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FEBRUARY Keeping The Edge: 2010 Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps Edited by Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton Contributing Authors: Brian M. Burton; Dr. John A. Nagl; Dr. Don M. Snider; Frank G. Hoffman; Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN; Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF Acknowledgments We would like to thank our colleagues at the Center for a New American Security for all of their assistance and support during this process. Dr. Kristin Lord and Garrett Mitchell provided excellent organizational and editing recommendations during the writing process. Liz Fontaine was invaluable in translating the draft text into a high-quality final product. We benefited tremendously from the research support provided at all stages of the project by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Research Intern, National Security Interns Nick Masellis, Seth Rosen, Maile Yeats and Iranga Kahangama. This report is the outcome of consultation and cooperation with numerous military officers and other students of the military profession. We are very grateful for the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation, which made this project possible. We especially thank the contributors to this monograph, Captain Mark Hagerott, USN; Frank Hoffman; Dr. Don M. Snider; and Col. Rod Zastrow, USAF. We also greatly appreciate the participation of numerous others in our working groups, whose thoughtful discussion informed our recommendations. Finally, we acknowledge the helpful insights and comments on draft versions of this report provided by Col. Ross Brown, USA; Col. Joe Buche, USA; Commander Herb Carmen, USN; Lt. Col. Jeffery Goodes, USMC; Vice Admiral (ret.) Kevin Green, USN; Lt. Col. Kelly Martin, USAF; Tom Ricks; Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup, USN; Dr. Leonard Wong; Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, USA; and others. Cover Image U.S. Army Col. Katherine Kasun brings her detail to attention before greeting President George Bush during his arrival at the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport in Virginia February 2007. Kasun led a detail of nine active duty military personnel from US Joint Forces Command. Each member that was selected to greet the President has recently deployed to Operations Iraqi or Enduring Freedom. The President was in the area meeting with congressional Democrats in Williamsburg. (STAFF SGT. JOE LAWS/USAF) TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 3 Chapter 5: Strategic Leader Development 49 Chapter 1: The Future of the U.S. Military 9 from an Air Force Perspective Officer Corps: Strategic Context By Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF By Brian M. Burton and Dr. John A. Nagl Chapter 6: Revitalizing America’s Officer Corps 61 Chapter 2: Developing a Corps of Professionals 19 By Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton By Dr. Don M. Snider Chapter 3: Embracing a Full Spectrum Profession 27 By Frank G. Hoffman Chapter 4: Rebalancing the Naval Officer Corps 37 By Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN FEBRUARY 2010 Keeping The Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps Edited by Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton Contributing Authors: Brian M. Burton; Dr. John A. Nagl; Dr. Don M. Snider; Frank G. Hoffman; Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN; Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF Keeping The Edge: FEBRUARY 2010 Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps About the Authors Brian M. Burton is a Research Associate at CNAS. Mark R. Hagerott is a Captain in the U.S. Navy currently serving as Director of the Commanding General’s Strategic Action Group at NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan. At the time of writing, he was a faculty member in the History Department at the U.S. Naval Academy. Frank G. Hoffman is currently the Deputy Director of the Office of Program Appraisal in the Department of the Navy. At the time of writing, he was a national security affairs analyst and Research Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Dr. John A. Nagl is President of CNAS. Dr. Don M. Snider is Emeritus Professor of Political Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and Adjunct Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Roderick C. Zastrow is a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force currently serving as a force planner in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Disclaimer: None of the views expressed in this document by any of the contributors represent those of the United States government or any of its departments or agencies. 2 | EXecuTIVE SummarY Keeping The Edge: FEBRUARY 2010 Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The U.S. military officer corps, the professional body entrusted with preparing and training the armed forces for war and peace, is at the fore- front of an ever-increasing array of challenges. Indeed, America arguably relies on its armed forces to perform a wider variety of functions than any other nation in history. While the military cannot shoulder the entire burden of responding to complex international circum- stances, it must prepare itself better for the inevitability of such challenges. Four trends in particular are likely to alter the range of skills and knowledge officers will need: the increased incidence of “wars amongst the people;” the likelihood of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in parts of the world with which the United States has little experience; widespread access to highly destructive weapons; and the 24-hour global media environment. To respond effectively to complex challenges, the U.S. military must develop and maintain a high degree of adaptability within the officer corps. Twenty-first-century military officers must learn and embody enduring principles of warfare and leadership, but the teaching and training of officers must also change to meet the contemporary demands and opportunities they are likely to face. In addition to demonstrating a high degree of proficiency in conventional warfare, officers must also develop a broader knowledge of politics, economics, and the use of information in modern warfare to cope with a more complicated and rapidly evolving international environment. Emerging strategic trends and threats also high- light the importance of some new attributes and career development options. This will require rethinking the balance between the need for specialists and generalists at different ranks and the specific responsibilities and requirements of generals, field-grade officers, and company-grade officers. Service leadership must determine the | 5 Keeping The Edge: FEBRUARY 2010 Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps proper balance between deep expertise in one one we have today. The difficulty of maintain- small subset of requirements of officership and the ing a healthy family life amid reassignments and broader strategic perspective that is necessary for deployments is now a commonly cited reason senior leadership of a branch or service. for talented young officers who decide to leave the force. These cultural changes affect military RecONSIderING TALENT DIStrIbutION AND Career TrackS careers more than any other American profession; Complex operations demand military officers an officer assignment system that ignores the fact who possess a comprehensive understanding of of increased marriage rates and working spouses the battle environment and the capacity to inte- will force officers to choose between career and grate capabilities to achieve mission success. They family, and both will lose. Increased use of sabbati- must understand the capabilities and mission of cal years — particularly to pursue higher education their unit or platform, as well as the role of forces or gain additional experience in an unconventional from other services, allied military forces, civilian assignment while also allowing “downtime” from government agencies, intergovernmental organiza- deployments for families — would provide additional tions (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations career flexibility for future generations of officers. (NGOs). The solution, however, cannot be as Better recognition and employment of these outside simple as adding even more to the already-packed experiences and talents could allow the military to training and professional military education cur- attract or retain some of the most innovative and riculum for junior and intermediate-grade leaders. dynamic talent in today’s workplace. Instead, the services should develop a balanced distribution of talents across required knowledge ENhaNCING OffIcer EducatION areas within segments of the services’ officers A lifelong Professional Military Education through more differentiated career paths. There (PME) system would allow the military services is substantial tension in officer training programs to design adaptable programs that balance between cultivating excellence in tactical and necessary warfighting skills with a broader technical competencies and developing the quali- exploration of similarly pertinent topics to ties needed for operating in complex environments include language and cultural studies. The pro- in concert with multiple partners. A more holistic gram should not be designed to produce experts officer development program is required to coun- in non-military subjects but instead be geared teract a disproportionate focus on tactical training toward better equipping officers to understand over strategic education. Strategy and warfighting the political and cultural complexities that will are integrative tasks, requiring not only the ability affect their activities. While the current system to operate specialized equipment
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