles will have to be built from scratch; • Treatment of fuel from RMBK-1000 reactors is not advised, as the U-235 content in this fuel is lower than that found in natural uranium; • Treating fuel from PWR-1000 reactors would require the construction of a new facility, which would cost approximately USD 3 billion.
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Fuel from PWR-440 reactors, FBRs and transport reactors is partially processed at Mayak’s RT-1 Plant (80 tons per year). Meanwhile, experts have calculated that this process is only cost-efficient if more than 1,000 tons of SNF is treated annually. In order to upgrade the RT-1 plant, roughly USD 1 billion is required, but there are no financial resources. That is why there are currently no prospects for increasing the plant’s output. By reprocessing spent fuel from the reactors named above, the nuclear fuel cycle remains open and the problem persists: how do we close the cycle? Today, the situation concerning transport reactors has fundamentally changed compared to Soviet times. The quality and number of reactors is changing, as is the quality of the fuel itself and the way the Navy and RosAtom work together. That is why treatment for this type of fuel is very costly and not especially relevant today. As a result, it is practically impossible to provide solid economic grounds proving the need to close the nuclear fuel cycle. International experience has also shown that technological and technical grounds for doing so are also unacceptable for most countries. The only argument in favor of the need to close the nuclear fuel cycle is political, and this approach can realistically be applied in Russia.
SNF Management in Russia Accumulation Over 60 years of using nuclear energy, Russia (and the USSR) has accumulated over 18,500 tons of spent nuclear fuel (uranium). Total radioactivity is approximately 7 billion Ku. The SNF was produced in NPP reactors, research reactors, and reactors on nuclear-powered ships. Each year, Russia produces about 850 tons of SNF. The isotope structure of the fuel varies depending on the type of reactor that was used and its initial properties.
Storage Most of Russia’s SNF is accumulated in NPP storage facilities. Experts have estimated that these storage facilities currently house approximately 14,000 tons of SNF. The rest is stored at RT-2 in Krasnoyarsk (roughly 4,000 tons), Mayak (about 500 tons), the Northern and Pacific fleets (about 130 tons) and research institutes (about 20 tons). With few exceptions, all of these storage facilities are storage pools meant for the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuels.
Transport Each year many tons of SNF is transported across Russian territory, primarily by railway. A special type of tank car is used for each different type of SNF. Today there are 59 different types of tank cars for used fuels. The routes used for SNF transport generally connect the NPP to Mayak and the storage facility in Krasnoyarsk. Furthermore, approximately 700 kg of SNF (uranium) is transferred from the Northern and Pacific fleet storage facilities to Mayak annually.
Treatment Mayak’s RT-1 plant only reprocesses fuel that is produced from PWR-440, FBR- 350, and FBR-600 reactors in addition to transport reactors and a number of different kinds of research reactors. Projected reprocessing capacity is 400 tons of SNF per year, but Mayak treats just 80 tons. The plant has been in operation for 25 years. Its equipment
252 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY is both worn down and obsolete and requires upgrades. Construction of the RT-2 plant has not been completed. The technologies that are planned for use at this plant are already outdated, which is why there are major doubts as to whether or not construction should be completed, especially considering the hefty resources required to do so (about USD 4 billion).
Cost of SNF Management Operations SNF transport costs an average of USD 50 per kilogram, while storage of one kilogram over the course of one year costs USD 120. Consequently, the storage of Russia’s accumulated 18,500 tons of SNF costs the country USD 2.22 billion each year. In 1998 there was an initiative to import 20,000 tons of SNF into Russia from abroad in exchange for USD 20 billion over the course of 10 years. Estimates show that the average cost of reprocessing SNF at RT-2 has reached USD 750/kg. Considering that the average cost of vitrification of high-level waste (HLW) produced by SNF treatment has reached USD 340/kg, the entire treatment process for one kilogram of SNF runs about USD 1,340, while the entire management cycle, including transport and storage over the course of one year is about USD 1,500/kg.
Proposals for the Main Principles and Approaches in SNF Management In order to deal with current and future problems, we need to develop and approve a strategy and a long-term concept for handling SNF. It is our opinion that the strategy should take into account three key current challenges with regard to ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in Russia today: 1) The existence of civil and defense industry facilities where SNF is kept under conditions that do not meet modern nuclear and radiation safety requirements and pose a threat to national security; 2) The acknowledgement of the need to tackle SNF-related problems that have accumulated on a government level and to stop postponing these issues any further; and 3) A weak government system to ensure and oversee nuclear and radiation safety in the use of nuclear energy (including in SNF management). The concept should incorporate fundamental principles and approaches in SNF management that will lay the foundation for key administrative, legal and economic mechanisms.
The main principles and approaches should include: • A total refusal to reprocess SNF, and, consequently, a refusal to build a research and demonstration center for SNF reprocessing at the Gorno-Khimichesky Combine; • The long-term, controlled storage of SNF in storage facilities that meet global safety standards; • Minimization of SNF transport; and • A refusal to import SNF into Russia from abroad. A plan for handling accumulated SNF should be as simple and safe as possible. It must be drawn up with due account for global practices and domestic realities.
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Key Actions The following actions are necessary for resolving the SNF management problem: • The creation of a government system for SNF management, which has administrative and economic independence from operators; • The creation of a legal base for ensuring safety in SNF management; • The creation of an infrastructure for regional dry storage facilities that meet international safety levels for long-term (at least 300 years) SNF storage; • The creation of interim storage facilities for short-term SNF storage before transfer to long-term storage; • The transfer of SNF that has been accumulated at NPP storage facilities to the facilities at Gorno-Khimichesky Combine and other storage facilities; • The closure and phase-out of the RT-1 Plant at Mayak; • Full compliance with international conventions in nuclear and radiation safety.
Conclusion The concept of the Federal Target Program for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety (2008–2015) considers three options for a nuclear and radiation safety strategy. Unfortunately, none of the options provides for the opportunity to cease the reprocessing of SNF or ruling out the ideology of a closed nuclear fuel cycle. That is why our proposals are aimed at including an option to cease the treatment of SNF in the FTP. We suggest that an option that rules out the introduction of a closed nuclear fuel cycle will free up resources that could be redirected at remediation of the territory and taking other actions set out in the FTP. Ceasing the partial SNF reprocessing and steering away from the idea of a closed nuclear fuel cycle will produce considerable economic benefits. Most importantly, it will help resolve the most critical problems we face today, and the problems we will face in the future, concerning environmental safety and the radioactive pollution of the environment.
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Results of the Sample-Based Radiation Inspection of the Zvezdochka Health Protection and Observation Zones. Measurement of External Gamma Radiation Dose Equivalent and Beta Particles Flux Density on Yagry Island, Severodvinsk
Vladimir Kuznetsov Director, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Academy of Industrial Ecology, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council Vladimir Nikitin General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, Severodvinsk
Nikolai Shcherbinin Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk
In December 2007, in accordance with the RosAtom Public Council plan and after several meetings with the management of Zvezdochka Shipyard, the parties agreed to conduct a sample-based radiation inspection of the health protection zone and the shipyard’s observation zone. On March 18, 2008, the following locations were included in the radiation inspections: the grounds of School No. 4 at 4 ulitsa Gogolya, 24 proezd Mashinostroitelei and the building’s stair landings, the grounds of the Rucheyok Kindergarten located at 3A ulitsa Gogolya, and samples along ulitsa Korabelnaya. The following people participated in the inspection: • Staff and technicians from the Zvezdochka Shipyard Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department’s External Environment Laboratory (accreditation certificate from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department [OYaRB] No. SARK RU.001442055 dated 07/05/07); • Vladimir Kuznetsov, PhD, member of RosAtom’s Public Council; • Staff and experts Green Cross Russia Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program; • Staff from the Hygiene and Epidemiology Center No. 58 of the Russian Federal Medical and Biological Agency (accreditation certificate No. GSEN. RU.TsOA/TsA.3/46 dated 05/15/03, State Registry entry No. ROSS. RU.0001.513937 dated 05/15/03); • Members of the Environmental Council under the Office of the Mayor of Severodvinsk, representatives of non-governmental organizations and movements of the cities of Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk. The inspection used dosimetry equipment that had gone through government verification and had been entered into the State Registry of equipment used to measure radiation. The equipment included the DRBP-03 dosimeter for measuring the external
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gamma-ray radiation dose equivalent, beta contamination, the DRG-06T (dose equivalent), and the DRG-06N (dose equivalent). Work was structured according to Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99), Basic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation Safety (OSPORB-99), and Environmental Radiation Monitoring at Enterprises Engaged in Building, Testing, Repair, or Disposal of Ship and Vessels with Nuclear Power Installations and Floating Support Structures (RD5.2946-99).
Inspection Conditions and Results in Establishing the Gamma-Ray Radiation Dose Equivalent Inspection conditions: air temperature: -14°С (6.8°F), no precipitation. Open grounds along the perimeter of School No. 4 at 4 ulitsa Gogolya: 103 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.133 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95. Open grounds along the perimeter of 24 proezd Mashinostroitelei building: 90 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.134 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95. Stair landings at 24 proezd Mashinostroitelei: 20 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.134 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95. No surface contamination by beta-active radionuclides. Open grounds along the perimeter of the Rucheyok Kindergarten at 3A ulitsa Gogolya: 75 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.131 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95. Open grounds along ulitsa Korabelnaya: 75 sampling points, maximum dose does not exceed 0.135 microsieverts/hour with p=0.95.
Conclusion No radiation anomalies or levels exceeding NRB-99 or OSPORB-99 standards were found.
256 Valeriy Men’shchikov, Co-Director of the International Social Ecological Union and the Russian Center for Environmental Politics’ Program for Radioactive and Nuclear Safety, Board Member of the Center of Russian Environmental Politics, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council, comments on one of the presentations.
Igor Babanin, Greenpeace Russia, St. Petersburg, talks about alternative energy scenarios for Russia. Lina Zernova, from the Public Advisory Council of Sosnov’y Bor, Leningrad Oblast.
Panel of the International Science and Technology Center session on alternative energy. From left to right: Aleksandr Chumakov, Vice President of Green Cross Russia; Albert Gozal, Senior Program Manager, Partnering & Sustainability Department, Commercialization Support Program (PCS), International Science and Technology Center; Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of the Legacy Program for Green Cross Switzerland; and Nina Lesikhina, Coordinator of Energy Projects, Bellona-Murmansk. International Dialogue participants. From left to right: Igor Khripunov, Associate Director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia; Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, Global Green USA and Chairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committee for Green Cross International; and Jurki Terya, Second Secretary for the Economy at the Finnish Embassy in Russia.
Nina Lesikhina, Coordinator of Energy Projects for Bellona-Murmansk, gives a presentation on “Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable Energy Sources on the Kola Peninsula.” Pavel Munin, Moscow Academy of Business Administration and the Eurasian Center of Continuous Development.
Leaders of the plenary session on ‘Radiobiological Problems and Rehabilitation of Affected Regions’, from left to right: Vladimir Sorokin, Chief Researcher, United Institute of Energetics and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus; Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Director of the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’s Public Council; Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council; and Valeriy Bulatov, Professor at Yugorsk State University, Khanty-Mansiisk. RosAtom employees at the Dialogue, from left to right: Igor Konyshev, Director of RosAtom’s Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch and Secretary of RosAtom’s Public Council; Ms. Ulanova, AtomProf’s Press Service; and Marina Labyntseva, Head of the Public Relations Department at the AtomProf Institute of Continued and Professional Studies.
Svetlana Kostina, Deputy Minister for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast, speaking about the experiences of RosAtom and the Chelyabinsk Oblast government on their joint project to clean the floodplain of the Techa River. Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program for Green Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council.
Valeriy Bulatov, Professor at Yugorsk State University, Khanty-Mansiisk, gives his presentation on “Remediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh Basin.” During a plenary session at the Dialogue.
Sergey Vakulovskiy, Deputy Director of the Typhoon Company, comments on data on the state of radiation near a nuclear explosion site. Nikolai Shcherbinin, Director of the Green Cross Public Outreach Office in Severodvinsk, talks about improving public outreach efforts by using existing systems of radiation monitoring and emergency response in the Arkhangelsk Oblast.
Svetlana Krasnoslobodtseva, Junior Scientific Collaborator at the Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Governments at the Urals Academy of Public Service, gives her presentation. At the podium: Vyacheslav Khatuntsev, Senior Lecturer at the Northwest Academy of Public Service, Severodvinsk.
Exchanging contact information: Norwegian journalist Morten Sickel (on the left) and Denis Flory, Advisor on Nuclear Issues at the French Embassy in Russia. Samat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator at the State Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov.
Sergei Zhavoronkin, expert with the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, Murmansk affiliate, follows the Dialogue presentations. The panel for the plenary session on international cooperation and global partnership in disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. From left to right: Vladimir Novosyolov, Professor at the Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service; Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation; Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, Global Green USA, and Chairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committee for Green Cross International; and Matt Martin, Program Manager, the Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa.
During the plenary session on spent fuel and radioactive waste. From left to right: Oleg Muratov, Executive Secretary of the Northwest Branch of the Nuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg; Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council, and Aleksandr Nikitin, Director of the Bellona Environmental Foundation, St. Petersburg. Dialogue participants: Anne-Marie Duchemin and Marie Kirchner, Members of the Council of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France; in between them, Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Director of the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’s Public Council; and on the right: Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Commission for Evaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-scale Tests with the State-owned the Scientific-Research Institute, Moscow.
Mr. Nasibov, Head of Public Relations for RosEnergoAtom (left), and Ms. Katkova of ITAR-TASS. Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Plenary Session on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste
Anatolii Nazarov Director, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Member of Russian Academy of Sciences; and Deputy Chairman, RosAtom’s Public Council; and Member, Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
Dear colleagues, I, as its Deputy Chairman, together with Vladimir Kuznetsov, Valery Men’shikov, and Albert Vasil’ev, Members of the RosAtom Public Council, can assure you that we have listened carefully to everything that was said at this Dialogue. The Council’s membership is made up exclusively of scientists and experts, and also includes the heads of non-profit organizations that also have experience working in the field of radiation and nuclear safety. As regards the presentations and discussions we heard today, these important contributions made this year’s Dialogue fundamentally different from the first; the speakers covered a broad range of topics, provided in-depth information, and introduced proposals from their regions. Work is indeed underway and moving fast toward the adoption of a law on radioactive waste, including how it is managed in Russia. The issue of spent nuclear fuel is left out, as was mentioned by Alexander Nikitin. It has been left out, because these are two completely separate issues. What can we do in this situation? We have the text of the draft law here, and the section chairman, Valery Men’shikov does too. We could re-write it right here on the spot and all those interested should send their comments for consideration by the Public Council. My second comment concerns the fact that the draft law will be submitted to the Duma in June [2008] in accordance with due process. This is an extremely important law. It is, in essence, seen as a new step forward by the public. It will then be submitted for consideration by the regions, including the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Mr. Talevlin, you must seize this opportunity! Every public organization and all Dialogue participants here today must take notice! This is a crucial decision, because the success of nuclear energy depends on how we handle radioactive waste. If we do not respond with suggestions, we will miss this opportunity. I would like to thank the presenters for their highly professional presentations. The high quality of the documents presented here is a significant achievement for grassroots organizations.
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The Nuclear and Radiation Legacy of Northwest Russia: Problems, Solutions, and the Role of the Public
Mikhail Rylov Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia, St. Petersburg
I am convinced that mankind cannot do without nuclear power and must be developed, but only in conditions of total safety. –Andrei Sakharov
The Scale of the Regional Radioecological Safety Problem Northwest Russia (NWR) — like no other region on Earth — is saturated with industrial, defense, and commercial firms and facilities that are potential sources of nuclear and radiation hazards. Their number is reaching the tens of thousands, and at least one-third of them conduct operations related to the military-industrial complex. As a result, an analysis and assessment of the radiation conditions in NWR lead us to the conclusion that this region features an increased level of all radiation risk factors, both natural and anthropogenic. A detailed overview of the radiological situation brings us to the obvious conclusion on the scale of the problem. The territory of NWR is home to a large number of companies that use nuclear and radioactive materials. These include the Leningrad NPP (4 RBMK-1000 reactors) and the Kola NPP (4 PWR-440 reactors), shipbuilding and ship repair plants for ships and other vessels with nuclear power installations, the nuclear icebreaker fleet, the Northern Fleet (where over 60% of the ships are nuclear-powered, carry nuclear weapons and are equipped with the infrastructure to provide maintenance for nuclear facilities), and over 4,000 companies using radioactive substances and other sources of radiation for technological purposes. The facilities and infrastructure of the nuclear fleet include primarily nuclear submarines and ships, nuclear icebreakers, light carriers, nuclear service ships (NSS), as well as fleet bases, coastal maintenance bases and floating technical bases, technical property bases, temporary spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transshipment points and nuclear submarine decommissioning and dismantlement bases. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) have a special place in radioecological safety. RTG were developed as autonomous sources of electricity for use in remote areas. RTG have been the focus of much Russian and international attention due to the potential dangers associated with them for humans and the environment, as their 90Sr activity levels can reach 1x1015Bq. Other sources of radiation pollution that pose a potential threat to the environment include: • Nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya;
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• Underground nuclear explosions for “peaceful” purposes; • Radioactive waste storage points; • Submerged nuclear ships and radioactive waste (RW) on the floor of the Kara and Barents Seas; • The consequences of radioactive fallout after the Chernobyl accident; and • The transportation of radiation hazards. Experts say that the Barents Sea gets nearly 20% of cesium and 30% of strontium from radwaste dumped by European SNF reprocessing plants at Sellafield, Dounreay and Cape de la Hague (France). This list should also include companies where operations also have a negative impact on the region’s radiation conditions, as the radioactive products of their operations enter the northern rivers and the Arctic Sea. These include the Siberian Chemical Combine in the City of Tomsk, Mayak in the South Urals, and the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Plant. The region has districts with increased natural sources of ionizing radiation. These include: the Baltic Klint (with of the layer black argillite [Dictyonema shale] at the surface), the Medvezhegorsk Rayon of Karelia (high levels of equilibrium equivalent radon — up to 2,500 Bq/m3 — have been found at most of the developed mines and shafts in Karelia). Increased radiation hazards are still in effect in the village of Vodny (in the Komi Republic) within the boundaries of a former radium plant. Despite the fact that most radioactive pollution has been contained and decontaminated over the past 50 years, there are still areas where people should not go. An extremely critical environmental situation has developed on the Kola Peninsula (the Levozyorsk and Kovdor Mining Plants), where high concentrations of industrial (mining, ferrous metals, machine building) is leading to rapid deterioration of the environment and negative impact on the health of local residents. This is because the content of radioactive substances in the ore, half-finished material and finished products are close to the lower end of the range of radioactivity that requires special measures. A demographic analysis reflects the poor conditions of NWR’s large cities in the manifestation of a number of diseases (respiratory, nervous system, urogenital disorders and birth defects). The main reasons behind the mortality rate of the adult population are circulatory diseases and malignant tumors. Those employed at nuclear complex companies have noted a growing trend in tumor cases. The increase in children’s diseases caused by tumors is especially worrying. Overall, Russia’s Northwest can be characterized as a region with an increased risk of exposure of the public and the environment to damaging effects in the event of accidents at facilities that would require an emergency response or due to hazardous natural phenomena. Approximately 8.5 million people (54% of the region’s population) live in NWR’s risk zones. Based on the presence of hazards and the calculated potential losses for the local residents, the region’s territory is subjected to: • Radiation hazards: 300,000 residents (26%) in the Murmansk Oblast, and 150,000 (8%) in the Leningrad Oblast. • Chemical hazards: 4.5 million residents (68%) in the Leningrad Oblast and the City of St. Petersburg; 500,000 (30%) in the Arkhangelsk Oblast;
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250,000 (33%) in the Novgorod Oblast; 480,000 (35%) in the Vologda Oblast; 280,000 (33%) in the Pskov Oblast; 360,000 (40%) in the Kaliningrad Oblast; 120,000 (15%) in the Republic of Karelia; and 290,000 residents (25%) in the Murmansk Oblast. Consequently, radiation hazard zones are home to 450,000 residents (3%), while 6.7 million (42% of the region’s entire population) live in zones of potential chemical threat. The key issues in preventing radiation pollution of the environment while continuing to operate nuclear and radiation facilities are: • The acceleration of the rate at which SNF is being removed from nuclear submarine and nuclear ship reactors and support for SNF management; • The slicing of reactor compartments containing removed SNF; • Planned and organized removal of SNF to Mayak; • The burial of unsafe reactor compartments holding SNF; • The removal of SNF from floating and coastal storage points that pose radiation hazards; • The remediation of the land and decontamination of structures at the Russian Navy’s coastal technical bases; • The provision of all types of safety (radiation, nuclear, toxicological, explosion and fire hazards, durability and water-proofing) while keeping nuclear submarines and NSS in non-operating conditions; • The construction of an infrastructure for RW and SNF management, including storage facilities for reactor compartments; • The creation of installations for consolidation of liquid radwaste (LRW); • The construction of long-term storage facilities or regional burial grounds for RW; • The elimination of unauthorized RW burial sites and restoring territories affected by radiation pollution; • The increase in effectiveness in cleaning gas emissions; • The introduction of a comprehensive system for decontaminating waste water • The creation of a system for a closed water processing cycle with chemical reagent disposal. Despite the wide range and large scale of radioecological problems, these are all things that can be resolved. The nature of the specific measures that are taken should be established by the Russian Government based on the presence of sources of radiation and nuclear hazards that may affect humans and the environment.
Views on the Development of Nuclear Power As a complicated technological complex, a nuclear power plant is a source of increased risk: there is a probability of damages, malfunctions or other bugs in plant operations with unpredictable consequences. The close proximity of the Leningrad NPP to St. Petersburg and Russia’s borders require increased public attention to safety and environmental protection. However, the public understands that the risk of living without heat and power is a major risk. Everyone understands that the country’s economy will fail to grow without the development of power. Along these lines, the development of capacities
260 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY at the Leningrad and Kola NPPs is a logical step toward solving the energy deficit in NWR. The administration and the public of the constituents of NWR are interested in implementing NPP-2 projects in the Leningrad and Kola regions. On February 7, 2007, public hearings were held in Sosnovy Bor on the environmental impact assessments of the construction and operations of these new plants. The Leningrad NPP-2-4, equipped with PWR-1100 reactors, will replace the current reactors at the Leningrad NPP with RBMK reactors and will become a reliable source of electricity for NWR throughout the 21st century. The expected state of the environment and living conditions will help assess Leningrad NPP-2 as environmentally safe based on the requirements of current regulatory documents. The effects of radiation are minor, and the consequences of chemical and thermal effects on the district’s microclimate do not present any danger. The construction of new reactors will provide many socioeconomic advantages: the creation of new jobs, the construction of social and business facilities, and an increase in the tax base. When the development of nuclear power becomes one of the priorities for the authorities and for the country as a whole, changes in public sentiment with regard to nuclear power will inevitably result. Many of our compatriots (especially the younger generations) understand that the nuclear industry is the future of our country. This is why today, due to the sharp rise in the growth rate of electricity consumption, the public is beginning to view nuclear power in a better light. It has become a serious, respected and constructive option in most of the country’s regions. People understand that this is one of the economy’s competitive and environmentally safe industries today.
The Role of the Public in Resolving Radioecological Problems The systemic crisis that took shape in the early 1990s gave rise to a wide range of complex problems, including the sharp decline of in the state’s economic ability to continue the necessary financing of efforts related to large-scale reductions of nuclear arsenals, the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and nuclear ships from Russia’s Navy, and the remediation of the consequences of the nuclear and radiation legacy of the Cold War. Some of the defense facilities in NWR turned out to be in very poor, nearly unsafe conditions, which is a major factor in radiation and nuclear risks for the public and the environment. It is clear that in order to resolve issues at this level in a democratic country, public opinion plays a considerable role, and that opinion could turn out to have the final say. One cannot deny the fact that the concerns of Russian people regarding nuclear and radiation safety after Chernobyl has led to a decline in the construction of new reactors. Furthermore, we must consider the international public response, since nuclear technology is perceived as having the highest possible potential for destruction. Nuclear and radiation safety is basically the top issue in environmental safety and sociopolitical and economic stability. If one or several major accidents take place, then the public will stop seeing the use of nuclear energy as an acceptable option. Public opinion polls conducted recently have shown that people will change their stance on an issue depending on the related events taking place in the country. Considering the importance of the nuclear issue for NWR (the nuclear testing range in Novaya Zemlya, the construction and dismantlement of ships with nuclear installations, the construction of floating nuclear service ships in Severodvinsk, and facilities dealing in the management of SNF and radioactive waste, the second Leningrad NPP in Sosnovy
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Bor, the second Kola NPP in Polyarniye Zori in the Murmansk Oblast and an FNPPs near Arkhangelsk; the extension of the service life of operating NPP reactors, the environmental remediation of coastal maintenance bases in the Andreeva Bay and the village of Gremikha, the creation of complexes for reprocessing all types of radioactive wastes at the temporary storage point in the Andreeva Bay and the long-term storage point in Sayda), the local authorities and the public are speaking out openly about nuclear and radiation safety and the protection of personnel, the population and the environment given so many large-scale projects in the region. In previous decades, nuclear experts did not inform society about what they were doing. The international community has constantly expressed concern about the situation developing in Northwest Russia. In 2003, a decision was made to draft the two-phase Strategic Master Plan (SMP) for the dismantlement of the nuclear fleet. The first phase was drafted by Russian experts. The final document includes a detailed analysis of the current situation and setsout long-term goals for the comprehensive dismantlement of ships with nuclear installations and remediation of coastal maintenance bases. The report also presents urgent measures for strategic solutions for the entire project, and priorities have been defined. Priority measures include the creation of facility-specific and regional monitoring and emergency response systems in NWR. While conducting the environmental impact assessment, the impact of the planned activity on the air, water, and soil as well as facility staff and the local population was considered in order for company managers to make informed decisions toward reducing radiation and non-radiation risks at potentially hazardous facilities. Over the past several years, the public has voiced a strong interest in these problems and expressed serious concerns about a number of topics; the public fervently supports efforts to clean the region from the nuclear and radiation legacy left from previous years, while accepting RosSudoStroyeniye operations. Overall, the level of nuclear and radiation safety in NWR meets the standards set out in regulatory documents and meets the recommendations of relevant international organizations. Working in what is now referred to as this “sensitive area” of these brewing problems, it is time to work toward a constructive dialogue (consolidation) between public organizations and the regional authorities, RosAtom, and the Russian Naval Fleet. It is good that discussions are taking place, that they are transparent, open, and based on a commitment to and deep understanding of the problems related to nuclear and radiation safety. The proponents of nuclear power do not need to give up their positions, neither do they need to go looking for trouble. One requisite condition for the sustainable development of nuclear power is greater ability to respond adequately to the continual changes taking place in society and in nature. The constructive criticism of independent experts and professionals is an objective necessity for the safe development of in this power sector. Today, we can say that certain positive results have been achieved. However, there are still many unresolved problems concerning cooperation among NGOs on the one hand, and RosAtom, the Russian Naval Fleet, and government authorities and agencies on the other hand. These include the problem of access to information and access to facilities. What is getting in the way are old foundations and traditions, and the conservative views of officials. It is important to overcome aversions to and the lack of understanding of nuclear power, not by making things secret or covering things up, but by explaining, persuading, disseminating special knowledge, providing appropriate
262 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY education and improving the awareness of all members of society. We must reconsider old views and during preparations for new ideas and plans in Northwest Russia, hold broader consultations with public organizations. This will reassure us that we are making the right decisions. NGOs should look to improve their corporate management culture and focus on a balanced approached toward introducing nuclear technologies in the power industry. We must pool our efforts to resolve nuclear and radiation safety problems productively. The assistance of the public and NGOs in doing away with the legacy of the Cold War in Northwest Russia will be viewed positively.
Conclusion The use of nuclear energy for peaceful and military purposes is a fundamentally important part of many operations that provide national security for Russia for the following reasons: • The possession of nuclear weapons is currently (and will continue to be) the main guarantee of Russia’s status as a global superpower, while the presence of a powerful nuclear fleet will maintain Russia’s status as a leading maritime power. Russia’s Naval Fleet and the defense and military complex in Northwest Russia play a major role in ensuring Russia’s national interests. • The nuclear industry is the most developed in terms of science and technology and is at the forefront, both in Russia and in other countries. The products and services produced by the companies of Northwest Russia’s nuclear industry contribute significantly to Russia’s GNP. • Weakening scientific and technical potential in this field, reduced studies for strategically important developments in science and technology are threatening Russia with the loss of its leading global position, the degradation of science- intensive productions, a stronger dependence on foreign technology and the curtailment of Russia’s defense capabilities. The accelerated pace of economic development in NWR and improved living standards for the local population have resulted in increased demand for electricity. Large municipal conglomerations, regions where hydrocarbons are mined and the location of heavy industry firms and military and defense facilities have run into problems with insufficient electricity. Under these conditions, the nuclear sector faces the major challenge of increasing electricity generation. Developments should be based on sustainable energy well-being, without which it will be impossible to resolve problems in the industrial, transportation, and social economic sectors. Under the Federal Target Program for the development of the nuclear power industry complex in Russia in 2007–2010 with an outlook to 2015, Russia’s Northwest region needs to take on the following tasks: • The construction of four new reactors with a design capacity of 1,100 MWt at Leningrad NPP-2 (Sosnovy Bor) with operations to be launched in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, in addition to reactor No. 1 with a design capacity of 1,100 MWt at Kola NPP-2 (Polyarniye Zori, Murmansk Oblast), to be launched in 2020. • The extension of the service life of operating reactors 2–4 with design capacities of 1,000 MWt at Leningrad NPP-2, with operations to be launched in 2007, 2009 and 2011, in addition to two reactors (3 and 4) with a projected
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capacity of 440 MWt at Kola NPP, with expected launch of operations in 2011 and 2014, respectively. • The construction of a small-capacity nuclear power plant with a KLT-40S reactor installation (Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast). • The construction of radwaste management facilities (Polyarniye Zori, Murmansk Oblast), with operations to be launched in 2008. • The construction of a complex for the reprocessing and storage of solid and liquid radioactive wastes, in addition to a complex of facilities for the reprocessing and storage of SNF (Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast) with operations to be launched in 2008. • The development of a NPP-2006 baseline project for a mass-produced PWR reactor (AtomEnergoProekt St. Petersburg Scientific Research and Design Engineering Institute, a federal state-owned franchise). Meanwhile, we must not forget that ensuring nuclear and radiation safety is fundamentally the most prominent issue for environmental safety as well as society’s sociopolitical and economic stability. Restricting the effects of radiation on the environment, minimizing the consequences of previous radiation accidents and catastrophes, and a high-quality, streamlined system providing nuclear and radiation safety in Northwest Russia are all priorities in the joint efforts of the government and the public in the field of environmental protection.
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The Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and the Environmental Rehabilitation of Facilities Constituting Nuclear and Radiation Hazards: Experience, Today’s Problems, and the Future
Viktor Kovalenko Associate Manager, RosAtom’s Department for SNF and RW Management and Decommissioning Hazardous Nuclear and Radiation Facilities Alexander Pimenov Deputy Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET), Moscow Vladimir Shishkin Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET), Moscow
The scale of the nuclear submarine dismantlement project: • The total activity levels of nuclear submarine materials and accumulated radioactive waste (RW) amounts to nearly 80×106 Ci; • The total weight of all radioactive construction material designated for disposal is at least 1 million tons; • It would take over 300 railway train trips to transfer all of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF); • Based on feasibility studies, in order to complete priority tasks in dismantling nuclear ships and vessels, rehabilitation efforts for facilities will require at least USD 4 billion. The state-run Dollezhal Institute of Scientific Research and Power Engineering (known as the Dollezhal Institute or NIKIET from its abbreviation in Russian) is: 1. A scientific leader in the efforts toward the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear installations, nuclear service ships, and the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous nuclear and radiation facilities. 2. The chief executor (in terms of nuclear and radiation safety and the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities in the Russian Navy) of the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear power installations. The Institute also deals with the reduction of radiation hazard levels where these facilities are stationed, and the environmental rehabilitation of facilities that belong to Russia’s Ministry of Defense (see Figures 1–3).
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Figure 1. Number of nuclear submarines being decommissioned (grey bars) and number of nuclear submarines containing SNF maintained in storage (white bars) (2000 White Book).
The Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy serves as the government client and coordinator and ensures: • The comprehensive dismantlement of decommissioned Naval nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships, floating technical bases, tankers, and floating storage facilities; • The environmental rehabilitation of former facilities of Russia’s Ministry of Defense (under the Navy) used for temporary storage of SNF, solid RW (SRW) and liquid RW (LRW); • The funds derived from the sale of recycled materials from dismantled nuclear submarines and ships are used to finance the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and related work; • The stationing of nuclear submarines designated for dismantlement; • Unloading SNF from nuclear submarines and ships undergoing dismantlement; • Unloading SNF and RW from storage containers on nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement; • Transferring SNF from nuclear submarines, nuclear ships, and nuclear service ships to Mayak; • Separating reactors and the ends of nuclear submarines; • The long-term storage of separated reactors; • Reconstructing and creating new solutions for unloading SNF from the reactors or nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement; • Creating and using the structures and solutions for the safe temporary storage of SNF at sites where SNF is unloaded and transferred for treatment; • The conversion, temporary storage and subsequent dismantlement of nuclear service ships; • The collection and reprocessing of RW that forms during the nuclear submarine
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dismantlement process; • The collection, reprocessing, conditioning and subsequent storage of all types of RW accumulated at coastal maintenance bases; • The development and implementation of a flowchart for process stages and transportation for the safe management of SNF and its transfer from bases to treatment sites; • A series of steps toward the environmental rehabilitation of buildings, structures and associated grounds;
Figure 2. The location of decommissioned Naval nuclear submarines, dismantlement companies and temporary storage points for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the Northwest Region.
Figure 3. The location of decommissioned Naval nuclear submarines, dismantlement companies and temporary storage points for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the Pacific Region.
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The Dollezhal Institute has developed and put into practice: • A concept for the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear power installations; • A concept for the environmental rehabilitation of coastal maintenance bases in the Russia’s Pacific and Northern regions; • Technology for conserving nuclear submarine reactors when it is not possible to remove all SNF from the reactor; • General technical requirements for one-compartment blocks of reactor compartments for nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement; • General technical requirements for using reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear submarines to store SRW; • Fundamental provisions for preparing reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear submarines for storage at Sayda; • Technology for using the Sayda long-term storage point (regulations); • Technology for using the Razboinik long-term storage point (regulations); • Technology for the environmental rehabilitation of unsafe nuclear submarines; • Technical feasibility studies for safely handling unsafe nuclear submarines (numbers 541, 175 and 533); • Instructions for maintenance of one-compartment reactors from dismantled nuclear submarines; • Instructions for the dismantlement of the barrels from safety control systems from dismantled nuclear submarines during removal of SNF; • Additional measures to prevent simultaneous chain reactions when conducting potentially hazardous work on nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement; • Other work and removing SNF from reactors from nuclear submarines undergoing dismantlement in contingency situations.
Figure 4. Nuclear submarine dismantlement: process stages and transportation flowchart.
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Key efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations, and Nuclear service ships as well as the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities: 1. The environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities. 2. The safe storage of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations decommissioned from the Russian naval fleet, and floating three-compartment reactor blocks at temporary storage points; 3. Removal of SNF from reactors from nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear power installations, as well as coastal storage facilities for handling SNF safely, its temporary storage, transport and treatment; 4. Forming one-compartment (3-compartment) reactor blocks and dismantlement of the ends of nuclear submarines; 5. Handling unsafe nuclear submarines and nuclear service ships; 6. Creating long-term storage points and points of transport for reactor compartments at coastal long-term storage points; 7. The collection, conditioning and reprocessing of radioactive wastes that form during the dismantlement process of nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear power installations and the rehabilitation of facilities presenting a radiation hazard; 8. The collection and burial of harmful and toxic wastes; 9. Dismantlement of nuclear service ships.
Figure 5. Removal of SNF from nuclear submarine reactors, 1994–2007
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Figure 6. Storage containers for radioactive components of nuclear submarines.
Figure 7. A storage site for radioactive components of nuclear submarines.
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Table 1. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement: Progress Made
RosAtom (Russian Total (as Russian Ministry of Nuclear Ministry of Nuclear of Defense, 1986–1998 (over submarines Energy) 1999–present April 15, a 12-year period) (over a 10-year period) 2008)
Decommissioned from the Russian 177 21 198 Naval Fleet
Removed SNF 53 118 171
Dismantled 39 125 164
Designated for dismantlement, total 34 (including those currently undergoing dismantlement).
Designated for dismantlement with SNF not removed (including those 27 currently undergoing dismantlement)
Summary of Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET) Operations: The following has been accomplished: • The safe dismantlement of 164 nuclear submarines; • The launch of operations at the first phase of the long-term storage point for reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear submarines in Sayda Bay; • The development, coordination and monitoring of the use of the infrastructure and equipment used to remove SNF from the reactors of dismantled nuclear submarines and transport it for treatment; • The development of economic indicators for the dismantlement of ships, actual quantitative and qualitative attributes for the products of dismantlement and the related costs; • Substantiation of a list of priority R&D tasks and coordination of R&D co-executors working on the comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations, nuclear service ships and the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities, as well as the management of unsafe nuclear submarines; • Comprehensive radiation and technical inspections of unsafe facilities designated for dismantlement (nuclear submarines) and environmental rehabilitation (temporary storage points in Andreeva Bay and the village of Gremikha).
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Figure 8. Ships with nuclear power installations: the Admiral Lazarev battlecruiser (left) and the Urals.
Figure 9. A storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and solid radioactive waste at a coastal maintenance base in Andreeva Bay.
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Figure 10. A storage facility for solid radioactive waste under construction in Sysoyev Bay, 5,000 m3.
Main research and development areas • Development of technical solutions and feasibility studies for contingency situations in the dismantlement process for nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships; • Developing technical standards and organizational documents supporting comprehensive dismantlement and the environmental rehabilitation of radiation hazards and functioning long-term storage points; • Development and launch of operations of infrastructure facilities and equipment used in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and SNF transport; • Development of projects and launching operations at long-term storage points for reactor compartments from nuclear submarines in the Northwest and Pacific regions; • Development of an enclosure at Ustrichny Cape for the containment of unsafe nuclear submarines.
Key strategic issues requiring solutions • The environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities; • Ensuring safe SNF management; • The completion of coastal long-term storage points for reactor compartments in the regions, the construction of which is currently underway in the Northwest at Sayda Bay thanks to international aid (Germany) and in the Pacific region in Razboinik Bay thanks to federal budget contributions; • The creation of regional centers for RW consolidation and long-term storage; • Ensuring the safe management of unsafe nuclear submarines and nuclear service ships, and the creation of coastal storage facilities for unsafe nuclear submarines.
Main unresolved problems slowing the pace of nuclear submarine dismantlement and the environmental rehabilitation of hazardous radiation facilities • The lack of railway lines between the Zvezda coastal SNF removal complex
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and Smolyaninovo station, which transports SNF for treatment; • The absence of modern regional high-output centers for the conditioning and long-term storage of RW in Russia’s Northwest and Pacific regions; • The absence of a final solution for selecting the best possible options for the management of SNF and RW accumulated at former coastal Naval bases, including defective SNF and SNF from Alpha nuclear submarine reactors; the rehabilitation of the buildings and structures of these facilities; • Delays in resolving issues concerning the reconstruction of the bridge through Nikolskoye estuary into the town of Severodvinsk to facilitate the removal of SNF from areas of accumulation and enable operations at the coastal SNF removal base; • The lack of any operating coastal long-term storage points for reactor compartments in the Pacific region; • The lack of funds to support the safe shipment of nuclear submarines from their stationed location to dismantlement companies; • The absence of full and reliable information on the quantity, type and state of SNF and RW in temporary storage facilities, as well as the state of their buildings and structures; • The absence of modern methods for the safe management of toxic wastes produced during the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and ships with nuclear power installations; • The lack of modern regional radiation and environmental monitoring systems.
Priority measures that will help resolve the problems listed above • Comprehensive engineering and radiation surveys of territories, buildings and structures of former coastal Naval bases and adjacent waters; • The collection and analysis of information on the quantity, type and state of SNF and RW, and the creation of an industrial infrastructure for the rehabilitation of facilities and territories for SNF and RW management; • The development and implementation of projects for the optimum, safe management of SNF and RW located in storage facilities belonging to former coastal Naval bases; • Maintenance of the achieved pace of dismantlement of nuclear submarines, ships with nuclear power installations and nuclear service ships at industrial companies; • Completion of the creation of coastal long-term storage points for reactor compartments; • The reconstruction of railway tracks from Smolyaninovo station to Zvezda (the town of Bolshoy Kamen) to support the railway transport of SNF; • The reconstruction of the bridge through Nikolskoye estuary into the town of Severodvinsk in order to facilitate the removal of SNF from areas of accumulation and enable operations at the coastal SNF removal base; • The development of projects and construction of regional centers for radwaste consolidation and long-term storage; • The creation of coastal enclosures for unsafe nuclear submarines; • The preparation and removal of SNF and the subsequent dismantlement of the
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Lepse service ship; • The development and implementation of projects to create modern regional radiation monitoring systems; • The creation and modernization of physical protection systems for comprehensive dismantlement facilities.
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The 1954 Nuclear Exercise at the Totskoye Test Range: How is this “Radiation Legacy” Dangerous?
Sergei Zelentsov The Government Institute for Strategic Stability, RosAtom, Moscow
Vadim Logachev Co-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full- Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow Anatoliy Matushchenko Co-Chairman, Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom, Professor, Moscow
The Totskoye Nuclear Exercise: The Concept and the Process The leadership of the Soviet Union learned that, in the autumn of 1949, the United States developed plans for a potential nuclear attack against USSR. One of these — “Operation Dropshot” — involved dropping 300 nuclear bombs on 100 Soviet cities. But, at the time, scientists did not yet fully understand the consequences of this kind of attack on the perpetrator or on the planet as a whole. However, the consequences of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, were horrifying. Our armed forces in the post-World War Two period, right up to 1953, were equipped only with standard weapons and military technology used against Hitler’s Germany. The way our troops were trained and led was based on the experience from the recent war. But intense research was already underway at test ranges and laboratories. In 1953, the USSR’s Army and Navy began to learn about using nuclear weapons. The troops were now being trained in military techniques in the event that nuclear weapons were used. The focus changed to creating missile technology, which was seen as the best means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target. The USSR had already gained experience from eight nuclear tests under Soviet programs: one on August 29, 1949 (the first above-ground test, 22 kilotons, at the Semipalatinsk test range), two in 1951 (September 24, above ground, 38 kilotons; October 18, an air test (a 42 kiloton bomb was dropped, the explosion took place at a height of 380 meters — note this one in particular!), five in 1953 (the most powerful above-ground test at 400 kilotons, and 4 air tests, ranging from 1.6–28 kilotons). Then another program was adopted in 1954: 10 nuclear tests were to take place over September–November, and one of them was to take place at the Totskoye test range in Orenburg. This test was planned as a tactical exercise where a nuclear bomb would fall as close as possible to a military post. By 1954, the US Air Force boasted over 700 nuclear bombs and had conducted 45 nuclear tests, including the bombing of two Japanese cities. What’s important, however,
276 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY is that, by 1954 in the United States, eight exercises were conducted using nuclear weapons. At the test range in Yucca Flats, Nevada, during one tactical exercise that involved the use of nuclear weapons under the codename Desert Rock IV, a nuclear device of 30 kilotons was detonated on the ground. The troops were located 3 km from the explosion site. The offensive began eight minutes after the start of the operation. A Decree passed on September 29, 1953 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers approved holding exercises involving the use of nuclear weapons with troops. Due to the difficulty in preserving the secrecy of the exercise given the involvement of a large number of troops, and the need to select an area that in terms of terrain and plant life was closest to areas in the European part of the USSR, the decision was made to conduct these exercises at the Totskoye Training and Artillery test range in the South Urals military district. The range was a flat valley of the Makhova River measuring 15 km long and 2–3 km wide, and featuring shrubbery and wooded areas, with rugged topography on either side (1–3). The theme of the exercises was announced as “Breaking through the enemy’s prepared tactical defense using nuclear weapons” (1). The rugged terrain in the area, marked for the explosion of a 40 kiloton nuclear bomb at a height of 350 meters, was similar to the one conducted on October 18, 1951 at the Semipalatinsk test range and supported multilateral testing of the impact of a nuclear explosion on military facilities, equipment and animals and helped identify the effect of the terrain and the flora in the area on the spread of the shock wave, radiant flash and penetrating radiation. The location of villages and settlements in the area of the exercises made it possible to avoid causing significant harm to the interests of the local population during the explosion and select a bomber route that would skirt the largest villages and that would ensure safety as the radioactive cloud moved to the east, north, and northwest. The troops at the exercises were transferred to specially designated personnel groups in line with the organization adopted in 1954 and provided with new arms and military equipment. The fact that the troops were being prepared for the upcoming exercises can be gleaned from the report document materials: over 380 km of trenches were dug in the areas where the troops were set up, and over 500 dugouts and other shelters were built. In order to conduct research, a special group comprised of six generals, 207 officers, 28 servicemen, and 23 soldiers and sergeants was put together. This group also included representatives from the Sixth Department of the Ministry of Defense, the Semipalatinsk Test Range, the Central Scientific Research Institute No. 12, and representatives from the Central Departments of the Ministry of Defense, the 71st test range of the armed forces, SredMash (the predecessor of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy), and even the Soviet Ministry of Culture (3).
Some historical background: the Supervisor of this group was the Deputy Manager of Special Training, Lieutenant General V. Bolyako; his Deputies were: Major General M. Kochergin, Major General B. Malyutov of the Engineering Troops, Major General K. Pavlovsky of the Medical Services, Colonels V. Tyutyunnikov, A. Ivanov, and A. Osin, and Colonel Engineer I. Remezov. Scientific Research departments were headed by: Colonel S. Forsten, Colonel N. Smirnov of Medical Services, and Colonel Engineers P. Rusanov and I. Remezov. Colonel Engineer N. Kozin and Captain Engineer S. Zelentsov were assigned the
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task of determining the coordinates and force of the explosion. All of the actions were reviewed and approved by a special commission headed by Ivan Kurchatov. This group included: N. Semenov, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, M. Sadovsky, Correspondent Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Generals V. Bolyako and B. Malyutov. SredMash was represented by V. Alfyorov and Y. Gavrilov. The event was represented by G. Zhukov, Deputy Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union and V. Malyshev, representing SredMash at the Central Committee of the Communist Party and approved by Ruling No. P80/1 passed on August 26, 1954 (3).
The exercise documents confirm that planned safety measures prevented the destructive aspects of the nuclear explosion from affecting those involved with radiation exceeding established allowable standards. In particular, this concerned the allowable contamination levels of those involved and military equipment were lowered several times from the standards that were issued by the Instructions on anti-nuclear defense. The areas of the selected territory with radiation levels over 25 R/hr during the exercises were declared prohibited zones, warning signs were posted, and the troops were instructed to avoid them. The strict enforcement of all rules and instructions left no risk that any harm would be caused to the troops. The exercises saw the organization and actual implementation of a new type of tactical military support: anti-nuclear defense. Special attention was paid to engineering equipment for the premises, dispersing and camouflaging the troops, observing and alerts, and radiation reconnaissance. Nearly 45,000 people, thousands of weapons, tanks, thousands of motor vehicles were sheltered and camouflaged in engineering structures. A site in the valley was designated for the approximate epicenter of the explosion. All other military components of the enemy (“Westerners”) and our front (“Easterners”) were determined relative to the epicenter. On the one side, at a distance of 5 km, a variety of military equipment was placed: tanks, artillery weapons of varying calibers, airplanes of varying classes, armored vehicles and trucks. In order to evaluate the impact of destructive factors of the nuclear explosion on living things, animals were also placed in the area: sheep, pigs, cows, and horses. A large number of devices were scattered around the premises in order to register the parameters of the nuclear explosion: excess pressure in the shockwave, the fireball and temperature impulses, and the dose of penetrating radiation.
Exercise Day: September 14, 1954 By 9 AM, the wind was almost westerly, at speeds of 20 m/s. By the time the bomber was en route, the target was covered with medium level cloud cover of 5–7 oktas. At 9:33 AM, the bomber was flying at an altitude of 8,000 meters and dropped the nuclear bomb, the explosion of which followed within 48 seconds and took place at a height of 350 meters, at 280 meters northwest of the target. The explosion was accompanied by a blinding flash, and then followed by an incandescent, luminous area on the site of the explosion that quickly increased in size and took the shape of a ball before beginning to transform into an expanding mushroom cloud. Five minutes later, the 20-minute artillery preparation started. Then a bomber
278 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY assault was launched. Those monitoring radiation reconnaissance near the epicenter of the explosion arrived in 40 minutes. They established that the level of radiation in that area, one hour after the explosion, reached 50 R/hr; 25 R/hr within 300 meters of the epicenter, 0.5 R/ hr within a 500-meter radius, and 0.1 R/hr within an 850-meter radius. The delimitation of the boundaries of the pollution zone was completed 1.5 hours after the explosion, or prior to the entry of the troops into the polluted zone. At approximately noon, the “Eastern” troops, having begun to enter the tactical defense zone and working their way through the fires, entered the area of the nuclear explosion. The area was unrecognizable: trees had been cleared, only splinters remained from the enormous oaks that had stood there moments before, all of the grass had been “combed” to one side, as if after a flood. During the exercise, nuclear explosions were simulated twice more and were psychologically perceived as nuclear assaults. At 4 PM the exercises were completed. The lines of soldiers began to make their way back to the field camps, where concluding operations were conducted to evaluate the health of the participants and to decontaminate equipment and weapons. That was the USSR Armed Forces’ first experience with troops working under conditions involving the use of nuclear weapons (1–3).
Radiation Conditions at the Exercises Immediately before the “Eastern” troops played their role in the exercises, radiation reconnaissance established that at D+2.5 hours after the explosion, at a distance of 400 meters from the epicenter of the explosion, the exposure rate did not exceed 0.1 R/hr. In other words, moving by foot through the polluted area at an average speed of 4–5 km/hr, the participants could have been exposed to approximately 0.02–0.03 R of radiation, and those in armored vehicles and tanks would have received 4–8 times less than that. Furthermore, the exposure rate near the nuclear explosion was measured with specially-installed remote devices. For example at 750 meters from the epicenter, the remote gamma-ray recorded the following measurements: 65 R/hr 2 minutes after the explosion; 10 R/hr 10 minutes after the explosion; 2.4 R/hr 25 minutes after the explosion, and 1.5 R/hr after 50 minutes, due to A1 decay with a half-life of 2.24 minutes. Another important detail: the aircraft that flew over to bomb targets on the ground 21–22 minutes after the nuclear bomb were forced to cross through the stem of the mushroom cloud — the barrel of the radioactive cloud. Dosimetric monitoring of the flight staff and the planes after landing indicated insignificant levels of contamination Specifically, the exposure rate from pollution in the plane’s fuselage measured at 0.2–0.3 R/hr, and 0.2–0.3 R/hr inside the cabin. The reason is that the exposure rate was measured based on the specific details of the explosion with radiation primarily from short-lived, induced-activity radionuclides: isotopes of aluminum, manganese, sodium found in soil. No fission products were found near the explosion zone. This conclusion has been confirmed by activity measurements from soil samples from the explosion zone (1–3, 8). Thus, the Totskoye explosion, according to the standard classification system, is an explosion at the scaled height of burst of 10.2 m/kilotons1/3. One of the distinguishing features of these explosions is that despite the connection of the dust column with the cloud of the explosion, the soil and ground lifted from the surface does not react with radioactive products — the fragments of nuclear fuel fission. As a result, the formation
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of a source of radioactive pollution takes place only due to the condensation of the vaporized bomb construction materials and the subsequent coagulations of the drops of the resulting liquid and the concentration of radionuclides therein. The largest size of radionuclide particles formed in this manner does not exceed 20–40 µm while the median mass is 10 µm. These particles are dispersed and fall onto the Earth’s surface at distances of up to several hundreds — even thousands — of kilometers from the place where the explosion takes place. Furthermore, the surface layer of soil in the epicentral zone experiences the impact of a flow of neutron radiation that triggers the activation of chemical elements in the soil. Activated particles in the surface layer of soil are then pulled into the disturbed area of the atmosphere, and subsequently fall from the dust column onto the areas closest to the epicenter as determined by the air current in the surface atmosphere. On September 14, 1954, the fireball at the epicenter caused the moisture in the soil to evaporate and incinerated organic substances, causing the ground to crack and crumble. The result was the widespread formation of smoke and dust in the surface layer of the atmosphere and, as a result, a considerable decrease in visibility. This layer swallowed up part of the energy of the fireball and quickly heated up to 800°K within a radius of up to 1 km. As time passed, the temperature of the fireballs began to fall, and within 3.6 seconds, the surface began to grow dark and was marked by a number of bright spots that began to spread and grow and soon encompassed the entire area. This is where it stopped expanding, and where the stage in which the explosion cloud began to take shape and, triggered by the rising vortex flows, began to move upward into the upper layers of the atmosphere. Following the cloud, the dust column began to rise from the epicentral zone. Having reached the cloud in 4–5 seconds, it lent the typical mushroom shape. As it continued to rise, the upper part of the cloud was covered with a white layer of condensed steam, which gradually enveloped the entire cloud and began to pull inward, taking the shape of a bell. In one minute, the explosion cloud had shot up to a height of 4 km, and within 7 minutes, it had reached 15 km. In 15–20 minutes after the explosion, the explosion cloud and the dust column began to disperse toward the east (2, 3, 8). As a result of this process a 210 km “local” trail of the cloud also took shape. Radiation reconnaissance conducted by a Li-2 plane has established that the axis of the trail passes through the first 70 km along a 70° bearing, then an 84° bearing, which coincided with the trajectory of the drift of the air mass at a height of 7–9 km (8). In a period of 30 minutes to 24 hours, radiation reconnaissance indicated that the 54 24 level of radiation at the epicenter was measured as Mn (Td.p. = 2.58 hr) and Na (Td.p. = 14.96 hr). That means that the individual radiation dose received by exercise participants would not have exceeded the allowable level (0.5 rem) for the category of people who work permanently or temporarily with sources of ionizing radiation. Even if we were to hypothetically state that all of the exercise participants (44,000 people) had entered the epicentral zone and each of them had received a dose of 2 rem, in this situation the collective dose would be 88,000 rem, which is the maximum surplus of induced, radiation-caused cancerous illnesses over the spontaneous level of 0.8%. Given the natural, non-recurrent volatility of the frequency of cancerous diseases up to over 50% lies below the acceptable risk level for society and cannot be singled out from studying medical statistics. Furthermore, document analyses have shown that no more than 1% of the exercise participants entered the explosion zone.
