A Complementary Approach to Bioterrorism Prevention
MICHAEL MAIR AND JULIE SAMIA MAIR
Michael Mair, MPH, is a senior research assistant at the Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Julie Samia Mair, JD, MPH, is an assistant scientist in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and a core faculty member of the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities.
ioterrorism is a particularly horrific crime, and the perceived effort and risk of committing the crime, reduce premeditation and deliberation required to mount the anticipated rewards expected from the crime’s Ba successful attack make bioterrorists a special breed commission, and remove excuses that justify the crime. of criminal. Therefore, criminology theory can help to in- While the rational choice perspective is usually ap- form and shape bioterrorism prevention efforts. Success- plied to very specific criminal opportunities (for example, ful crime prevention strategies include those that view bus driver robberies in a particular city, automobile thefts criminals as opportunists who search for and exploit op- in a certain parking lot, violence in a specific prison set- portunities to commit crime. One opportunity theory, the ting), the theory applies to crimes with broader implica- rational choice perspective, argues that a criminally mo- tions.2 Terrorists associated with the September 11th 3 tivated person engages in a cost-benefit analysis before attacks, for example, engaged in significant planning. committing a particular crime.1 This cost-benefit analy- They allegedly considered alternative targets and meth- sis is driven by four key considerations: ods of attack and weighed such factors as the feasibility of 1. Perceived effort completing the attacks and the potential harm that they 4 2. Perceived risk could cause. The idea that terrorists are rational actors is 3. Anticipated rewards not new to national security policy. Indeed, the Bush administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security 4. Excuses or rationalizations. recognizes that “[t]errorists are opportunistic,”—deliber- If—upon consideration of these four rational choice ately choosing targets based on perceived vulnerabilities.5 categories—the benefits appear to outweigh the costs, the This article recommends viewing potential bioterrorists theory argues that the potential offender will be more as rational actors and analyzing their decisionmaking pro- likely to commit the crime. By understanding the cesses in order to foster a deeper understanding of current considerations that drive a potential offender’s cost- bioterrorism prevention measures, identify gaps in current benefit analysis, interventions can be designed to prevent measures, and identify new and complementary measures. a crime’s commission. These measures aim to increase the
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BIOTERRORISTS AS RATIONAL ACTORS require large-scale agent production, would not be constrained by long-term storage requirements, and would For the foreseeable future, biological weapons represent pursue low-tech (i.e., non-military) delivery systems.12 one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.6 How- However, there is also tremendous concern that state ever, no terrorist group or state potentially hostile to the actors could supply these biological weapons systems to United States is known to possess the weapons systems non-state actors either conspiratorially or unwittingly necessary to mount a significant, military-style biological through theft.13 attack directly against the United States.7 Even if a group or state actor had the capability, an overt attack is un- likely given the overwhelming response such an attack COUNTERPROLIFERATION—REDUCING would elicit. It is far more plausible, therefore, that a bio- OPPORTUNITIES logical attack against the United States will be carried Every step along a given proliferation pathway provides out through bioterrorism—defined here as a covert bio- opportunities to prevent proliferation, although it is logical weapons attack by a state or non-state actor for not necessary to intervene at every step. The which attribution and retribution are extremely difficult.8 counterproliferation approach to intervention determines Thus, as defined, bioterrorism refers to a particular method where along the pathway a combination of “opportunity- of conducting a biological attack, and not to the type of reducing” counterproliferation measures can be reason- attacker or the goals of the attack as do some other defi- ably applied with the greatest likelihood of affecting the nitions.9 As such, in this context a bioterrorist can be a potential bioterrorists’ cost-benefit analysis such that pro- state or a non-state actor. ducing or acquiring biological weapons is no longer at- Executing a biological attack depends critically on tractive. 