DOCSLIB.ORG

Bioweapons Monitor 2011 the Bioweapons Prevention Project

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Bioweapons Monitor 2011 the Bioweapons Prevention Project BWPP BioWeapons Monitor 2011 The BioWeapons Prevention Project The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) is a global network of civil society actors dedicated to the permanent elimination of biological weapons and of the possibility of their re-emergence. It was launched in 2003 by a group of non-governmental organizations concerned at the failure of governments to fortify the norm against the weaponization of disease. BWPP monitors govern- mental and other activities relevant to the treaties that codify that norm. www.bwpp.org BioWeapons Monitor 2011 BWPP Copyright and credits © BioWeapons Prevention Project, 2011 Editor First published in November 2011 Iris Hunger ([email protected]) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may Copy-editor, design and layout be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or Rick Jones ([email protected]) transmitted, in any form or by any means, without Printer the prior permission in writing of the BioWeapons Druckpunkt Druckerei & Repro GmbH, Berlin 2 Prevention Project, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate repro- Images graphics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning Shutterstock Images and iStockphoto reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to Iris Hunger at [email protected]. ISBN: 978-3-00-036561-4 BioWeapons Prevention Project Contents About the BioWeapons Monitor ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Findings ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Country report: Germany ...................................................................................................................................................... 16 3 Country report: India ............................................................................................................................................................. 29 Country report: Japan ............................................................................................................................................................ 42 Country report: Kenya ........................................................................................................................................................... 54 Country report: South Africa ................................................................................................................................................ 61 Country report: Switzerland ................................................................................................................................................ 73 Country report: United Kingdom ........................................................................................................................................ 90 Country report: United States ........................................................................................................................................... 105 Annex: ranking of states in terms of their biotechnological capabilities ........................................................... 138 BioWeapons Monitor 2011 About the BioWeapons Monitor The BioWeapons Monitor is an initiative of the prevent their re-emergence. It is meant to comple- BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP)—a global ment BWC States Parties’ reporting requirements network of civil society actors dedicated to the XQGHUWKH%:&FRQÀGHQFHEXLOGLQJPHDVXUHV &%0V permanent elimination of biological weapons and While some states have chosen to make their CBMs of the possibility of their re-emergence—to help available to the public, this is not the case for most monitor compliance with the international norm states, with the result that civil society is unable, SURKLELWLQJELRORJLFDOZHDSRQVODLGGRZQFKLHÁ\ except through the BioWeapons Monitor, to assess 4 in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). treaty compliance. Particularly, it aims to increase the transparency of The BioWeapons Monitor 2011 contains country activities relevant to the BWC, which the current reports on BWC-relevant activities in eight states: WUHDW\UHJLPHGRHVQRWDFFRPSOLVKVXIÀFLHQWO\ Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, South Africa, Preventing states and non-state actors from acquir- Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United ing and using biological weapons is an urgent, unmet States. In-country researchers collected and analysed need. The BioWeapons Monitor seeks to provide relevant information that is distributed through factual information that will enhance discussions the publication. The researchers used open sources on strengthening implementation of the BWC and and actively