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Let us also consider the radiation conditions along the “local” and “distant” trails of radioactive fallout that were formed by sources such as the dust column (induced- activity radionuclides, particles from the surface layer of soil from the epicentral zone) and the upper part of the cloud (radionuclides produced in fragmentation, and particles from the bomb’s construction materials). The local radioactive trail (within 210 km — the trail of the dust column) caused radiation conditions described by the data received as the result of direct measurements from radiation reconnaissance (2, 3, 8 and 9). Processing these data based on mathematical modeling of the trail formation process in line with weather conditions and considering the radionuclide content of neutron activation products has shown that the maximum exposure rate (within 70 km from the epicenter) does not exceed 1.3 rem, while the contribution of internal radiation is less than 5% (9). The distant trail of fallout was formed by the drifting of the explosion cloud in a northeastern direction. Mathematical modeling of this process has shown that radioactive product fallout produced by fragmentation took place at a distance of up to hundreds of kilometers from the explosion site, as a result of which radioactive pollution affected the territory of Western Siberia and resulted in a maximum accumulated dose of 0.1 rem on the territory of the northern parts of the town of Krasnoyarsk. This is considerably lower than the amounts of radiation received by the population (Category B) set out in the NRB-76/87 Radiation Safety Standards. The density of the pollution in the area by key irradiating radionuclides (137Сs, 90Sr) is considerably lower — approximately by 60 times — than the background levels that are typical for this region (4–7).
Impressions of Radioecological Conditions: The Opinions of Interested Parties In line with a request from Mr. Chernyshev, Deputy of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR, which was originally initiated by the requests from veterans for benefits for the victims of radiation effects following the Totskoye explosion (4, 5), RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 40-rp on September 13, 1991 on protective measures for the residents of the Gorno-Altaisk Republic, Altaisk Krai and the Orenburg Oblast and those residing on the territories located within the zone affected by nuclear tests. A similar decree (No. 1041-r) was issued by the RSFSR Council of Ministers on September 20, 1991. In order to enforce these decrees, it was necessary to evaluate the radiation and health conditions in these regions. This task was assigned to a commission that included representatives of the RSFSR’s GosKomGidromet, the Committee for Eliminating the Consequences of Accidents at the Chernobyl NPP, the RSFSR Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry for Health and Social Welfare, the Government Committee for Health and Medical Monitoring, the Central Military Medical Department, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Government Committee for the Environment and Natural Resource Management. The members of this commission studied the documents available at the center and on location, such as in the Orenburg Oblast, on the Totskoye exercises and visited the Totskoye area. They drew the following conclusions (6, 7): • In all of the villages and settlements in the Totskoye, Buzuluk, and Sorochinsk Rayons, the radiation conditions were deemed to be at normal natural background levels and safe for the residents; • A retrospective analysis of the situation showed that calculated radiation doses could not have affected the health of the people residing in the areas that were
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examined; • The state of health of the residents of the areas that were examined, according to current key medical demographic data, are in line with average Oblast indicators, including oncological diseases and birth defects, and are no higher than these levels in the control regions of the Oblast and of the RSFSR in general. Furthermore, the members of the commission noted that the results of many years of observations of radiation conditions in the Orenburg Oblast have made it possible to draw a conclusion regarding the lack of “any local impact on the environment near the Semipalatinsk test range.” It should be noted that almost a year before these instructions were issued, in June 1990, the radiation health experts at LenNII scientific research institute had conducted a radioecological study of the territory near the Totskoye exercises under the supervision of the deputy head of the laboratory, Mr. Prokofiev (5). The report was objectively based on the results of measurements of the exposure rate on-site, as well as radio-chemical analyses of environmental elements and samples from locally produced food products and feed to determine their 137Cs and 90Sr content. Measurements of the exposure rate and collection of samples were conducted in villages and settlements near the epicenter of the nuclear explosion. The village of Novosergievka was chosen as a control point, as its territory did not feature any radioactive fallout after the Totskoye test. In the end, the researchers drew the following conclusion: as of 1990, any additional exposure received by the residents of the areas adjacent to the Totskoye test range, where an airborne nuclear bomb was detonated on September 14, 1954, is almost completely absent (5). Naturally, this report was submitted to the Chief State Medical Officer of the Orenburg Oblast, Mr. Vereschagin, who confirmed his consent and support by signing the report. Everything seemed clear enough — but it wasn’t. In 1992, Tamara Zlotnikova, a Deputy of the Russian State Duma representing the 132nd district of Orenburg and school biology teacher, came onto the scene. She demanded that letters be made public by the higher authorities — letters that allegedly contained information about the poor health condition of the residents of Orenburg due to the consequences of the explosion at the Totskoye test range nearly 40 years prior. Her goal was to involve the Oblast Administration and the management of the Orenburg medical Academy in the preparations for a project to undertake a set of urgent measures to improve the health of the local population and support social and economic development of the villages in the Orenburg Oblast located within the zone affected by nuclear tests and peaceful underground nuclear explosions. Soon, this project was approved by V. Vekhovy, the Head of the Oblast Administration. The project was comprised of five courses of action: 1. Rehabilitating public health and improving healthcare services in the Orenburg Oblast; 2. Ensuring a greater general level of radiation safety for the population of the Orenburg Oblast; 3. Investigating potential exposure to hazardous radiation effects of the population of the Orenburg Oblast in the past, as well as any other effects that could explain the damage done to the health of local residents, including the general environmental conditions in the Oblast (including scientific research);
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4. Taking measures to provide social protection for the local population; 5. Major construction and investments. The appendix to the document provided the scientific grounds of the document. In just two years (1994–1995), RUB 772.2 million and USD 78.5 million were requested. Incidentally, Professor Boyev, Doctor of Medical Sciences, Correspondent Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Head of the Orenburg State Medical Academy’s General Health Division was an active participant in the scientific substantiation for the “urgent measures” project. He is also one of the authors of the book “Anthropogenic Pollution of the Environment and the Health of the Residents of East Orenburg” (10). The repeated requests submitted by Ms. Zlotnikova to the country’s authorities, scientists and scientific specialists at the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Ministry and Ministry of Health over the course of several years since her arrival in the Duma, including securing the status of Chairwoman of the Environmental Committee, were met with a variety of report-type answers that provide assessments of the radiation conditions in the territory of the Orenburg Oblast, which in principle differ from the negative assessments provided by the authors of the narrow-minded program. As the flames of this fire were being fanned, Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations, acting as a kind of arbitration court, submitted a set of documents for review by the Russian Scientific Commission for Radiation Protection (RNKRZ) (No. 6-41/156 of January 22, 1996), including: • A draft of a 1996–1997 Program of urgent medical and public health measures to improve the health of the local population of the Orenburg Oblast living near the area affected by the Totskoye nuclear explosion, and related expenses; • A reference report substantiating the project’s program from the Orenburg Oblast Administration; • A draft of a decree issued by the Government of Russia on the program’s approval. The RNKRZ basically denied the substantiation of the petitioners as scientifically unfounded. The program was not adopted. The Oblast Administration, caving in to Ms. Zlotnikova’s persistent lobbying, decided to hold one scientific conference in Orenburg on the Medical and Environmental Aspects of the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Explosion. The conference was held October 21–23, 1996 at the Optical Micro-Surgery International Scientific Conference Hall and essentially resulted in nothing. Over the two days of the conference, 7 reports and 25 statements were heard. The main report was the first: “Problems in Assessing Radiation Conditions and the Health of the Population in the Zone of the Totskoye Nuclear Explosion,” by V. Boyev, N. Vereschagin, S. Lebedkova, A. Rusanov, and Y. Kopylov. This report was based on materials from the aforementioned book (10), which had been released to coincide with the opening of the conference. In this work, the authors attempted to prove the damaging blow dealt to the health of the population by the nuclear explosion with data on the population’s mortality rate: “Comparative mortality data of the Orenburg Oblast population from 1995 through 1991,” and “Mortality indicators from malignant tumors among the residents of various areas in the Orenburg Oblast (per 100,000 residents) from 1970 through 1991.” What can a person say about these data? The reactions were simple: 1. The medical statistics and data on the reasons for the mortality rate given
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the absence of regular autopsies to confirm diagnoses must not be used for scientific research, not to mention to draw any significant conclusions. This was set out by a special set of instructions issued by the USSR’s Ministry of Health. 2. The book and the report include average mortality indicators for malignant tumors “throughout the Oblast,” which do not match up with “Rayon”-based indicators. For example, in 1975, almost all of the Rayon indicators were lower than average Oblast-wide indicators, which points to the total absence of the reliability of these very significant indicators. These data can essentially be used to prove anything. That is why the data thrown about in the book cannot in the least be used to establish the level of impact caused by radiation factors in the so-called “affected areas” of Buzuluksky, Sorochinsky, and Totskoye. 3. The average increase in the mortality rate in the Oblast due to malignant tumors (103.6 in 1970, 173 in 1991 — per 100,000 residents) is equal to approximately 3.5% per year, which matches up with the average national Russian indicators and the average figures for other European countries. 4. Even in the central Orenburg area of the Oblast, the indicators are rife with discrepancies: in 1980, the mortality level was equal to 55.4 per 100,000 residents, and in ten years, that number became 227.5 per 100,000, i.e., it changed five times over. What does that then say about the “provincial” regions of the Oblast? There was no such this indicator did not change at all in the Yasnensky district. And another interesting fact: all of the mortality rate indicators for the population of the Orenburg Oblast after 1990 began to increase markedly. The reason is that the mass media began at that time to fervently discuss the harmful impact of the Totskoye nuclear explosion on the health of the Oblast’s residents. The responses noted above testify to the irrefutable fact that the conclusions that are drawn in the book — and in most of the reports presented at the conference — cannot be trusted (11). In summary, in reviewing problems connected to the Totskoye explosion at the conference, it was once again proven that, unfortunately, poorly qualified representatives, who have their own interests at stake, are often the ones taking a populist approach to framing and solving complex problems. We’re lucky if they are only genuinely mistaken; these people do not want to hear what the experts have to say, and are clearly opportunists (12, 13). Substantial funds were spent in vain by the government on the aforementioned conference. The conference only served to agitate the public and mislead people with regard to their expectations of receiving a variety of benefits or reparations. But the experts already knew what would happen (4–9): all of the decisions made at the conference remained only “wishes.” At least this prevented the irresponsible spending of considerable funds, and most importantly, the people of the Orenburg Oblast have been calmed after having been recklessly punished by “radiophobia” under the influence of a “biology” teacher with immunity privileges and opportunities to lobby for her own ambitions. Having demonstrated total incompetence in her official capacity, Ms. Zlotnikova has faded into the background and has been off our radar for a long time. Moreover, this story has its own “curiosities”: for example, one of the dissertations, “A Radioecological and Genetic Assessment of the Long-Term Effects of the Totskoye Nuclear Explosion” deserves attention. It was presented by A. Korneyev under the
284 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY scientific guidance of V. Boyev, the results of which, according to page 16 ofthe dissertation, “…have been included in the Russian Government’s project for urgent medical and public health measures…” The scientific weight of the work is clearly revealed by the following passage: “Considering the experience that has been gained in rehabilitating the territories that fell within the zone of the Chernobyl NPP disaster, one can propose the following measures: organizing food provisions for the residents of the epicentral zone of the Totskoye nuclear explosion…by supplying foodstuffs to the area… and, finally, resettlement into environmentally clean and healthy regions.” And that is what is proposed 43 years after an airborne nuclear bomb? Even amateurs know fairly well that, if the epicentral zone on the territory of the Totskoye test range, which is used only for artillery exercises, and not for residential housing, is practically bereft of any local pollution, then, naturally, the local food products produced at a significant distance from said zone where villages and settlements are located would meet public health standards. This is supported by data from the Oblast Scientific Production Veterinary Laboratory and research materials approved by N. Vereschagin, the Chief State Health Officer of the Orenburg Oblast. That is why Mr. Korneyev’s recommendation to “organize food provisions for the residents of the epicentral zone of the Totskoye nuclear explosion by supplying foodstuffs to the area” is both unscientific and immoral (2, 3).
The Totskoye Test Range Today The most recent, in-depth examination of the test range’s territory was conducted in July 1994 under a program to prepare for joint peacekeeping exercises. The preparations were conducted by a joint group of Russian and American experts. During the examination, a large number of measurements of gamma-radiation exposure was taken, 38 soil samples were collected, and air samples from the surface layer of the atmosphere were taken as well. Furthermore, the flows of alpha-beta-gamma radiation were measured along the surface of the soil as well as at a depth of up to 20 centimeters. The control points were the epicentral zone and several different spots on the test range’s territory (9). The following was established: • The exposure rate in the epicentral zone and at other control points did not exceed 20 µR/hr, i.e., the levels were within natural radiation background fluctuations; • Soil samples from the epicentral zone contained an extremely minimal number of radionuclides that are typically the products of neutron activation (such as 152,154Eu and 60Co); • The presence of 137Cs in soil samples and the nature of its distribution deeper in the soil are the same as global levels; • 40K content is well within the range for average content in black earth samples, equal to 410 Bq/kg; • There are no anomalies with regard to the distribution of 239,240Pu throughout the territory of the test site, attributed to global fallout. In order to evaluate the internal radiation dose received by the inhalation of radionuclides, data were used on the mass concentration and physical and chemical properties of dust, as well as the results of determining the maximum specific activity of radionuclides in the surface soil level. Calculations were used to establish that the external exposure rate due to the effects of the radiation background (= 20 µR/hr) will
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be 140 times higher than the internal exposure rate due to the effects of incorporating anthropogenic radionuclides (9). This is a kind of opposition to the conclusions that were presented in Mr. Korneyev’s dissertation, defended at the Orenburg State Medical Academy on March 27, 1997, and which contained unfounded, clearly “commissioned” scare tactics with regard to the “radiation legacy” of the Totskoye nuclear test which, we would like to repeat once again, took place over 40 years ago. But what really poses a danger to the health of the people of our country, and to the people of the Orenburg Oblast in particular? The answer is unequivocal: the low living standards and poor social protection the state of the environment, and other factors. And no matter how much we want to, we must admit that is it not radiation; radiation’s effects on the human body have been studied in more detail than the impact of other harmful factors, yet it is only in the top thirty of these harmful factors (14, 15) — and is the main reason behind the deteriorating health of the population? Frankly speaking, it is high time that we stop blaming everything on radiation. We must increase living standards and education among the people of the country, improve social provisions, lower the level of pollution caused by toxic chemical agents in the air, water, food products and the environment in general. We must stamp out our bad habits, and so on. In our opinion, people are already beginning to understand this position.
References 1. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR]. Volume 1. Chapter 6. V. Mikhailov, et al. Sarov, RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1997, 286: ill. 2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Modern Radiological Conditions at Test Ranges [Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR. Sovremennoye radiologicheskoye sostoyaniye poligonov]. Chapter 7. V. Logacheva, et al. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639: ill. 3. Nuclear Tests. The Totskoye Military Exercises [Yaderniye ispytaniya. Totskoye voiskovoye ucheniye]. Book 2. S. Zelentsov et al. Moscow: Kartush Publishing, 2006. 197: ill. 4. Smirnov, Y., Prokofiev, O., Vereschagin, N. and others. A Report onthe Results of the Work of the Commission Organized by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in line with requests from A. Chernyshev, People’s Deputy [Spravka po rezultatam raboty komissii, organizovannoi po rasporyazheniyu SM RSFSR v sootvetstvii s zaprosom narodnogo deputata RSFSR Cherysheva A.A.]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1990.5 5. Prokofiev, O.N. A Report on the Radiation Conditions in the Sorochinsk, Totskoye, and Buzuluksk Rayons of the Orenburg Oblast [Spravka o radiatsionnoi obstanovke v Sorochinskom, Totskom i Buzulukskom rayonakh Orenburgskoi oblasti]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1990. 7 6. Bubliy, S. Meskikh, N., Meshkov, N., and others. A Report on the Results of an Environmental Examination of the Territory of the Gorno-Ataisk Soviet Socialist Republic, the Altai Krai and the Orenburg Oblast [Doklad o resultatakh ekologicheskoi ekspertizy territoriy Gorno-Altaiskoi SSR, Altaiskogo kraya i Orenburgskoi oblasi]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1992. 18 7. Logachev, B.A. An Analysis of Data on Medical and Biological Research and an Assessment of the Health of the High-Risk Population in the Chelyabinsk, Bryansk and Orenburg Oblasts Living in the Areas Affected by Radiation. An Analytical Overview [Analyz dannikh o medico-biologicheskikh issledovaniyakh i otsenke zdorovya
286 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY kriticheskikh group naseleniya Chelyabinskoi, Bryanskoi i Orenburgskoi Oblastei, prozhivayuschikh v rayonakh radiatsionnikh vozdeystviy. Analitichesky obzor]. GNTs- IBF Fund, 1992. 44 8. Matushchenko, A.M., Sudakov, V.V., Khmel, S.I., and others. The Experts Speak: Assessing the Radiation Consequences of the Nuclear Explosion of the Totskoye Military Exercises [Svidetelstvuyut spetsialist: otsenivaya radiatsionniye posledstviya atomnogo vzryva na Totskom uchenii]. Information Bulletin from TsNII-AtomInform, 1993. No. 9, 68–72. 9. Dyachenko, V.I., Kazantsev, V.V., Martakov, Y.P., Semenovikh, S.V. The Radiation Conditions in the Area of the Nuclear Explosion on the Totskii Test Range on September 14, 1954 [Radiatsionnaya obstanovka v rayone yadernogo vzryva, osuschestvlyonnogo na Totskom poligone 15 sentyabrya 1954 g.]. Information Bulletin from TsNII-AtomInform, 1995. No. 5–6, 44–47. 10. Boyev, V.M., Boyalnik, M.N. Anthropogenic Pollution of the Environment and the Health of the Residents of East Orenburg [Antropogennoye zagryazneniye okruzhayuschei sredi i sostoyaniye zdorovya naseleniya Vostochnogo Orenburzhya]. Orenburg, 1995. 127 11. Guskova, A.K. A Statement on the Clinical Section on the Boyev Report on the Radioecological and Medical Assessment of the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Explosion [Zaklyucheniye po klinicheskomu razdelu spravki Boyeva V.M. “Radioekologicheskaya i meditsinskaya otsenka posledstviy Totskogo yadernogo vzryva]. GNTs-IBF Fund, 1997. 2 12. Smelayakova, T. The Crime that was Declared a Feat [Prestupleniye, nazvannoye podvigom]. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 14, 1994. 13. Zlotnikova, T.V. An Open Letter to Scientists and Nuclear Power Experts [Otkrytoye pismo k uchyonym i spetsialistam atomnoi energetiki]. Atom-Press, March 1996, No. 9. 14. Radiation. Doses, Effects, and Risks. Translation from the English. Moscow: Mir, 1988. 79 15. Andreyev, F. A Diagnoses by Mathematicians. The Health of Society Determines the Quality of Life [Diagnoz stavyat matematiki. Kachestvo zhizni opredelyayet sostoyaniye zdorovya obschestva]. Izvestiya, June 29, 2001.
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Resolving Radiation Safety Problems in the Kurgan Oblast
Ivan Manilo Director, Kurgan Public Outreach and Information Office, Green Cross Russia, and Member, Russian Environmental Academy Lyudmila Ponomareva and Aleksandr Revyakin Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute
The accident at Mayak in 1957 and the many years of dumping radioactive waste into the Techa River before the accident have not only left the territory infested with radioactivity, but it has also left a permanent mark on the memories of more than one generation. For more than 50 years, the consequences of radiation pollution of the natural environment continue to impact the health of those residing in the area, as well as the socioeconomic conditions of the affected territory. The lands of five different districts in the Kurgan Oblast have been subjected to radioactive effects, and two in particular — located along the Techa River — have borne the brunt of the impact (Dalmatovsky Rayon and Kataisky Rayon). The results of the accident continue to be relevant today. Higher morbidity rates of a variety of illnesses have been observed among local residents. According to scientists and experts from the Urals National Medical Academy for Continued Education and the six years of experience in working with this problem under the Chelyabinsk-Hanford Project (Chelyabinsk), the medical implications of the accident are still unclear; the examination of the residents of radiation-polluted areas was started late, and early studies were superficial and selective (1). According to data from the Department for Land Remediation under the Oblast’s Government, the average annual activity volumes of 90Sr in the river’s water exceeds by 2–3 times the intervention level in drinking water and by 1,700–2,000 times over the background radiation levels found in rivers in Russia (2). The Iset River’s average annual level of radioactivity does not exceed radioactivity safety standards, although they are still higher than the nationwide average by 250–480 times. The territories of the Kurgan Oblast that have been subjected to the effects of radiation cover 95 towns and villages with over 140,000 people, in addition to 300,000 hectares of arable land, and roughly 100,000 hectares of forest land. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the populations of five towns were fully evacuated due to radioactive pollution. Another eight towns and villages underwent partial evacuation. The residents of nine towns and villages located on the banks of the Techa River were exposed to radiation in doses measuring over 7 rem. At present, ten of the villages near the Techa River are home to 5,300 people, while the 77 towns and villages near the Iset River are home to approximately 100,000 people. People began to speak openly about the Mayak accident and the consequences of years of the unregulated dumping of radioactive wastes in the Techa River after the Chernobyl disaster. Openness with regard to the implications of the accident and its scale stimulated all levels of authorities to take action. In the early 1990s, a Federal
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Target Program (FTP) was drafted to overcome the consequences of Mayak operations. However, the period allotted for this project coincided with an extremely difficult period for the national economy. Financing the FTP was a disaster. The volume of federation investment in new constructions in 1993–1995 was at just 2–3%, and there was no funding in 1997. Starting in 2002, the next, third FTP was put into place: overcoming the consequences of radiation accidents, a program that was scheduled to run until 2010. One of the most complex issues is providing those in need of improved living conditions with well-built homes. After the Oblast Government appealed to the Government Chairman and the Russian President several times, the federal budget for 2008–2010 finally earmarked RUB 3 billion in funds for remediation efforts in the Kurgan Oblast. Today, as before, the source of a potential radiation accident and additional radiation effects on the environment and the public of the five districts located near the Techa and Iset Rivers is the Techa Reservoir, while the polluted valley of the Techa River and the Asanov Swamp are sources of secondary radioactive pollution. The factors that must be considered in resolving radiation safety problems in the Kurgan Oblast are: • The complex socio-economic situation (the Oblast is subsidized); • The existence of a facility for the storage and destruction of chemical weapons in the Oblast’s Northwest area, where the most highly five districts affected by radiation are located; • The set of regulatory legal acts that have been developed do not meet the needs of the actual socio-economic and environmental conditions. In addition to the above, it is the opinion of the Oblast Government that it will be impossible to overcome the consequences of the Mayak radiation accident by implementing just one FTP (2). Today, the residents are concerned about a number of questions. These questions are asked by visitors to Green Cross Russia’s Public Outreach and Information Offices (POIOs), and the participants of lectures and discussions, which are held regularly by GCR’s regional division. Some of these questions are: • What is being done to prevent another accident at Mayak? • What will be done with the enormous amount of radioactive waste that is currently located in the Chelyabinsk Oblast? • When will we start to see the regular supply of environmentally clean food products and radiation monitoring for the people who live in polluted areas? • When will the living conditions be improved, and when will conditions be put into place that will ensure satisfactory quality of life? In order to get remediation efforts going, one of the most important factors is environmental education, for both governmental and public structures. The complex environmental situation in the Northwest area of the Kurgan Oblast, the radioactive pollution of the land, and the existence of a CWD facility have become some of the priority issues being worked on at higher education institutions in the Trans Urals (Kurgan State University, the Maltsev State Agricultural Academy, Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute). These issues have influenced the selection of the key tasks by a number of leading public environmental organizations in the Oblast (the Kurgan
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regional affiliates of GCR, the Russian Environmental Academy, the Kurgan Science Center under the International Academy of Environmental Sciences and Public Safety). These include (2, 3, 4): • The combined efforts of regional and municipal authorities toward eliminating the consequences of the effects of radiation in the Oblast; • Examining the effects of radiation factors on a variety of social groups and age groups among the local population; • The problems and solutions for making agricultural and livestock technologies more environmentally friendly; • Educational and consulting work with the public on issues related to potential accidents and catastrophes and the possible consequences of the radioactive pollution of areas near the Chelyabinsk Oblast. In October 2007, the regional GCR POIOs, the Russian Environmental Academy and the Kurgan Science Center under the International Academy for Environmental Sciences and Public Safety, with assistance from the Oblast Government and Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute, held a scientific conference dedicated to today’s problems in setting up and developing a system for dealing with the consequences of the 1957 Mayak accident and public education for those living in regions affected by radiation. A book was published containing the results of the conference (2). In terms of public environmental education, GCR, the Russian Environmental Academy and the Kurgan Science Center (Members of Presidiums and Members of the Boards who are leading scientists and highly qualified experts from the Trans Urals) read lectures, hold discussions, and conduct targeted scientific research (3, 4). The subjects of the lectures and discussions include a wide range of problems and specific tasks that require decisions with regard to remediation efforts: • An assessment of the environmental damages that have been inflicted by industrial and business operations in a number of districts in the Oblast due to unauthorized dumping of radioactive waste in the Techa River, which is still the most radioactively polluted river in Russia; • Carrying out federal and Oblast target programs for remediation efforts; • The efforts of executive and legislative authorities of the Kurgan Oblast and a number of districts with regard to eliminating the consequences of radiation on public health; • The approaches and methods for building socially safe behavior skills for those living in areas affected by radioactive pollution. In order to ensure safe living conditions in the Techa River valley, protect the environment and prevent catastrophic implications for the Iset-Tobol-Ob river system, we must not only stabilize the level of the Techa Reservoir as soon as possible, but also lower it and fully eliminate the radwaste storage ponds that are the sources of radioactive pollution in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Accidents similar to the Mayak disaster are among the main reasons holding back the widespread construction of NPPs (5).
References 1. Sharov, V. B. Environmental Education for the Public and Experts under the Chelyabinsk-Hanford Project [Ekologicheskoye obrazovaniye naseleniya i spetsialistov v programme obschestvennogo obyedineniya].. Sharov, V. B. Public Environmental Education and Training: Papers from the IV International Conference on Environmental
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Education. Edited by Moiseyev, N. N., Russian Academy of Sciences.–M.: MNEPU, 1998. 314–317. 2. Overcoming the Consequences of the Mayak Accident in the Kurgan Oblast (Problems and Solutions) (Overcoming the Consequences of the 1957 Mayak Radiation Accident) [Preodoleniye posledstiviy avarii na PO “Mayak” v Kurganskoi oblasti (problemy i resheniya) (predoleniye posledsvtiy radiatsionnoi avarii na PO “Mayak”]. Papers from the Science Practicum / Conference. Edited by: Bukhtoyarov, A. I., Manilo, I. I., Ponomareva, L. I. Kurgan-Shadrinsk, the Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute, 2007. 185. 3. Kobyakova, T. I. An Environmental Assessment of Surface and Ground Waters and Snow Cover in the Northwest Area of the Kurgan Oblast [Ekologicheskaya otsenka poverkhnostnikh, podzemnikh vod i snezhnogo pokrova severo-zapadnoi tekhnogennoi provintsii Kurganskoi oblasti]. Dissertation for Candidacy in Biological Science. Yekaterinburg, 2005. 133 pages. 4. Kuschedva, O. V. An Assessment of the Anthropogenic Pollution of Water, Soil, Feed, and Cow’s Milk by the Agricultural Companies of the Shchuchansk Rayon in the Kurgan Oblast [Otsenka tekhnogennogo zagryazneniya vod, pochv, kormov i moloka korov selskokhozyaqsetvenikh predpriyatiy Schuchanskogo rayona Kurganskoi oblasti]. Dissertation for candidacy in Biological Sciences. Yekaterinburg, 2005. 148 pages. 5. Manilo, I. I. Restoring Trust in Nuclear Energy — Relevant Problems Today [Vosstanovleniye doveriya k yazernoi energetike – aktualnaya problema sovermennosti]. Manilo, I. I., Usmanov, V. V, Manilo, I. I. Overcoming the Consequences of the Mayak Accident in the Kurgan Oblast (Problems and Solutions) (Overcoming the Consequences of the 1957 Mayak Radiation Accident): Papers from the Scientific Practicum / Conference. Edited by: Bukhtoyarov, A. I., Manilo, I. I., Ponomareva, L. I. Kurgan- Shadrinsk, the Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute, 2007. 177–184.
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Comprehensive Radioecological Examination of the Territories and Surrounding Waters near Nuclear Submarine Stationing and Dismantlement Points
Sergey Vakulovskiy Deputy Director, Typhoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast V. Kim, M. Propisnova, A. Nikitin, I. Katrich, V. Chumichyov, A. Volokitin Typhoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast Comprehensive radioecological examinations of territories and water areas near nuclear submarine stationing points and dismantlement facilities beyond the boundaries of health protection zones (HPZ) are carried out regularly by Rosgidromet divisions under the management of Typhoon Company (Table 1). This report provides information on the radiation monitoring systems in the Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and Kamchatka oblasts, as well as in Primorsky Krai — all regions in which nuclear submarines are being dismantled. This report also includes a summary of regular observations of facilities that pose radiation hazards, including: volumetric activity (VA) of radioactive substances in the surface layer of the atmosphere, fallout onto the Earth’s surface, tritium content in precipitation, VA of 90Sr in the sea, and the exposure rate of gamma-radiation in 2003–2007 compared to data for all of Russia. These data indicate that the content of radioactive substances in the natural environment on the territories adjacent to facilities that present a radiation hazard outside of HPZ are no different from average levels across the country and are significantly lower than the allowable levels set out in Radiation Safety Standards NRB-99 (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 1. The Structure of Rosgidromet’s Stationary Monitoring Network in the Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Kamchatka Oblasts and Primorsky Krai Region Observation type, number of points Exposure Atmospheric VA in 3H in 90Sr in the rate fallout the air precipitation ocean Arkhangelsk 34 9 2 1 5 Oblast* Murmansk 35 9 3 1 1 Oblast Kamchatka 12 7 - 1 1 Oblast Primorsky 31 10 1 - - Krai** Notes: * In addition to the observations noted in this table, monitoring is conducted annually in the Arkhangelsk Oblast to measure the content of radioactive substances in
292 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY the bottom sediments near the city of Severodvinsk in Dvinsk Bay of the White Sea; ** In addition to those noted in this table, field studies are being conducted in Primorsky Krai’s territories along Chazhma Bay, in addition to data collection in the Peter the Great Gulf.
Table 2. A Summary of Data on Radioecological Conditions in the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts, 2003–2007 Year Bq/L Sr in sea water mBq/L 90 Н in precipitation 3 radiation hazards Radionuclide fallout Exposure rate, μR/hr VA of VA Zones within 100 km of VA of VA VA of radionuclides in the air VA ∑β, 90Sr, 137Cs, 7Ве, ∑β, 137Cs, ×10-5 ×10-7 ×10-7 ×10-5 Bq/ Bq/ Bq/ Bq/ Bq/m3 Bq/m3 m2×Day m2×Year m3 m3 2003 11 3.7 2.6 0.51 153 0.61 0.48 2.2 3.4 Arkhangelsk 2004 11 4.2 2.1 0.69 166 0.63 0.37 2.1 3.8 Oblast, 2005 11 3.9 2.3 0.44 184 0.77 0.27 2.2 3.4 1 Sevmash 2006 11 3.8 2.3 0.45 191 0.77 0.41 2.0 3.6 2007 11 4.2 4.4 0.41* 188 0.74 0.29 2.0 3.0 2003 11 6.7 1.5 0.45 75 0.82 0.96 2.4 3.6 2004 10 5.3 1.7 0.08 82 0.67 0.71 1.9 2.8 Murmansk 2005 8 7.9 1.6 0.17 102 1.53 1.0 1.8 2.0 Oblast1, 2 2006 9 6.1 1.1 0.17 61 1.28 0.43 1.9 2.3 2007 9 4.3 0.55 0.046* 112 1.26 0.36 1.9 2.1
2003 10.1 4.2 1.36 205 0.9 0.63 2.5 Average data for 2004 10.4 3.2 1.19 210 1.0 0.67 2.4 all of 2005 13.2 3.5 0.87 221 1.0 0.54 2.8 3 Russia 2006 10.8 2.8 0.90 223 1.0 0.55 2.8 2007 9.7 4.6 0.71** 253 1.0 0.32 2.4 Notes: 1. The VA of radionuclides in the air in the Arkhangelsk Oblast is shown for the city of Severodvinsk, and the city of Murmansk for the Murmansk Oblast. 2. For the Murmansk Oblast, data are shown for zones beyond the 100-km zone of the Kola NPP.
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3. The VA and fallout in the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts is comparable to the average data for European Russia. * Data over three quarters; ** Data over two quarters.
In 2006, under a joint Russia-Norwegian monitoring project to study the radioactive pollution of the Barents Sea, work began on tracking trends in radiation conditions, both in the coastal regions of the Barents as well as in the open sea.
Table 3. A Summary of Data on Radioecological Conditions in the Kamchatka Oblast and Primorsky Krai, 2003–2007 Radionuclide VA of radionuclides in the air fallout 3 3 Н in Bq/ 7 3 -7
Bq/m Ве, Year 3 -7
Bq/m -5 Cs, Sr in sea water sea in Sr mBq/L m ×10 ×Day ×Year Bq/ Bq/ ∑β, ∑β, -5 2 90 2 VA of VA 3 137 m Bq/m m Cs, ×10 ×10 precipitation Bq/L of radiation hazards Exposure rate, μR/hr Sr, ×10 Sr, 137 Zones within 100 km 90 VA of VA 2003 10 - - - - 0.80 <0.1 1.9 2.1 Kamchatka 2004 10 - - - - 0.93 <0.04 1.3 1.8 Oblast 2005 9 - - - - 0.77 <0.13 1.8 1.7 2006 10 - - - - 0.76 <0.20 1.9 1.5 2007 10 - - - - 0.72 <0.04 1.5 1.3 2003 12 18.9 4.4 1.7 421 0.90 0.29 - 2.2 Primorsky 2004 12 22.4 3.9 1.5 419 0.92 0.14 - 2.1 Krai2 2005 12 20.2 4.4 1.8 394 1.00 0.41 - 2.1 2006 12 - - - - 1.10 0.35 - 2.2 2007 12 - - - - 1.08 0.29 - 1.7 Average 2003 10.1 4.2 1.36 205 0.9 0.63 2.5 data for all 2004 10.4 3.2 1.19 210 1.0 0.67 2.4 3 Russia 2005 13.2 3.5 0.87 221 1.0 0.54 2.8 2006 10.8 2.8 0.90 223 1.0 0.55 2.8 2007 9.7 4.6 0.71** 253 1.0 0.32 2.4 Notes: 1. The VA of radionuclides in the air in Primorsky Krai was measured in the city of Vladivostok; 2. The VA and fallout in the Kamchatka Oblast and Primorsky Krai are comparable to average data for the Asian Pacific Region; ** Data over two quarters; - No measurements taken. In order to assess the impact of local sources of radioactive pollution on the natural environment, the water, bottom sediments, flora and fauna of the Barents Sea
294 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY were examined in areas that are affected by (or may be affected by) the impact of local sources of radioactive pollution of the Kola Peninsula. Radionuclide analysis results are included in Tables 4 and 5. The data from the radionuclide analysis of samples from the sea environment (water, bottom sediments, flora and fauna) conducted at a Russian coastal monitoring station (near the village of Teriberka) during the first year of the project demonstrate the lack of any impact from facilities that present a radiation hazard in the Kola Peninsula or from the sunken K-159 nuclear submarine in 2003 on the radioactive pollution of elements of the sea environment.
Table 4. Radionuclide Content in Samples of Sea Water and the Surface Layer of Bottom Sediments in the Area near Teriberka Village in September 2006 Sample Radionuclide 137CS 90Sr 239,240Pu 3Н Sea Water, Bq/m3: – suspension <0.01 – <0.07 - 6.l×10-3 - – filtrate 2.3–2.7 1.2–1.6 (7.2–7.5)×10-3 490 Bottom sediments, Bq/ 0.46–0.50 - - - kg of dry mass - – no measurements taken
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Table 5. The Specific Radioactivity of Radionuclides in Biological Samples Taken from the Area Near Teriberka Village in August– September 2006, Bq/kg of dry mass Biota Radionuclide (sampling location) 239,240Pu, 241Am, 137Cs 90Sr ×10-3 ×10-3 Sole* 0.18±0.02 - - - Catfish* 0.12±0.01 - - - Cod* 0.24±0.06 0.034±0.017 0.72±0.2 - Herring* 0.13±0.01 0.23±0.11 1.6±0.3 - Mussels (meat)* < 0.04 - - - (at the fish processing plant wharf) Mussels (shells)* < 0.1 - - - (at the fish processing plant wharf) Crab (meat)* < 0.03 0.02±0.01 1.1±0.3 - Crab (shell)* < 0.03 - - - Bladder wrack 0.51±0.07 0.2±0.1 69.4±10.3 < 11.3 (at the fish processing plant wharf) Bladder wrack 0.39±0.08 - - - (near the weather station) Kelp (leaves) 0.69±0.08 0.31±0.15 32.2±5.6 10.4±3.1 (near the weather station) Kelp (stems) 1.05±0.13 - - - (near the weather station) Kelp (at the fish processing 0.80±0.08 - - - plant wharf) Cladophora balls < 0.09 - - - (near the weather station) * Unit of measurement is in Bq/kg of dry mass - No measurements taken.
Annual radionuclide content monitoring of the bottom sediments in the water areas adjacent to Sevmash, a state-run industrial complex in the town of Severodvinsk, demonstrates the presence of 137Cs in quantities that are typical for global sources of pollution (see Table 6).
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Table 6. Average Samples Across Ten Sampling Sites of Specific Activity of 137Cs in the Bottom Sediments of Dvinsk Bay (White Sea) in 1998–2007, Bq/kg of Dry Mass
Indicator Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Specific activity 10.9 6.6 8.6 5.9 7.1 3.1 - 4.7 5.8 5.4 – no samples taken
References 1. Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99). SP 2.6.1.758-99. Moscow: Russian Ministry of Health, 1999. 2. 137Сs, 90Sr, 239,240Pu, and 238Pu Content in the Sea Environment (Water, Bottom Sediments, Biota) in the Coastal Areas of the Barents and Azov Seas. [Soderzhaniye 137Сs, 90Sr, 239,240Pu, 238Pu v obyektakh morskoi sredy (vode, donnikh otlozheniyakh, biote)]. R&D (conclusion). UDK 504.4.064:621.039. Typhoon Company; Manager: Nikitin, A.I.; Executors: Valetova, N.K., Kabanov, A.I., Chumichyov, V.B. Obninsk, 2007. 21. No. GR 0120.0510426. Inv. No. O-899.
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Questions from the Roundtable Discussion on the Radiation Legacy of the Cold War
– Alexander Nikitin: This question is for Anatoliy Matushchenko. As I understand it, you are not a participant of the Totskoye tests. In 1954, 31,000 soldiers and officers and others took part in these tests. The soldiers that were sent there were just 17 and 18 years old. In 1992, Tamara Zlotnikova, who was a Deputy in the Russian State Duma, decided to look into just exactly what was going on there. Since the explosion, of the 31,000 participants, only one thousand were still alive. She decided to arrange for some benefits for the thousand survivors, to try to make things right. And today you are saying that she built her political career around this. Could you please elaborate on your views that you just stated — not as an expert from RosAtom, but as a human being? – Anatoliy Matushchenko: All I said was that [Tamara Zlotnikova] is clearly incompetent in this field. The court in Elektrostal heard the case of these 1,200 survivors, and the court’s ruling was clearly not in the favor of Ms. Zlotnikova. Who are these 1,200 people? These are test participants who were found by the Committee of Veterans from high-risk divisions in order to recognize them and provide them with benefits. These people are still coming to us, even if they are few and far between. That is why I asked Tamara Zlotnikova in court if 31,000 people were suddenly rising from their graves. Technically speaking, only 400 people who crossed the epicenter of the explosion are eligible for the benefits that are in place today. This is set out by the legislative base by law and by the decree on high-risk division veterans. Right now, there are 1,200 or 1,400 of these former participants, i.e., three times the eligible number. Let’s look at it like this: the state decided to increase the number and nobody has any objections. Mr. Venetsianov, the Committee Chairman, is in charge of it all. That’s why when you turn the numbers around and say that 1,200 survived, that is actually a lie, misinformation.
– Alexander Nikitin: Let me clarify. There was a search for people, and these were the only ones they found. And the ones that they found — for everything that they went through — received benefits. – Anatoliy Matushchenko: Before 1990, veterans who participated in the Totskoye test — and they are not such an impoverished lot as you say they are — and who were at the front, were well equipped and morally prepared. And before 1990, they were proud of what they had done. We know this from their letters, their comments and their memories. Ms. Zlotnikova turned the whole thing on its head when others turned up with illnesses, problems, complaints, etc. This kind of situation, when the subject under discussion is subverted by populism, is both easy and difficult to explain. What is the value of our Dialogue? Its value is that in discussing these subjects, we begin to see things from a professional point of view: both from the point of view of those who pressed the button, and from the point of view of people who appreciate the obvious consequences and impact that it has had on public health and public opinion. I filed a request to remove my name from the radiation registry run by A. F. Tsib, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, for one simple reason; I suffered from my own form of radiation phobia in the sense that I, a tester, was not afraid of radiation. I respected it. It is my own kind of
298 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY radiation phobia in that I do not want my surname there. What if biologists suddenly prove that in the seventh generation my descendants will suffer defects, and attribute it to me taking part in nuclear testing, in which I have been taking part since 1960? We have people on the testing ranges who have become very fearful of becoming affected by radiation. This is the Hibakusha syndrome, the syndrome of the Japanese who suddenly found that they were being watched. Suddenly, a Japanese woman cannot marry an American, or vice versa, due to a variety of reasons. They say if your grandmother or great-grandmother suffered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then don’t get married, don’t take a bride: seven generations from now, your descendants will suffer from defects. I think that is the crime of the century. This illness is radiation phobia. What happened at Totskoye does not need to be blown out of proportion. And that is my firm position on the matter.
– Vladimir Baskakov: You just stated that Zlotnikova turned the issue on its head and that Professor Boyev wrote false data. Can you explain exactly what it was that he did? And what information was falsified? – Anatoly Matushchenko: There is a lot that can be said about this. There is a national commission for radiation protection. When reports were submitted for analysis, the Commission drew its own conclusions. Therefore, the conclusions I am presenting today are those of the Commission, not mine. I am a physicist. The Commission’s documents form the basis for claiming that Boyev’s data was falsified. I can give you the example of the Kazakh scientists. They conducted analyses of all of their works under the Institute of Medical Statistics, and they were excluded from the PROTECT project (concerning radiation from test ranges) due to the falsification of data practically at an international level. That document is available for review.
– Dialogue Participant: One of your slides in the presentation showed a dry storage point for single reactor compartments in Sayda Bay. How are these transported from the water to the dry storage site? –Alexaander Pimenov: Due to time constraints, it wasn’t possible to go into detail about certain technological aspects and subtleties in all of the processes and technical solutions that are taken during each stage of disposal. At Nerpa we were using three- compartment units, and now we have begun slicing just the reactor compartment directly from the nuclear submarine. This constraint of the three-compartment system is now a thing of the past. The plant slices out just the reactor compartment, after which these are combined into batches — in this case there were three batches, 2 batches with 7 units and 1 batch with 8 units — and they were loaded onto the PD-42 floating dock and transported to the portside long-term storage point at Sayda. The dock is connected with the wall of the berth and ship haulers are used to roll the compartment from the dock onto the turn-out tracks. Then, the ship haulers are put on a rail system and transport the compartments, they are place onto stationary support structures and the haulers are removed. The maximum weight of a compartment at the portside long-term storage facility was calculated at 1,800 tons.
- Mr. Cherezov, from the Institute of Radiology: My question is for Sergei Zhavoronkin. He spoke in detail about the dismantlement of nuclear submarines and everything related
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to that process, but he did not mention where or how the docks where the submarines are broken down will be dismantled. Or are they clean? - Answer missing from proceedings.
- Dialogue Participant: Regarding the unsafe or submerged No. 159 nuclear submarine, is there any certainty with regard to the timeframe for lifting and dismantlement? The lifting of submarine No. 159 is the duty of the Russian Navy, and this issue is fully within its authorities and abilities, and since this submarines was not transferred to RosAtom — rather, to a firm that deals specifically in dismantlement — the Russian Navy will be determining the timetable for these operations, as well as the necessary technical and financial means. - Answer missing from proceedings.
– Valery Menschikov: Could you please explain just what is inside the reactor that is going to be stored for 70 years and will there be any commissioned inspections after a certain period of time? – Alexander Pimenov: Unfortunately, I was not able to address one-compartment units in greater detail in my report. One of the documents that was prepared by NIKIET during preparations of the standards for comprehensive nuclear submarine dismantlement is a directive that makes it possible to store solid radioactive waste (SRW) inside reactor compartments. As a result, the reactor compartments house power installation equipment and radioactive waste that was put there in containers in accordance with the documentation of the ship designer and in accordance with the standards that make it possible to store the wastes there. The standards for waste containers that are put inside the compartments are the same as the standards for external radiation from the compartment itself. That is why the storage of radwaste cannot serve as a reason for increased radiation from the compartment surface. At the end of the 70-year storage period, an investigation will be conducted and the reactor compartment will be taken apart, after which the plans are to arrange final containment from the external environment only for the body of the reactor, while the rest of the metal will be recycled and put back into the industrial use cycle. As a result, today we are lowering the radiation burden on staff members; the reactor compartments cannot be taken apart at this time without exceeding standard levels, and there is no sound reason to do so. We are dealing with the issue of storage in these compartments and freeing up the coastal facilities of the Russian Navy as well as industrial enterprises where these wastes have been accumulated from the repair and modernization of nuclear submarines.
- Stephan Robinson: I was at the Baltic shipyard last year, the former staff center that serviced maritime reactors. This center is closed today. We examined the reactor and the staff working there and we were told that they know when these reactors were decommissioned, and that they added a lot of equipment, but that they don’t know what kind of cocktail is inside today. Is it hazardous or not? They were also closed for 70 years, but I think that the people who will deal with it 70 years from now will be very interested in this documentation, a type of archive or inventory reports. – Alexander Pimenov: The same directive documentation governing the storage of additional waste in reactor compartments has established a passport system for all loaded containers and all of the additionally loaded equipment in each reactor compartment.
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This is strictly monitored and verified, including by NIKIET. Each reactor compartment has its own documentation that is sent to the military, the manufacturing plant, and the facility itself. There is also a backup system in place for this documentation to prevent the loss or damage of this valuable information that would force people to inspect the contents of these compartments from scratch. Furthermore, companies often approach us, as the scientific manager and the developer of the document, with requests to store something in reactor compartments that we have not specified, such as a variety of industrial sources. We categorically speak out against storing anything that could result in either the decay of the bottom and the bilge of the compartment, or something that could lead to spoilage, since that would later pose problems for handling the compartments. As the head organization, we are enforcing a very strict policy on compliance with all required rules and the conditions for handling these compartments.
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The Global Consequences of Nuclear Testing
Pavel Munin Head of Department, Moscow Academy of Business Administration, Eurasian Center of Continuous Development
According to a well-known model, the global consequence of maximally synchronized mass bombing of large areas of the Earth’s surface could be a so-called “nuclear winter” (6). Along these lines, we can expect that the impact of local, but regular nuclear explosions at known testing ranges, which is essentially what happens during nuclear tests, will most likely also have an impact on the geosphere (5). The energy release of these tests in 1945–1980 changed from one kiloton to 50 megatons in TNT equivalent. Over these years, there was approximately one atmospheric nuclear test per month with a force of roughly one megaton. Over the entire period, a total of 520 nuclear and thermonuclear explosions were conducted, and the United States and the USSR accounted for over 210, while 21 took place in Great Britain, 50 in France, and 23 in China (4). The overall energy release over this period of time amounted to approximately 400 megatons (8). Figure 1 gives some sense of the regularity of nuclear tests.
Figure 1. Global nuclear tests, 1945–1998 (11)
An interesting fact is that the average global temperature, as we can see from Figure 2, nearly stabilized during this very period. Its steady growth, later qualified as global warming — and which began in 1910 — was interrupted. It recommenced only after
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1980. It was at this moment that the world’s last atmospheric nuclear test was conducted (China).
Figure 2. Changes in global temperature, °С (10)1.
On this basis, one can draw the conclusion that nuclear tests have somehow curbed global temperature growth by disrupting some process that accompanies global warming. A similar curtailing influence on the increase of the global temperature was also caused by the ordinary explosives used during WWII, which left Europe in ruins. However, a string of three nuclear explosions — one test in the United States and two destructive blows in Japan — had the same effect, if not stronger, on the climate system, and the temperature continued to drop. Nevertheless, when the moratorium on nuclear testing was announced in 1959– 1960, the Earth’s climate system in 1961 more or less took up where it left off in 1939. However, the subsequent “test” explosion of a 50-megaton thermonuclear “Tsar Bomb” once again put the climate system into a state of shock, which led to a significant decrease in the global temperature. Overall, if one were to make a connection between the nature of changes in temperature with anthropogenic processes (economic, political, social and technological) in the 20th century, then we find a surprising synchronization between destructive forces and the periods during which the global temperature stabilized, such as during WWI in 1914–1918. More dramatic events came into play during the Cold War, when empires were razed, new states emerged, and international tension reached new highs. All of this took place against the backdrop of globalization in science and technology, which had a rapid impact on the state of the environment. “Environmental problems” began to take shape in the form of a bitter conflict between man and nature.
1(See also: Vozmozhnosti…, 2006: p. 10, Figure 1; p. 62, Figure 1)
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Nevertheless, by the time atmospheric nuclear tests had come to an end, progressive trends had taken over, since high technology and space development had garnered strength. It was the beginning of a new order with the help of computers, i.e. industrial methods, but in the field of information. And, as a result, the temperature again resumed its climb. This is why there is an impression that the nature of changes in the global temperature is closely tied to the appearance and dominance in the geosphere of one or another order. Correspondingly, the combination of changes in the temperature and the degree of chaos could serve as an indicator of the direction in which the development process is moving. This combination, if one were to envision the biosphere as a closed system, the temperature of which (T) stabilizes due to heat exchange with the environment, is represented as the product (TS) in the well known free-energy (F) formula, namely:
F=U – TS, (1) where U – internal energy, S – entropy.
Since free energy must strive to reduce itself to a minimum, in the formula (1), as entropy decreases, which serves as the disorder metric, temperature increases. This model (1) helps provide a qualitative description of the nature of the link between entropy and temperature in a closed system, if they change given a comparatively “constant” temperature. A constant temperature can be supported by following, for example, the well- known theory put forward by Professor Budyko (1), “by introducing into the lower stratosphere (12–20 km) finely dispersed and aerosol substances” (2: 403). This theory found development and support in a decision issued by a Council seminar held by the Russian Academy of Sciences (2: 406), as well as in the report “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis,” published by an international group of experts on climate change (13). From the perspective of this proposed model (1), at first glance, the consequences of this kind of heat regulation would quickly manifest itself in the increase of free energy, which means hurricanes and other phenomena would grow stronger, i.e., in the disruption of the existing order. In other words, entropy would begin to increase, and this would then have to be compensated for by introducing another, harsher “new” order. Nevertheless, if this kind of regulation is conducted slowly and consistently, ensuring a smooth readjustment of social-ecological and economic processes, it could truly make a global contribution to the global community’s transition toward sustainable development. In this case, the temperature may serve as the main indicator of this transition or the “order parameter,” as these values have come to be called in synergetics, Entropy, as it is wont to do, will serve as a measure of disorder, or chaos. For example, a sharp drop in temperature in the third part of 19862, was most likely a result of the Chernobyl NPP explosion, and was accompanied by major disruptions. A similar collapse seen in 1991–1995 can naturally be linked with the fall of the USSR, while the 10-year cold spell in the early 20th century is associated with agricultural
2Measured value
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I=Log2 |N|. (2)
Consequently, changes in information (∆/) and the population (∆N) are related to one another as follows:
(3)
These changes are achieved via the reception of an external flow of information genetically, which fully matches up with the view of modern demographers. They believe that human society is a complex self-organizing system that is constantly processing an enormous volume of information. This information reflects the state of the system’s external and internal environments and, thanks to the existence of a number of channels of direct communication and feedback, corrects the behavior of the system’s elements. Part of the general flow of information pertains to demographic behavior and controls it (3: 546–547). However, while information flows may be difficult to measure, the growth rate of the population is known (see Figure 3).
3See: (2: 10, Firugre 1; 62, Figure. 1), where the referenced ten-year period has been bro- ken down into two parts: the cold spell in 1900–1904, and temperature stabilization during 1905–1910. In this case, agricultural reform took place over only five years, before the onset of industrial development and a transition into growth that was interrupted by the war.
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Figure 3. The growth rate of the world’s population (12)
From this graph, it follows that the flow of information reached its peak in approximately 1963, and then began its decline, as it had achieved the required level of progress. Then replication began, or the growth of the number of achievements made as a result of so-called “globalization.” A sharp drop in the growth rate in 1959–1960, according to demographers, took place due to the so-called “Great Leap Forward” in China, when the level of agricultural production and natural calamities, which had coincided with this massive social reform, together led to a sharp rise in the mortality rate, while fertility was nearly halved (12). From an information point of view, the “Great Leap Forward” period saw the redistribution of the flow of information taken in by the population, between genetic and cultural channels in favor of the latter, which led to a drop in the growth rate of the population of China4. Consequently, I would volunteer this very unusual hypothesis: the so-called “demographic explosion” is synchronous with the nuclear testing, if not actually triggered by it. Furthermore, it is striking how synchronized nuclear explosions, including underground explosions, are with the growth rate of the Earth’s population. Meanwhile, global temperatures only seem to be affected by atmospheric explosions.
Conclusions 1. The population of the Earth, having ceased nuclear testing, matured sufficiently in order to enter the final stage of the “demographic transition” and stabilize its own population at a comparatively high level. 2. The opinions of some politicians that nuclear weapons have already played their main role in modern civilization seem altogether reasonable. 3. We can now expect the expansion and relatively safe use of nuclear reactions for the purposes of electricity generation.
4 In connection with this, it is interesting to note the synchronization of the sharp decline observed in the growth rate with the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in 1959–1960, see Figure 1.
