A Complementary Approach to Bioterrorism Prevention
MICHAEL MAIR AND JULIE SAMIA MAIR
Michael Mair, MPH, is a senior research assistant at the Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Julie Samia Mair, JD, MPH, is an assistant scientist in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and a core faculty member of the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities.1
ioterrorism is a particularly horrific crime, and of committing the crime, reduce the anticipated rewards the premeditation and deliberation required to expected from the crime’s commission, and remove the Bmount a successful attack make bioterrorists a excuses that justify the crime. special breed of criminal. As such, criminology theory While the rational choice perspective is usually can help to inform and shape bioterrorism prevention applied to very specific crimes (for example, bus driver efforts. Successful crime prevention strategies include robberies in a particular city, automobile thefts in a cer- those that view criminals as opportunists who search for tain parking lot, violence in a specific prison setting), the and exploit opportunities to commit crime. One “oppor- general theory that a criminal engages in a cost-benefit tunity theory,” the rational choice perspective, argues that analysis prior to committing a crime can be applied more a criminally motivated person engages in a cost-benefit broadly. 3 Terrorists associated with the September 11th analysis before committing a particular crime.2 This cost- attacks, for example, engaged in significant planning.4 benefit analysis is driven by four key considerations: They allegedly considered alternative targets and meth- 1. Perceived effort ods of attack and weighed such factors as the feasibility 2. Perceived risk of completing the attacks and the potential harm that they 3. Anticipated rewards could cause.5 4. Excuses or rationalizations. The idea that terrorists are rational actors is not If—upon consideration of these four rational choice new to national security policy. Indeed, the Bush categories—the benefits appear to outweigh the costs, the administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Secu- theory argues that the potential offender will be more likely rity recognizes that “[t]errorists are opportunistic,”— to commit the crime. The theory also suggests that by deliberately choosing targets based on perceived vulner- 6 manipulating this cost-benefit analysis, interventions can abilities. This article recommends viewing potential be designed to prevent a crime’s commission—specifically, bioterrorists as rational actors and analyzing their interventions that increase the perceived effort and risk decisionmaking processes in order to foster a deeper
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 1 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR understanding of current bioterrorism prevention measures, not require large-scale agent production, would not be identify gaps in current measures, and identify new and constrained by long-term storage requirements, and would complementary measures. pursue low-tech (i.e., non-military) delivery systems.13 However, there is also tremendous concern that state BIOTERRORISTS AS RATIONAL ACTORS actors could supply biological weapons to non-state actors either conspiratorially or unwittingly through theft.14 For the foreseeable future, biological weapons represent one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.7 How- COUNTERPROLIFERATION—REDUCING ever, no terrorist group or state potentially hostile to the United States is known to possess the weapons systems OPPORTUNITIES necessary to mount a significant, military-style biological Every step along a given proliferation pathway provides attack directly against the United States.8 Even if a group opportunities to prevent proliferation, although it is not or state actor had the capability, an overt attack is necessary to intervene at every step. Instead, the objec- unlikely given the overwhelming response such an attack tive is to determine where along the pathway a combina- would elicit. It is far more plausible that a biological tion of “opportunity-reducing”15 counterproliferation attack against the United States will be carried out through measures can be reasonably applied with the greatest like- bioterrorism—defined here as “a covert biological weap- lihood of affecting the potential bioterrorists’ cost-benefit ons attack by a state or non-state actor” for which attri- analysis such that producing or acquiring biological bution and retribution are extremely difficult.9 Thus, as weapons is no longer attractive. No single step must be defined, bioterrorism refers to a particular method of con- completely blocked for the strategy to be effective. For ducting a biological attack, and not to the type of attacker example, it is not necessary to attempt to block access to or the goals of the attack as do some other definitions.10 all potential biological weapon agents if the information, Acquiring or producing a biological weapon is a com- equipment, or materials necessary to turn those agents plex undertaking that requires a rational, deliberate, and into weapons cannot be acquired. The combination of systematic approach.11 For example, as shown in Figure measures should seek to: 1, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) developed 1. Make it more difficult to produce biological a proliferation pathway for state actors seeking a military weapons (increase perceived effort) biological weapons capability.12 According to this assess- 2. Make