sought to procure information from other national and international measures that government departments, research institutions, support the biological weapons prohibition. It works LQGXVWU\VFLHQWLÀFVRFLHWLHVDQGRWKHUHQWLWLHV7KLV LQJRRGIDLWKLQRUGHUWREHQHÀWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO wide range of sources helps to ensure the project’s community as a whole. success—that is, it does not rely solely on govern- ments being forthcoming with information. The BioWeapons Monitor LVQRWDWHFKQLFDOYHULÀFD- tion system, but an effort of civil society to hold The BioWeapons Monitor takes the Landmine Monitor— governments accountable for their obligations to a product of the International Campaign to Ban eliminate permanently biological weapons and to Landmines, which is a global network of civil society BioWeapons Prevention Project organisations—as its role model. Although a civil time its aims have become more concrete. In 2008, society initiative, Landmine Monitor is regarded as a group of four civil society organisations—the the de facto monitoring regime for the 1997 Mine Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, the Ban Treaty, reporting on States Parties’ implemen- Research Group for Biological Arms Control in tation of, and compliance with, that accord. The Germany, the Society for the Study of Peace and country reports in the BioWeapons Monitor 2011 &RQÁLFWLQ,QGLDDQGWKH9HULÀFDWLRQ5HVHDUFK provide factual information and are critical but Training and Information Centre in the UK—took constructive in their analysis. As a rule, any con- up the challenge of increasing transparency in troversial piece of information is backed by two areas related to the BWC by monitoring the activi- different sources. More importantly, countries were ties of states. With the input of the BWPP Board of given the opportunity to respond to information Directors, the BioWeapons Monitor was further prior to publication. developed and initial funding secured in early 7KHÀUVWHGLWLRQRIWKHBioWeapons Monitor This second edition of the BioWeapons Monitor was released on 10 December 2010. builds on experience obtained during work on the inaugural issue in 2010. While the BioWeapons Monitor 2011 XWLOLVHGUHÀQHGGDWDFROOHFWLRQDQG Acknowledgements analysis procedures, limitations still exist in this 5 regard, particularly with respect to countries covered We gratefully acknowledge the receipt of funding IRUWKHÀUVWWLPH7KLVVHFRQGHGLWLRQZDVDQG for this second edition of the BioWeapons Monitor future editions will be, able to build on relation- from the Governments of Norway and Switzerland. ships established by the in-country researchers The views expressed in this publication do not with relevant experts on the ground and experience QHFHVVDULO\UHÁHFWWKRVHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWVRI RIÀQGLQJDQGXVLQJGDWDVRXUFHVDOORZLQJRYHUWLPH Norway and Switzerland. reports to be more comprehensive, and the paint- ing of a more complete picture of BWC-relevant List of researchers and advisers activities. The BioWeapons Monitor is a work in progress, being constantly updated, corrected and The following in-country researchers were respon- improved. We welcome comments from governmental sible for researching and writing the country reports: and non-governmental actors. Animesh Roul, Society for the Study of Peace DQG&RQÁLFW,QGLD Origins of the BioWeapons Monitor %LONLV2PDU$IULFDQ5HVHDUFK,QVLJKW6RXWK$IULFD The BioWeapons Monitor idea grew in response to Eucharia Kenya and Margaret Muturi, Interna- the failed negotiations on a legally-binding protocol tional Centre for Health Intervention and Research WRWKH%:&LQWKHHDUO\WZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\2YHU in Africa (ICHIRA), Kenya. BioWeapons Monitor 2011 Iris Hunger, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Germany. James Revill, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons, UK. Lynn Klotz, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, US. Masamichi Minehata, Sasakawa Peace Foundation/ 3DFLÀF)RUXP&HQWHUIRU6WUDWHJLFDQG,QWHUQD- tional Studies (CSIS), Japan/US. Sergio Bonin, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, Switzerland. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance provided by Paul McGregor (New Zealand). Work was coordinated by the Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Germany. 6 The following people have continuously supported the BioWeapons Monitor by providing information, comments and advice: Chandre Gould and Noel Stott, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa. $QJHOD:RRGZDUG9HULÀFDWLRQ5HVHDUFK7UDLQLQJ and Information Centre, UK. Marie Chevrier, Scientists
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Equine Biosecurity and Biocontainment Practices on U.S