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References 1. Budyko, M. I. Climate Change [Izmenenie klimata]. Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat, 1974. 280, 2. Opportunities to Prevent Climate Change and its Negative Consequences: the Kyoto Protocol Problem: Materials from the Board Seminar under the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences [Vozmozhnosti predotvrashcheniya izmeneniya klimata i ego negativnykh posledstviy: problema Kiotskogo protocola: materialy Soverta- seminara pri Prezidente RAN]. (Izrael, Y. A., ed.); Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Nauka, 2006. 408. 3. The Demographic Modernization of Russia, 1900–2000 [Demograficheskaya modernizatsiya Rossii, 1900–2000]. Vizhnevsky, A. G., ed. Moscow: Novoye Izdatelstvo, 2006. 608. 4. Kaurov, G., Stebelkov, V. Toward the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [K 40-letiyu vstupleniya v silu Dogovora “O zapreshchenii yadernykh ispytanii v tryokh sredakh”]. Moscow: Nuclear Energy Bulletin, October 2003. 5. Mikhailov, V. Nuclear Weapons – Scientific Problems and a Search for Solutions and Experiments with Models [Yadernoe oryzhie – nauchnye problemy, poiski reshenii i eksperimenty s modelyami]. Atomnaya energetika, Issue 5 (5), November 1991. 6. Moiseev, N. N., Alexandrov, V. V., Tarko, A. M. Man and the Biosphere: Experience of Systemic Analysis and Mode—Based Experiments [Chelovek i biosfera: Opyt sistemnogo analiza i eksperimenty s modelyami]. Moscow: Nauka. 1985. 7. Munin, P. I. Sustainable Development, Demographics and Information Technology [Ustoichivoe razvitie, demografiya i informatsionnaya tekhnologiya]. Problemy regional’noi ekologii]. 2001. No. 4, 30–33. 8. Science and Society: The History of the Soviet Nuclear Project (1940s–1950s) [Nauka i obshchestvo: Istoriya sovetskogo atomnogo proekta (40–50 gody)]. International Symposium Works, ISAP–96. Moscow: IzdAT, 1997. 608. 9. Hartley, R.V.L. (1928). Transmission of information. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 7, 535–563. 10. http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/tadjik/vitalgraphics/rus/html/c6.htm 11. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/worldwide_nuclear_ testing.png 12. http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html 13. IPCC: The Fourth Assessment Report “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.” http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu
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Nuclear Tests on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the Nuclear Cultural Legacy
Anatoliy Matushchenko Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom A. Volkov The BTS Scientific Research Center under the Russian Defense Ministry, St. Petersburg
Vladimir Safronov Radon Federal Scientific and Industrial Association, Moscow Nadezhda Shusharina The Global Climate and Environment Institute under RosGidromet and the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Petr Boyarsky The Likhachev Russian Cultural and Natural Legacy Scientific Research Institute, Moscow
Introduction After the Limited Test Ban Treaty (prohibiting air, space and underwater nuclear tests) was signed in August 1963 in Moscow by the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, the amount of radioactive products that entered the environment decreased markedly. France and China continued to conduct nuclear tests — their last nuclear tests in the air were conducted on September 14, 1974, and October 16, 1980, respectively. Nevertheless, the radioactive products accumulated by that point in the environment created and continue to create a certain level of radiation background. This explains the public’s justifiable concern in the radioecological consequences of nuclear testing, including at the Novaya Zemlya test range located on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. As the topic is periodically raised by representatives of various environmental unions and organizations it is often perceived with a great deal of concern and is often politically loaded and approached from a populist standpoint. That is why accurate information about the state of radiation conditions and the consequences of nuclear tests for human health has become more important and more relevant. The beginning of nuclear activity on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago dates back to September 21, 1955, when the USSR’s first underwater nuclear explosion was detonated (3.5 kilotons of TNT equivalent at a depth of 12 meters off of Cape Cherny). Later
308 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY in the mid-1970s, the systematic radioecological monitoring of the territory began with a specific goal in mind: identify the consequences of nuclear tests. Meanwhile, an extensive archive of data on radiation conditions resulting from previous test explosions was analyzed and standardized. These data had been obtained from a variety of radioecological studies conducted by organizations and institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences, GosKomGidromet, the USSR Ministry of Health, and the USSR Ministry of Defense (1955–1957, 1958–1963, and 1964–1968). This program was carried out over the course of several years under assignment by the Russian Navy and incorporated the use of modern scientific research methods. Professor V. Chugunov, PhD, recalls: “…Since then, the operations of various agencies in this field have been almost non-stop and receive government support. However, its ‘flaw’ prior to 1992 was the general secrecy of the work related to nuclear weapons. That is why the data on the actual state of affairs at Novaya Zemlya remained inaccessible to the curious public. This gave rise to a number of myths and fabrications, which at times were really quite odd (such as “hairless deer” and “mutant fish”). After the accident at the Chernobyl NPP, the attention paid to radioactive pollution skyrocketed. In 1990, RosGidromet and the USSR Ministry of Defense arranged detailed aerial photographs of the extensive territory adjacent to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, the results of which were immediately submitted to elected officials and a variety of media outlets, as well as interested “environmental movements.” From that year on, a targeted, comprehensive interagency program for radioecological monitoring of the Region-2 Northern test range has been underway. The program was initially conducted under the auspices of the Nuclear Ministry while today it is overseen by RosAtom and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Khlopin Radium Institute leads the monitoring efforts. For the purposes of parliamentary hearings held on June 16, 1992 by the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources and the Committee for Defense and Security Issues, to consider the advisability of continuing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range, a group of experts from the Nuclear Ministry, the Environmental Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Health Ministry and RosGidromet presented a report called “The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Weapons Testing and Environmental Pollution.” In 1992, the Environmental Ministry conducted a state-sponsored environmental study of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, headed by Professor Yuriy Sivintsev. The October 13, 1992 report summary was published by Eurasia issue number 2 in 1993, and in Moskovskiye Novosti on January 17, 1993. Since 1993, interagency research on the radioecological effects of nuclear bombs has continued under the federal target program on Russia’s environmental safety (1–10). As a result, we have every reason to believe that the radioecological consequences of nuclear testing are receiving due attention from government bodies. However, the fact is that accurate, proven, and methodically justified information is still highly inaccessible to a wider public, since, although it is now unsealed, it is generally published in specialized scientific journals, books and collections. Gratefully taking up the organizers of this Dialogue on their suggestion, the authors of this report have striven to shed light upon this rather technical issue in a way that is accessible to a wide range of people, including those who do not have any specialized
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background, and on the premise that you’ll “take our word for it.” Those who are interested in learning about this issue in greater depth will inevitably have to refer to the main cited publications, which in turn point to extensive resources on this topic (1–10), which will ultimately confirm that there is every reason to trust the authors of this report, who were all directly involved in nuclear testing in 1961–1990.
Some Background The Birth of the Novaya Zemlya Test Range Over 50 years ago in January 1954, the design team headed by Nikolai Dukhov— who was declared three times a Hero of Socialist Labor—completed the creation of the nuclear warhead for the T-5 torpedo. The next step was to test it. From the very beginning the plan was to get a test done, but they expected to conduct only one test. With this one test, they needed to study the impact of an underwater nuclear explosion on ships, other vessels, and nuclear submarines. Next, they had to determine the impact of the bomb’s destructive effects on coastal facilities, the structures and buildings of the anti-airborne defense, and minefields. Third, they hoped to make progress in solving a number of scientific problems related to the further study of the physics of the nuclear explosion. Fourth, there were the ambitious goals of politicians who were responsible for Russia’s nuclear prowess, as well as the senior commanders, who were meant to ‘bring up’ the naval military nuclear experts with an eye to the possible future use of nuclear weapons by the USSR Navy. The Semipalatinsk test range could not, naturally, support this kind of test. Eyes were then turned to the remote areas of the northern seas and a reconnaissance commission was sent out via the Northern Fleet. On July 31, 1954 a secret Decree was issued by the USSR Council of Ministers (No. 1559-669), which ordered the creation of Novaya Zemlya Facility No. 700, which would report to the USSR’s Ministry of Defense (Department 6 of the Navy). On September 17, 1954, a directive from the General Headquarters of the Soviet Navy was signed. The directive set out the organizational structure of a new unit of troops (No. 77510). This date also became known as the anniversary date of the founding of the Sixth State Central Test Range of the Defense Ministry of the USSR. The first Commander, between November 1954 and August 1955, was Captain First Class Valentin Starikov—a Hero of the Soviet Union. But the first to arrive at Belushya Guba on the southern island of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago were military construction workers led by Colonel Engineer Yevgenyi Barkovskiy, who was appointed Head of the Special Construction Unit No. 700 (August–November 1954). Under his command, in the summer of 1954, the members of ten construction battalions arrived at the archipelago. Against the severe conditions of the Arctic, they worked selflessly to prepare a variety of structures, laboratories and residential premises, as well as other facilities related to the test range’s operations. In line with Presidential Decree No. 194 on the Novaya Zemlya test range (February 27, 1992), the range has been given the status of a Central Russian Test Range.
Nuclear Tests at the Northern Test Range Over the course of 35 years (September 21, 1955 through October 24, 1990), a total of 130 nuclear tests were conducted at the Northern test range — that’s 18% of the total number of nuclear tests conducted by the USSR. Of these tests, three were
310 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY underwater and two were above water, one was a land test, and 85 were atmospheric tests, including: • Only one land-based nuclear explosion (32 kilotons on September 7, 1957), while the Semipalatinsk test range had been the venue for 25 powerful explosions, which are the type responsible for considerable radioactive pollution; • The most powerful atmospheric nuclear explosion in history (50 Megatons at an altitude of 4,000 m on October 30, 1961), where the fission reaction accounted for only about 3% of the yield; this was the “Tsar Bomb” and it is the Guinness Book of World Records. These tests were conducted at three different sites: Cape Cherny (Zone A), the area near the Matochkin Shar (Zone B — only underground tunnel explosions) and near Sulmenova Bay (Zone C — a number of atmospheric and high-altitude explosions). No full-scale nuclear tests have been conducted at the Northern test range since October 25, 1990. No further tests are planned, as Russia, in its position as a nuclear nation, signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996, and ratified it in May 2000 (something the United States has yet to do). However, it should be noted that for Russia, the fundamental condition under which it agreed to sign and ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty were the positive results of the tests at test range mock-ups in hydrodynamic “non-nuclear explosive experiments” (NNEE), or in US terminology, “sub-critical” experiments. These experiments began on December 24 and 27, 1995 (four of them were carried out prior to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’s signature) and continue to this day. Along these lines, Federal Law No. 59-FZ (May 27, 2000) on the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty notes in Article 2 that the Treaty is to be carried out “based on supporting the fundamental potential for the possible recommencement of nuclear research activity should Russia elect to withdraw from the Treaty, support for the preparedness to conduct fully-fledged tests at the Russian Central Test Range, and prepare it for conducting work with nuclear charges and warheads when said work is not prohibited by the Treaty.” In line with a directive issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 28, 1998, the test range was transferred from the supervision of the Russian Navy to the supervision of the 12th Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense. A few non-standard inspections of its battle-readiness were conducted in September 2004 and 2007, when traditional scientific practicums were held; they were dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the test range and the 110th anniversary of the village of Belushya—the test range’s main settlement. The challenging task of maintaining this test range located beyond the Arctic Circle continues accompanied by consistent radioecological monitoring of the conditions on the territory.
The Radioecology of Novaya Zemlya In the foreword to the Russian edition of the book “Ecocide in the USSR” (authors Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr. Moscow: 1992, p. IX), Sergei Zalygin, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, took a populist stance: “I have not yet named another environmentally criminal organization — our hydrometerological service, which has hidden and continues to hide the truth from the people… when it comes to Novaya
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Zemlya, the Semipalatinsk test range, etc.” He was completely wrong, since, if one were to carefully and objectively review the references cited for this report, it will become clear that information regarding the truth of the radiation conditions at the archipelago and Russia’s northern territories had already been published openly. But there had not been, so to speak, a widespread public demand or interest for this information (even on the part of Mr. Zalygin), and when demand and interest did emerge, they came accompanied by some reasons for concern. Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, whose fate was very closely connected to the Novaya Zemlya test site, assessed the situation as follows: “I want to just come out and say it: we are partly to blame for these concerns — everything was made top secret. Of course, even now the test range is not a place one goes to take a stroll, but we will deliberately remedy the situation and provide the people with accurate information about everything that is happening there...” We have since seen confirmation of what he said. Atmospheric nuclear explosions — and there were 85 of them over the Northern test range — do not involve the ball of fire touching the surface of the Earth. The epicentral zone features only some small areas of radioactive “stains” that are polluted with radionuclides with induced activity — these are formed as the result of a reaction of the neutron flow during the explosion with the underlying soil. During this kind of explosion, micro- and submicro- radioactive particles form when evaporated materials from the construction of the nuclear device begin to condense and then coagulate, which explains their small size. If one were to consider that by time the explosion cloud stabilizes it is in the stratosphere, then the radioactive particles are held at very high altitudes for a relatively long period of time, while the tropopause (the border between the stratosphere and the troposphere) acts as a natural barrier blocking the particles from penetrating the lower levels of the atmosphere and subsequently falling onto the surface of the Earth. This results in a kind of stratospheric conservation of particles, the partial ejection of which from the stratosphere can range anywhere from three months to two years, while their total activity decreases considerably due to radioactive decay. The fallout of these kinds of radioactive products onto the Earth took place over the course of several years, mixed with the fallout from explosions at other test ranges (Semipalatinsk, as well as test ranges in the United States, Great Britain, France and China), which combine to form the “global” background. From the point of view of radioactive pollution of the atmosphere and the land, the “dirtiest” tests are surface nuclear explosions, during which direct contact is made between the fireball and the underlying terrain. This results in the activation of roughly 200 tons of soil per one kiloton of the explosion’s capacity. As a result, a local “radioactive trail” takes shape over dozens, even hundreds of kilometers, starting from the test range premises; this is exactly what happened as the result of the only surface nuclear test conducted at the Novaya Zemlya explosion on Cape Cherny on September 7, 1957. During underwater nuclear explosions, the cloud usually rises to a very low altitude. Literally within several seconds after it breaks into the atmosphere, most of the water falls from it, “cleaning out” most of the radioactive products that formed. The radioactive products that form during an underground nuclear explosion remain within its central zone: 80% in the form of refractory radionuclides stay within the mass of molten rock in the main explosion cavity. However, in 30% of all cases, streams of inert radioactive gases (IRG) have leaked into the atmosphere. These have contained 133,135Xe isotopes (their half-life is 5.2 days and 9.1 hours, respectively), and their decay
312 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY products are stable 133Cs and the extremely long-lived, and therefore practically non- radioactive, 135Cs, which has a half-life of over two million years. The streams of IRG also include 88Kr (half-life of 2.3 hours) and its by-product 88Rb (17.8 minutes). In theory, all of these radionuclides cannot trigger radioactive fallout and, as a result, they cannot have any kind of harmful impact on humans. Based on data on aerial radiation control, the transfer of IRG from the territory of the North test site via air currents has taken place at altitudes of 1,000–1,500 meters and the levels of radiation they contain when they reach the mainland have not exceeded several dozens to several hundreds µR/hr. That is why even if the IRG streams pass over a village or settlement, the exposure received by its residents would be negligible at most. Nevertheless, each time an underground test is conducted, a great deal of attention is paid to the selection of the best possible weather conditions in order to prevent gaseous radioactive products from being carried from the test range territory to the west or the south in order to avoid the risk that the IRG steams may pass over any populated areas. This is also justified if one considers the risk of explosion products in the vapor phase being accidentally released. Such situations have happened twice out of 39 underground nuclear tests conducted at the Northern test range (in the A-9 tunnel on September 14, 1969, and in the A-37A tunnel on August 2, 1987). Based on the results of the radioecological inspections conducted on the test range, we can state the following: 1. The overall exposure rate (radiation level) on the premises of the test range amounts to 7–12 µR/hr, the average 137Cs pollution density does not exceed 0.06–0.09 Ci/km2, 90Sr density levels are at 0.04 Ci/km2 and these are both close to the average level of the background surface pollution of the soil across the territory of the CIS at 0.08 and 0.05 Ci/km2, respectively. In Western Europe 137Cs levels are at 0.13 Ci/km2. 2. On the southern island of the testing range, there are two health protection zones (HPZ). One of them is at the site of an underground test conducted on August 2, 1957 (Zone B, near the Matochkin Shar measuring less than 0.3 km2. In the near future, given the density of the surface pollution and the exposure rate, the area’s status will be revised to that of an observation zone. The second area, which is less than 0.5 km2, is at the site of a surface nuclear explosion conducted on September 7, 1957 (Zone A, near Cape Cherny). The maximum exposure rates at these two sites do not exceed 1 mR/hr and 0.5 mR/ hr, respectively. 3. The southern part of the southern island has another four plots where the level of surface activity and the exposure rate exceed background numbers for the Novaya Zemlya archipelago as a whole: • The site of the first underwater nuclear explosion on September 21, 1955. It is polluted by 137Cs, 90Sr, and 60Co. The maximum exposure rate amounts to nearly 30 µR/hr, and the width of the trail is 2 km, the length is 10 km. The 137Cs pollution density is 0.8 Ci/km2, and the 60Co density level is up to 0.3 Ci/km2. • The trail from a low atmospheric nuclear explosion that has maintained the form of a “stain” with a diameter of 0.5 km. The maximum exposure rate in the center is approximately 30 µR/hr. The radioactivity of the soil is caused by 152Eu and 60Co. The contributions from 90Sr and 137Cs are significantly lower. The maximum pollution densities are: 0.6 Ci/
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km2 for 60Co, 3.5 Ci/km2 for 152Eu, and 0.05 Ci/km2 for 90Sr and 137Cs. • The trail from the on-water explosion in Cape Cherny that stretches from the bay to the northeast. The maximum exposure rate is 25 µR/hr. Radioactive fallout here contains 90Sr and 137Cs at a density of 0.1–1.2 Ci/km2. • The trail from an underground explosion in a cavity caused by the early (defined as within 20 minutes) escape of IRG. The maximum exposure dose in the cavity is 25 µR/hr. The pollution density of residual 137Cs does not exceed 1 Ci/km2. 4. The gamma-radiation survey and an analysis of samples taken in the northern island have shown that there are four “stains” at Sukhoy Nos, in the center of which the exposure rate is higher and is more than double the natural radiation background. The areas of the stains measure 0.5, 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4 km2. The maximum pollution densities are as follows: 0.05 Ci/km2 for 60Co, 0.5 Ci/km2 for 137Cs, and 0.6 Ci/km2 for 152Eu. 5. On the site of underground tests near the Matochkin Straight, in addition to one HPZ, there are other zones with increased radiation levels compared to the global pollution level: these are the epicentral zones of individual explosions. The maximum exposure rates of these relatively small areas are 0.7 Ci/km2 for 137Cs and 0.8 Ci/km2 for 90Sr. Assessments of the possible and actual spread of atmospheric masses from all of the nuclear tests that were conducted at Novaya Zemlya have shown that the dose received by the population over the period of time since the nuclear explosions were conducted and to the present time do not exceed several rem, which is lower than the doses received from natural radionuclides present in the Earth’s crust and the atmosphere. One could also say that these parts of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago near the test range, and the absence of any regular population on the islands has actually improved the conditions for the flora and fauna and have made it possible to essentially make the test area a natural preservation area with a relatively wide variety of wild animals and birds. The islands are inhabited by reindeer (the rare Novaya Zemlya reindeer), arctic foxes, lemmings, and polar bears. The lakes and rivers are home to a variety of fish. In the summer, seagulls, willocks, kiddaws, geese, ducks, swans and other birds come to nest.
About the Nuclear Cultural Legacy at Novaya Zemlya: A Monument to the History of Nuclear Weapons In 1995–1998, the Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy published several unique volumes edited by Petr Boyarsk, Candidate of Physics and Mathematics, and Professor Aleksandr Lyutyi (11–13). These publications were the first to showcase nearly 200 historical and cultural monuments of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, including those dedicated to the history of the Russian nuclear program. These monuments were indicated on a map of Novaya Zemlya Titles “A Natural and Cultural Legacy,” co-authored with Anatoliy Matushchenko). This map was made possible by contributions from the Russian National Atlas of Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Center of Comprehensive Expedition Research [Tsentr kompleksnykh ekspeditsionnykh issledovanii], and the Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, which seeks to develop unique historical and
314 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY natural territories based on original materials from the Arctic Maritime Expedition from 1988–1995. This was the first publication of its kind in 1995, and it opened the door to a series of maps highlighting the natural and cultural legacy of the Arctic based on expedition reports. In particular, the map’s index includes site No. 68 (D-2 on the map) described as: “Historical monuments to the nuclear weapons program: a complex of structures from 1957 (two bunkers, an aerial lift bridge, and a settlement of the automatic command center “D” for conducting atmospheric nuclear explosions until 1962. The Northwest coast of Gribova Bay. Arctic Maritime Expedition, 1993–1995 (12).” In turn, in another publication (13) the figures and photographs show: “the remains of the structures of the nuclear test range, located on the northern coast of the Gribova Bay, 25 km from its neck, in the depression in the southernmost edge of the eastern slope of the Klochkovsky peninsula (the base of the peninsula is located between the mouth of the Promyslovaya River to the east and the Brach Bay to the west) near the coast of Mityushikha Bay, west of Klochkovsky mountain, at the top of the hill.”
A Description of the Monument The main part of the structure is located near a wedge in the pier in the bay built from boulders. By the base of the ledge of the pier, 16 meters from the coastline, there is a wooden structure with a slanted roof — this was a radiation monitoring point. The walls of the building and the entryway from the outside are more than halfway covered in gravel. The structure has two rooms, divided in the middle by a foyer with an entrance from the northwest and a stove across from the entrance. Doorways lead from the foyer into the rooms. There are wooden plank bunk beds along the walls of the rooms. The structure also marks the beginning of a dirt road that leads to the southwest toward a reinforced concrete bunker that served as a shelter for equipment. Along both sides of the road, stretched out along the southeast and northwest lines, there are a number of rectangular platforms with wooden rostrums, apparently the remains of a tent city. The platforms are the bases for canvas tents with wooden frames, some of which have remained intact. There are two structures that share a vestibule lined with boards. One of the buildings still has a red brick stove and part of a timber frame. Forty meters to the east from a series of platforms, there are two iron cisterns lying on their sides with the openings positioned upward. To the northwest of the group of structures (500 meters along the bottom of the depression) there are a number of wooden posts that end at two wooden sheds. One of the sheds stands 17 meters from the coast. At the bottom (also in the space between the structures and the sheds) there are two large cone-shaped piles of gravel, about five meters across. The entire area of the depression is littered with 200-liter barrels that were used to contain flammable liquid. To the south from the piles of gravel, the coast is strewn with bits of metal constructions, wooden boxes, scraps from electric and telephone wires, and construction and household trash. Approximately 45 meters to the north of the platforms, not far from the edge of the water, there is a wooden drum dug into the pebbly soil. The remains of the gate are posts with crosspieces. The remains of the facilities include the following structures: entrance structures, structures for the transport and storage of freight (a berth), a reinforced concrete bunker used to shelter equipment, structures for official and residential purposes, an explosion observation point at the top of the peninsula, and other parts of the infrastructure
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(communications and power supply). The territory of the berth is located to the very south of the eastern coast of the peninsula on the first and second terraces (in the southern area) and is easily visible from the bay thanks to other free-standing structures, albeit in poor shape, and scattered unused construction materials. The site comprises the remains of several structures, warehouse space, a radiation control point, beams, household structures, power line posts, scattered construction materials (bricks, cement (over 200 sacks), wooden constructions, metal scraps, wires), etc. We have included this historical information in order to give you a feel for the atmosphere of the military life of the people involved in testing nuclear weapons during atmospheric nuclear explosions. This is also important for coming to grips with the spiritual legacy of past efforts to create the USSR’s nuclear shield. This speaks to the need for historical monuments to the nuclear weapons program, nuclear testing, and the testers themselves, who worked under such “exotic” conditions. Without a doubt, the efforts of scientists and historical and cultural monument experts to preserve this “layer” of manmade facilities deserve encouragement and assistance.
Conclusion In late September 2007, celebrations were held at the test range in honor of the 110th anniversary of the Belushya Guba village, now the main settlement of the Central Russian Test Range. Again, experts and veterans from past nuclear tests noted that under the conditions of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, this test range is serving well as a military watch point and fulfilling its primary purpose: ensuring support for the battle-readiness and safety of Russia’s nuclear capacity, but now by conducting experiments that do not involve nuclear energy release. Both Russia and the United States have the technology for conducting these tests. Consequently, in the present and foreseeable future, the test range may no longer be exclusively associated with the “nuclear genie,” which due to its nature inevitably pollutes our environment.
References Early Sources 1. The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and Radiation Safety. [Severniy ispytatelniy poligon: yaderniye vzryvy, radiologiya, radiatsionnaya bezopasnost]. Issue 1. Reference Material. Misc. authors, Ed. V.N. Mikhailov, Y.V. Dubasov, G.A. Zolotukhin, A.M. Matushchenko. St. Petersburg. The Khlopin Radon Institute. 1992, 195 pp:ill. Republished with support from the IAEA in 1999 in both Russian and English. 2. The Northern Test Range: Expert Materials from the Russian Federation from Conference, Meeting, Symposium and Hearing Proceedings. [Severny ispytatelniy poligon: materiali ekspertov Rossiiskoi Federatsii na conferentsiakh, vstrechakh, simpoziumakh i slushaniyakh]. Issue 2. Misc. authors, Ed.: V.N. Mikhailov, Y.V. Dubasov, G.A. Zolotukhin, A.M. Matushchenko. St. Petersburg. The Khlopin Radon Institute. 1993, 405:ill. 3. Novaya Zemlya. Volume 3. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky, A.M. Matushchenko, G.A. Kaurov, G.A. Krasilov, K.V. Kharitonov. “The Nuclear Test Range without the Top Secret Seal (Dates and Events, May 1990–December 1992) [Yadnerny poligon bez grifa
316 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY sekretnosti (daty, sobytiya, mai 1990–dek. 1992)]. Moscow: Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, 1994. 54–67. 4. Novaya Zemlya. Volume 3. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky. K.N. Adrianov, V.G. Safronov. “Radioecological Conditiosn at the Russian Federation’s Central Test Range.” [Radioekologicheskoye sostoyaniye Tsentralnogo poligona Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. Moscow: Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, 1994. 68–75. 5. The Nuclear Archipelago [Yaderny arkhipelag]. (Compiled by B.I. Orogorodnikov). Moscow: IzdAT, 1995 256:ill.
Monographs 6. The Northern Test Range (Novaya Zemlya). The Radioekological Consequences of Nuclear Tests [Severniy poligon (Novaya Zemlya). Radioekologicheskiye posledstviya yadernikh ispytanii.] Ivanov, A.B., Logachev, V.A., Matushchenko, A.M., Safronov, V.G., et al. Moscow: State Institute for Applied Ecology, 1997. 85:ill. 7. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Novaya Zemlya Test Range. Ensuring the General and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Tests. [Yaderniye ispytaniye SSSR. Novozemelsky poligon. Obespecheniye obschei i radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti yadernikh ispytanii]. Misc. authors, Ed. V.A. Logachev. Moscow: IzdAT, 487: ill. 8. Novaya Zemlya. Book 2 Part 2. Ed. P.V. Boyarsky. Matushchenko, A.M., Naglis, Y.A., Zolotukhin, G.E., Kovalev, V.I., Popov, P.M., Solomonov, A.A., Chernyshev, A.K. “The Nuclear Test Range without the Top Secret Seal (Dates and Events, January 1993–December 1998)” [Yadnerny poligon bez grifa sekretnosti (daty, sobytiya, yanv. 1993–dek. 1998)]. Russian Scientific Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Legacy, 2000. 87–109. 9. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Modern Radioecological Conditions at Test Ranges. [Yaderniye ispytaniye SSSR. Sovremennoye radioekologicheskoye sostoyaniye poligonov]. Misc. authors, Ed. Logachev, V.A. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639:ill. 10. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. Nuclear Tests in the Arctic, Scientific Publications and Monographs. [Yaderniye ispytaniya SSSR. Yaderniye ispytaniya v Arktike, nauchno- publits. monografiya.] Book 1, Volume 2, Section 1. “Radioecological Conditions at the Russia’s Central Test Range and the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago [Radioekologicheskiye obstanovka na Tsentralnom poligone Rossii i arkhipelag Novaya Zemlya]. Various authors, Ed. Logachev, V.A. Moscow: Kartush Publishing, 2006. 9–201.
Historiography 11. Map of Novaya Zemlya. A Natural and Cultural Legacy [Prirodnoye i kulturnoye naslediye]. Ed., P.V. Boyarsky, A.A. Lyuty. Moscow: RNII KPN, 1995. 12. Novaya Zemlya. A Natural and Cultural Legacy. A History of Discoveries. Map Legend and Explanations. [Novaya Zemlya. Prirodnoye i kulturnoye naslediye. Istoria otkrytii. Ukazateli, poyasnitelny tekst k karte]. (11) Reference material. Ed., P.V. Boyarsky, A.A. Lyuty. Moscow: RNII KPN, 1996. 212: ill. 13. Novaya Zemlya. Nature, History, Archeology, Culture. [Novaya Zemlya. Priroda. Istoria. Arkheologiya. Kultura]. Book 2, Chapter 1. Ed. Ed., P.V. Boyarsky. Moscow: RNII KPN, 1998. 275: ill.
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Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the USSR: Hopes and Realities
Albert Vasilyev Director, International Center for Environmental Safety under the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, Moscow
Vladimir Kasatkin Department Head, PromTechnologia Scientific Institute, Moscow
We begin with a brief overview of the industrial nuclear explosions that were conducted. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were conducted in the USSR over the course of 23 years. The first explosion took place in January 15, 1965 in order to form the artificial reservoir at the Semipalatinsk testing range.The last explosion took place on September 6, 1988 near the City of Kotlas in the Arkhangelsk Oblast for the purposes of deep seismic sounding in the Earth’s crust. A total of 1251 explosions were conducted using 135 nuclear explosive devices, including: • 81 tests (84 devices) in Russia; • 39 explosions (46 devices) in Kazakhstan; • 2 explosions in Uzbekistan; • 2 explosions in Ukraine; • 1 explosion in Turkmenistan. Table 1 shows a breakdown of peaceful nuclear explosions in the USSR by their purpose. Twenty years have passed since the last explosion. The results are now clearer, and one can compare what has been achieved with the intended goals and identify the successes and the failures. Both in the United States and the USSR, peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) were primarily used to create canals, reservoirs, harbors, etc. (i.e., these were excavating explosions). “Clean” devices were needed for these projects — where the energy release was caused primarily by thermonuclear reactions. This complex task was quickly accomplished in the USSR thanks to the efforts of the All-Russian Scientific Research Center for Technical Physics (a state-run nuclear center known as VNIIEF) and All- Russian Scientific Research Center for Experimental Physics (a state-run nuclear center known as VNIITF), which competed as rivals. The nuclear device tested at the Semipalatinsk range (~140 kilotons) was comprised of an initial assembly (by VNIITF), 1 A number of publications say that there were 124 explosions. The difference is whether to con- sider explosions detonated under the same name using two devices located in two holes, as in the first test to improve the Grachev oil deposit, as one or two explosions (the Butan test, March 30, 1965). We count them as two explosions, since two independent cavities formed underground.
318 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY a transition module (by VNIIEF) and a primary module that ensured the assigned capacity was achieved (by VNIITF). Thermonuclear energy accounted for ~99.8% of the tested device’s energy. Furthermore, the use of gaseous deuterium ensured a minimum of residual tritium. The construction of the nuclear device included materials that gave rise to the least possible amount of induced activity.
Table 1. A Breakdown of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions by Purpose Project Codes Number of Explosion Purpose and Number of Explosions (devices) Explosions 1 2 3 4 1. Industrial Research and Industrial Explosions Globus (4), Region (5), Meridian (3), Gorizont (4), Rubin 39 (39), Russia – 33, 1. Deep seismic sounding (2), Kimberlit (3), Kazakhstan – 6 Kraton (4), Batolit (2), Shpat, Rift (3), Kvartz (3), Agat Creation of Magistral, Sapfir (2), 26 (26), Russia – 20, 2. industrial testing Neva, Vega (15), Lira Kazakhstan – 6 premises (6), Tavda Butan (5), Gryphon (2), Benzol, Geliy (5), Oil and gas well 3. 21 (21), Russia – 21 Angara, Oka, Vyatka, stimulation Sheksna, Neva (3), Takhta-Kugulta
Elimination of 5 (5) Uzbekistan Urta-Bulak, Pamuk, 4. accidental gas – 2, Turkmenistan – 1, Krater, Fakel, Pirit blowouts Ukraine – 1, Russia – 1
Burial of industrial 5. 2 (2) Russia – 2 Kama (2) waste 6. Breaking up ore bodies 2 (3) Russia – 2 (3) Dnepr (2) Creating water 7. 1 (1) Kazakhstan – 1 Chagan reservoirs
Preventing gas 8. from escaping in 1 (1) Ukraine – 1 Klivazh coal beds Creating parts of the 9. 1 (3) Russia – 1 (3) Taiga Pechora-Kama Canal
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Creating dams for 10. 1(1) Russia – 1 Kristall tailings ponds Subtotal 99 (102) 1 2 3 4 2. Tests and Scientific Experiments (all in Kazakhstan) 1. Creating premises 9 (14) Azgir
2. Creating sinkholes 4 (4) 1-T, 2-T, 6-T, A-9
Creating water 3. reservoirs and 3 (5) Sary-Uzen, Telkem (2) canals Forming an incline for 4. the construction of a 1 (1) Lazurit dam Developing technologies for the 5. burial of radioactive 2 (2) Shtolni 148-1, 148-5 products of the explosion Scientific 6. 7 (7) Azgir experiments Subotal 26 (33) TOTAL 125 (135)
Furthermore, in order to ensure that a special burial system was developed for the device that would help remove most fission fragments and unreacted material from the explosion zone, which can reduce the atmospheric emissions produced by the explosion dozens of times over. This system was used in the Dnepr project. The device that was created was a good one, one that we can be proud of. It is displayed in the VNIITF museum. But its use is prohibited by the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which does not allow any release of radioactive products into the atmosphere. The techniques used to detect them achieved such a high level that we can now detect individual radionuclides at state boundaries. That is why the “nuclear lake” that was created in 1965 at the Semipalatinsk test range has remained the only used result of excavating explosions. Proposals had been made to use nuclear explosions at the Pechoro-Kolvinsk elevation in order to construct the Pechora-Kama canal. As part of a test explosion, three “clean” devices with a capacity of 15 kilotons each were planted at a depth of 128 meters and formed a part of the future canal (a trench) measuring 700 meters long, 300 meters wide and 10–15 meters deep. The next test was supposed to use improved devices that would produce four times less the amount of fission fragments. But the test was not permitted due to the potential detection of radionuclides beyond the boundaries of the
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USSR; the Nuclear Ministry’s team, which had already arrived at the site, was forced to return. The boreholes were filled in, and the devices were not planted. However, as a result, a number of articles about “forgotten” nuclear devices left in boreholes appeared, as well as articles about heavy pollution of the area in the explosion zone and a large number of radiation victims, etc. Contained explosions were the most successful. The first contained explosions were conducted by VNIIEF and used modifications of nuclear devices created originally for defense purposes. This use was justified, as it was important to assess the general capabilities, financial factors and environmental safety of nuclear explosive technologies. Only real tests could demonstrate the accuracy of calculated estimates, including of radiation and seismic safety. In order to support the widespread use of peaceful nuclear explosions, it was necessary to create specialized nuclear devices that would take into account the requirements of clients, such as the minimization of total (production and drilling) expenses, which could withstand high pressure and temperatures, which could be transported on all modes of transportation, and be safe and convenient to use in remote regions of the country. These devices were produced at VNIITF. The most commonly used (55 explosions) were 260-mm caliber devices that could work at temperatures of up to 80°С and pressure of up to 500 atm. It had more than a dozen different modifications and a wide range of capacities. The most frequently used capacity modifications were 3.5, 8.5 and 13.5 kilotons of TNT equivalent. One of the modifications has, regardless of the capacity, a record low amount of residual tritium at less than 0.1 grams, which is an important factor when working at oil and gas deposits when developing hydrocarbon deposits. A device with 182 mm caliber can withstand pressure of up to 700 atm and temperatures of up to 150°С. It is irreplaceable for geophysicists, since a drilling rig capable of drilling a hole for it can be delivered via helicopter to even the most remote locations, just like borehole casing and the device itself. During development, the designers managed to ensure the safety of the nuclear explosions even in emergency conditions, including the crash of an airplane or helicopter. As a result, Sredmash (the Ministry of Nuclear Energy) provided the opportunity to use nuclear explosion technologies in order to meet client needs. The use of complex scientific technologies requires compliance with strict nuclear discipline and a high level of preliminary analysis of all potential consequences. Unfortunately, not all of the participants of these projects met these requirements. The problem itself was relatively complicated. The impact of a powerful explosion on a rock bed, complex physical and chemical processes and the interaction of the resulting compounds, and their migration from the explosion zone could not be precisely calculated, even using the best calculation methods of the time. Many clients did not have these kinds of mathematical capabilities or even solid computer systems. The best options for calculations were seen at the nuclear centers — VNIIEF and VNIITF. But unfortunately, they were not kept very involved in the development of the projects themselves.
The most effective use of peaceful nuclear explosions was to put out accidental gas blowouts that burned millions of cubic meters of gas daily and struck an enormous blow to the country’s economy and environment. The explosions were detonated at a
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substantial depth (1.5–2.5 km) in a thick, low-permeable rock bed (salt or clay), which is why the products of the explosion were safely entombed in the molten rock. However, in two of five tests, the blowouts were not put out permanently and again rose up, although with significantly smaller output they made it easier to eliminate using traditional means. The main reason these tests did not succeed was insufficiently precise knowledge of the location of the problem borehole. Its location was determined with a large margin of error, since the drillers were not overly concerned about being exact. As a rule, by the time the device was planted in the borehole, the space between the device and the borehole in question was much greater than the one for which the device’s capacity was selected.
The most common use was for deep seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust. A total of 39 explosions were conducted for these purposes, and even concurrent explosions were used under other programs, in addition to test explosions at the Semipalatinsk test range. The large capacity of the seismic source, the precise knowledge of its location and the exact moment of the explosion made it possible for geophysicists to determine the boundaries of layers and their properties with great precision. The large depth at which the devices were placed, the ability to select the requisite layer of rock and fill the borehole with a cement mixture should, it seemed, fully rule out the escape of even noble gases to the surface. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the cementing — especially at the mouth of the borehole — the poor selection of the location and technical violations during drilling led to the pollution of a territory measuring 60×100 m2 around the borehole during the Globus-1 test near Kineshma. That happened even when the device — with a force of just 2.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent — was detonated at a depth of 577 meters. The proximity to the banks of the river means that additional protective measures must be taken to prevent radionuclides from entering the water. An even more dangerous situation arose during the Kraton-3 test in Yakutia. There, geologists had proposed an abandoned damaged borehole for the test, and only the upper part of the borehole, which was permafrost, was cemented closed; the permafrost melted under the heat of the cement. As a result, the borehole was barely sealed at all, and when the explosion took place, radionuclides were released. A radioactive trail roughly 30 kilometers long resulted. The external radiation dose received by the experiment participants amounted to 90–150 mSv. The level of radiation measured 9 days after the explosion was ~1 R/hr near the borehole, ~10 mR/hr within 10 km along the trail, and ~50 µR/hr at a distance of 30 km. The territory surrounding the borehole has been recultivated, the polluted soil has been removed, and a burial ground — a flat hill 2 meters high and measuring 10×30 m3 — has been formed. Then-Minister Yefim Slavsky issued an order forbidding further use ofold boreholes.
The technology used to create storage cavities in rock salt was primarily developed in tests performed at the Galit range (Azgir, Kazakhstan, the Gurievsk Oblast). The earliest uses of underground nuclear explosions for the purposes of creating underground storage facilities for gas condensate close to the city of Orenburg confirmed the high level of cost effectiveness and environmental safety. Explosions and fires that sometimes occurred in metal container lots were thereby ruled out, and the burning of
322 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY gas condensate, a valuable chemical raw material, and the pollution of the air by the hydrogen sulfide contained in gas condensate ceased. The device created by VNIITF could withstand an impact from an explosion in neighboring boreholes, which made it possible to conduct group explosions — 2, 4 and 6 explosions with intervals of 5 minutes between them. This was done first during the Vega tests at the Aksarai gas condensate field in the Astrakhan Oblast. This provided an additional economic and psychological impetus, since the cessation of hazardous work at nearby companies, the warnings issued to people in nearby villages — and sometimes their evacuation — took place once a month instead of six times each month. Interestingly enough, our colleagues in the United States never did decide to use this method of group explosions. However, the Vega tests did involve some miscalculations that resulted from the selection of the location of the 15 reservoirs. Calculations had the ideal depth for the reservoirs at 700–1,000 meters. With great depths, increased lithostatic pressure and the plasticity of the salt lead to a gradual decrease in the volume of the cavity. The speed of this process grows as temperatures rise and given the absence of any internal pressure within the cavity. Sufficient studies of the properties of the salt were not conducted at the selected site. As it turned out later, both the temperature and the pressure at a depth of ~1,000 km were higher than usual for this depth, while the salt layer featured a number of seams of anhydrite and gypsum, in addition to water lenses. Furthermore, the explosions were conducted precisely according to plan, while operations at the facility for processing gas condensate were delayed. As a result, the empty cavities began to gradually fill in, and water entered some of these cavities, which led to radionuclides being washed out of the salt that covered the molten rock. Nevertheless, an analysis of the results of all of the tests to create storage facilities in rock salt confirm that, given the proper selection of location, the technology using the timely sealing of cavities and their pressurization and filling with gas or another hydrocarbon under pressure is very cost effective, ensures radioactive safety, and makes it possible to create storage volumes in very short periods of time. The volume of each cavity depends on the power of the explosion (~3,000 m3/kiloton) and may amount to dozens of thousands of cubic meters. Suitable salt deposits can be found in many Russian regions. In total, 26 cavities were formed, one of which was formed in clay (the Tavda test in the Tyumen Oblast). This test demonstrated that durable cavities that are preserved long after the explosion can be created only in rock salt. Clay is not suitable for these purposes.
Well stimulation for oil and gas extraction (21 explosions) was one of the first uses of contained explosions (the Butan test at the Grachev deposit in Bashkortostan, 1965). The first explosions at the depleted Grachev deposit helped increase well capacity, slow the decrease in extraction and increase the rate of oil recovery. Even better results were achieved by the combined use of explosive impact (1980) and subsequently pumping casinghead gas into the well. The cost-efficiency of technologies strongly depends on oil prices. A more objective and independent assessment compares electricity generated from burning additional oil at thermal power plants (~150,000 tons per explosion) and electricity generated from burning fission products of nuclear devices at an NPP. This assessment showed the high
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cost-efficiency (3–7 times) of well stimulation technology. Unfortunately, after the start of perestroika and President Gorbachev’s policies, not only were nuclear tests ceased, but peaceful explosions were also stopped, which led to the end of efforts to introduce new applications for nuclear explosions or research into the additional effects of explosive impact on oil beds discovered in a number of tests. Furthermore, as often happens when introducing new, complex technologies, some flaws were discovered that led to the spread of radionuclides (137Cs and 90Sr) in the extracted products and the contamination of equipment. Although this contamination does not present any danger to the health of the workers or the environment, it has been and continues to be one reason for the inflation of radiophobia in newspaper articles. Strict compliance with all technological requirements and the proper selection of facilities for its use (nuclear explosions can’t be detonated just anywhere!) will provide a substantial economic effect and ensure the radiation safety of personnel.
The burial of industrial biohazards (2 explosions in the Kama-2 and Kama-1 tests near the towns of Sterlitamak and Salavat in Bashkortostan) in deep geological formations can help prevent or significantly reduce the pollution of surface waters. Experience gained in the use of two boreholes over the course of 30 years has proven the cost-effectiveness of this technology and its safety. As per the request of clients, a project to extend the service life of both of these facilities is currently underway. Over 30 years, over 35 million cubic meters of highly-mineralized waste was buried at Kama- 2, and every day the borehole receives 4,000–5,000 cubic meters of waste, or what would ordinarily require 10–15 ordinary boreholes. Unlike ordinary boreholes, these cavities do not require regular breaks for washing out the borehole. Several additional explosions were planned so that all of the waste produced by the Sterlitamak sodium carbonate plant and the Salavat petrochemical plant could be dumped into the borehole without dilution with water. These plans were stymied by both objective and subjective reasons.
Breaking up ore bodies using nuclear explosions was done in two Dnepr tests at the Kuelpor apatite ore deposit near the town of Kirovsk on the Kola Peninsula. The tests used “clean” devices with a minimum of fission fragments and incorporated a system for the removal of fission products and remaining fissile material in the burial chamber outside of the explosion zone and outside of the ore body. The studies conducted after the explosions showed that 85–90% of the radionuclides escaped the burial chamber. The ore was broken down into smaller fragments than they would have been using typical mining technology, and the ore poured freely from the taphole onto to the lower level in the required volumes. In the Dnepr 1 test, the device explosion (powered at 2.1 kilotons) broke down a block of ore measuring 50×50×50 m3. In Dnepr-2, two devices measuring 1.7 kilotons each broke up an ore block measuring 50×125×90 m3. An analysis of the samples of the ore showed that the concentration of radionuclides within them did not exceed allowable levels. Radiation conditions at work places were the same as background radiation levels. Only the concentration of tritium in mining water exceeded allowable levels for drinking water by 1.5–2 times. After it came into contact with the local stream, the tritium
324 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY concentration became significantly lower and within allowable levels for drinking water due to dilution. As a result, the peaceful nuclear explosions that have been conducted have shown that on the one hand, it is possible to use nuclear explosions to resolve a full range of important issues, affirming their high cost-efficiency given that both seismic and radiation safety is ensured. On the other hand, some concerns were also confirmed: procedural violations, insufficient knowledge of the properties of the environments in which the explosions are conducted, or the lack of consideration for these factors can lead to potential pollution of the environment and contamination of extracted resources. And although there was not one case in which pollution presented a considerable hazard, it did serve as a reason for protests against the use of nuclear explosions, and suspicions about the harm to the health of the local residents and personnel working at these facilities. These concerns and suspicions of trickery on the part of the “nuclear people” and the authorities gave rise to more worry, which caused more harm to the health of local residents than the actual radiation. As we have gained more knowledge and experience, nuclear explosives and related technologies have improved. Experience has shown us that not all of the proposed technologies provide the expected results, although we do hope that the same positive effects that were achieved during the course of peaceful nuclear explosion programs will be examined in depth and standardized, so that it will be easier to implement them in the future. Below is a brief overview of the current state of peaceful nuclear explosion facilities, the protective measures that have been taken and the rehabilitation efforts conducted at certain facilities in Russia.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the Russian Federation: Today’s Conditions and Problems From 1965–1988, a total of 81 underground peaceful nuclear explosions were conducted on Russian territory. The explosions were detonated at 50 different sites in 18-21 of the subjects of the Russian Federation in all seven federal districts (see Figure 1 and Table 2). After the introduction of the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions, the federal-owned VNIPI-PromTechnology continued, as the primary entity, to research radiation conditions and the design of rehabilitation efforts at the facilities where industrial underground nuclear explosions were previously conducted. This work included geo-radioecological monitoring research, research into the conditions of radiation safety, assessment of radiation conditions and radiation certification of mining output, designing subsurface storage facilities for radioactive waste, special mining sections, designing decontamination measures, recultivation, monitoring, industrial radiation monitoring and drafting of safety regulations.
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Table 2. Peaceful Underground Nuclear Explosions on Russian Territory
Federal District Sites of Peaceful Number of (number of Subject of the RF Nuclear Explosions Explosions explosions) Central (1) Ivanovsk Oblast Globus-1 1 Globus-3,4, Northwest Republic of Komi Gorizont-1, 4 (10) Kvartz-2 Agat, Globus-2, Arkhangelsk Oblast 3 Rubin-1 Murmansk Oblast Dnepr 2 Nenets Autonomous Pirit 1 District The North Caucasus Republic of Kalmykia Region-4 1 (17) Stavropol Krai Takhta-Kugulta 1 Astrakhan Oblast Vega 15 Butan (5 Republic of Privolzhye (20) explosions), Kama- 7 Bashkortostan 1, Kama-2 Magistral, Orenburg Oblast Region-1,2, Sapfir (2 5 explosions) Geliy (5 explosions), Perm Oblast Taiga, Grifon (2 8 explosions) The Urals (8) Tyumen Oblast Tavda 1 Khanti-Mansiisk Angara, Benzol, Autonomous Kvartz-3, Kimberlit-1, 5 District Kraton-1 Yamalo- Nenets Gorizont-2, Rubin-2 2 Autonomous District Ust-Ordynsk Buryatsk Siberia (13) Meteorit-4, Rift-3 2 Autonomous District Krasnoyarsk Krai Kraton-2, Rift-4 2 Chitinsk Oblast Meteorit-5 1
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Kemerovo Oblast Kvartz-4 1 Gorizont-3, Taimyr Autonomous Rift-1, 3 District Meteorit-2 Meteorit-3, Evensk Autonomous Batolit-1, 4 District Kimberlit-3, Shpat-2 Oka, Gorizont-4, Kraton-3, 4, Republic of Sakha The Far East (12) Kimberlit-4, Kristall, 12 (Yakutia) Vyatka, Sheksna, Neva (4 explosions)
Total: 81
Figure 1. The locations where underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were conducted in the USSR.
Based on the potential radiation hazards presented by the sites where peaceful nuclear explosions were conducted, they can be placed into 3 categories (see Table 3).
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Tables 4 and 5 include data on the current state of radiation safety at a number of the sites.
Problems Ensuring Safety of Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Sites All underground nuclear explosion facilities are potential radiation hazards. That is why regular radioecological monitoring of these facilities is mandatory. In order to prevent the spread of anthropogenic radionuclides, it is necessary to design and organize a special mining section in the protected block. One challenge is the lack of clarity in terms of how the molten rock containing plutonium would behave after long-term contact with water. The main problem is the uncertainty of the legal status of underground nuclear explosion facilities. Regular radiation monitoring has been assigned only for those facilities that operated within the central zones of the explosions (Butan, Vega, Geliy, Grifon, Kama-1, and Kama-2). At the other facilities, radiation monitoring is conducted periodically by the radiation safety laboratory under VNIPI-PromTechnology as commissioned by RosAtom and in some cases, as commissioned by the administrations of the respective constituents of the Russian Federation or a resource manager. Below are descriptions and photographs of the different peaceful nuclear explosion facilities.
Globus-1 In 2002, VNIPI-PromTechnology designed the Globus-1 Rehabilitation Project, which envisaged the construction of a canal to redirect the Shacha River (Figures 2 and 3) and some work to contain the boreholes and install a containment screen.
Table 3. Classification of Underground Nuclear Explosion Sites: Potential Radiation Hazards Facility Class Facilities and Influencing Factors
– Sites where the premises are polluted by radionuclides as the result of accidental or planned emissions of some radioactive products from explosions (Taiga, Kristall, Globus-1, Kraton-3) – Sites where parts of the premises are polluted and which feature subsurface storage sites for radioactive waste that formed as the result of research in central explosion zones or during borehole repair work (Globus-1, Kama-1,2, Kraton-3, Sapfir, Vega, Grifon, and others) High risk – Sites with the continued escape of radionuclides from fluids that are extracted or escape onto the Earth’s surface and into the environment (Butan, Geliy, Grifon, Globus-1, Dnepr, and others) – Sites where the central zone is being used for a project (Kama-1, Kama-2) – Sites where brine created by salt formations is “pressed out” from the central explosion zones (Vega, cavities 1T, 2T, 5T, 7T, 8T, 9T, Sapfir, Magistral)
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–Sites located within resource exploration and development zones on licensed territories (Kvartz-3, Kimberlit-1, Rubin-2, Rift-1, Gorizont-2, Tavda, Benzol, Angara, Pirit, and others) Problematic – Sites where the central explosion zones are impacted by artesian pressure while the cement inside the stemming structure and the hole clearance is cracking and ageing, and the metal is corroding
– All underground nuclear explosion sites in the event of Potentially unauthorized intended or accidental drilling or other work in the hazardous explosion zones
Figure 2. The Globus-1 water drainage channel (2004).
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Table 4. Key Data on Unsafe Facilities
Main Radioecological Factors that Determine Facility Radiation Conditions
An explosion for deep seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust. An explosion resulting in a critical radiation situation. The early escape of gaseous and volatile explosion products was observed. The escape of radioactive water and slime took place during examination of the explosion zone. Radioactive water could potentially leave the cavity and enter the active water cycle zone through the casing of the borehole where the device was buried. Along the stems of the boreholes that were examined, radioactive water is escaping from the explosion Globus-1, zone onto the Earth’s surface. There are surface storage areas Ivanov Oblast for radioactive soil that are not serviced, and are eroded by atmospheric precipitation, which leads to radioactive pollution of the Earth’s surface (up to 50 µSv/hr in 2005). The design of a water drainage channel from the river has been completed. A project for the physical containment of buried radioactive waste has been drafted, as well as waterproofing the shafts and mouths of the boreholes and rehabilitating the area and monitoring the facility. This project has been partially completed.
A deep seismic sounding explosion resulting in an unexpected radiation situation. The early escape of undissolved explosion product mixtures was observed, including plutonium isotopes, and the formation of an extensive trail of contaminated soil. Kraton-3, Republic of Decontamination of the area has been conducted. There Sakha, (Yakutia) are surface burial areas for radionuclide-polluted soil and equipment that has been subject to erosion from atmospheric precipitation. In 2006, work was conducted on additional waterproofing of the burial area. Large areas of the territory are polluted with T, 137Cs, 90Sr and in some places Pu.
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A test explosion for the construction of dams by loosening bedrock. The heap is contained by a clean layer of rock several meters deep and is an improvised burial area of radioactive carbonate rock. In 2005–2006 additional decontamination of the territory of the nearest radionuclide pollution (including plutonium) trail was conducted by using clean soil for Kristall, Republic of containment. The facility has been fenced off and warning Sakha (Yakutia) signs have been put in place. In July 2002, experts from VNIPI-PromTechnology detected traces of tritium in samples of mineralized water from the sides of the pit at Udachninsk Mining Plot (2 km from the facility) The migration of the tritium had been predicted. Geo-radioecological monitoring is required.
An experimental explosion for the construction of a canal in water-bearing cavities. As a result of the excavating explosion involving three nuclear devices, a heap and a water reservoir were formed. Part of the heap is polluted with radionuclide products from the explosion, including transuranium elements in the form of varying levels of disruption of slag Taiga, Perm Krai granules. The exposure rate measures up to 14 µSv/hr. The activity of the water in the reservoir is primarily caused by tritium. Measures are needed to contain the territory around the facility to close it off from recreational or business use. A project has been drafted for creating a health protection zone. This project has not been completed due to lack of funding.
