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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Radboud Repository PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen The following full text is a publisher's version. For additional information about this publication click this link. http://hdl.handle.net/2066/187266 Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-04-11 and may be subject to change. Alphonsus Vargas on the Powers of the Intellective Soul Alphonsus Vargas on the Powers of the Intellective Soul With an Edition of Vargas’s Quaestiones de Anima 2.4 Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur inter se realiter Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, volgens besluit van het college van decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 20 maart 2018 om 12.30 uur precies door Johannes Hermanus Ludovicus van den Bercken geboren op 14 maart 1945 te Horst (L.) Promotor: Prof. dr. P.J.J.M. Bakker Copromotor: Dr. W.O. Duba (Université de Fribourg, Zwitserland) Manuscriptcommissie: prof. dr. L. Spruit prof. dr. J.M.M.H. Thijssen prof. dr. E.P. Bos (Universiteit Leiden) prof. dr. R.L Friedman (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, België) prof. dr. T. Noone (Catholic University of America, Verenigde Staten) On the cover: Personification of the human soul. Pontifical matutinale and missal of Jean Coeur. France, Bourges, ca. 1465. Pierpont Morgan Library, MS G.49 fol. 2r © 2018, John van den Bercken Printed by Ipskamp Printing, Enschede Typesetting by TAT Zetwerk, Utrecht Contents Abbreviations ix 1 Introduction 1 1 About This Study 1 2 Alphonsus Vargas and His Writings 3 A Note on Scholarship Concerning Vargas 5 3 Core Problems in the Medieval Science of the Soul 7 The Notion of ‘soul’ 8 One or More Souls in Man? 9 The Soul and Its Powers 10 The Intellective Soul and the Agent Intellect 11 The Process of Cognition and the Causes of Intellection 12 4 Overview 13 2 Opinions Concerning the Powers of the Soul at around 1300 17 1 Thomas Aquinas: (Real?) Distinction 18 2 Early Franciscan School: Distinction and Identity 24 3 Henry of Ghent and Vital du Four: Real Identity and Relational Distinction 28 4 John Duns Scotus 31 Unqualified Real Identity 34 Real Identity and Formal Distinction 37 Scotus and the ‘Middle Position’ 39 3 Making Distinctions 43 1 The Scotistic Understanding of the Formal Distinction and the Notion of ‘Formalities’ 45 2 Vargas’s Rejection of Formalities and the Formal Distinction 50 Gerald of Odo’s Formalistic Ontology 51 Scotus’s Theological Applications 56 3 The Evolution of the Conceptual Distinction 59 Early Initiatives 59 James of Pamiers and Alphonsus Vargas: Varieties of the Conceptual Distinction 61 vi contents Remarks on the Conceptual Distinction in Vargas’s Sentences Commentary 68 4 The Place of Vargas’s Conceptual Distinction in the Taxonomy of Distinctions 71 5 Conclusion 74 4 The Intellective Soul and Its Powers 77 1 The Relation between the Soul and Its Powers 78 Vargas’s Criticism of the Identity Thesis 81 Arguing for the Distinction View 84 The Origin of the Soul’s Powers of the Soul 87 2 Acts, Objects and Powers 91 Vargas and Gerard of Siena on the Role of Objects in Distinguishing Acts 94 Vargas on the Role of Acts in Distinguishing Powers 96 3 The Relation between Intellect and Memory: Giles of Rome and Vargas 98 4 The Relation between Intellect and Will 101 The View of Durand of Saint Pourçain and Vargas’s Criticism 101 Vargas’s Opinion: Real Distinction between Intellect and Will 103 5 Conclusion 104 5 The Nature and Function of the Agent Intellect 105 1 The Need for an Agent Intellect 106 2 The Position of the Agent Intellect in the Intellective Soul 109 3 James of Viterbo: The Agent Intellect and Congenital Aptitudes 114 4 Godfrey of Fontaines: The Agent Intellect and Abstraction 119 5 Vargas’s Criticism of Godfrey’s Opinion 121 6 The Function of the Agent Intellect according to Vargas 124 6 The Causes of Intellection 129 1 The Questions on the De Anima vs. the Sentences Commentary 130 2 Vargas’s General Assessment of the Candidate Causes of Intellection 133 The Role of the Object 133 The Role of the Possible Intellect 136 Object (or Species) Together with the Possible Intellect 137 3 Scotus’s Co-Causality Theory 137 4 Vargas’s Criticism of Partial Causality Theories 148 Landulph Caracciolo on the Role of the Object 149 contents vii Scotus and Caracciolo on the Role of the Possible Intellect 151 ‘Francis of Meyronnes’ on the Partial Causality of the Object and the Agent Intellect 158 5 Vargas’s View: The Agent Intellect as the Total Efficient Cause of Intellection 161 6 Concluding Remarks 162 7 Summary and Conclusions 181 8 Edition of QDA 2.4 191 Introduction and Outline 191 Text 197 Fontes 255 