it more likely that potential bioterrorists will be ment, proliferation has five major phases, each with mul- discovered (increase perceived risk) tiple elements: 3. Make it less likely that the desired results will be • Research and development achieved (reduce anticipated rewards) • Agent production 4. Make it more difficult for potential bioterrorists to • Munitions design, testing, and building justify their actions (remove excuses). • Delivery system acquisition Every counterproliferation measure implemented • Operational capability acquisition. raises the hurdle that must be cleared in order to produce The specific proliferation pathway undertaken biological weapons. And every time the hurdle is raised, depends, in part, on the type of bioterrorist: state actor, there are fewer potential bioterrorists who can clear the terrorist organization, lone actor, or some combination hurdle—thus reducing the bioterrorism threat. thereof. Proliferation by state actors raises special concerns because they are more likely than non-state actors to have Analysis of Current Counterproliferation access to the resources—knowledge base, technical skills, Measures financial assets, infrastructure—necessary to engage in the One way to understand current counterproliferation mea- production of both biological agents and the weapons sures is to plot them on a proliferation pathway to deter- systems to deliver them. While there would be certain mine where and how they intervene to inhibit proliferation. similarities, the proliferation pathway that non-state actors Each measure can then be analyzed to determine how it might pursue would depend on the non-state actor’s goals most affects the four rational choice categories that drive and likely more limited abilities and resources. For the potential bioterrorist’s cost-benefit analysis. While example, in comparison to state actors pursuing a military some measures may significantly affect only one category, biological weapons capability, non-state actors likely would
2 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO BIOTERRORISM PREVENTION
FIGURE 1 OTA BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PATHWAY
I. Conduct Research & Development II. Produce Agent
Obtain Test Develop Mass Induce Store microbial seed suitability and produce spore Micro- agent stock for for pilot-test and formation encapsulate under standard or weapon production harvest or freeze- agent refriger- novel agent purposes process agent dry ation
Manipulate genetic characteristics (optional)
III. Design, Test, and Build Munitions
Area delivery: sprayer system Field-test Mass Fill OR produce munitions Point delivery: Stockpile cluster bomb or filled warhead munitions
IV. Acquire Delivery System
Integrate Adapt aircraft, munitions with artillery, missiles, etc. delivery system as necessary OR Establish logistical support network V. Acquire Operational Capability
Acquire individual and collective BW defenses, Integrate including vaccines weapon systems into Develop strategic military forces and tactical BW battle plans
Train troops to use OPERATIONAL BW munitions and CAPACITY operate in BW environment
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Priting Office, December 1993) p. 83.
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 3 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR others may affect several of the categories simultaneously. on foreign students increases the perceived risk of devel- Therefore, the categories are more effectively conceptu- oping a bio-weapons R&D program by making it more alized as areas of influence that may overlap. likely that students who attempt to exploit loopholes in In this analysis, it is the perspective of the potential the U.S. foreign student visa system in order to acquire bioterrorist that is important, and therefore social, cultural, necessary expertise and materials will be caught. This and economic factors must be considered. For example, measure also increases the perceived effort by making a country whose military capabilities fall far below those access to expertise and materials more difficult. of its perceived enemies might justify the proliferation of Likewise, conducting surveillance on shipping and biological weapons as one of the few options available to receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens and main- achieve a balance of power. Because the country may taining export controls on dual-use equipment and mate- view its options as few, it may also tolerate a higher level rials makes detection of an illicit attempt to obtain these of risk in producing or acquiring these weapons. Con- materials more likely, thus increasing the perceived risk. versely, a country more concerned with its status among These measures also increase the difficulty of obtaining the global community might be more risk-averse in its the equipment and materials necessary to create a bio- proliferation activities because of the potential ramifica- logical weapon increasing the perceived effort. tions of engaging in such activities. Redirecting former biological weapons scientists toward legitimate scientific endeavors has a three-fold Example Analysis—OTA Pathway Phase I: advantage. While redirect programs increase the perceived Research & Development effort of developing an R&D program by making it more difficult to obtain the knowledge necessary to create a Looking only at Phase 1 of the OTA proliferation biological weapon, they also increase the perceived pathway (Figure 1) as an example, the main U.S. risks involved by tracking former weapons scientists, counterproliferation measures that seek to prevent the increasing the likelihood that their involvement in a weap- research and development (R&D) phase of biological ons program would be detected. Finally, redirect programs weapons production by a state actor include: remove the excuse of unemployment that former weap- 1. Restricting access to potentially dangerous ons scientists may use to justify working for a biological pathogens16 weapons R&D program. 