    Veterinary Services Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health November 2006 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Equine Biosecurity and Biocontainment Practices on U.S. Equine Operations With the globalization of animal industries, biosecurity General Practices and biocontainment practices play a vital role in the health of domestic animals. Biosecurity practices include General biosecurity measures taken on equine measures that reduce the risk of disease introduction on operations include isolation protocols, infection-control an operation. Biocontainment practices include precautions for visitors, and use of separate or measures that reduce the spread of disease on an disinfected equipment. Other general management operation and from one operation to another. practices address contact with other animals, potential Vaccination, another important aid in infection control, contamination of feed and water, insect control, and will be addressed in a separate information sheet. manure management. Equine diseases are spread in a variety of ways, including direct contact between equids and contact with Separation for isolation or infection control feces, insect or animal vectors, aerosol particles, and contaminated needles. Often overlooked but equally Overall, 65.1 percent of operations separated important modes of disease transmission include contact animals for isolation or infection control. For this study, with contaminated equipment, tack, transport
    [Show full text]
  • Department of Agriculture
    Vol. 76 Monday, No. 191 October 3, 2011 Part V Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 7 CFR Part 331 9 CFR Part 121 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List; Amendments to the Select Agent and Toxin Regulations; Proposed Rule VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:12 Sep 30, 2011 Jkt 226001 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4717 Sfmt 4717 E:\FR\FM\03OCP3.SGM 03OCP3 srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS3 61228 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 191 / Monday, October 3, 2011 / Proposed Rules DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station determines has the potential to pose a 3A–03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118, severe threat to animal or plant health, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Riverdale, MD 20737–1238. or to animal or plant products. Service Supporting documents and any Paragraph (a)(2) of section 212 requires comments we receive on this docket the Secretary to review and republish 7 CFR Part 331 may be viewed at http:// the list every 2 years and to revise the www.regulations.gov/ list as necessary. In this document, we 9 CFR Part 121 #!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2009-0070 or are proposing to amend and republish [Docket No. APHIS–2009–0070] in our reading room, which is located in the list of select agents and toxins based room 1141 of the USDA South Building, on the findings of our third biennial RIN 0579–AD09 14th Street and Independence Avenue, review of the list. SW., Washington, DC.
    [Show full text]
  • ADF = Air Defence
    PARTNERSHIP WORK PROGRAMME – SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES FOR 2004 ADF = Air Defence ACO.2728 Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Planning Seminar Proposed by: JFC HQ Brunssum AOC: ADF Topic: GBAD mission planning to include employment principles, joint doctrine, C2 interoperability, point defence, area defence and cluster concept. Discuss procedures used in developing the commanders air defence policies. Terrain analysis. Events Action Authority Type Date Location 30 Aug 2004 - 10 Sept ACO.2728.24 CC-Air HQ Ramst Seminar Halmstad , AIR/RAMSTEIN 2004 ACO.2960 P-3-06 Ground Based Air Defence Course (C-06) Proposed by: SHAPE AOC: ADF Topic: Ground Based Air Defence Course for PfP Events Action Authority Type Date Location ACO.2960.5 NS(S) Course 9 Feb 2004 - 13 Feb 2004 Oberammergau , NS(S) ACO.3009 PfP Cross - Servicing Training Proposed by: JFC HQ Brunssum AOC: ADF Topic: Information about NATO's concept of cross-service aircraft, including re-arming and hands-on training. Events Action Authority Type Date Location ACO.3009.2 CC-Air HQ Ramst Training 9 Jun 2004, 1 day AIRNORTH IS/DI.932 NADC Plenary Proposed by: NADC AOC: ADF Topic: Enlarged Plenary Session of the NATO Air Defence Committee Events Action Authority Type Date Location IS/DI.932.15 IS/DI Meeting 2nd Qtr 2004, 2 days IS/DI.932.16 IS/DI Meeting 4th Qtr 2004, 2 days IS/DI.1155 NADC Seminar Proposed by: NADC AOC: ADF Topic: Seminar on Air Defence topic Events Action Authority Type Date Location IS/DI.1155.11 IS/DI Seminar TBD 2004, 1 day IS/DI.1155.12 IS/DI Seminar TBD 2004, 1 day IS/DI.1191
    [Show full text]
  • 125 Jahre Feldpost
