War As Aesthetic: the Philosophy of Carl Von Clausewitz

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War As Aesthetic: the Philosophy of Carl Von Clausewitz WAR AS AESTHETIC: THE PHILOSOPHY OF CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AS THE EMBODIMENT OF JOHN DEWEY’S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE A Dissertation by OAK HERBERT DE BERG Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2011 Major Subject: Philosophy War as Aesthetic: The Philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz as the Embodiment of John Dewey’s Concept of Experience Copyright 2011 Oak Herbert De Berg WAR AS AESTHETIC: THE PHILOSOPHY OF CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AS THE EMBODIMENT OF JOHN DEWEY’S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE A Dissertation by OAK HERBERT DE BERG Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, John J. McDermott Committee Members, Gregory F. Pappas Kristi Sweet John Van Alstyne David Erlandson Head of Department, Daniel Conway August 2011 Major Subject: Philosophy iii ABSTRACT War as Aesthetic: The Philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz as the Embodiment of John Dewey’s Concept of Experience. (August 2011) Oak Herbert De Berg, B.S., University of California at Berkeley; B.A., University of Texas at San Antonio; M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott This dissertation confirms war as the zenith of aesthetic experience and demonstrates the pragmatic nature of war through explication of John Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy. Likewise, the coherency of Carl von Clausewitz’s philosophy parallels Dewey as it too leads to complete development, or flourishing, of the individual in a complex, ever-changing world. Von Clausewitz’s sets his philosophy in the context of war, but his philosophy transcends that milieu. The timelessness of the General’s philosophical concepts guarantees the appropriateness of these concepts in today’s inconstant world. To exemplify this point, this paper applied von Clausewitz’s concepts to the range of contemporary wars in which the demands on modern warriors are often perceived as qualitatively different from demands placed on individuals in the armies of the early 1800s. This perception is shown to lack credibility and, even though the methods and technologies of war are in continuous flux while the basic nature of war remains unchanged, the germane nature of the General’s iv philosophy to contemporary times remains unsullied and follows logically. Rather than simply asserting that the concepts of these two philosophers are apropos in the contemporary context of war, this dissertation concludes by contending that modern military thinkers employ the Clausewitzian philosophy, as synthesized by John Boyd, as a basis for fighting in today’s contemporary environment. As an exemplar, the current doctrine of the United States Marine Corps is offered as a template of the philosophy of von Clausewitz and, by extension, Dewey. Modern war, once established as an archetype of the Deweyan philosophy, can be claimed as the primary illustration of the aesthetic. v DEDICATION To Joellen de Berg To my best friend, mentor and love of my life. Little did I realize how her statement to me in the fall of 2006 would change my life. As I lounged in my comfortable chair musing on world events Joellen looked me in the eye and said, “You are bored. You need to apply to graduate school. If you keep sitting in that chair you will waste away.” I think she was correct. Thank you, dearest one. To John J. McDermott To a good friend and teacher par excellence. Not only does he care passionately for his students and their understanding of the art of living but he also serves as the example of the consummate teacher. I can think of no higher accolade. His gentle guidance and “pep talks” kept this student on track and out of the weeds. I was indeed fortunate to be able to spend time with the professor. Professor John J. McDermott is living proof of what education should be. Unfortunately, few others are able to fulfill those requirements. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people made this dissertation possible. As anyone who has entered into a grand project knows, great effort is rarely rewarded if an individual tries to “go it alone.” Nothing could be more true than when applied to completing a dissertation. My dissertation committee provided excellent advice and encouragement. For their support, I wish to thank Professors Gregory Pappas, Kristi Sweet, John Van Alstyne, David Erlandson and committee chair, John J. McDermott. Grateful appreciation is given also to the Chair of the Texas A&M Department of Philosophy, Dr. Daniel Conway. Not only did Dr. Conway extend much appreciated support but also he gave me the opportunity to teach the great undergraduate students in “Aggieland.” That opportunity, teaching military ethics, led eventually to this dissertation. As