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BIOTERROR AGE of BIOTECHNOLOGY BIOTERROR in the AGE of By D A NIEL M. GER S T E IN BIOTECHNOLOGY Library of Congress U.S. Army M190 chemical warhead section containing demonstration Sarin bomblets, 1943 his powerful statement from the most recent Commission on the The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and Prevention of Weapons of Mass T Destruction (WMD) Prolifera- with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction tion and Terrorism serves as ample warning of the dire threats faced by the United States will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. and indeed the world from a bioweapon successfully deployed by a determined and The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able knowledgeable terrorist. In thinking about the potential for such a bioterror attack, to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission several important questions serve to frame the discussion. Do terrorists have the desire believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the to employ WMD, and in particular biological weapons? Under what conditions might bio- proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.1 logical weapons be an attractive choice for use by terrorists? Would they have the requisite knowledge, equipment, and organizational Dr. Daniel M. Gerstein is a Strategist and Policy Expert with significant operational experience. He has capacity to mount a biological warfare (BW) written extensively about national security. This article is based on his most recent book, Bioterror in the 21st attack? Would they be successful in such an Century: Emerging Threats in a New Global Environment (Naval Institute Press, 2009). 78 JFQ / issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu GERSTEIN attack? What could we do to mitigate the Second, terrorists are continually some might consider related to an insur- effects of a bioterror attack? searching for new means to facilitate increas- gency rather than terrorist action. Still, the This article provides a framework for ingly violent and spectacular attacks that will increases in violence and number of attacks understanding the potential for a BW attack gain visibility for and further their causes. are worth considering. A statement by noted now and in the future by a terrorist or terrorist Attacks have become more frequent and terrorism expert Brian Jenkins summarizes organization. In developing this framework, more violent. Prior to the Embassy bombings the trends in terrorism: the findings hinge less on the technical capa- in Kenya and Tanzania in the late 1990s, bilities than on the intentions of the potential for instance, global casualties from terrorist Over the past three decades, terrorists have perpetrator. State use of biological weapons attacks were fewer than 500 per year.4 The multiplied the number of their victims by an in either large-scale strategic scenarios or as Embassy bombings caused casualties in order of magnitude every 15 years. In the 1970s, tools of assassination is not examined directly, the thousands, and then the attacks of 9/11 the bloodiest incidents involved tens of fatali- although the framework could have equal ties. By the 1990s, hundreds were killed and application to a state BW program. no agreed definition of the incidents increased. In 2001, the number reached the thousands, and today we fear sce- The Potential Perpetrator terrorist has been developed, narios in which tens of thousands might die.6 Terrorism is a term that evokes strong and the word has been used emotions. Events of 9/11 brought terrorism to seemingly interchangeably Third, general agreement now exists that the forefront of the national security debate in with other terms such as terrorists are “rational” actors. Their actions the United States and arguably throughout the insurgent, illegal combatant, may not be understood by their victims or the rest of the world. Despite this increased atten- and freedom fighter governments and law enforcement agencies tion during the intervening period, the debate that attempt to deal with these threats, but has seen little increased clarity. they are far from random irrational acts. One No agreed definition of terrorist has been caused over 3,000 deaths with many more noted expert identifies alienation, humilia- developed, and the word has been used seem- injured. In compiling terrorism trends for tion, demographics, history, and territory as ingly interchangeably with other terms such 2008, the National Counterterrorism Center grievances that motivate terrorists.7 as insurgent, illegal combatant, and freedom (NCTC) identified 11,770 attacks that killed Fourth, and related to their rational fighter. The result is a politicization of the term 15,765 (see figure 1).5 A note of caution is actor status, terrorists have constituencies that hinders global cooperation and confuses in order for the reader who might want to they must satisfy. High violence strategies that the issue. This can be seen in a discussion of directly compare the casualty figures. The indiscriminately