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The Legacy of Clausewitz by ANTULIO J

The Legacy of Clausewitz by ANTULIO J

JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 76

War, Soldiering. , and RMA— DOD The Legacy of Clausewitz By ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

ver the last few years practi- older forms of will continue to co- tioners and students of war exist with newer ones, RMA, when alike have debated the na- complete, will mean that future war Oture and impact of the revo- will differ fundamentally from of lution in affairs (RMA) on fu- the past. It will include more intelli- ture war, especially with its emphasis gent warriors, knowledge-oriented on speed, precision, and intelligence weaponry, a five-dimensional - rather than the mass production and field (namely, breadth, depth, height, target saturation so characteristic of in- space, and time—the ability and subse- dustrial-age warfare. Moreover, analysts quent need to act within an enemy’s have pondered the impact of RMA on decision cycle), global envelopment, the structure and philosophy of the capabilities to attack simultaneously Army of the 21st century, conflicts short and precisely on the tactical, opera- of war, and . All of tional, and strategic levels, and an ex- these observers agree that even though plicit “civilianization of war” in terms of increased direct and indirect public Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is operations officer of participation. In addition, RMA will the 3/6 Regiment and formerly taught history at the likely challenge statecraft as diplomats U.S. Military Academy. adapt to the flow of real-time data, its

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effect on public opinion, and the un- the last century. Eberhard Kessel ar- certain political capabilities and limits gued, for example, that for Clausewitz of future war. Politik consisted of subjective and ob- Given the extent of such change, jective elements. The former related to does the thought of Carl von Clause- choices by political leaders about the witz, developed one hundred and sev- type of war to wage and the specific enty years ago, offer anything to aims to pursue. The latter involved warfighters of the future? Indeed, some dominant ideas, emotions, and politi- say that Clausewitz’s funeral rites are cal interrelationships unique to a given overdue: “[Future] war will be fought time and place.5 not to pursue national interests, but to In fact, Clausewitz’s varied use of kill enemy leaders, to convert oppo- Politik and the context in which he nents....Thus the core of Clausewitz’s wrote indicate that he signified three —that states wage things with the term. First, it meant pol- wars using armies in pursuit of politi- icy, the extension of the will of the state, cal objectives—will disappear.” 1 Some the decision to pursue goals, political or think that nuclear , transna- otherwise. Second, it meant politics as tional constabulary warfare, anti-ter- an external state of affairs—strengths rorism, counter-narcotrafficking, and and weaknesses imposed by geopolitical

position, resources, NDU Library Special Collections treaty, etc.—and as a Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz. despite technological changes from RMA process of internal inter- his conception of war remains valid action between key decisionmaking institu- tions and the personali- Political Forces greater compartmentalization among ties of policymakers. Last, it meant an The final three books of — political and military leaders render historically causative force, providing an on defense, attack, and war plans— obsolete the Clausewitzian definition explanatory framework for examining contain the majority of Clausewitz’s of war as an act of policy and his tri- war’s various manifestations over time. mature ideas pertaining to the influ- partite concept of war.2 Moreover, the The first definition appears princi- ence of politics on war. They also dis- relevance of On War 3 appears suspect pally in the first chapter of On War close that his military thought was be- for not addressing war as a cultural which discusses the nature of war. A coming increasingly historicist. He phenomenon: it not only fails to ex- prefatory note indicates that Clausewitz sought to interpret historical epochs on plain why wars occur, it views war considered only this chapter to be in their own terms and understood that from the perspective of the Western final form. But one must resist the temp- those who lived and fought in past nation-state paradigm.4 However, such tation to read no further, for while it wars were governed by institutions, val- arguments fundamentally misunder- might appear that the essence of Clause- ues, and beliefs unique to a specific stood what Clausewitz meant by poli- witz’s message can be grasped in 15 time and place. In “The Scale of the tics. In fact, despite technological pages rather than 600, this is not the Military Objective and of the Effort To changes introduced by RMA—as well case. As one authority observes, strong Be Made,” Clausewitz broadens his as those brought about by nuclear though circumstantial evidence suggests concept of Politik to encompass the first weapons—his conception of war re- that the note was written when On War and second definitions mentioned mains valid. was closer to completion than generally above. He refers to policymaking, for believed.6 Thus, individuals seeking a example, as more than a mere act of in- In Search of Politik “genuine understanding of Clausewitz telligence or product of pure reason: It Clausewitz’s description of war as cannot escape the task of actually read- is “an art in the broadest meaning of a “continuation of politics (Politik) by ing On War.” 7 Indeed, one should read the term—the faculty of using judg- other means” is well known but unfor- his other works as well. For example, his ment to detect the most important and tunately is often interpreted to mean notes on history and politics and the decisive elements in the vast array of that war is merely an act of state policy essay on “Agitation” (Umtriebe) reveal facts and situations.” This judgment, in aimed at achieving political aims. Part that his ideas were continually evolving. turn, was highly subjective, affected by of this confusion stems from the ambi- The hefty tome On War constitutes “qualities of mind and character of the guity of the term Politik, which means barely a third of them.8 Clausewitz is men making the decision—of the both policy and politics. But Clause- often clearer when read in German, but rulers, statesmen, and commanders, witz also deserves some blame for ne- the prerequisites for understanding this whether these roles are united in a sin- glecting to define in simple language great theorist are really patience and a gle individual or not.” States or soci- how this multivalent term was to be will to reflect. eties were not limited in form to understood. German scholars and sol- monarchies (constitutional or abso- diers alike have puzzled over that since lutist) and semi-rigid social hierarchies

