Intelligence Failures of the Vietnam War: Lessons for the Contemporary Operating Environment

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Intelligence Failures of the Vietnam War: Lessons for the Contemporary Operating Environment INTELLIGENCE FAILURES OF THE VIETNAM WAR: LESSONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT Maj B.J.L. Irvine JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT INTELLIGENCE FAILURES OF THE VIETNAM WAR: LESSONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT Maj B.J.L. Irvine “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 5377 Compte de mots : 5377 1 Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. - Sun Tzu, The Art of War The Vietnam War was the United States’ (US) longest and one of its most costly conflicts.1 From 1 November 1955 to 30 April 1975, the US fought a series of evolving campaigns to counter North Vietnamese Army (NVA) aggression, supported by Viet Cong (VC) insurgents, against South Vietnam. Beginning first with an advisory role before escalating into a conventional then counter-insurgency conflict, the US employed the latest technological advancements to support its campaign, with emerging technologies utilized to great tactical effect. Yet despite possessing the most technologically advanced weaponry and sensors available, and having “never suffered a tactical defeat during the Vietnam War,”2 the withdrawal of US ground combat forces in 1973 and the eventual collapse of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975 resulted in an embarrassing strategic defeat for the US. This paper will demonstrate that the failure of operational military intelligence to fulfil its doctrinal mandate to provide situational awareness and support decision-making was a critical factor in the US defeat in Vietnam. Throughout the course of the Vietnam War, the US intelligence apparatus employed some of the most sophisticated sensor technologies available to locate, identify and template NVA and VC forces, enabling US intelligence to achieve great success at the tactical level.3 However, the primary purpose of military intelligence is to enlighten 1 William C. Westmorland, “The Military Attrition”, The Lessons of Vietnam, eds. W. Scott Thompson & Donaldson D. Frizzel, (New York: Crane, Russak & Co), p. 71. 2 Robert K. Brigham, “An Unwinnable War”, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, ed. Robert j. McMahon, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co, 2008), p. 219. 3 Michael Warner, “US Intelligence and Vietnam; The Official Version(s)”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 25, No. 5, (October 2010), p. 631. 2 and inform planners and decision-makers. The failure of US intelligence to fulfill this mandate at the operational level was critical to its defeat in Vietnam.4 As argued by Michael Warner, “[US] intelligence miscues did not lose the Vietnam War for the Americans and South Vietnamese, but it now seems clear that they made victory less likely.”5 Initial intelligence estimates failed to recognize that North Vietnamese aggression as early as 1963 was essentially support provided to the National Liberation Front’s (NLF) insurgent campaign conducted through the VC. This failure led the US to adopt conventional military solutions for an unconventional problem. US intelligence focused on the employment of advanced technological sensors, at the expense of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This resulted in the inability to penetrate into the “infrastructure” of both the NVA and the VC to determine accurate assessments of their intent. Finally the ‘stove-piped’ nature of US intelligence resulted in a disconnect that prevented the integration and fusing of information to achieve efficient, accurate intelligence assessments. METHODOLOGY This paper will first address the US Intelligence Warfighting Function as the doctrinal imperative under which military intelligence operates. While US doctrine has changed in the years following the Vietnam War, using current doctrine provides a common point of reference from which to extrapolate lessons applicable to contemporary conflicts. This paper will then discuss the critical points of failure in US intelligence 4 George W. Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of Intelligence Failure in Vietnam, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Press, 2001), 282. 5 Warner, 611. 3 during the Vietnam War. Using the analytical framework of the Intelligence Function, it will address how the inability to effectively provide operational commanders with sufficient situational awareness to support their decision-making was a critical component in the failure of the US Campaign in Vietnam. Finally this paper will extrapolate key lessons learned about the use of intelligence during the Vietnam War and offer conclusions to how these lessons are applicable to Western militaries conducting operations in the face of the complexities of the contemporary operating environment (COE). The analysis will focus on US intelligence efforts in Vietnam during the timeframe of the major land force deployments, beginning in 1963 with the dramatic surge in U.S. involvement from 600 personnel to 16,000 personnel, until the 1973 cease- fire. 6 The analysis will allow for a thorough examination of military intelligence during all phases of the conflict, focusing on the operational level of war. The US Army defines the operational level as that “at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.”7 Therefore, this paper will focus on intelligence in Vietnam at the corps and theatre of operations levels. While there were undoubtedly intelligence failures at the tactical and strategic levels, these are beyond the scope of this paper. As intelligence from the four US Military Services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and US Civilian Agencies (CIA, NSA) was indelibly linked at the 6 David Kaiser, “Kennedy’s Prudent and Cautious Policy”, in Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, ed. Robert J. McMahon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 136. 