2. Limiting student visas17 The Strategic National Stockpile—composed of phar- 3. Preventing access to sensitive information18 maceuticals and equipment that should enable U.S. offi- 4. Conducting surveillance on foreign students19 cials to respond quickly to a biological or chemical 5. Conducting surveillance on shipping and receiving of attack—mitigates the destructive potential of certain potentially dangerous pathogens20 threat agents, thereby reducing the anticipated rewards 6. Controlling exports of dual-use equipment and of an attack. The SNS also increases the perceived materials21 effort involved by forcing states that are developing 7. Maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)22 biological weapons to exert more resources (time, fund- 8. Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons ing, expertise) either to manipulate the genetic character- scientists.23 istics of a particular agent in order to overcome the SNS’s These measures affect the four rational choice mitigative effects or to develop new biological agents not categories in different ways (Table 1). Certain measures currently addressed by the SNS. increase the perceived effort of developing a bio-weapons The SNS is an example of a measure with benefits R&D program. Current restrictions on access to potentially not initially aimed at counterproliferation. The SNS was dangerous pathogens do this by making it more difficult established to enhance the ability to respond to the effects to obtain a microbial seed stock from a laboratory source. of a chemical or biological weapons attack (see dis- Placing limits on student visas and preventing access to cussion on the significance of the difference between bio- sensitive information also increase the perceived effort by logical weapons proliferation and use below).24 But as making it more difficult to obtain the knowledge, training, shown in this analysis, it also serves as an effective and materials necessary to undertake such a program. counterproliferation measure. Measures that increase the perceived effort sometimes From the foregoing analysis it might appear that it is also increase the perceived risk. Conducting surveillance quite difficult for a state actor to institute a biological
4 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO BIOTERRORISM PREVENTION
TABLE I EFFECT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS R&D COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES ON RATIONAL CHOICE CATEGORIES
Effect on Rational Choice Category Counterproliferation Measure Increases Increases Reduces Removes Perceived Perceived Anticipated Excuses Effort Risk Rewards Restricting access to potentially dangerous X pathogens Limiting student visas X
Preventing access to sensitive information X
Conducting surveillance on foreign X X students
Conducting surveillance on shipping and X X receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens Controlling exports of X X dual-use equipment and materials
Maintaining the Strategic National X X Stockpile Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons X X X scientists Source: Authors
weapons R&D program. But in fact, while current Further Analysis counterproliferation measures create difficulties, most of the necessary materials, equipment, and information The analysis above is for illustrative purposes only. It remain readily available.25 The vast majority of scientific superficially examines the main counterproliferation mea- knowledge is disseminated through scientific literature in sures that address the R&D phase of biological weapons the public domain, and much of this knowledge is widely production by a state actor. A more in-depth analysis of accessible through massive databases over the Internet. In these and other such measures is required, and it should addition, blocking access to all potentially dangerous include implementation issues. For example, export con- pathogens is impossible. U.S. domestic laws and interna- trols on dual-use equipment and materials will be ineffec- tional agreements governing the shipping and receiving tive if they are not stringently and broadly enforced or if of these pathogens cannot cover all agents that conceiv- there are insufficient resources to implement the program ably can be used to cause harm, especially considering properly. the potential use of modern biotechnology techniques to A similar but more in-depth analysis should be con- create novel pathogens or advanced biological weapons.26 ducted on counterproliferation measures that address the With the exception of smallpox, moreover, the pathogens other four phases of the OTA proliferation pathway for considered the most likely biological weapon agents27 state actors (Figure 1). These separate analyses should occur naturally and can be obtained from the environment. then be combined for an overall assessment of all current
