Eliot Cohen; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army
merica began the 20th century with helps illuminate the extraordinary challenges inher Amilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency ent in defeating an insurgency. (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is Legitimacy as the main objective. A legitimate conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, government derives its just powers from the gov and a number of other countries around the globe. erned and competently manages collective security During the past century, Soldiers and Marines and political, economic, and social development. gained considerable experience fighting insurgents Legitimate governments are inherently stable. They in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now engender the popular support required to manage in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. internal problems, change, and conflict. Illegitimate Conducting a successful counterinsurgency governments are inherently unstable. Misguided, requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. corrupt, and incompetent governance inevitably While every insurgency is different because of fosters instability. Thus, illegitimate governance is distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all the root cause of and the central strategic problem successful COIN campaigns are based on common in today’s unstable global-security environment. principles. All insurgencies use variations of stand Five actions that are indicators of legitimacy and ard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere that any political actor facing threats to stability to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign should implement are— plan. In the Information Age, insurgencies have ● Free, fair, and frequent selection of leaders. become especially dynamic. Their leaders study ● A high level of popular participation in and and learn, exchange information, employ seemingly support for the political process. leaderless networks, and establish relationships ● A low level of corruption. of convenience with criminal gangs. Insurgencies ● A culturally acceptable level or rate of political, present a more complex problem than conventional economic, and social development. operations, and the new variants have a velocity that ● A high level of regime support from major previous historical insurgencies never possessed. social institutions. Governments that attain these goals usually Principles of Counterinsurgency garner the support of enough of the population The principles and imperatives of modern coun to create stability. The primary objective of any terinsurgency provide guideposts for forces engaged counterinsurgent is to establish such a government. in COIN campaigns. However, counterinsurgency While military action can deal with the symptoms of is a strange and complicated beast. Following the loss of legitimacy, restoring it can only be accom principles and imperatives does not guarantee suc plished using all elements of national power. Unless cess, which is just one of the several paradoxes of the government achieves legitimacy, counterinsur counterinsurgency. Understanding such paradoxes gency efforts cannot succeed.
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Unity of effort. Ideally, a counterinsurgent would in the conflict. The interconnected politico-military have unity of command over all elements of national nature of insurgency requires the counterinsurgent power involved in COIN operations. However, the to immerse himself in the lives of the people in best that military commanders can generally hope order to achieve victory. Successful U.S. COIN for is unity of effort through communication and operations require Soldiers and Marines to pos liaison with those responsible for the nonmilitary sess a clear, nuanced, empathetic appreciation of elements of power. The ambassador and country the essential nature of the conflict, particularly the team must be key players in higher level plan motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of insurgents ning, while similar connections are achieved down and indigenous actors. the chain of command. Even nongovernmental Intelligence as the driver for operations. organizations (NGOs) can play important roles in Without understanding the environment, one cannot improving lives. Many such players will resist being understand and properly apply intelligence. With overtly involved with military units, but they must out good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a make an effort to establish some kind of liaison. blind boxer wasting energy flailing at an unseen Connecting with joint, interagency, coalition, opponent. With good intelligence, a counterinsur and indigenous organizations is important to ensur gent is like a surgeon cutting out the cancers while ing that objectives are shared and that actions and keeping the vital organs intact. All operations must messages are synchronized. The resulting synergy be shaped by carefully considered actionable intel is essential for effective counterinsurgency. Unity ligence gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible of effort must pervade every level of activity, from levels and disseminated and distributed throughout national to neighborhood. Otherwise, well-inten the force. tioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each Isolating insurgents from their cause and sup- other out or provide a competent insurgent with port. Cutting an insurgency off to die on the vine many vulnerabilities to exploit. is easier than it is to kill every insurgent. Dynamic Political primacy. While all the elements of insurgencies regenerate quickly, so a skillful national power have a role in successful counter counterinsurgent must cut off the sources of that insurgency, political objectives must retain pri recuperative power. Ideological support can be macy. All actions, kinetic or nonkinetic, must be sundered by redressing the grievances that fuel the planned and executed with insurgency. Physical support consideration of their con can be cut off by population tribution toward strengthen Without good intelligence, a control or border security. ing the host government’s counterinsurgent is like a blind In the 20th century, popu legitimacy and achieving the boxer wasting energy flailing at lation control often meant U.S. Government’s political an unseen opponent. resettling people; in the 21st goals. The political and mili century, biometric identifi tary aspects