JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 76 War, Soldiering. Politics, and RMA— DOD The Legacy of Clausewitz By ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II ver the last few years practi- older forms of war will continue to co- tioners and students of war exist with newer ones, RMA, when alike have debated the na- complete, will mean that future war Oture and impact of the revo- will differ fundamentally from wars of lution in military affairs (RMA) on fu- the past. It will include more intelli- ture war, especially with its emphasis gent warriors, knowledge-oriented on speed, precision, and intelligence weaponry, a five-dimensional battle- rather than the mass production and field (namely, breadth, depth, height, target saturation so characteristic of in- space, and time—the ability and subse- dustrial-age warfare. Moreover, analysts quent need to act within an enemy’s have pondered the impact of RMA on decision cycle), global envelopment, the structure and philosophy of the capabilities to attack simultaneously Army of the 21st century, conflicts short and precisely on the tactical, opera- of war, and information warfare. All of tional, and strategic levels, and an ex- these observers agree that even though plicit “civilianization of war” in terms of increased direct and indirect public Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is operations officer of participation. In addition, RMA will the 3/6 Cavalry Regiment and formerly taught history at the likely challenge statecraft as diplomats U.S. Military Academy. adapt to the flow of real-time data, its 76 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 77 Echevarria effect on public opinion, and the un- the last century. Eberhard Kessel ar- certain political capabilities and limits gued, for example, that for Clausewitz of future war. Politik consisted of subjective and ob- Given the extent of such change, jective elements. The former related to does the thought of Carl von Clause- choices by political leaders about the witz, developed one hundred and sev- type of war to wage and the specific enty years ago, offer anything to aims to pursue. The latter involved warfighters of the future? Indeed, some dominant ideas, emotions, and politi- say that Clausewitz’s funeral rites are cal interrelationships unique to a given overdue: “[Future] war will be fought time and place.5 not to pursue national interests, but to In fact, Clausewitz’s varied use of kill enemy leaders, to convert oppo- Politik and the context in which he nents....Thus the core of Clausewitz’s wrote indicate that he signified three philosophy of war—that states wage things with the term. First, it meant pol- wars using armies in pursuit of politi- icy, the extension of the will of the state, cal objectives—will disappear.” 1 Some the decision to pursue goals, political or think that nuclear weapons, transna- otherwise. Second, it meant politics as tional constabulary warfare, anti-ter- an external state of affairs—strengths rorism, counter-narcotrafficking, and and weaknesses imposed by geopolitical position, resources, NDU Library Special Collections treaty, etc.—and as a Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz. despite technological changes from RMA process of internal inter- his conception of war remains valid action between key decisionmaking institu- tions and the personali- Political Forces greater compartmentalization among ties of policymakers. Last, it meant an The final three books of On War— political and military leaders render historically causative force, providing an on defense, attack, and war plans— obsolete the Clausewitzian definition explanatory framework for examining contain the majority of Clausewitz’s of war as an act of policy and his tri- war’s various manifestations over time. mature ideas pertaining to the influ- partite concept of war.2 Moreover, the The first definition appears princi- ence of politics on war. They also dis- relevance of On War 3 appears suspect pally in the first chapter of On War close that his military thought was be- for not addressing war as a cultural which discusses the nature of war. A coming increasingly historicist. He phenomenon: it not only fails to ex- prefatory note indicates that Clausewitz sought to interpret historical epochs on plain why wars occur, it views war considered only this chapter to be in their own terms and understood that from the perspective of the Western final form. But one must resist the temp- those who lived and fought in past nation-state paradigm.4 However, such tation to read no further, for while it wars were governed by institutions, val- arguments fundamentally misunder- might appear that the essence of Clause- ues, and beliefs unique to a specific stood what Clausewitz meant by poli- witz’s message can be grasped in 15 time and place. In “The Scale of the tics. In fact, despite technological pages rather than 600, this is not the Military Objective and of the Effort To changes introduced