7 Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, 2001), 2-2. 4 operational level of the campaign, for the purposes of this paper they will all be considered as military intelligence. Lastly, while US intelligence certainly achieved many successes at all levels of war during the Vietnam campaign, the weight of this paper will focus on the failures, with a view to identifying lessons learned that can be applied in the COE. INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION To fully analyze the failures of US intelligence in Vietnam, one must understand the doctrinal construct under which it operated. While Vietnam featured predominant ground and air campaigns, supported by naval and SOF elements, for consistency purposes the US Army’s intelligence doctrine will be used for this analysis. US Army doctrine details six Warfighting Functions; Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment and Protection which describe the functional capabilities used by a military force to accomplish their mission. The US Army’s Operations manual describes the Intelligence Warfighting Function as “the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment.”8 The role of intelligence function is to “drive operations by supporting the commander’s decision making” through the provision of timely and relevant intelligence about one’s enemy and the influences of the various other actors; political, economic, military, infrastructure, social, and information that exist within an operational area.9 8 Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), 4-7. 9 Department of the Army, FM 2-0 Intelligence (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2010), 1-4, 1-5. 5 The intelligence
Recommended publications
  • Principles of Counterinsurgency Garner the Support of Enough of the Population the Principles and Imperatives of Modern Coun­ to Create Stability
    Eliot Cohen; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army MERICA began the 20th century with helps illuminate the extraordinary challenges inher­ Amilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency ent in defeating an insurgency. (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is Legitimacy as the main objective. A legitimate conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, government derives its just powers from the gov­ and a number of other countries around the globe. erned and competently manages collective security During the past century, Soldiers and Marines and political, economic, and social development. gained considerable experience fighting insurgents Legitimate governments are inherently stable. They in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now engender the popular support required to manage in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. internal problems, change, and conflict. Illegitimate Conducting a successful counterinsurgency governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably While every insurgency is different because of fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all the root cause of and the central strategic problem successful COIN campaigns are based on common in today’s unstable global­security environment. principles. All insurgencies use variations of stand­ Five actions that are indicators of legitimacy and ard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere that any political actor facing threats to stability to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign should implement are— plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have ● Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutional Memory and the US Air Force Lt Col Daniel J
    Institutional Memory and the US Air Force Lt Col Daniel J. Brown, USAF Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in theJournal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, theAir and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. No modern war has been won without air superiority. —Gen T. Michael Moseley, 2007 lthough the vague term modern war leaves some question about the wars General Moseley was referring to, his 2007 white paper raises questions re- garding airpower’s impact and historical record, especially in light of the two Aconflicts that consumed the US military at the end of that year.1 The question of whether or not air superiority is vital to successful military operations is nothing new; indeed, arguments concerning the utility of American airpower have raged in earnest for over 100 years. No technological milestone such as the atomic bomb, super- sonic flight, precision-guided weapons, or even stealth has settled the debate about where Airmen and airpower fit in the dialogue of national defense. After each ad- vance is tested in combat, a new round of intellectual sparring commences regarding 38 | Air & Space Power Journal Institutional Memory and the US Air Force the effect of airpower. Though hugely useful in the development of military think- ing, these differing schools of thought have always returned to fundamental ques- tions, the answers to which vary widely depending on the strategic context of the day.
