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An Actor-Centric Theory Of he United States, the most power- Soldiers and Afghan National Police coordinate ful nation in the world, is reas- security for Afghan national election, September 2010 sessing its approach to war. With TAmerica entering the 10th year of what was originally called the global war on terror, the Nation finds itself engaged in con- flicts in Central Asia and the Middle East that challenge decades of planning, training, and doctrine. Although collectively this series of campaigns recently crossed the marker-point for America’s longest combat engagement ever, arguments persist—even in the pages of this publication—as to whether we have the correct approach.1 This debate is, for the most part, limited in scope.2 In general, it can be summarized as revolving around one contentious point: whether one agrees with the idea that the United States must redefine its fighting capacity based upon irregular threats—such as insurgency—or not. On the one hand, we have the proponents of a counterinsurgency, or COIN, approach often associated with U.S. Army (Chris G. Neeley) one of Washington’s newest think tanks, the Center for a New American Security, and its energetic president, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.3 In brief, the An Actor-centric argument on this side of the current debate is that the U.S. Army (note, not the U.S. Marine Corps) deliberately shunned irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency in particular, Theory of War after it was “not allowed” (politically) to win the Vietnam war.4 Only when faced 30 years later in Iraq with an insurgency that seemed Understanding the Difference to be winning did the uniformed establish- ment return to the library of irregular warfare Between COIN and Counterinsurgency and, under the leadership of General David Petraeus, rewrite and embrace this form of war in the shape of revised Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency.5 This doctrinal By SEBASTIAN L.v . GORKA revival, so the story goes, was operational- and DAVID KILCULLEN ized in the “surge” that stabilized Iraq. The strongest proponents of this rediscovery and renewed emphasis on counterinsurgency see the future as predominantly shaped by irregular challenges and thus argue for Everything in war is very simple, an approach to the use of force that sees but the simplest thing is difficult. conventional warfare as passé (at least for the time being). Some go on to assert that —Carl von Clausewitz future conflicts will be determined less by the kinetic effect of our units and their weapons Dr. Sebastian L.v. Gorka teaches on the Faculty of the College of International Security Affairs at the National than by the “shaping” and influence that we Defense University and is Military Affairs Fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracy. Dr. Gorka is bring to bear nonkinetically and, addition- contributing author and coeditor of Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism (McGraw Hill, 2010). Dr. David ally, that the adaptability of America’s forces Kilcullen is a Counterinsurgency Advisor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security is paramount.6 Assistance Force, the U.S. Government, and other governments. Dr. Kilcullen is the author of The Accidental On the other side, we have experi- Guerrilla (Oxford University Press, 2009). enced experts, such as Army Colonel Gian 14 JFQ / issue 60, 1 st quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GORKA and KILCULLEN Gentile—who has made a name for himself by 20th century. In fact, COIN is but one small such as “winning hearts and minds” or writing of the “cult of COIN”—who are con- example of the various forms of warfare the “clear, hold, build.” Nevertheless, despite this vinced that the recent war on terror–driven world has witnessed over time. These forms nationwide doctrinal revival, two disturbing overemphasis on COIN seriously degrades can be classed with regard to the character- issues lay unresolved. the essential core combined arms competen- istics of the parties involved—State versus First, for some opaque reason, the list cies of the Army, such as artillery, and that we State, State versus nonstate actor, or conflict of conflicts that the military and academic must “return to basics” if we are to maintain among nonstate actors (see figure). We argue worlds examine under the category of “insur- essential national security capabilities.7 To that these constricted foundations upon gencies” is incredibly restrictive and ignores some observers and commentators, COIN is which classical COIN doctrine was built have many cases of irregular warfare that could be an ambiguous concept that has gained such not only distorted our understanding of the included without undue justification. (In most popularity because either side of the political current threat environment but also danger- cases, these ignored conflicts have for some aisle can emphasize very different policies ously limits