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FROM LAMBS to LIONS Even After 9/11 This Threat Is Underestimated

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FROM LAMBS to LIONS Even After 9/11 This Threat Is Underestimated International Relations | Current Events Thomas Preston “This is a significant, interesting, and well-written contribution to the international Preston relations/national security literature. Thomas Preston’s work is a must-read for policy makers and professionals in the field. Summing up: Essential.” —CHOICE “Victory can only begin once we are willing to stare potential defeat calmly in the face and begin to understand its causes. Thomas Preston does us all a huge service by pull- ing no punches in this candid, sophisticated, and hard-eyed look at the nuclear and biological threats that are coming at us.” —R. James Woolsey, vice president Booz Allen Hamilton, former director of Central Intelligence “[This] book is a penetrating analysis of the most worrisome challenge facing the United States and its allies in the twenty-first century: the spread of nuclear and biological weapons to hostile states, terrorist groups, or both. Preston argues—convincingly—that FROM LAMBS TO LIONS even after 9/11 this threat is underestimated. He . makes valuable recommendations as to how policy makers can best address this challenge, which, if left unaddressed, could result in carnage so catastrophic that it would dwarf that caused by the 9/11 attacks. This is policy-relevant scholarship at its finest.” —Devin T. Hagerty, University of Maryland, Baltimore County While many books discuss how nations can prevent the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons, this unique and controversial volume begins with the premise that these weapons will certainly multiply despite our desperate desire to slow this process. How worried should we be and what should we do? Thomas Preston examines current trends in the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons capabilities, know-how, and technologies for both state and nonstate actors—and then projects these trends over the coming ten to fifteen years to assess how they might impact existing security rela- tionships between states. Providing thorough discussion and analysis of a potentially nuclear North Korea and Iran, the current biotechnical revolution, and the future threat of attacks against the United States by terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, Preston offers answers and some potentially surprising reassurances in this accessibly written and informative book. Thomas Preston is professor of international relations in the Department of Political FROM LAMBS Science at Washington State University. For orders and information please contact the publisher Rowman & Littlefield TO LIONS ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, Maryland 20706 Future Security Relationships in a World 1-800-462-6420 Photo courtesy of National Nuclear Security www.rowmanlittlefield.com Administration/Nevada Site Office of Biological and Nuclear Weapons FromLambstoLionsPBK.indd 1 12/19/08 10:11:40 AM From Lambs to Lions From Lambs to Lions Future Security Relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons Thomas Preston ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2007 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. First paperback edition 2009 Preface to the paperback edition copyright © 2009 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The hardback edition of this book was previously cataloged by the Library of Congress as follows: Preston, Thomas, 1963– From lambs to lions : future security relationships in a world of biological and nuclear weapons / Thomas Preston. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Weapons of mass destruction. 2. Security, International—Forecasting. 3. Biological warfare—Prevention. 4. Nuclear warfare—Prevention. 5. Nuclear proliferation— 21st century. 6. Asymmetric warfare—Forecasting. I. Title. II. Title: Future security relationships in a world of biological and nuclear weapons. U793.P74 2007 355'.031—dc22 2006039722 ISBN: 978-0-7425-5502-0 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-7425-5503-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-7425-6630-9 (electronic) Printed in the United States of America ϱ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. This book is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Joseph J. Kruzel, deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy (1993–1995), who died while serving the cause of peace as a diplomat on a rain-soaked mountain road above Sarajevo. His tireless efforts to nego- tiate peace in the Balkans and unflinching service to his country will always be remembered. But he was also a mentor and role model to a generation of young scholars who had the immense good fortune of working with him at The Ohio State University. He was an inspiration to us all, gen- erous with his time, frank with his criticisms, and always a shining example of the kind of “scholar-practitioner” we hoped we could one day emulate. Thank you, Joe. Contents List of Figures and Tables ix List of Abbreviations xi Preface to the Paperback Edition xiii Acknowledgments xxv 1 The Challenge for Small States Seeking to Be Lions Rather Than Lambs 1 2 Nuclear Proliferation, Deterrence, and Evolving Security Relationships 15 3 Nuclear Security Relationships: Options and Constraints on New Nuclear States 83 4 Biological Proliferation and the Future of Warfare 181 5 Biological Security Relationships: Options and Constraints on New Bioweapon States 263 6 The Bionuclear Security Threat: Implications and Recommendations for Policy 333 References 369 Index 415 About the Author 423 Please see the book’s website for additional materials: www.rowmanlittlefield.com/isbn/0742555038 vii Figures and Tables FIGURES Figure 2.1 Objective Threat Matrix 52 Figure 2.2 Likely Challenger Perceptions of Credibility of Defender’s Nuclear Deterrent Threats 62 Figure 4.1 Potential Bioweapon Applications of Bioagent Given Different Weaponized Forms and Employed Delivery Systems 250 Figure 4.2 Nature of Potential Biodeterrence Security Relationships 256 TABLES Table 2.1 Breakdown of Indicators of State Nuclear Capability 44 Table 2.2 Survivability of State Nuclear Capability 47 Table 2.3 Employment Options and Crisis Stability Characteristics Achieved by Differing Levels of Nuclear Force Survivability and Capability 70 Table 3.1 North Korea’s Nascent/Local Nuclear Capability 111 Table 3.2 Survivability Characteristics of North Korea’s Nuclear Capability 112 Table 3.3 Extremely Conservative Estimate of North Korea’s Available (and Potential) Stockpile of Nuclear Materials over the Next Decade from Its HEU—and Plutonium—Production Facilities 120 ix x List of Figures and Tables Table 3.4 Available North Korean Nuclear Targeting and Employment Options 125 Table 3.5 India’s Regional Nuclear Capability 141 Table 3.6 Survivability Characteristics of India’s Nuclear Capability 142 Table 3.7 India’s Available (and Potential) Stockpile of Nuclear Materials over the Next Decade from Its Three Main Reactors (Cirus, Khruva, and Kalpakkam) 147 Table 3.8 Pakistan’s Regional Nuclear Capability 151 Table 3.9 Survivability Characteristics of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability 152 Table 3.10 Pakistan’s Available (and Potential) Stockpile of Nuclear Materials over the Next Decade from Its HEU—and Plutonium—Production Facilities 154 Table 3.11 Available Indian Nuclear Targeting and Employment Options 165 Table 3.12 Available Pakistani Nuclear Targeting and Employment Options 167 Table 4.1 Types of Bioweapons Based upon the Characteristics (Properties) of Bioagents 244 Table 5.1 Examples of Potential BW Agents and Their Characteristics 266 Abbreviations ALCM air launched cruise missile ASCM antiship cruise missile ASF African swine fever ATV advanced technology vessel AVLIS atomic vapor laser isotope separation BMD ballistic missile defense BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy BW bioweapons CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CW chemical weapon CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DMZ demilitarized zone DoD Department of Defense DRTF Decade Radiation Test Facility DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency EMP electromagnetic pulse END exotic Newcastle disease EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FAD foreign animal disease FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FMD foot-and-mouth disease GAO General Accounting Office GPS Global Positioning System HEU highly enriched uranium HFV hemorrhagic fever virus xi xii Abbreviations IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IDF Israeli Defense Forces IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile LACM land-attack cruise missile MPV monkeypox virus MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NIE National Intelligence Estimate NMD national missile
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