    [Show full text]
  • Trump's Generals
    STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY - PERSPECTIVE Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment in Civil-Military Relations JAMES JOYNER Abstract President Donald Trump’s filling of numerous top policy positions with active and retired officers he called “my generals” generated fears of mili- tarization of foreign policy, loss of civilian control of the military, and politicization of the military—yet also hope that they might restrain his worst impulses. Because the generals were all gone by the halfway mark of his administration, we have a natural experiment that allows us to com- pare a Trump presidency with and without retired generals serving as “adults in the room.” None of the dire predictions turned out to be quite true. While Trump repeatedly flirted with civil- military crises, they were not significantly amplified or deterred by the presence of retired generals in key roles. Further, the pattern continued in the second half of the ad- ministration when “true” civilians filled these billets. Whether longer-term damage was done, however, remains unresolved. ***** he presidency of Donald Trump served as a natural experiment, testing many of the long- debated precepts of the civil-military relations (CMR) literature. His postelection interviewing of Tmore than a half dozen recently retired four- star officers for senior posts in his administration unleashed a torrent of columns pointing to the dangers of further militarization of US foreign policy and damage to the military as a nonpartisan institution. At the same time, many argued that these men were uniquely qualified to rein in Trump’s worst pro- clivities. With Trump’s tenure over, we can begin to evaluate these claims.
    [Show full text]
  • Our Lives Marked by War: Reflections on J. Glenn Gray's the Warriors
    Our Lives Marked By War: Reflections on J. Glenn Gray’s The Warriors John Nagl September 5, 2013 John Nagl, a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, is Headmaster at The Haverford School in Haverford, Pennsylvania. He is the author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War and a member of the Juniata College Board of Trustees. am going to talk to you tonight a little bit about this book, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in I Battle.1 It was written by a philosophy professor who studied Martin Heidegger, and I’m guessing none of you have studied Heidegger yet. There are philosophy professors in the room, so I won’t get in trouble by telling you to continue in that tradition. Heidegger is tough going. What I’m going to try do for you tonight is put in context some of what J. Glenn Gray talked about in ways that will make sense to you and connect with your life a little bit. And I’m going to do a lot of that by telling some of my stories. First, let’s talk about this very interesting man, Jesse Glenn Gray. It’s the centenary of his birth. He is no longer here, but he was an interesting guy. He graduated from this fine institution you have just become a part of and he did pretty well, magna cum laude, which means “with great honors.” That is pretty good. I am sure all of you — because you came to watch this on a Sunday night — don’t have much by way of a social life, so you, too, are likely to be magna cum laude.
    [Show full text]
  • The Long War: Four Views by Joseph J
    The Long War: Four Views By Joseph J. Collins Journal Article | Jan 5 2015 - 6:29pm The Long War: Four Views Joseph J. Collins While the Long War continues to march, four new books have presented challenging and sometimes contradictory conclusions about the war and its lessons for the future. This review essay looks at: the memoir of a Secretary of Defense, a recent RAND study, the cri de coeur of a retired general, and the memoir of a combat veteran and leading coindinista. What follows is not just a review essay, but also an exploration of lessons encountered, but not yet learned. It ends with a call for help from the Small Wars Journal readership. Robert Gates’s memoir, Duty: the Memoirs of a Secretary at War made tremendous splash[1] for its hard- but-fair critique of two Presidents, the firing of a few generals, its blow-by-blow description of the battle inside the Pentagon to improve support to war-fighters, and, surprise to many, the emotional bond that this tough secretary forged with the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lost in the many great vignettes and secretarial sea stories is the fact that the last chapter of this book, “Reflections,” is a mini-war college, full of the kind of wisdom that can only come from years of strategic analysis, and a world class resume: Deputy National Security Advisor, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, President of Texas A&M, and Secretary of War for two Presidents with vastly different styles and priorities. Gates’s take-aways are a short-course in strategy for future leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps
    FEBRUARY Keeping The Edge: 2010 Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps Edited by Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton Contributing Authors: Brian M. Burton; Dr. John A. Nagl; Dr. Don M. Snider; Frank G. Hoffman; Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN; Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF Acknowledgments We would like to thank our colleagues at the Center for a New American Security for all of their assistance and support during this process. Dr. Kristin Lord and Garrett Mitchell provided excellent organizational and editing recommendations during the writing process. Liz Fontaine was invaluable in translating the draft text into a high-quality final product. We benefited tremendously from the research support provided at all stages of the project by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Research Intern, National Security Interns Nick Masellis, Seth Rosen, Maile Yeats and Iranga Kahangama. This report is the outcome of consultation and cooperation with numerous military officers and other students of the military profession. We are very grateful for the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation, which made this project possible. We especially thank the contributors to this monograph, Captain Mark Hagerott, USN; Frank Hoffman; Dr. Don M. Snider; and Col. Rod Zastrow, USAF. We also greatly appreciate the participation of numerous others in our working groups, whose thoughtful discussion informed our recommendations. Finally, we acknowledge the helpful insights and comments on draft versions of this report provided by Col. Ross Brown, USA; Col. Joe Buche, USA; Commander Herb Carmen, USN; Lt. Col. Jeffery Goodes, USMC; Vice Admiral (ret.) Kevin Green, USN; Lt. Col. Kelly Martin, USAF; Tom Ricks; Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup, USN; Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • An Actor-Centric Theory Of
    he United States, the most power- Soldiers and Afghan National Police coordinate ful nation in the world, is reas- security for Afghan national election, September 2010 sessing its approach to war. With TAmerica entering the 10th year of what was originally called the global war on terror, the Nation finds itself engaged in con- flicts in Central Asia and the Middle East that challenge decades of planning, training, and doctrine. Although collectively this series of campaigns recently crossed the marker-point for America’s longest combat engagement ever, arguments persist—even in the pages of this publication—as to whether we have the correct approach.1 This debate is, for the most part, limited in scope.2 In general, it can be summarized as revolving around one contentious point: whether one agrees with the idea that the United States must redefine its fighting capacity based upon irregular threats—such as insurgency—or not. On the one hand, we have the proponents of a counterinsurgency, or COIN, approach often associated with U.S. Army (Chris G. Neeley) one of Washington’s newest think tanks, the Center for a New American Security, and its energetic president, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.3 In brief, the An Actor-centric argument on this side of the current debate is that the U.S. Army (note, not the U.S. Marine Corps) deliberately shunned irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency in particular, Theory of War after it was “not allowed” (politically) to win the Vietnam war.4 Only when faced 30 years later in Iraq with an insurgency that seemed Understanding the Difference to be winning did the uniformed establish- ment return to the library of irregular warfare Between COIN and Counterinsurgency and, under the leadership of General David Petraeus, rewrite and embrace this form of war in the shape of revised Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency.5 This doctrinal By SEBASTIAN L.v .
    [Show full text]
  • War, Strategy & History
    WAR, STRATEGY & HISTORY ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR ROBERT O’NEILL WAR, STRATEGY & HISTORY ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR ROBERT O’NEILL EDITED BY DANIEL MARSTON AND TAMARA LEAHY Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: War, strategy and history : essays in honour of professor Robert O’Neill / editors: Daniel Marston, Tamara Leahy. ISBN: 9781760460235 (paperback) 9781760460242 (ebook) Subjects: O’Neill, Robert J. (Robert John), 1936- Strategy. War. Military history. Festschriften--Australia. Other Creators/Contributors: Marston, Daniel, editor. Leahy, Tamara, editor. Dewey Number: 355.02 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover photograph: THE XUYEN MOC BATON. This hand-carved baton was presented to Captain Bob O’Neill by the commander of Xuyen Moc District, Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam, Captain Duc, on 4 October 1966. O’Neill made the first visit to this isolated outpost by allied personnel after the arrival of the 1st Australian Task Force in the province. Bob, his interpreter and assistant, and RAAF helicopter pilot and co-pilot, had no confirmation that they were flying into and landing in a secure area. All went well and Captain Duc showed his gratitude by presenting O’Neill with this baton just before departure.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army
    Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq LTC John Nagl U.S. Army Making “war upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” - T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom Thesis l The organizational culture of the British Army allowed it to learn and implement effective counterinsurgency methods in Malaya. l The organizational culture of the American Army prevented such learning in Vietnam, but... l The American Army is rapidly adapting to COIN in Iraq. l More to be done to set the USG up for victory in The Long War. OUTLINE I. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency II. Learning in Military Organizations III. British COIN in Malaya IV. American COIN in Vietnam V. American COIN in Iraq VI. Comparisons and Conclusions Insurgency l“Illegal measures including the use of force to overthrow a government or to persuade or force people to do things they do not want to do.” - British Military Doctrine, 1987 Counterinsurgency l“A coordinated attempt to defeat insurgents, usually relying upon both civilian and military authorities either of the afflicted government or of its allies.” - U.S. Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, 1994. Military Forces Hate COIN l“The long list of unsuccessful operations conducted against guerrilla activities is a product of the inflexibility of many military leaders as well as their intransigent attitude concerning the abandonment of conventional tactics. This military arteriosclerosis has existed down through the ages...” – LTC Joseph Kutger, USAF, 1960 Organizational Culture l“Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.” - James Q.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq: a Critical Analysis