14 No single step must be completely blocked for acquiring or producing a sophisticated delivery system. the strategy to be effective. For example, it is not neces- Biological weapons proliferation is a complex undertak- sary to attempt to block access to all potential biological ing that requires a rational, deliberate, and systematic weapon agents if the information, equipment, or materi- approach.10 For example, as shown in Figure 1, the Office als necessary to turn those agents into weapons cannot be of Technology Assessment (OTA) developed a prolifera- acquired. The goal of the counterproliferation approach tion pathway for state actors seeking a military biological is to find a combination of measures that: weapons capability.11 According to this assessment, pro- 1. Make it much more difficult to produce biological liferation has five major phases, each with multiple ele- weapons (increase perceived effort) ments: 2. Make it far more likely that potential bioterrorists will • Research and development be discovered (increase perceived risk) • Agent production 3. Make it far less likely that the desired results will be • Munitions design, testing, and building achieved (reduce anticipated rewards) • Delivery system acquisition 4. Make it much more difficult for potential bioterrorists • Operational capability. to justify their actions (remove excuses). The specific proliferation pathway undertaken Once implemented, every counterproliferation depends, in part, on the type of bioterrorist: state actor, measure raises a barrier to the production of biological terrorist organization, lone actor, or some combination weapons. And with each new barrier are fewer potential thereof. Proliferation by state actors raises special concerns bioterrorists who can overcome it—thus reducing the because they are more likely than non-state actors to have bioterrorism threat. access to the resources—knowledge base, technical skills, financial assets, infrastructure—necessary to engage in the Analysis of Current Counterproliferation production of both biological agents and the weapons Measures systems to deliver them. While there would be certain similarities, the proliferation pathway that non-state One way to understand current counterproliferation mea- actors might pursue would depend on the non-state actor’s sures is to plot them on the proliferation pathway to de- more limited goals, abilities, and resources. For example, termine where and how they intervene to inhibit in comparison to state actors pursuing a military biological proliferation. Each measure can then be analyzed to de- weapons capability, non-state actors likely would not termine how it most affects the four rational choice cat- egories that drive the potential bioterrorist’s cost-benefit
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FIGURE 1 OTA BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PATHWAY
I. Conduct Research & Development II. Produce Agent
Obtain Test Develop Mass Induce Store microbial seed suitability and produce spore Micro- agent stock for for pilot-test and formation encapsulate under standard or weapon production harvest or freeze- agent refriger- novel agent purposes process agent dry ation
Manipulate genetic characteristics (optional)
III. Design, Test, and Build Munitions
Area delivery: sprayer system Field-test Mass Fill OR produce munitions Point delivery: Stockpile cluster bomb or filled warhead munitions
IV. Acquire Delivery System
Integrate Adapt aircraft, munitions with artillery, missiles, etc. delivery system as necessary OR Establish logistical support network V. Acquire Operational Capability
Acquire individual and collective BW defenses, Integrate including vaccines weapon systems into Develop strategic military forces and tactical BW battle plans
Train troops to use OPERATIONAL BW munitions and CAPACITY operate in BW environment
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Priting Office, December 1993) p. 83.
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analysis. For example, a potential bioterrorist’s socioeco- Surveilling foreign students increases the risk of exploit- nomic status may factor into the rationalization category: ing loopholes in the U.S. foreign student visa system in A country whose military capabilities fall far below those order to acquire expertise and materials, because such stu- of its enemies might justify the proliferation of biological dents are more likely to be caught. This measure also in- weapons as one of the few options available to achieve a creases the perceived effort by making access to expertise balance of power. However, the four rational choice cat- and materials more difficult. egories are not always distinct—a particular Likewise, conducting surveillance on shipping and counterproliferation measure may affect several of the receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens and main- categories simultaneously. Because the less advantaged taining export controls on dual-use equipment and ma- country may view its options as few, it may also tolerate a terials makes detection of an illicit attempt to obtain these higher level of risk in producing or acquiring these weap- materials more likely. These measures also increase the ons. Conversely, a country more concerned with its status difficulty of obtaining the equipment and materials nec- among the global community might be more risk-averse essary to create a biological weapon. in its proliferation activities because of the potential rami- Redirecting former biological weapons scientists to- fications of engaging in such activities. Therefore, the ward legitimate scientific endeavors has a three-fold ad- categories are more effectively conceptualized as areas of vantage. While redirect programs increase the perceived influence that may overlap. effort of developing an R&D program by making it more difficult to obtain the knowledge necessary to create a Example Analysis—OTA Pathway Phase I: Research biological weapon, they also increase the