by RMA—as well case. As one authority observes, strong Be Made,” Clausewitz broadens his as those brought about by nuclear though circumstantial evidence suggests concept of Politik to encompass the first weapons—his conception of war re- that the note was written when On War and second definitions mentioned mains valid. was closer to completion than generally above. He refers to policymaking, for believed.6 Thus, individuals seeking a example, as more than a mere act of in- In Search of Politik “genuine understanding of Clausewitz telligence or product of pure reason: It Clausewitz’s description of war as cannot escape the task of actually read- is “an art in the broadest meaning of a “continuation of politics (Politik) by ing On War.” 7 Indeed, one should read the term—the faculty of using judg- other means” is well known but unfor- his other works as well. For example, his ment to detect the most important and tunately is often interpreted to mean notes on history and politics and the decisive elements in the vast array of that war is merely an act of state policy essay on “Agitation” (Umtriebe) reveal facts and situations.” This judgment, in aimed at achieving political aims. Part that his ideas were continually evolving. turn, was highly subjective, affected by of this confusion stems from the ambi- The hefty tome On War constitutes “qualities of mind and character of the guity of the term Politik, which means barely a third of them.8 Clausewitz is men making the decision—of the both policy and politics. But Clause- often clearer when read in German, but rulers, statesmen, and commanders, witz also deserves some blame for ne- the prerequisites for understanding this whether these roles are united in a sin- glecting to define in simple language great theorist are really patience and a gle individual or not.” States or soci- how this multivalent term was to be will to reflect. eties were not limited in form to understood. German scholars and sol- monarchies (constitutional or abso- diers alike have puzzled over that since lutist) and semi-rigid social hierarchies Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 77 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 78 ■ JFQ FORUM characteristic of his day, but “deter- While the Tartar system of formu- and chameleon-like, composed of sub- mined by their times and prevailing lating policy appears less sophisticated jective as well as objective natures. The conditions.” A state, for instance, can than that of Frederick the Great or former consist of war’s means. Since be a united, sovereign entity, a “person- Napoleon Bonaparte, it proved no less they vary over time and place, Clause- ified intelligence acting according to decisive in developing strategies and witz dubbed them subjective. The lat- simple and logical rules,” or merely “an directing military force in pursuit of ter, on the other hand, embrace ele- agglomeration of loosely associated political objectives. As seen in this ex- ments of violence, uncertainty, chance, forces.” Hence, the definition applies ample, Clausewitz’s use of Politik af- and friction; and while embodying equally to feudal rulers, drug cartels, or fords both a transhistorical and tran- many varieties and intensities, they re- terrorist groups. Even numerous Euro- scultural perspective on war, one that main a constant part of war despite pean military institutions (for instance, at the same time respects historical time and place. Moreover, because war armies and command structures) have and cultural uniqueness. Thus the ele- is not an autonomous activity but a so- “differed in the various periods.” In ments that shape policy are both situa- cial and human event, it has two ten- fact, in his later books Clausewitz uses tional and cultural, objective and sub- dencies, escalation and reciprocation. the term military to mean all institu- Absent the moderating influence tions, procedures, philosophies, and technological advances affect the of policy and debilitating force of values of the military as a community. friction, these tendencies push Clausewitz employed several his- grammar of war, not its logic warfighting toward a violent ex- torical examples to show how policy treme. Thus, for Clausewitz war and political forces have shaped war jective (or rational, nonrational, and might change color like a chameleon, from antiquity to the modern age. His irrational according to political-scien- but its essential nature remains con- chapter “The Scale of the Objective” tific models).12 “The aims a belligerent stant—violent, unpredictable, and includes vastly different yet pro- adopts, and the resources he employs, prone to escalation. foundly similar wars of conquest and will be governed by the particular Technology, in fact, resides in all plunder carried out by semi-nomadic characteristics of his own [geopolitical] elements of the trinity without altering Tartars and those of expansion prose- position; but they will also conform to their inter-relationship.