of an insurgency cation cards will accomplish are usually so bound together as to be inseparable, the same objectives with much less disruption to and most insurgents recognize this fact. In coun people’s lives. International or local legal action terinsurgencies, military actions conducted without might be required to limit foreign financial support proper analysis of their political effects will at best to insurgents. be ineffective and at worst aid the enemy. As the host government increases its own legiti Understanding the environment. A key aspect macy, the people will more actively help achieve in an insurgency is the population. Analyzing this principle. Victory will be gained when this the effect of any operation is impossible without isolation is permanently maintained by the people’s understanding the society and culture within which active support. the COIN operation occurs. Soldiers and Marines Security under the rule of law. The cornerstone must understand demographics, history, and the of any COIN effort is security for the populace. causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, Without security, no permanent reforms can be approaches, and supporting entities for every player implemented, and disorder will spread. To establish
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The insurgent wins if he does not lose. moon cannot restore electricity. American agen The counterinsurgent loses if he does cies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts must avoid making exorbitant promises. In some cultures, not win. failing to deliver promised results is interpreted as deliberate deception, not simply good intentions legitimacy, security activities must move from the gone awry. realm of major combat operations into the realm of Managing expectations also involves showing law enforcement. Insurgents seen as criminals will economic and political progress as part of the cam lose public support. If they are dealt with by an paign to show the populace how life is improving. In established legal system in line with local culture the end, the people must be convinced that their lives and practices, the legitimacy of the host govern will be better with the counterinsurgent in control ment will be enhanced. This process will take time, rather than with the insurgent in control. Both the but Soldiers must be aware of the legal procedures counterinsurgent and the host nation must ensure applicable to their conduct and support them. They that their deeds match their words. Any action has an must also help establish indigenous institutions information reaction, so they must carefully consider (police forces, court systems, and penal facilities) its effect on the many audiences involved and work that will sustain that legal regime. to shape responses that further desired ends. Long-term commitment. Insurgencies tend to Use measured force. Any use of force gener be protracted conflicts. Counterinsurgency always ates a series of reactions, so, it is best to use the demands considerable expenditures of time and minimum possible force in resolving any situation. resources. The insurgent wins if he does not lose. At times, an overwhelming effort is necessary to The counterinsurgent loses if he does not win. intimidate an opponent or reassure the populace, Insurgents are strengthened by the belief that a few but the amount of force and who wields it should casualties or a few years will cause adversaries to be carefully calculated. Mounting an operation that abandon the conflict. Only constant reaffirmations kills 5 insurgents is futile if collateral damage leads of commitment backed by deeds will bolster public to the recruitment of 50 more. Often it is better that faith in government survivability. People will not police handle urban raids, even if they are not as support a government until they are convinced the well-armed or as capable as military units, because counterinsurgent has the means, ability, stamina, the populace is likely to view that application of and will to win. force as more legitimate. Also, a local police force reinforces the rule of law. Contemporary Imperatives of Learn and adapt. A COIN force must be a Counterinsurgency learning organization. Insurgents shift between Recent experiences with counterinsurgency high military and political phases and approaches. In light the following additional imperatives that we addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange must keep in mind for success. information about enemy vulnerabilities. A skillful Manage information and expectations. Infor counterinsurgent must be able to adapt at least as mation and expectations are related, and a skillful fast as the opponent. Every unit must be able to counterinsurgent must carefully manage both. To make observations, draw lessons, apply them, and limit discontent and build support, a counterinsur assess results. Higher headquarters must develop gent and host government must create and maintain an effective system to circulate lessons learned realistic expectations among the populace, friendly throughout the organization. Insurgents shift their military forces, and even the international commu areas of operations looking for weak links, so nity. Information operations will be a key tool to widespread competence is required throughout the accomplish this. counterinsurgent force. Americans have a disadvantage because of our Empower the lowest levels. The learning pro reputation for accomplishment, resulting in what cess must go on at every level of the COIN effort. has been termed the Man on the Moon syndrome. The mosaic nature of an insurgency means that To people in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems unbe local commanders have the best grasp of their own lievable that a nation that can put a man on the situations. They must have the assets to produce