    COUNTERINSURGENCY IN VIETNAM, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS by BRIAN CHRISTOPHER DARLING A Capstone Project submitted to the Graduate School – Camden Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies under the direction of Professor Martin Clemis Approved by: _____________________________________________ Capstone Adviser Date Camden, New Jersey May 2014 i ABSTRACT OF THE CAPSTONE Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq: A Critical Analysis By: BRIAN DARLING Capstone Advisor: Professor Martin Clemis Counterinsurgency, in theory and practice, has been a popular topic in the defense community for the past several years. Historians like Mark Moyar and Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. have spent their careers writing about counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War, and advocating and promoting specific interpretations based on the lessons learned during that conflict to the Global War on Terror. The recent revival of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics has raised a number of significant questions. For example, under what circumstances should counterinsurgency operations be conducted? Should counter- guerilla operations have a permanent place in the training of the United States military? Are counterinsurgency operations ethical? This paper will seek to define counterinsurgency, and to analyze the application of counterinsurgency to the modern battlefield. ii PREFACE This capstone project is the culmination, not just of my time at Rutgers as a graduate student, but also of my adult education. I have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since September 11th, 2011. I read some of the works listed in the bibliography of this Capstone Project while mobilizing through Fort Bliss, Texas; I read some in my downtime at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, and Fort Polk, Louisiana.
    [Show full text]
  • Haverford Headmaster Dr. John A. Nagl to Resign Subsequent to The
    Rohith Tsundupalli ‘24 The Haverford School’s Head of School abruptly resigned at the end of August prompting many questions about whether or not he was leaving willingly. Shortly before the resignation, Dr. John Nagl co-authored an open letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s top military officer, calling on him to ensure that President Trump leaves office if he loses the 2020 election. The letter, posted on a website open to the public stated that Trump was “following the playbook of dictators throughout history” and likened him to Julius Caesar. The letter caused a large outcry among Haverford parents. In the This Is Lower Merion and Narberth online newspaper a parent and alumni of the school said, “Great day for the Haverford School! I commend the Board of Trustees for forcing John Nagl to resign. He has been an embarrassment! Now it is time to also get rid of the two Assistant Heads and the CFO.” Dr. Nagl attended the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, and the University of Oxford in England. In the United States Armed Forces, he served as a Lieutenant Colonel where he received a Bronze Star Medal. Dr. Nagl currently serves as the ninth head of school. Sarah Garling, from Haverford’s Marketing and Communications Office, says, “[Dr. Nagl] has moved The Haverford School forward in so many important ways, including, most recently, the completion of our $50 million capital campaign, [our] 5-year strategic plan, and the opening of [our] new state-of-the-art Middle School.” However, Nagl has also suffered some personal setbacks in the recent past, including his arrest in 2016 after he allegedly assaulted his son with a chokehold.
    [Show full text]
  • Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency 5B
    Eliot Cohen; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army MERICA began the 20th century with helps illuminate the extraordinary challenges inher­ Amilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency ent in defeating an insurgency. (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is Legitimacy as the main objective. A legitimate conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, government derives its just powers from the gov­ and a number of other countries around the globe. erned and competently manages collective security During the past century, Soldiers and Marines and political, economic, and social development. gained considerable experience fighting insurgents Legitimate governments are inherently stable. They in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now engender the popular support required to manage in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. internal problems, change, and conflict. Illegitimate Conducting a successful counterinsurgency governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably While every insurgency is different because of fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all the root cause of and the central strategic problem successful COIN campaigns are based on common in today’s unstable global­security environment. principles. All insurgencies use variations of stand­ Five actions that are indicators of legitimacy and ard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere that any political actor facing threats to stability to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign should implement are— plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have ● Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders.
    [Show full text]