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 5 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR counterproliferation measures. In addition, likely prolif- ness of a biological attack, thus reducing the anticipated eration pathways for other potential actors (e.g., state/non- rewards to potential bioterrorists. Medical breakthroughs state actor partnerships, terrorist groups, lone actors) that came about as a result of such an R&D program might should be developed and analyzed in the same fashion. also increase the perceived effort of potential bioterrorists, The use of “red teams” (groups of individuals charged who would need to undertake their own advanced R&D with simulating terrorist activity to learn how to counter- programs in order to overcome advances of the U.S. pro- act them) as proposed in the National Strategy for Home- gram. In turn, substantially increasing the size and scope land Security could help to develop these different of their biological weapons programs would increase the pathways and aid this type of analysis.28 For example, a likelihood of detection, thus increasing the perceived risk. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) program entitled The development of new biological markers and surveil- Project Bacchus employed a red team to set up a clan- lance systems might also enhance our ability to trace destine biological weapons laboratory within the United biological weapons attacks back to their original source, States using materials and equipment purchased on the further increasing the perceived risk. In addition, such open market.29 The team produced a sufficient amount an R&D program could augment existing programs to of a nonpathogenic agent to kill 10,000 people—were redirect former weapons scientists by generating greater it actually anthrax. Project Bacchus provided the DoD opportunities for legitimate employment, further remov- with in-depth knowledge of how a terrorist group might ing the excuses to work for a biological weapons program. undertake biological weapons production and how such Finally, mobilizing the scientific community on the scale activities might be detected and countered. suggested by such a program would likely strengthen the research community’s opposition to biological weapons Gaps in Current Efforts and Promising New proliferation and help to remove the excuses of scientists Counterproliferation Measures who still might be lured into such programs. To be effective, this R&D program would likely have Understanding how current counterproliferation mea- to be on the magnitude of the Apollo Program, which put sures affect a potential bioterrorist’s cost-benefit analysis a man on the moon within 10 years. It would be far more offers a unique perspective by which to identify gaps in broadly focused and ambitious than the proposed Project the current strategies, which in turn will suggest areas Bioshield, which focuses largely on countermeasures di- to focus future efforts. As Table 1 indicates, current rected at specific biological weapon threat agents (such U.S. measures designed to prevent a state-run R&D as anthrax, smallpox, and botulinum toxin).32 A “bio- program in support of biological weapons proliferation Apollo” program would also require the collaboration of focus largely on increasing the perceived effort and the biotechnology, medical, public health, and security risk of that undertaking. Much less appears to have communities and sustained funding from Congress.33 been done with respect to reducing anticipated rewards In designing and implementing new bioterrorism coun- and removing excuses. The United States has a long termeasures, it is important to recognize the limits of what and arguably successful history of reducing anticipated can be reasonably accomplished and work within those rewards in its counterterrorism policy with respect to limits to avoid undermining other potential countermea- hostage taking by not conceding to terrorist demands sures. For example, the effort devoted to blocking access thereby removing the incentive to commit such acts.30 to dangerous pathogens must be balanced with the level A similar strategy could be pursued more fully with of security expected in return. It is the legitimate scien- respect to bioterrorism. tists who will develop vaccines and therapeutics to pro- One measure that potentially could reduce anticipated tect society from biological weapons, helping to render rewards, as well as affect the other three rational choice these weapons useless in the process.34 Therefore, any categories (Figure 2), is a large-scale R&D program to additional legislation meant to further deny potential counter the threat of infectious diseases—whether from bioterrorists access to potentially dangerous pathogens a natural or intentional outbreak.31 By enhancing our abil- must be crafted carefully so as not to unduly inhibit legiti- ity to counter infectious diseases (for example, through mate research and development with those agents.35 new antibiotics, antiviral medications, and vaccines) and It is also important to recognize how these new advancing early diagnostic and detection capabilities, an measures might affect the motivation to engage in future R&D program of this scale could mitigate the effective- terrorism. Measures intended to prevent bioterrorism may
6 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO BIOTERRORISM PREVENTION
FIGURE 2 EFFECT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS R&D COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES ON RATIONAL CHOICE CATEGORIES
Increases Perceived Effort Increases Perceived Risk 1 2 3
6 4 7 5
8 Bio-Apollo
Removes Excuses Reduces Anticipated Rewards
Counterproliferation Measure
Conducting surveillance on shipping 1 Restricting access to potentially dangerous pathogens 5 and receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens
