War, Strategy & History
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The Removal of Whitlam
MAKING A DEMOCRACY to run things, any member could turn up to its meetings to listen and speak. Of course all members cannot participate equally in an org- anisation, and organisations do need leaders. The hopes of these reformers could not be realised. But from these times survives the idea that any governing body should consult with the people affected by its decisions. Local councils and governments do this regularly—and not just because they think it right. If they don’t consult, they may find a demonstration with banners and TV cameras outside their doors. The opponents of democracy used to say that interests had to be represented in government, not mere numbers of people. Democrats opposed this view, but modern democracies have to some extent returned to it. When making decisions, governments consult all those who have an interest in the matter—the stake- holders, as they are called. The danger in this approach is that the general interest of the citizens might be ignored. The removal of Whitlam The Labor Party captured the mood of the 1960s in its election campaign of 1972, with its slogan ‘It’s Time’. The Liberals had been in power for 23 years, and Gough Whitlam said it was time for a change, time for a fresh beginning, time to do things differently. Whitlam’s government was in tune with the times because it was committed to protecting human rights, to setting up an ombuds- man and to running an open government where there would be freedom of information. But in one thing Whitlam was old- fashioned: he believed in the original Labor idea of democracy. -
Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age
WORKING PAPER NO. 376 RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE MODERN AGE: A CASE STUDY OF HIZBULLAH Lieutenant-Colonel Rodger Shanahan Canberra June 2003 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Shanahan, Rodger, 1964-. Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age: A Case Study of Hizbullah Bibliography. ISBN 0 7315 5435 3. 1. Hizballah (Lebanon). 2. Islamic fundamentalism - Lebanon. 3. Islam and politics - Lebanon. 4. Terrorism - Religious aspects - Islam. I. Title. (Series : Working paper (Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) ; no.376). 322.42095692 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which is located in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies in the Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, especially those relating to the general region of Asia and the Pacific. The centre gives particular attention to Australia’s strategic neighbourhood of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Participation in the centre’s activities is not limited to members of the university, but includes other interested professional, diplomatic and parliamentary groups. Research includes military, political, economic, scientific and technological aspects of strategic developments. Strategy, for the purpose of the centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes that could cause violence. This is the leading academic body in Australia specialising in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities and Australian service training institutions are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses. -
Being Prepared for Unprecedented Times Peter Layton
Being prepared for unprecedented times National mobilisation conceptualisations and their implications Peter Layton 1 2 3 BEING PREPARED FOR UNPRECEDENTED TIMES National mobilisation conceptualisations and their implications Peter Layton 3 About the Griffith Asia Institute The Griffith Asia Institute (GAI) is an internationally recognised research centre in the Griffith Business School. We reflect Griffith University’s longstanding commitment and future aspirations for the study of and engagement with nations of Asia and the Pacific. At GAI, our vision is to be the informed voice leading Australia’s strategic engagement in the Asia Pacific— cultivating the knowledge, capabilities and connections that will inform and enrich Australia’s Asia-Pacific future. We do this by: i) conducting and supporting excellent and relevant research on the politics, security, economies and development of the Asia-Pacific region; ii) facilitating high level dialogues and partnerships for policy impact in the region; iii) leading and informing public debate on Australia’s place in the Asia Pacific; and iv) shaping the next generation of Asia-Pacific leaders through positive learning experiences in the region. Visit us at: www.griffith.edu.au/asiainstitute About the publication This paper has been developed with the support of the Directorate of Mobilisation, Force Design Division within the Australian Department of Defence. Mobilisation involves civil society, emergency services and all levels of government. The sharing of the research undertaken aims to encourage informed community debate. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Australian Government or the Department of Defence, or any part thereof. -
Speaker Bios
SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES Kate Hansen Bundt, Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee and Chair of the Board of NUPI Kate has been Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee since 2010. She is a political scientist (MA) and foreign policy analyst with expertise on German, European and transatlantic security and strategy. She is chair of the board at NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) since 2014, a board member of NOREF (Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution) since 2017, member of the CSIS Stuart Center Advisory Council since 2016 and a member of the council at Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Oslo since 2013. Prior to her current position, she worked at NUPI from 1990-93 and she was Research Director at the Oslo-based think tank “Europa-programmet” for thirteen years. In 2009 she graduated from the executive course at the Norwegian Defence University College, were she still lectures. Kate has been member of several Government appointed expert committees on security, defence and EU-issues and she is frequently invited by the media to comment on developments in Germany, NATO, and the EU. Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Honorary Chairman of New Strategy Center, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Sergiu Celac is a career ambassador who joined the diplomatic service in 1961. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first post-communist government (1989-1990), then as ambassador to the United Kingdom and Ireland, ambassador-at-large and personal adviser to the President of Romania. After retirement, he worked as president of the Romanian Institute of International Studies, alternate director general of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies in Athens and is currently Vice-President of the Romanian Association for the Club of Rome, member of the Board of the European Institute of Romania, Black Sea University Foundation, Energy Policy Group, member of the Writers’ Union of Romania. -
The Australians in Vietnam 1962-1972
“They Were Hard Nuts”: The Australians in Vietnam, 1962-1972 A focus on the American failure to make maximum use of the Australians’ counterinsurgency tactics in South Vietnam Kate Tietzen Clemson University Abstract: Addressing the need for studies examining the relationship between Commonwealth militaries and the American military, this paper examines the American military’s relationship with the Australian military contingency sent to Vietnam between 1962 and 1972. Analyzing Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUSA) documents, Australian government documents and Australian primary sources including interviews, papers, and autobiographies, this paper argues that the Americans deliberately used the Australian army in South Vietnam for show rather than force. The paper also illustrates American efforts to discredit and ignore Australian counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics; this undertaking only hindered the overall American anti- communist mission in Vietnam. Australia (1) Met all day Sunday (2) They were hard nuts (3) They had a long list of their contributions to Vietnam already (4) Real progress was made with Holt when went upstairs alone and told of the seriousness of the matter (5) Holt told Taylor that he was such a good salesman that he was glad he had not brought his wife to the meeting —Dr. Clark Clifford, meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson 5 August 19671 While the Viet Minh and the French fought each other during the First Indochina War in Vietnam, Australia was fighting a guerilla-style war in Malaysia in what has been dubbed the “Malayan Emergency” of 1948-1960. In October of 1953, the Australian Defence Committee, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff met in Melbourne to air concerns regarding the possibility of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia.2 The delegation feared Chinese determination for communist control in Southeast Asia, which would threaten the accessibility of strategic raw materials for western powers in the area. -
PO, Canberra, AX.T. 2601, Australia
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 056 303 AC 012 071 TITLE Handbook o Australian h'ult Educatial. INSTITUTION Australian Association of AdultEducati. PUB DATE 71 NOTE 147p. 3rd edition AVAILABLE FROMAustralian Association ofAdult Education, Box 1346, P.O., Canberra, AX.T. 2601,Australia (no price quoted) EDRS PRICE Mr-$0.65 HC-$6.58 DEsCRIPTORS *Adult Education; Day Programs;*Directories; *Educational Facilities; EveningPrograms; *Professional Associations;*University Extension IDENTIFIERS Asia; Australia; New Zealand;South Pacific ABSTRACT The aim of this handbookis to provide a quick reference source for a number ofdifferent publics. It should be of regular assistance to adult andother educators, personnelofficers and social workers, whoseadvice and help is constantlybeing sought about the availability ofadult education facilities intheir own, or in other states. The aim incompiling the Handbook has been tobring together at the National and Statelevels all the major agencies--university, statutory body,government departments and voluntary bodies--that provide programsof teaching for adults open to members of thepublic. There are listed also thelarge number of goverrmental or voluntary bodi_eswhich undertake educationalwork in special areas. The Handbook alsolists all the major public institutions--State Libraries, Museums,and Art Galleriesthat serve importantly to supplement thedirect teaching of adults bytheir collections. New entries includebrief accounts of adult educationin the Northern Territory andin the Territory of Papua-NewGuinea, and the -