risks involved & Development by tracking former weapons scientists, increasing the like- Looking only at Phase 1 of the OTA proliferation path- lihood that their involvement in a weapons program way (Figure 1), current U.S. counterproliferation measures would be detected. Finally, redirect programs remove the that seek to prevent the research and development excuse of unemployment that former weapons scientists (R&D) phase of biological weapons production by a state may use to justify working for a biological weapons R&D actor include: program. • Restricting access to potentially dangerous patho- The Strategic National Stockpile—composed of phar- gens15 maceuticals and equipment that should enable U.S. offi- • Limiting student visas16 cials to respond quickly to a biological or chemical • Preventing access to sensitive information17 attack—mitigates the destructive potential of threat • Surveilling foreign students18 agents, thereby reducing the anticipated rewards of an • Surveilling shipping and receiving of potentially dan- attack. The SNS also increases the effort involved by forc- gerous pathogens19 ing states that are developing biological weapons to exert • Controlling exports of dual-use equipment and mate- more resources (time, funding, expertise) either to ma- rials20 nipulate the genetic characteristics of a particular agent • Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons scientists21 in order to overcome the SNS’s mitigative effects or to • Implementing the Strategic National Stockpile develop new biological agents not currently addressed by (SNS)22 the SNS. The SNS is an example of a measure with benefits Certain measures are designed to increase the not initially aimed at counterproliferation. The SNS was perceived effort of developing a bio-weapons program. established to enhance the ability to respond to the ef- Current restrictions on access to potentially dangerous fects of a chemical or biological weapons attack (see dis- pathogens increase the effort of undertaking an R&D cussion on the significance of the difference between program by making it more difficult to obtain a microbial biological weapons proliferation and use below).23 It now seed stock from a laboratory source. Placing limits on also serves as an effective counterproliferation measure. student visas and preventing access to sensitive From the foregoing analysis (see Table 1), one might information make it more difficult to obtain the conclude that it is quite difficult for a state actor to insti- knowledge, training, and materials necessary to undertake tute a biological weapons R&D program. However, while such a program. current counterproliferation measures create difficulties, Measures to increase the perceived effort often over- most of the requisite materials, equipment, and informa- lap with those designed to increase the perceived risk. tion remain readily available.24 The vast majority of sci-
4 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 A NEW APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COUNTERPROLILFERATION
TABLE I EFFECT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS R&D COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES ON RATIONAL CHOICE CATEGORIES
Effect on Rational Choice Category Counterproliferation Measure Increases Increases Reduces Removes Perceived Perceived Anticipated Excuses Effort Risk Rewards Restricting access to potentially dangerous X pathogens Limiting student visas X
Preventing access to sensitive information X
Conducting surveillance on foreign X X students
Conducting surveillance on shipping and X X receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens Controlling exports of X X dual-use equipment and materials
Maintaining the Strategic National X X Stockpile Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons X X X scientists Source: Authors
entific knowledge is disseminated through scientific lit- that address the R&D phase of biological weapons pro- erature in the public domain, and much of this knowl- duction by a state actor. A more indepth analysis of these edge is widely accessible through massive databases over particular measures—one that addresses implementation the Internet. In addition, blocking access to all poten- issues—is required. For example, export controls on dual- tially dangerous pathogens is impossible. U.S. domestic use equipment and materials will be ineffective if they laws and international agreements governing the ship- are not stringently and broadly enforced or if there are ping and receiving of these pathogens cannot cover all insufficient resources to implement the program properly. agents that conceivably can be used to cause harm, espe- In addition, a similar, but more indepth analysis cially considering the potential use of modern biotech- should be undertaken on counterproliferation measures nology techniques to create novel pathogens.25 With the that address the other four phases of the OTA prolifera- exception of smallpox, moreover, the pathogens consid- tion pathway for state actors (Figure 1). Also, likely pro- ered the most likely biological weapon agents26 occur liferation pathways for other potential actors (e.g., state/ naturally and can be obtained from the environment. non-state actor partnerships, terrorist groups, lone actors) should be developed and analyzed in the same fashion. Further Analysis The use of “red teams” (groups of individuals charged The analysis above is for