Table 5. Key Data on Facilities with Radioactivity on the Earth’s Surface (operational and preserved facilities) Main Radioecological Factors that Determine Facility Radiation Conditions
Explosions for oil well stimulation purposes and increasing well output at dry deposits. The products that Butan, Republic of are extracted, primarily associated gas, are polluted with Bashkortostan tritium. The pollution of the water that forms during gas burning exceeds allowable levels.
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Explosions for oil well stimulation and increasing well output at a flooded well. The use of the facilities without a planned burial system for associated water in special boreholes led to the spread of T, 137Cs and 90Sr throughout Grifon, Perm Krai the entire deposit and the contamination of equipment and the land. At present, planned decontamination of the territory and the burial of soil in an equipped solid waste burial site.
Explosions for oil well stimulation and increasing well output at a deposit supported with pressure pumping. Products extracted in the explosion zone are polluted with tritium. At present, these zones are not operational. The reason the Geliy, Perm Krai project was halted is the lack of gas pumping. This led to the appearance of tritium in extracted resources in 2006 (in associated gas) and may lead to flooding of the explosion zones and to contamination of the territory, the industrial zone equipment, the oil pipelines and beyond.
An explosion with the purpose to create a facility for the burial of liquid industrial runoff. Planned pumping with petrochemical Kama-1, Republic of products is underway. When this area was being developed, there Bashkortostan was an accidental emission of radioactive water. The territory was decontaminated and an improvised surface burial area for soil polluted with radionuclides and equipment was formed.
An explosion to create a cavity in a salt rock formation. The facility was used for 18 years, and is currently being contained Magistral, and prepared for closure. There are surface burial areas for Orenburg Oblast radionuclide-polluted soil on site. If unauthorized drilling takes place, it could lead to the escape of radioactive brine to the surface. Explosions with the purpose of creating cavities in a rock salt formation. This facility is currently in operation. There Sapfir, Orenburg are surface burial areas for soil polluted by radionuclides. Oblast Radioactive brine is stored in the cavities. Procedural or technical failures could lead to the escape of radioactive brine to the surface.
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Explosions meant to create cavities in a rock salt formation. Of 15 drilled cavities on the territory, six have an increased radioactive background. Most significantly, contamination levels of up to 90 µSv/hr have been recorded of the ground Vega surface and equipment at three production units. Plans to eliminate a number of cavities also pose a radiation hazard and require protective measures. A project to close the 2T cavity and bury part of the brine in 12T has been completed.
One explosion meant to extract oil from low-permeability collection layers. Two boreholes drilled into the cavity were connected with the upper strata of the water table. Casing- Angara, Khanti- head gas from the explosion zone and water escaping during Mansiisk the unsealing of the boreholes were polluted with tritium. The Autonomous deposit is being developed without any regard for the presence District of the Angara facilities at the site. In 2002, containment and disposal efforts related to the boreholes were completed at the facility.
The Kumzhinsk gas condensate deposit. An explosion meant Pirit, Nenets to close the boreholes of an accidental gas blowout. Requires Autonomous radiation control at the deposit, organization of a special mining District area and a number of rehabilitation efforts. The facility is located on the territory of the Nenets State Preserve. An explosion for the purposes of oil well stimulation. The Srednye-Balykskoye oil deposit. The borehole in which the Benzol, Khanti- device was placed did not explode. The nearest lot of operational Mansiisk boreholes (3,140) have been preserved and are not being used. Autonomous District Requires a special mining area. At present, repair, containment and disposal works are underway. The facility is located in Protected Zone 3 of the Velizhansk water intake, which supplies the city of Tyumen with Tavda, Tyumen drinking water. Requires continuous radiation monitoring Oblast and a ban on drilling in the protected area near the central explosion zone.
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Figure 3. The general view of the territory of the Globus-1 facilities (2001).
The water drainage channel should play a positive role and prevent streams from approaching the industrial zone. This project has undergone the required approval process. The Governor has assigned temporary responsibility for the maintenance of the facility to the administration of the Kineshma Rayon in the Ivanovsk Oblast. In 2003–2004, the water drainage channel was equipped. Further progress on the project was halted due to a lack of funding.
Kraton-3 In 2001, VNIPI-PromTechnology projects were drafted, agreed and approved for the rehabilitation of the Kraton-3 facility. In 2007, the project was partially completed with the contribution of ALROSA’s Aikhal Mining Plant and the participation of VNIPI-PromTechnology representatives. Other exploratory work was conducted, and the waterproofing of the waste storage facility was improved (see Figures 4and5). Furthermore, the offtake shaft was reconstructed, warning signs were posted around the health protection zone, and some of the planned observation wells were drilled and equipped.
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Figure 4. A view of the industrial zone and the radioactive trail at the Kraton-3 facility (1999).
Figure 5. The waterproofing cover of the trench storage facility for radioactive waste at the Kraton-3 facility (April 2007). Kristall In 1992, decontamination of the subsidence craters in the epicentral zone and a part of the radioactive trail by filling these zones with a layer of waste rock from the Udachnaya pipe pit. The filled area formed a mound of waste rock in the form of a truncated cone with a diameter of 220 meters and a height ranging from seven to 20 meters (see Figures 6 and 7).
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Figure 6. A view of the Udachnaya pipe pit.
In 2006–2007, using a design by VNIPI-PromTechnology, ALROSA’s Udachninsk Mining Plant conducted additional rehabilitation efforts to reinforce and expand the protective screen, fence off the facility and establish a health protection zone.
Figure 7. Photographs of the “sarcophagus” over the epicentral zone of the Kristall facility after rehabilitation efforts (December 2006).
Taiga As of July 2001, this facility looks like an oval, closed water reservoir in the form of a natural lake measuring up to 750 meters in length and 350 meters in width. Radiometric scans have revealed the radioactive properties of the area. Compared to the results of a 1990 study, the radiation level has fallen 5–7 times. A project to delimit a health protection zone measuring 1000 × 600 m2 had been drafted. It includes the water reservoir, a heap and part of the surrounding territory.
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Figure. 8. A view of the Taiga facility (July 2001).)
Dnepr
Figure 9. The production layout after the explosion at the experimental bloc at the Dnepr facility.
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Figure 10. A view of the area before the bridge to the closed gangway at the Dnepr facility (2002).
Grifon
Figure 11. Unloading polluted soil and equipment into solid waste storage containers at the Grifon facility.
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Figure 12. Unloading polluted soil and equipment into the solid waste storage point at the Grifon facility.
Deep Seismic Sounding Facilities (“abandoned”)
Figure 13. The Rift 3 facility, Irkutsk Oblast (July 2003).
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Figure 14. The Meteorit-5 facility, Chitinsk Oblast (2003).
Figure 15. The Rubin-2 facility, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (2006).
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Figure 15. The Angara facility (2001).
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The Semipalatinsk Test Site, Exploring the Nuclear Underworld: A Beginner’s Guide to Radiation Levels in Cavities Created by Underground Nuclear Explosions
Samat Smagulov Senior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov Anatoliy Matushchenko Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom; Co-chairman, Interagency Expert Commission on Assessing Radiation Safety of Underground Nuclear Tests; Professor, Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Technology, Moscow Aleksandr Kiryukhin RosAtom Situation Crisis Center
Introduction Eighteen years have passed since the last nuclear test was conducted at Borehole 1365 on October 19, 1989 at the Semipalatinsk test site. That day the Soviet Union ceased to exist, while its member republics became sovereign states. On August 29, 1991, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev issued an order to stop testing at the Semipalatinsk test site. Before the site was closed, members of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk social movement spoke about the possibility that local residents may have been irradiated during the time period when testing was conducted at the site. These people needed financial support, social assistance and rehabilitation. Since those days, no one has thought about the people who participated in these tests or what assistance they might need. There have been no publications about the conditions under which they worked or what radiation exposure they received. The first part of this report presents experimental data on the radiation doses received by test participants under different scenarios that took place during underground nuclear testing in the Degelen Mountain tunnels at the Semipalatinsk test site. The second part of this report takes a look at the cavities created by underground nuclear tests conducted in the tunnels.
Contributing Factors in the Irradiation of Underground Nuclear Test Participants The Degelen Mountain is located approximately 100 km south of the Semipalatinsk site administrative and residential zone. Five staging areas were built for conducting underground nuclear tests. Over the years of testing, a dense network of 181 horizontal tunnels was built here (4). The first underground nuclear test using a tunnel in the USSR was held atthe
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Semipalatinsk test site (also known as Ministry of Defense National Central Test Site 2) on October 11, 1961. The last explosion at the site was held on October 19, 1989. In all, 209 tests took place here (1). There were two years when there was an especially high number of test explosions conducted at the site: 13 explosions were organized in both 1965 and 1978. Certain tunnels were used more than once. Salvo (multiple-device) explosions were also tested. Several nuclear charges were placed in the same tunnel or in two separate tunnels. The first salvo test was held on December 3, 1966, when two charges were placed in the same tunnel. The maximum number of charges detonated in the same tunnel was five. The first salvo explosion with one charge placed in each of two tunnels was held on December 10, 1972. A total of 223 test devices were detonated at Semipalatinsk in a total of 209 tests conducted in tunnels (1, 3, 4). The main goals of these explosions were to test nuclear devices and nuclear charges and to study the effects of explosions on surrounding rock formations and underground structures. The number of nuclear tests conducted in tunnels at the Semipalatinsk test site year to year is shown in Figure 1 (4). We know that there were a number of different radiation scenarios during the underground nuclear tests that were conducted during this period. Let us look at the working conditions of the personnel involved in the testing. The escape of radioactive gases, such as xenon and krypton isotopes, to the surface is not a violation of containment requirements. In terms of residual radioactive contamination, the early emission of radioactive substances shortly after the explosion was particularly undesirable. Early emission carries with it 137Cs and 89Sr isotopes, which are the decay products from their isobaric analogues, and 137Xe and 89Sr isotopes (1, 3, 4).
Figure 1. The number of underground nuclear tunnels tests at Semipalatinsk through the years.
The release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere during tests using boreholes occurs either through cracks in the ground, the stemming complex, or along the cables. The latter is the most likely, which is why during the last tests, the top portions of the shafts were reinforced with cement. In addition to radioactive inert gases, tunnel tests typically could also release radioactive isotopes 131–135I (1, 3). The direction of the released radioactive substances into the atmosphere (through the tunnel outlet or through the epicentral zone) depends on the temperature difference
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between the escaping gases and the ambient air. During cold weather conditions in the winter, fall, and spring, radioactive gases escape through the epicentral zone, while in the summer the radionuclides are more likely to escape through the tunnel opening. Just like during borehole testing, the isotopic makeup of the radioactive substances entering the air of the work area depends on the initial release time and its age. For typical (safe) radiation conditions, there is no persistent contamination of the area due to the short half-life of the resulting radioactive aerosols or the dispersion of the gases into the atmosphere (3). When examining factors that contribute to radiation exposure during underground nuclear explosions, we must first consider the specific conditions under which radiation levels were achieved. All tunnel tests were divided into five groups according to intensity and the location and timing of the radioactive release into the atmosphere (2, 3, 5). The first group includes tunnels where radioactive substances escaped under pressure or almost immediately through the surface openings of the underground structures (see Table 1). In these situations, the staging areas at the head of the tunnels received practically all of the radioactive products that normally accompany nuclear explosions. This happened mostly during the very first underground nuclear tests while different stemming designs were still being developed. To this day, samples taken from soil at those sites indicate the presence of fission and activation products and fissile material.
Table 1. Classification of Underground Nuclear Explosions in Tunnels by Type and Location of Radioactive Emission (based on the total number of tunnel explosions) Early Early Radioactive Gas Medium-Term No Pressurized Radioactive Emission with and Late Radioactive Radioactive Gas Emission Release through Radioactive Gas Emission through Tunnel the Epicentral Gas Emission Emission Opening Zone 11 11 14 155 33 4.9% 4.9% 6.3% 69.2% 14.7%
When test explosions were accompanied by the early emission of radioactive gases, within the first few minutes following the explosion, the contaminated air and the area close to the test site contained 140Ba and 89Sr, which are relatively long-lived fission products of 140Хе and 89Kr (3). The fourth group combined tunnels with “safe” radiation conditions, where the emitted gas mixture was found to contain radionuclide of noble gases, radioactive iodine, and short-lived radionuclides, which are the products of radioactive inert gas fission. No persistent contamination of the area was observed for these tests. It is easy to see that the tests in the fourth group account for 69% of all tests conducted in the mountain tunnels. Assuming that each individual test involved approximately the same number of participants, we can conclude that the most of those who worked close to where the underground explosions were staged received radiation exposure under “safe” radiation conditions. The fifth and final group included all tests for which no radioactive
344 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY emissions were detected. The most detailed analysis of radiation factors that determine the level of exposure during contained nuclear explosions was carried out by Mr. A. P. Martynov (2). By combining methods for calculating exposure rates, studies of radioactive contamination of air of the work area, and tests done to determine external beta-gamma radiation doses, the author of the study was able to determine the significance of external gamma radiation, external beta radiation, and internal radiation under tunnel test conditions. Based on this analysis, which used testing data collected at Semipalatinsk 1964–1973, external radiation doses received by personnel under normal (“safe”) radiation conditions are dependent on the emission of radioactive inert gases and aerosols with short-lived fission products. The risks associated with various radiation factors during tunnel nuclear tests depends on the time when emissions occur, where the people are located (in the tunnel, in open air, or at the staging site next to the test tunnel), where radioactive emissions emerge (through the tunnel opening or through the epicentral zone), and whether the personnel are equipped with gear ensuring skin and respiratory system protection. During the first 24 hours following the explosion, the highest risk associated with working in the tunnel is the effect of the maximum beta radiation dose on internal organs. Afterwards, for as long as 700 hours following the explosion, thyroid gland irradiation becomes the more significant risk. On the staging platform at the tunnel opening, in the event that radioactive gases take this route, for the first 24 hours following the explosion, gamma radiation and beta radiation risks are on roughly the same level, after which thyroid gland irradiation becomes the more significant risk. In open air, for up to 1,000 hours following the explosion, external gamma radiation poses the highest risk. Table 2 shows the test data for thyroid gland radiation doses for certain participants that were working during the test. The analysis shows that underground nuclear explosions, in addition to the risk of full-body gamma ray exposure, there is a real risk of thyroid gland irradiation as a result of inhaling iodine radionuclides. In contrast, nuclear explosions conducted in boreholes under safe radiation conditions result in internal radiation doses due to radioactive inert gases and short-lived fission products that are 10–100 times smaller that associated external gamma radiation doses.
Table 2. Thyroid Gland Radiation Doses in Test Participants Internal Radiation Dose Dose rad rem Activity No. Tunnel Full Name External Radiation Professional Group Professional Measurement 175-2P, 164, of dose rates, 138, 132, K-85, 1 S. Semyonovykh 2.81 1.5 2.12 2 collection of 169/2, 129P, air samples 704, 901, 169/1
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Radiation 175-2P, 164, 2 A. Prozorov 2.5 1.3 3.85 safety 2 138, 132, K-85, management 190, 129P
130, K-85, 901, 3 N. Posokhov 0.43 0.26 1.39 Dosimetry 2 169/1, 169/2, К-85
132, 169/2, 4 N. Chupis 2.36 1.23 1.15 Dosimetry 2 129P, 200-ASM
Remote sample 5 V. Polekhin 0.38 0.24 0.145 3 130, 704 collection and spectrometry Remote 6 A. Kiryukhin 0.112 0.12 1.7 dose rate 3 130, 132 measurement Technical support for 7 S. Karasev 2.69 1.38 1.54 the sample 3 130, 132, K-85 collection system 8. N. Seretkin 4.87 2.55 0.89 Dosimetry 2 169/2, 704, 901
Radiation 9. S. Smagulov 1.29 0.68 0.37 safety 2 901 management
10 L. Vlasenko 1.78 0.95 0.205 Dosimetry 2 132, 200-ASM
Cavities Created by Underground Nuclear Explosions This portion of the report discusses the goals and tasks of scientists that examined the epicentral cavities created by tunnel explosions, the kind of work this involved, and the working conditions these individuals faced. We will use one of the tunnels (No. 148/5) as a case study. Table 3 contains the data on radiation conditions inside the cavities formed by the nuclear explosions. The first underground nuclear explosion in the USSR was conducted at Semipalatinsk tunnel V-1 (10/11/61). In order to study the radiation and mechanical effects of the underground explosion, a tunnel was made reaching the center of the cavity. Anatoliy Matushchenko and Yuri Dubasov, researchers with the Industrial Scientific Research Institute Project (PromNIIProyekt), the Khlopin Radium Institute,
346 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY and the Semipalatinsk test site, used the tunnel to access the cavity in August 1964. By this time, the original cavity created by the explosion was found to have been filled by rubble. Because of this, the initial inspection concluded that the cavity itself had not been reached or that the access tunnel had significantly deviated from its course. Once surveyors demonstrated twice that this was the exact location where the test device had been placed, all doubts vanished. An inspection of the cavity showed that its cross- section had increased significantly. After the rubble was cleared, a dome 7–8 meters tall was revealed. Amid the rubble, scientists found pieces of vitrified rock in the shape of icicles 4–5 cm long. The placement of the boundary where finely crushed rock met blocks of unchanged granite measuring several cubic meters in volume, as well as the presence of molten rock that had trickled down the walls of the cavity, indicated that the cavity wall was located 8 meters from the epicenter (4).
Table 3. Inspection of Cavities Produced by Underground Nuclear Explosions Initial Tunnel Inspection Re-entry Test Date Radiation Conditions No. Date Inspection Team The radiation dose rate increased to 0.2 mR/ hr within 70 m from the epicenter. Approaching the cavity the dose rate Yu. Dubasov grew from 1 to 25 mR/ A. Matushchenko August 1964 В-1 10/11/1961 hr. Maximum values of V. Gusak 25 mR/hr were recorded V. Semyonov 34 m from the epicenter, E. Stukin at the cavity boundary. In the center of the cavity the exposure rate was 10 mR/hr.
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The larger part of the visible surface of the cavity, to within 4 meters of the equatorial plane, is covered with A. Matushchenko hardened molten rock in Yu. Dubasov the form of stalactites. 1971, 1972 V. Semyonov 504 10/29/1968 The vitrified rock layer R. Blinov ranged from 1–20 cm. V. Gusak The exposure rate right at L. Solovyov the molten cavity walls ranged from 20–40 mR/ hr, and measured around 20 mR/hr on top of the rubble chimney. The temperature inside the burial chamber was around 30°С. Exposure rate in the cavity at R. Blinov height of 1 m varied from Yu. Dubasov Summer 148/5 12/16/1974 20 mR/hr to 200 mR/hr. V. Semyonov 1975 On the floor of the cavity S. Smagulov it was ~ 250–700 mR/hr Yu. Fedotov (N=0.1 m), at sampling points it equaled 60— 1000 mR/hr. Temperature measured at 35–40°С. Exposure rate February R. Blinov equaled 100–250 mR/hr. 1982 Yu. Dubasov 103 11/20/1981 Temperature 30–35°С. July, August A. Matushchenko Exposure rate in the 1982 S. Smagulov cavity equaled 5–25 mR/ Yu. Fedotov hr.
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Cavity measurements match expected values, radius of the cavity equals 25 m. At the time of re-entry, the cavity R. Blinov temperature equaled July, August Y. Dubasov 30–35°С. Exposure rate 190 04/15/1984 1984 V. Semyonov at cavity entrance: 45–60 S. Smagulov mR/hr; at the top of the A. Matushchenko rubble chimney: 30–40 mR/hr; for N=1 m from the cavity wall: 50–150 mR/hr; for N=0.1 m: 150–200 mR/hr.
The radiation dose rate increased to 0.2 mR/hr within 70 m from the epicenter. Upon approaching the cavity, the dose rate grew from 1 to 25 mR/hr. Maximum values of 25 mR/hr were recorded 34 m from the epicenter and at the cavity boundary. In the center of the cavity, the exposure rate was 10 mR/hr. The high radiation dose rate observed at the 34-meter mark was due to the presence of a vein of molten rock, 40 cm wide, spanning 6 meters along the cavity wall. This vein contained a melted metal pipe, 30 cm in length, weighing 1 kg. The number of exposed small (1 cm) and medium (up to 10 cm) vitrified veins sharply increased in the 12–6 m section. The next opportunity to enter an explosion cavity was during the test at tunnel 504P, which was also conducted at the Degelen Mountain on the Semipalatinsk test site on October 29, 1968. The tunnel reached the cavity 457 days after the explosion in the winter of 1970. The initial inspection of the cavity’s measurements and radiation parameters was conducted by test site experts with Anatoliy Matushchenko at the helm and PromNIIProyekt staff. The last portion of excavated tunnel rubble was pushed into the cavity, adding more material on top of the rubble that had formed. To the team’s surprise and delight, the cavity was almost completely intact. It was half-full of rubble from the cavity walls and ceiling. A detailed inspection of the cavity, complete with sample collection, was done by Khlopin Radium Institute staff with Yuri. Dubasov leading the team, as well as local test site experts, Anatoliy Matushchenko, PromNIIProyekt staff, and researchers from the Fyodorov Applied Geophysics Institute in 1971 and 1972 (4, 5). The bottom section of the cavity, up to 3 m from the floor, was found to be full of radioactive monolithic dark vitrified rock with a greenish color, reminiscent of obsidian. The spherical segment with hardened molten rock was covered by a thick layer of rubble with pieces of varied sizes. Fissures up to several centimeters thick were observed in the cavity dome, filled with molten rock. Most of the visible cavity surface up to 4 m within the equatorial plane was covered in the molten rock, taking on the appearance of stalactites. It was clear that the molten rock had trickled down and hardened in the form of threads and icicle formations. The thickness of the vitrified rock layer ranged from 1–20 cm. The layer is vesicular, with the long axis of the gas pockets pointing in the direction of the flow. The pockets measure up to 2 cm, and the volume density of
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the vitrified material is ~ 600–1400 kg/m3. The exposure rate right up against the cavity walls ranged between 20–40 mR/hr and measured approximately 20 mR/hr at the rubble column. The molten rock mixture was found outside of the cavity boundary in the form of solitary thin veins that reached no more than 7 m beyond the cavity walls. The molten rock traveled along fissures created by the explosion and pre-existing cracks in the rock. Close to the cavity boundary, new fissures were more common, while pre-existing cracks were more frequent the further one went from the cavity. The following tools were used to study the level of contamination of the rock: gamma-ray logging, spectrometer gamma-ray logging, radiometric sampling, gamma-ray profiling, and spectrometer sampling together with radiometric sampling. Later inspections were conducted on the cavity in tunnel 190, tunnel 103, burial chamber (5) of the explosion in tunnel 148/5 and others. These inspections collected unique data on the effect of high temperatures and pressure on rock formations. The results obtained from the tests were used in predicting radiation levels and geological changes, and to design nuclear tests for both research and peaceful use.
Inspection of the Tunnel 148/5 Burial Chamber The test was conducted on December 16, 1974 in a Degelen Mountain tunnel for the purpose of developing a technique for the peaceful use of nuclear explosions as a way to bury radioactive products of an explosion in a separate chamber (see Figure 2). The difference in this scenario was that for the purpose of burying the radioactive products of the explosion, the burial chamber [5] was directly connected to the end chamber [1] where the test device was placed. The compartment was the shape of a widening horizontal tunnel that was connected to the epicenter of the explosion. The test designers expected the chamber to become filled with molten rock and radioactive products of the explosion. The inspection of the explosion cavity and the burial chamber was to determine what really happened (6).
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Figure. 2. A diagram of Tunnel 148/5, with the burial chamber. 1. End chamber 2. First stemming segment 3. Radiation release channel 4. Hermetic seal 5. Burial chamber
The first inspection, led by Rudolf Blinov, took place in the summer of 1974. The inspection was conducted by resident experts (R. Blinov, A. Andreev, Yu. Fedotov, S. Smagulov, A. Solomonov), V. Semyonov and V. Vertrogradov from the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16) and a mine rescuer team headed by Gennady Larin from the Leninobadsk Mining and Chemical Combine. Re-entry into the burial chamber was to go through a bypass tunnel made possible by the mine rescuer team. The plan for this tunnel was developed by a group of researchers from PromNIIProyekt (MSM) under K. Myasnikov. Rudolf Blinov and the mine rescuer team developed a plan for going from the bypass tunnel into the burial chamber. The main goals were: • Collection of representative samples, • Description of the sample site and identification of the site using survey tools, • Measurement of gamma-ray dose rates at sampling sites. Later, the samples would undergo radiochemical and gamma-ray spectroscopy tests at the Semipalatinsk Third Research Division. After training, we entered the bypass tunnel. Each participant had an assigned spot in the order in which we moved through the tunnel, and the order could not be changed. We followed the tunnel to the main section of Tunnel 148/5. Along the way, the tunnel vault collapsed in a several places and the tunnel was filled with rubble. We continued over the rubble a bit further. When we stopped, Gennady Larin told us that there was an obstruction ahead. Once we cleared it, we would be at the point when the burial chamber began. The entrance to the burial chamber was prepared, but we had to be careful, since not much time had passed since the explosion (it had been a little over a year), the mountain was still “breathing,” which meant rock formations could shift. We came to the end of the bypass tunnel and the chamber entrance, if you could call it that. The entrance was a gap about 0.6–0.8 m tall and 2 m wide. One by one, we climbed in through this gap and saw the burial chamber. Our first impression, when we turned on our flashlights, was that we had penetrated into a magical, crystal cave, where slag and glass icicles reflected all the colors of the rainbow. Unfortunately, we had no time to admire this sight.
Primary Findings Inside the Burial Chamber The temperature in the chamber was about 300°С. The exposure rate in the chamber at the height of 1 m varied from 20 mR/hr to 200 mR/hr. At floor level, the rate was ~ 250–700 mR/hr (N=0.1 m); at sampling points, the rate varied from 60–1000 mR/hr. An inspection of the burial chamber showed that close to the entire length of its surface was covered in a vitrified radioactive mixture. It covered the dome, walls, and
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especially the floor of the chamber, which was called K3 in the design. The molten layer on the floor became thinner toward the epicenter. Judging by the radiation dose rates and the distance between the floor and the dome, a large proportion of the molten material had been collected at the back. The dome of the tunnel was also covered in “icicles.” Some of these measured 20–30 cm in length and were 2–5 cm thick. It should be noted that the “icicles” were bent away from the epicenter and toward the back of the burial chamber. The molten rock in the burial chamber included both vesicular and dense vitrified rock of two grades, one of which was fragile, with numerous, very fine vesicles, similar to pumice stone. Above two hours later we were given the order to wrap up and come out. The radiation dose of the participants did not exceed 2 rem. That was the conclusion of the first stage of field work: the inspection of the burial chamber ofTunnel 148/5. Tests and in-depth study of burial chambers and explosion epicenters have shown that it is possible to control how radionuclides are distributed inside a rock formation. The concentration of 90Sr and 137Cs, along with other radionuclides with gaseous analogues, was much lower in the space immediately near the cavity than in a standard symmetric spherical explosion. In some cases, 90Kr and 137Xe went beyond the boundaries of the end chamber, turning into 90Sr and 137Cs (3–6). The specific activity in the burial chamber turned out to be 1–100 times higher than next to the rock in the explosion cavity. Later inspections determined that the burial chamber contained over 90% of the nuclear explosion’s products.
Conclusion The intention of this report was to provide a brief overview of the work of Semipalatinsk testers, which involved radiation risks during the nuclear tests themselves and also provided them with opportunities to do fascinating research inside underground nuclear explosion cavities. By inspecting the epicentral zones of underground explosions, we were able to better understand the processes that affect rock formations, learn more about certain processes in nuclear physics and mechanics, and to make significant changes to how the tunnels used to conduct underground nuclear tests are designed. Beyond this, the experimental data we obtained was used to develop and implement the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. One such example is the use of a nuclear explosion at the Kola Peninsula apatite deposits where a burial chamber was used to contain the resulting radioactive products. Finally, the researchers’ unique experience under non-standard radiation conditions was also useful during the clean-up effort following the Chernobyl accident.
References 1. Gorin V., Matushchenko, A. M., Smagulov, S. G., et al. Semipalatinsk Test Site: A Chronology of Underground Nuclear Tests and their Primary Radiation Effects [Semipalatinskiy poligon: Khronologiya podzemnykh izpytaniy i ikh pervichnye radiatsionnye effekty] (1961–1989), Byulleten’ po atomnoi energii, No. 9, 1993, Moscow, TsNIIATOMINFORM. 2. Martynov, A. P. A Study of Radiation Factors Affecting Irradiation of Participants during Contained Nuclear Explosions. [Issledovanie radiatsionnykh
352 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY faktorov, opredeliayushchikh obluchenie lyudey pri kamufletnykh yadernykh vzryvakh]. Doctoral dissertation, 1975. 3. Safonov, F. F., Smagulov, S. G., et al., Overview and Conclusions Based on Available Documents on Radioactive Environmental Pollution at Nuclear Test Sites [Sbor i obobshchenie imeyushchkhsya materialov po radioaktivnomu zagryazneniyu prirodnoy sredy v mestakh provedeniya yadernykh vzryvov]. Kurchatov, military unit 52605, 1992. 4. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [Yadernye ispytaniya v SSSR], Mikhailov V. N. ed., RFYaTs-VNIIEF, Sarov, 1997. 5. Matushchenko, A. M., Aidin, A. I., Smagulov, S. G. Converting the Semipalatinsk Test Site to a Peaceful Nuclear Test Site [Semipalatinskiy poligon: konversiya v oblast’ mirnykh yadernykh vzryvov]. Conference paper, Kurchatov, NYaTs RK, 2005. 6. Smagulov, S. G. Development of Nuclear Explosive Technology for Peaceful Uses at the Semipalatinsk Test Site [Otrabotka yaderno-vzryvnoi tekhnologii v mirnykh tselyakh na Semipalatinskom poligone]. Byulleten’ po atomnoi energii, No. 1, 2005.
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The Nuclear Explosion in the Aral Desert
Alexander Aidin State Science Center Institute of Biophysics at the Federal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia, Moscow
Sergei Zelentsov The Federal Institute of Strategic Stability, RosAtom, Moscow Anatoliy Matushchenko Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering; Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom
The Forging of the Nuclear Sword On July 16, 1945, at 5:30 AM near the town of Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first nuclear device test in the history of mankind was conducted — with a yield of nearly 20 kilotons of TNT equivalent — under the codename “Trinity.” This occurred shortly before the Potsdam Conference, which brought together the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain. Exactly three weeks later — on August 6 and 9 — the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped off the face of the Earth by nuclear bombs codenamed “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” which were dropped from a B-29 bomber. As Ivan Kurchatov vividly put it, “this was a nuclear fist in front of our face.” In an address on American radio, US President Henry Truman stated, “We thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes.” The planet’s nuclear arms race had begun. In response, the Soviet government decided to accelerate uranium research, which had been interrupted by the war; this task was entrusted to Ivan Kurchatov (in non- confidential correspondence named Borodin). On September 28, 1942, Joseph Stalin had already signed the Order from the State Defense Committee regarding uranium research: “Instruct the USSR Academy of Sciences (specifically Abram Ioffe, a prominent physicist and Member of the Academy) to recommence researching the feasibility of using nuclear energy through the expansion of uranium nuclei and report to the State Defense Committee by April 1, 1943, on the possibilities of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel…” This was an important political turning point that predicted the future aggressive behavior on the part of anti-Soviet powers. And so, under the extremely turbulent setting of World War II, the USSR took on the challenge of the United States, which was already secretly and actively working on the A-bomb (1). In 1944, Winston Churchill wrote to Joseph Stalin that the Germans were conducting experiments with missiles at the test range in Debica (Poland). He requested that, after
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Soviet troops take over the region, English specialists be allowed to study the seized machinery and devices. In Germany, the missile center was located in Peenemünde. On May 2, 1945, its management, headed by Wernher von Braun, the “father” of V-2 missiles, surrendered to the United States. In effect, that day marked the beginning of the race to create effective missile weaponry. Yesterday’s allies found themselves on opposite sides of the barrier. On August 20, 1945, the State Defense Committee resolved to create an institution to oversee uranium research — a special committee within the USSR’s State Defense Committee (Chairman: L. Beria; Members: M. Pervukhin, N. Voznesensky, G. Malenkov, B. Vannikov, V. Makhnev, P. Kapitsa, I. Kurchatov, A. Zavenyagin) (1). The formation and development of missile armament simultaneously began in Russia in accordance with Decree No. 1017-419 of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the USSR issued on May 13, 1946, on missile weapons issues. The decision was made to establish the State Central Missile Test Range in the interest of all the ministries participating in the creation of this armament. Major General Voznyuk was appointed commander of the State Central Missile Test Range. The facility was located 100 kilometers east of Stalingrad, near the Kapustin Yar rail station in the Astrakhan Oblast. On August 29, 1949, at 7:00 AM local (Kazakhstan) time, the first Soviet nuclear explosive was tested at the Semipalatinsk test range, with a yield of 22 kilotons of TNT equivalent (2). The Soviet leaders also learned that in the autumn of 1949, the United States developed nuclear strike scenarios against Russia. One of them, codenamed Operation Dropshot, involved the launch of 300 nuclear bombs onto 100 Soviet cities. At the time, scientists did not yet know the full consequences of such an attack on the aggressor, or on the entire planet for that matter. However, the aftermath of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on August 6 and 9, 1945 was horrifying. Up until 1953, Russia’s armed forces in the post-war period were armed with only standard weaponry and battle technology, such as had been used during the war against Hitler’s Germany. Military training was based on the experience of that war. But on the testing grounds and in laboratories, intense research was already underway. Sergey Korolev began designing the R-5 missile in 1949. The missile’s firing distance needed to be two times greater than the distance of the operational-tactical R-2 missile. By October 1951, an outline for the R-5 missile project had been drafted, and in 1952, a government decree was issued ordering the creation of a ballistic missile with a flying distance of over 1,000 km. Dmitrii Kozlov was appointed lead designer. This was the first Russian-designed missile. Its first successful launch was conducted at the maximum distance (1,200 km) on April 19, 1953. To quote from “Strategic Ground Missile Complexes” (3): “…On April 10, 1954, a decree was issued by the government to use the R-5 missile as the basis for creating a nuclear weapon. In October of 1955, tests were conducted on the missile’s nuclear explosives haul. Based on the results, a warhead was developed for further modification. Sergey Korolev’s new creation was indexed as 8K51 (R-5M). Dmitrii Kozlov was the lead designer for both this missile and the R-5.” Beginning in 1953, the Soviet Union Army and Navy had begun practical nuclear weapons testing and related exercises. The armed forces began to study how to maintain combat operations in the event that nuclear weapons were used. Missile technology
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research and development was in full swing and was seen as the most promising way to deliver nuclear weapons to their targets.
No Room for Error Creating nuclear missile technology became a priority. In the future, an aggressor would be unlikely to attack a country holding such powerful weapons, as it would ultimately suffer the greater damage. The first successful launch of an R-5M missile equipped with a nuclear warhead was conducted on May 20, 1955. The final series of missile launches, using missiles equipped with imitation nuclear warheads (security testing), began on January 11, 1956 (3). At the insistence of the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, Operation Baikal took place on February 2, 1956. This was the first and only experimental launch of a R-5M ballistic war missile with a real nuclear warhead, the force of which equaled 0.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent (until then, 14 missiles were launched with conventional warheads). The nuclear explosive was a modified explosive of the first generation of RDS-4, developed at KB-11 (currently, the Russian Federal Nuclear Center – All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics) for air bombing, and successfully tested on August 23, 1953 at the Semipalatinsk test range from an Il-28 airplane. The reliability of both the missile and the nuclear warhead dispelled any lingering doubts (3). As a result, a guided missile system with a 4R R-5M warhead was approved for arming the engineering brigades of the Supreme Command Reserve on June 21, 1956. The following individuals were honored with the title “Hero of Socialist Labor” for their contribution to the missile system: designers S. Korolev, V. Mishin, V. Glushko, V. Barmin, M. Ryazansky, N. Pilyugin, V. Kuznetsov, and scientists Y. Khariton, Y. Zeldovich, A. Sakharov, and M. Keldysh. Lieutenant General Sergei Zelentsov (one of the co-authors of this presentation) was a direct participant in this event and stated that:
The battle launch of the missile was carried out from the missile and artillery test range at Kapustin Yar, located between the cities of Astrakhan and Stalingrad, at maximum distance onto the battlefields of the opposition forces located 1,200 km away from the test range, 160 km northeast of the city of Aralsk. A special group of researchers measured the parameters of the 0.3 kiloton nuclear explosion in at the impact site: penetrating radiation, shockwave, a fireball, video and photography of the mushroom cloud, as well as the radiological conditions that took shape in the sandy desert setting. This group was headed by Major General Benetsky (Chief of the 6th Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense); the group included both myself and Alexander Aidin – another of the co-authors of this presentation. The group maintained an uninterrupted connection with the launching base. (8)
While the battlefield was being prepared for the tests, temperatures were below- freezing and the air temperature was roughly –30 C◦. The uninhabited steppe was covered with 1.5–2 meters of snow. Strong winds also posed a complication. Barracks for the experimenters were located about 10 km from the target, consisting of two Finnish houses and barracks with storage. The roads from this settlement were buried by snow
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(there were simply no roads). Transportation was conducted using two T-34 tanks. Sergei Zelentsov continues:
The day before and the day of testing, the target region and settlement were covered by fog, which meant that the visual recordings of the nuclear explosion set up several kilometers from the border of the impact site might be compromised. These recordings were a kind of express method of confirming that the explosion had taken place and determine its force with the express method. The cold had done its job: the equipment had frozen.
The right decision was made: they sent me to the border of the impact site on a tank with optical equipment. But there were some small problems with this as well: the tanks would not start because of the cold, and only one of them was finally started in the early morning hours. In addition to the crew, the tank fit only one person – me – and the equipment (film cameras, batteries, a radio set). We drove without any roads and oriented ourselves by the markers sticking out from under the snow, but the tank crew lost the markers and went in the wrong direction. However, after overcoming these worrisome difficulties, we eventually arrived at the border of the impact site in time. By this time, the fog had dissipated and the “center” became visible. After establishing a connection with the launching base, I informed A. Osin, who confirmed the calculated time of the missile launch, and coordinated my further actions to set up the equipment on the tank and maintain an uninterrupted radio connection with him for all of the remaining time right up to the explosion.
“T” time had arrived. A. Osin began the countdown: …three, two, one, zero, bang! It occurred at the calculated time. The recording equipment worked as expected. I informed A. Osin that everything on our end was going as planned. After this, G. Benetsky got on the radio to say that helicopters would be arriving at the impact site in about 1.5–2 hours, which is what happened. I was loaded into one of them along with the equipment; they brought me to the airfield in the city of Aralsk, where a plane was already waiting to take me to Bagorovo (in Crimea), to the 71st Air Force Division. There, the film was developed and color photographs were printed, which allowed me to determine the force of the explosion: approximately 300 tons of TNT equivalent. The following morning, I was in Moscow, at the 6th Department of the Ministry of Defense, where we prepared a presentation for the Central Committee of the USSR and an album with photographs of the explosion.” And so, on February 2, 1956, the first test of an R-5M nuclear warhead missile was launched from the Kapustin Yar missile test range at 10:30 AM Moscow time (State Committee Chairman – Marshal Nedelin). Development of the R-5M missile – the carrier of the nuclear warhead – began in 1953. The framework for its design was a draft of a single-stage R-5 missile, already completed in S. Korolev’s design studio at Scientific Research Institute No. 885 in 1951. During the summer tests conducted in 1953 at the Kapustin Yar facility, R-5 missiles were about 90% reliable: out of 15 missiles, only two did not reach the target. The R-5M nuclear warhead missile traveled
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a distance of 1,200 km through space in under 11 minutes without breaking down or falling in the Aral Karakum region (1). Development continued, and in December 1959, a decision was made to create the Strategic Missile Forces. The first missiles with nuclear components were positioned on alert status in the Baltic and Far East regions. Individuals who made a significant contribution to the development of the nuclear missile system include S. Korolev, V. Mishin, L. Voskresensky, Y. Khariton, N. Petrov, K. Shelkin, S. Kocharyants, E. Negin, N. Dukhov, V. I. Zuevsky, V. Glushko, V. Vizhna, M. Ryazansky, N. Pilyugin, M. Borisenko, V. Kuznetsov, V. Barmin, G. Katkov, A. Goltsman, N. Leykin, V. Petrov, B. Zhdanov, F. Kurbatov, G. Bazhanov, M. Kulakov, P. Khodos, and others.
Radiation in the Aral Karakum Desert One important element of the nuclear explosion in the Aral Desert is its force, which was 0.3 kilotons of TNT equivalent, but certainly not 80 kilotons, as described in the book “The Ecological Dangers of Space Activity” (1999) by cosmonaut and researcher Sergey Krichevsky, who worked under the supervision of Aleksey Yablokov. The attempt to augment the yield of the explosion so significantly is a purely populist move, arguably even a provocation. We can confirm the yield of the explosion was 0.3 kilotons according to official data published in a number of official publications (2, 6). The explosion was detonated on the Earth’s surface. Accordingly, this is used as the source in the assessment of post-explosion radiation conditions, which is very important for radioecologists. This explosion was discussed openly in the press for the first time when the first expert version of the Catalogue of Nuclear Testing in the USSR was presented in September 1994 at the 2nd International Seminar on the RADTEST project in the city of Barnaul (presentation by Anatoliy Matushchenko). The Republic of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Environment and Bioresources asked questions about the radiological consequences of this explosion in the Aral. A detailed answer was given in a statement at the International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in 1998, in the city of Kurchatov — the capital of the former Semipalatinsk test range facility. Its authors (Anatoliy Matushenko (Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy), Vadim Logachev (The Institute of Biophysics State Science Center under Russia’s Ministry of Public Health) and G. Krasilov (Institute of Global Climate and the Environment at the State Committee of Hydrometeorology and the Russian Academy of Sciences) carefully calculated the main properties of the 0.3 kiloton radioactive footprint and assessed the possible doses of radiation, as the initial measurements were not found in the archives. Therefore, the decision was made to use existing design methods to determine the scope and extent of the radioactive pollution in this region (5, 6). As we all know, the baseline data for evaluating radioactive conditions after the surface nuclear explosion are its yield during fission (in this case, 0.3 kilotons), the average wind speed (24 km/hour), and the distance from the epicenter on the axis of the localized radioactive footprint. The results of the calculations helped establish that a surface nuclear explosion on a soft surface (sand) would create a 6–8 m deep crater with a diameter of 20 m. After the explosion, the top of the radioactive cloud at the moment of its stabilization could reach a height of 3–3.5 km, with a horizontal diameter of about 0.4–0.5 km. A radioactive trail may have formed as the result of fallout from the explosion as the cloud moved in the direction of the wind. The main features of this trail, based on
358 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY mathematical modeling, are as follows: the exposure rate at the location at the time the pollution occurs (cGy/hr, R/hr) at varying distances from the epicenter along the trail’s axis: 1 km – 30,000; 2 km – 950; 5 km – 90; 10 km – 10; 20 km – 1.3; 50 km – 0.03 R/hr. In the same location after 10 hours: around 5; 3; 1; 0.2; 0.06 and 0.005 R/hr respectively. The dose at the location before complete radionuclide decay (cGy, R) at the same distances would be 700, 380, 90, 20, 5 and 0.3 R (4). These data prove the small size of the radioactive trace formed in the sand desert. Based on the public health standards in effect in the 1950s and 60s, when the permissible dose level of radiation was 15 R (cGy) per year (4, 5), the danger zone on the territory where the radioactive trail appeared could not be greater than 12–15 km. On desert terrain with shifting sands, the radioactive trail can exist for a short period. Calculations allow us to draw the conclusion that, considering the radioactive decay of the explosion’s products and the shifting sand, the trail would not have been able to last longer than one year. That is to say, the risk of radioactive exposure was negligible. Any expeditions to that region for studies on the radioactive aftermath of this explosion would have yielded absolutely no results (4). There are witnesses to everything that occurs in history. Retired Colonel Alexander Aidin happened to be such an eyewitness, unexpectedly even for us. He was a direct participant in and organizer of the radiological investigation after the explosion, and served for a long time afterwards at the Semipalatinsk’s Radiation Safety Services. He unambiguously confirmed our estimates, putting an end to any speculation regarding this old story: “…at the time of this test, I was the Head of a radiation patrol that operated specifically in the region of the explosion’s epicenter and the neighboring area. As the result of such heavy activity, I received a cumulative dose of radiation equivalent to 18 roentgens, which is on record in the official documents preserved in my archive.” (7). This also concluded the disagreement with A. Yablokov, who was very sensitive to our reproaches regarding the pointless misinformation on the yield of the warhead delivered 50 years ago. In the end, however, the main goal of this brave and risky experiment, where a warhead was delivered to an assigned location with the use of a first-generation missile, was to irrefutably demonstrate that the USSR now also possessed a “nuclear sword.”
References 1. The Nuclear Age. Events, People, Work [Atomniy Vek. Sobitiya, Lyudi, Dela]. Massovo-politicheskoye Publishing. Moscow: Atompressa, 2005. 457: ill. 2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR [Yadernye ispytania SSSR] V. N. Mikhailov. ed. Sarov, Russian Federal Nuclear Center and All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics [RFYaC-VNIIEF], 1997, 286: ill. 3. Strategic Surface Missile Facilities [Strategicheskie raketnye kompleksy nazemnogo bazirovania]. Moscow: Voenniy Parad, 2007. 248: ill. 4. Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Current Radiological Conditions at Test Ranges [Yadernye ispytaniya SSSR. Sovremennoe radiologicheskoe sostoyanie poligonov] / Chapter 8: Missile Launch into the Sands of the Near-Aral Karakum desert [Raketniy pusk v peski Priaralskikh Karakumov] Misc. authors, Professor V. A. Logachev, ed. Moscow: IzdAT, 2002. 639: ill. 5. Report on the Destructive Effects of Nuclear Weapons [Spravochnik po
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porazhayuzhemu deystviyu yadernogo oruzhiya]. Part 2. Identifying and Evaluating the Surface Radiation Conditions [Vyyavlenie i otsenka nazemnoy radiatsionnoy obstanovki]. Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1984. 159. 6. Sanitation Standards in Designing Companies and Laboratories [Sanitarnye normy proektirovaniya predpriyatiy i laboratoriy]. Approved by A. I. Burnazyan on April 11, 1954, and put into force by the USSR Ministry of Defense on November 10, 1954, signed by V. A. Malyshev. 7. Matushenko, A. M. Remembering the Test Range: an Echo of Kapustin Yar in the Karakum Desert. [Vspominaya poligon: ekho Kapustina Yara v pustyne Karakumy], No. 8. Moscow: Atompressa, 2001. 4. 8. Zelentsov, S. A. The Beginning of the Nuclear Missile Era. Recollections of a Participant in the Events. [Nachalo raketno-yadernoy ery. Vospominaniya uchastnika sobytiy] No. 6. Moscow: Atompressa, 2006, 6.
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Evaluating the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Tests in 1954
Vladimir Baskakov President, Green Cross Russia Orenburg Affiliate
The intellect of man created a new world, taming Nature and populating the world with monstrous inventions that began to change man’s environment with the sheer scale of their activity. During the general military exercises that took place in September 1954 at the Totskoye test range in the Orenburg Oblast, a nuclear bomb was detonated. As the result of this explosion, two main zones of pollution took shape: the epicenter area of the explosion and the radioactive trail, spreading 210 kilometers. In addition to radionuclide fallout, the pollution of this area was caused by the products of the neutron-activation of chemical elements contained in the top layer of the soil at the test range. Considering the principles of international environmental law, the situation surrounding the events of the Totskoye nuclear explosion of 1954 deserves special attention from the President, the Government of Russia and the global community. At the center of a densely populated area, a nuclear bomb twice as powerful as the one dropped on Hiroshima was detonated. The impact of the radiation on the Orenburg Oblast is considerably higher than that of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Information in the archives and scientific research confirm the fact that the radiation has had varying degrees of impact on the population, which matches the conservative hypothesis accepted by the global community, under which any small level of radiation increases the probability of negative implications. Over the course of the past 30 years, we have seen a negative trend in key demographic indicators. The birth rate fell 2.6 times, while the mortality rate increased 1.8 times, and the high morbidity rate and death rate among children remain high. According to experts, Russia has the highest levels of radioactive pollution of all the countries in the world. The environmental conditions on the territory of the Totskoye nuclear test have already led to inevitable consequences, not just for the area’s flora and fauna, but for human genetic makeup. This demonstrates the critical role of the government and society in protecting and improving the environment. That means that a variety of different measures need to be taken, with a special focus on legal aspects, in addition to political, economic, and ideological measures. Each branch of Russian law governs the environmental activities of the state to one extent or another, starting from constitutional law and ending with the punitive branches of administrative and criminal law. For the first time in history, Russia’s current Criminal Code now dedicates a separate Section to environmental crimes. In 1981, by special resolution of the UN General Assembly, the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe was adopted, under which “States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity.” A number of international agreements on limiting and prohibiting nuclear weapons testing should
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also be noted: Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) of 1963, the Latin American Nuclear Ban of 1967, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea- Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) of 1971, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1985, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996. The residents of the area used in the Totskoye nuclear test have fulfilled a Biblical mission: they have saved the world from nuclear madness. After the test, many countries came to the conclusion that a nuclear war should never take place — no one would come out on top. A review of legislation on the consequences of nuclear weapons testing at the Totskoye test range speaks to the need to adopt new laws and increase the effectiveness of laws. At present, the entire legal framework is summarized in Order No. 354 issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on August 18, 2005 on the procedures and conditions under which citizens from Special Risk Divisions are to be recognized. The state of protection of today’s generations and future generations against health-damaging factors depends directly on the effectiveness of legal regulations with regard to the response to issues concerning the nuclear weapons test at the Totskoye range. During the Soviet era, health was not a vital priority. Government control over the state of the environment was patently insufficient. Today, we must actively help the population become healthy and rehabilitate polluted lands. An equally important issue is education about radiation conditions, social and medical support for the public who have suffered from the Totskoye nuclear tests in 1954. The development and adoption of new statutory provisions, in addition to conducting nature conservation efforts on polluted territories will help fully assess the extent to which the government is concerned about Russians’ health and the state of the environment. First and foremost, measures for social medicine and environmental protection of the people of the Orenburg Oblast must be put into place. This includes dealing with funding problems: • Diagnostic and preventative healthcare, with a special focus on the immune system, allergies and health and hygiene; • Genetic health passports for each Oblast resident; • High-tech equipment for a center specializing in the immune system, allergies and endocrinology; • Development of the population’s environmental education. For the purpose of improving the economic, environmental, social and medical health of the territory and the residents of Orenburg, the country needs to recognize the Oblast as a zone affected by radiation as a result of the Totskoye nuclear test (addendum to Decree No. 864 of the Russian Government issued December 12, 2004). In their responses to requests to take legislative measures to support those who have suffered from the tests, many agencies point to the need for further studies of the long-term effects of the Totskoye nuclear explosion on the environment and human health. However, none one of these agencies are able to provide even minimal funding for these studies. We are now dealing with a vicious circle: in order to prepare the laws, new studies are needed, but in order to conduct studies, funds are needed and no funds are being allocated. Additional studies are of critical importance, as is the participation of international.
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These steps will help change the government’s attitude toward this very important social problem. There is no doubt about it: the environmental function of the government is one of its primary and most important functions. A solution for the problems stemming from the Totskoye test will facilitate the achievement of environmental safety for all of Russia’s citizens.
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Post-Plenary Discussion on the Consequences of Nuclear Device Testing
– Sergei Baranovsky: I should say a few words in conclusion, because this is a typical example of a topic where we see opposing views of the events that happened during the lives of several generations and the consequences that several generations, apparently, will experience. Here we need to focus on the scientific aspects on both sides. Accusations of politicking or distorting the facts have to be backed up with evidence. On the other hand, the facts that were stated in the last report on the probable impact of the consequences of the Totskoye explosion on the health of the local population and the state of the environment should also be confirmed scientifically. The goal of our Dialogue is to identify different approaches toward events that have become known. I am thankful to our speakers who have for the first time voiced their points of view based on personal experience, but in my opinion, this is insufficiently objective data for establishing a discussion. Each side will remain right where they are, because each is convinced of what he/she has already stated publicly. What is important here is the fact that this information has become open and the property of civil society, and we are now seeing an opportunity to ask questions of representatives of the RosAtom system and our respective local authorities. – Yuriy Sivintsev: As I understand it, the positions of the sides are irreconcilable, and moreover, they are antagonistic, which is the worst part. In order to have a discussion we need to at least respect each other. I would like to say that I, unfortunately, found that many do not know about the international, generalized experience with the assessment of the biological impact of radiation on humans. These works are regularly published in reports from leading scientists around the world under the aegis of the UN General Assembly. They are also published in Russian. These are reports of a scientific committee on the effects of nuclear radiation. A two-volume report was published in 1988–1992 in Russia, and last year another issue was released for the year 2000. These works include everything that we are discussing, including a large section on the only experiment on people — Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is no better basis for discussing these issues. I would like our audience to first read those documents and then, later, based on that scientific foundation, attempt to present an argument. This would prevent starting with a blank slate, as the previous report did, where a lot of emotions run deep, but where there is little evidence. – Vladimir Baskakov: I would like to add something. We published a book in 2006 and I would like to present it. It includes the latest data and research, including some very interesting documents. – Anatoly Matushchenko: There is the Russian Science Commission for Radiation Protection, and papers on the Totskoye tests were reviewed in detail by this commission, but I, as a member of this commission, am prepared to put you in contact with members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor Tsib. He will request that all papers and materials be reviewed one more time at a special meeting and he’ll appoint relevant speakers. Please come and we will see whose side comes out on top. I do not want to be accused of providing unverified information, although it is already published everywhere. As per your request on behalf of the residents of Orenburg, we will set up a special meeting of the Science Commission for Radiation Protection.