    125 Jahre Feldpost Die Schweizerische Post 125 Jahre Feldpost Jahre 125 1889 bis 2014 bis 1889 125 Jahre Feldpost 1889 bis 2014 Impressum Herausgegeben von der Schweizerischen Post Redaktion Patrick Teuscher Autoren Fritz Affolter: Die letzten 25 Jahre Rebekka Brönnimann: Erlebnisbericht Ulrich Hurni Matthias Dürst: Die letzten 25 Jahre / Waffenplatzpostdienst Hans-Ulrich Friedli: Erlebnisbericht Treberwurstessen Marc Imobersteg: Prolog Marcel Marti: Jubiläumsanlass, Erlebnisberichte von Frédéric Balet / Bernard Beyeler / Urs Friedli / Ueli Gerber / Stephan Gilgen / Michel Pochon / Janik Roth Nicola Passini: Erlebnisbericht Nicola Passini Hans Schlatter: Erlebnisbericht Hans Schlatter Hanspeter Wenger: Die ersten 100 Jahre / Fakten und Zahlen Beat Wiget: Erlebnisbericht Beat Wiget Interviews Rebekka Brönnimann: Interview mit Ulrich Hurni Hans-Ulrich Friedli: Interview mit Denise Schütz Marcel Marti: Interview mit Büro Schweiz Gaby Zimmer: Interview mit Daniel Baumgartner Bildredaktion Fritz Affolter, Hanspeter Wenger Fotos Museum für Kommunikation und Feldpostdirektion Fotos der Erlebnisberichte wurden von den Porträtierten zur Verfügung gestellt Übersetzung Die Schweizerische Post / Sprachdienst Lektorat Patrick Teuscher Korrektorat und Übersetzung Die Schweizerische Post / Sprachdienst Konzept, Gestaltung, Satz und Bild Printsatz AG Druck Ast und Fischer AG Bezugsquelle Feldpostdirektion 3030 Bern BBL 07.2014 1800 860334288 Inhaltsverzeichnis 5 Vorwort von Ueli Maurer 6 Vorwort von Susanne Ruoff 7 Vorwort von Fritz Affolter 9 Die ersten
    [Show full text]
  • Switzerland1
    YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW - VOLUME 14, 2011 CORRESPONDENTS’ REPORTS SWITZERLAND1 Contents Multilateral Initiatives — Foreign Policy Priorities .................................................................. 1 Multilateral Initiatives — Human Security ................................................................................ 1 Multilateral Initiatives — Disarmament and Non-Proliferation ................................................ 2 Multilateral Initiatives — International Humanitarian Law ...................................................... 4 Multilateral Initiatives — Peace Support Operations ................................................................ 5 Multilateral Initiatives — International Criminal Law .............................................................. 6 Legislation — Implementation of the Rome Statute ................................................................. 6 Cases — International Crimes Trials (War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Genocide) .... 12 Cases — Extradition of Alleged War Criminal ....................................................................... 13 Multilateral Initiatives — Foreign Policy Priorities Swiss Federal Council, Foreign Policy Report (2011) <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/doc/publi/ppol.html> Pursuant to the 2011 Foreign Policy Report, one of Switzerland’s objectives at institutional level in 2011 was the improvement of the working methods of the UN Security Council (SC). As a member of the UN ‘Small 5’ group, on 28 March 2012, the Swiss
    [Show full text]
  • Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook
    USAMRIID’s MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES HANDBOOK Sixth Edition April 2005 U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES FORT DETRICK FREDERICK, MARYLAND Emergency Response Numbers National Response Center: 1-800-424-8802 or (for chem/bio hazards & terrorist events) 1-202-267-2675 National Domestic Preparedness Office: 1-202-324-9025 (for civilian use) Domestic Preparedness Chem/Bio Helpline: 1-410-436-4484 or (Edgewood Ops Center – for military use) DSN 584-4484 USAMRIID’s Emergency Response Line: 1-888-872-7443 CDC'S Emergency Response Line: 1-770-488-7100 Handbook Download Site An Adobe Acrobat Reader (pdf file) version of this handbook can be downloaded from the internet at the following url: http://www.usamriid.army.mil USAMRIID’s MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES HANDBOOK Sixth Edition April 2005 Lead Editor Lt Col Jon B. Woods, MC, USAF Contributing Editors CAPT Robert G. Darling, MC, USN LTC Zygmunt F. Dembek, MS, USAR Lt Col Bridget K. Carr, MSC, USAF COL Ted J. Cieslak, MC, USA LCDR James V. Lawler, MC, USN MAJ Anthony C. Littrell, MC, USA LTC Mark G. Kortepeter, MC, USA LTC Nelson W. Rebert, MS, USA LTC Scott A. Stanek, MC, USA COL James W. Martin, MC, USA Comments and suggestions are appreciated and should be addressed to: Operational Medicine Department Attn: MCMR-UIM-O U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702-5011 PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION The Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, which has become affectionately known as the "Blue Book," has been enormously successful - far beyond our expectations.
