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Biological/Agricultural Threat: U.S

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Biological/Agricultural Threat: U.S Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Presentation to the FAZD Annual Meeting Dr. Daniel Gerstein Deputy Under Secretary Science & Technology Directorate June 27, 2013 1 S&T At A Glance One of 10 DHS Components Highly collaborative . Provides key technical & analytical . Components & HSE capacity for DHS . State & Local . Operationally focused . Interagency & International . Supports DHS, Component and HSE requirements with innovation . Industry & Private sector S&T statistics: Laboratories . ~1.2% of DHS Budget . 5 Internal Labs . ~1,200 personnel Biodefense, chemical, explosives, Federal, contractor, IPAs urban environment Highly technical staff Adding new agricultural Six primary commodity areas biodefense lab . First responders, borders & . Responsible for usage of DOE Labs & maritime, cyber, chem-bio defense, FFRDCs explosives, resilience DHS S&T Mission: Strengthen America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) 2 DHS Mission Guidance Complex & White House Strategic Guidance Quadrennial Homeland Dynamic Guidance (Examples) Security Review (QHSR) 2010 Environment (Examples) U.S Law & Threats Globalization & Interagency Smaller Scale Terrorism Transportation Trafficking & Crime HSPD-5 Pandemics, Accidents, National Incident Border Security & Natural Hazards Immigration Management Homeland System Security Act 2002 Violent Extremism (2003) High Consequence WMD Violent Extremism HSPD-7 Critical National Response Core Missions Cyber Domain Infrastructure Identification & Framework (2008) 1. Preventing terrorism & Protection (2003) enhancing security Nature of 2. Securing and managing Innovation PPD-8 National our borders Preparedness QHSR Natural 3. Enforcing & administering (2011) (Feb 2010) Disasters immigration laws HSPD -9 4. Safeguarding and securing Defense of cyberspace United States More Threats, Agriculture and Energy Sector 5. Ensuring resilience to Less Resources Food Plan (2010) disasters 3 Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security First Responders across the Nation Enterprise (HSE) Critical Infrastructure Personnel: DHS is about 230K … HSE is about 3.5M Culture of law enforcement Focus on borders, customs enforcement & maritime Requires threat, lexicon, plans, procedures, communications, etc. 4 Organization of DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Aligned with Mission Under Secretary TSA, CBP, CIS, ICE, USSS, FEMA, USCG, NPPD, DNDO, Deputy Under Secretary OHA, First Responders Homeland Security Acquisition Support Research & First Responders Advanced Research & Operations Development Group (FRG) Projects Agency Analysis (ASOA) Partnerships (RDP) (HSARPA) Interoperability & Borders & Maritime Research & Development Interagency Compatibility Analysis & Assessment Chemical/Biological International Transportation Security Technology National Labs Cyber Security Lab (TSL) Clearinghouse Plum Island (PIADC) Federally Funded Research & Explosives National Biodefense Analysis National Urban Security Development Centers & Countermeasures Center Technology Lab (NUSTL) Resilient Systems Program Management Office (NBACC) Standards Chemical Security Analysis Test & Evaluation Center (CSAC) National Bio & Agro-Defense S&T’s Value Added Proposition … Facility (NBAF) Public-Private Partnerships Operationally focused … focused technology options & operational University Programs process enhancements Innovative … develop innovative, systems-based solutions to complex homeland security problems Partnerships … technical depth and reach to leverage technology solutions from federal, state, local and tribal governments, universities, and the private sector - across the US and internationally 5 Maximizing Operational & Technology Returns in Challenging Fiscal Times From R&D to r&D Collaboration B A Including Technology Foraging Systems Analysis – Biodefense Example Deliverables Identify Threats, Risks What is a comprehensive biodefense strategy? & Opportunities. How does the Department of Homeland Develop Objectives & Security fit into the national biodefense Priorities architecture? Fill Requirements & What are the seams and gaps in the Gaps architecture? 