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– Anatolii Nazarov: Colleagues! Among those here today, I am one of a handful of radiobiologists, a Doctor of Sciences who has been working in the field of radiation for dozens of years. In our time, we have attempted to discuss the concept of “the Totskoye tests” within our professional circle. It seems to me that we need to identify two moral positions here. The first was expressed by Anatoly Matushchenko. We must respect the great human feats of those who took part in the special risk divisions. This was a huge act of courage. If we do not accept that now, the rest of the discussion will be for nothing. That is the first thing. The second thing is that there is no serious radiobiological data that we can use as a scientific reference point today for situations in which a mass of people have passed through the site of a nuclear bomb explosion and it is clear that we are not going to have that, since these people do not exist. I know other sources, and you have spoken about this, that the position of Marshal Zhukov, the outstanding military leader, was negative. I would not dismiss the last speech from our Orenburg colleague simply because it was emotional. In fact, there is data for the Orenburg Oblast stating that the condition of the participant survivors of the Totskoye test is not all that optimistic. Of course, there is a huge amount of factors at play here, and the issue of small doses, where we don’t know where the lines are. There will never be a definitive answer here, just like there won’t be any data for direct measurements. But the work on shedding light on this problem needs to continue, because there isn’t any open publication anywhere, we have only published half a page from thousands of pages. – Sergei Baranovsky: We will definitely continue this discussion at the next Dialogue. I would like to ask all of our environmentalist colleagues to get ready for this discussion, to select some objective arguments, and be ready to cite precise data. I would like everyone, both environmental activists and nuclear experts, to carefully read the book that was mentioned, so that we can determine a potential platform for a common approach to the consequences of the Totskoye tests.
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A Nuclear Aluminum Investment Project for Balakovo
Anna Vinogradova Head, Balakovo Affiliate of the All-Russian Society for Nature Conservation, Saratov Oblast
In April–May 2007, the Russian government approved a program for Russia’s development of nuclear energy through 2015 (with an outlook to 2020). This program does not envisage the construction of the fifth or sixth reactors for the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). This decision is both founded and appropriate, as the scientific, social and environmental assessment of the project to build the fourth BNPP reactor, which was conducted as per the ruling of the Balakovo City Deputy Council in 1992, found that the introduction of the fourth reactor at the NPP would reach the environmental threshold for Balakovo’s industrial hub (and BNPP). The grounds behind the decision against the construction of these reactors were confirmed by highly qualified experts who conducted a second social and environmental assessment of the BNPP in 2005. The experts’ analysis identified numerous facts indicative of extreme hazards and the economic inadvisability of building the plant’s fifth and sixth reactors and could not guarantee a sufficient level of radiation and environmental safety. According to available information, one of the reasons that the second phase of the BNPP was not included in the nuclear energy development program is the need to build additional power lines stretching 700–800 km in order to transmit the electricity generated from two reactors (with a capacity of 2 million kWt/h). The approximate cost per kilometer of these power lines is USD 1 million, which will increase the expenses of construction immeasurably. Furthermore, the region is not expecting any electricity shortages over the optimal planning period (through 2020). Balakovo is an environmentally polluted city where the atmospheric pollution index has reached 15–20 (high or very high). There are many companies producing environmentally hazardous chemicals, petrochemical products, energy, etc. A dangerous quantity of wastes containing radionuclides is located on-site at the NPP, including a special storage facility for solid and liquid radioactive wastes, storage ponds for holding spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (where it spends three years in storage after every batch of fresh fuel is unloaded), and a storage facility for eight steam generators that wore out before the end of their guaranteed service lives. This is also where sludge deposits that contain radionuclides from cooling ponds are being kept in open storage with no protection against the elements. All of this, save for the SNF, is designated for permanent on- site storage, directly along the banks of the Volga River, just 8 km from a city with a population of 206,000.
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Figure 1. The fourth reactor of the BNPP.
Independent studies of the area indicate the presence of anthropogenic radionuclides in all samples from water, air, soil and plant life. Scientists based in Saratov believe that over years of nuclear tests, nuclear accidents and other nuclear incidents, the background gamma radiation in the area increased 3–4 times from natural levels. It is scientifically proven that low dose radiation and chemical pollution feed off of one another, aggravating the effects on humans and the environment. As a result of these environmentally poor conditions, Balakovo is affected by a high morbidity rate (70%), as well as a high mortality rate (14.1 per 1,000 people). Oncological diseases are among the most frequent among the population. The infant mortality rate is 11.6%. Balakovo’s children suffer from perinatal illnesses (ranked first at 46.2%), birth defects (second at 38.6%) and malignant tumors (ranked third at 7.6%). There has been no response to the appeals of the residents and public organizations requesting aid from the authorities to supply Balakovo with medical diagnostics equipment to help monitor the content and accumulation of radionuclides in the human body. In August 2007, Pavel Ipatov, the Governor of the Saratov Oblast and the former Director of the BNPP announced the beginning of a large-scale and unprecedented nuclear aluminum investment project for the Balakovo Rayon. The Russian Aluminum Company (RUSAL) is expected to invest in the construction of the fifth and sixth NPP reactors at a complex with a high-output aluminum factory with a capacity of 1.050 million tons/year. The placement of new industrial firms in the Balakovo Rayon, with its unclean and unhealthy environmental conditions and a local population in a terrible state of health that is actively protesting the construction of new NPP reactors and the aluminum plant will only lead to the aggravation of the environmental conditions and intensify social tension in the area. The latest data as of December 2007 from the Balakovo City independent institute for sociological studies shows that 80.2% of surveyed residents are concerned about the environmental conditions of the area, and 64% actively speak out against the construction of a nuclear aluminum complex.
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On December 13, 2007, a group of media journalists and correspondents from Saratov and Balakovo visited RUSAL’s Moscow office and its aluminum plant in Sayanogorsk (Khakassia). Russia consumes just 12% of the aluminum produced at the plant, while the remainder is exported. In addition to its plants, RUSAL also owns mines in equatorial countries. Furthermore, in order to gain independence, the company intends to acquire its own power facilities, which is why the proposal coming from the Government of the Saratov Oblast caught the interest of the corporation’s management.
Figure 2. Protest by the residents of Balakovo.
As it turns out, RUSAL is aware of the protests of the Balakovo residents, of the environmentally poor conditions of the area, and of the extremely poor health conditions of the residents. Ms. Vera Kurochkina, the company’s PR Director, confirmed this and stated that the space that the Oblast’s government offered the company is ideal for their needs, and that the plant will be built there. She was unfazed by a question about whether Russian law prohibits private investments in the nuclear industry, since constitutionally, this industry runs under the aegis of the state. Ms. Kurochkina boldly stated that they will either change the legislation or find another way to resolve the issue. Apparently, this is already being accomplished, since Internet sources are reporting that RosEnergoAtom has approved a construction project in the Saratov Oblast for a power and metal- processing complex and is now waiting for investment proposals from RUSAL. No one among those making the decisions is the least bit interested in the opinion of the Balakovo residents. Apparently there are already “tried and true” methods that will again be employed to secure the “consent” of the residents when needed. The population of the city and the rayon, in line with the law, intend to conduct a referendum in the Balakovo municipal rayon on the construction of the aluminum plant. Yet how can the referendum expenses from the local budget be justified, if it is clear that: 1. Russia’s nuclear energy development program does not envisage the construction of the fifth and sixth BNPP reactors; 2. The construction of a nuclear aluminum complex in Balakovo poses an environmental threat to the area, all of Povolzhye and is economically inadvisable for the government; and 3. The announcement of the intent to build this complex in Balakovo has already led to social tension in the region, and stand-off between the residents and the authorities is growing, which is not contributing to stability in the region?
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The way in which this issue is ultimately resolved, in the opinion of many Balakovo residents, will demonstrate whose interests are protected by the authorities: the health and safety of the population or the profits of the privately-owned RUSAL.
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The Uranium Tailing Pit in Tien Shan and Environmental Consequences for the Local Population
Igor Khodjamberdiev Coordinator of the Toxic Action Network for Central Asia and Co-Chairman of the International Social-Ecological Union, Kyrgyz Republic
Tien Shan and Pamir were the sites of uranium piles in the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s. Order of Stalin awards were given out to 17 scientists and engineers for contributing to the development of the uranium industry in the region. There are still dozens of old Soviet uranium repositories in Tien Shan and Pamir. Unfortunately, in the 1960s, obsolete methods were used to store uranium waste. Uranium tailings paste was left in mountain gorges, covered with a thin layer of sand and about 6–10 meters of soil. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a special security service that prevented any human or animal contact (with the exception of miners) with the uranium tailings. But this system was discarded in the early 1990s. Today, we have not found any protective services in the areas in question (see Figures 1–3). There are 48 uranium tailing pits in Tien Shan, which contain hazardous radioactive compounds. In Kyrgyzstan alone, the volume is 70 billion m3, with an activity level of 5,500 Ci. In the Mailuu-Suu Valley in 1958 and 1994, several accidents involving breach took place. The health-related hazards are considerable, particularly for those using the land illegally. The soil and the water have significant uranium concentrations, and in several places the radon content in the air is very high.
Figure 1. The former uranium combine along the Mailuu-Suu River.
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Figure 2. A valley settlement below a uranium tailings pit.
This article will address our observations in the most hazardous zone of uranium pollution.
Figure 3. Illegal scrap metal collectors at the tailing pit.
Study Materials and Methods Radiometric equipment manufactured in the USSR was used to detect radiation, namely a SRP-68-01 radiometer with a BTGI-01 sensor, which registered gamma radiation at a discrimination level of 20 keV and a range of up to 3000 μR/hr. The trace quantity of radioactive elements was measured using a JMS-01-BM2 mass spectrometer with gas chromatography (with participation of the Ilim independent laboratory under the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Organic Chemistry under the
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Russian Academy of Sciences). We applied a mathematical comparison to identify zones and sub-zones based on health and environmental conditions and the original eco-geographical classification of the territory. Previous (latent) manifestations of health conditions were assessed based on original, tested surveys. Health conditions were examined among the adults living in polluted areas, including pregnant women, and infants. Tests to determine health conditions included: surveying expecting mothers (latent illnesses), an evaluation of the pregnancy on the Apgar scale, an assessment of depression symptoms, a polygraph analysis recording changes in the cardiovascular system, an examination of the kidneys (residual ammonia, creatinine clearance), an analysis of the blood from the liver, for example measuring glucose, cholesterol, asparagine transaminase enzyme and alanine transaminase (ALT) content. Other tests included gel immunodiffusion (the Mancini technique), a count of the number of E and M lymphocyte rosettes, theophylline incubation, etc. It was found that in the observation areas, latent illnesses are widespread among pregnant women. Early stages of diseases are usually not officially registered as medical statistics. A chemical analysis of human blood samples (measuring glucose, cholesterol, asparagine transaminase enzyme and alanine transaminase (ALT) content) was conducted under the new management of the International Association of Chemical Analysts.
Results and Discussion Uranium tailings in Mailuu-Suu are in the form of sludge. Sludge tailing piles numbers 3, 7, 8 and 18 contain 0.1–0.15% uranium (the result of incomplete uranium extraction technology used in 1950–1960). High content of other toxic agents were also found in the sludge (copper, cobalt, chromium, molybdenum and zinc). Our study has shown that the most hazardous uranium content in soil is found in the outskirts of tailing pit number 3 in the Mailuu-Suu district, where uranium concentration reached 35×10-6 g/g at a depth of one meter from the surface. That is 35–50 times higher compared to the general trend in the area. It is likely that as a result of landslides and ground water movement uranium and the other toxic agents named above have made their way onto the fields and into plant life. Our preliminary studies showed that uranium content in grassy plants (based on dry weight) in Mailuu-Suu is widely varied, but sometimes it is very significant. For example, 2.29±0.03 × 10-6 g/g in Taeniatherum crinitum and 2.27×10-6 g/g in Aegilops triuncialis, while levels are lower in Cotoneaster suavis (0.28 ± 0.001 × 10-6 g/g). The highest rates of accumulation in grass have been noted in plants with a powerful root system. Feed is one source of substances from which animal organisms are built (cows and camels), and consequently a source of contamination of meat and milk. the current situation could lead to the development of chronic illnesses both among animals and humans. One clear symptom of damaged health among the local residents was disrupted liver function (Figure 4). Lamb meat contained 1.2±0.15 mg/kg of uranium in the Min-Kush area, and 0.06±0.0002 mg/kg in Mailuu-Suu. Beef and cow’s milk in Min-Kush contained 2.27±0.031 (P<0.05) and 0.107±0.001 (P <0.05) mg/kg in green weight. The skin, horns and hooves of lambs in Mailuu-Suu contained 0.183±0.007 (P<0.05) mg/kg of uranium. The meat of domestic animals is the only source of protein for the local population. Uranium content in human teeth was measured (in Mailuu-Suu): baby teeth – 0.481±0.002 × 10-6 g/g, and in elderly groups from 0.7684 × 10-6 g/g to 0.6876 × 10-6 g/g (P<0.05).
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Table 1. Uranium Storage Areas in Mailuu-Suu, Kyrgyzstan Exposure dose Year Put into Volume, Name and Place min./max. Storage thou. m3 (µR/hr) No. 2a, Ailampa 1967 85 20/40 No. 2b, Ailampa 1967 65 20/40 No. 3, Izolit 1954–58 110–150 20/800 No. 4, Ailampa ? 115 25/330 No. 5, Mailuu-Suu, right riverbank ? 111 20/400 No. 6, same location 1970 35 15/30 No. 7, same location 1958 600 15/55 No. 8, same location ? 90 15/30 No. 9a, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank ? 115 30/60 No. 9b, same location ? 50 40/70 No. 10, Mailuu-Suu, right ? 70 20/30 riverbank No. 12, Ailampa-sai ? 62 20/30 No. 13, same location ? 40 30/360 No. 14, same location ? 99 15/30 No. 15, Sudzhet-sai ? 47 15/90 No. 16, Ashvaz-sai 1968 303 16/20 No. 17, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank Destroyed by landslides in 1994 No. 18, next to number 3 ? 3 25/800 No. 19, Mailuu-Suu, left riverbank ? 1 15/25 No. 20a, Mailuu-Suu, right ? 1 15/25 riverbank No. 20b, same location ? 2 18/85 No. 22, Mailuu-Suu, right riverbank ? 2.2 25/18
Several diseases were found among the population both in early and advanced stages in two sections of the Mailuu-Suu Rayon, where uranium mining was conducted for a long time. It was established that undetected illnesses in early stages are very widespread among the local residents, but that illnesses in early stages were not taken into account in official medical statistics.
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Figure 4. The balance of enzymes (intra- and extracellular) indicating damaged human liver cell membranes in Mailuu-Suu.
Uranium content (in soil, plants and teeth) on the one hand, and disrupted liver function among local residents and the consequences thereof (tachycardia, migraines, insomnia) on the other hand, must be related. Laboratory analyses have identified hyper- erythrocythemia, neutropenia, monocytosis, lymphocytosis, and low total protein levels in blood. The low level of immune system function among the region’s residents was also evident (lymphocytes, blood proteins, etc.) A recent article is based on an extensive three-year study on migration in the environment, including effects on human skin. Childhood illnesses were 55–67% more common in the affected areas. We have found a confirmed correlation (from r=0.72 to r=0.80) between the concentration of pollutants and disease markers (liver enzymes, thyroid function, and leukocyte count). Ethnic factors (the region features Mongols (Kyrgyz), Caucasians peoples (Turks), Slavs, and mixes of these genetic groups) do not influence the results. Newborns and young children are the most sensitive, therefore impaired immune system function will contribute to the spread of diseases.
Conclusion An assessment was conducted regarding the links between uranium-polluted waters (resulting from seepage in areas close to tailing pits) and human health conditions. Perhaps total removal of resistant mutagenic pollutants from the environment is impossible. But we must continue to make all possible efforts toward this goal.
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Muslyumovo: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
Milya Kabirova Techa Environmental Organization, Chelyabinsk
The village of Muslyumovo is in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Some of you may be wondering whether this village in the Urals isn’t getting too much attention. It all started 17 years ago in 1991. Then-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin signed into law bills concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe. That was when public attention turned to certain communities in the Urals and their residents, who had been adversely affected by the nuclear industry. In 1993, a federal law was passed on social assistance for citizens affected by the consequences of the 1957 radiation accident at the Mayak plant and the radioactive waste being flushed by the plant into the Techa River. An official list of affected communities was compiled. In 1994, a government decree added both the village and the station of Muslyumovo to the list of population centers where the average annual effective dose equivalent is greater than 1mSv. That same year, in November, the Head of the Chelyabinsk Oblast administration signed an order to resettle the residents of Muslyumovo Village and Station in the Kunashak Rayon, but nothing happened. No one started the resettlement process. Three years later, in July 1997, Pyotr Sumin, the re-elected governor of the Chelyabinsk Oblast, issued a new decree on the resettlement of the residents of Muslyumovo Village and Station in the Kunashak Rayon to replace the first one, considered expired. Voluntary resettlement lists were then compiled of residents in Muslyumovo Village and Station, with those living in houses along the Techa River at the top of the lists. By that time, the Federal Target Program (FTP) for the social and radiation rehabilitation of local residents and territories of the Urals region that had been adversely affected by operations at the Mayak Plant had been drafted. The FTP was scheduled through the year 2000 and financing of the program has begun. The rayon and village administration were consulted over the choice of new site for the villages and the resettlement process began. Some families bought apartments in Chelyabinsk, private homes were built for others in Kunashak. The building designs for these homes were such that the houses were uninhabitable in the winter. I know a large family where some of the children discovered that, while they slept, their pajama tops would freeze to the wall by morning. They didn’t know how to keep their new homes warm. Water would freeze in the basement and the governor sent his representatives to deliver oil heaters in person. But the most bizarre and incomprehensible part to us was the fact that the new site selected for resettlement of those who had lived right along the river was just a little further from the river, on the other shore, closer to the woods. They had done everything: they built good housing, invested a lot of money from the federal budget, and provided
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the people with all of the benefits and compensation that come with living in a polluted zone. But we just couldn’t figure out: If you are going to spend so much money, why not resettle people onto clean land? They finally resettled more or less all residents of one riverfront street and never got to the second one. They probably ran out of money. That’s how things stayed for nine years, until 2006. In July 2006, RosAtom Director Sergei Kiriyenko visited Mayak. The visit agenda included a meeting to discuss the Techa reservoir system, the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents, and the construction of the South-Urals Nuclear Power Plant. Mr. Kiriyenko was accompanied by Petr Latyshev, the Presidential representative for the Urals Federal Okrug, Pyotr Sumin, the Governor of the Chelyabinsk Oblast, Vladimir Grachev and Mikhail Grishankov, both Duma Deputies, and Vitalii Sadovnikov, General Director of Mayak. The agenda item that was discussed in the greatest detail was the resettlement of Muslyumovo residents. Vladimir Dyatlov, the Governor’s First Deputy, brought up two options: 1. Resettlement to a new location of the entire village, or 741 households, at a cost of approximately RUB 1.8 billion. 2. Resettlement of the residents of the two riverfront streets and the junction, at a cost of RUB 500 million. In his comments on the presentation, Sergei Kiriyenko stated that RosAtom is ready to allocate RUB 600 million and that Governor Pyotr Sumin would allocate RUB 450 million. The money was real and the first transfers could start as early as the following month. He also said that people had to be given options. Here is one million rubles for housing. You can use it to have a house be built for you in a place of your choosing, or you can take that million and go wherever it is you need to go. However, the main condition was that this transaction comprised a purchase agreement of the original house, to be torn down and bulldozed. The land would then be planted over and rehabilitated. All of the decisions on RosAtom’s end had already been made and they were prepared to start making payments starting in the fall of 2006. Those who will want to take just the monetary compensation could do it within a few months. Those who choose to move into a new home would have to do so by 2008 at the latest. And so it was decided. During his next visit, in October 2006, the RosAtom Director and the Oblast Governor signed the timeline for addressing environmental problems of the Techa River and the social issues associated with the Muslyumovo Village and Station residents. At that same time, the Resettlement Assistance Fund for the Residents of Muslyumovo Village, Kunashak Rayon, the Chelyabinsk Oblast, a not-for-profit organization, was created. The Fund operated under an agreement with Mayak to carry out the instructions of the corresponding government decree from October 19, 2006. On November 28, 2006, the Fund’s Board passed a resolution on the procedure for buying out the residential homes from resident owners in Muslyumovo Village. According to this resolution, the resident buyout agreement can be concluded if: 1. Ownership rights to the home are in order; 2. The home is located within the administrative boundaries of Muslyumovo Village; 3. The home is residence-worthy (walls, windows, roof). RosAtom funds were used to set up an Information Center at the village, complete with office
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equipment, and lawyers who were supposed to work at the Center to advise the residents on any issues that may arise and assist in the drawing up of buyout applications. In order to submit an application, a Muslyumovo resident had to decide on the resettlement package and bring a set of documents to the Information Center. These documents had to include: • Proof of state registration of ownership rights to the residence in question; • Certification of legal basis for acquiring the property; • A home inspection report; • Proof of ownership of the lot by the owner of the home; • Proof of no arrears on utilities payments or taxes at the time of application submission. Within 30 days of application submission, the Fund’s authorized representative (staff member) makes a decision regarding the buyout agreement or provides specific reasons why no such agreement can be made. The Fund must inform the applicant of its decision within three days. The initial refusal is not final and the applicant may resubmit the application to the Fund after addressing the reasons for the refusal. The Fund makes the resettlement payment available in three ways: 1. The Fund pays monetary compensation (RUB 1 million), if the individual has a residence in a locality other than Muslyumovo. In this case, the individual must provide the Fund proof of ownership rights to that property and a document certifying legal basis for its acquisition (purchase and sale agreement, exchange agreement, etc.). 2. The Fund pays for a new residence to be purchased by the individual in a different locality. In this case, a three-way purchase and sale agreement is concluded. The Fund pays the buyout sum for the new housing. In the event that the cost of the new housing is less than one million rubles, the difference is deposited into the applicant’s bank account. 3. The Fund pays a contractor to build a new home for the applicant in New Muslyumovo. In this case the applicant may choose a house design from among the ones provided by the Fund. It seems like a straightforward process that offers several options. People have a choice, except that New Muslyumovo will be built on the same exact territory as the old village, just next to the Muslyumovo Station. Muslyumovo Station residents have all the same papers and receive the same (miserly) benefits and compensations as any other resident living on land with radiation pollution. When the people being resettled started to object, the authorities said: “Don’t you understand? This option is in your favor. We are leaving you all your benefits and compensations for living on polluted land.” So the residents asked again: “Why does the government want to spend billions just to keep us living on polluted land?” As of today, according to Maria Sobol, Head of the Environmental Safety and Environmental Protection Commission under the Public Chamber of the Chelyabinsk Oblast, 54 buyout agreements have been drawn up and honored (RUB 1 million each). However, over 150 houses have been built at New Muslyumovo. That is to say, the agreements have not been drawn up, but the houses have already been built. What happens if a person makes a different choice and asks for monetary compensation instead? The 54 home owners in New Muslyumovo account for just 7% of the total population to be
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resettled. The infrastructure of the new village will also require an additional RUB 450 million from the Oblast treasury. Does this mean the investment is at the rate of over RUB 8 million per agreement? There are also doubts over how clean the territory is. Perhaps it is clean now, before the residents move in, but, trust me, after several years the [radiation] measurements will be completely different. This is because the livestock and poultry will be going to the river. The best meadows are along the river banks and the locals simply have no better option. The Muslyumovo Station has yards where the radiation background measures over 120 μR/hr, instead of the permitted 17–20 μR/hr. The same will happen at the new site in a few years! The drinking water does not meet the SanPiN 2.1.4.1074-01 Standard’s requirements in terms of total alpha and beta activity levels, opacity, and color. There is an official Directive from the Chelyabinsk RosPotrebNadzor—the consumer protection agency— to immediately stop using drinking water from underground sources in Muslyumovo Village and Station and to organize an external supply of drinking water. However, nothing was done about it. The residents, uninformed, continued to use the water as usual. In response to our insistent questions, the local Administration said that supposedly they had plugged up any wells that contained radioactive water. My question was: where did they get any other kind of wells? They said that they had dug new ones in New Muslyumovo. However, there is no guarantee that the ground waters feeding these wells are not the same in both places, given that the distance between the new and old village is so small. These are the concerns of those who did make up their minds and decided to stay in the village. Meanwhile, if a person decided to get his million rubles and leave the village behind, according to RosAtom Director this can be done in just one month. Clearly this is the most reasonable solution. In that case the applicant would need to submit the necessary paperwork showing that he has housing available at another locality. This way he would keep some belongings and won’t be left out in the cold, but what is really going on here? At the Information Center the staff started requiring that individuals have permanent residency in Muslyumovo. At the same time an Inventory Commission, created by decree of Tanir Yanbaev, Head of the Kunashak Rayon, is hard at work. New lists are being compiled, which include the new residents at their discretion, but those who were previously in the old lists, which included 741 households, are excluded. The Commission explains this by saying that the people in question are not actually residing in their homes at the time of the inventory. It was getting to the point where, if the snow was piling up in the front yard and no smoke was coming out of the chimney, they would say the house was uninhabited. They went through the properties, checking if the owners had stocked up on coal and firewood, and when they found nothing, the residents were out of luck: you were crossed off the list and no one at the Center was going to sign a buyout agreement with you, regardless of whether you had all the papers in order and this was your property. It smacked of 1937. People started panicking. They would sit at home all day, waiting for the Commission members, stoking their stoves, and leaving notes on their doors whenever they stepped out reading: Went to Kunashak, Went to the hospital. The most persistent were told by the Inventory Commission that the right to
378 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY conclude agreements lay with the Resettlement Fund while the lists being drawn up by the commission were only for recommendation purposes. The result was a vicious cycle. Luckily, there is such a thing as the rule of law, so people started turning to the courts to help resolve the resulting problems with concluding sale-purchase agreements. With the court’s assistance, a person hopes he can leave the village behind without abandoning his belongings and property. The government had guaranteed resettlement and created the Resettlement Fund, opened the Information Center, and drafted documents signed by the top people in the country and the oblast, all for this purpose. However, even a court ruling in favor of the home owner means nothing. The reason for this is that your buyout agreement, where in exchange for RUB 1 million your property is razed, is concluded with the not-for-profit Resettlement Assistance Fund for the Residents of Muslyumovo Village, and the Fund can do whatever it pleases. I can give many examples. In one case, 16 months had passed since the first contact with the Information Center and the elderly couple, themselves invalids, went to submit the paperwork, accompanied by two representatives of the Techa Environmental Organization and a representative of the regional office of the Lawyers’ Association, carrying a video camera and a voice recorder. This was just to submit the document for consideration, not to sign the agreement itself. The Fund’s top staff member was not very welcoming. She did however, after consulting with someone by phone, accept the documents for consideration. But first, she ordered the applicants to renew a bunch of the documents since they had expired. Of course they had expired! Almost a year and a half had passed! As we left, we politely thanked her for being so helpful. She grimaced in response, saying that the acceptance of the documents meant nothing. Her words verbatim: “IT’S NOT A DONE DEAL” We were bewildered. What could that mean? Is our entire existence to be spent fighting? What is the point of all these agreements, decrees, laws, timetables, if one person already decided that you WILL live on polluted land to the end of your days.
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Environmental Aspects of Radiation Safety near the Kirovo- Chepetsk Chemical Combine
Tamara Ashikhmina Director, Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring, Vyatka State Humanitarian University; President, Green Cross Russia Kirov Affiliate
A large radiochemical company has been in operation in the town of Kirovo- Chepetsk (Kirov Oblast), near the Vyatka River, for ten years. This was a nuclear fuel cycle enterprise and the largest source of radioactive chemical waste in Europe. In 1944, this company was the first in Russia to produce hydrofluoric acid, and it was there that operations continued for a long time producing hexafluoride and uranium tetrafluoride by fluorinating uranium metal and uranium oxide. It was also here that it became possible to achieve a reaction without adding chlorine as a catalyst. The territory of the Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine measures 4.5 × 4.5 km2 (20.25 km2) and is located south of the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk, near the floodplain terrace of the Vyatka River (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The location of the Combine sludge dumps in the town of Kirov.
The western end of the chemical combine’s industrial zone is adjacent to a territory along the upper floodplain and first terrace above the floodplain of the Vyatka River that is used to store radioactive waste (RW, radwaste). The combine’s industrial zone features eight storage facilities for radwaste, storing a total of 784,500 tons. The accumulated mass of radwaste has reached a total radioactivity of 1,176.7 Ci. The wastes contain: 238-235U, 232Th, 239Pu, 240,60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs and several short-lived 134Cs isotopes and their fission products. The storage facilities for radioactive and other toxic wastes are within the boundaries of the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk, within 2 km from the residential zone. The chemical combine and its storage facilities are just 1.5–3.0 km from the Vyatka River.
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The Elkhovka River flows to the northwest across the entire territory; this river is used as a collector for dumping industrial and storm sewage from the Combine and flows into the Prosnoye Lake in the west of the territory. Also in the area near the Combine, there are a large number of swamps and ground waters are very close to the surface (Figure 2). At low summer levels, the soil water can be found at a depth of 1.5–3.5 meters, while in the swampy depressions it comes very close to the surface. Ground water flows primarily east to west, away from the chemical combine’s storage facilities and towards the Vyatka River. The water table feeds deeper formations in this area, determining the natural and industrial resources of the ground waters they contain. Most of the soil water is discharged in the Vyatka River, and partially in the floodplain lakes of the Elkhovka River. Its mineralization from natural chemical composition changes from 0.08 to 0.34 g/L. When the water table is high, some of the territory is subject to flooding by the surface waters from the Vyatka River. Another negative physical and geological factor is the area’s seismic activity.
Figure 2. The runoff collector at the Combine.
Currently, this is a large chemical combine that uses special technology to manufacture complex fertilizers, ammonium, nitric acid, chloride, and lye. The Combine also includes Russia’s largest polymer plant, where 96% of all Russian fluorocarbon polymers are produced. Despite the fact that the Combine has not dealt with nuclear fuel cycle issues for over 60 years it remains one of the most worrisome sources of potential environmental pollution due to the fact that radioactive and toxic substances have been detected in soil waters, soil, bottom sediments and waterways located near the radioactive waste storage
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facilities. Alpha-active nuclides (plutonium and uranium) have polluted nearly 17.5 hectares at an average density of 0.7 Ci/km2, and 137Cs has polluted nearly 53 hectares at a pollution density of up to 50 Ci/km2. It is possible that radionuclides may pollute soil waters due to the long service live of the storage facilities. The chemical combine’s premises and the waste storage facilities are located in the second belt of Kirov’s health protection zone, where nearly 600,000 people reside. The population of the town of Kirov gets its drinking water primarily from the Vyatka River. Data from monitoring soil water, soil and bottom sediments near the bed of the Elkhovka River in previous years pointed to radioactive pollution in specific lower areas, which was the result of dumping radioactive materials. For a more in-depth and independent assessment of the radioactive conditions in the Kirovo-Chepetsk and Kirov zone, samples have been taken from the bottom sediments of the rivers and lakes near the Combine (the Elkhovka and Prosnitsi rivers) and near these cities. The gross uranium content is generally low, and in most cases lower than 2.5 g/T (dry weight) with maximum concentrations reaching 4.5–6 g/T seen in the lower and middle currents of the Elkhovka River, and further along the current where the solid radioactive waste storage facilities are located. In addition to gross uranium, mobile uranium and the general mineralization of aqueous extract were also measured. In most cases, mobile uranium content amounts to (1.9–4.6) × 10-6 g/L in four points of the lower currents of the Elkhovka River, where gross uranium content reaches a maximum of 4.5–6.0 g/T and mobile uranium increases up to (24.0–30.6) × 10-6 g/L. These are also the spots where very high mineralization has been observed (210–230 mg/L). As a result, one could state that there is some uranium pollution of the bottom sediments, presumably from the RW storage facilities. More specifically, the source of the pollution can be identified by testing bottom sediments for radioactive isotope content (90Sr, 137Cs, and 60Co or 239Pu and 235U). In all samples, thorium content was low and did not exceed 5–7 g/L. Water at two control points (the water intakes for the cities of Kirov and Kirovo- Chepetsk) is annually tested for 90Sr and 137Cs content. Both intakes are located within the zone of potential impact from the Combine’s industrial waste (see Figure 3) and the waste from the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant. In line with Russian Government Decree No. 484 (dated April 19, 2007) and the procedures approved by Decree No. 594 of the Russian Government (June 26, 1995) for preparing and implementing federal target programs and interstate target programs in which Russia participates, the Federal Target Program for Ensuring Nuclear and Radioactive Safety in 2008 with an outlook to 2015 was drafted. The plans for this program involve efforts in five different areas. The second area, “practical solutions for problems related to past activities,” includes, in addition to a number of other measures, ensuring safety in handling previously accumulated radwaste and rehabilitation of territories, buildings and structures contaminated by radiation. This project focuses on the Combine, the past operations of which were connected to its role in the nuclear fuel cycle as Europe’s largest source of radioactive chemical waste.
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Figure 3. The Konstantinov Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine.
There are three decrees passed by the Oblast Administration currently in force in our region aimed at regulating radiation safety, including radiation monitoring efforts: one on introducing radiation health passports for companies and territories in the Oblast, one on ensuring the radiation safety of the population, and another on the further development of public health monitoring. Each decree has approved targeted action programs. Radiation monitoring in the region began back in 1961, when the health and medical service began to analyze the indicators of the frequency of x-ray procedures and dosage rates received by the population during these procedures. Since the 1960s, ongoing studies have been examining atmospheric precipitation and the air. Since 1990, monitoring has been held to observe the gamma exposure rate at open areas (the gamma background) throughout the entire territory (see Figure 4). Considering that the main rivers — the Vyatka and the Cheptsa — supply drinking water for the towns of Kirov and Kirovo-Chepetsk, a comprehensive evaluation of the potential pollutant content in the natural resources and an examination of the impact of pollutants on the ecosystem and human health are crucial. In order to ensure representative monitoring of the water systems of these rivers, additional research examining water reservoirs is needed in addition to selecting the key parameters for monitoring the natural environment and facilities. At present, a great deal of work has been completed. The pollution of the land is local. The radiation conditions are monitored by the Oblast’s GosSanEpidNadzor Center and the Oblast Center for hydro-meteorology and environmental monitoring. Studies that are part of the territory radiation monitoring program needs to be prepared and put into practice.
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Figure 4. Gamma background fluctuations in the town of Kirov.
In order to ensure environmental sustainability of the natural resources, as well as the safety and health of local residents in the central areas of the Oblast, we have developed a comprehensive environmental monitoring program for the areas near the Combine. A systemic approach has been adopted as the methodological framework and the focus will be on examining the state of natural resources in the area impacted by the radioactive waste storage facilities. This system should serve as a set of subsystems: controlling and monitoring sources of anthropogenic effects of radwaste storage facilities, environmental monitoring and monitoring the health of local residents. The tasks of each would vary depending on the agency, yet they should be organized into a common body. The system is founded on the principles of integration, structural unity, priority parameters, analysis methods, the location of monitoring sites, and mandatory scientific support for all stages of work. Furthermore, we envisage the creation of monitoring subsystems based on specific methods: comparison, responsiveness, continuity, sensitivity, and forecasting. The organization of these subsystems should provide for the systematic registration and control of indicators relating to the state of the health of local residents and the state of the natural environment, predictions of potential changes, the preparation of recommendations and proposals to reduce and prevent radiation from affecting the natural resources in the area, and monitoring the effectiveness of the actions underway to normalize environmental conditions. One of the main issues — and one of the most complex — concerning comprehensive monitoring of the territory near this kind of chemical plant is determining the most important parameters for chemical pollutants for establishing cause-and-effect relations between anthropogenic effects and the ability of the natural ecosystem to reproduce its structure and functions. Priority parameters ought to be defined for all of the components of the natural environment, and along these lines it will be necessary to conduct monitoring of the air, the state of the soil, bodies of water on the surface, bottom sediments, ground,
384 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY soil water and drinking water, and woodland and meadow plant life. An important element in organizing a comprehensive environmental monitoring system is its efficient special structure, i.e., determining the best, most informative locations for setting up monitoring points, key areas, and observation wells within the territory affected by the facility. In selecting key areas, one must consider all of the options of potential radiation effects caused by radwaste: its position, the direction of the wind, the distance of the storage facility from the river and residential housing, and the density of forest cover on the territory. It would be wise to compare indicators of the health of the local residents with that of the residents of a different territory with similar background and population levels for the purposes of achieving an accurate statistical evaluation. Since 2000, the biomonitoring laboratory under the Institute of Biology at the Komi Scientific Center, part of the Russian Academy of Sciences Urals Branch, and VyatGGU have been studying the soil, flora and fauna and precipitation (snow), surface waters and bottom sediments near the Combine. The studies involve active use of bio-indication and bio-testing techniques. Research has been completed on mercury content, fluoride content, and strontium content in the local flora. Undertaking a variety of different tasks as part of carrying out a comprehensive environmental monitoring program will help develop scientifically-founded, long-term predictions regarding the state of the health of local residents and the environment in the area surrounding this source of radioactive pollution.
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Nuclear “Red Herrings” Along the Eurasian Canal
Vladimir Lagutov Chairman, Green Don Environmental Movement, Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast
The latest campaign for a new, massive project led by the heirs of Russia’s original “conquerors of nature” aims to construct a Eurasian canal from the Caspian Sea to the Azov Sea. This project has the very specific goal of destroying everything that lives within the Southern Federal District (SFD). This can be seen from the intentions of Russia’s senior-most leaders, who mean to have it out with the environment once and for all using an elections campaign involving the Government Council and Russia’s Security Council. It can also be gleaned from the behavior of administrative officials. In fact, their intent is to fool the public to get exactly what they want. You can judge for yourselves. In the lower Don River and the lower Volga, we have observed degraded floodplains, destroyed river ecosystems, destroyed migration routes used by fish, and the slow death of the Azov and Caspian seas. We can add the loss of these two to the loss of the Aral Sea. The service life of the hydropower generating complexes that were built to regulate these rivers expired long ago and they ought to be either dismantled or rebuilt. The water resources are fully claimed by water consumers and further river operations will require transferring water from the Volga to the Don and to the Volga from the Northern slope of Russia’s European territory — projects that had been suspended as too environmentally hazardous. The number-one water consumer on the list of environmental threats against river ecosystems are power companies in general, and nuclear power plants in particular. The oil and gas sector is another interested party when it comes to these types of construction projects and has gone mad from the savagery of the profits market. Its companies have been exploiting the ecosystems of the Caspian and the Azov for exploratory works, oil extraction, shipment via water and pipeline transport in a way that does not take the interests of the people into consideration. The illegal launch of the first reactor of the Rostov NPP is an environmental crime, as it stands in the way of resolving the issue of dismantling and rehabilitating the Tsimlyansk hydropower plant on the Don River, which is both obsolete and decrepit. Nevertheless, the Rostov Oblast and Russian authorities are preparing for the launch of the second Rostov NPP reactor, this one not reliant on water from the Don but rather on water transferred from the Volga. In order to ensure sufficient water supply, [the authorities] are doing everything in their power to steamroll the option to build the Volga-Don-2 canal, which falls neatly within the interests of the oil mafia, as it is seeking to double oil tanker traffic by doubling their tonnage from 5,000 to 10,000. A new shipping lock has already been built and put into operation at the Kochetovsk hydropower complex accommodating the doubled dimensions of the tanker fleet. All that is left to do is to launch the twinned lock of the Volga-Don-2
386 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY shipping canal to accommodate doubled tanker tonnage of up to 10,000 tons. Moreover, the entire Administration of the Rostov Oblast is petitioning for the soonest-possible launch of two additional reactors at the Rostov NPP (numbers 3 and 4), as evidenced not only by their election speeches, but by the election speeches made by Russia’s upper hierarchy. Here, one should bear in mind that economic arguments in favor of the project are based on the findings of an independent environmental assessment and the Rostov NPP environmental impact assessment, which imply that there is some sort of short-lived return on investment (ROI) for the Rostov NPP — but only if there are at least six operational reactors. If it takes 30 years or more to complete construction, the project will no longer be viable. In order to shift public attention away from the nuclear adventures on the Don River, the “next Panama” project is being aggressively promoted: the Eurasian Canal from the Caspian to the Azov that will transport oil via a shorter route thanks to the total destruction of the last remaining ecosystems in the SFD and the desertification of Kalmykia and the Manych Depression. Naturally, during future investigations, it will become obvious that the oil deposits will have been exhausted by the time the construction of the canal is finished, and that the situation will need to be rectified by the launch of the Volga-Don-2. Shortly after, they will recommence the transfer of water from northern rivers in order to save the lower Volga. The fact is that the true goal here is to destroy the river ecosystems and the entire environment of the SFD, and we can see that from the actions of RAO UES, the energy monster, with its rate policy and the degradation of the SFD, the refusal even of the idea of recultivating and reviving the Don and the Volga, which they killed, by ignoring the Declaration on Fishing. The report of the Legislative Assembly of the Rostov Oblast to the public reads: “ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.” The President’s address described the largest structural reform in the last decade. Essentially, what we are talking about is the second largest power supply project in the nation’s history. There are plans to increase Russia’s electricity generation by two-thirds by 2020. In order to do this, the government and private companies will invest about RUB 12 trillion. In the next 12 years, Russia plans to build 26 [nuclear] power plants using the latest technologies. Considering the plans for the socioeconomic development of the Rostov Oblast and Russia’s south by 2020, the political party United Russia has reviewed ways for developing the NPP in Volgodonsk and ensuring its reliable and safe operation. The party came to the following conclusions: • The construction of the third and fourth reactors of the Rostov NPP is necessary, and it must be done by the deadlines set out in the Federal Target Program for Developing Russia’s Nuclear Power Industry in 2007–2010, with an outlook to 2015 (2010–2015); • Discuss RosAtom’s participation in financing the development of a comprehensive system for the use of water resources in the Don River basin. Then, without any qualms, we see the phrase: “The United Russia Party has taken control of the process of restoring irrigated farming at minimum to regain lost capacity.” At one time, for the sake of the light bulb, all of the rivers of the European part of the USSR were destroyed. Likewise, the “builders of Communism” received one light bulb as part of pension payments if they were recognized veterans of labor and had damaged
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their health in the process. For example, victims of repressions that supplied the labor for these projects were rewarded with a standard allotment of 28 kWt/hrs per month, which means just a few hours of light from that light bulb each day. And here we see the task set by the President: increase electricity generation by three times. One might be inclined to ask why, if in the beginning of the Dark Ages we had more than enough energy to power Russia’s industries, [are we now] the most energy-hungry in the world? We need to bear in mind that industry has decreased by 70% as well since the beginning of perestroika. In other words, only 15% of the energy produced is for our own needs. They will destroy the entire biosphere for peanuts. They don’t even understand that no modern technologies exist for 26 NPP reactors, they haven’t even figured out how to reprocess their waste and use a closed cycle, either for fuel or for water. The level of technical illiteracy is shocking among regional deputies who don’t know anything about their own country. Especially in Don’s case, the river doesn’t even have enough water to support two reactors at the Rostov NPP, and now we are supposed to build another two and restore the land reclamation system in full, which is mutually impossible given the limited water supply. Moreover, they are going to raise the issue of financing the development of the water resources of the Don River with the gains from selling nuclear power. As if their development will result in an excess of water resources! Is it really so difficult to understand that the water resources of the Don River are already completely exhausted, and that it is already necessary to bring water from the Volga, and that will result in the death of the lower Volga? Just as the Communist functionaries of the Soviet Union was uneducated, so is its spawn, making the same old mistakes with the new Volga-Don and the manipulation of the northern rivers. We ought to recall some of the notes from the Rostov NPP Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the final statement of the expert commission of the public environmental inspection of the Rostov NPP, dated December 22, 1999. In terms of the water supply for the Rostov NPP, leading Don River scientists made the following points and conclusions, taken from the EIA: “2.1. Regarding the negative (possibly catastrophic) impact on the entire basin of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir and the lower Don River, the only source of water supply for the population, and on the numerous recreational areas; 2.3. Regarding the negative impact on the dam side of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir (directly and via the cooling pond), which will result in the destruction of the fish population; fish productivity has already decreased several times since the construction of the Rostov NPP. 2.4. Due to the extremely strained and insufficient water balance of the lower Don River and the need to ensure reservoir releases from the Tsimlyansk water reservoir for the fishing industry to regularly fill the river floodplains; THERE ARE NO RELEASES IN THE SPRING, WHICH HAS CAUSED THE DEGRADATION OF THE FLOODPLAINS AND ALL OF THE ECOSYSTEMS, RESULTING IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LOCAL SPECIES. 2.5. Due to the inevitable need to decide the fate of the Tsimlyansk hydropower station (the state of the dam was not examined) and rehabilitate the degraded floodplains of the Don River this issue was raised by the Environmental Commission of the Rostov Oblast Council in the early 1990s, which has now fallen silent, an inaction wrought with catastrophic consequences.
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4. In assessing the project in terms of water resource issues, thermal load and climate effects, the EIA did not consider the already negative environmental conditions in the area of Volgodonsk and the basin of the lower Don River, described in the Environmental Atlas of the Rostov Oblast (1996) and in the Assessment of the Conditions of the Water Ecosystems of the Basin of the Lower Don River (1996). Nor was the anthropogenic congestion of the Don River’s water basin and the assessment of the drinking water as extremely dirty (water quality rated at 5–4), as reported in the Russian Water Quality Almanac in 1998, taken into account. The conclusions drawn by the Rostov NPP EIA is based on inaccurate data and is rife with errors: …4.2. Inaccurate data was submitted on the filtration of the water from the cooling pond at the Tsimlyansk water reservoir; 4.3. The thermal pollution of the cooling pond was inaccurately assessed, as was the water closest to the dam of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir due to the absence of any analysis of the monitoring results for the cooling ponds at other NPPs operating in similar climates; the pollution of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir by blue-green algae and increased concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the water were not considered; 4.4. The consequences of pollution by salts in the cooling ponds and the dammed stretch of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir were not assessed correctly.” All of these issues remain unresolved today. The EIA is peculiar because the design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents were considered for all of the components of the ecosystem, save for the water reservoir, the conditions of which are reviewed in-depth ONLY in for normal operation of the Rostov NPP. The design-basis accidents are reviewed in much less detail, primarily in the form of tables. Finally, in the case of beyond design basis accidents, the only thing it indicates is that the drinking water supply for the plant’s staff will be supplied from an artesian aquifer reserve. Clearly, the problems of the lower Don River, the Azov Sea and the Black Sea basin will cease to exist in this case. In other words, the EIA fails to address the impact of the Rostov NPP on the Don River basin, which constitutes criminal intent. As a result, the assessment of the project with regard to water resources, thermal pollution and climate factors makes it impossible to come to a positive conclusion. THE DEFICIT OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE DON RIVER CANNOT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY WATER FROM THE VOLGA. The official stance of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Supply regarding the water supply of the Don River is simple: “The water resources of the Don River are practically exhausted and the further development of irrigation and other water consumers may take place based only on Volga water, the reserves of which are similarly not without limit. Today the issue of transferring water from northern rivers into the Volga, and from the Volga into the Don, is under real consideration.” This statement was made in the early 1990s, but it is relevant today. Having not found a suitable use for their earth-moving capabilities, those involved in land reclamation came to a mutual agreement with the power sector and attempted to bestow another two large trenches upon the North Caucasus, which they quickly began to dig. A lot of force was required to put an end to these murderous projects. This holds equally true for the canals for transferring water from the Volga. The first of the canals, the Volga-Chograi, is meant to supply water to the North Caucasus NPP, planned to be built at the Chograi water reservoir. The second, the Volga-Don-2, was built expressly to supply water to the Rostov NPP; based on the plant specifications, from which it follows
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that the water in the Don and the Tsimlyansk water reservoir is guaranteed to suffice on average for only one-and-a-half of the reactors at the Rostov NPP. The problem of putting an NPP in the Don River area is closely tied to water from the Volga. First of all due to insufficient water resources in the area for supporting even two reactors at the Rostov NPP, and second due to the planned construction of the North Caucasus NPP along the Chograi. The first involves the construction of the Volga-Don-2 canal, and the second presumes the construction of the Volga-Chograi canal. Moreover, the design of the North Caucasus NPP envisages measures to prevent the dumping of radioactive water into water reservoirs; there are no such conditions for the Rostov NPP project — they were omitted either in error or intentionally. A decision needs to be made regarding the fate of the Tsimlyansk reservoir, as its service life has already exceeded the standard of 40 years. In 1991–1993, the regular commission for nature conservation and the rational use of natural resources of the Rostov Oblast Council of People’s Deputies tried several times to force the administration and the Oblast’s Committee for Nature Conservation to make a decision about the reservoir. Even competitive bidding was announced for carrying out work in relation to the Tsimlyansk reservoir problem, but the last military coup in 1993 and the total dissolution of councils deprived the situation of any kind of leadership or coordination in terms of environmental work on an Oblast-wide scale. Yet the problem hasn’t gone anywhere: a decision is still needed. Fifteen years have passed, and the problem remains. And the possibility of releasing water from the reservoir contradicts the requirements of the Rostov NPP, in particular, when the level is reduced from the standard headwater level down to inactive storage capacity, the cooling pond will also be emptied. This possibility is not even mentioned in the design of the Rostov NPP, nor is any other catastrophe involving the Tsimlyansk dam and the breakage of the waterfront and a rapid drop in the water level. On the other hand, the designers did not resolve the problem of preventing the contamination of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir during normal NPP operations with a filter dam, nor did it address any emergency scenarios in which the dam might wash out or be destroyed by an explosion. The town of Tsimla itself has been damaged by the emergence and intensive growth of blue-green algae during warm periods, and this algae is toxic to all living things. As far as the cooling pond is concerned, the expectations are that it will receive up to 80 tons of salt combined with the evaporation of 172,000 cubic meters of water daily, while the salt needs to be removed from the pond in order to supply cooling water to the NPP reactors — the pond needs to be washed out regularly. The launch of the Rostov NPP guaranteed the destruction of the Don River basin and the Azov Sea, which was once richly populated with fish. There will not be any natural releases or flooding of the river’s plains to aid the fishing industry. The Don River has been transformed into your typical run-off trench used for water transport and thermal power. The outlook is the same for all of the regulated rivers of the USSR: Don, Kuban, Volga, Dnepr Rivers, etc. This is an example of environmental ignorance in policy- making and demonstrates the lack of the responsibility of the authorities, fraught with the destruction of Russia’s most fertile area. The rate policy of the Russian government also indicates that the stage is set for “the abomination of desolation,” to use a Biblical reference, where the South of Russia, a potential breadbasket, may crumble under the economic destruction caused by maximally hiked rates of 8–9 cents per kilowatt hour,
390 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY as opposed to 2–3 in the West. Incidentally, issue 44 of the newspaper Argumenty i Fakty na Donu includes an article by Oleg Bessonov, Doctor of Geological and Mineral Sciences, entitled “Does the Southern Federal District Need its Own ‘Panama Canal’?” This article contains a surprising statement of a particular opinion voiced by the Rostov Oblast Governor Vladimir Chub. The excerpt in question reads: “The Administration of the Rostov Oblast, in response to a message from President Vladimir Putin to the Federation Council of Russia, insists on the implementation of the construction project to build the second branch of the Volga-Donsk Shipping Canal, including the simultaneous modernization of the hydrological structures that are in place today. Arguments in favor of this decision have been voiced recently by the Governor of our Oblast, Mr. Vladimir Chub, in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, issue No. 230 (October 16, 2007). It is the opinion of the Governor that the construction of the second branch of the Volga- Donsk Shipping Canal will tackle the full set of national development goals while meeting the region’s socioeconomic and environmental interests. The approximate cost of the construction is RUB 60 billion.” That gives rise to the question: Why did the governor suddenly take a stance against the next Panama Canal and what is he hiding? Based on documents, it is our opinion that: • There is a close tie between the purely commercial interests of the Oblast Administration and the federal authorities with the interests of regional power companies; • There is an equally strong tie between the interests of Governor Chub and the management of Rostov NPP, to which he gave the green light to launch the first reactor, is preparing for the launch of the second reactor, and wants to obtain consent from the Oblast’s Legislative Assembly for the third and fourth reactors; • We can presume the following: the Rostov NPP resolved the issue of responsibility for the destruction of the fish reserves (estimated at RUB 700 million) by offering RUB 200 million in compensation, which the Administration then allocated to the construction of the Aksai-Donsk sturgeon fish farm and, essentially, for the commercial complex at the Bagayevsk station. As a result, of the two versions of the canal scam, both address only the interests of the power sector, the water sector, and the oil sector. Both destroy the surrounding landscape, the water resources and all living things. But the northern version also destroys the floodplains of two major rivers, the upper Don and the lower Volga, while the southern version deals the final blow to the ecosystem of the Manych Depression. The fact that the version including the North Caucasus NPP in Chorgai was not adopted has to do with the inaccuracy of the calculations made by the designers, who did not consider that the water transferred from the Volga via the Kalmyk wasteland, which is undergoing intense mineralization and is not suitable for irrigation or use. It is also not much use for the NPP. Here is a quote from the 1983 feasibility documentation for the Volga-Chorgai canal: “Development in this zone will receive energy from other sectors of the economy. In 1990, the construction of a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 6,000 MWt is planned. It will be located in the rear area of the Chorgai water reservoir, the water for which will be supplied via the Volga- Chorgai canal.” In other words, talks were underway about the ROI of the NPP, but only
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given six operational reactors running on million-kilowatt mega turbines. That idea already died a natural death, while the Rostov NPP, despite the reality of the situation, will keep plugging in the reactors until the Don and Volga Rivers have dried up for good. There is another interesting quote that addresses the fishing situation: “The source of the canal’s water supply is the Volga River, which has an average annual flow of 250 km3 and flow rate moves at 8,100 3m /s. After building the Kuibyshev and Volgograd water reservoirs, the lower reaches of the Volga have been regulated with releases from the reservoirs, which simulate the springtime flood patterns for fishing industry needs and the minimum water flow for shipping at 4,000 3m /s.” That is an odd release if it is less than half of the average flow rate. What exactly they were simulating now, three decades later, is unclear. All we know is that all fish resources will have been lost. So, it was poorly designed, poorly operated, and the errors are irreparable. Instead of placing another noose around the neck of the entire Don-Volga river system, someone should be held accountable for the harm already done. Thirty years have not yet passed and new benefactors have appeared who feign their concern for the territories that have been entrusted to them and who peddle the need for new massive construction projects, which are grandiose only in their degree of absurdity. The fact that the Eurasian canal is merely a “red herring” used to distract attention is supported by the fact that it does not resolve the primary goal at stake here: reliable shipping. The problem of shallow waters of the Azov Sea remains for shipping vessels carrying their capacity, i.e., the need for new shipping channels starts here. Or there is the possible construction of a new Manych-Taman canal along the eastern coast, via the Taman peninsula through the old Kuban riverbed and ending directly in the Black Sea. This idea is also technically possible, but it is patently economically and environmentally ill-conceived. As a result, the advertising campaign for the Eurasian canal is beneficial only for the purpose of detracting attention from the new Volga-Don-2 canal, since yesterday’s Communist conquerors of Mother Earth, and today’s regional leaders, have earmarked their piece of the pie not only in the power industry, but in the oil sector as well. Those are the true reasons behind the “Eurasian Panama Canal.” But the most distressing aspect of this story of the conjoined interests among the water industry and the nuclear sector is the way they both thrive off of the demise of the environment. Both the NPP and the water reservoir are facilities with exceptionally high environmental hazards, and not for their use of primitive technologies that exploit the ecosystem, but for the lack of any technologies that could be used to dismantle these facilities and rehabilitate the biosphere that they destroyed. Neither the nuclear sector nor the water industry have any promising technologies or any finished technologies to rebuild the destroyed ecosystem, and they are forced to extend the service lives of these facilities endlessly, a kind of life after death, until there is an accident or a natural disaster. Extending the standard service lives of water reservoirs and NPPs cannot be seen as normal from any point of view; it can only lead to an unavoidable cataclysm.