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characteristic of his day, but “deter- While the Tartar system of formu- and chameleon-like, composed of sub- mined by their times and prevailing lating policy appears less sophisticated jective as well as objective natures. The conditions.” A state, for instance, can than that of or former consist of war’s means. Since be a united, sovereign entity, a “person- Bonaparte, it proved no less they vary over time and place, Clause- ified intelligence acting according to decisive in developing and witz dubbed them subjective. The lat- simple and logical rules,” or merely “an directing military force in pursuit of ter, on the other hand, embrace ele- agglomeration of loosely associated political objectives. As seen in this ex- ments of violence, uncertainty, chance, forces.” Hence, the definition applies ample, Clausewitz’s use of Politik af- and friction; and while embodying equally to feudal rulers, drug cartels, or fords both a transhistorical and tran- many varieties and intensities, they re- terrorist groups. Even numerous Euro- scultural perspective on war, one that main a constant part of war despite pean military institutions (for instance, at the same time respects historical time and place. Moreover, because war armies and command structures) have and cultural uniqueness. Thus the ele- is not an autonomous activity but a so- “differed in the various periods.” In ments that shape policy are both situa- cial and human event, it has two ten- fact, in his later books Clausewitz uses tional and cultural, objective and sub- dencies, escalation and reciprocation. the term military to mean all institu- Absent the moderating influence tions, procedures, philosophies, and technological advances affect the of policy and debilitating force of values of the military as a community. friction, these tendencies push Clausewitz employed several his- grammar of war, not its logic warfighting toward a violent ex- torical examples to show how policy treme. Thus, for Clausewitz war and political forces have shaped war jective (or rational, nonrational, and might change color like a chameleon, from antiquity to the modern age. His irrational according to political-scien- but its essential nature remains con- chapter “The Scale of the Objective” tific models).12 “The aims a belligerent stant—violent, unpredictable, and includes vastly different yet pro- adopts, and the resources he employs, prone to escalation. foundly similar wars of conquest and will be governed by the particular , in fact, resides in all plunder carried out by semi-nomadic characteristics of his own [geopolitical] elements of the trinity without altering Tartars and those of expansion prose- position; but they will also conform to their inter-relationship. Military tech- cuted by Napoleon’s armies. Selecting the spirit of the age and to its general nology, for example, might be defined the Tartars as an example of politics di- character.” as any technology used by a nation’s recting war is significant, for some forces for military purposes. While would claim that their “tribal soci- Technology and the Trinity items such as missiles fall in the mili- eties” fall outside the Western nation- With a more complete understand- tary corner of the trinity, their compo- state paradigm.9 Tartar tribes origi- ing of what Clausewitz meant by Politik, nent (such as microchips) nated in Central Asia along with other we can examine his tripartite concep- usually originate in the private sector. Turkic peoples. In the 12th and 13th tion of war in some detail. This “remark- Indeed, technologies related to com- centuries they were overtaken by Mon- able or paradoxical trinity,” as it has munications and transportation have gols and mixed with them. They par- been called, is Clausewitz’s framework, broad application in all branches of ticipated in Mongol invasions of east- or model, for understanding the change- the trinity, thereby defying pat labels. ern Europe and the Middle East.10 They able and diverse nature of war. The The point is that the interdependency eventually converted to Islam and forces that comprise it—blind emotion, of various components of the trinity joined in Ottoman Jihads (holy wars of chance, and politics—function like will remain unchanged despite techno- conversion) against the West. Tartar “three different codes of law, deeply logical advances. The evolving infor- bands even raided in 1656–57, rooted in their subject and yet variable mation and communication technolo- burning hundreds of villages, killing in their relationship to one another.” gies of RMA will simply expand the 23,000, and enslaving 34,000.11 They They, in turn, correspond to three repre- immediacy—by shortening response thus fought for booty, to convert infi- sentative bodies—the character and dis- times and heightening sensitivity—for dels, to kill enemy leaders, and for position of the populace, skill and each component in its interaction with entertainment—all motives for future prowess of the military, and wisdom and the others.14 war as cited above. Yet, such motives, intelligence of the government. Information technology will cer- as Clausewitz knew, were shaped by re- Despite revolutionary advances in tainly demand increases in the intelli- sources available to the Tartars, their technology, this trinity remains rele- gence levels of and geopolitical role as a composite of vant to future war. Technology does civilians alike, or at least oblige them to Turkish and Mongol nations located in not require adding a fourth component process more information in less time. Central Asia, their nomadic culture to the trinity, squaring the triangle, as But it will not change the fact that rul- and traditions, and the religious influ- has been suggested.13 Technological ad- ing bodies—legitimate governments, ence of Islam. These factors all fell vances will not alter the framework of revolutionary cells, terrorist gangs, or under the rubric of political forces in war since they affect the grammar of drug cartels—will make decisions on Clausewitz’s mind. war, not its logic. In other words, new technologies change only war’s form, not its nature. War is multidimensional