Military Review March-April 2006 51 actionable intelligence and manage information Dollars and ballots will have a more operations. Also, COIN operations must be decen tralized, and higher commanders owe it to their important effect than bombs and subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible bullets. down to lower levels. Lower level initiative has to be supported and encouraged in order to create a COIN exploit. If a careful analysis of the effects of a response force that can adapt as quickly as insurgents. reveals that more negatives than positives might Support the host nation. American forces must result, Soldiers should consider an alternative. remember that they are conducting COIN operations The best weapons for counterinsurgency do to help a host government. The long-term goal is for not fire bullets. Counterinsurgents achieve the that government to stand on its own. In the end, the most meaningful success by gaining popular sup host nation must win its own war. While U.S. forces port and legitimacy for the host government, not by and agencies can provide invaluable assistance, killing insurgents. Security is important in setting they must be able to hand off responsibilities to the stage for other kinds of progress, but lasting indigenous elements. And, while it might be easier victory will come from a vibrant economy, political for U.S. military units to conduct operations them participation, and restored hope. Dollars and ballots selves, it is far better for them to help strengthen will have a more important effect than bombs and local forces. In successful COIN operations, host bullets; information is even more powerful when governments have the final responsibility to solve correctly wielded. T.E. Lawrence once observed their own problems. that “[t]he printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander. . . .”1 This is Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency even truer today than it was when Lawrence wrote it COIN operations present complex, often unfa nearly a century ago—except that the truly effective miliar missions and considerations. In many ways, counterinsurgent requires not just a printing press, conducting COIN operations is counterintuitive to but radio and television programs and an Internet the traditional American approach to war and combat presence. Soldiers and Marines must be prepared to operations. Some representative paradoxes follow: engage in a host of traditional nonmilitary missions The more you protect your force, the less secure to support COIN operations. you are. The counterinsurgent gains ultimate success Them doing something poorly is sometimes by protecting the populace, not himself. If military better than us doing it well. Who performs an forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch operation is just as important as how well it is with the people who are the ultimate arbiters of vic done. The United States is and will be supporting tory and who could concede the streets and fields host nations in a counterinsurgency, and long-term to the insurgent. Forces must conduct patrols, share success requires establishing viable institutions that risk, and maintain contact to obtain the intelligence can continue without significant U.S. support. The to drive operations and to reinforce the connections longer that process takes, the more popular support with the people who establish legitimacy. in the United States will wane and the more the local The more force you use, the less effective you populace will question the legitimacy of their own are. Any use of force produces many effects, not all forces. Lawrence said of his experience leading the of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turkish Empire: the greater the chance of collateral damage and “Do not try and do too much with your own hands. mistakes. Enemy propaganda will portray kinetic Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it per military activities as brutal. Restrained force also fectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not strengthens the rule of law the counterinsurgent is win it for them.”2 trying to establish. If a tactic works this week, it will not work next Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. week; if it works in this province, it will not work Often an insurgent will carry out a terrorist act or in the next. Today’s competent insurgents are adap guerrilla raid to entice the counterinsurgent to over tive and are often part of a widespread network that react or, at least, react in a way that the insurgent can constantly and instantly communicates. Successful
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COIN practices and appropriate countermeasures high command, a feeble domestic base of support, pass rapidly throughout the insurgency, and insur a hostile press, and the sheer impossibility of the gents can implement changes quickly. COIN leaders task. These judgments were grounded in reality, but must avoid complacency and be at least as adaptive the Army’s institutional failures deserved no less as the adversary. attention. Instead, although Army officers developed Tactical success guarantees nothing. When skills and achieved successes in irregular warfare in Colonel Harry Summers told a North Vietnamese places like El Salvador and the former Yugoslavia, counterpart in 1975 that “[y]ou know you never the institution continued to treat irregular warfare as defeated us on the battlefield,” the reply was: “That an exception, an additional duty, or simply as a mis may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”3 Military actions take. The result was an Army that was not as well- alone cannot achieve success. Tactical actions must prepared to battle sophisticated insurgent enemies be linked to operational and strategic military objec in Iraq and Afghanistan as it could have been. tives and essential political goals. Without those We are at a turning point in the Army’s insti connections, we might waste lives and resources tutional history. By considering the principles, for no real gain. imperatives, and paradoxes of counterinsurgency presented here, we can learn the lessons from Iraq The Future of Warfare and Afghanistan needed to prepare for the insur America’s extraordinary conventional military gencies and small wars we will have to fight in the power makes it likely that many of our future oppo future. Our enemies are fighting us as insurgents nents will choose irregular means, including terrorism because they think insurgency is their best chance and insurgency, to achieve their political objectives for victory. We must prove them wrong. MR and prevent us from achieving ours. The U.S. Army prides itself on its system of lessons learned. We must understand that others study us no less carefully than NOTES we study them. We reflect on tactics, techniques, and 1. T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (October 1920). Reprinted by the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command procedures; our enemies consider those as well, but and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with permission. On-line they also pay attention to the operational and strategic at
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