important as the faculty support, perhaps even more important, the support from my fellow graduate students kept me going when times were rough. A special group of my comrades were instrumental in seeing that “the old man” kept on track. This group, informally calling themselves “The Pondertorians,” consists of John Tyler, Kim Diaz, Dr. Paul Shockley, Olga Gerhart, Charles Carlson and, of course, Professor Scott Austin, our honorary faculty member. The Pondertorians gave, and continue to give, each other support to see one another through the “dark times.” My office mate, John Tyler, deserves yeoman’s credit for listening to all my ideas and giving cogent comments and feedback. vii Without question, any success I have enjoyed at Texas A&M would not have been possible without the wonderful support of the team in the “front office.” When I needed help with any administrative tasks, everyone eagerly assisted. Never did I hear any complaint. To Katie Wright, Jamie Bosley, Michelle Wiechold, Tom Ellis, and Osmara Garcia I offer a hearty, “Thank you!” Not to be forgotten is Ms. Laura Torres. As I worked in my office very early in the morning, I often heard a knock on my door before 6:00 a.m. and Laura appeared with words of encouragement. She would say, “No problem, you can do it!” then she departed to go about her business of keeping our offices neat and tidy. Thank you Laura. Finally, I must applaud my entire family for standing by me and helping me through the work of writing a dissertation. My wife, Joellen, has been wonderful in this endeavor. She read all my papers and offered advice on how to make them better. For all the faults that may surface in my work, only I can be held responsible. My daughter, Karen, and my grandchildren, Emily, Anna and Andrew, often bring me back to earth with statements such as, “Granddad, why are you going to school. After all, you already receive social security checks; what else do you want?” The answer is, "Not much. Perhaps, to think about life’s great mysteries, teach a bit, and stay out of my easy chair.” To all who I have not thanked personally but have been by my side in this quest, please accept my most sincere and profound thanks. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………….… iii DEDICATION …………………………………………………………………………………………………… v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………………………………………………………… vi TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………………………viii LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………………………………………… x CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: ESTABLISHING A PHILOSOPHY FOR THE NATURE OF WAR ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 1 II EXPERIENCE AS BEDDING FOR THE AESTHETIC …………………………………. 12 Experience as Pedagogical ……………………………………………………….… 14 Experience and Nature ……………………………………………………………… 30 Art as Experience …………………………………………………………………….… 42 III THE PHILOSOPHICAL AMBIENCE OF VON CLAUSEWITZ’S “ON WAR” ….… 60 What Is War? …………………………………………………………………………….. 63 The Genius for War ……………………………………………………………………. 74 Friction and Resistance ……………………………………………………………… 84 Theory, Practice, and Moral Forces …………………………………………….. 87 War as Art or Science? ……………………………………………………………….. 92 Pedagogical Value of Moral Virtue ……………………………………………… 97 IV DEWEYAN RETROSPECTIVE ON VON CLAUSEWITZ’S PHILOSOPHY …….. 104 The Aesthetic ……………….…………………………………………………………... 106 Continuity …………………………………….………………………………………….. 122 Uncertainty and Friction; the Organism ……………..………………………. 128 Theory and Practice, (or the Abstract and the Real) ….………………... 141 Art and Science ……………………………………………………………….……….. 145 Existence as a Social Construct………………………….……………………..… 151 ix CHAPTER Page The Live Creature and the Military Genius …………………………………. 156 V THE DEWEY/VON CLAUSEWITZ PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN WAR …………167 The Nature of Contemporary War ……………………………….…………… 170 Boyd’s Philosophical Synthesis ………………………………………………… 178 The Philosophical Basis for Fighting (and Winning) Modern Wars …………………………………………………………………188 Dewey and von Clausewitz’s Philosophy in Practice …..……………… 195 Observations on the Philosophical Demands for Victory ……………. 202 VI CONCLUSON: THE AESTHETIC VERDICT ON WAR ……………………………..… 216 ENDNOTES …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 223 BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 224 APPENDIX I ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 229 APPENDIX II ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 239 VITA …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 241 x LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page 1 The OODA Loop …………………………………………………………………………… 192 2 Battle of Cannae, Initial Roman Attack and Defeat of the Roman Cavalry……………………………………………………………………………… 210 3 Battle of Cannae, Destruction of the Roman Army ..................................... 211 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION:
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