The Chief of Defence Staff S.K.Sinha
The Chief of Defence Staff S.K.Sinha India as a nation went through a very traumatic experience in 1962. Our faith in the impregnability of the Himalayas, the infallibility of our foreign policy and the invincibility of our Army, got shattered. I was then an Instructor at Staff College. I was assigned the task of preparing a Telephone Battle exercise for Staff College on mountain warfare, based on our experience in the Himalayas. I toured the battle zone in the North-East to study the terrain and the course of operations that had recently taken place there. This also enabled me to interact with some of the officers who had taken part in those operations. The tour of the battlefield and research at Staff College,led one to conclude that there were three main reasons for our debacle in the Himalayas. First, a total mismatch between Indian foreign and defence policies. Second, the loss of élan amongst the officer corps in the Indian Army. Third, an irrational higher defence organization in which the Defence Services were increasingly isolated from the process of decision making in defence matters. Vital issues of war and peace, concerning the nation were being dealt with in a casual manner. For instance, in September 1962, on his way to Colombo, the Prime Minister had issued a statement to the Press at Chennai, that he had ordered the Army to evict the Chinese from the Himalayas. The Army Chief then at Tezpur, wanted written orders to that effect. A Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence present at Tezpur gave him those orders. -
Principles of Counterinsurgency Garner the Support of Enough of the Population the Principles and Imperatives of Modern Coun to Create Stability
Eliot Cohen; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army MERICA began the 20th century with helps illuminate the extraordinary challenges inher Amilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency ent in defeating an insurgency. (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is Legitimacy as the main objective. A legitimate conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, government derives its just powers from the gov and a number of other countries around the globe. erned and competently manages collective security During the past century, Soldiers and Marines and political, economic, and social development. gained considerable experience fighting insurgents Legitimate governments are inherently stable. They in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now engender the popular support required to manage in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. internal problems, change, and conflict. Illegitimate Conducting a successful counterinsurgency governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably While every insurgency is different because of fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all the root cause of and the central strategic problem successful COIN campaigns are based on common in today’s unstable globalsecurity environment. principles. All insurgencies use variations of stand Five actions that are indicators of legitimacy and ard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere that any political actor facing threats to stability to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign should implement are— plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have ● Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders. -
Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity Australia in Asia, 1944–74
COMMONWEALTH RESPONSIBILITY AND COLD WAR SOLIDARITY AUSTRALIA IN ASIA, 1944–74 COMMONWEALTH RESPONSIBILITY AND COLD WAR SOLIDARITY AUSTRALIA IN ASIA, 1944–74 DAN HALVORSON Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] Available to download for free at press.anu.edu.au ISBN (print): 9781760463236 ISBN (online): 9781760463243 WorldCat (print): 1126581099 WorldCat (online): 1126581312 DOI: 10.22459/CRCWS.2019 This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). The full licence terms are available at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. NAA: A1775, RGM107. This edition © 2019 ANU Press Contents Acknowledgements . vii Abbreviations . ix 1 . Introduction . 1 2 . Region and regionalism in the immediate postwar period . 13 3 . Decolonisation and Commonwealth responsibility . 43 4 . The Cold War and non‑communist solidarity in East Asia . 71 5 . The winds of change . 103 6 . Outside the margins . 131 7 . Conclusion . 159 References . 167 Index . 185 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Cathy Moloney, Anja Mustafic, Jennifer Roberts and Lucy West for research assistance on this project. Thanks also to my colleagues Michael Heazle, Andrew O’Neil, Wes Widmaier, Ian Hall, Jason Sharman and Lucy West for reading and commenting on parts of the work. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to participants at the 15th International Conference of Australian Studies in China, held at Peking University, Beijing, 8–10 July 2016, and participants at the Seventh Annual Australia–Japan Dialogue, hosted by the Griffith Asia Institute and Japan Institute for International Affairs, held in Brisbane, 9 November 2017, for useful comments on earlier papers contributing to the manuscript. -
