Action, Outcome, and Value: a Dual- System Framework for Morality

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Action, Outcome, and Value: a Dual- System Framework for Morality PSRXXX10.1177/1088868313495594<italic>Personality and Social Psychology Review</italic>Cushman 495594research-article2013 Article Personality and Social Psychology Review 17(3) 273 –292 Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual- © 2013 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reprints and permissions: System Framework for Morality sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1088868313495594 pspr.sagepub.com Fiery Cushman1 Abstract Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between “emotional” and “rational/cognitive” processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain. Keywords dual-system theory, morality, emotion, reasoning, reinforcement learning A central aim of the current research in moral psychology is How can we bridge the gap between these literatures, to characterize a workable dual-system framework (Bartels, applying insights from computational neuroscience to the 2008; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, 2007; qualitative distinction between two systems widespread in Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; moral judgment research? This requires formulating core Haidt, 2001; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Young & Koenigs, concepts from each domain in common terms. The approach 2007). Candidate systems are sometimes described in terms pursued here is to distinguish two systems of value repre- of intuition versus reasoning, automaticity versus control, sentation—action- versus outcome-based—and to show that and emotion versus cognition. While there is considerable the connection between the computational models and psy- agreement that a dual-system framework of some kind is chological phenomena is more than a loose analogy or fam- necessary, agreement is far from universal; moreover, the ily resemblance. Rather, the models provide a detailed basis contours, functions, and relative influence of each are dis- for understanding otherwise peculiar facets of moral puted (Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009; judgment. Kvaran & Sanfey, 2010; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008; Paxton & Greene, 2010; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). Dual-System Morality Meanwhile, current research into the neurological basis of decision making has been transformed by the identification The utility of a dual-system framework for understanding of two broad classes of algorithms that structure learning and human judgment, reasoning, and behavior has been force- behavioral choice. One algorithm encodes the value of fully argued elsewhere (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; actions by associating them with subsequent punishment and Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Some of the evi- reward, leveraging prediction error and temporal difference dence that motivates a dual-system approach specifically for learning to efficiently represent whether an action is reward- moral judgment is reviewed below, but equally emphasized ing without representing what makes it so. The other algo- are the shortcomings of the current characterizations of the rithm encodes the value of outcomes and selects actions systems (e.g., as emotional vs. rational). I argue for an alter- based on their expected value, relying on a probabilistic native characterization of the systems that distinguishes causal model that relates actions, outcomes, and rewards. This broad distinction, first identified in the machine learn- 1Brown University, Providence, RI, USA ing literature (Sutton & Barto, 1999), provides a valuable Corresponding Author: description of the two systems of learning and decision mak- Fiery Cushman, CLPS Department, Brown University, Box 1821, 190 ing in the human brain (Daw & Doya, 2006; Daw & Shohamy, Thayer St, Providence, RI 02912, USA. 2008; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Email: [email protected] Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at BROWN UNIVERSITY on September 13, 2013 274 Personality and Social Psychology Review 17(3) between valuing the intrinsic status of actions (e.g., “I must cortex (Cushman, Murray, Gordon–McKeon, Wharton, & tell George the truth because lying is wrong”) and valuing Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 2004). Under cognitive load, the expected consequences of actions (e.g., “if I deceive deontological judgment becomes more likely (Trémolière, De George it will ultimately cause him harm”). Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012) and utilitarian judgment is slowed My discussion centers largely on the extensive literature (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008); motivated by moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem, moreover, the latter effect is exclusive to “personal” (i.e., but not because the ethics of improbable railway crises carry push-type) cases. Meanwhile, deontological responding is much intrinsic interest. Rather, cases such as the trolley prob- reduced in individuals with damage to the ventromedial pre- lem appear to efficiently dissociate between processes of frontal cortex, a brain region thought to play a key role in inte- moral judgment that apply to a much broader set of empirical grating affect into decision making (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, phenomena, and now constitute the lingua franca of dozens Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto, of studies. As such, they are a useful proving ground for the Ladavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2010); again, this effect is action/outcome framework. selective to personal cases. In addition, deontological respond- ing is enhanced when serotonin levels are raised pharmaco- The Trolley Problem and the Aversion to Harm logically, consistent with the role of serotonin in aversive learning and inhibitory functions (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & The trolley problem contrasts two cases—the “switch” case Robbins, 2010). This effect, too, is selective to personal cases. and the “push” case (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985). In the These and other findings (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; “switch” case, a runaway trolley threatens five workers Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005; Moore, Clark, & Kane, ahead on the tracks, and it must be decided whether to flip a 2008; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Suter & Hertwig, 2011; switch that diverts the trolley onto a side track where only Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) suggest the influence of compet- one person is threatened. In the “push” case, five people are ing processes in personal cases. similarly threatened but there is no side track—instead, it While it is clear that some division between processes is must be decided whether to throw a person in front of the necessary, it is equally clear that the simple division between trolley to slow it down. A great majority of people say that “cognitive” and “emotional” processes is inadequate one person should be sacrificed for the sake of five in the (Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Huebner et al., 2009; first case, whereas a small minority say that one person Kvaran & Sanfey, 2010; Moll et al., 2008; Nucci & Gingo, should be sacrificed in the second case (Greene et al., 2001; 2010). First, both processes must involve affective content, Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, in the sense that they do not merely process information but 2000). Therein lies the problem: Given that in each case one also yield competing motivations toward distinct behaviors. person is sacrificed for the welfare of five, what accounts for In particular, the system that supports utilitarian responding this discrepancy? cannot merely represent the factual content, “5 lives is An influential answer to this challenge rests on a dual- more than 1 life”; rather, it must carry the affective force of system theory that contrasts cognitive and emotional pro- “choosing to save 5 lives is better than choosing to preserve cessing (Greene, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 1.” What is required, then, is not a theory distinguishing Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001). The controlled cognitive affective from nonaffective processing, but a theory distin- process is posited to underlie the welfare maximizing choice guishing two processes both of which involve affective con- in both cases, diverting the train as well as pushing the man, tent. For instance, two qualitatively distinct kinds of affective because of the greater number of lives saved. The automatic response may be at play, or affect may be triggered by dis- emotional process is posited to underlie the aversion to tinct factors in each process. doing harm in an up-close and personal manner, and thus to Second, both processes must involve cognition in the be engaged exclusively in the “push” case. Thus, the dual- sense of information processing. In particular, the psycho- system theory explains why the cases are judged differently logical mechanisms responsible for a deontological response (because the emotional system is more strongly
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