illustrative purposes only. It su- with simulating terrorist activity to learn how to counter- perficially examines current counterproliferation measures act them) as proposed in the National Strategy for Home-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 5 MICHAEL MAIR & JULIE SAMIA MAIR land Security could help to develop these different path- capabilities, a bio-Apollo program would mitigate the ef- ways and aid this type of analysis.27 For example, a U.S. fectiveness of a biological attack, thus reducing the an- Department of Defense (DoD) program entitled Project ticipated rewards to potential bioterrorists. These Bacchus employed a red team to set up a clandestine bio- breakthroughs might also potentially increase the per- logical weapons laboratory within the United States us- ceived effort of potential bioterrorists, who would need ing materials and equipment purchased on the open to undertake their own advanced R&D programs in or- market.28 The team produced a sufficient amount of a der to overcome the advances of the new program. In turn, nonpathogenic agent to kill 10,000 people—were it ac- increasing the size and scope of their biological weapons tually anthrax. Project Bacchus provided the DoD with programs would increase the likelihood of detection and, indepth knowledge about how a terrorist group might un- thus, increase the perceived risk. The development of new dertake biological weapons production and how such ac- biological markers and surveillance systems would en- tivities might be detected and countered. hance our ability to trace biological weapons attacks back to their original source, further increasing the perceived Gaps in Current Efforts and Promising New risk. In addition, a bio-Apollo program could remove the Counterproliferation Measures excuses of scientists who might be lured into working for a biological weapons program by augmenting existing di- Understanding how current counterproliferation measures version programs to generate opportunities for legitimate affect a potential bioterrorist’s cost-benefit analysis offers employment and mobilizing the research community’s a unique perspective by which to identify gaps in the cur- opposition to biological weapons proliferation. rent strategies, which in turn will suggest areas for future In designing and implementing new bioterrorism efforts. As Table 1 indicates, current U.S. measures de- countermeasures, it is important to recognize the limits signed to prevent a state-run R&D program in support of of what can be reasonably accomplished and work within biological weapons proliferation focus largely on increas- those limits to avoid undermining other potential coun- ing the perceived effort and risk of that undertaking. Much termeasures. The effort devoted to blocking access to dan- less has been done with respect to reducing anticipated gerous pathogens, for example, must be balanced with the rewards and removing excuses. In fact, the United States level of security expected in return. It is the legitimate has a long and arguably successful history of reducing an- scientists who will develop vaccines and therapeutics to ticipated rewards in its counterterrorism policy with re- protect society from biological weapons, helping to ren- spect to hostage taking by not conceding to terrorist der these weapons useless in the process. Any legislation demands and thereby removing the incentive to commit designed to deny potential bioterrorists access to poten- such acts.29 tially dangerous pathogens must therefore not unduly in- With respect to bioterrorism, a dedicated R&D pro- hibit legitimate research and development with those gram to counter the threat of infectious diseases—whether agents.32 from a natural or intentional outbreak—may be a valu- While a national strategy should aggressively iden- able counterproliferation tool not only by reducing an- tify and implement a variety of bioterrorism prevention ticipated rewards but by affecting the other rational choice measures, it should also seek to understand how those categories as well (Figure 2). To be effective, this R&D measures might affect the motivation to engage in future program would have to equal the magnitude of the Apollo terrorism. Measures meant to prevent bioterrorism may Program, which put a man on the moon in 10 years. It unwittingly precipitate future acts of terrorism if not de- would be far more broadly focused and ambitious than the signed and implemented with consideration for their po- proposed Project Bioshield, which focuses largely on coun- tential long-term effects in addition to immediate security termeasures directed at specific biological weapon threat concerns. For example, unduly restricting student visas agents (such as anthrax, smallpox, and botulinum toxin).30 from states suspected of weapons proliferation could pre- A “bio-Apollo program” would require the collaboration vent legitimate learning and cross-cultural exchange and, of the biotechnology, medical, public health, and security in turn, foster resentment against the United States.33 In communities and sustained funding from congress.31 addition, export controls on dual-use equipment and re- By enhancing our ability to counter infectious dis- agents could be perceived as unjust and oppressive if the eases through new antibiotics, antiviral medications, and equipment and reagents are needed for legitimate pur- vaccines, and advancing early diagnostic and detection poses.
