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Principles of Counterinsurgency Garner the Support of Enough of the Population the Principles and Imperatives of Modern Coun­ to Create Stability

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Principles of Counterinsurgency Garner the Support of Enough of the Population the Principles and Imperatives of Modern Coun­ to Create Stability Eliot Cohen; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army MERICA began the 20th century with helps illuminate the extraordinary challenges inher­ Amilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency ent in defeating an insurgency. (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is Legitimacy as the main objective. A legitimate conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, government derives its just powers from the gov­ and a number of other countries around the globe. erned and competently manages collective security During the past century, Soldiers and Marines and political, economic, and social development. gained considerable experience fighting insurgents Legitimate governments are inherently stable. They in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now engender the popular support required to manage in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. internal problems, change, and conflict. Illegitimate Conducting a successful counterinsurgency governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably While every insurgency is different because of fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all the root cause of and the central strategic problem successful COIN campaigns are based on common in today’s unstable global­security environment. principles. All insurgencies use variations of stand­ Five actions that are indicators of legitimacy and ard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere that any political actor facing threats to stability to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign should implement are— plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have ● Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders. become especially dynamic. Their leaders study ● A high level of popular participation in and and learn, exchange information, employ seemingly support for the political process. leaderless networks, and establish relationships ● A low level of corruption. of convenience with criminal gangs. Insurgencies ● A culturally acceptable level or rate of political, present a more complex problem than conventional economic, and social development. operations, and the new variants have a velocity that ● A high level of regime support from major previous historical insurgencies never possessed. social institutions. Governments that attain these goals usually Principles of Counterinsurgency garner the support of enough of the population The principles and imperatives of modern coun­ to create stability. The primary objective of any terinsurgency provide guideposts for forces engaged counterinsurgent is to establish such a government. in COIN campaigns. However, counterinsurgency While military action can deal with the symptoms of is a strange and complicated beast. Following the loss of legitimacy, restoring it can only be accom­ principles and imperatives does not guarantee suc­ plished using all elements of national power. Unless cess, which is just one of the several paradoxes of the government achieves legitimacy, counterinsur­ counterinsurgency. Understanding such paradoxes gency efforts cannot succeed. MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2006 49 Unity of effort. Ideally, a counterinsurgent would in the conflict. The interconnected politico-military have unity of command over all elements of national nature of insurgency requires the counterinsurgent power involved in COIN operations. However, the to immerse himself in the lives of the people in best that military commanders can generally hope order to achieve victory. Successful U.S. COIN for is unity of effort through communication and operations require Soldiers and Marines to pos­ liaison with those responsible for the nonmilitary sess a clear, nuanced, empathetic appreciation of elements of power. The ambassador and country the essential nature of the conflict, particularly the team must be key players in higher level plan­ motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of insurgents ning, while similar connections are achieved down and indigenous actors. the chain of command. Even nongovernmental Intelligence as the driver for operations. organizations (NGOs) can play important roles in Without understanding the environment, one cannot improving lives. Many such players will resist being understand and properly apply intelligence. With­ overtly involved with military units, but they must out good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a make an effort to establish some kind of liaison. blind boxer wasting energy flailing at an unseen Connecting with joint, interagency, coalition, opponent. With good intelligence, a counterinsur­ and indigenous organizations is important to ensur­ gent is like a surgeon cutting out the cancers while ing that objectives are shared and that actions and keeping the vital organs intact. All operations must messages are synchronized. The resulting synergy be shaped by carefully considered actionable intel­ is essential for effective counterinsurgency. Unity ligence gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible of effort must pervade every level of activity, from levels and disseminated and distributed throughout national to neighborhood. Otherwise, well­inten­ the force. tioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each Isolating insurgents from their cause and sup- other out or provide a competent insurgent with port. Cutting an insurgency off to die on the vine many vulnerabilities to exploit. is easier than it is to kill every insurgent. Dynamic Political primacy. While all the elements of insurgencies regenerate quickly, so a skillful national power have a role in successful counter­ counterinsurgent must cut off the sources of that insurgency, political objectives must retain pri­ recuperative power. Ideological support can be macy. All actions, kinetic or nonkinetic, must be sundered by redressing the grievances that fuel the planned and executed with insurgency. Physical support consideration of their con­ can be cut off by population tribution toward strengthen­ Without good intelligence, a control or border security. ing the host government’s counterinsurgent is like a blind In the 20th century, popu­ legitimacy and achieving the boxer wasting energy flailing at lation control often meant U.S. Government’s political an unseen opponent. resettling people; in the 21st goals. The political and mili­ century, biometric identifi­ tary aspects of an insurgency cation cards will accomplish are usually so bound together as to be inseparable, the same objectives with much less disruption to and most insurgents recognize this fact. In coun­ people’s lives. International or local legal action terinsurgencies, military actions conducted without might be required to limit foreign financial support proper analysis of their political effects will at best to insurgents. be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy. As the host government increases its own legiti­ Understanding the environment. A key aspect macy, the people will more actively help achieve in an insurgency is the population. Analyzing this principle. Victory will be gained when this the effect of any operation is impossible without isolation is permanently maintained by the people’s understanding the society and culture within which active support. the COIN operation occurs. Soldiers and Marines Security under the rule of law. The cornerstone must understand demographics, history, and the of any COIN effort is security for the populace. causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, Without security, no permanent reforms can be approaches, and supporting entities for every player implemented, and disorder will spread. To establish 50 March-April 2006 MILITARY REVIEW COUNTERINSURGENCY The insurgent wins if he does not lose. moon cannot restore electricity. American agen­ The counterinsurgent loses if he does cies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts must avoid making exorbitant promises. In some cultures, not win. failing to deliver promised results is interpreted as deliberate deception, not simply good intentions legitimacy, security activities must move from the gone awry. realm of major combat operations into the realm of Managing expectations also involves showing law enforcement. Insurgents seen as criminals will economic and political progress as part of the cam­ lose public support. If they are dealt with by an paign to show the populace how life is improving. In established legal system in line with local culture the end, the people must be convinced that their lives and practices, the legitimacy of the host govern­ will be better with the counterinsurgent in control ment will be enhanced. This process will take time, rather than with the insurgent in control. Both the but Soldiers must be aware of the legal procedures counterinsurgent and the host nation must ensure applicable to their conduct and support them. They that their deeds match their words. Any action has an must also help establish indigenous institutions information reaction, so they must carefully consider (police forces, court systems, and penal facilities) its effect on the many audiences involved and work that will sustain that legal regime. to shape responses that further desired ends. Long-term commitment. Insurgencies tend to Use measured force. Any use of force gener­ be protracted conflicts. Counterinsurgency always ates a series of reactions, so, it is best to use the demands
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