392 Sergey Baranovsky, President of Green Cross Russia, asks a question.
Igor Khripunov, Associate Director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, USA. Yuriy Sivintsev, Senior Scientific Collaborator at the Kurchatov Institute, gives a report about the submersion of nuclear and radioactive objects.
Oleg Muratov, Executive Secretary of the Northwest Branch of the Nuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg. Anatolii Nazarov, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Science, Director of the Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Chairman of RosAtom’s Public Council.
Milya Kabirova, Techa Environmental Organization, Chelyabinsk. Discussion among participants during a break. In the middle: Miles Pomper, Editor of Arms Control Today; and Cristian Ion, Senior Associate, Legacy Program, Global Green USA.
Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of the Legacy Program for Green Cross Switzerland, speaks on behalf of Reinhard Koch, Managing Director of the European Center for Renewable Energy, Güssing, Austria. Roundtable discussion on the Cold War’s radioactive legacy. From left to right: Stephan Robinson, International Coordinator of the Legacy program, Green Cross Switzerland; Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Commission for Evaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-scale Tests with the State-Owned the Scientific-Research Institute, Moscow; and Ivan Manilo, President of Green Cross Russian, Kurgan Affiliate.
Ivan Manilo, President of Green Cross Russia Kurgan POIO, shares his experience in solving radioactive safety-related problems for the population of the Kurgan Oblast. Mikhail Rylov, Director of the Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, and Vice President of Green Cross Russia.
Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Commission for Evaluating the Radioecological Safety of Full-Scale Tests with the State-Owned Scientific-Research Institute, Moscow, presenting one of four reports at the Dialogue, prepared with co-authors.
In the middle, Rita S. Guenther, Senior Program Associate, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
Albert Vasil’ev, Director of RosAtom’s International Center for Environmental Safety. Tamara Ashikhmina, Director of the Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring at the Vyatka State Humanitarian University, and President of Green Cross Russia, Kirov POIO (on the right), shares her thoughts with a colleague.
Vladimir Baksakov, President Green Cross Russia Penza POIO (standing in rear center), asks a question about nuclear testing ranges. Anna Vinogradova, Head of the Balakovo Affiliate of the All-Russian Society for Nature.
Lina Zernova, from the Public Advisory Council of Sosnov’y Bor, Leningrad Region, asks about the Leningrad NPP-2. The Dialogue’s official exhibition stand.
The Dialogue official photographer, Irina Petrova. The chief organizer of the St. Petersburg Dialogue, Marina Labyntseva, Head of the Public Relations Department at the AtomProf Institute of Continued and Professional Studies.
Matt Martin, Program Manager, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa. Paul Walker, Director of the Legacy Program, Global Green, USA, and Chairman of the international Legacy Program Steering Committee for Green Cross International (right); and Jeffrey Lewis, Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation.
Veronica Tessler, Program Associate, The Stanley Foundation Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Nuclear Energy, Society and Security
Andrei Frolov Union of Public Environmental Organizations, Moscow
I have been leading the Union of Public Environmental Organizations for the past 15 years, and before that, I worked for 15 years with the Special Control Services under the Defense Ministry. Anatoliy Matushchenko was the supervisor for my dissertation. That explains why I can represent both parties present at this Dialogue. We have gathered here to discuss nuclear energy, society, and security. With regard to security, I would like to note that neither RosAtom nor the proponents of the development of nuclear power have argued against nuclear safety. Everyone knows fairly well that this is a dangerous thing. And maybe in the big picture, it would be better for mankind if it did not exist. We can understand why: all of our arguments are overshadowed by the enormous black cloud of Chernobyl. The damage that was caused by Chernobyl cost us much more than any potential revenue from the use of nuclear energy in the foreseeable future. This is what makes the issue of safety and security so relevant today. Another element is society. Here we have reached the understanding that there is significant distrust of nuclear power on the part of society. There is distrust of the people toward the ruling elite, including the American people toward our elite, and of our people toward the American elite. To a large extent, our Dialogue, organized by Green Cross/Global Green, diminishes that distrust. This is purely a human problem of communication and solutions can only be reached by using tools such as this Dialogue. We must remember that all of the problems related to nuclear power are problems caused by human error, be they nuclear explosions, Chernobyl, radioactive wastes—it all comes down to typical human foolishness. It could all have been avoided by using the proper approach. Unfortunately, that is not what happened. That is why the human factor here is key, and it needs more attention in order for us to achieve a balanced decision-making process. The final element is nuclear energy itself. In its basic form, it has to be acknowledged — including by its proponents, they probably will take no offense — that it is doomed. Even Hegel said that everything that exists will have a rational, dignified death. So, the form in which it exists today will not last forever. A certain kind of transition stage is taking place, and it is not the most favorable. We do not need to fight for its approval and declare that it is the best option. This is simply the transitional phase toward generating normal energy. It needs to be acknowledged that nuclear power is the bastard child of the arms race. If there had been no arms race, there would be no nuclear power. Let us try to imagine that mankind rejects the arms race in the next 10–15 years. This development of events is altogether possible, since, for example, the United States does not need nuclear weapons for domination. The situation would be much more stable if there were no nuclear weapons at all. The American strategy is indicating a rejection of nuclear weapons, and in fact we have been moving in the direction over the past 30 years. All international agreements, including START, are a gradual approach toward the destruction of nuclear weapons in general. If such a decision were to be made and Russia
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were to support it, then together with the United States, these two countries would force the rest of mankind to forego nuclear weapons. What will happen to nuclear power then, if it remains in the form in which it is today? These issues are connected: the destruction of nuclear weapons will lead to the need to destroy modern nuclear energy. And the question of its future will be closed. This is just one of the ways in which mankind may develop. It is certainly not the worst option. This is why RosAtom must speak today, and not about how nuclear power will save mankind, etc. There are questions that must be asked and discussed at these types of conferences, including: • Further developments in space exploration cannot be made today without uranium-233, which is related to the creation of long-lived energy systems without any threats of exposing the crew; “burning” uranium rules out that possibility for us. • It would be possible to create nuclear power that does not result in the creation of fissile materials using accelerator-driven nuclear energy systems. Making this possibility a reality put a stop to the accumulation of radioactive wastes in the quantity that is poisoning us today. I do not understand why nuclear experts do not speak about this. The new method for generating nuclear power must not produce wastes and must rule out the possibility of using it to create nuclear weapons.
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Dialogue Closing Discussion
- Albert Gozal: This comment is for Tamara Ashikhmina. Your report was very clear. You named the problems but you should also say how much it would cost. If you have a clear program with the costs identified, you will easily find the means.
- Dialogue Participant: I have information about Kirovo-Chepetsk. The area has an anthropogenically reinforced background of natural radioactive isotopes, as I understand it, and uranium enrichment is taking place. Where did you get the fission products cesium and strontium? You have a nuclear reactor and critical assemblies? You don’t have anything there at all! - Tamara Ashikhmina: It is all there, I will provide explanations individually.
- Marie Kirshner: My first comment is that we have seen footage where water is collected from the river. People must be made to wear masks and gloves, because [collecting the water] is very harmful, and protective measures need to be taken. It will be good even if we save just one life. My second comment concerns civil and military cooperation in the nuclear field. Please, do not compare peaceful power and the use of nuclear power for military purposes. Civil use is developing a closed fuel cycle. If everything is carried out as planned, then the well-being of the people will improve. If we talk about weapons, this concerns more than just the collaborative programs between the United States and Russia. These were two superpowers before, but today we live in a multipolar world. Personally, I believe that there should be no weapons. I have spoken with Professor Rimsky-Korsakov in St. Petersburg, and he told us about the closed nuclear fuel cycle that prevents pollution, and he confirmed that this will also prevent proliferation in the future. He believes that it will never be possible to persuade the people who are set on becoming terrorists to do otherwise. But if someone in your bathroom or your kitchen creates a nuclear explosive and plans on using it as a weapon, the problem lies in how to stop terrorism. We need to share experience and speak with people about what needs to be done and how and always take deliberate measures. I have experienced terrorism myself — my relatives died in 1983 from the Orly airport bomb. I have been working on these issues and making real efforts to help change the world a little bit at a time.
- Igor Konyshev: I have a small suggestion for Milya Kabirova. No matter how we try to deny the less-than-perfect social situation in Muslyumovo, we cannot, unfortunately, continue to deny it. There are drugs and there is alcoholism. My suggestion is this: there is an organization called Nabat, and there is one called Techa, and there are several other organizations, including some in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. Why not come up with a social project that would involve, among other things, aid for the people in Muslyumovo who need it? It is something we could do this year or next year. Soon, we will stop calling Muslyumovo a village, it will only be a station. Society and the breakdown of the problem are approximately the same. Let us work together on this.
– Andrey Ozharovsky: I would like to reiterate that the name of this portion of the
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Dialogue is “Sustainable Development,” and move away for 30 seconds from the individual presentations — which have been very appropriate — to tell you how it came to be that I took part in the work of the UN’s Sustainable Development Commission a number of times. This is the only specialized body of the UN that deals with these questions, and I am happy to report that nuclear power has not been declared a requirement for sustainable development for the reason that most of the problems, and especially nuclear waste, is being laid upon the shoulders of future generations. The Sustainable Development Commission has adopted the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development: development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” As the problem of nuclear weapons unfortunately is not resolved in any one country of the world, despite the efforts of lobbyists and despite the presence of a large IAEA delegation, nor the past sessions that were dedicated to power or the 9th session on sustainable development, nuclear power has not been adopted as a criterion.
– Tamara Ashikhmina: Someone asked how much it will cost. If one were to speak in general about resolving the problems related to the tailing pits that we have, that would be roughly several million rubles. The construction alone of one storage pit is currently estimated at approximately RUB 157 million, and the government is searching out funds to support this. As far as inspection of the territory around the pollution source is concerned, this project will cost approximate RUB 2–2.5 million and will help complete our task in the near future.
– Dialogue Participant: Of the number of those who were part of the Totskoye tests, eight live in St. Petersburg, and three remain from the tank regiment. I, on behalf of the person who wrote to me before the Dialogue, will tell you that he fell ill one year after the tests. He has had one lung removed, and he has Class II disability status. He says that if they had proved that his illness was related to the Totskoye nuclear tests, he would now have a larger pension. But there are no such documents. I would like our Dialogue to provide some answers for these people. This is important. And what will he get from the materials of our Dialogue? Materials that say that nothing happened there, that there are thick volumes in Russian from the International Commission for Radiation Protection? What about this person who wants to live longer? I have a letter from someone who ran a biostation during the tests. He is from Saratov. He had to cut up animals that were exposed there and fed them to the soldiers. And he observed them. Those were his orders. That’s why no documents are left, because those kinds of experiments were conducted.
– Vladimir Kuznetsov: The documents exist. They are sitting pretty and marked “Top Secret.”
– Sergei Baranovsky: Please do not overestimate our capabilities. We are at least doing what no one has done before, and we are discussing things that neither civil society, nor regular people, or even officials knew before. They are not black and white issues. We need to continue our discussions and try to achieve some kind of consensus. We are in no situation to make any decisions, and we have no mandate to do so. Please address your difficulties with your local deputies, for whom you vote and whom you should
396 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY trust. We were not elected by the people and cannot decide things for them. We can only make recommendations to the people who make the decisions. And we need to raise these issues and inform the public. That is why everything that you have said today will be published in two languages. There will be a Russian-language collection that the deputies, the officials and the decision-makers will have to read, including those in RosAtom and the Presidential Administration. And we will publish an English-language version for our colleagues in the global community.
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Closing Statement
Sergei Baranovsky President, Green Cross Russia; Member of Green Cross International’s Board of Directors; Professor and Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
I would like to say a few words to conclude this event. Our ambitious project, the National Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Society and Security, originally focused on two fundamental themes, and now a third has been brought up as well. We have had a two-day forum. The first day was mainly dedicated to problems related to the development of nuclear energy and communication with the public on this important topic. The second day provided a platform for dialogue between strident supporters and opponents of nuclear energy and the attempt to find a compromise or any key solutions. The second and most important theme of the Green Cross Russia and Green Cross International is the legacy of the Cold War and ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction. There is also a host of environmental problems about which none of the people who created nuclear, chemical or biological weapons ever thought; they didn’t consider the possibility that sooner or later, these weapons would have to be destroyed at high cost, both financially and environmentally. This topic is addressed by the Green Cross/Global Green Legacy Program, which we are trying to implement with the public. We would like to invite not only Russian activists, but our international colleagues and citizens as well to help us in achieving our goals. Today we have also addressed a third topic. No matter what the UN Commission for Sustainable Development has said, ignoring what has already taken place and what will be taking place, even if we decided today to forever ban everything nuclear, it would still take us about 100 years before we are relieved of the legacy of what has already been done, and we must still live and implement sustainable development with this problem present. That is why discussions on what accompanies the resolution of problems related to nuclear issues ought to take place. The discussion of these three major issues represents the uniqueness of our Dialogue. I have asked many people: “Do we need this Dialogue?” Everyone has answered yes. So we will keep working! As the Vice Chairman of RosAtom’s Public Council, I will propose that the Council and our international sponsors hold a third Dialogue in 2009. I believe that it will take place and will become as much as a tradition as the international Chemical National Dialogue, which we hold every year in the fall and will continue until the very last milligram of chemical weapons have been destroyed. One hundred percent destruction of chemical weapons is planned for 2012. What will happen with nuclear weapons and how much time is required to solve all of the problems related to nuclear power and weapons remains to be seen. The next hundred years may not be enough.
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At one of the RosAtom Public Council’s recent meetings, Anatolii Nazarov spoke during a discussion on collaboration between the public and the nuclear industry. We were looking for ways we could make an impact on the situation in the regions. After these discussions, I suggested — and was supported by all of the members of the Council and the management — that there is one way besides a national-level Dialogue, or even an international-level Dialogue. Regional forums must be held, and Green Cross has experience in organizing such events. Tamara Ashikhmina organized the first regional Dialogue, which addressed the problems in the Kirov Oblast. Ivan Manilo organized a similar forum in the Kurgan Oblast. Our proposal is to continue holding the National Dialogue once a year and accept proposals from you regarding which Russian regions should see regional forums. Regional forums should be held with a focus on problems related to nuclear power, the legacy of the Cold War and previous testing, major catastrophes such as Mayak or Chernobyl, dismantlement facilities, etc. The first suggestions were of Tomsk, an area that faces a number of problems, and the Murmansk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts. The Public Council must consider this, but it is time to branch out at the regional level. We have high hopes for the regional authorities; we will speak with governors and regional legislators, the media, and public organizations. These forums have a worthy purpose, and I will do everything I can to make sure it happens. However, it is very important to consider what topics should be addressed at these regional forums. At the first Dialogue last year, the session dedicated to different technologies was difficult to understand. This subject turned out to be too specialized and did not resonate with the public or the other participants. We need your feedback; we have email and a website. Please don’t be indifferent and let us know what you would like to see. It is no easy task to organize this kind of forum, and we need your ideas. We need your intellectual assistance. I believe that Green Cross and all of us have received a necessary mandate issued by the RosAtom Public Council and by society, and we are supported by public organizations. No one has told us that we are doing anything harmful. The Dialogue and forums will continue, both on a national scale and on a regional scale. I would like to thank our sponsors once more, and especially those from abroad who I named during my opening remarks, as well as our Russian sponsors; it is no easy feat to gather 150 people in Moscow, St. Petersburg or Chelyabinsk and give them an opportunity to work. Again, my gratitude goes out to those who have helped, a big thanks to all of those who found the time to put everything aside and come here for 3–4 days, and to everyone who spoke honestly about what they think and believe. We may not all agree, but at least we have said what we came to say. Thank you to our interpreters, and especially to those who conducted the Dialogue: RosAtom’s GROTs, the staff at RosAtom, and the staff of Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland and Global Green USA. I hope to see you all again next year in April. Good luck to you all!
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THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVERED AT THE EVENT
The Widespread Effects of “Peaceful” and “Non-Peaceful” Uses of Nuclear Energy in the Orenburg Oblast on Humans and Nature
Valentin Dombrovsky Chairman of Green Committee, Orenburg
The Orenburg Oblast stands out among Russia’s regions due to the widespread effects on humans and the environment of both the “peaceful” and “non-peaceful” use of nuclear power. The consequences of these experiments have been made only partially public only decades after the events took place, when the “top secret” label was finally removed from documents with environmental data. One of the largest military experiments took place on September 14, 1954 at the Totskoye Nuclear Test Range, where a nuclear bomb weighing 40 kilotons was exploded at a height of 350 meters. This is comparable to the combined power of the two nuclear bombs dropped by the US Armed Forces on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII. The Totskoye explosion was the eighth for the Soviet Union, but it was the only one in history conducted for general military training purposes. The advisability of conducting these studies was explained by the similarity of the area to German terrain. At the beginning of the exercise, Khrushchev and his entourage walked along the front line and introduced the soldiers, sergeants and officers participating in the exercise to Ivan Kurchatov, who explained the details of the planned nuclear explosion and guaranteed the safety of all participants (?!). But witnesses say that neither the soldiers nor the officers had dosimeters, or that there was only one dosimeter for a large group of people. The clothing contamination process consisted of beating the dust off of uniforms. After returning from the exercise, many of the soldiers began to experience vomiting. According to official data, no more than one percent of those taking part in the exercise were affected at the epicenter of the explosion — roughly 450 people. After the explosion, a near wake in the form of a dust cloud measuring 210 km by 28 km took shape over the territory of the Orenburg Oblast and Bashkortostan. The radiation dose within 70 km from the epicenter was measured at no more than 1.3 rem. Radioactive pollution from the fallout from the explosion cloud spread over the territory of West Siberia, north of Omsk, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk, where the maximum radiation dose recorded was 0.1 rem. With such low official levels of exposure and pollution, the morbidity statistics for the participants of the Totskoye exercise are hard to explain. Furthermore, after the explosion, there was a sharp increase in cancer morbidity among the local population — up to 103–152 people per every 100,000 people in 1955–1960. The external radiation dose received by the residents of the Orenburg Oblast after the Totskoye nuclear test was a maximum of 13 mSv and an average of 0.1 mSv per year. From there, in light of modern official views on the effects of ionizing radiation on human health, the average annual effective dose was exceeded by a factor of 13! That
400 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY means that given an average effective radiation dose over the course of a person’s life (70 years) of 70 mSv, among people who have been exposed to these levels of radiation, the result is a shortened life expectancy of 57 years. The residents of Orenburg who live within 30 km from the Totskoye explosion had long observed oncological disease among cattle and increased mortality rates of their sheep. While it is well known that high-dose radiation causes radiation illnesses and lesions in the body’s organs, the effects of low doses remain highly controversial. It has not yet been scientifically proven whether or not there is a defined lower limit below which radiation poses no danger. According to the “no-threshold concept” for radiation, infinitesimal doses of radiation are amplified by other effects, such as chemical effects. The servicemen who took part in the Totskoye exercise signed 25-year non- disclosure agreements. That is why information about the studies only began to appear in the press in the late 20th century. In order to provide mutual assistance and support, in the late 1980s, the surviving veterans established the Special Risk Divisions Committee. Today, the veterans of special risk divisions, including the participants of the Totskoye test, have been put into the same category as the survivors of the Chernobyl disaster. In July–August 1971, [when I was a university student], I attended military training exercises near the Totskoye range next to the Pristantsionnaya train station where the sappers barracks were located. Upon completion of the drills, the servicemen offered to take us on a tour of the epicenter of the nuclear bomb. No one, however, volunteered. The instructors were puzzled — they had never witnessed this kind of “indifference” to radiation before. In September 1994, Russian and US army peacekeepers participated in joint tactical exercises at the Totskoye training grounds, but the Americans call their participants “nuclear guinea pigs.” In 1991, the HydroMetCenter of Russia conducted measurements of the residual activity levels at the epicenter of the Totskoye explosion, where they found 152Eu (1.23 Ci/km2), 154Eu (0.03 Ci/km2), Cs and Pu at global background levels. The Eu isotopes are the products of activation of stable 151Eu, which is found in soil. Activated Eu and Cs are concentrated in the surface level of the soil, reaching a depth of 5 centimeters. The radiation levels under normal conditions and with anthropogenic pollution are measured using dosimeter devices. The exposure dose is often measured in microroentgens per hour (μR/hr) and ranges from 5 to 30 μR/hr, creating a background radiation dose of 0.03–0.06 rem. The last four decades have seen an increase in mortality rates among those aged 0–14 years by 117–145% in the city, and 127–164% in rural areas. Malignant tumors are the second most common reason for deaths. Each year, oncological institutions in the Oblast diagnose over 6,000 malignant tumors. As compared to data from 1950, the number of first-time diagnoses has grown 2.7 times. Overall, the incidence of oncological disease has increased 6.3 times since 1950. Another radioactive addition to the steppes came from the testing of 100–120 mm caliber artillery shells with uranium tips at the Donguz military range in 1981–1982, located 26 km to the south of Orenburg. If you consider the number of shots based on the deformation of the barrels of the weapons used, approximately 2,000 shells were fired. These types of tips on shells increase precision. Apparently, the tests were a success. According to a variety of sources, based on stories and the retelling of the events by
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the local population, it appears that the officials overseeing these tests received medals, awards, and early promotions in rank. The shots were fired at the targets without any regard for the requirements in place to protect the land from radioactive pollution. The firing range was not equipped with any shell traps or other means of catching or disposing of the spent shells. Inspections discovered this abuse on the part of the military by accident, but clean-up efforts of the test range were not conducted for a number of reasons. The Donguz River is the left tributary of the Ural River, and joins the latter at a northwest angle, with the village of Nizhnepavlovka being located at the confluence. The general public was not provided with any information about the environmental consequences of these types of tests, nor was civilian medical personnel who began to observe new illness patterns in their respective areas. This information is not precise and does not claim to be so, because official data on the tests that were conducted has yet to appear in the open press. It is known that 20 years later, similar shells with uranium tips were used by NATO troops during operations in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, no one is bearing the responsibility for the spread and the introduction of this type of “radioactive fertilizer” in the soil with varying levels of radiation doses or the harm done to the health of the local population. After the USSR signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, tests were conducted underground. These nuclear explosions “in the interests of the economy” began in 1965 and were carried out on a large scale in many of the country’s regions, but were only made public after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1970–1973, five underground nuclear explosions were conducted in Orenburg. These were categorized as “peaceful” explosions: 9 kilotons in 1970, 15 kilotons in 1971, and 6 kilotons in 1972 (two tests of 3 kilotons each). The total force of all of the underground nuclear explosions amounted to 40 kilotons, resulting in cavities measuring approximately 195,000 cubic meters, or a sphere measuring 72 meters in diameter! The explosions beneath Orenburg with a force of up to 25 kilotons alone created a cavity of up to 125,000 cubic meters — equivalent to a sphere with a 62-meter diameter. Thus, the region was shaken four years in a row without a break. It should be noted that underground nuclear explosions generate seismic waves in the Earth’s crust. The greatest danger comes from longitudinal waves, which pass along the change in volume in the soil environment and create additional forces of compression and expansion. These “seismic” blows result in the deformation of the Earth’s surface and interrupt the hydrological system of rivers and lakes, provoking artificial earthquakes at considerable distance from the site of the test, and more. The results are landslides, splits in original ground, and the destruction of buildings that were not constructed to withstand such strong vibrations. As far as we know, no monitoring of the impact of the Orenburg underground nuclear tests on the environment was conducted. The Orenburg gas condensate field is located 30 km from Orenburg. It is the site of two underground nuclear explosions that were conducted in salt domes. Due to disruptive flooding of the wells and the sharp drop in strata pressure in the gas condensate deposits, increased rock fissuring and the migration of radionuclides from the explosion zones, a worrying situation has developed as underground gas deposits are developed. Explosions of 15 kilotons (10/22/1971) and 10 kilotons (09/30/73) took place at a depth of 1,140 meters, but in direct proximity of the village of Nikolskoye, which is located about 10 km from the epicenters. Having ended up in the zone of direct radiation impact from the
402 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY underground nuclear tests, the villagers were neither evacuated nor resettled to a more favorable location. In spring of 1995, under coercion from protests organized by the Green Committee of Orenburg, aided by pressure from the Oblast’s Environmental Enforcement Office, OrenburgGazprom immediately switched off the gas pipe system from underground reserves, which are now conserved and will not be developed any further. Another side of the problem is the lack of any kind of environmental control over the shipment of gas, at the time. As far as I can remember, in 1971–1972, people in Samara, where I was studying at a construction institute, refused to accept Orenburg natural gas due to its radioactivity. Gas by itself does not transfer radioactivity, but if it is mixed with impurities and water, an induced radiation reaction occurs. One can imagine the tragedy of the situation in which the Orenburg companies and residents used radioactive gas for industrial and household purposes over an extended period of time. Radiation won’t cause your home to go up in flames, but it does enter the natural environment. The combined impact of “peaceful” and “non-peaceful” nuclear energy plays a clear role in the disruption of the health of the local population, which is observed in the growth of the number of inpatients at oncological clinics and the recent opening of two specialized children’s hospitals in Buzuluk and Orenburg. Time has shown that the problem will not disappear on its own, and it will actually bring more and new, negative health surprises. The total force of all of the nuclear explosions conducted in the Orenburg Oblast amounts to 80 kilotons. That means an average of 36 kilograms of TNT explosives for each person residing in the area. Suffice it to say that that amount is sufficient to transform every single Orenburg resident into dust!
Conclusion The Totskoye Rayon accounts for 50.6% of the “nuclear bludgeon,” the Orenburg Rayon represents 38%, the Kurmanayev Rayon accounts for 7.6%, and the Okilotonsyabrsky Rayon accounts for 3.8%. In other words, the main blows were dealt primarily against the Western and Central rayons of Orenburg — those with the highest population density. The uranium-coated debris from the Donguz test range is not even counted in that calculation. The products of nuclear fission and fallout move from the atmosphere into the soil, surface and ground waters, entering the food supply for both humans and animals. The quantity of emitted products and their half-lives are not the only factors that determine the degree of hazards that they present. It is important to know how they are concentrated in the bodies of animals and humans, the volumes in which chemical elements in the body are absorbed, as well as where and when they accumulate in individual plant and animal cells. There are no data for these indicators. In the Soviet Union, there was no environment. There was no radiation, there was no accountability for the grave harm suffered by the people at the hands of the government. It seems as though the largest anthropogenic accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986 became a starting point and the last straw that triggered the subsequent fall of the USSR, in combination with other economic, social and environmental reasons. It is important to remember that, in our country, before 1995 legislative efforts in the realm of nuclear energy use, the field was not regulated at all, if you donot
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count ministry orders (for example, the well-known Ministry of Machine Building, the predecessor to the Ministry of Nuclear Power known by its abbreviation, SredMash) and agency provisions that were not discussed. For information, the Law on Nuclear Energy was adopted by the United States back in 1946, four years after the launch of a nuclear reactor. Nothing similar was possible in Russia until almost 50 years later. Russia adopted the Federal Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy on November 21, 1995. This law set out the legal basis and general principles governing the relations arising from the use of nuclear energy for both peaceful and national defense purposes — save for operations related to the development, manufacturing, testing, use and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and nuclear power installations designated for military use. An important moment in Russia’s legislative history is the adoption by Russia’s State Duma of the Federal Law on Public Radiation Safety on December 5, 1995. This law came into force on January 9, 1996. It defines the legal framework for ensuring radiation safety for the Russian people in order to protect their health. This promising development did not begin until the post-Soviet period.
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THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVERED AT THE EVENT
Nuclear Tests in the USSR: The Red Book (From Nuclear History: Fear, Horror and Nuclear Blackmail)
Anatoliy Matushchenko Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom
Samat Smagulov Senior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov
Vadim Logachev Co-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow
We are gathered here on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (August 5, 1963). Let us think back to this and other memorable events and dates in the history of nuclear tests. August 6th, 1945: the US delegation, led by President Harry Truman, was returning from the Potsdam Conference on the USS Augusta. The Commander of the ship reported a telegram received from Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Truman rushed to get the message and read it louder and louder to those around him: “Big bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, August 5, at 7:15 pm Washington time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.” Truman beamed glass of champagne in hand, and announced: “This is the greatest thing in history!” Several hours earlier, heroic US pilots had dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan. The bomb had incredible destructive force — more than that of two thousand of England’s most powerful Grand Slam bombs. The United States now had the most powerful weapon in the world. Truman than made a toast to this amazing bomb and its possession by the greatest country in the world. The president made this toast as the champagne spurted out, and essentially “raised the sword of a new nuclear arms race,” just as the Japanese children’s writer Takeshi Ito had prophetically written. Truman never regretted the decision to put half a million civilians to their death: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt it should be used.” But even earlier, the physicist Leo Szilard recalled: “During 1943 and part of 1944 our greatest worry was the possibility that Germany would perfect an atomic-
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bomb before the invasion of Europe. In 1945, when we ceased worrying about what the Germans might do to us, we began to worry about what the Government of the United States might do to other countries.” During 1945–1949, the American ruling elite for some reason got the idea that it could do away with the USSR by destroying nearly 100 of its towns and industrial centers with nuclear bombs (in November 1945, American Joint Intelligence Committee Report 329 on the Strategic Vulnerability of the USSR to a Limited Air Attack, the Half Moon emergency war plan in May 1948, Operation Dropshot in 1949), and other plans that emerged later (15 in all). On August 6 and 9, 1945, the flashes “brighter than a thousand suns” and the howl of the kamikaze, was made known to the entire world: the nuclear bomb was a horrific reality. Twenty years later, the former chaplain of the US Armed Forces Father George Zabelka repented; it was he who had blessed the Enola Gay and Bockscar aircraft before their departure to Japan with the bomb. He did not suspect that the result would be hell on Earth—twice. In a speech on the twentieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, Father Zabelka said that after twenty years his soul and his conscience forced him to recognize the sin of war and begin preaching the total amorality of nuclear weapons. At the time of the bombing, Igor Kurchatov described this situation as vandalism and a monstrous act and drew his own conclusion: “I believe this is a nuclear fist in our face.”
Rapid Response: Russia Gets the Bomb Russia had only one thing left to do: take proactive measures toward creating a reliable, domestic nuclear shield. Efforts in this area were led by Igor Kurchatov. He worked closely with selfless, renowned physicists including A. Alexandrov, A. Alikhanov, L. Artsimovich, Y. Zeldovich, I. Kikoin, I. Pomeranchuk, A. Sakharov, Y. Khariton, G. Flerov and many, many others. On April 9, 1946, the USSR’s Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 805-327ss/op, appointing Yulii Khariton Chief Engineer of KB-11 (design bureau) responsible for jet engine design and manufacture. A decision was also made by the Commission (comrades Vannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton) regarding placing KB-11 at Factory No. 350 under the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building and using adjacent territories for KB-11 purposes. On June 21, 1946 the Soviet Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 1286-525ss/ op, ordering KB-11 project members (namely comrades Khariton and Zernova) under the management of Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences (the Kurchatov Institute) to construct two types of RDS jet engines: one that would use heavy fuel (RDS- 1) and one that would use light fuel (RDS-2). The ambitious excitement among the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain fizzled out when anthropogenic radioactive particles appeared in the atmosphere in early September. These particles were gathered by the US Armed Forces B-29 flying laboratory. President Truman, concerned, could draw only one conclusion: on August 29, 1949, those “Russian Asians” had conducted their own nuclear bomb tests. These were from the RDS-1 (officially an acronym for the Russian phrases “Special Jet Engine-1,” unofficially — “Made in Russia,” “Russia Strikes Back,” and known in the United States as Joe-1 in reference to Joseph Stalin). This test was conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Range, located in the Semipalatinsk,
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Pavlodar and parts of the Karaganda Oblasts of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, stretching over roughly 18,500 km2.
Some background information: The Semipalatinsk Test Range was built in just two years with the efforts of 15,000 military construction workers and cost the country, which was torn and suffering after the blood spilled during WWII, a total of RUB 80 million, which was an enormous sum at the time and did not include the expenses for all of the preparations for testing the bomb. From August 29, 1949 through December 24, 1962, a total of 116 land and atmospheric nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Range, plus two underground tests (26% of all of the tests conducted at this site). Later, from March 15, 1964 through October 19, 1989, only underground tests were conducted (74%). In total, this site saw 456 nuclear tests (i.e., 64% of the USSR’s total of 715 tests).
Nuclear Scientists Break Their Silence Since 1991, a substantial number of interesting collections, books, monographs, memoirs, articles, reports and other publications have been made available on the history of the USSR’s nuclear tests. Let us turn to the pioneer efforts in 1992–1993 in the “Nuclear Tests in the USSR” series, dedicated to the Northern Test Range (the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago), which currently operates as the Central Russian Test Range (Presidential Decree No. 194, dated February 27, 1992, the text of which has been included below): 1. The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and Radiation Safety. Reference Information [Severny ispytatelny poligon: yaderniye vzryvy, radiologiya, radiotsionnaya bezopasnost. Spravochnaya informatsiya]. Issue 1. Moscow: 1992, 195. Mikhailova, V., Matushchenko, A., Zolotukhina, G., general eds. Dubasov, Y., Krivokhatsky, A., Bazhenov, V., Kharitonov, K., science eds. 2. The Northern Test Range: Reports from Russian Experts Presented at Conferences, Meetings, Symposiums and Hearings [Severny ispytatelny poligon: materialy ekspertov Rossiiskoi Federatsii na konferentsiyakh, vstrechakh, simposiumakh i slushaniyakh]. Issue 2. St. Petersburg: 1993, 405. Bogdan, V., Dubasov, Y., Zolotukhin, G., Krivokhatsky, A., Matushchenko, A., Mikhailov, V., Kharitonov, K., Tsyrkov, G.; Mikhailova, V., Zolotukhina, G., Matushchenko, A., eds. Only 200 and 230 copies respectively of these two publications were made available, and basically as Xeroxed copies, thanks to the efforts of the staff at the Khlopin Radium Institute and enormous support from the legendary G. Tsyrkov (November 28, 1921– June 20, 2001), the Head of the Fifth Head Department of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry (1965–1996). The publication of the first issue was timed to coincide with the international conference on Environmental Problems in the Arctic and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament in the town of Arkhangelsk (see October 14–18, 1992). But the authors only managed to bring the first 20 copies to the event. At the conference, the “interested parties,” as it has become common to say, prepared for a serious discussion on the affairs at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range, right up to insisting that it be closed (this was initiated by A. Emelyanenkov and N. Yakimets, leaders of the environmental movement K Novoi Zemle [To Novaya Zemlya]). And there was already a precedent:
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the Semipalatinsk Test Range would no longer be used for nuclear testing, due to an initiative from the international anti-nuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk (the leaders of this group were O. Suleymenov and V. Yakimets) and under Decree No. 409 issued on August 29, 1991 by Mr. Nazarbayev, the President of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, these groundbreaking collections and publications became in high demand and were nurtured in a context where fresh information was being dug up. Today I’ll try to give the younger members of the audience an overview of those publications, although today, they are essentially inaccessible, since they are now rarities. Just as the physicists L. Landau and E. Livshits joked, “the last edition sold out long ago, and it looks like the readers still have a need for this book,” (Physicists Laugh. But They Aren’t the Only Ones Laughing. Moscow: Sovpadeniye, 2006). Which is why it is so nice to recall that in 1999, with support from the IAEA, the first part of the series was republished, both in Russian and English (1,500 copies). But back then in 1992, under Decree No. 322 issued by Mr. Mikhailov, the Minister of Nuclear Energy, on September 15, 1992, these republished copies could only be distributed one by one to strictly defined organizations under a variety of ministries and agencies, libraries, journals such as Energiya and Atomnaya Energiya and high-ranking personnel, where they were promptly lost. However, those in the nuclear industry and the nuclear defense complex still have theirs. The degree of openness of the materials achieved in these early publications is another interesting detail to consider; let us take a look at the contents of these publications (which we borrowed from Vitaly Khalturin, Tatiana Rautian, Paul G. Richards, and William S. Leight, the authors of the article “A Review of Soviet Nuclear Tests at Novaya Zemlya in 1955–1990” [Obzor sovietskikh yadernikh ispytaniy na Novoi Zemlye v 1955–1990 godakh], in which they presented the contents of these publications. “Science and General Safety. Technical Requirements for an Initiative to Control Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation” [Nauka i vseobschaya bezopasnost. Tekhnicheskiye predposylki dlya initsiativ po kontrolyu nad vooruzheniyami, razoruzheniyu in nerasprostraneniyu], Vol. 13, No.2, October 2005).
Contents of Issue 1: • Introduction (written in July 1992 by V. Mikhailov, who was appointed Head of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry in March 1992 for a total of six years, until March 1998). • Radiation Safety Standards and Radiation Loads from Sources of Ionizing Radiation (Anatoliy Matushchenko). • The Northern Test Range: Basic Information about Nuclear Tests (1955–1990), K. Andrianov, V. Vyskrebentsev, Y. Dubasov, V. Dumik, G. Zolotukhin, V. Ivanov, V. Karimov, G. Kaurov, G.Krasilov, V. Kozlov, G. Kudryavtsev, V. Kulikov, A. Matushchenko, V. Mikhailov, P. Ramzayev, V. Safronov, V. Strukov, V. Filippovsky, K. Kharitonov, G. Tsyrkov, A. Chernyshev, V. Chugunov (the underlined names indicate those who have passed away). • The number of nuclear explosions (the Northern Test Range as of 01/01/1992). • Details of the nuclear tests. • Primary baseline data for assessing the radiation consequences of nuclear explosions.
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• Modern radioecological conditions in the Extreme North. • Criteria for radiation and seismic safety of underground nuclear tests. • Scientific support for today’s radiological studies in relation to the operations at the Northern Test Range. • Information about the Northern Test Range. • “Novaya Zemlya – Nevada.” V. Dumik, N. Filonov, K. Kharitonov, Y. Shipko. • The Northern Test Range: A Chronology of Radiation Phenomena from Underground Nuclear Tests. V. Bazhenov, V. Dumik, G. Kaurov, G. Krasilov, A. Matushchenko, V. Safronov, V. Filippovsky. • A Chronology of Underground Nuclear Explosions at the Northern Test Range (1964–1990). • The Study of Radiation Phenomena of Underground Nuclear Tests at the Northern Test Range. • Expert reports. • The Northern Test Range: A Chronology and Examination of the Phenomena of Nuclear Tests at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. A. Matushchenko, V. Dumik, V. Mikhailov, V. Safronov, G. Tsyrkov. • Containing Radioactive Products from Underground Nuclear Explosions in the Geological Formations of Novaya Zemlya. A. Matushchenko, V. Chugunov, G. Krasilov, A. Maltsev, A. Pichugin, V. Safronov. • About the Polar Test Range. P. Ramzayev. • The Polar Test Range: Aspects of Environmental Monitoring. Y. Doskoch. • Nuclear Tests: Radiation Monitoring and Safety. Y. Dubasov, A. Krivokhatsky, A. Matushchenko, V. Filippovsky. • Peaceful Underground Nuclear Explosions beyond the Arctic Circle. K. Myasnikov, V. Kasatkin, K. Kharitonov. • The Northern Test Range: A Basic Bibliography and Other Sources of Information. A. Matushchenko. • A Bibliography (192 references). • Other sources of information (an additional 19 sources, making a total of 211 — unique, original, and very educational).
Contents of Issue 2 • Introduction (including information that this issue includes reports and materials that were presented at different meetings). • The Soviet-Finnish Meeting of Experts, February 28, 1991. • The Environmental Safety of Underground Nuclear Tests (Moscow). • The All-Soviet Conference of the Soviet Committee of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, April 4–6, 1991; The Medical and Environmental Consequences of Producing and Testing Nuclear Weapons (Kurgan). • The International Symposium in Canada, April 21–26, 1991 on Underground Tests of Nuclear Weapons: the Potential Impact on the Environment and Limitations (Ottawa). • The International Conference of the Nuclear Community of the USSR, June 25–28, 1991, Radioactive Waste: Problems and Solutions (Moscow). • The First Constitutive Meeting of the Public Environmental Movement “To Novaya Zemlya,” November 17–18, 1991 (Arkhangelsk).
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• The International Conference in Norway on November 22–23, 1991 on Problems Concerning Radiological and Radiation Protection in the North (Troms). • The International Conference on the Democratization of Civil and Military Safety, June 1–2, 1992 (Moscow). • Parliamentary hearings at the meeting of the Committee for Environmental Issues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources and the Committee for Defense Issues and Safety under the Supreme Soviet of Russia, regarding the advisability of continuing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range, June 16, 1992 (Moscow). • The International Conference on Environmental Problems in the Arctic and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament, October 14–18, 1992 (Arkhangelsk).
Russia did not conduct any nuclear tests while these collections were being prepared. However, studies were continued with regard to radiation, public health, medicine, and geological monitoring in the areas affected by the tests that were previously conducted. These studies made it possible to generalize or adjust previous views, from both scientific and social standpoints. Overall, the general concept behind preparing these and two other collections (Issue No. 3 on the Semipalatinsk Test Range and No. 4 on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions) based on the reports by Professor Matushchenko was approved by the Inter-Agency Expert Commission for the Evaluation of the Radiation and Seismic Safety of Underground Nuclear Explosions (MVEK-PYaV), co-chaired by G. Krasilov, A. Matushchenko, and V. Filippovsky) and the National Commission for Radiation Protection (chaired by L. Ilyin) as a part of the Comprehensive Target Program for Studying the Radiation and Public Health Conditions of the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya Test Ranges and Adjacent Territories. Five months after his appointment as the Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy, Viktor Mikhailov noted the following in his introduction to the first issue (July 1992):
“The key political goal of our military doctrine is to eliminate war from the experience of mankind, and to strengthen international stability and safety. The world is changing in leaps and bounds. The large-scale actions of Russia and the United States toward reducing their nuclear arsenals are a strong example of these changes. The only deterrence strategy that can be an alternative to nuclear parity is a regime of total trust, openness, and complete and total destruction of all nuclear weapons, followed by the prohibition of their development. That is our goal. Nuclear testing has a place here as well.
By the end of 1991, a total of 2,053 nuclear tests had been recorded. They were conducted in five countries: the United States (since 1945), the USSR (since 1949), England (since 1952), France (since 1960) and China (since 1964). During these tests, designs for nuclear warheads were developed, the phenomena that accompany nuclear explosions were researched, as were the effects of the destructive impact on weapons, equipment, facilities and the environment. Experiments were conducted with anti-nuclear protection, means of detecting and intercepting explosions, and ways to conceal nuclear tests. Meanwhile, since the emergence of nuclear weapons, our country has been persistently fighting for its total prohibition, starting with the
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corresponding UN proposal back in 1946.”
He goes on to say:
“A control mechanism over the number of nuclear tests can be put into place — a very important step — on a widespread international basis by plugging national oversight systems into the international network and conducting inspections at test sites.
Today, ceasing all nuclear tests means preventing the third generation of nuclear weapons and preventing them from progressing beyond the research stage into the development stage. Third-generation weapons feature new qualities in terms of effectiveness and reliability, and in terms of the global consequences of their use. On the one hand, they can produce radioactive pollution in volumes hundreds of thousands of times smaller than existing weapons. On the other hand, they are capable of destroying strategic targets both in space and on Earth. This is what causes concern, since someone may be tempted to use them in a local conflict. Prohibiting the use of these weapons is the duty of all of mankind.”
An attentive and interested reader should compare these words with the realities of our time in order to make an educated assessment of today’s nuclear challenges and the need to adequately respond to external threats, considering the geo-political position of Russia and its rich natural resources across a vast territory. If you recall, the last underground nuclear test in the USSR was conducted on October 24, 1990 at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. Russia has not renewed testing since, as it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996, later ratified by Federal Law No. 72-FZ on May 27, 2000. But the United States has still not taken this step, conditioning its political action on the fulfillment of a mass of provisions about “guarantees.” We would also like to remind the reader that on August 29, 1991, President Nazarbayev of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan passed Decree No. 409, closing the Semipalatinsk Test Range. Later, on October 26, 1991, President Yeltsin of Russia passed Decree No.76-rp (see below), announcing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range for one year, which was, naturally, then extended again on November 19, 1992 by Decree No.1267 and on July 5, 1993 by Decree No.1008, “...until such a moratorium, announced by other states who posses nuclear weapons, is de jure or de facto enforced by said states.” Another provision instructed “the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold consultations with the representatives of other countries that possess nuclear weapons in order to begin multilateral negotiations on developing an agreement on the comprehensive ban of nuclear testing...” which was completed with the multilateral signature on September 24, 1996 and subsequent ratification by the countries involved, as noted above by Mr. V. Mikhailov. Thus in this race for peace, not nuclear arms, Russia is the clear leader. Let us add that by today, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (signed 45 years ago!) has been joined by over 170 countries and ratified by over one hundred. However, of the 44 countries in which ratification is required in order to validate the Treaty, it has yet to be signed by three countries: India, Pakistan, and China, and it has not been ratified in
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about ten countries, including the United States! Is this not because, after its musical series of “subcritical” tests (codenamed “Oboe” and “Bagpipe”) at the Nevada test range, the United States intends to replace these studies with a cacophony of full-scale tests of a new generation of nuclear weapons? That leaves us with the question: Should the Novaya Zemlya test range stay or go?
But let us return to our overview and note the following: It is important to bear in mind that Issues 1 and 2 were preceded by a concerted and dedicated effort to disclose information in relation to nuclear tests and the consequences thereof. These efforts were made in line with Decree No. 882 passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 27, 1989 on urgent environmental improvement measures for the country, in addition to Decree No. 198 passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on February 11, 1990 on enforcing Decree No. 882. Other related legislation includes the ruling of the Commission led by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. I. Belousov, on May 30, 1990 (Minutes BI-2259) on preparing media publications on radiation conditions at the Northern Test Range and its environs compared to other regions of the country and countries in the North and providing this information to centralized, republican and Oblast newspapers. This is how it started for the first time, including with respect to the Novaya Zemlya test range, which was still operational (up until October 25, 1990) as a facility used to conduct full-scale underground nuclear weapons testing and which then joined the long-term moratorium. The following excerpts illustrate how the main findings were provided to the general public with its wide range of interests:
• December 12, 1989 marked the second convention of the People’s Deputies of the USSR. This event saw the intense exchange of opinions and discussion of questions regarding the Novaya Zemlya Test Range during which the Deputies and media representatives were offered detailed information about the operations of such a secure facility, the radiation conditions at Novaya Zemlya and its environs, and the plans for future tests. Reports and presentations were made by experts from the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry together with representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Gosgidromet and the USSR Ministry of Health.
On a side note: In 1989, the nuclear superpowers conducted 28 underground nuclear tests: 7 in the USSR (only at the Semipalatinsk test ranges, none at Novaya Zemlya), 11 in the United States, 9 in France, 1 in Great Britain, and none in China (the test range near Lobnor Lake was not used this year, either).
• May 24–25, 1990, in Syktyvkar: Reports of nuclear tests at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range were presented by experts from the USSR Ministry of Defense (Anatoliy Matushchenko from the 12th Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and V. Tereschenko from the 6th Department of the Naval Fleet) and the USSR Goskomgridromet (Mr. G. Krasilov) at the May session of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Komi. For the first time, a televised broadcast was held on the test range with a roundtable discussion in the autonomous republic which (we must give credit where credit is due) was led by the head of the television group, Mr. A. Poshumyansky, with great tact and without making any jabs at nuclear “hawks” or their filibustering, which was quite noticeable at the session itself where for some reason
412 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY everyone was unshaven and the deputies fought tooth-and-nail for the microphone to make derogatory comments and ask clownish, denunciatory questions.
• May 29–30, 1990: The village of Belushye in Novaya Zemlya. A governmental commission was led by Mr. I. Belousov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and included Mr. Konovalov, the USSR Minister of the Nuclear Energy Industry and Admiral Gromov, the decorated Commander of the Northern Fleet, as well as a group of People’s Deputies from the USSR’s Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR: A. Butorin (Severodvinsk), A. Vyucheiskiy (Salekhard), A. Emelyanenkov (Moscow, the Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the weekly paper Sobesednik), A. Zolotkov (Severodvinsk), I. Shpektor (Vorkuta, a People’s Deputy of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Komi), and P. Balakshin (Chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Executive Committee), E. Alekseev (Chairman of the Nenets Okrug Executive Committee), Y. Romanov (Arkhangelsk, Secretary of the Okrug Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and I. Ventsa (Naryan-Mar, Correspondent from the Pravda Severa newspaper). Reports about the test range’s history, its operations, and the radioecological and seismic and mechanical consequences of the tests were presented by: Rear Admiral V. Gorevy (Head of the Test Range), and other experts, such as Rear Admiral V. Vyskrebentsev, Professor V. Chugunov and Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Safronov, as well as by Professor Matushchenko from the Special Control Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and by Candidates of Technical Sciences G. Kaurov and E. Kozlov from the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry, Candidate of Technical Sciences Y. Tsaturovy from the USSR Goskomgidromet, and V. Devyatov from the USSR Ministry of Health. The People’s Deputies were provided with an opportunity to learn about the different facilities on the test range and what life was like for the military servicemen and their families.
• On July 15, 1990, an analytical scientific report was presented for the People’s Deputies of the USSR, the RSFSR, and media outlets from the Arkhangelsk Oblast, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Komi, and the Nenets and Yamalo- Nenets Autonomous Okrugs. This report addressed the modern state of radiation and environmental conditions on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the surrounding areas of the Extreme North (in line with the ruling passed by the Commission under I. Belousov, No. BI-2259, May 30, 1990). The report included results of research conducted under the Region-2 sub-project, which brought together the efforts of the following: scientific managers Y. Dubasov (PhD in Chemical Sciences, representative of the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry and the non-profit Khlopin Institute), Professor A. Matushchenko (representing the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Scientific Research Center under the Special Control Service of the Ministry of Defense), Professor P. Ramzayev (USSR Ministry of Health and LIRG), K. Andrianov (USSR Health Ministry, the Institute of Biophysics) and Candidate of Physics and Mathematical Sciences G. Krasilov (Goskomgidromet, the Institute of Applied Geophysics).
• On July 19, 1990, the paper Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article from V. Mikhailov, the Deputy Minister of the USSR Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry, under the threatening headline “The Third-Generation Bomb.” The author dotted all of his ‘i’s and addressed the role of nuclear weapons in various countries and the inevitability of
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the perfection of nuclear weapons. He continued on this same subject on August 28th the same year in the newspaper Rabochaya Tribuna in an editorial discussing “The Problem of Nuclear Tests.”
On another side note, Viktor Mikhailov was right back then, if you bear in mind that on October 9, 2006 North Korea conducted its own underground nuclear test, thus announcing its membership in the nuclear club.
• On August 20, 1990 in Geneva, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference took place. The Treaty had come into effect in 1970. V. Pokrovsky, the Deputy USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Soviet Delegation, emphasized:
“One of the main goals is to reduce nuclear tests as soon as possible. Not so long ago and over a course of a year and a half, from August 1985 through February 1987, Moscow complied with a unilateral moratorium. And again since November 1989, our test ranges have not been used. Tests have been reduced in the United States.
Washington and Paris have stated that these tests are necessary in order to verify the effectiveness of their stockpiles and battle-readiness, as well as to improve technology. This is why all of our relevant initiatives are turned down by the West. Under these conditions, banning nuclear tests once and for all is hardly a possibility. But what is possible is moving forward in terms of limiting the force of nuclear explosions, and limiting their number.”
And it was at this wave of the hand that an emergency situation suddenly presented itself.
Some background information: October 8, 1990: the “Emergency.” A group raid took place, led by representatives of Greenpeace, on the territory of the Novaya Zemlya Test Range near the Matochkin Shar bay and the zone in which underground nuclear tests had been conducted. They were well informed that only days before, an underground nuclear test was meant to take place (conducted on October 24, 1990, the last in USSR). It is not difficult to imagine just how much this demonstration irritated those who had undertaken enormous responsibility in conducting such a complex test. Furthermore, the raid — so closely tied to Greenpeace — also involved some of our familiar faces from the People’s Deputies: A. Emelyanenkov and A. Zolotkov (see May 29–30, 1990). Naturally, they played their deputy immunity cards.
• On October 24, 1990, the news agency TASS reported: “at eighteen hundred hours Moscow time in the Soviet Union, an underground nuclear test with a force ranging from 20 to 150 kilotons was conducted at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range in order to confirm the reliability and increased safety of nuclear weapons. The radiation conditions at the site of the test are normal.” This statement was later confirmed by those invited just a few days later to the opening of the A13N tunnel. Invitees included media representatives (and A. Emelyanenkov, naturally), correspondents V. Bentsa (Pravda Severa), A. Rastorguyev (Molodyozh Severa) A. Pokrovsky (Pravda), and A. Taskaeyv, Candidate of Biological Sciences and Director of the Komi Institute of Biology under the Scientific Center of the Ural Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, represented the Northern scientific
414 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY community. Elected officials were represented by N. Plotnikov, the People’s Deputy from the Arkhangelsk Oblast Council, M. Danilov, an assistant to the RSFSR People’s Deputy and I. Shpektor, the People’s Deputy from the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Komi. Their subsequent comments to the press were fully objective.
• However, on October 29, 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Council of Ministers made an unexpected statement about nuclear weapons testing at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. Here is the “flustered” text:
“On October 24 this year, in violation of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, an underground nuclear explosion was conducted near the islands of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. This nuclear weapons test was not approved by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, or the local authorities.
The Supreme Soviet and the Government of the RSFSR consider this situation unacceptable, expresses its decisive protest and going forward demands total and unconditional compliance with the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR in all of its aspects.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR are appealing to the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to immediately and urgently set out the conditions and procedures for preparing for, carrying out and enforcing the decisions that are made with regard to national defense and security.”
In the end, a great fuss was made, as were demands that those who had arranged the test undergo a trial — from the head of the test range and right up to the top officials of the Ministry of Defense and the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry. But the question remained: who would the judge be? (The details of this escapade, reminiscent of the “strike your own so that the others will fear you” philosophy, was described in the books “Nuclear Archipelago” (1995) and “Nuclear Tests in the Arctic” (2006), which we are prepared to send to anyone interested in the subject.)
As a side note: In 1990, the nuclear superpowers conducted 17 nuclear tests: 1 in the USSR (October 24, 1990 at Novaya Zemlya, which turned out to be the last), 8 in the United States, 6 in France, and 1 each in Great Britain and China.