6 DHS S&T Performers DHS S&T Labs DHS Centers of DOE National Labs Excellence CSAC TSL NUSTL (COE) & PIADC NBACC NBAF Federally Funded Academic Research & Institutions Development Private Industry Centers (FFRDCs) Medium & Large Small Integrators Business Interagency International Industry Organizations Investment Community 7 Nature of the Biological Threat Aum Inspire Rajneeshee Amerithrax State-Sponsored BW Shinrikyo Magazine Programs Attack Attack “Proliferation” of BSL-3+ labs Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV) State –like Historical E. Coli (Germany) capabilities in hands Perspective West Nile Virus in USA H1N1 of non-state actors Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release SARS Pandemic Rapid naturally occurring disease UK FMD Outbreak H7N9 BWC EIF spread MERS-CoV Open-Source Biosynthetics Recombinant DNA Human Genome Project Poliovirus Synthesized H5N1 Biotech & Gene Modification Role of Dual Use Synthetic Pathogens Articles Bioinformatics Concern Advanced Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) First Synthetic Cell Manufacturing Selective DNA Isolation Insider DIY Bio Threat Likelihood of Event State BW Use 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 2010 Future 8 Examining the Potential for Bioterror P = f {Capabilities, Intent, Knowledge} P Viable Attack Viable Attack 1.0 What did we learn from the Anthrax attacks? Project Bacchus Dr. Eckert Wimmer (+) Dr. Mark Butler Dr. Steven Kurtz Why did Aum Amerithrax Shinrikyo fail? 77 BW events in over 100 years Dr. Jerzy Mierzejewski Why did the (-) Dr. William Patrick task Rajneeshes fail? 1 yr 6 months (Height of line indicates rate of development – time to double) 5 yr (Arrows show enabling technology) 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Solid State Peptide and Nucleic Acid Synthesis 1970 Vaccines Nucleic Acid Probes Chimeric Monoclonal Antibodies Monoclonal Antibodies 1972 Sensors 1984 What does this tell us DNA Engineering 1982 Pathogen Efficacy 1992 about the potential for Human Genome Project 1989 Encapsulization & Stabilization Antibiotics a bioterror attack in Bioactive Peptides Cell Growth Chambers / Fermenters the future? 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 -20 Years -10 Years Today + 10 Years +20 Years +30 Years 9 Agriculture Threat Space Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs) are endemic, spreading, and emerging globally on six continents FADs could be easily introduced intentionally (agroterrorism) or accidentally (food imports, foreign travelers) An “across the nation” outbreak of a FAD like foot-and-mouth disease could result in losses of up to $60 billion (USDA, 2005) resulting from control measures Foot and Mouth Disease - 2010 and protective embargoes FMD is widely considered to be the number one agricultural threat to the US 10 Biological/Agricultural Threat: U.S. Government Biodefense Programs Natural Disease Unintended Vandalism, Deliberate Biological Accidents Negligence Outbreak Consequences Sabotage Use of BW Threat Spectrum Biodefense issues are: International & Interagency Complex & Multidisciplinary Inherently Dual Use Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Engagement (State & Defense) Biorisk Management: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Bioethics Australia WHO International Health UNSCR 1540 Group Regulations (IHR) Laboratory Response Network (LRN) BSAT Regulations Dual Use Research of One Health Concern (DURC) Bilateral arrangements BWC FAO & OIE Export Controls 11 S&T’s Agricultural Defense Programs span the entire outbreak spectrum Tools to support planning and Vaccines (VX) to rapidly response, drive requirements prevent disease in for countermeasures healthy animals prevents development and inform post- disease spread among outbreak response activities healthy herd, maintaining Agricultural Screening Tools by creating scalable (local to business continuity (AST): to verify disease free national) simulation and status so uninfected animals modeling tools to analyze and products can continue to potential responses and move maintaining business control options to minimize continuity FAD spread. Enhanced Passive Surveillance (EPS): includes diagnostic tests, surveillance tools and data integration procedures to identify infected animals prior to Livestock Depopulation, Disposal and Decontamination overt symptoms and improve our (3D): New methodologies and decision support tools for ability to detect diseases that threaten High throughput diagnostics (DX) allow more depopulation, disposal and decontamination that facilitate the U.S. agricultural critical rapid confirmation of disease status and rapid response and prevent disease spread in a manner that infrastructure. increased sample processing capabilities minimizes waste, environmental impact and negative public enhancing our ability to contain outbreaks perception. 12 DHS S&T Contributions to Biodefense Chem-Bio Division Successes (Examples) …Save lives & protect Nation’s Foot & Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine infrastructure against chemical, biological Rapid point of care diagnostics & agricultural threats & disasters. Medical Countermeasures Development S&T Labs (MCM) support “White Powder” standard Assay development standards Threat characterization studies Interagency DOE National Labs Bioterror Risk Assessment (BTRA) Defense Threat Reduction Bioforensics Agency (DTRA) Department of Agriculture Areas of Concern (Examples) Others … Crisis Management International
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