Institutional Memory and the US Air Force Lt Col Daniel J
Institutional Memory and the US Air Force Lt Col Daniel J. Brown, USAF Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in theJournal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, theAir and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. No modern war has been won without air superiority. —Gen T. Michael Moseley, 2007 lthough the vague term modern war leaves some question about the wars General Moseley was referring to, his 2007 white paper raises questions re- garding airpower’s impact and historical record, especially in light of the two Aconflicts that consumed the US military at the end of that year.1 The question of whether or not air superiority is vital to successful military operations is nothing new; indeed, arguments concerning the utility of American airpower have raged in earnest for over 100 years. No technological milestone such as the atomic bomb, super- sonic flight, precision-guided weapons, or even stealth has settled the debate about where Airmen and airpower fit in the dialogue of national defense. After each ad- vance is tested in combat, a new round of intellectual sparring commences regarding 38 | Air & Space Power Journal Institutional Memory and the US Air Force the effect of airpower. Though hugely useful in the development of military think- ing, these differing schools of thought have always returned to fundamental ques- tions, the answers to which vary widely depending on the strategic context of the day. -
John Burton: Undermined by Dishonest History: Honest History Lecture Series, Manning Clark House, Canberra, Monday, 18 August 2014 Pamela Burton
John Burton: undermined by dishonest history: Honest History lecture series, Manning Clark House, Canberra, Monday, 18 August 2014 Pamela Burton Dr John Burton headed the Department of External Affairs in 1947 at age 32, his minister being Herbert Vere Evatt (‘the Doc’). He and Evatt shared a joint vision for an Australian foreign policy independent of Britain and the United States. In his short public service career Burton had significant influence over Australia’s foreign policy. Ahead of his times, he held the view that Australia’s security in the Asia-Pacific region depended upon better understanding of and engagement with its neighbours. To achieve this, he advocated ‘open diplomacy’. Burton’s work and influence has been the subject of numerous scholarly works. Curiously, alongside the honest historians, there has been a concerted effort by some dishonest ideologues writing to discredit Burton and what he stood for. Sixty years on, malicious writers continue to skew the historic record by asserting that Burton betrayed his country. Why? And how can the record be corrected? I am a non-fiction writer. I would love to write fiction, but I’ve been told that it’s not my forte, because I can’t help letting truth get in the way of a good story. There are non-fiction writers, however, who won’t let the truth spoil a story. Take the example of a recent article in the magazine Quadrant, ‘The curious case of Dr John Burton’.1 A fictitious spy story if ever there was one, though it purported to be an historical account. -
Department of Tutorial Classes, Sydney University, 1919 to 1963 Darryl Dymock and Ann Kelly Griffith University
24 Meeting diverse expectations Meeting diverse expectations: Department of Tutorial Classes, Sydney University, 1919 to 1963 Darryl Dymock and Ann Kelly Griffith University The University of Sydney has offered some form of organised adult education since the late 19th century. In 1914, that provision was formalised through the establishment of a Department of Tutorial Classes, the appointment of a Director, and a partnership with the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA). Right from that time, however, there was ambivalence and sometimes direct opposition to the role and sometimes to the existence of the department. As a result, successive directors of the department had to tread for extending the academy into the adult community, while also satisfying the demands of the WEA. This paper reviews the period of three directorships of the Department of Tutorial Classes, between 1919 and 1963, and argues that the liberal adult education approach adopted by the university from its earliest days was sustained over those 45 years mainly because ongoing disagreement within the university about the purpose of the department and the status of the director, as well as continuing external pressure from the WEA, ensured that the status quo prevailed, even when there were innovative adult education developments elsewhere, and opportunities for change presented themselves. Darryl Dymock and Ann Kelly 25 Introduction University adult education was introduced into Australia more than a century ago as a means of extending the knowledge and expertise of the academy to the general public, through means other than formal tertiary courses. All the sandstone universities and others such as adult education programs.