• February 28, 1991, Moscow: On this date, a Soviet-Finnish meeting was held to discuss the environmental safety of underground nuclear tests. This meeting was attended by V. Mikhailov, the Deputy Minister for the Nuclear Energy Industry and experts A. Ivanov, E. Kozlov, V. Kulikov, A. Matushchenko and P. Ramzayev, who presented a report on Novaya Zemlya and the environmental safety of underground nuclear tests. This was the proper beginning of the “disclosure” of the test range at an international level, and later, this took place at a number of different international conferences, as well as under the NATO SCOPE-RADTEST project.
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• April 4¬6, 1991, in Kurgan: A report was presented by the USSR Ministry of Defense (A. Matushchenko and V. Karimov), the USSR Ministry of Health (V. Logachyov) and the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry (N. Filonov and K. Kharitonov) on the Northern and Semipalatinsk test ranges: a diagnosis of the radiation, public health and environmental conditions of the test ranges and their surrounding territories and a comprehensive research program. This report was presented at the All-Soviet Conference of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which focused on the medical and environmental consequences of manufacturing and testing nuclear weapons.
Another side note: Oh, so much bile was spewed forth from Doctor Vladimir Lupandin at the conference with regard to the operations at the test range aimed at the creation of our nuclear shield (by the way, he intentionally presented his report in “English,” but announced beforehand in Russian that until Colonel Matushchenko was in the conference hall, he would not give his presentation. That was the point at which the conference participants had a strongly negative reaction. And the very person who had started this filibustering later lobbied and tried to somehow apologize after having realized that we actually shared all of the principles of the international physicians’ movement, the heads of which had invited us in person to attend the conference).
• April 22–25, 1991: Ottawa was the host city for the International Symposium at the Canadian Center for Arms Control & Disarmament. The theme of the event was “Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing: Potential Consequences on the Environment and Their Restriction.” Experts from the USSR, including Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry (V. Mikhailov and A. Chernyshev), the USSR Ministry of Defense (A. Matushchenko), the USSR Ministry of Health (P. Ramzayev) and the USSR Ministry of Nature (V. Ziberov) presented a targeted analysis of unexpected radiation situations that had taken place during underground nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya in tunnels A-9 ( (October 14, 1969) and A-37A (August 2, 1987) and addressed issues regarding monitoring these anomalies and their effects. This was an example of outstanding openness before the representatives of Northern countries who unwaveringly stood for the right to a nuclear-free North.
• May 1991: From the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry’s NTS-2 Workgroup Report, Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, the Chief of the 6th Department of the Russian Navy in charge of the Novaya Zemlya test range states:
“Over the course of two years the topic of conducting tests at Novaya Zemlya has been in the stage of being resolved and work is in progress. Over this time, we saw the violation of procedures for centralized capital investments and shipments of supplies and technical resources and, furthermore, the test ranges have been excluded from funding by the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry and the National Planning Committee (GosPlan) meaning that no centralized government capital investments are envisaged. The Ministry of Defense, as usual, allocated capital investments only for basic support. Moreover, the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry this year deprived the Russian Navy of practically all of its supply and technical resources, which were allocated for test preparations in 1991. All of these factors have contributed to extremely tense conditions
416 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY at the Novaya Zemlya test range. Nevertheless, the Russian Navy, in line with instructions from the government, continues to work towards preparing facilities for tests in 1991 at the Northern test field, although at a slower pace.”
This was the “cry for help” of a man seeking to serve his country. Essentially, the test range’s half-life had ended. Six months later, circumstances were aggravated by RSFSR President Yeltsin’s Order No. 67-rp dated October 26, 1991 (see below).
• July 12–13, 1991. A new delegation of People’s Deputies arrived at the test range from the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, and led by Alexei Akhrameyev, Chairman of the Commission for the Environment and Natural Resource Management under the Yamalo- Nenets Okrug Soviet. But this delegation’s viewpoint on the test range was altogether different, i.e., more positive. The members included: A. Bondar, the Head of the Okrug’s Civil Defense headquarters (his objective, civil response to the actual state of radiation conditions at the test range was published in the newspaper Krasny Sever issue No. 50, November 1991, under the title “Novaya Zemlya: A Test Range of Death?” The answer in the article was a resounding “no”), Y. Morozov, a correspondent from the paper Rabochiy Nadyma (in September–October he published a series of reports under the column “Novaya Zemlya — Rumors and Facts,” in which he provided a relatively complete and educated description of the situation that had developed with regard to the test range and debunked various fabrications and outright lies about it), A. Kuzin, the Deputy Chairman of the Okrug Council, V. Obtsenko, the Head of the Radiological Division of the Okrug’s Public Health Services, N. Pavlenko, a People’s Deputy from the village of Aksarka (and soon delighted us by unexpectedly sending a package with unbelievably delicious local fish to the 5th Department of the Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry with a note that the fish was totally free of radionuclides from the Novaya Zemlya nuclear tests, which was not a surprise in the least. We ate it happily, having had a great deal of experience with expedition feasts near testing facilities). This delegation was accompanied by Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, Major General V. Kosorukov, Rear Admiral and Head of the test range V. Gorev and experts from the USSR Ministry of Defense (Captain 1st Class V. Dumik and Colonel Matushchenko), the Russian Nuclear Energy Industry Ministry (Y. Shipko) and the USSR Ministry of Heath (the Director of LIRG and correspondent member of the Russian Academy of Mathematical Sciences P. Ramzayev), who all gave detailed explanations directly on test range premises, including at the epicenter of the only surface nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya (September 7, 1957), where radiation levels were below 1 mR/hr). As always, the delegation was welcomed heartily in Belushye, and the topic of “radiophobia” was discussed over a welcome luncheon and dinner with a sense of humor that comes naturally to those who live at Novaya Zemlya, quoting the words of well-known songs in which “the stoker opened up our eyes” to the fact that “vodka is a good tonic against strontium.”
• October 7, 1991: The Soviet President Gorbachev made a statement regarding the US President George Bush’s initiative: “My fellow countrymen, one week ago, George Bush spoke about an important initiative on nuclear weapons. George Bush’s proposal is a solid continuation of what was started in Reykjavik. That is my fundamental assessment. I do know that this opinion is supported by Boris Yeltsin and the heads of
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other republics. I would like to announce our intent to take similar measures. I announce that as of today we are declaring a unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear tests for a period of one year. This will leave the path open toward the speedy and total cessation of nuclear tests.” On October 26, 1991, totally unexpected Order No. 67-rp was issued by the RSFSR President on ceasing nuclear weapons testing at the Novaya Zemlya test range. “In support of the initiative of US President George Bush, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, based on our intent to strive toward the total cessation of nuclear testing and considering the many appeals of local authorities and Russian citizens, I hereby declare the following: 1. We declare a moratorium on conducting nuclear tests in Russia for a period of one year; 2. We will halt nuclear testing operations at the Novaya Zemlya test range; 3. We instruct the RSFSR Council of Ministers to submit a proposal on ways to optimize the scientific and technical potential of the Novaya Zemlya test range and the experts and citizens working there. Said proposal is to be submitted by December 1, 1991; 4. We instruct the RSFSR Council of Ministers to ensure the social protection of military servicemen who are discharged due to the cessation of operations at the test range.” These instructions were issued with the “not for print” seal, which of course was completely ignored by the democratic media, including the deputy-cum-journalist A. Emelyanenkov who addressed the public in one of V. Pozner’s television shows. He stated that, if there is no law on state secrets, then it was perfectly fine to reveal these secrets and expect no consequences. The populism of this statement was simply shocking! In 1991 the nuclear superpowers conducted 14 nuclear tests: 7 in the United States, 6 in France, and 1 in Great Britain. Neither the USSR nor China conducted any tests.
• In February 1992, Russian President Yeltsin more or less revoked his previous Order No. 67-rp (10/26/91) when he issued Decree No. 194 on the Novaya Zemlya Test Range: “Considering the insistent need to make qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons, increase their safety and conduct checks of nuclear munitions, I order the following: Transform the Government’s Central Test Range under the USSR Ministry of Defense into the Central Test Range of Russia and declare the test range the federal property of Russia. Temporarily, until the Government of Russia has issued instructions in line with Clause 4 of this Decree, maintain the previous standards and legal documents with regard to this test range and grant the right to use the land and the property of the test range to the Senior Command of the Collective Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Navy). Instruct the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Senior Command of the Collective Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Navy) to continue in 1992 the necessary work (shaft-sinking and tunneling, construction and assembly work) to prepare tunnels and cavities in order to support underground nuclear tests at the Central Test Range (two to four per year) should the moratorium on nuclear testing come to an end.”
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This legal act, which served more as a set of instructions within the authorities of the Russian President, did not contradict any current legislation. It did envisage preparing proposals for negotiations — both bilateral or multi-lateral with regards to nuclear testing — and considered the participation of public movements and organizations.
• On March 7, 1992, V. Mikhailov, the Russian Nuclear Energy Minister issued Decree No. 271, announcing the decision to write the history of the nuclear industry of the former USSR and Russia. These materials were meant to reflect the USSR’s nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk (1949–1989) and Northern (1955–1990) test ranges, as well as peaceful nuclear explosions (1965–1988). This process began to take shape, as we can see from the productive participation of International Physicians against Nuclear War, the Federation of Peace and Accord and a number of other organizations in the Conference. On February 28, 1991, the decision was made to conduct a government inspection of the radiation and environmental conditions at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the surrounding territories (under orders from the Russian Ministry of the Environment on February 28, 1992, Order No. 131 to create a commission chaired by Professor Y. Sivintsev).
• In April 1992, V. Mikhailov again brought attention to the following (an Information Bulletin published by TsNII-AtomInform, issue No. 4): “Considering the need to support a sufficient level of defense in the country, it has been proposed that the Northern test range be used to conduct up to 2–4 underground nuclear weapons tests in the following years. As a result, what we are talking about is reducing the testing program four times, from an average of 15 tests a year at two test ranges to 4 tests per year at one. The reduction of testing will account for heightened safety requirements, which will require developing new approaches to conducting the tests themselves and to improving the effectiveness of physical diagnostics processes stemming from underground tests.”
A side note: two and a half years later, this provision turned out to be 100% justified by the tests conducted in December 1995 by VNIITF experts at a whole new level — “hydro-dynamic” tests (or in American terminology, subcritical) non-nuclear explosive experiments. This important achievement allowed Russia to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996.
• On May 25, 1992, P. Shcherbakov, Head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Scientific Research Institute No. 55, sent reference materials on conducting a government environmental inspection of Novaya Zemlya and surrounding territories to the Chairmen of the Committees of the Supreme Soviet of Russia (V. Varfolomeyev, Chair of the Committee for Environmental Issues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, and S. Stepashin, Chair of the Committee for Defense and Security Issues) as well as troop commanders G. Zolotukhin (No. 31100), S. Zelentsov (No. 31600-N) and G. Tsirkov, the Supervisor of the 5th Department of the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy. This material was distributed to these parties so that they would be used in preparations for parliamentary hearings on Russia’s Central Test Range. The documents were drawn up under the supervision of A. Matushchenko (Scientific Research Institute No. 55 under the Russian Defense Ministry) based on the results of the Region comprehensive scientific development by experts from
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the Inter-Regional Expert Commission on evaluating the radiation and seismic safety of underground nuclear tests. This Commission included: K. Andrianov (from the Institute of Biophysics under the Russian Health Ministry), V. Bazhenov (the 5th Department of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry), V. Gorin, V. Yevseyev and A. Maltsev (also from the Russian Defense Ministry’s Scientific Research Institute No. 55), G. Krasilov (the Institute of Global Climate and the Environment of Rosgidromet and the Russian Academy of Sciences), V. Safronov (The Central Test Range of the Russian Federation), and A. Chernyshev (VNIIEF). As the baseline data and the results of their analysis were complete, this information became the basis for all other publications about nuclear test operations at Novaya Zemlya, their radiation impact on the test range territory and surrounding areas. This was a “breakthrough” in terms of disclosing standard restrictions on this kind of information. There were no complaints made about the work that was conducted, and any attempts to re-check the data were inevitably approved. That is why all of the attempts of the “Greens” to plant a seed of doubt in our information have been futile, and — as this information is disclosed — it became uninteresting to them, once they could no longer use the secrecy “trump card,” and this was made possible by the newly- established order, just as intended. This is where we experienced the diffusion of a good deal of the tension driven by individual ambitions and often ratcheted up using purely populist means. The parliamentary hearings to which A. Yablokov and others of his ilk had been called successfully took place on June 16, 1992. Only the teams of A. Bulatov and Deputy A. Emelyanenkov, E. Gaer and O. Suleymenov accompanied the topic of radiation with the slogan: “Say no to funding for test ranges, say yes to funding for radioecologically damaged regions.” All of this bore a feeling of “radiation leprosy” among the residents of Kazakhstan, the Altai Krai, Yakutia, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts and drew a connection with the “Chernobyl zone” and branded Russia as a “radioactive country.” Meanwhile, I. Belov’s article on “Radiation Ecology: anthropogenic radiation in everyday life and at home” (Energiya, No. 7, July 1992) confirmed: “At present, the average dosage rate caused by the products of nuclear explosions amounts to approximately 15 mSv/year, which is equivalent to approximately 1% of the amount of the dose from the natural radiation background.” Alas, over ten years have passed since then, but still not everyone “gets” this objective position. Although by all accounts, the process is underway.
• On July 10, 1992 in Geneva, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the governments of Russia and the United States on research test ranges. Article one stated that “the test ranges of the Parties are: the Northern Test Range (Novaya Zemlya) in Russia, and the Nevada Research Test Range in the United States.”
• On September 16–17, 1992 a commission began working in Novaya Zemlya headed by P. Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister, and V. Mikhailov, the Russian Nuclear Energy Minister. The commission heard the opinions of representatives of the science community in charge of the test range. “Over that time, we lost many qualified staff members and we let our science programs take a hit,” said Captain 1st Class V. Lepsky, the Head of the Scientific Research Division of the test range. “It is difficult to make up for what was lost.” V. Kitayevsky noted: “Over the test range’s entire existence, there has not been one case
420 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY of radiation illness here. There are nearly 9,000 people living here and every year we celebrate weddings and children are born. In 1991, 29 babies were born in Novaya Zemlya, 60 students graduated from high school, and most of them got into institutes, military schools or vocational schools…” P. Grachev also states: “Unfortunately, no one besides the French have joined us in the moratorium. When I was in the United States, I asked Mr. Cheney, the Defense Secretary a question. The Russians and the French have announced a moratorium, but you are still detonating bombs. For what purposes? Are you perfecting nuclear weapons? “No,” he replied, “The explosions are continuing in order to ensure that the staff do not lose their skills and in order to test the reliability of the storage of nuclear munitions.” (O. Falichev, “The Novaya Zemlya Test Range: Two Years of Silence. What About Nevada?” [Novozemelsky poligon: dva goda tishiny. A v Nevade?] Krasnaya Zvezda, 09/22/1992). A statement from V. Mikhailov: “Why are the Americans so stubbornly fixed on nuclear tests? There are a number of reasons. First, the Americans are carrying out a multiyear program of nuclear tests that will accomplish both military and economic tasks in the interests of all of society. Second, they are less vulnerable to the influence of public opinion when the issue at hand is drawn back to national interests.” (Inspections at Novaya Zemlya [Inspektsiya na Novuyu Zemlyu]. Izvestiye, 09/24/1992). Both ministers resolved a lot of the test range’s problems on the spot, in particular staffing issues, and supplied motor vehicle and aircraft equipment.
• September 1992: The Public Outreach Center for Nuclear Energy’s Bulletin No. 9 published an article on “Underground Nuclear Tests: The Conditions under which They Were Conducted under the Criteria of the Moscow Agreement of 1963” (authors: A. Matushchenko, G. Krasilov, A. Maltsev, V. Bazhenov, and V. Dumik). This article provided the following significant information about the Novaya Zemlya test range: “In the period from 1964 through 1990, a total of 42 underground nuclear explosions were conducted at the Novaya Zemlya Test Range. In terms of radiation conditions, they are categorized as follows: • 15 (36%): explosions with total internal action, i.e., no radioactive inert gases leaked into the atmosphere; • 26 (60%): explosions that were not completely contained, and inert radioactive gases did escape into the atmosphere, although they did not cause any residual pollution; • 2 (4%): explosions with pressurized release of gaseous and steam products into the atmosphere, which are characterized by those who were directly involved as non-standard radiation situations (October 14, 1969 and August 2, 1987).” Furthermore, there was no radioactive fallout beyond the territory of the test range after any of these tests. This publication took place on the eve of the international conference on the environmental problems of the Arctic and the outlook for nuclear disarmament, which was planned under the initiative of the environmental movement “To Novaya Zemlya” on October 14–18, 1992 in the City of Arkhangelsk. This was one of the components of the information that was presented in the first collection (Issue 1), which was already signed for publication (July 24, 1992).
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• On September 18–26, 1992, the government environmental inspection began at Novaya Zemlya under the supervision of Professor Y. Sivintsev, PhD (see February 28, 1992). The results of the inspection commission’s work were reviewed on October 7 at a plenary meeting of the expert commission under the Chief Department of the State Environmental Inspection under the Russian Ministry of the Environment. During the 9:00 PM broadcast of the news show Vesti, the first-ever report was made that the radiation level near Novaya Zemlya was within natural background levels (8–12 mSv/ hour) and that the inspection confirmed the previously published information. The complete report from the environmental inspection of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago from October 13, 1992 was published in the weekly Evraziya on January 17, 1993. This was an important next step toward disclosing information about the test range for the greater public, which had become very worried by our radiation legacy. But other steps were also taken.
• October 14–18, 1992: Work began in Arkhangelsk for the international conference on environmental problems in the Arctic and the outlook for nuclear disarmament. The representatives of the environmental movement Toward Terra Nova advocating the closure of the Novaya Zemlya test range and voicing their discontent with Presidential Decree No. 194 (February 27, 1992) were clearly planning to take revenge and play off of the government’s ignorance of their position as anti-nuclear “doves.” However, the “nuclear hawks” were equally alert. Retired Lieutenant General Gavriil Kudryavtsev, former Chief of the Novaya Zemlya test range (from April 1959 through June 1963) and someone who had been involved in 56 atmospheric nuclear tests before the ban came into force, including the 50 megaton “Tsar Bomb” (of October 31, 1961), expressed his stance as follows: “I never saw myself as a ‘nuclear hawk,’ a proponent of nuclear weapons or the intensive testing thereof like, for example, the American General Groves was. But I honestly, like all military testers, viewed my responsibilities and my debt and my oath to my loyalty to the Motherland. I am in favor of the announced moratorium, but I am against one-sided disarmament.” He pointed to the fact that our information was made public, not only through participation in the conference, but by receiving representatives of various countries at the Novaya Zemlya test range (see below). For many “Greens” in the hall, this information came as a surprise, as did the subsequent frank reports presented by a group of experts under L. Ryabev from the Russian Ministry of Defense, including some who had come directly from the test range, the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Nature, and Goskomgidromet. The reports included: “The Novaya Zemlya Test Range: Its Contribution to Nuclear Testing” [Novozemelsky poligon: vklad v yaderniye ispytaniya] (A. Matushchenko, G. Zolotukhin, V. Dumik, and others); “I Believe – Russia Will Rise Again” [Ya veryu – Rossiya obyazatelno vozroditsa] (E. Negin, S. Voronin, S Brezgun); “The Contribution to Testing at the Northern Test Range to Radioactive Pollution of the Environment” [Vklad ispytanii na Severnom poligone v radioaktivnoye zagryazneniye okruzhayuschey sredy] (A. Miroshnichenko, P. Popov, V. Safronov, O. Frolov); “The Underground Nuclear Explosion: Recording Radioactive Products in Molten Mountain Rock” [Podzemny yaderny vzryv: fiksatiya radioaktivnikh produktov v rasplavakh gornykh porod] (Y. Dubasov, A. Krivokhatsky, and others); “Some Questions Concerning Radiation Monitoring in Regions Near the Northern Test Range” [Nekotoriye voprosy radiatsionnogo kontrolya v rayonakh, prilegayuschikh k
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Severnomy poligonu] (G. Kaurov, G. Krasilov, and others); “Some Aspects of Creating Nuclear Explosion Technologies for Destroying Toxic and Hazardous Materials and Wastes” [O nekotorykh aspektakh sozdaniya yaderno-vzrysnikh tekhnologii dlya unichtozheniya toksichnykh i opasnykh materialov i otkhodov] (I. Andryushin, Y. Trutnev, A. Chernyshev); “Experience in Assessing External Gamma-Beta Radiation Among the Participants of the Nuclear Test in Tunnel A-9 on October 14, 1969 in the Absence of Data on Individual Dosage Rate Monitoring” [Opyt otsenki vneshnego gamma- beta-oblucheniya uchastnikov yadernogo ispytaniya v shtolne A-9 15 oktyabrya 1969 g. v otsustviye dannykh individualnogo dozimetricheskogo kontrolya] (N. Nadezhina, A. Guskova); “Retrospective Assessment of Radiation Doses among Participants of Nuclear Weapons Testing at the Northern Test Range” [O retrospektivnoy otsenke doz oblucheniya uchastnikov ispytaniy yadernogo oruzhiya na Severnom poligone] (V. Logachyov); “The Fauna of Novaya Zemlya Today” [Fauna Novoi Zemli segodnya] (S. Uspensky, G. Khakhin); “Our Service is Rigorous and Difficult: About the Union of Novaya Zemlya Residents” [Nasha sluzhba i surova i trudna: o soyuze novozemeltsev] (V. Tsaubulin) and a number of others. There was also a presentation of the already-mentioned “The Northern Test Range: Nuclear Explosions, Radiology, and Radiation Safety. Reference Information. Issue 1,” as well as a showing of the uncensored documentary “Testing a 50 Megaton Nuclear Bomb (October 31, 1961).”
• October 14–15, 1992: Media representatives visited the test range. The representatives were accredited journalists from Moscow, the United States, Great Britain, France and a number of non-nuclear countries. This was essentially an unprecedented event, yet their first visit to the nuclear test range was nevertheless organized to coincide with the conference. Their names for posterity: Carroll Bogert (the Vice President of Newsweek Association, United States), David Leuvggren (Reuters International), John Kampfner (the Daily Telegraph, Great Britain), Malcolm Dixelius and Berko Jonssen (TV-1, Sweden), Stephen Gram (TV, Denmark), Ishikawa Ichiye (TV INK, Japan), Michel Chevalier and Yvan Scopan (TV-1, France), Bruce Conover (CNN Producer, United States), Jan Kruse (Teleradio, Norway), Sheppard Scherbel (Der Spiegel, Germany), Frederick Hyatt (Washington Post, United States), Odoris Gonzalez and Sylvia Elena (EFE News Network, Italy). In addition to these foreign correspondents, the test range also welcomed representatives of Russian media outlets: Colonel V. Beketov and Captain 3rd Class Biketov from the Russian Ministry of Defense Press Service, V. Gondusov (military observer for ITAR-TASS), L. Zolotenko (Soyuz- Telefilm), N. Malyshev (photo journalist, ITAR-TASS), S. Naberukhin (Correspondent for the television program “Military Review”), V. Tarasenko (film director, Soyuz- Telefilm), and N. Tereschenko (correspondent with the weekly Zelyoniy mir). They did not give negative reports about their visit to the Central test range of the nuclear superpower known as the Russian Federation. Only John Kampfner grumbled slightly in Nezavisimaya Gazeta about what seemed to him to be “showing off” things that were much more impressive than in reality (November 3, 1992, “The Soviet Union Lives On at Novaya Zemlya” [Na Novoi Zemlye prodolzhayet zhit Sovietsky Soyuz]). G. Kaurov, Head of PR for the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, oversaw the organization and convention of this complex event. He was also a former resident of Novaya Zemlya, as he had formerly served as the head of the department for radiation studies (May
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10, 1935 – May 6, 2007, may his memory be honored).
Side note: In 1992 the nuclear superpowers conducted eight nuclear tests: 6 in the United States and 2 in China. No tests were conducted in Russia, Great Britain or France.
• July 5, 1993 marked the announcement of Presidential Decree No. 1008 on the moratorium on nuclear testing: “Based on the Russian Federation’s goal toward total cessation of nuclear testing by all countries and the wish to facilitate favorable conditions for the commencement of multilateral negotiations in the near future toward developing a comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, I hereby decree: 1. The Russian Federation will extend its moratorium on nuclear testing first announced by the President of the Russian Federation on October 26, 1991 in Decree No. 67-rp and extended by the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation from November 19, 1992 in Decree No. 1267, until such a moratorium is de jure or de facto honored by other countries possessing nuclear weapons. 2. I instruct the Russian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct consultations with the representatives of other countries possessing nuclear weapons in order to commence multilateral negotiations to develop a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”
• October 11–14, 1993: Antwerp (Belgium) hosted a symposium on radioecology under the aegis of the European Commission, which preceded the start of the SCOPE- RADTEST project. Russian scientists Y. Izrael, Professor Matushchenko and Y. Tsaturov agreed on the extent to which Russian experts would participate in this project, with a focus on mutual exchanges of adequate information about tests conducted at the test ranges of the five nuclear states among the nuclear superpowers.
Books, Books, and More Books! • On November 1, 1993: Russian Nuclear Energy Minister V. Mikhailov published his book “I am a Nuclear Hawk” [Ya – Yastreb]. Proud and kind words were expressed for the Novaya Zemlya test range. But the book also includes details about his hard work and the hazards of nuclear tests, even if they are conducted underground. For the first time, a photograph of a radioactive cloud – explosion products escaping as steam into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test with that did not go as planned (August 2, 1987). Five thousand copies of this book were printed, and the book quickly became a rarity. Interest was shown among foreign publishers as well; in 1995 it was published in China, and in 1996 it was published in England, in addition to a second printing in Russia. This work includes the strong words: “Russia’s history is great, and it is not an easy feat to contribute to its further greatness, but I am confident that each generation must strive to do so in the name of our future. Today Russia is experiencing what may be the most difficult period in the history of our generation. So let us remember that all of us and each of us carry the burden of responsibility. And we will help those who cannot carry that burden. Peace is a beautiful thing, and each person is capable of recognizing happiness simply by living and taking a peaceful step on his own native ground.”
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• In December 1993: A team of enthusiasts began working on a project to create a series of important books that became collectively known as “Nuclear Tests in the USSR.” The project was planned in six volumes: Volume 1: Goals. General Features. Organizing Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The First Nuclear Tests (published in 1997). This same volume was released as a book in a red binding (IzdAT Publishing, 1997), which was a symbol of the extinction of nuclear tests, i.e., they were entered into the “Red Book.” Volume 2: The Technology of Nuclear Tests in the USSR. The Impact on the Environment. Safety Measures. Nuclear Test Ranges and Fields. (published in 1998). Volume 3: Nuclear Weapons. Military and Political Aspects (2000). Volume 4: The Technology of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (2000). Volumes 5: (Nuclear Tests and the Environment) and 6 (The People of the Nuclear Era) are still being prepared for publication and their delay was caused by objective reasons (as explained below). This work is supervised by V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A great deal of the work contributed to this series was conducted by an editorial group led by A. Chernyshev. PhD of Physics and Mathematics (RFYTs-VNIIEF) and members of the MVEK-NE.
A side note: Issue 3 of the Reference information about tests at the Semipalatinsk test range is still waiting its turn. This test range, with its rich nuclear legacy, has been left in a non-nuclear country. It is not open to “unauthorized” visits, which hinders access to any additional information requested in the name of “openness” or the “environment.” Basically, the key here is to “hurry along slowly,” which our Kazakh friends understand, as they are also concerned about problems such as nonproliferation and terrorism. But this collection, which has “been lost” in the manuscript archives of A. Matushchenko and Y. Dubasov, will naturally grow if given the opportunity to do so.
• On October 5, 1993, a nuclear test was conducted only in China (with a force ranging from 20 to 150 kilotons).
• In 1994, again China was the only country that conducted nuclear tests – three to be exact (June 10 and 16, and October 7).
A side note: At this point there are just two years left before the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is signed, but China insisted on its own “moral right” to continue its nuclear tests in order to ‘catch up’ to the United States and Russia.
• On April 16, 1994: Finally the first manuscript of the book “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions. A Reference. Issue 4.” was completed (it was published in July under editors and Professors O. Kedrovsky and A. Krivokhatsky.
• In 1995 China continued to conduct nuclear tests (two – on May 15 and 17) and France also resumed its testing with five tests (September 5, October 1 and 27, November 21 and December 27).
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As a result, the number of tests amounted to 36 since the start of the moratorium at Russia’s Novaya Zemlya test range. Russia adhered to its moratorium. However, in December 1995 right before the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was signed, two non-nuclear gas dynamic experiments were conducted at Russia’s Central Test Range as planned by RFYaTs VNIITF in order to develop methods for assessing the safety of nuclear munitions.
• On April 9, 1996: Russian President Yeltsin presented US President Bill Clinton with a book, the cover of which depicted a polar bear against a landscape of snow- covered mountains: “There are but two copies of this book,” the Russian President explained. “I have one, and now you have the other. I would like for the information in this book to remain confidential for now. Only you and I will know about it.” This conversation took place on the eve of the Group of Seven in Moscow. The book was called “Nuclear Weapons Testing and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the USSR, 1949–1990.” (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, Sarov, 1996. 66p. ISBN 5-85165-062. Professor V. Mikhailov, ed. Authors: I. Andryushin, V. Bogdan, S. Vashchinkin, S. Zelentsov, G. Zolotukhin, V. Karimov, V. Kirichenko, A. Matushchenko, Y. Silkin, V. Strukov, K. Kharitonov, A. Chernyshev, G. Tsyrkov and P. Shumayev.) An excerpt from Vladimir Gubarev’s message (“A Portrait of a Nuclear Devil. The Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy Discloses Yet Another Secret,” published in the paper Vek, No. 391, 10/04/1996, p. 10): “The American President held true to his word: the book that he received from Yeltsin was not leaked to the media or to physicists (with some minor exceptions). But the interest in the book shown by all of the US secret services is perfectly understandable — for many years, these agencies gave themselves headaches trying to figure out the secrets of different tests. But frankly, the US spies did not believe that we had reported the truth! But careful examination of “Yeltsin’s present” (as the book was codenamed) confirmed the integrity of the Russian government…” The foreword to the book was written by Russian Nuclear Energy Minister V. Mikhailov: “This book contains official facts about the general features of all of the nuclear explosions and all peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in the USSR. This book is the fruit of long-term work conducted by experts at the Russian Ministries of Nuclear Energy and Defense, which analyzed baseline data contained in many classified documents. A similar (non-classified) book was published by the US Department of Energy: “United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,” DOE/NV. 209. (Rev/14) December 1994. The existence of these two symmetrical materials helps us make specific, qualitative comparisons of the nuclear test programs carried out by the USSR and the USA. During the time when the USSR was conducting underground nuclear weapons tests, technology had been developed for grouped nuclear explosions, which were used for both military and peaceful purposes. This technology is significantly more complex compared to the explosion of single nuclear devices, although its use has helped considerably reduce economic expenses, and intensify the process of nuclear testing. The total number of nuclear tests and peaceful explosions conducted in the USSR amounts to 715, while the number of detonated nuclear charges and nuclear explosive devices amounted to 969.
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In comparing the nuclear testing programs of the USSR and the United States, we find the following: • The USSR conducted less tests than the United States (715 in the USSR, 1,032 in the United States, and 24 tests conducted jointly by the United States and Great Britain); • The number of explosive nuclear charges and devices are: 969 in the USSR, 1,127 in the United States, and 24 joint explosions by the United States and Great Britain; • The number of peaceful nuclear explosions in the USSR amounts to 124, which is much more than the number of peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in the United States (27). I would like to stress that, in conducting its nuclear testing program, the USSR almost always had to ‘play catch-up’ with the United States. Thanks to effective scientific and technological solutions and the heroic contribution of its experts, the USSR managed to close the gap to a large degree in conducting its nuclear weapons development and testing program, despite its more restricted financial situation and even stricter limitations due to the features of the test ranges themselves. At the same time, the announcement of moratoriums and the introduction of newly negotiated restrictions on nuclear testing generally had a serious effect on the USSR’s testing capabilities and the Soviet Union was left to once again undertake extraordinary efforts under the conditions set out by said restrictions. Nuclear weapons tests were at the foundation of the USSR’s nuclear shield and it is difficult to downplay their significance, as they often compensated for our restricted abilities when it came to other elements of the technology of creating nuclear weapons. The importance of the nuclear tests that were conducted for Russia’s defense capabilities will remain for many years, and the results of the tests are part of the military and technical foundation of our national security.” V. Gubarev states: “You cannot disagree with the conclusion of the book’s authors. In the two agencies — the Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Defense Ministry — the same people who work today worked then to build the country’s nuclear competence under unbelievably difficult conditions. It was their fate to take on America’s challenge, and they honorably undertook all of the trials that fell into their lot. And believe me, they had a lot fewer holidays than tough workdays!”
• In October 1996, in line with the established procedures, Russian scientists submitted an analytical report to the US Department of Defense on the history of Soviet nuclear weapons tests, information about which appeared in The Washington Post with an explanation from A. Chernyshev stating that the report was no more than a history of the tests, and did not reflect Russia’s modern nuclear arsenal. He also noted that before its submission to the Pentagon, the text was thoroughly reviewed by Russia’s Nuclear Energy and Defense Ministries. Minister V. Mikhailov, who was also the scientific supervisor at VNIIEF, approved the document for submission. But what was the reaction of our critics at home? Printed in the newspaper Izvestiya No. 205, 10/30/1996: “Alexander Baldin from the United Institute of Nuclear Studies in Dubna believes that there are no secrets in Russia. They’ve gone crazy in Arzamas. All of the information is leaking out, and not only from there.” The reaction from one authoritative member of Russia’s nuclear
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community, Evgeniy Velikhov, the Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was also interesting: “Chernyshev? I know him — that’s the guy who in all seriousness proposed making small nuclear weapons in case NATO began moving into the East. He was talking about a neutron bomb. And weapons-grade plutonium was something else that he proposed be retained despite international agreements to destroy it. Crazy ideas. I won’t be surprised if he came up with something weird as an overview for the Pentagon.” Well, there is always the option to respond in true American style: “No comment.” Although all subsequent information, can be considered to be a specific response to this criticism. In particular, Izvestiya published another piece to balance out the opinions: “The First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute, N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, was sure that Minister Mikhailov, based on his nature and his view on his work, would never have allowed any classified information to lead to the West. Basically, the scientist believes that working together with the Americans on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons could be useful for both sides.” In 1996, nuclear tests continued in France (one on January 27) and China (1 on July 29). Russia conducted another two subcritical tests (on January 15 and July 7). Russia then confidently moved toward signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty after having conducted four subcritical tests.
• September 24, 1996, New York: All five nuclear superpowers had signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Later, over 140 countries became signatories. But not many people are aware that one of the fundamental conditions that Russia set before signing the Treaty was the achievement of positive results from the four subcritical tests conducted at the Central Test Range in 1995–1996. Information from the United States has revealed that similar tests were conducted there. But the purpose is one and the same: the absence of any nuclear energy release. This was announced on September 24, 1996 at the Moscow Carnegie Fund by First Deputy Minister of Nuclear Energy, Mr. Ryabev.
• In 1997, no nuclear tests were conducted. But the media published hints about preparations for tests in India and Pakistan. There is always someone willing to fill the void. And another thing: whatever a politician dreams up will come true every time.
• In 1998, it happened. India and Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests (2 at India’s Pokhran Test Range on May 11 and 13, and 2 at Pakistan’s Chagai Test Range on May 28 and 30). Had the “nuclear club” just expanded to eight members? Who would be next? North Korea?
• The years 1999–2005 passed without any nuclear tests. But the non-nuclear subcritical tests continued at both Russia’s Central Test Range and the Nevada test range, within the terms of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
• On October 9, 2006 North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion!
And here it was: the ninth member, despite Suleymenov’s anti-test range formula of 5 – 1, the number of nuclear test ranges became “4 + 2 + 1”: the United States, Russia, France
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Now that there was more information available about radioecology, the following original scientific and journalistic monographs came before the publication of the 5th essential volume of “Nuclear Tests and the Environment” (in addition to volumes 1–4 from RFYaTs-VNIIEF): 1. The Semipalatinsk Test Range: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Tests. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow: Medbioekstrem, 1997. 319: ill. 3,000 copies). This work includes a foreword from Russian Healthcare Ministry Professor T. Dmitrieva, who noted: “…In conclusion, I would like to say that I hope that the Healthcare Ministers of Russia and other countries never have to take part in nuclear tests or oversee measures to reduce the impact of radioactive pollution.” 2. Nuclear Tests in the USSR: Hydronuclear Tests: An Inventory of Used Plutonium. V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, ed. (Sarov, RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1998. 22.). This work includes additional data about the altitudes at which nuclear charges were detonated for the overwhelming majority of the nuclear tests conducted in 1949– 1962. It includes a Catalog of 89 hydro-nuclear tests conducted by the USSR, 4 of which were conducted at Novaya Zemlya, including 2 atmospheric tests at the Semipalatinsk test range detonated by dropping an explosive device from aircraft, and 15 underground tests at the Semipalatinsk test range conducted in tunnels in the Degelen Mountains, in addition to 72 surface tests. Furthermore, one of the hydro-nuclear tests resulted in the dispersion of uranium, while several others caused the dispersion of plutonium. For the first time, data was published on the inventories of weapons-grade plutonium for use in nuclear weapons tests and hydro-nuclear tests in 1949–1963: tests using nuclear charges (1949–1962) used 520 kg of plutonium and hydro-nuclear tests (1958–1963) used 11 kg; of these, 290 kg were detonated at the Semipalatinsk test range (97 kg for surface tests) and Novaya Zemlya accounted for 206 kg (4 kg for a surface test on September 7, 1957), while another 35 kg was used on non-test range premises (1 kg for a surface test). The total is 531 kg. 3. The Novaya Zemlya Test Range: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety of Nuclear Tests. Facts, Evidence and Recollections. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow, IzdAT, 2000. 487: ill. 1,500 copies). This work included a foreword from V. Mikhailov, the Director of the Institute for Strategic Stability, the scientific supervisor of RFYaTs-VNIIEF and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He noted: “In conclusion, I would like to express my wish that this book, a little piece of the lives of the professionals who have written it, finds acknowledgment among readers, as it is about nuclear weapons testing and about those who took the first steps toward understanding this energy of colossal force, allowing no one any privileges save for one: to be on the forefront of something that was as of yet unknown, and to selflessly and professionally fulfill one’s duty. I also truly hope that the authors’ intent to release a third book dedicated to the problems of ensuring general and radiation safety during peaceful nuclear explosions becomes a reality. May you be successful in your endeavors!” 4. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: Ensuring General and Radiation Safety: Facts, Evidence, and Recollections. Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow: IzdAT, 2001. 519: ill. 1,500 copies printed). This book includes a foreword from Deputy Healthcare Minister Professor G. Petrov, who notes: “… When conducting underground nuclear explosions for industrial purposes, we had every reason to believe that the safety level needed to
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protect people was sufficient for protecting other living beings and plants, as well as the environment, against radioactive pollution. This monograph proves that it is time to acknowledge that over the last several years, the health of the Russian population has been affected by a number of different negative factors, including poor socio-economic conditions and the state of the environment, increased daily stress, and many others. That is why it is important to understand that each person must be attentive when it comes to his own health and attempt to avoid illnesses from the onset, which requires prompt doctor visits in order to ensure qualified aid or recommendations.” Also in the foreword is a message from Professor V. Lebedev, the Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister, who emphasized the following: “It can be said that there is a high demand for peaceful nuclear explosions, but there are also countless problems involved with them. That is why the global community is so cautious and correctly included a number of provisions in the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. For example, in line with Article VIII, every ten years conferences are to be held to review the Treaty and actions taken within it, and any participant may request that recommendations be considered to amend the Treaty in order to permit peaceful nuclear explosions, provided that there would be no military benefits to these explosions. According to Article VII, amendments to the Treaty must be passed by a consensus. So what it really comes down to is appropriate proposals from the Treaty’s signatories at these conferences. In conclusion, I would like to express my wish that this book about peaceful nuclear explosions be recognized by its readers, and not just those who share the opinions about their usefulness, but also among those who have different opinions for a variety of reasons. This is why, if we return to the words of one of the fathers of Russia’s nuclear program, Yulii Khariton, I would like to agree with his optimism and the competent authors of this book, particularly in the belief that the powerful energy of nuclear explosions, which is fully manageable by intelligent people, will be in demand and useful to all as an element of high technology. Let us see the atom as a worker, and not a soldier. I am also pleased to note that Chagan Lake, created in Kazakhstan by a nuclear explosion, made its own mark in history as a showpiece in the field of nuclear explosive technology when it was included in the register of monuments of nuclear science and technology (see: “The Monuments of Science and Technology of the Domestic Nuclear Industry. Moscow: the Memorial Humanitarian Fund. Znaniye. 1999). 5. Radiological Conditions at Test Ranges Today (Semipalatinsk, Novaya Zemlya, Totskoye, and Kapustin Yar): Facts, Evidence, and Recollections: Professor V. Logachev, ed. (Moscow: IzdAT, 2002, 639: ill. 1,500 copies printed). This book includes a foreword from Deputy Healthcare Ministry Professor and distinguished doctor V. Korbut, who noted: “…This monograph, the fourth book in the series on ensuring radiation safety during the use of nuclear explosive technologies, answers practically all of the questions related to the assessment of the consequences of nuclear tests and the extent of their impact on the health of the country’s citizens.” 6. The Semipalatinsk Test Range: Creation, Operation and Conversion. Editors: Professor V. Shkolinka, M. Akhmetov, S. Berezin, R. Ibrayev, V. Logachev, L. Logacheva, A. Matushchenko, L. Ptitskaya, S. Ryskulova, S. Tukhvatulin, O. Tyupkina, and Y. Cherepnin (Almaty, ISBN 9965-00-614-8, 2003. 344: ill.). This book was also published in English. This volume includes a foreword from V. Shkolnik, who states: “...It is impossible to provide an objective evaluation of the results of the operations at the Semipalatinsk test range without shedding light on the history of how it was created, how the nuclear tests were conducted, and how it has since been converted. This monograph
430 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY addresses the most important aspects that have had an influence on operations at the test range, as well as the consequences of those operations. Often, the lack of expertise of the authors with regard to issues such as nuclear hazards and nuclear safety, as well as their biased positions, are surprising, and not just to professionals. One of the participants in the nuclear epic wrote in his memoirs that the scientific supervisor of the nuclear program — Igor Kurchatov — whose name has been bestowed upon an administrative and scientific center at the Semipalatinsk test range, during the last five years of his life often said: “We must start to write. The time has come to tell others about what we are doing. We must write about everything and what everything was like, without leaving anything out and without making anything up. If we do not do this now, we will only see lies, confusion and fabrication later on — we will not recognize ourselves.” 7. Radioactive Pollution of the Environment and Public Health. Supervised by I. Vasilenko (Russian Academy of Natural Sciences) and L. Buldakova (Russian Academy of Medical Sciences). Radiation Consequences of Nuclear Tests at the Test Ranges of the Former USSR. Authors: V. Logachev, L. Logacheva, A. Matushchenko, Y. Stepanov Y. Dubasov, L. Belovodsky, B. Shagin, G. Khodalev, and V. Gayevoi (Moscow: Meditsina, 2004. 15–33. 1,500 copies printed). The book’s introduction reads: “...This multidimensional study was conducted under the International Science and Technology Center’s project No. 519 on the radioactive pollution of the environment and the health of the population. Leading scientists and engineers were recruited for the project, including those who had taken part in preparations for the nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya test ranges, studies of radioactive pollution in the regions from radionuclide fallout, studies of the destructive effects of nuclear fission products and biologically significant radionuclides at test ranges and under laboratory-created conditions, and finally radiation, health and epidemiological studies in areas affected by radioactive pollution. The people who carried out this project were directly involved in cleaning up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP. This executive team is of fundamental importance in researching such a complex and multifaceted problem.” 8. Radioecological Conditions at the Sites of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the Russian Federation Today: Facts, Evidence, and Recollections. Authors: V. Logachev, L. Logacheva, A. Matushchenko, V. Uyba, and O. Shamov (Moscow: IzdAT, 2005. 256. 500 copies printed). The publication of this monograph was timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the first peaceful nuclear explosion in the Former Soviet Union, which was conducted on the eastern border of the Semipalatinsk test range in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan on January 15, 1965 in order to create a research and industrial water reservoir for the steppe area often affected by droughts. The book’s foreword was written by G. Onishchenko, the Chief National Medical Officer of Russia, the Head of the Federal Services for Supervision of the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being, member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and laureate of the National USSR Award, and A. Vasiliev, Director of the International Center for Environmental Safety under the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry. These contributors stated: “This monograph is the result of many years of work performed by a team of qualified members of leading scientific and research organizations: the State Science Center and Institute of Biophysics, VNIPI-PromTekhnologiya under RosAtom, and other specialized institutions. The authors labored over the collection, analysis and review of extensive materials that were submitted by the regional Centers of State Public Health and Epidemiological Monitoring, as well
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as data from a variety of literary sources…” It is noted that the overwhelming majority of facilities created with the use of nuclear explosive technologies have radiation conditions that are within natural background radiation levels. Rehabilitation efforts and measures to protect staff members are currently underway at the territories of facilities where radiation conditions exceed background levels. “It is important to note that in the future, such seemingly harmless actions as pumping water out of deep aquifers or pumping water into a cavity formed by a peaceful nuclear explosion as part of an oil extraction process, could pose an environmental threat. It is equally important to have a solution for the status of the facilities where peaceful nuclear explosions were conducted with developed title documentation, and it is important to define who the owners of these wells and facilities are. All of these issues are the prerogative of the Government of the Russian Federation.” 9. Nuclear Tests in the Arctic: A Scientific and Journalistic Monograph. Under the general editorship of RFYaTs VNIIEF, V. Mikhailov, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Book 1 in 2 volumes: vol. 1: “The Arctic Nuclear Test Range,” in two parts by E. Shitikov, Part 1, “History of the Nuclear Weapons Fleet,” and part 2 “Memoirs of the Residents of Novaya Zemlya.” Volume 2: “The Arctic Nuclear Test Range,” also in two parts. Part 1 written by V. Logachev, “Radioecological Conditions at the Central Test Range of the Russian Federation and the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago,” and Part 2 by Y. Smirnov, V. Adamsky and Y. Trutnev “Nuclear Tests in the United States and the USSR as the Emergence of Government Policy”). Book 2, by S. Zelentsov “Nuclear Tests. The Totskoye Military Exercises.” Moscow: Moscow Textbooks, 2006. Book 1, Vol. 1: 463: ill., Vol. 2: 455: ill., Book 2 197: ill. This edition of the books was dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Novaya Zemlya test range and the 50th anniversary of the military exercises at the Totskoye test range in the Orenburg Oblast (September 14 and 17, 1954). Andrei Efremov made a comment regarding these books in Literaturnaya Gazeta (No. 5, February 7–13, 2007). “If we were to ask our contemporaries and our citizens which events in 1961 were the most historically significant, more or less educated people would recall Yuri Gagarin and his legendary cry of “And we’re off!” Others may point to Khrushchev’s monetary reform. And only a handful, the most erudite of them all — the nuclear experts — would answer the following: “In autumn of 1961 a bomb was detonated over Novaya Zemlya that had no equal on the planet in terms of its colossal force.” Then on October 31, we saw the successful test of a thermonuclear weapon, which made the USSR at least the geopolitical equal of the United States in the military and strategic sense, and clearly put the USSR amongst the world’s leaders in terms of scientific potential in the defense industry. The closure of the Semipalatinsk test range in August 1991 left the test range on the Novaya Zemlya the only operating test range across the vast post-Soviet territory. Nearly 15 years later, nuclear tests are no longer conducted here due to the introduction of moratoriums starting with Gorbachev and continued by Yeltsin.” In turn, V. Mikhailov made a statement at the end of the book, summing up everything optimistically: “Right now we can only admire how the country’s nuclear industry has managed to survive and retain its key intellectual and scientific staff members, a feeling of loyalty for serving the state. Today this is a factor of national security and a badge of honor.” 10. The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range: Creation, Establishment, and Operations.
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I. Akchurin, Professor S. Pertsev, ed. Moscow: Golden Bee, 2007. 258: ill. The introduction of the book includes a note from V. Verkhovtsev, the Head of the 12th Government Department of the Russian Defense Ministry: “At the price of the incredible efforts of the test range staff, military construction workers and designers, the test range was built and ready to conduct tests in an extremely short period of time. Later, a one-of-a-kind research testing base was created here, allowing us to conduct full-scale nuclear tests and model the destructive effects of a nuclear explosion and its consequences on military equipment and both military and civil facilities. Everything that was done at the Semipalatinsk test range to create the country’s nuclear shield was done for the first time ever. This is where the first Russian-made nuclear device was tested, where the model of a real nuclear air-delivered bomb was first dropped, where thermonuclear charges were first tested, where the prototype for the thermonuclear munitions that comprised the foundation of the Armed Forces nuclear arsenal was first tested, and where underground nuclear explosions were first carried out [Note from the author: and, we should add, the first peaceful nuclear explosion used to create a massive water reservoir]. In 1994, the Second State Central Test Range under the Russian Defense Ministry was complete. This achievement remains an honored memory not only for test range veterans, but for new generations as well.”
The works listed above are also complemented by: - Underground Burial of Industrial Waste via Enlarged Cavities Made Using Underground Nuclear Explosions. Authors: N. Prikhodko, A. Vasiliev. A. Agapova, ed. Moscow: IzdAT, 2007. 104. This book is about the development and introduction of the technology used for the underground burial of toxic industrial waste water using peaceful nuclear explosions, such as the Kama-2 facilities (10/26/1983, 10 kilotons, a depth of 2,206 m, put into use in 1967), and Kama-1 (07/08/1974, 10 kilotons at a depth of 2,123, put into use in 1983) in Bashkortostan. Over 29 years of operation, the Kama-2 cavity (as of 01/01/07) stored nearly 34.5 m3 of highly-mineralized industrial waste water from the Sterlitamaksk Soda Industrial Association. Over 23 years of use, Kama-1 has stored 3.42 million m3 of particularly toxic industrial waste water from Salavatnefteorgsintez. Overall, these systems have made it possible to prevent dumping industrial waste into surface water reservoirs and thus prevent RUB 6.5 million in damage to the environment. - The Nuclear Shield, by A. Greshilov, N. Egupov, and M. Matushchenko. Moscow: Logos, 2008. 424: ill. Based on a number of sources, including newly declassified sources, this book presents the true history of nuclear weapons development and the birth of nuclear industry in the Soviet Union. The scientific and technological requirements for carrying out the first nuclear project are revealed, and the work also reflects the political climate of the time that developed under the influence of the Cold War and the growing threat that a thermonuclear attack could be unleashed against Russia. This book also addresses the development of the H-bomb and second- and third-generation thermonuclear devices. It includes information about the USSR’s test ranges, the main types of nuclear weapons, the tests conducted with them, and the nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. A detailed bibliography on the book’s subject is also included (335 sources, and all from the ever-growing personal “nuclear library” of co- author Professor A. Matushchenko as of July 25, 2007).
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- Trust, But Check You Must! N. Voloshin. Snezhinsk: RFYaTs-VNIITF Publishing, 2008. 216: ill. This work is a striking memoir of one of the most active participants in the events involved with the preparation for, the conducting of, the receipt and the assessment of results from a unique joint Soviet-US experiment in monitoring the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on underground nuclear weapons testing, which was signed on June 3, 1974 in Moscow between the USSR and the United States. This experiment was carried out 20 years ago and involved detonating two underground nuclear explosions: one on August 17, 1988 (“Kearsarge” at the Nevada test range) and another on September 14, 1988 (“Shagan,” at the Semipalatinsk test range). This experiment was referred to as “the Signal of Hope” in reference to the future comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. During the following four years, the USSR / Russia conducted observation and monitoring at four tests (Hoya – 1991, Junction – 1991–1992, and in part Greenwater – 1992) at the Nevada test range in the United States. However, during this period, Russia was already enforcing a moratorium on nuclear tests, which is still in effect today. That is why the United States did not have the opportunity to monitor or observe any Russian nuclear tests. However, experts were able to take part in scheduling observation and monitoring activities for three planned tests and attend and tour the Central Russian Test Range on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago (Russia’s only test range after the fall of the USSR) on June 14–18, 1993. This was done in line with an agreement reached at the Fourth Session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on enforcing the provisions of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on restricting underground nuclear weapons testing.
A little background: the US delegation was led by Robert Cockerham, and included Eugene McKenzie, William Menold, Michael Chiders, Roger Hill, and others (total of 14 people). Our American guests were shown what support the US staff would receive for its monitoring activities in line with the 1974 Treaty and related protocols. They were shown certain test range facilities (based on prior agreements), examples of equipment and technology and they were provided with information about how accommodations, meals, transportation and collaboration were dealt with at the test range. The US guests were met by the Head of the 6th Department of the Russian Navy, Vice Admiral G. Zolotukhin, and representatives from the Russian Nuclear Energy and Defense Ministries B. Andrusenko, N. Voloshin, V. Frolov, A. Kolesnikov, V. Gorev, V. Shevchenko, V. Yarygin, D. Rusin, V. Smirnov, and Y. Naglis, in addition to others, including experts working at the test range.
And We Are Still Writing… Our efforts in disseminating nuclear information are continuing: preparations for the publication of a manuscript of another work are nearing completion: “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: Past and Present (edited by the International Center for Environmental Safety under the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, A. Vasiliev) which will contain extensive information about all 124 of the peaceful nuclear explosions conducted in the USSR from 01/15/1965 through 09/06/1988. On January 30, 2007 at a meeting of experts from the Interagency Commission (MVEK-NE), the following was noted: “The finished manuscript is a highly qualified and well-developed book project that summarizes modern views on the results of the USSR’s peaceful nuclear explosion program and the radiological consequences of these explosions on the surface of the Earth as well as the depths of the explosion zone, which
434 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY are being addressed for the first time. There are recommendations to improve the integral peaceful nuclear explosion database (the MTsEB-ICES international peaceful nuclear explosion database) by including a geologic time scale model showing the characteristics of the rock formations found in the explosion zone and the work area in order to build an extensive database for the Russian agencies involved…” In turn, on January 9, 2008 the group of authors led by Professor V. Logachev submitted a manuscript for publication of an important new work on the effects of radiation on the public resulting from nuclear tests conducted at the test ranges of all nuclear superpowers. We also intend to work on collections such as “Nuclear Radiance” [Yadernoe siyaniye] and “The Mountain Station” [Gornaya stantsiya] in continuation of the Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk veterans’ memoirs, as well as books such as “The Nuclear Shield” and “The Nuclear Umbrella,” which will continue where “The Nuclear Sword” left off (under the government program for the Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in 2006–2010, by Decree No. 422 of the Russian Government, 07/11/2005).