2 Limiting student visas Controlling exports of dual-use 6 equipment and materials
3 Preventing access to sensitive information 7 Maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile
4 Conducting surveillance on foreign students Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons 8 scientists
Source: Authors
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 7 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR unwittingly precipitate future acts of terrorism if they Separating bioterrorism into four stages has sev- focus only on short-term security. For example, unduly eral benefits for prevention. First, it helps to clarify restricting student visas from states suspected of weap- the opportunities where prevention efforts can be focused. ons proliferation could prevent legitimate learning and And by doing so, it highlights areas that may need more cross-cultural exchange and, in turn, foster resentment attention. One such area is the development of likely against the United States.36 Similarly, export controls on biological weapon “attack-pathways.” It has been sug- dual-use equipment and reagents could be perceived as gested, for example, that the food supply is a likely means unjust and oppressive if the equipment and reagents are through which terrorists might carry out a biological needed for legitimate purposes. attack. Understanding the likely scenarios for such an at- tack will allow counterattack measures to be developed 37 BEYOND COUNTERPROLIFERATION: THE and implemented. FOUR-STAGE MODEL The four-stage model also provides a better under- standing of particular bioterrorism prevention measures. While counterproliferation efforts are a logical starting For example, an articulated goal of the current national point for reducing the threat of bioterrorism, smallpox vaccination program is to “increase deter- bioterrorism entails more than proliferation. Prior to rence” by fostering preparedness for a smallpox attack— an actual attack, several opportunities exist to imple- in other words, reducing anticipated rewards. 38 The ment prevention efforts. These are most effectively phrase “increase deterrence” could mean to prevent the realized by recognizing that biological weapons prolif- proliferation of smallpox as a weapon, or to prevent eration and use are two separate, yet inextricably the use of smallpox as a weapon, or both. The precise linked, endeavors. A bioterrorist cannot conduct an at- definition of the goal, though, has important implica- tack without first acquiring the weapons, but acquiring tions for implementing and gauging the success of the the weapons does not ensure their successful use. How- program. ever, focusing prevention efforts solely on prolifera- The U.S. military has achieved a level of smallpox tion and use assumes that the motivation (and intent) vaccination that will likely deter a smallpox attack to engage in these activities already exists. Therefore, against deployed military forces, but the civilian pro- a better strategy is to conceptualize a bioterrorist attack gram has not been as successful to date.39 As of Sep- in four major stages (Figure 3). Specific prevention tember 26, 2003, only 38,489 civilians have been measures can be designed and applied at each stage to vaccinated, leaving the vast majority of the U.S. popu- reduce the likelihood that an attack will occur. lation vulnerable to an attack.40 It is unlikely that this In Stage 1, the motivation to produce or acquire bio- level of coverage is sufficient to deter an attack by a logical weapons has not yet been formed. Effective pre- bioterrorist already armed with smallpox or with easy vention measures at this stage—aimed at addressing the access to it. Indeed, 500,000 or even 1 million or 10 conditions that give rise to this motivation—can prevent million smallpox vaccinations in a country of 291 mil- the motivation from forming. If those efforts fail, prolif- lion people might not, by itself, be an adequate deter- eration will proceed provided that the bioterrorist’s cost- rent to such a terrorist. However, a limited vaccination benefit analysis is favorable. An attack still can be program that confers the ability to respond rapidly and prevented at Stage 2 by reducing the opportunities for effectively to a smallpox attack (thereby reducing the proliferation to proceed using measures such as those dis- anticipated rewards) in conjunction with other cussed in the example analysis above. If counterproliferation counterproliferation efforts might prevent a potential efforts are unsuccessful and biological weapons are pro- bioterrorist without ready access to the smallpox virus duced or acquired, at Stage 3, measures can be applied from exerting the considerable effort and resources to prevent the motivation to use biological weapons from necessary to acquire it and turn it into a weapon. The forming. Should those measures fail, and the motiva- level of vaccination coverage—short of mass vaccina- tion to use weapons is formed, an attack will proceed tion—that might deter proliferation compared to the provided that the cost-benefit analysis is favorable. An level that may deter use requires more study, but this attack, though, can still be prevented at Stage 4 by reducing example illustrates the potential of the four-stage model the opportunities that enable an attack to occur, thus to allow for a more refined analysis of the goals and making the use of biological weapons an unattractive potential success of specific prevention measures. 41 alternative.