Samenvatting en Conclusies 263 Bibliography 275 Woord van Dank 285 Curriculum Vitae 287 Abbreviations DSC De spiritualibus creaturis (Aquinas) Ord. Ordinatio (Scotus) PL Patrologia Latina (ed. Migne, 1841–1855) QDA Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (Vargas and other authors) QMet Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Scotus) Quod. Quodlibetal question(s) (several authors) Rep. Reportatio (Scotus) SENT Commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Vargas and other authors) S. Th. Summa Theologiae (Aquinas) chapter 1 Introduction ‘Le Moyen Âge, c’était le salut. On ne peut s’emmerder nulle part quand dix siècles vous accompagnent. Le génie du Moyen Âge … c’est qu’on n’en verrait jamaislebout,qu’onpouvaitencorecreuserlà-dedansdesmilliersd’années…’ Fred Vargas, Un peu plus loin sur la droite (15) The present study is devoted to Alphonsus Vargas’s views on the nature and function of the powers of the intellective soul as found in his Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (QDA).InthisintroductorychapterIbrieflypointoutthepurposeof thestudy(section 1), summarize what we know of Alphonsus Vargas’s life and works (section 2), indicate the main issues of the science of the soul at Vargas’s time (section 3), and point out which of them will be treated in the present the study (section 4). 1. About This Study The present study is primarily concerned with Vargas’s fourth question on book Two of Aristotle’s De Anima, which is in fact a collection of six subquestions, dealing with a variety of topics. The main question of QDA 2.4 is whether the powers of the soul are really distinct from each other, in particular, whether memory and intellect are really distinct and whether intellect and will are really distinct. But the answer to these substantive questions is prepared by an extensive discussion, taking up more than three quarters of the text, concerned with the methodology of making distinctions: the construal of a particular kind of the so-called conceptual distinction (the distinctio rationis ex natura rei necessitantis) and a set of auxiliary distinctions for describing the relation between powers, acts and objects. So the content of QDA 2.4 itself is already quite diverse, but the range of topics to be treated in the present study becomes even more diverse because several issues directly related to the nature and function of the intellective soul are treated in other parts of the QDA. Moreover, Vargas discusses some of these topics also in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, which postdates the QDA, so the it has to be consulted where it may clarify the positions held in the QDA. 2 chapter 1 Vargas’s QDA, in particular the parts dealing with the nature and function of the intellective soul, has not yet been the object of a thorough analysis. It is my aim to provide an introduction to Vargas’s views by covering the relevant source texts in a fairly detailed way. Like most authors of his time, Vargas develops his ideas in discussion with other opinions, considering and formulating lots of theses, arguments, objections and replies. Following Vargas on his winding way to his own conclusions does not make for smooth reading; at times it will come down to slaloming through a series of arguments and counterarguments. When Vargas discusses a number of alternative theories, he is wont to apply meticulously the general scholastic method of not only refuting arguments given in favour of an opinion but also to attack the opinion itself directly. A vexing problem, especially in the QDA, is the fact that the identity of Vargas’s sources and opponents is not clear at all, a problem that can only be solved on the basis of a thorough familiarity with the writings of Vargas’s contemporaries, much of which is only accessible in manuscript form. The required resources are to a large extent beyond my reach, but there are a few cases where I was lucky enough to identify Vargas’s interlocutor. In any event, before it is possible to recognize the influence of other authors on Vargas’s thought it is necessary to have a clear picture of what his thought actually is – that is what the present study hopes to achieve, at least for the issues discussed in it. Vargas’s views can often be summarized in a few statements, for example: Memory and intellect as powers of the intellective soul are conceptually distinct ex natura rei. Or:The agent intellectis not a powerof thesoul but acon-naturalhabit of the possible intellect and it is the only effective cause of acts of understanding. But even if such statements may be immediately clear to specialists of fourteenth-century philosophy, they hardly do justice to the reasoning that underlies them and to the context in which they were made.