    [Show full text]
  • Concepts of Biocontainment & Biosafety Training
    Concepts of Biocontainment & Biosafety Training UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA - CHARLOTTE/ APRIL 30, 2014 CLIENT NAME / DATE Regulatory Guidance . OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standard . NIH Recombinant Guidelines – Apply to all institutions receiving NIH funding – Covers rDNA work, but also includes risk group listing . Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) . Select Agent and Toxin regulations . Dangerous goods shipping regulations . North Carolina Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources CLIENT NAME / DATE US Guidance for Laboratories . BMBL Outlines: – Standard Microbiological Practices – Special Microbiological Practices – Safety Equipment – Facilities . Includes – Agent summary statements – BSC design and use – Toxin handling http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/index.htm CLIENT NAME / DATE Layers of Protection CLIENT NAME / DATE Definitions . Biohazard – A biological agent capable of self- replication that can cause disease in humans, animals, or plants – Generally, a microorganism, or toxins and allergens derived from those organisms . Biocontainment Class III cabinets at the U.S. Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland (Photo, 1940s) – the physical containment of pathogenic organisms or agents to prevent accidental infection of workers or release into the surrounding community . CLIENT NAME / DATE Biosafety . Fundamental objective: – Containment of potentially harmful biological agents . Risk assessment: – Helps to assign the biosafety level that reduces to an absolute minimum the worker’s exposure to agents, their risk of an LAI (lab associated infection), and potential impact on the community and the environment CLIENT NAME / DATE Biosafety Levels (BSLs) . Combinations of lab practices and techniques, safety equipment, and laboratory facilities . Appropriate level determined by risk assessment . Specifically appropriate for: – Organism in use – Operations performed in the laboratory – Known or suspected routes of infection CLIENT NAME / DATE Determining BSLs .
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)
    United States of America: Perspectives and Approaches to Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulatory Framework Samuel S. Edwin, PhD Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins September 26-28, 2018 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) FSAP regulates the possession, use, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products Managed jointly by: ▪ The Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ▪ The Agriculture Select Agent Services (AgSAS) at the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Overview & History 2001 anthrax attacks led to strengthening of program Title II of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ▪ Legal authority for the current Federal Select Agent Program ▪ Required security measures in addition to biosafety measures ▪ Strengthened the regulatory authorities of HHS ▪ Granted comparable regulatory authorities to USDA 1. Establish and maintain a list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. Consider: 1. Effect on human health 2. Degree of contagiousness and transmissibility 3. Availability of pharmacotherapies and immunizations 4. Other
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 Biodefense Public Report Implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy PREFACE
    2019 Biodefense Public Report Implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy PREFACE The National Biodefense Strategy (NBS or the Strategy) was released on September 18, 2018 and guides the U.S. government’s efforts to reduce the risk of, prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental in origin. National Security Presidential Memorandum-14 (NSPM-14) directs implementation of the Strategy, including the development of this Biodefense Public Report. This report does not primarily address activities related to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic because the data collection period concluded well before the HHS Secretary’s declaration of a public health emergency regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the content of this report is diverse and highlights some of the efforts across the U.S. government to address all biological threats. Development of this report followed the timeline laid out in NSPM-14. Work began among federal departments and agencies to collect biodefense data in late 2018, the first year to capture biodefense programs and activities across the federal government, and continued through the first half of 2019. This report describes a sampling of specific achievements and programs undertaken by federal agencies that reduce the risk of biological threats to the American people. In addition to the specific programs captured here, many other activities continue to be implemented across the federal government to protect the United States from a wide range of biological threats. Some of the efforts that have been described within this report, and many activities that have not been reported here, support the ongoing COVID-19 response.