our ability to defeat current and reason been labeled civil wars or revolutions under the same doctrinal banner—aggressive future enemies. and not insurgencies.) Second, despite the kinetic approaches for the right, softer nation- number of canonical texts and individual and building priorities for the left. Data and Doctrine comparative studies, no one has attempted a We believe that neither side of this The Army’s rediscovery of COIN theory categorization of previous COIN cases that argument has a monopoly on the truth. following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan differentiates among the original conditions Rather, the question of how America should and Iraq led scholars and officials to revisit at the start of a given conflict and the eventual and could apply force in the post–Cold War case studies and doctrinal texts on the subject strategic endstate that it wished to achieve. and post-9/11 environment can be answered long overlooked by political and policy ana- Together, these two factors—the restric- only after taking a more historic perspective, lysts. The drastically deteriorating events in tion of COIN analysis to just a handful of which places Iraq and Afghanistan into a Iraq were followed by the wholesale return of famous 20th-century cases and the mistake of far broader and richer context than just the serving officers and strategists to the study examining each doctrinally without first sep- last few decades. Additionally, we need to be of classic texts on previous insurgencies, arating them based upon the strategic aims of aware of the fact that COIN—in the American foremost among them Frank E. Kitson on the government and the political, economic, mode—is but one small reflection of the much Northern Ireland, Roger Trinquier and David and military point of departure—have greatly older, even ancient, practice of countering Galula on the French experience in Algeria, distorted what can be learned from existing insurgents, or irregular enemies. Finally, we as well as Robert Taber’s original War of the examples of irregular warfare and what in fact propose that a theory of war based on who is Flea, and, of course, the works of T.E. Law- the lessons for today may be. If the data set using violence against us makes much more rence (of Arabia), in an effort to relearn that of COIN analysis is enlarged to include other sense today than theories based on putative which we once knew. 20th-century conflicts that were not analyzed generational changes in warfare or the asym- As a result, thanks in part to mass as insurgencies by the RAND team (and metry of combatants. media coverage and the exposure of theater others), the results are striking. commanders such as Generals Petraeus and The disturbing truth that modern Irregular Warfare at the Meta-level Stanley McChrystal, millions of people across Western COIN theory is built on a handful of COIN, as the U.S. Armed Forces and the Nation are familiar with COIN concepts books based upon practitioner experiences in policy elites currently understand it, is an intellectual fad, a way to think about irregular Figure. Typology of Conflict: The Reality of War warfare. Before COIN, there was “asymmet- ric warfare,” before that, “AirLand Battle.” LEGEND Next will come another transitory doctrinal War Less than 20% of war in lens such as “stability operations” to replace * last 2 centuries has been between “conventional,” state v. COIN, and another lens after that. While States state, soldier versus soldier war against nonstate actors using unconven- More than half of all tional means has existed for millennia and conflicts in the same under many names (such as “tribal warfare” War between period have been state v. nonstate actor 8 and “small wars”), COIN, as the Western States and (counterinsurgency, world understands and uses the concept, Nonstate unconventional warfare, Actors resistance warfare, developed out of key meetings at the RAND counterterrorism, Corporation in 1958.9 Yet the activities so counterpiracy, peace enforcement) described should be understood as a specific War The remainder are conflicts subset of the overarching, far older activity of between between nonstate actors, counterinsurgency. The doctrinal principles Nonstate “warrior versus warrior” (such as inter-tribal) that resulted—eventually in FM 3–24—were Actors * Boundary conflicts shaped not by the lessons of past centuries of include special cases such war against nonstate actors but by the limited as civil war experiences of Western nations during the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 60, 1 st quarter 2011 / JFQ 15 FORUM | An Actor-centric Theory of War a handful of 20th-century conflicts is not miti- cases, the insurgent was interested in self- and which therefore have greater relevance to gated by the less famous but broader COIN determination or similar politically (as today’s threat environment. works. Country studies by lesser known opposed to religiously) motivated goals.
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