8 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO BIOTERRORISM PREVENTION
FIGURE 3 FOUR STAGE MODEL OF BIOTERRORISM
Biological Weapons Proliferation Biological Weapons Use
Stage 1 Stage 13
Conditions leading to Conditions leading to motivation/intention to motivation/intention to attack with produce/ aquire biological biological weapons weapons
Alter conditions Alter conditions
Successful Successful
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Motivation/intention to Motivation/intention to attack with biological produce/acquire weapons formed biological Bioterrorism weapons formed Prevented
Successful Successful Opportunity-reducing Opportunity-reducing counterproliferation counterattack measures measures
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Biological weapons production/acquisition Bioterrorism
Stage 2 Stage 4
Source: Adapted from R. Wortley, “A Classification of Techniques for Controlling Situational Precipitators of Crime,” Security Journal 4, 2001, pp. 63-82.
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 9 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR
Finally, the four-stage model underscores the im- Viewing potential bioterrorists as rational actors is only portance of the far more difficult task of addressing one possible way to help address the very complicated the motivations of bioterrorists. The conditions that give and challenging threat posed by bioterrorism. It comple- rise to and support the motivation to commit acts of ments other activities such as intelligence gathering and bioterrorism (or terrorism in general) are mired in politi- analysis. Whatever approach is ultimately employed must cal, socioeconomic, ideological, and cultural perspectives be systematic, comprehensive, and engage the necessary where cause-and-effect is difficult to quantify and inter- stakeholders. An uncoordinated, patchwork approach is ests frequently differ.42 Designing policies to alter those likely to miss areas of vulnerability and opportunities for conditions favorably is no less daunting. While an in- intervention. Worse still, an uncoordinated approach might depth analysis of the various conditions that give rise encourage future terrorism if prevention measures are not to terrorism is beyond the scope of this article, address- understood and implemented within a broad national ing these conditions should be a vital part of any security context. The National Strategy for Homeland bioterrorism prevention strategy. This does not imply Security recognizes that our society provides a nearly end- that the United States should cater to terrorist demands. less supply of targets vulnerable to attack by a variety of As with extremists groups in the United States, terror- methods. 44 But the United States also has vast resources— ists must be marginalized and their activities con- intellectual, technological, economic—that can be mobi- demned. But a sober understanding of the conditions lized to reduce the risk of attack. While a national that ultimately help form terrorist motivations will en- strategy should seek to reduce the opportunities that able the United States to find strategies to help pre- enable terrorist attacks to occur, it must also seek to vent such motivations from forming. understand and address the conditions that help pro- duce terrorists in order to disrupt the cycle of violence CONCLUSION and foster long-term security.
The threat of bioterrorism cannot be treated in the 1 The authors would like to thank Molly D’Esopo, Thomas Inglesby, Gigi Kwik, same manner as the threat posed by naturally occurring Monica Schoch-Spana, Tara O’Toole, Lisa Donohoe, and the reviewers for the infectious diseases because there is a “thinking enemy” Nonproliferation Review for their thoughtful comments on this manuscript. whose aim is to inflict as many casualties and cause as We would also like to thank Tim Holmes for his expert assistance on graphic design. 43 much damage as possible. Analyzing a potential 2 Ronald V. Clarke, “Introduction,” in Ronald Clarke, ed., Situational Crime bioterrorist’s decisionmaking process as suggested in Prevention: Successful Case Studies, Second Edition (Guilderland, NY: Har- this article offers a new and complementary approach for row and Heston, 1997), pp.1-43; Julie Samia Mair and Michael Mair, “Violence Prevention and Control Through Environmental Modifications,” Annual Re- reducing the threat of bioterrorism. By deconstructing view of Public Health 24 (2003), pp. 209-225. bioterrorism into discrete steps and focusing on the cost- 3 Julie Samia Mair, et al., “Violence Prevention and Control Through Environ- mental Modifications.” benefit analysis of the potential terrorist, this approach 4 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Intelligence Committees, provides a framework with which to analyze our current Joint Investigation of September 11 Intelligence Failures, 107th Congress, counterproliferation measures in a broader context. It also 2nd Session, October 17, 2002. 5 BBC News, “Al-Qaeda ‘plotted nuclear attacks’,” September 8, 2002, helps to identify gaps in our current efforts and identify
10 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003 A COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO BIOTERRORISM PREVENTION ber 21, 2001,
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