Conclusion There is a reason that today, we have dedicated so much time to sharing information about nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, and the consequences thereof. Without a doubt, society must know about this from the horse’s mouth, and not from a dilettante’s point of view or that of opportunists or populists. I would also like to give answers to a number of questions that are especially relevant in our time, which is particularly complicated by geopolitical relations. These questions (by Natalia Vershinina) and the answers (by Nikolai Voloshin)—former Head of the 5th Chief Department of the predecessor to the Nuclear Energy Ministry in 1996– 2004, the Nuclear Munitions Research and Development Department of the Russian Nuclear Ministry, to be precise, known since March 2004 as RosAtom—from the book “For You, My Colleagues – 2” (2003) and in the pages of the magazine Ekonomicheskiye Strategii “The Fifth Department...” (2003, No. 01).
– Correspondent: How would you compare our scientists with foreign scientists? – N. Voloshin: Before the end of the 1980s, we spoke with US experts via the Committee for Nuclear Energy Use. The weapons issue was “behind the curtain” — our specialists were invited only for consultations, but no one ever had any direct contact with foreigners. The first time I met with American scientists was in 1988 when they visited the Semipalatinsk Test Range. Later, when I had the opportunity to work at the test range in Nevada, I noted one detail: all of the workers there had very narrow specializations. Each person had in-depth knowledge of their topic, and no one needed to know anything beyond the realm of their own field of specialization. We have a different kind of system. Our experts possess extensive knowledge from one field to another. My career took me from being your typical engineer to becoming a Doctor of Sciences and I later mastered the entire range of processes and interconnections. Another difference is our unfaltering sense of responsibility. Even when he retires, a Russian nuclear expert lives his work, he will still be consulted for advice. Our men will watch over their “children” like a father his entire life. – Correspondent: Was it difficult to take this step – to open up to the Americans
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and start to work together on something that had always been this great secret? – N. Voloshin: Yes, it was difficult. But our proactive stance was the result of political decisions made at the very top. Many perceived contact with foreigners as a clear violation of everything we stood for. I remember how the supervisor of one of the laboratories in my department responded to the suggestion that he go abroad on a business trip. His answer was a terse “I’m not going anywhere! You go, I won’t have any part of it.” And he was not the only one who felt that way. – Correspondent: How would you evaluate your collaboration with the G5 and the strategic partnership with the world’s nuclear superpowers? – N. Voloshin: In 1996, after signing the new CTBT, we were confident that we were working for the good of mankind, and that the nuclear powers had managed to achieve mutual understanding and an agreement on their positions. However, in 2000, England, France and Russia ratified the Treaty, while the United States opted not to; the Republicans had taken majority over the Democrats, and they decided that ratifying the Treaty would contradict national interests. Now China is wavering, waiting to see what the United States will do next. At present, talks about the fate of the Treaty are still underway, but three of the five nuclear states ended up, generally speaking, in a state of surprise and confusion. - Correspondent: Perhaps it was simple provocation? “At the count of three, everyone jump! One, two, three!” But not everyone jumps. - N. Voloshin: It’s a possibility. We know that, as far as that issue is concerned, the United States is dealing with some internal struggles. The US National Academy of Sciences has released a report that states outright: no matter what, the United States would benefit from ratifying the Treaty. After all, the nuclear superpowers already know how to do everything. If you need to create a new nuclear arsenal with old tested devices, it can be done without testing. And if CTBT comes into force, not one country — either nuclear or non-nuclear — will make a new nuclear device without testing. That is why the Treaty is beneficial for the entire global community. - Correspondent: What priorities has the government set for the Nuclear Munitions Research and Development Department? - N. Voloshin: The main thing is to ensure national security in today’s changing geopolitical situation. The Americans have withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, and now we are thinking about how to respond to that withdrawal. The United States is building a national missile defense system that will have global capabilities. The layout of the radiolocation station has already been published — they are aiming to surround the entire Northern hemisphere. Not only will they be able to protect the United States from individual missiles, but they will also be able to quickly expand the system’s capabilities for more dangerous threats. We are modernizing our old arsenal and reaching a new level with new delivery vehicles and control systems. We are carrying out non-nuclear explosive experiments at Novaya Zemlya, which are not restricted by the CTBT. This affirms the safety of our old arsenal. The Americans know about this and they conduct the same experiments. Based on what has been published, the United States has carried out about 20 similar experiments over the past few years. We have carried out 30. – Correspondent: Are any large-scale experiments being conducted? – N. Voloshin: Not at this time. – Correspondent: What 20th century discovery in nuclear physics do you think was outstanding?
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– N. Voloshin: Well, my specialization is weapons, so that affects my answer. At first, in the first half of the 1940s, the Americans figured out how to release nuclear energy and use it, and we followed the same path. Later we learned to use released nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — I mean first and foremost nuclear explosive technology, which presumes the existence of devices that result in fewer fission fragments and less residual tritium. The weapons experts were the ones to develop these devices. I believe that these two discoveries — nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive technology — are genius. We have conducted 124 peaceful nuclear explosions at various locations. Six of these had unsatisfactory results, which damaged our reputation somewhat. The remaining 95% of peaceful explosions were a success and were very useful. I, for example, have participated in putting out gas fires in Uzbekistan (Ura-Bulak, 09/30/1966). There was a gas well fire burning for over a year, and it was impossible to put out. Underneath that gas well, we created a new one with an incline and planted a nuclear device there (30 kilotons of TNT equivalent), the explosion of which compressed the fire. A great deal of explosions have been conducted for seismic exploration of mineral resources. The explosions have extracted ore at apatite deposits in the Kirov Oblast. The Americans have carried out 27 peaceful explosions. They folded that program in 1973 under pressure from environmentalist protests. We stopped conducting peaceful explosions in 1988. – Correspondent: What is your favorite saying? – N. Voloshin: From Abutalib: “Don’t fire a gun into the past, or the future will fire at you from a cannon.”
One final side note: In 2001 and 2003, N. Voloshin published two books: “For You, My Colleagues – 1” and “For You, My Colleagues – 2” with the fabulous motto: “Dedicated to the deeds of those who have passed, and the moxie of those still with us.” The pages of these books are filled with his warmth and kindness in portraying many interesting events and people involved in the past and present of Russia’s nuclear weapons industry. He ended the book with this bit of verse: “Everyone needs peace, a belief we revere, Yet the gunpowder must always stay dry. We are entrusted with the Fatherland’s nuclear shield, We protect it and we hold it dear.” And on this note we end our narrative of the creation of our nuclear shield, the sixty years of which will be celebrated in August 2009 under the Government Program for the Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in 2006–2010 (by Decree No. 422 of the Russian Government, 07/11/2005). May these words also serve this purpose well!
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THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION WAS NOT DELIVERED AT THE EVENT
Why We Need the History of Science: Understanding and Resolving Radiation Problems
Marina Khvostova Senior Scientific Collaborator, Environmental Center, Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technics, Russian Academy of Sciences
At first glance, the topic of my speech may seem completely removed from modern radiation problems and not at all practical. But believe me when I tell you this is not the case. On the contrary, a historical scientific analysis can help us see and understand the roots and origins of any number of radiation issues that are very relevant today, or that may arise in the future. The great scientists who understood the role of science history in global scientific and technological progress hold this field of scientific work in very high regard. Vladimir Vernadsky noted that science history is “one of the ways to determine scientific truth” (1). Sergey Vavilov wrote that “to correctly judge the current state of any science and its prospects, it is always useful to look back to its past, sometimes even its distant past” (2). What is the goal of science history? Its main goal is to reveal patterns in the development of science, conditions, and factors that favor development. A researcher brings to light the development of ideas and problems in a given field of science. All science history is strictly documented and is based exclusively on official, verified sources. Conversely, science history is important for the substantiation of facts and helps determine whether or not a given event took place. What, then, is considered a source document? These are various archived documents, such as letters, notebooks, expedition logs, accounts of works conducted, maps, etc., as well as tested research results laid out in studies and articles, materials for scientific conferences, and many others. Science historians note that in recent years, environmental problems have led to greater attention toward the latest history of natural science. Consequently, the argument can be made that turning to the history of a given field of science may be an indicator of the importance of this scientific direction for modern society. So how does this theory relate to radiation? Let us try a kind of historical scientific digression, placing an emphasis on and showing the priorities of radioecological research. A little over 110 years has passed since Antoine Henri Becquerel discovered the phenomenon of radioactivity in 1896. While 110 years is not a very long time in science history, in this short period of time, the practical use of the discovery’s findings has signified a new era in the history of mankind: the nuclear era. Even during the first years of studying radioactivity, many scientists understood the importance of this discovery. In 1911, Vladimir Vernadsky, who foresaw the immense significance of nuclear energy,
438 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY said: “before us, through the phenomenon of radioactivity, are revealed sources of nuclear energy, which are a million times greater than all the sources of power that man had ever imagined” (3). Even earlier, in 1905, Pierre Curie ended his Nobel Prize acceptance speech at the Swedish Academy of Science with the following words: “In criminal hands, radium may become dangerous…Will humanity benefit from learning nature’s secrets, has it matured enough to use them constructively, or will this knowledge be a source of harm?” (4). Thus, even at the dawn of radiation research (nearly 30 years before the discovery of artificial radioactivity by Irene and Frederic Joliot-Curie), Pierre Curie foresaw great possibilities of using nuclear energy, but at the same time, warned mankind of the enormous responsibility resulting from this discovery. A science historian must also consider the society’s response to a new discovery. For example, the discovery of the emanation of radium in mineral sources and the study of its physiological effect on the human body elicited an unusual burst of interest in medical treatment with radioactive mineral waters. Interest in physiotherapy became more or less mainstream nature; the well-known doctor Lev Bertenson wrote in 1914 that this interest was entirely legal, but fueled artificially “by modern advertising — widespread, brazen, deftly supported by a scientific ballast…” (5). In one vivid illustration, he described the following incident: “It is amazing how shamelessly inventive some of the modern creators of the reputation of water can be, as illustrated by the following example. La Gazette des Eaux recently published a letter from an anonymous entity doing business with some French water. The letter was addressed to a well-known and respected chemist, suggesting, for a hefty honorarium of course, “to find strong levels of radioactivity in the designated medicinal water area in order to launch an advertisement campaign based on a scientific analysis that cannot be verified!” (5). This is one example of how society reacted to a new field of knowledge with relatively little research, but that was nonetheless becoming the new, fashionable trend in both science and society. The founder of Russia’s very first specialized radiological laboratory in 1909, Evgeny Burkser, made the following comparison: “Similarly to how the discovery of bacteria launched the study of infectious diseases to a new level, currently, radium is causing an overturn in physiochemical theories” (6). Even in the early stages of studying radioactivity, it was clear to many scientists that this field of knowledge would become one of the dominant areas in the upcoming years, and indeed, this is what happened later in the history of its development. I am purposefully bringing up the names of scientists in my presentation, because, in science history, it is particularly important to follow the development of ideas and the people behind the research. In the foreground, there is always the persona of the scientist, his or her way of thinking, motivations, working conditions, and even aspects of his or her personality. Researchers who devoted their lives to studying the phenomenon of radioactivity were, in many ways, portraying their finest qualities — selflessness, dedication, the desire for knowledge, and the drive to help people. We can gather this from their biographical data, both from early researchers and from our contemporaries. At the same time, each individual scientist belongs to his or her era, works within the framework of that era’s traditions, and cannot exist outside it. Historical scientific analysis allows us to judge the contribution of a specific scientist to a particular area of science, and to rediscover the names of the researchers who were misunderstood or unappreciated in their time. Today we are familiar with the roles of the first researchers of radioactive properties in the environment. Starting in
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1904, scientists such as A. Sokolov, P. Orlov, E. Burkser, V. Spitsyn, and E. Karstens independently organized research in different parts of Russia and began paving the road for the search for radioactive ores and minerals. Archives give us the opportunity to incorporate new layers of knowledge into our scientific knowledge, and discover entirely unexpected information. Another interesting fact proven by science historians is that Antoine Henri Becquerel was not the first to observe radioactive properties in uranium salt. The French officer Niepce de Saint Victor determined in 1858 (i.e., nearly 40 years before Becquerel’s experiments) that uranyl nitrate releases a form of energy that affects photographic plates (7). Unlike Becquerel, the officer immediately came to the conclusion that this phenomenon is not inany way related to fluorescence. But, after nine years of attempting to solve this mystery and conducting his experiments in a laboratory that he single-handedly organized in an unused hall in the police station (Niepce de Saint Victor was a lieutenant in the municipal guard), he was unable to explain the phenomenon he was observing. Scientists explain this by pointing out that, at the time when the Frenchman was conducting his experiments, physics and chemistry had not developed sufficiently to understand the nature of radioactivity. The works of Niepce de Saint Victor were not recognized by his contemporaries and were not continued. It is important to note that one common feature of historical and scientific studies of radiological issues is a kind of “material resistance.” All of the vast work conducted by an enormous number of scientific institutions, scientists, governmental organizations in the USSR, beginning in the mid-1930s, became increasingly secretive, until the very end of the Soviet Union, and much of it is still inaccessible to science historians today. Therefore, researchers seek their own approaches to studying radioecology. L. Rikhvanov notes that most of his attention is focused on radioecology in the 1950s and 60s, as he is convinced that “it was in those years that the true, un-retouched state of affairs was portrayed, which, in later times, was significantly contorted and excluded from wider discussions” (8). Many scientists unanimously state that the secrecy of materials, as well as the absence of consistency and a unified work program, led to the fact that even after the unfortunate experience of the Kyshtym disaster, the government turned out to be completely unprepared for Chernobyl. Only in the 1990s did the public and the scientific community learn about the information that had been kept secret, or not studied at all (for example, dumping radioactive waste into Siberian rivers). In any field of science, it is extremely important that no scientific experiment ever be aborted and that it is transferred from generation to generation and developed, adding to new knowledge. We are clearly approaching the concept of a “field of research.” Once again, a historical scientific analysis allows us to observe the establishment and development of a given field of research — radiobiological, radioecological, radiogeoecological, etc. In terms of accumulation of knowledge in radioactivity, and depending on what is being studied and the different tasks involved, the material becomes differentiated, and scientific fields such as radiobiology, radiation biogeocenology (later, “radioecology”), agricultural radioecology, continental and sea radioecology, radiological hygiene, etc., begin to take shape. We can trace the evolution of ideas, understand what was important at a particular time, and identify the questions that faded into the background, while others came to the
440 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY foreground. For example, the beginning of nuclear weapons testing marked the beginning of global radioactive pollution. The study of anthropogenic radionuclide migration gained more attention, while studies of natural radionuclide biogeochemistry decreased somewhat. However, as early as the 1970s, interest grew in the natural radioactive background as it affects the environment and radiological health. Moreover, in the 1980s, the view that the natural radioactive background had an important role became popular, and the concept of an “anthropogenic radioactive background” emerged, although the issue of radiological pollution from anthropogenic radionuclides was still important in certain regions of the country. Historical scientific analysis helps us understand and evaluate the significance of an idea or study. For example, today we can judge to what extent the biogeochemical field developed by Vladimir Vernadsky was productive. All further studies on the migration of natural radionuclides, and later, anthropogenic radionuclides, are based on the laws of biogeochemistry. Today, there is not one single plant or animal on the planet whose composition does not include anthropogenic radionuclides. An organism’s ability to accumulate radioactive substances was noted by Vladimir Vernadsky back in 1929, after establishing that swamp algae is capable of accumulating radium in significantly greater quantities than the surrounding water. Even then, in the early stages of researching natural radioactivity in natural objects, nature was giving a “warning” about the threat of radionuclides accumulated by living organisms in concentrations far greater than those seen the environment. Here, developing on Vladimir Vernadsky’s thesis, one can go so far as to call mankind a geological force that changes the chemistry of the Earth, bringing unnatural, anthropogenic radionuclides into the biosphere. In this case, humans are acting on par with nature’s own natural forces. As I have already stated, interest in the most recent history of natural science has increased in the last few years. There are many questions. Can a science historian study the present day? How does one make the distinction between historical events and current events? When addressing topics related to science history, Vladimir Vernadsky would say that a historical period consists of 25 years, i.e., one generation. As a result, arguments often occur: should the Chernobyl catastrophe be regarded as an event that can be analyzed in a historically scientific manner? After all, 25 years have not yet passed, and the radioecological effects of Chernobyl will continue to be studied for several more decades, if not centuries. It would follow that one cannot analyze the present day from a historical scientific perspective. However, modern sociologists, philosophers, and even science historians note that the 20th and 19th centuries brought about an increase in the speed with which science and technology develop. Mankind has entered the information era, where the speed of exchanging information is rapid and is a part of daily life. Therefore, it can be said that the historical 25-year period described by Vladmir Vernadsky has been significantly reduced. Even as theth 20 anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster approached, one could identify the primary patterns in the negative impact on humans and ecosystems based on studies by Russian radioecologists, radiobiologists, doctors, and other scientists. In concluding my presentation, I would like to say the following: science history forces us, again and again, to turn to issues that seem to have been addressed long ago, that should not have any influence on the course of today’s events. Nonetheless, practice shows that many modern problems were put aside long before they became relevant.
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Another important element in historical scientific research on radiology is the attempt to obtain credible, objective, and to the extent that it is possible, complete information. By studying our scientific radiological legacy, we can gradually put together a mosaic of many years of studies, reflecting the different fields of development, the scientists behind the ideas, different schools of thought, cultural traditions and, importantly, the mistakes that have been made. Step by step, we strive to reach the top, trying to grasp with our minds everything that mankind has already achieved in this field of science, in order to take all of the best and use it to help mankind.
References 1. Vernadsky, V. I. Academic K. M. von Ber: In Memoriam [Pamyati akademika K. M. fon Ber]. Works by the Commission on the History of Knowledge [Trudy komissii po istorii znanii]. Leningrad: 1927, 2nd edition, 3. 2. Vavilov, S. I. Collection of essays [Sobranie sochinenii]. Volume 3. Works of Philosophy and History in Natural Science [Raboty po filosofii i istorii estestvoznaniya]. Moscow: 1956. 870. 3. Vernadsky, V. I. Top Priorities in the Study of Radium [Zadacha dnya v oblasti radiya]. Russian Academy of Science News. 1911. Volume 5. No. 1. 61–72. 4. Staroselskaya-Nikitina, O. A. The History of Radioactivity in Nuclear Physics [Istoriya radioaktivnosti i vozniknoveniya yadernoi fiziki]. Published by the Academy of Science of the USSR. Moscow: 1963. 428. 5. Bertenson, L. B. Radioactivity in Medicinal Waters and Mud [Radioaktivnost v lechebnykh vodakh i gryazyakh]. Saint-Petersburg: 1914, 204. 6. Burkser, E. S. Studies on Radioactive Phenomena [Ocherki yavlenii radioaktivnosti]. Public Lectures, Read in Odessa, Nikolaev, and other cities 1908– 1909 and Presentations at the Student Chemistry Club at the Imperial Novorossiysk University. Nikolaev: 1909. 99. 7. Zaytseva, L. L., Figurovsky, N. A. Radioactivity Research in Pre-Revolutionary Russia [Issledovaniya yavlenii radioaktivnosti v dorevolyutsionnoi Rossii]. Moscow: 1961. 223. 8. Rikhvanov, L. P. General and Regional Problems in Radioecology [Obshchie i regionalnye problemy radioekologii]. Tomsk: 1997. 384.
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Russian Participants Director, All-Russian Institute for Agricultural Radiology and Agro- ALEKSAKHIN Rudolf Mikhailovich Ecology; Member, RosAtom’s Public Council Editor-in-Chief, Bellona- Rashid ALIMOV RU Internet Publication, St. Petersburg Reporter, Posev ARTEMOVA Tatiana Magazine Director, Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring, Vyatka State Humanitarian ASHIKHMINA Tamara Yakovlevna University; President, Green Cross Russia Kirov Affiliate Coordinator, Project on Resource Efficiency, BABANIN Igor Valentinovich Greenpeace Russia, St. Petersburg Office President, Green Cross Russia, and Member of BARANOVSKY Sergei Igorevich the Board of Directors, Green Cross International President, Green Cross Vladimir BASKAKOV Russia, Orenburg Alexandrovich Affiliate Chairman, Green World BODROV Oleg, Viktorovich Council, Sosnovy Bor, St. Petersburg Director, Russian BRYZGALOVA Natalya Vladimirovna Environmental Congress, Moscow Professor, Yugorsk State BULATOV Valeriy Ivanovich University, Khanti- Mansiisk
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Chairwoman, Scientific Council on Radio- Biology, Russian Academy of Sciences; BURLAKOVA Elena Borisovna Assistant Science Director, the Emmanuel Institute of Bio-Chemical Physics under the Russian Academy of Sciences Advisor to the General BURTSEV Andrei Aleksandrovich Director, Avangard Director of Research and Development, Dollezhal CHEREPNIN Yuri Semyonovich Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of CHUMAKOV Aleksandr Nikolaevich Natural Sciences; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia Scientific Director / First Deputy Director, Institute for Nuclear Energy, Saint Petersburg State EPERIN Anatoliy Pavlovich Polytechnic University, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast; Doctor of Sciences and Professor Evgeniy EVSTRATOV Deputy Head, RosAtom Vyacheslavovich Reporter, Dom Prirody FROLOV A.N. Newspaper Union of Public FROLOV Andrei Environmental Organizations, Moscow Director, Public Aleksandr FYODOROV Relations, Green Cross Vyacheslavovich Russia Dekom Technologies, GAVRILOV Sergey Dmitrievich Moscow General Director, GORIN Valeriy Vladimirovich EcoGeoTekh
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Advisor to the General Director of RosAtom; Member of RosAtom’s Vladimir GRACHEV Public Council; and Alexandrovich Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Member, RosAtom’s GUSKOVA Tatyana Sergeevna Public Council Techa Environmental Milya KABIROVA Organization, Nurmukhametovna Chelyabinsk Doctor of Sciences, KALININ Remos Ivanovich Professor. Nuclear Safety Institute, Moscow Department Head, KASATKIN Vladimir Viktorovich PromTechnologia Scientific Institute KATKOVA Ekaterina Reporter, ITAR-TASS Senior Lecturer, Vyacheslav Northwest Academy KHATUNTSEV Viktorovich of Public Service, Severodvinsk Senior Scientific Collaborator, Environmental Center, KHVOSTOVA Marina Sergeevna Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technics, Russian Academy of Sciences Director, EcoService, KIRILIN Vladimir Ivanovich Krasnoyarsk Konstantin Institute for Nuclear Physics, Russian KIRSANOV Gennadiy Antonovich Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg Reporter, Norwegian KNUTSEN Kai Asbern Society for the Conservation of Nature
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Director, Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and KONYSHEV Igor Valerievich Regions Liaison Branch, RosAtom; and Secretary of RosAtom’s Public Council Deputy Minister, Ministry of Radiation and KOSTINA Svetlana Yurievna Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast Junior Scientific Collaborator, Center of History of the Svetlana KRASNOSLOBODTSEVA Chelyabinsk State and Vyacheslavovna Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service Director, Nuclear Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia; Member of the Russian Academy of KUZNETSOV Vladimir Mikhailovich Natural Sciences and Academy of Industrial Ecology; and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council Head, Public Relations Department, AtomProf LABYNTSEVA Marina Anatolievna Institute of Continued Professional Education, St. Petersburg Stanislav Chief Constructor, LAVKOVSKY Aleksandrovich Lazurit Chairman, Green Don Environmental LAGUTOV Vladimir Viktorovich Movement, Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast
Vladimir Program Director, Green LEONOV Alexandrovich Cross Russia
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Coordinator for Energy LESIKHINA Nina Andreevna Projects, Bellona, Murmansk Office LISOVSKII Sergey Ekologiia Society Co-Chairman, Inter- Departmental Expert Commission for the Assessment of Radio- LOGACHEV Vadim Afanasievich Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow Laboratory Head, Institute of High MALYSHENKO Stanislav Petrovich Temperatures, Russian Academy of Science Director, Kurgan Public Outreach and Information Office, Green Cross MANILO Ivan Ivanovich Russia; and Member, Russian Environmental Academy Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research MATUSHCHENKO Anatoliy Mikhailovich Institute for Pulse Engineering, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom, Moscow Co-Manager, Program for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Russia’s Center for Environmental Policy and the International MENSHCHIKOV Valeriy Fyodorovich Socio-Economic Union; Board Member, Center of Russian Environmental Politics; Member, RosAtom’s Public Council
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Chairman of the Russian Federation Council of the Federal Assembly; and MIRONOV Sergey Chairman of Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, Life Scientific Secretary, Laboratory for Nuclear MITROPOLSKIY Ivan Andreevich Spectroscopy, Konstantin Institute for Nuclear Physics, St. Petersburg
Department Head, Moscow Academy of MUNIN Pavel Ivanovich Business Administration, Eurasian Center of Sustainable Development
Executive Secretary, Northwest Branch of MURATOV Oleg Enverovich the Nuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg Director, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy NAZAROV Anatolii Georgievich of Sciences; Deputy Chairman, RosAtom’s Public Council; Member, Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
Director, Public Relations NASIBOV Ashot Alexandrovich Center, RosEnergoAtom
Head, Department of Engineering and Radiation Ecology and NECHAEV Aleksandr Fyodorovich Radiological-Chemical Technologies, St. Petersburg Institute of Technology
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Director, Bellona Alexander NIKITIN Public Organization, St. Konstantinovich Petersburg General Director, NIKITIN Vadimir Semyonovich Zvezdochka Shipyard, Severodvinsk Professor, Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and NOVOSYOLOV Vladimir Nikolaevich Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service Project Coordinator, Andrey OZHAROVSKIY EcoZashchita Public Vyacheslavovich Organization Senior Scientific Collaborator, Scientific PETUKHOV Viktor Vasilievich Institute for Shipbuilding Technologies Deputy Senior Engineer, Research and Design PIMENOV Alexander Olegovich Institute for Power Engineering General Director, Green PIMENOV Valeriy Ivanovich Cross Russia Center of Assistance PISKUNOV Mikhail Andreevich to Civil Initiatives, Dimitrovgrad Coordinator, Nuclear and PONOMARENKO Andrey Anatolievich Radiation Safety Projects, Bellona-Murmansk Director, Far Eastern Star RASSOMAKHIN Andrey Yurievich Shipyard Power Engineering RYBALCHENKO Igor Leonidovich Technology, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological RYLOV Mikhail Ivanovich Safety, St. Petersburg; Vice President of Green Cross Russia Member, Russian SARKISOV Ashot Arakelovich Academy of Sciences
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Director, Green Cross SHCHERBININ Nikolai Gennadievich Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk Senior Scientific Collaborator and SIVINTSEV Yuri Vasilievich Professor, Kurchatov Institute Transborder Ecological SHKREBETS Alexander Information Agency, Saint Petersburg Senior Scientific Collaborator, State SMAGULOV Samat Gabdrasilovich Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov Professor, United Institute of Energetics and Nuclear SOROKIN Vladimir Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus Chairman of the Board, For Nature Charity Fund; and Senior Instructor, Department for Civil, TALEVLIN Andrei Alexandrovich Land and Environmental Law under the Legal Division at Chelyabinsk State University, Chelyabinsk Executive Director, Green Cross Russia TOROPOV Alexei Vladimirovich Tomsk Affiliate; and Siberian Environmental Agency Deputy Director, Typhoon Company, VAKULOVSKY Sergey Mstislavovich Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast Director, International Center for Environmental VASILYEV Albert Petrovich Safety, Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy
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Head, Balakova Affiliate of the All-Russian VINOGRADOVA Anna Mikhailovna Society for Nature Conservation, Saratov Oblast Secretary, Murmansk Oblast Public Council on Nuclear Energy Safety and Expert, ZHAVORONKIN Sergei Nikolayevich Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia Murmansk Affiliate Public Advisory Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast; and Chairman ZERNOVA Lina Sergeevna of the Leningrad Oblast Green Russia Fraction, Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party General Director, ZUBKOV Artyom Nikolayevich Avangard
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International Participants Assistant to the Nuclear Advisor ALBERTIN Raphaelle on Nuclear Issues, Embassy of France, Moscow Minister and Deputy Head BORTIS Hans-Ruedi of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland, Moscow Nuclear Issues Officer, the Global Threat Reduction BYSTROVA Tatyana Program, British Embassy, Moscow Council of Development of the DUCHEMIN Anne-Marie Pays du Cotentin, France Nuclear Advisor, Embassy of FLORY Denis France, Moscow Senior Program Manager, Partnering & Sustainability Department, Commercialization GOZAL Albert Support Program (PCS), the International Science and Technology Center HAAVISTO Pekka Member of Parliament, Finland Senior Associate, Legacy ION Cristian Program, Global Green USA L J Jardine Services Director, JARDINE Leslie Dublin, CA, USA Second Secretary for the JURKI Terva Economic Sector, Embassy of Finland, Moscow Coordinator of the Toxic Action Network for Central Asia; and KHODJAMBERDIEV Igor Bakhabovich Co-Chairman of the International Social-Ecological Union, Kyrgyz Republic Member, Council of KIRCHNER Marie Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France Managing Director, the KOCH Reinhard European Center for Renewable Energy, Güssing, Austria
452 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Deputy Head, Swiss KOLDE Dorothea Cooperation Office, Embassy of Switzerland, Moscow Director, Nuclear Strategy and LEWIS Jeffrey Nonproliferation Initiative, New American Foundation, USA Program Manager, The Stanley MARTIN Matt Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa, USA Director, G8 Global Partnership MATHIOT Alain Program of France Editor, Arms Control Today, POMPER Miles USA Senior Manager, Global Threat Reduction Program, Department RANDALL Thomas David for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR), UK International Coordinator, ROBINSON Stephan Legacy Program, Green Cross Switzerland Assistant to the Nuclear Advisor, SCHATZKINE Julie Embassy of France in Russia Chief Researcher, United Institute of Energetics and SOROKIN Vladimir Nikolaevich Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus Program Associate, The Stanley TESSLER Veronica Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa, USA Legacy Program Director, Global Green USA, and WALKER Paul Chairman, International Legacy Program Steering Committee, Green Cross International First Secretary, Royal WESTSTRATE Erik Netherlands Embassy, Moscow
453 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Abbreviations
ABWR Advanced Boiling Water Reactor ADE Plutonium Production Reactors ALT Alanine Transaminase AMEC Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Am Americium AMB A type of (slow neutron) nuclear reactor ANCLI National Association of Local Information Committees State-owned holding company that unites Russian civil Atomenergoprom nuclear industry A type of Russian nuclear icebreaker; also, refers to AtomFlot Murmansk Shipping Company that operates the this type of icebreakers Baikal-Amur Mainline Railway in Eastern Siberia and BAM Railway Far East BioSNG A synthetic fuel in gas form A type of reactor that can operate as burner or breeder BN by replacing the (U) uranium blanket with a stainless steel blanket. BNPP Balakovskaya Nuclear Power Plant BtL A synthetic fuel in liquid form BTGR Base Tariff General Rates BWR Boiling Water Reactor CANada Deuterium Uranium; a pressurized heavy CANDU water reactor CDP Comprehensive Dismantlement Program Cf Californium CIS Commonwealth of Independent States Co Cobalt Community of Practices Concerning Radioactive Waste COWAM Management CNPP Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Coordinated Research and Environmental Surveillance CRESP Program Cs Cesium
454 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction Program CWD Chemical Weapons Destruction DLR German Aerospace Center DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DOE United States Department of Energy EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development EEE European Centre of Renewable Energies in Güssing EEC European Energy Community A model of a graphite-moderated boiling-water nuclear EGP reactor for combined heat and power EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIA – US United States Energy Information Administration Russia’s only specialized metal radwaste treatment and EKOMET-S disposal plant An Armenian institute working to construct a nuclear EnergoSetProekt power plant EPR European Pressurized Reactor EREC European Renewable Energy Council EU European Union Eu Europium EUR Euro EURT Eastern Urals Radioactive Trace European Commission of Local Information EUROCLI Committees FBR Fast Breeder Reactor
FGU Federal State Institution
FGUP A federal state-owned franchise
FNPP Floating Nuclear Power Plant
FSB Russian Federal Security Service
FSI Federal State Institution
455 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
FTB Floating Technical Base
FTP Federal Target Program
FZ Russian federal law
GBWR Graphite-Moderated Boiling Water Reactor
GCCH Green Cross Switzerland
GCI Green Cross International
GCR Green Cross Russia
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFR Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor
GGUSA Global Green USA
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
GNTs A state scientific center
GO ChS Russian Civil Defense and Emergencies Service
GosSanEpidNadzor State Sanitary-and-Epidemiologic Inspectorate Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety authority of GosAtomNazdor the Russian Federation (It was known before 1991 as GosAtomEnergoNadzor) State Committee on Hydro- and Meteorology of the GosKomGidromet USSR Sanitary Centers for Hygiene and Epidemiology under GosSanNadzor the Ministry of Health GosStroy See RosStroi
GKhK Mining and Chemical Combine
GRTsAS Russian State Center for Nuclear Shipbuilding
HDMA Healthcare Distribution Management Association
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
HLW High-Level Waste
HPP Hydroelectric Power Plant
456 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
HPZ Health Protection Zone
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IASAP International Arctic Seas Assessment Project
Institute of the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy IBRAE under the Russian Academy of Sciences
IMB International Maritime Bureau
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
INFORSE International Network for Sustainable Energy
INPRO Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IRG Inert Radioactive Gases
ISO International Organization for Standardization Joint-Stock Company (can be open (OJSC) or closed JSC (CJSC)) K Potassium
KChKhK The Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine
KhMAO The Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug
KoAES The Khanti-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug
KSC Kola Science Center
KW Kilowatt
Lamin B Receptor, an integral protein of the inner LBR nuclear membrane
LEU Low-Enriched Uranium
LFR Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor
LLW Low-Level Waste
LNPP Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant
LRW Liquid Radioactive Waste
LWR Light Water Reactor
457 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
MAC Maximum Allowable Concentration
MChS Emergency Situations Ministry
MinAtom Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation The next advanced reactor after the RBMK in MKER development of pressure-tube reactor facilities in Russia MLW Mid-Level Waste Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Program in MNEPR Russia MNTTs International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MOX Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel
MSM Methylsulfonylmethane
MSR Molten-Salt Reactor Inter-agency Commission for Assessing Radiation and MVEK Seismic Safety of Underground Nuclear Explosions MW Megawatt
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDEP Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NDMA Nitrosodimethylamine
NFC Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NII Scientific research institute Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of NIKIET Power Engineering Non-Nuclear Explosive Experiments (aka. Sub-Critical NNEE Experiments) NM Nuclear Materials
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
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NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NRB Radiation Safety Standards
NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRES Non-traditional Renewable Energy Source
NRPA Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
NSS Nuclear Service Ship
NTs A science center
NWR Northwest Region of Russia
NZKhK Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant Organization of Economic Cooperation and OECD Development OJSC Open Joint Stock Company
OSK United Shipbuilding Corporation Convention for the Protection of the Marine OSPAR Environment of the North-East Atlantic Basic Sanitation Regulations for Ensuring Radiation OSPORB Safety OYaRB Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department
PICASSO A system for radiological monitoring
PNE Peaceful nuclear explosion
PO An industrial association
POIO Public Outreach and Information Office
PU Plutonium
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RAEPK Roadmap for Developing the Nuclear Energy Industry
RAN Russian Academy of Science Unified Energy System of Russia; a Russian electricity RAO UES trading and holding company RBMK High Power Channel Type Reactor
459 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
RBP Russian Biofuel Program
RF Russian Federation
REA Russian Environmental Academy
RES Renewable Energy Source
RFYaTs Russian Federal Nuclear Center
RITEG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
RNTs A Russian science center
ROI Return on Investment
RosAtom Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and RosGidromet Environmental Monitoring RosProm Federal Agency on Industry Russian nuclear power stations operator under the RosEnergoAtom Atomenergoprom. Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection RosPotrebNadzor Rights and Welfare Federal Agency of Construction, Housing and Housing RosStroi Services of the Russian Federation (aka. GosStroy) RosSudoStroyeniye Russian Shipbuilding Agency Russian Federal Service for Ecological, Technical and RosTekhNadzor Atomic Supervision RS Radioactive Substances
RSFR Russian Soviet Federated Republic
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
RUB Ruble (Russian currency)
RUSAL Russian Aluminum Company
RW, radwaste Radioactive Waste Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic SCEAR Radiation SCWR Super Critical Water Reactor
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Federal State Unitarian Research and Production SevMorGeo Company for Geological Sea Survey SFD Southern Federal District
SFR Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor
SIEP Severnoye Izmereniye Environmental Partnership
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
SMP Strategic Master Plan
SKhK Northern (Siberian or Seversk) Chemical Combine Health standards and regulations for radioactive waste SPORO management Sr Strontium
SRMS Ship Radiation Monitoring System
SRW Solid Radioactive Waste
TEK Heat and Energy Complex
TNT Trinitrotoluene
TPP Tidal Power Plant
TPU Tomsk Polytechnic University
TsPB Business Support Center
TW Terawatt
U Uranium
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
US United States of America
USD United States dollars
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VA Volumetric Activity
VHTR Very Hot Temperature Reactor
461 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical VNIIEF Physics, a federal nuclear center in the city of Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70) All-Russian Scientific Research Center for VNIITF Experimental Physics Institute that researches and develops uranium mining VNIPI-PromTechnology and processing technology VOOP National Russian Nature Conservation Society
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
462 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Table of Contents Forward ...... 3 Welcoming Address Sergei Baranovsky, President, Green Cross Russia and Member of the Board of Directors, Green Cross International ...... 4 Opening Remarks Hans Reudi Bortis, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland in Russia...... 6 Opening Remarks Sergey Mironov , Chairman of the Russian Federation Council of the Federal Assembly Chairman of Fair Russia: Motherland, Pensioners, Life...... 7 The Most Important Aspect of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia: A Legislative Solution for the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste Evgeniy Evstratov, Deputy Director, RosAtom...... 8 Resolving Global Environmental Problems through the Acceleration of Nuclear Energy Development Vladimir Grachev, Advisor to the Director of RosAtom, Member of the RosAtom Public Council and Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences...... 17 RosAtom’s Social and Environmental Program Igor Konyshev, Director, Department of Public Relations, Public Organizations and Regions Liaison Branch, Rosatom; and Secretary, Public Council of RosAtom ...... 28 Civil Society and Nuclear Activities: From Risks Perception to a Strategy of Developing our Territory Civil Society and Nuclear Activities: From Risks Perception to a Strategy of Developing our Territory Marie Kirchner and Anne-Marie Duchemin, Members of the Council of Development of the Pays du Cotentin, France...... 35 Developments at RosEnergoAtom and Its Public Image Ashot Nasibov, Director, Public Relations Center, RosEnergoAtom ...... 40 Innovative Nuclear Reactor Projects Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, Kurchatov Institute Russian Science Center Yuriy Cherepnin, Director of Research and Development, Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering...... 42 Efficient and Safe Use of Nuclear Technologies in Russia’s Northwest Anatoliy Eperin, Scientific Director and First Deputy Director, Institute for Nuclear Energy, Saint Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast ...... 52
463 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Conditions for Building a New Nuclear Power Plant in the Tomsk Oblast Alexei Toropov, Executive Director, Green Cross Russia Tomsk Affiliate ...... 55 A Local’s Perspective on Peaceful Nuclear Energy: A Heavy Hand Lina Zernova, Public Advisory Council, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region, and Chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Green Russia Fraction, Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party...... 58 Question and Answer Session Paths for the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector...... 61 The Untapped Potential of Alternative Energy in Russia Aleksandr Chumakov, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia ...... 64 Alternative Energy in Russia: Meeting Energy Needs While Decreasing Threats to the Environment Igor Babanin, Coordinator, Project on Resource Efficienc, Greenpeace Russia, Saint Petersburg Office...... 70 Development of Renewable Energy in Europe Reinhard Koch, Managing Director, European Center for Renewable Energy, Güssing, Austria...... 75 Prospects for Developing Non-Traditional, Renewable Energy Sources on the Kola Peninsula Nina Lesikhina , Coordinator for Energy Projects, Bellona, Murmansk Office ...... 79 The Russian Biofuel Program Vladimir Kirilin, Director, EcoService Nikolai Zubov, Chairman, Krasnoyarsk Krai Environmental Union...... 86 Questions and Answers Session on Alternative Energy Organized by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) ...... 91 What is the Meaning and Danger of Radioactive Disaster? Anatolii Nazarov, Director, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences; Deputy Chairman, Public Council of RosAtom; Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Viktor Letov, Institution for Continuing Professional Education; The Russian Medical Academy for Post-Graduate Education; Russian Ministry of Health and Social Development Elena Burlakova, Chairwoman of the Scientific Council on Radio-Biology, Russian Academy of Sciences...... 93 The Impact of Low Doses of Radiation: Why is it Controversial? Vladimir N. Sorokin, Professor, United Institute of Energetics and Nuclear Investigations, Minsk (Sosny), Belarus ...... 102
464 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Report on the Joint Agreement on Techa River Floodplain Rehabilitation between RosAtom and the Chelyabinsk Oblast Government Svetlana Kostina, Deputy Minister, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast Tatyana Meshkova, Department Head, Ministry for Radiation and Environmental Safety, Chelyabinsk Oblast...... 110 Environmental Surveys and Inspections of Plots of Land for the Construction of Single-Family Housing at the New Muslyumovo and Old Muslyumovo Resettlement Zones Vladimir Kuznetzov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia; Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Academy of Industrial Ecology; and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council ...... 116 Remediation of Polluted Areas in the Ob-Irtysh Basin Valery Bulatov, Professor, Yugra State University, Khanti-Mansiisk ...... 119 Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and the Occurrence of Leukemia in Children under Five Years Old1 Andrey Ozharovskiy, Project Coordinator, EcoZashchita Public Organization, Moscow...... 136 Question and Answer Session Radiobiological Concerns, Rehabilitation of Affected Territories ...... 140 Improving Public Outreach Using the Radiation Monitoring and Emergency Response System Being Created in the Arkhangelsk Oblast Vladimir Nikitin, General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, Severodvinsk Anatoly Shepurev, Deputy Chief Engineer, Zvezdochka Shipyard Nikolai Shcherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk. 142 Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Facilities And the Role of the Public in Countering Them Igor Khripunov, , Associate Director, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia...... 149 Overcoming Contention between the Authorities and NGOs in Regional Radioecology Public Outreach Svetlana Krasnoslobodtseva, Junior Scientific Collaborator Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Governments, Urals Academy of Public Service...... 153
465 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Negotiation Power: The Significance of the Public as Demonstrated by Public Hearings on the Creation of Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Management of Unsafe Vessels Sergey Gavrilov, Dekom Technologies, Moscow Mikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, St. Petersburg, and Vice President, Green Cross Russia Vyacheslav Khatuntsev, Senior Lecturer, Northwest Academy of Public Service, Severodvinsk Nikolai Scherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk... 156 A Strategy for Eliminating Threats Stemming from Decommissioned Facilities of the Russia’s Northern Nuclear Fleet Ashot Sarkisov, Member, Russian Academy of Sciences Leonid Bolshov, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences Sergei Antipov, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Valentin Vysotsky, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Prof. Remos Kalinin, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Pavel Shvedov, Engineer, RAS Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy Vladimir Shishkin, Dollezhal Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering . 167 Radiation Safety in the Region Affected by Radioactive Contamination from Operations at the Mayak Complex Vladimir Novosyolov, Professor, Center of History of the Chelyabinsk State and Municipal Government, Urals Academy of Public Service...... 179 Russia and the United States: Renewing the Strategic Dialogue Matt Martin, Program Manager, The Stanley Foundation...... 181 The New US Nuclear Posture Review: A US Perspective Jeffrey Lewis, Director, Nuclear Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation.....186 Plenary Discussion on the Topic of International Cooperation and Global Partnership in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of WMDs ...... 189 Tracking and Monitoring Radioactive Substances and Nuclear Materials: Achievements, Challenges, and Solutions Viktor Petukhov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, Scientific Institute for Shipbuilding Technologies, Saint Petersburg Mikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety, Saint Petersburg 196 Russian Federation Regulations Governing the Management of Radioactive Waste Andrei Talevlin, Chairman of the Board, For Nature Charity Fund, Chelyabinsk; and Senior Instructor, Civil, Land, and Environmental Law Dept., Law School, Chelyabinsk State University ...... 206
466 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Dismantlement of Nuclear Service Ships in Northwest Russia: Environmental Problems and Solutions Sergei Zhavoronkin, Secretary, Murmansk Oblast Public Council on Nuclear Energy Safety and Expert, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia Murmansk Affiliate...... 209 Submersion of Materials that Constitute Nuclear and Radioactive Hazards: Past, Present and Future Yuri Sivintsev, Senior Scientific Collaborator and Professor, Kurchatov Institute. 219 A Unified Federal System for Radioactive Waste Management: A Prerequisite for the Development of Nuclear Energy Oleg Muratov, Executive Secretary, Northwest Branch of the Nuclear Society of Russia, St. Petersburg...... 238 Proposal for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management in Russia Alexander Nikitin, Director, Bellona Public Organization, St. Petersburg...... 251 Results of the Sample-Based Radiation Inspection of the Zvezdochka Health Protection and Observation Zones. Measurement of External Gamma Radiation Dose Equivalent and Beta Particles Flux Density on Yagry Island, Severodvinsk Vladimir Kuznetsov, Director, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program, Green Cross Russia, and Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Academy of Industrial Ecology, and Member of RosAtom’s Public Council Vladimir Nikitin, General Director, Zvezdochka Shipyard, Severodvinsk Nikolai Shcherbinin, Director, Green Cross Public Outreach Office, Severodvinsk .255 Plenary Session on Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Anatolii Nazarov, Director, Environmental Center of the Vavilov Institute for Natural History and Technology, Member of Russian Academy of Sciences; and Deputy Chairman, RosAtom’s Public Council; and Member, Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.257 The Nuclear and Radiation Legacy of Northwest Russia: Problems, Solutions, and the Role of the Public Mikhail Rylov, Director, Center for Nuclear and Radiological Safety; and Vice President, Green Cross Russia, St. Petersburg...... 258 The Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and the Environmental Rehabilitation of Facilities Constituting Nuclear and Radiation Hazards: Experience, Today’s Problems, and the Future Viktor Kovalenko, Associate Manager, RosAtom’s Department for SNF and RW Management and Decommissioning Hazardous Nuclear and Radiation Facilities Alexander Pimenov, Deputy Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET), Moscow Vladimir Shishkin , Senior Engineer, Dollezhal Institute (NIKIET), Moscow... 265
467 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
The 1954 Nuclear Exercise at the Totskoye Test Range: How is this “Radiation Legacy” Dangerous? Sergei Zelentsov, The Government Institute for Strategic Stability, RosAtom, Moscow Vadim Logachev, Co-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman, Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom, Professor, Moscow...... 277 Resolving Radiation Safety Problems in the Kurgan Oblast Ivan Manilo, Director, Kurgan Public Outreach and Information Office, Green Cross Russia, and Member, Russian Environmental Academy Lyudmila Ponomareva and Aleksandr Revyakin Shadrinsk State Pedagogical Institute...... 288 Comprehensive Radioecological Examination of the Territories and Surrounding Waters near Nuclear Submarine Stationing and Dismantlement Points Sergey Vakulovskiy, Deputy Director, Typhoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast V. Kim, M. Propisnova, A. Nikitin, I. Katrich, V. Chumichyov, A. Volokitin Typhoon Company, Obninsk, Kaluzhskaya Oblast...... 292 The Global Consequences of Nuclear Testing Pavel Munin, Head of Department, Moscow Academy of Business Administration, Eurasian Center of Continuous Development...... 302 Nuclear Tests on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the Nuclear Cultural Legacy Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom A. Volkov, The BTS Scientific Research Center under the Russian Defense Ministry, St. Petersburg Vladimir Safronov, Radon Federal Scientific and Industrial Association, Moscow Nadezhda Shusharina, The Global Climate and Environment Institute under RosGidromet and the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Petr Boyarsky, The Likhachev Russian Cultural and Natural Legacy Scientific Research Institute, Moscow...... 308
468 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in the USSR: Hopes and Realities Albert Vasilyev, Director, International Center for Environmental Safety under the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, Moscow Vladimir Kasatkin, Department Head, PromTechnologia Scientific Institute, Moscow...... 318 The Semipalatinsk Test Site, Exploring the Nuclear Underworld: A Beginner’s Guide to Radiation Levels in Cavities Created by Underground Nuclear Explosions Samat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov Anatoliy Matushchenko, Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom; Co-chairman, Interagency Expert Commission on Assessing Radiation Safety of Underground Nuclear Tests; Professor, Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Technology, Moscow Aleksandr Kiryukhin, RosAtom Situation Crisis Center...... 342 The Nuclear Explosion in the Aral Desert Alexander Aidin , State Science Center Institute of Biophysics at the Federal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia, Moscow Sergei Zelentsov, The Federal Institute of Strategic Stability, RosAtom, Moscow Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering; Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom...... 354 Evaluating the Consequences of the Totskoye Nuclear Tests in 1954 Vladimir Baskakov, President, Green Cross Russia Orenburg Affiliate ...... 361 Post-Plenary Discussion on the Consequences of Nuclear Device Testing ...... 364 A Nuclear Aluminum Investment Project for Balakovo Anna Vinogradova, Head, Balakovo Affiliate of the All-Russian Society for Nature Conservation, Saratov Oblast...... 366 The Uranium Tailing Pit in Tien Shan and Environmental Consequences for the Local Population Igor Khodjamberdiev, Coordinator of the Toxic Action Network for Central Asia and Co-Chairman of the International Social-Ecological Union, Kyrgyz Republic ...... 370 Muslyumovo: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow Milya Kabirova, Techa Environmental Organization, Chelyabinsk...... 375 Environmental Aspects of Radiation Safety near the Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine Tamara Ashikhmina, Director, Laboratory for Bio-Monitoring, Vyatka State Humanitarian University; President, Green Cross Russia Kirov Affiliate...... 380
469 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
Nuclear “Red Herrings” Along the Eurasian Canal Vladimir Lagutov , Chairman, Green Don Environmental Movement, Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast...... 386 Nuclear Energy, Society and Security Andrei Frolov , Union of Public Environmental Organizations, Moscow ...... 393 Dialogue Closing Discussion...... 395 Closing Statement Sergei Baranovsky, President, Green Cross Russia; Member of Green Cross International’s Board of Directors; Professor and Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences ...... 398 The Widespread Effects of “Peaceful” and “Non-Peaceful” Uses of Nuclear Energy in the Orenburg Oblast on Humans and Nature Valentin Dombrovsky, Chairman of Green Committee, Orenburg...... 400 Nuclear Tests in the USSR: The Red Book (From Nuclear History: Fear, Horror and Nuclear Blackmail) Anatoliy Matushchenko, Co-Chairman of the Interagency Expert Commission under the Scientific Research Institute for Pulse Engineering, and Advisor to the Department Head, RosAtom Samat Smagulov, Senior Scientific Collaborator, State Institute for Applied Ecology, Saratov Vadim Logachev, Co-Chairman, Inter-Departmental Expert Commission for the Assessment of Radio-Ecological Safety of Full-Scale Experiments, Institute for Bio-Physics, Moscow ...... 405 Why We Need the History of Science: Understanding and Resolving Radiation Problems Marina Khvostova, Senior Scientific Collaborator, Environmental Center, Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technics, Russian Academy of Sciences ...... 438 Russian Participants...... 443 International Participants...... 452 Abbreviations...... 454
470 Second Russian National Dialogue on ENERGY, SOCIETY AND SECURITY
21-22 April 2008 Saint Petersburg, Russia
472 The Legacy Program Operating on the principle of “cooperation, not confrontation,” the Legacy of the Cold War Energy, Society And Security Second Russian National Dialogue On Energy, Society And Security Second Russian National Dialogue On Program (otherwise known as “The Legacy Program”) engages in neutral, third-party facilitation of issues related to arms control and disarmament, demilitarization, technology development Green Cross Russia for safe weapons destruction, nonproliferation, military base cleanup and conversion, and socio- economic development of communities impacted by weapons stockpiles. Green Cross Switzerland More specifically, the Legacy Program works to: Global Green USA • Support the safe and environmentally-sound demilitarization of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biological – as integral to the implementation of arms control treaties; • Provide access to information for communities near weapons destruction facilities and Second Russian National stockpiles and ensure open channels for dialogue between citizens and authorities; Dialogue On • Promote stakeholder input and involvement in demilitarization-related decision- Dialogue On making processes through citizens’ advisory commissions, public hearings, and national dialogues; • Address the weapons-related health, environment, and welfare concerns of affected Energy, communities by working through schools, hospitals, local government, and the media to promote understanding of weapons destruction processes, encourage emergency preparedness, and support sustainable economies and democratic policies; Society And • Educate legislatures and policy-makers in Russia, Europe, and the U.S. on the importance of international support for demilitarization and organize international gatherings of officials to encourage dialogue, collaboration, and consensus; Security • Collaborate with like-minded groups to advocate for continued funding of demilitarization and nonproliferation efforts, in particular the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative; and • Mediate and facilitate globally to make progress in arms control, disarmament, and 21-22 April 2008 nonproliferation. Saint Petersburg, Russia Global Green USA Green Cross Switzerland Green Cross Russia The Legacy Program spearheads a range of public outreach and education initiatives. In Russia, Global Green USA Green Cross Switzerland Green Cross Russia for example, the Legacy Program maintains 13 public outreach and information centers to educate and support communities near chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear submarine dismantlement sites. The centers are an important resource for residents seeking access to specific information and a channel to communicate with authorities. The Legacy Program also organizes forums promoting frank exchange on weapons and security issues. Two of the most important are the “National Dialogues” on Russian chemical weapons destruction, and on nuclear energy, society, and security held annually in Russia. A similar “Legacy Forum” is also held annually in the U.S. on global weapons demilitarization and nonproliferation.
The Legacy Program is a international effort of Green Cross International managed primarily by Global Green USA (Washington DC), Green Cross Switzerland (Basel and Zurich), and Green Cross Russia (Moscow). More information is available at www.globalgreen.org, www.greencross.ch, www.green-cross.ru, and www.gci.ch.
Global Green USA Green Cross Russia Green Cross Switzerland 1717 Massachusetts Ave, NW 3 Krasina St. Fabrikstrasse 17 Suite 600 Moscow, Russia 123056 8005 Zürich, Switzerland Washington, DC 20036, USA Tel: +7-495-925-6997 Tel: +41-43-499-1313 Tel: +1-202-222-0700