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when, where, how, and why to apply force. Their decisions will be influenced by political forces such as power rela- tionships linked to alliances and treaties (either perceived or real), the effective- ness of key institutions involved in de- cisionmaking, and general assumptions, beliefs, and expectations held by deci- sionmakers. Events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and October 1973 War reveal that even in the modern age misperceptions continue to create and/or exacerbate crises.15 Technology will speed the transmission of informa- tion (already approaching real time), even provide it in new forms (such as satellite imagery), and may, depending on the scenario, reduce or expand the time for making decisions. But decision- makers will continue to receive a vast quantity of information through sub- jective filters; thus, their decisions will remain largely a matter of judgment, and that judgment will be shaped by USS Cape St. George political forces. firing SM–2 standard missile. Paradoxically, new technology in-

creases and decreases violence, chance, U.S. Navy (Johnny Wilson) uncertainty, and friction in unforeseen and uneven ways. New weapons sys- tems enable both sides to observe and as some claim.18 His dictum that “war The destructive power of nuclear strike simultaneously throughout the is the continuation of Politik by other weapons, prospect of runaway escala- depth of a battlefield, thus eliminating means” is as valid in a nuclear conflict tion, and concept of superconductiv- safe areas. The five-dimensional battle- as in conventional war. The evolution ity—the elimination of friction by re- field means that operational comman- of nuclear from massive retali- ducing the chain of events between the ders must consider defeating either an decision to launch and the actual attack or a counterattack from various launch of a strike—will reduce or directions at any time. A general “lack Clausewitz’s thought does not negate the influence of policymakers of immunity” will prevail as units at all insist that warfare serves a on nuclear war should it occur.20 Obvi- echelons of command and control en- ously, until the technology is devel- dure greater risk.16 Precision-guided purely rational aim oped to harmlessly disarm nuclear weapons and munitions do increase weapons in flight, the possibility of the certainty of a hit or kill, but the ation in the 1950s to flexible response aborting or down-scaling nuclear war weak link will be supplying reliable in the early 1960s, for instance, shows after a launch is minimal. But such re- and timely target data.17 Enemies will how Politik affects war even in the nu- alities are merely products of the times take measures and countermeasures clear age.19 Since 1945 policymakers and constitute what Clausewitz, in his against this, and tactics will change as have duly responded to changing situ- historicist approach, would have con- a result. Thus new technology alone ations, growing strike and counter- sidered the subjective elements of war will not prove decisive in future war; it strike capabilities, and the will of the —means selected for its prosecution— will require a harness of sorts—a flexi- populace by determining that, because that distinguish nuclear war from other ble, comprehensive doctrine that inte- of attendant risks, nuclear war did not forms of conflict in the nuclear age. It grates the tactical, operational, and suit national objectives; hence, other might be an exaggeration to claim that strategic levels of war. The objective more conventional forms of war re- such means are the ultimate expression nature of Clausewitz’s concept of war ceived more attention while nuclear of the remarkable trinity in terms of ab- will remain relevant. weapons assumed a deterrent role. Pol- solute war, but not by much. icy and politics have patently con- Again, Clausewitz’s mature thought The Nuclear Factor spired to force the avoidance of nu- does not insist that warfare serves a Even the development of nuclear clear war. purely rational political aim. In any arms, the so-called absolute , event, the definition of a rational politi- has not meant the death of Clausewitz, cal aim is largely subjective. A terrorist

