An Essay in Moral Psychology
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WANTING THE BAD AND DOING BAD THINGS: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY By PETER BRIAN BARRY A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2005 Copyright 2005 by Peter Brian Barry ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful to a number of people for their contributions to this dissertation. My two greatest debts are owed to David Copp and Anton Tupa. As my supervisory committee chair, David faced the formidable task of reading and commenting on dozens of tortured drafts. His timely support and encouragement and wise counsel are greatly appreciated and I have learned much from him. Anton too helped guide earlier drafts into this present form. I only hope that he has enjoyed and benefited from working with me half as much as I have. Marina Oshana, Crystal Thorpe, and Dolores Albarracin all capably served as members of my supervisory committee. Marina and Crystal both provided crucial comments and suggestions for improvement. Dolores tolerated a layman’s forays and her very presence on my committee forced me to look for empirical confirmation of my theses. I am also grateful to members of the philosophy departments at the University of Florida and Bowling Green State University, especially John Biro, Kirk Ludwig, Chuang Lui, Greg Ray, David Sobel, Jon Tresan, and Gene Witmer. I also record my debt to the late Michael Robins, who served as my original dissertation advisor and sadly passed away while my dissertation was in its infancy. Mike is responsible for initiating and cultivating my interests in the philosophy of action and moral psychology. I fear that this dissertation barely resembles the project Mike briefly oversaw and that Mike may have less sympathy with my present views. I wish that I had a chance to argue with such a formidable philosopher again. He is missed. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER 1 THE IMP OF THE PERVERSE...................................................................................1 Introduction...................................................................................................................1 Wanting the Bad and Desirability...............................................................................10 What Intentionally Pursuing the Bad Is . and What it Is Not ...............................16 Intentionally Pursuing the Bad and Akratic Action....................................................29 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................34 2 DESIRE AND DESIRING THE BAD.......................................................................35 Introduction.................................................................................................................35 Humean Accounts of Desire.......................................................................................37 Nagel and Motivated Desires......................................................................................43 Hedonic Accounts of Desire.......................................................................................47 Thomism about Desire................................................................................................50 The Master Argument..........................................................................................64 Desiring the Bad and Intelligibility .....................................................................71 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................77 3 INTENTION AND INTENDING THE BAD............................................................78 Introduction.................................................................................................................78 The Function of Intention and the Nature of Intention...............................................79 Desire-Belief Reductions of Intention........................................................................84 Intentions as Evaluative Judgments............................................................................90 Intentions and Decisions to Act..................................................................................96 Whither Rationality?.................................................................................................101 Conclusion ................................................................................................................105 iv 4 ACTING FOR REASONS AND REASONS FOR INTENTIONALLY PURSUING THE BAD ............................................................................................109 Introduction...............................................................................................................109 The Problematic Syllogism.......................................................................................111 A Taxonomy of Reasons ..........................................................................................115 ‘Reason’ and Equivocation.......................................................................................122 The Problematic Syllogism Redux ...........................................................................128 Conclusion ................................................................................................................138 5 UNDERSTANDING, CONTROL, AND INTENTIONALLY PURSUING THE BAD..........................................................................................................................143 Introduction...............................................................................................................143 Goals and Having Goals ...........................................................................................145 Goal-Directed Behavior and Intentional Action.......................................................152 Full-Blooded Action, Control, and Conscious Direction .........................................155 Practical Reasoning ..................................................................................................163 Passive Cases of Treating as a Reason and Pursuing the Bad...........................166 Active Treating as a Reason and Pursuing the Bad...........................................170 Principled Decisions to Pursue the Bad.............................................................175 Resisting Raz’s Challenge ........................................................................................179 Conclusion ................................................................................................................182 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................183 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...........................................................................................193 v Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy WANTING THE BAD AND DOING BAD THINGS: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY By Peter Brian Barry August 2005 Chair: David Copp Major Department: Philosophy In this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to desire what is believed to be bad and not at all good, to intentionally pursue what is believed to be bad and not at all good, and that the believed badness of an action can be an agent’s reason for acting. I refer to these theses as the desirebad, intentionbad, and reasonbad theses, respectively. I consider various accounts of desire and I argue that all but one is consistent with the desirebad thesis. The account that is inconsistent, what I call the Thomist account, implies that believing that the object of desire is good is necessary for desiring it. However, the Thomist account depends on dubious assumptions about the nature of desire and what it is to act intelligibly. I also consider various accounts of intention and I argue that the intentionbad thesis is consistent with all of them, including accounts that identify intentions with a kind of evaluation and the outcome of a kind of decision. I then consider objections to my three theses. For example, it is plausible to suppose that intentional action is performed for reasons, but it seems that the intentional vi pursuit of the bad cannot be action performed for reasons. This objection fails because it fails to distinguish different kinds of reasons; in particular, it fails to distinguish normative reasons and an agent’s reason for acting. Here is another objection. Some philosophers claim that agents who intentionally pursue the bad cannot be in control of or understand themselves and what they do. I consider various ways that agents can possess control and understanding; for example, by having goals and performing goal-directed behavior, by deliberately forming and executing intentions, and by treating considerations as reasons. I argue that at least some agents who intentionally pursue the bad possess control and understanding, just as agents who act intentionally do. In responding to these objections, I develop a positive account of intentional action and agency that is inclusive enough to explain