    [Show full text]
  • Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness
    Order Code RL32521 Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness Updated March 12, 2007 Jim Monke Analyst in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness Summary The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability. The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at risk if contaminated food reaches the table or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). While agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first choice because it lacks the “shock factor” of more traditional terrorist targets, many analysts consider it a viable secondary target. Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique vulnerabilities. Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations, and transported or commingled with other herds. Many agricultural diseases can be obtained, handled, and distributed easily. International trade in food products often is tied to disease-free status, which could be jeopardized by an attack. Many veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal diseases that are eradicated domestically but remain endemic in foreign countries. In the past five years, “food defense” has received increasing attention in the counterterrorism and bioterrorism communities. Laboratory and response capacity are being upgraded to address the reality of agroterrorism, and national response plans now incorporate agroterrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Training Centre Swiss Armed Forces Inter National
    TRAINING CENTRE SWISS ARMED FORCES INTER NATIONAL COMMAND Course guide 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents 2 Introduction Commandant Training Centre SWISSINT 3 Infra structure 4 Mission & Task 5 General Information for all Courses 5 SUNMOC – Swiss United Nations Military Observer Course 7 KFOR SWISSCOY / EUFOR LOT Predeployment Training 9 SUNSOC – Swiss United Nations Staff Officer Course 11 ICPSO – Introductory Course to Peace Support Operations 12 PSOR – Peace Support Operations Refresher 12 HEAT – Hostile Environment Awareness Training 13 BST – Basic Security Training 14 BWT – Basic Weapons Training 15 Driving Training for Categories C1 / D1 16 TCCC/TC3 – Tactical Combat Casualty Care Provider Course 17 MMPC – Military Medical Personnel Course in the Balkans area 18 Host Nation Support to Geneva Centres Flagship Courses 19 Course Dates 20 4-PCE 21 Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTEC) 22 United Nations training location in Switzerland 23 Certifications 24 Welfare 25 How to find the Training Centre SWISSINT 26 How to Apply & Contact 27 2 INTRODUCTION COMMANDANT TRAINING CENTRE SWISSINT As commandant of the Training Centre Swiss Interna- tional Command (TC SWISSINT) I am in charge of the pre-deployment training for all Swiss military personnel sent abroad in the context of Peace Support Operations (PSO). Together with my staff we are committed to pro- viding high quality courses that meet both national and international standards. Throughout the year we offer a number of national and international courses specially designed to prepare individuals and contingents for deployment to crisis areas. Our priority is to assist our course participants in developing a “safety and securi- ty-first” attitude in all aspects of their work in whatever new and challenging environments they may encounter.
    [Show full text]
  • Agricultural Bioterrorism
    From the pages of Recent titles Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat Agricultural in the McNair MCNAIR PAPER 65 Bioterrorism: Paper series: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat 64 The United States ignores the The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran Agricultural potential for agricultural bioter- Kori N. Schake and rorism at its peril. The relative Judith S. Yaphe Bioterrorism: ease of a catastrophic bio- weapons attack against the 63 A Federal Strategy American food and agriculture All Possible Wars? infrastructure, and the devastat- Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security to Meet the Threat ing economic and social conse- Environment, 2001–2025 quences of such an act, demand Sam J. Tangredi that the Nation pursue an aggres- sive, focused, coordinated, and 62 stand-alone national strategy to The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric combat agricultural bioterrorism. Threats and the Next QDR The strategy should build on Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. counterterrorism initiatives already underway; leverage exist- 61 ing Federal, state, and local pro- Illuminating HENRY S. PARKER grams and capabilities; and Tomorrow’s War Martin C. Libicki involve key customers, stake- PARKER holders, and partners. The U.S. 60 Department of Agriculture The Revolution in should lead the development of Military Affairs: this strategy. Allied Perspectives Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University About the Author NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY President: Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN Henry S. Parker is National Program Leader for Aquaculture at the Vice President: Ambassador Robin Lynn Raphel Agricultural Research Service in the U.S.
    [Show full text]