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group can launch suicide bombings that 4 , A History of Warfare 19 The history of nuclear strategy did not it considers completely rational. Indeed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). end there. Strategies of the early 1960s gave the current world order advances the 5 In its polemics with Hans Delbrück, rise to mutual assured destruction, mutual possibility of a limited nuclear exchange the German great general argued that agreed assured destruction, Carter’s counter- between states or groups which have rel- war was indeed subordinate to politics, but vailing strategy, Reagan’s strategic defense that political forces had changed since initiative, etc. Donald M. Snow, National Se- atively small arsenals.21 Far from restrict- Clausewitz’s day. They saw politics as a so- curity: Enduring Problems in a Changing De- ing the influence of Politik over war, cial-Darwinistic struggle for national exis- fense Environment, 2nd edition (New York: St. such a climate is likely to increase it, tence that demanded war be waged to the Martin’s Press, 1991); Henry S. Rowen, “The while admittedly reducing the time poli- utmost. Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine,” in cymakers have to react to a strike. 6 It also appears in , The Origins Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, edited Nuclear weaponry does not render of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to by Laurence Martin (Baltimore: The Johns irrelevant the intelligence of the gov- Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 131– ernment, skill of the military, and pp. 255–63. 56; and Fan Zhen Jiang, “Is War Obsolete? A 7 emotive force of the populace as some Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in Chinese Perspective,” in Essays on Strategy believe. Rather, the advent of such English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain VI, edited by Thomas C. Gill (Washington: and America 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford National Defense University Press, 1989), weapons and attendant strategies re- University Press, 1994), p. 7. pp. 189–201. veals that each component of the trin- 8 These and other essays are found in 20 Stephen J. Cimbala, Force and Diplo- ity changes over time. Diplomacy is Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political macy in the Future (New York: Praeger, 1992); more aware that military action of any Writings, edited and translated by Peter and Richard N. Lebow, “Clausewitz and Cri- sort might generate unintended conse- Paret and Daniel Moran, (Princeton: Prince- sis Stability,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. quences and runaway escalation, and ton University Press, 1992). 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 81–110. it has developed systemic checks and 9 Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 11– 21 Jerome Kahan, Nuclear Threats from precautions to prevent that. The mili- 40; van Creveld, The Transformation of War, Small States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. tary has gradually altered its warrior pp. 33–62. Army War College, Insti- 10 ethos to prize rather than eschew intel- Douglas S. Benson, The Tartar War tute, 1994). (Chicago: Maverick Publishing, 1981). ligence and technical expertise. The 11 F.L. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia (Ox- public has also changed, becoming ford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 208. more educated and politicized, and 12 See Bassford’s discussion in Clausewitz, growing more sensitive to the fact that pp. 22–24, and “John Keegan and the the future rests in the hands of a few Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A chosen officials. Such developments do Polemic,” War in History, vol. 1, no. 3 not invalidate Clausewitz’s trinity but (1994), pp. 319–36. speak instead to its lasting durability 13 Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the and intrinsic dynamism. Age of Technology,” in Clausewitz and Mod- Of course, not all of Clausewitz’s ern Strategy, edited by Michael Handel (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 58–62. military thinking remains relevant. His 14 See also David Jablonsky, “U.S. Mili- vision of war did not include the eco- tary Doctrine and the Revolution in Mili- nomic, air, sea, and space dimensions, tary Affairs,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 (Au- for example. But his conception of war, tumn 1994), p. 34. his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of 15 Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Percep- the relationship between Politik and war tions: U.S. Crisis Decision Making will endure as long as states, drug car- (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, tels, warrior clans, and terrorist groups 1992). 16 have a mind to wage war. JFQ Avraham Rotem, “The Land Battle of the 1990s,” in Technology and Strategy: Future Trends, edited by Shai Feldman (Jerusalem: Jaf- NOTES fee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 56. 1 Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: 17 Shai Feldman, “Technology and Strat- Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century War- egy: Concluding Remarks,” in Technology fare,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter and Strategy, p. 130. 1994–95), pp. 126–32, here p. 130. 18 Sheppard, “Is Clausewitz Still Rele- 2 John E. Sheppard, Jr., “On War: Is vant?” pp. 88–91; and , Clausewitz Still Relevant?” Parameters, vol. and the Future of Conflict 20, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 85–99; Mar- (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp. 43–64. tin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 33–62. 3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

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