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BioWeapons Monitor n 2012 1 BWPP BioWeapons Monitor 2012 Copyright and credits © BioWeapons Prevention Project, 2012 Editor First published in December 2012 Gerald Walther ([email protected]) Simon Whitby ([email protected]) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, Design, Layout and Printer or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 2 without the prior permission in writing of the Inprint + Design, Bradford BioWeapons Prevention Project, or as expressly www.inprintdesign.com permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Images Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to Gerald Walther Shutterstock Images and iStockphoto at [email protected] or Simon Whitby at [email protected]. ISBN: 978-1-85143-270-7 BioWeapons Prevention Project Contents About the BioWeapons Monitor ............................................................................................. 4 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 7 Country report: Brazil ....................................................................................................... 12 Country report: Germany ................................................................................................... 23 Country report: India ........................................................................................................ 36 3 Country report: Japan ....................................................................................................... 51 Country report: Kenya ....................................................................................................... 65 Country report: Switzerland ................................................................................................ 94 Country report: United Kingdom ........................................................................................... 90 Country report: United States ............................................................................................ 112 BioWeapons Monitor 2012 About Bioweapons Monitor The BioWeapons Monitor is an initiative of the agreement of Standing Agenda items on international BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP)—a global cooperation and assistance, developments in network of civil society actors dedicated to the science and technology and strengthening national permanent elimination of biological weapons and of implementation, the BioWeapons Monitor will seek the possibility of their re-emergence—to help monitor to provide relevant national information that will compliance with the international norm prohibiting assist the States Parties in developing approaches biological weapons, laid down chiefly in the 1972 that will enhance the effectiveness and improve 4 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Particularly, the implementation of the BWC. A key starting it aims to increase the transparency of activities point is the information submitted by the BWC relevant to the BWC, and thereby complement the States Parties annually under the BWC confidence- current treaty regime. Preventing states and non- building measures (CBMs). The proposals submitted state actors from acquiring and using biological by Canada and Switzerland to the Seventh Review weapons is an urgent need. The BioWeapons Conference1 to explore a broader concept of Monitor seeks to provide factual information that compliance assessment based on examining and will enhance discussions on strengthening the assessing the national regulatory programme that effectiveness and improving implementation of the has been implemented to ensure compliance with BWC and other national and international measures a regulatory/legislated requirement provide an relating to the prohibition of biological weapons. Its interesting approach. objective is to benefit the international community as a whole. The BioWeapons Monitor 2012 contains country reports on BWC-relevant activities in eight The BioWeapons Monitor seeks to complement states: Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, and work with governments in their activities to Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United effectively implement the BWC and to fulfill their obligations to permanently eliminate biological 1 Canada and Switzerland, National Implementa- weapons and prevent their re-emergence. Following tion of the BTWC: Compliance Assessment, submitted to the Seventh the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 and its Review Conference and issued as MSP/2012/MX/WP. 17, BioWeapons Prevention Project States. In-country authors collected and analysed comments from governmental and non-governmental relevant information that is distributed through actors. this publication. The authors used open sources and actively sought information from government Origins of the BioWeapons Monitor departments, research institutions, industry, scientific societies and other entities. This wide The BioWeapons Monitor idea grew in response to range of sources helps to ensure that the project is the wish to find a way forward to strengthen the as comprehensive as possible and draws on as many effectiveness and improve the implementation of the reliable sources as possible. The BioWeapons Monitor Convention in the early twenty-first century. Over 2012 is based on the model for 2011: For future time, its aims have become more concrete. In 2008, years the intention is to extend the coverage to a group of four civil society organisations – the include all three of the Standing Agenda items of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, the Intersessional Process. Research Group for Biological Arms Control in Germany, the Society for the Study of Peace and The BioWeapons Monitor takes the Landmine Conflict in India, the Verification Research Training Monitor – a product of the International Campaign and Information Centre in the UK – took up the to Ban Landmines, which is a global network of civil challenge of increasing transparency in areas related society organisations – as its role model. Although to the BWC by monitoring the activities of states. a civil society initiative, the Landmine Monitor is With the input of the BWPP Board of Directors, regarded as the de facto monitoring regime for the the BioWeapons Monitor was further developed 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, reporting on States Parties’ and initial funding secured in early 2010. The first 5 implementation of, and compliance with, that edition of the BioWeapons Monitor was released on accord. The country reports in the BioWeapons 10 December 2010. Monitor 2012 provide factual information and are constructive in their analysis. As a rule, any Acknowledgements potentially controversial piece of information is We gratefully acknowledge the receipt of funding for backed by two different sources. More importantly, this third edition of the BioWeapons Monitor from the States Parties are invited to advice on and comment Government of Norway. The views expressed in this on the information prior to publication. This third publication do not necessarily reflect those of the edition of the BioWeapons Monitor builds on Government of Norway. experience obtained during work on the second issue in 2011. The Third edition was, and future editions will be, able to build on relationships established by the in-country authors with relevant experts on the ground and experience of finding and using data sources, allowing, over time, reports to be more comprehensive and presenting a more complete picture of BWC-relevant activities. The BioWeapons Monitor is a work in progress, being constantly updated, corrected and improved. We welcome BioWeapons Monitor 2012 List of researchers and advisers The following in-country authors were responsible for carrying out research and writing the country reports: Animesh Roul, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, India. Eucharia Kenya and Margaret Muturi, International Centre for Health Intervention and Research in Africa Géraldine Marks, Paul Cézanne University Aix- Marseille III, France Gunnar Jeremias, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Germany. Isabelle Jargowsky, Ecological Society of America, US James Revill, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons, UK Kai Ilchmann, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons, UK Masamichi Minehata, University of Bradford, UK. 6 Work was coordinated by the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford, UK. The following people have continuously supported the BioWeapons Monitor by providing information, comments, and advice: Angela Woodward, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, UK Graham Pearson, Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK Marie Chevrier, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, US Richard Lennane and Piers Millet, BWC Implementation Support Unit, United Nations Office Geneva, Switzerland. BioWeapons Prevention Project Introduction State of the biological weapons States not members of the BWC disarmament regime 1. Andorra 2. Angola The centrepiece of the multilateral biological 3. Cameroon weapons disarmament regime is the Biological 4. Chad Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972, which entered 5. Comoros into force 1975. In total, there are 166 members 6. Djibouti and 12 signatories to the BWC. Nineteen countries 7. Eritrea 7 remain outside of the Convention. Compared to other
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