Bioweapons Monitor 2011 the Bioweapons Prevention Project

Bioweapons Monitor 2011 the Bioweapons Prevention Project

BWPP BioWeapons Monitor 2011 The BioWeapons Prevention Project The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) is a global network of civil society actors dedicated to the permanent elimination of biological weapons and of the possibility of their re-emergence. It was launched in 2003 by a group of non-governmental organizations concerned at the failure of governments to fortify the norm against the weaponization of disease. BWPP monitors govern- mental and other activities relevant to the treaties that codify that norm. www.bwpp.org BioWeapons Monitor 2011 BWPP Copyright and credits © BioWeapons Prevention Project, 2011 Editor First published in November 2011 Iris Hunger ([email protected]) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may Copy-editor, design and layout be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or Rick Jones ([email protected]) transmitted, in any form or by any means, without Printer the prior permission in writing of the BioWeapons Druckpunkt Druckerei & Repro GmbH, Berlin 2 Prevention Project, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate repro- Images graphics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning Shutterstock Images and iStockphoto reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to Iris Hunger at [email protected]. ISBN: 978-3-00-036561-4 BioWeapons Prevention Project Contents About the BioWeapons Monitor ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Findings ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Country report: Germany ...................................................................................................................................................... 16 3 Country report: India ............................................................................................................................................................. 29 Country report: Japan ............................................................................................................................................................ 42 Country report: Kenya ........................................................................................................................................................... 54 Country report: South Africa ................................................................................................................................................ 61 Country report: Switzerland ................................................................................................................................................ 73 Country report: United Kingdom ........................................................................................................................................ 90 Country report: United States ........................................................................................................................................... 105 Annex: ranking of states in terms of their biotechnological capabilities ........................................................... 138 BioWeapons Monitor 2011 About the BioWeapons Monitor The BioWeapons Monitor is an initiative of the prevent their re-emergence. It is meant to comple- BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP)—a global ment BWC States Parties’ reporting requirements network of civil society actors dedicated to the XQGHUWKH%:&FRQÀGHQFHEXLOGLQJPHDVXUHV &%0V permanent elimination of biological weapons and While some states have chosen to make their CBMs of the possibility of their re-emergence—to help available to the public, this is not the case for most monitor compliance with the international norm states, with the result that civil society is unable, SURKLELWLQJELRORJLFDOZHDSRQVODLGGRZQFKLHÁ\ except through the BioWeapons Monitor, to assess 4 in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). treaty compliance. Particularly, it aims to increase the transparency of The BioWeapons Monitor 2011 contains country activities relevant to the BWC, which the current reports on BWC-relevant activities in eight states: WUHDW\UHJLPHGRHVQRWDFFRPSOLVKVXIÀFLHQWO\ Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, South Africa, Preventing states and non-state actors from acquir- Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United ing and using biological weapons is an urgent, unmet States. In-country researchers collected and analysed need. The BioWeapons Monitor seeks to provide relevant information that is distributed through factual information that will enhance discussions the publication. The researchers used open sources on strengthening implementation of the BWC and and actively sought to procure information from other national and international measures that government departments, research institutions, support the biological weapons prohibition. It works LQGXVWU\VFLHQWLÀFVRFLHWLHVDQGRWKHUHQWLWLHV7KLV LQJRRGIDLWKLQRUGHUWREHQHÀWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO wide range of sources helps to ensure the project’s community as a whole. success—that is, it does not rely solely on govern- ments being forthcoming with information. The BioWeapons Monitor LVQRWDWHFKQLFDOYHULÀFD- tion system, but an effort of civil society to hold The BioWeapons Monitor takes the Landmine Monitor— governments accountable for their obligations to a product of the International Campaign to Ban eliminate permanently biological weapons and to Landmines, which is a global network of civil society BioWeapons Prevention Project organisations—as its role model. Although a civil time its aims have become more concrete. In 2008, society initiative, Landmine Monitor is regarded as a group of four civil society organisations—the the de facto monitoring regime for the 1997 Mine Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, the Ban Treaty, reporting on States Parties’ implemen- Research Group for Biological Arms Control in tation of, and compliance with, that accord. The Germany, the Society for the Study of Peace and country reports in the BioWeapons Monitor 2011 &RQÁLFWLQ,QGLDDQGWKH9HULÀFDWLRQ5HVHDUFK provide factual information and are critical but Training and Information Centre in the UK—took constructive in their analysis. As a rule, any con- up the challenge of increasing transparency in troversial piece of information is backed by two areas related to the BWC by monitoring the activi- different sources. More importantly, countries were ties of states. With the input of the BWPP Board of given the opportunity to respond to information Directors, the BioWeapons Monitor was further prior to publication. developed and initial funding secured in early 7KHÀUVWHGLWLRQRIWKHBioWeapons Monitor This second edition of the BioWeapons Monitor was released on 10 December 2010. builds on experience obtained during work on the inaugural issue in 2010. While the BioWeapons Monitor 2011 XWLOLVHGUHÀQHGGDWDFROOHFWLRQDQG Acknowledgements analysis procedures, limitations still exist in this 5 regard, particularly with respect to countries covered We gratefully acknowledge the receipt of funding IRUWKHÀUVWWLPH7KLVVHFRQGHGLWLRQZDVDQG for this second edition of the BioWeapons Monitor future editions will be, able to build on relation- from the Governments of Norway and Switzerland. ships established by the in-country researchers The views expressed in this publication do not with relevant experts on the ground and experience QHFHVVDULO\UHÁHFWWKRVHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWVRI RIÀQGLQJDQGXVLQJGDWDVRXUFHVDOORZLQJRYHUWLPH Norway and Switzerland. reports to be more comprehensive, and the paint- ing of a more complete picture of BWC-relevant List of researchers and advisers activities. The BioWeapons Monitor is a work in progress, being constantly updated, corrected and The following in-country researchers were respon- improved. We welcome comments from governmental sible for researching and writing the country reports: and non-governmental actors. Animesh Roul, Society for the Study of Peace DQG&RQÁLFW,QGLD Origins of the BioWeapons Monitor %LONLV2PDU$IULFDQ5HVHDUFK,QVLJKW6RXWK$IULFD The BioWeapons Monitor idea grew in response to Eucharia Kenya and Margaret Muturi, Interna- the failed negotiations on a legally-binding protocol tional Centre for Health Intervention and Research WRWKH%:&LQWKHHDUO\WZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\2YHU in Africa (ICHIRA), Kenya. BioWeapons Monitor 2011 Iris Hunger, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Germany. James Revill, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons, UK. Lynn Klotz, Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, US. Masamichi Minehata, Sasakawa Peace Foundation/ 3DFLÀF)RUXP&HQWHUIRU6WUDWHJLFDQG,QWHUQD- tional Studies (CSIS), Japan/US. Sergio Bonin, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, Switzerland. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance provided by Paul McGregor (New Zealand). Work was coordinated by the Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Germany. 6 The following people have continuously supported the BioWeapons Monitor by providing information, comments and advice: Chandre Gould and Noel Stott, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa. $QJHOD:RRGZDUG9HULÀFDWLRQ5HVHDUFK7UDLQLQJ and Information Centre, UK. Marie Chevrier, Scientists

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