kill and maim large numbers the rationality of the terrorist. Many believe different counting rules and definitions of people are not desirable as a long-term that terrorists are pathologically damaged, certainly contribute to some of the disparities tactic. Likewise, failure to adequately gain vis- violent sociopaths who employ violence for noted. Additionally, the NCTC data include ibility and promote a cause will likely be seen their own perverted outcomes. Others believe attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which as ineffective by these constituencies. This that terrorists are calculating and highly rational actors with real or perceived griev- Figure 1. Terrorism Statistics (2008), National Counterterrorism Center ances, employing a range of strategies from Dead: 15,765 political actions to violence in order to achieve Number of attacks: 11,770 desired outcomes. Some have gone as far as to 5 826 suggest that it is possible to reach a negotiated 5,528 settlement with terrorists, in the same way that one might reach a postconflict settlement fol- lowing a state-to-state conflict.2 4,594 4,354 Regardless of the exact definition or the rationality of the terrorist, several important trends serve as the foundation for this analysis. First, terrorism is not a new 2,987 phenomenon and has a long historical pre- cedence. The direct origin of the term can be traced to the time of the French Revolution, although the period beginning in the 1970s is of the most interest for our discussion. It is during this period—with emphasis on the 978 762 774 718 post-9/11 period—where we see the conflu- 370 352 ence of the use of high violence strategies, the 292 rise of global terrorist organizations fueled Africa East Asia and Europe and Near East South Asia Western by globalization, and increasing religious Pacific Eurasia Hemisphere radicalization.3 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 57, 2 d quarter 2010 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | Bioterror in the Age of Biotechnology will serve as both a motivating influence and technical) which previously limited terrorist The use of biological weapons is not a moderating factor that will feature promi- use of WMD are eroding.”8 a new tactic and in fact predates the under- nently into the bioterror question. standing of disease. The history of biological Fifth, the question of whether a terrorist What Is Biological Warfare? warfare can be traced back to medieval will employ a unique means such as biologi- Biological warfare is the intentional times including the siege of Caffa on the cal weapons is directly related to the ability use of microbes to cause disease in a target Crimean Peninsula, the use of blood-laced to develop the capabilities, intentions, and population. Microbes are inherent in all life arrows against enemies, and the catapulting knowledge necessary for perpetrating a bio- forms and include bacteria, viruses, protozoa, of human and animal carcasses into enemy terror attack. Some terrorist groups will likely algae, and fungi. While some microbes are encampments and fortifications during the find it outside of their operational envelope Crusades. to employ such a technique. Others may find whether a terrorist will The modern history of biological development of these capabilities too techni- weapons includes programs by some 20 cally challenging. Still others may determine employ a unique means such states beginning in the 1940s to the present. that use of these weapons may present an as biological weapons is Often-cited efforts include the Japanese use of existential threat to the terrorist should the directly related to the ability BW against China and captured prisoners in attacked nation employ a massive retaliatory to develop the capabilities, the World War II period; the massive Soviet effort (assuming, of course, that the perpetra- intentions, and knowledge program that continued through the end of tors can be identified). necessary for perpetrating a the Cold War; and the programs and coopera- Finally, terrorism today does not repre- tion among Canada, the United Kingdom, sent an existential threat to the United States bioterror attack and the United States that began in the 1940s or our friends and allies. However, this could and continued until the United States uni- change should terrorists develop or acquire responsible for causing disease, many others laterally denounced biological weapons and the capability for conducting a WMD attack serve vital functions for supporting all forms toxins in 1969. The modern history of BW using either nuclear or biological weapons. of plant and animal life. In BW, the attempt is also includes the Biological Weapons Conven- In a harbinger of what the future might hold, to effectively and efficiently deploy weapons tion (BWC), which was the first arms control Bruce Hoffman noted ominously that “many composed of biological material to attack a treaty that banned the use of an entire class of of the constraints (both self-imposed and target and achieve a desired objective.
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