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FIGURE 2 EFFECT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS R&D COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES ON RATIONAL CHOICE CATEGORIES
Increases Perceived Effort Increases Perceived Risk 1 2 3
6 4 7 5
8 Bio-Apollo
Removes Excuses Reduces Anticipated Rewards
Counterproliferation Measure
Conducting surveillance on shipping 1 Restricting access to potentially dangerous pathogens 5 and receiving of potentially dangerous pathogens
2 Limiting student visas Controlling exports of dual-use 6 equipment and materials
3 Preventing access to sensitive information 7 Maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile
4 Conducting surveillance on foreign students Redirecting former Soviet Union weapons 8 scientists
Source: Authors
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BEYOND COUNTERPROLIFERATION: THE FOUR The four stage model also provides a better under- STAGE MODEL standing of particular bioterrorism prevention measures. For example, the articulated goal of the current national While counterproliferation efforts are a logical starting smallpox vaccination program is to “increase deterrence” point for reducing the threat of bioterrorism— by fostering preparedness for a smallpox attack—in other bioterrorism entails more than proliferation. Prevention words by reducing anticipated rewards.35 The phrase “in- efforts can be developed and implemented to reduce the crease deterrence” could mean to prevent the prolifera- likelihood that an attack will occur. This point is best tion of smallpox as a weapon, or to prevent the use of understood by recognizing the difference between prolif- smallpox as a weapon, or both. How the goal is defined eration and use. A bioterrorist cannot conduct an attack however, has important implications for gauging the suc- without first engaging in weapons proliferation by acquir- cessful implementation of the program. ing the weapons; however, acquiring the weapons does The U.S. military has implemented a vaccination pro- not ensure their successful use. Furthermore, focusing pre- gram that will likely deter a smallpox attack against de- vention efforts solely on proliferation and use assumes that ployed military forces, but the civilian program has not the motivation (and intent) to engage in these activities been as successful to date.36 As of June 13, 2003, only 37, already exists. 608 civilians had been vaccinated, leaving the vast ma- A bioterrorist attack, therefore, can be conceptual- jority of the U.S. population vulnerable to an attack.37 It ized in four major stages (Figure 3). Specific prevention is therefore unlikely that this level of coverage is suffi- measures can be designed and applied at each stage to re- cient to deter an attack by a bioterrorist already armed with duce the likelihood that an attack will occur. In Stage 1, smallpox. Indeed, 500,000 or even 1 to 10 million small- the motivation to produce or acquire biological weapons pox vaccinations in a country of 291 million people might has not yet been formed. Effective prevention measures not, by itself, be an adequate deterrent to a terrorist in at this stage—aimed at addressing the conditions that give possession of or access to the smallpox agent. However, rise to this motivation—can prevent the motivation from limited vaccination programs in conjunction with other forming. If those efforts fail, proliferation will proceed pro- counterproliferation efforts, might prevent a potential vided that the bioterrorist’s cost-benefit analysis is favor- bioterrorist from exerting the considerable effort and re- able. An attack still can be prevented at Stage 2 by sources necessary to acquire smallpox and turn it into a reducing the opportunities for proliferation to proceed weapon. What level of coverage—short of mass vaccina- using measures such as those discussed in the analysis tion—might deter proliferation requires more study, but above. If counterproliferation efforts are unsuccessful and the four stage model allows for a more refined analysis of biological weapons are produced or acquired, there are the goals and potential success of specific prevention still opportunities to intervene. At Stage 3, measures can measures.38 be applied to prevent the motivation to use biological Finally, the four stage model underscores the impor- weapons from forming. Should those measures fail, plans tance of the far more difficult task of addressing the moti- for an attack will proceed given a favorable cost-benefit vations of bioterrorists. The conditions that give rise to analysis. At Stage 4 the use of weapons can still be pre- and support the motivation to commit acts of bioterrorism vented by reducing the opportunities for an attack to oc- (or terrorism in general) are mired in political, socioeco- cur. nomic, ideological, religious, and cultural perspectives Separating bioterrorism into four stages helps to fo- where cause-and-effect is difficult to quantify and inter- cus prevention efforts on specific points of opportunity ests frequently differ. 39 Designing policies to alter those and, in so doing, highlights areas that may need more at- conditions favorably is no less daunting. While an in- tention. For example, similar to the development of pro- depth analysis of the various conditions that give rise to liferation pathways, likely weapons use pathways need to terrorism is beyond the scope of this article, addressing be developed to inform the development of effective these conditions should be a vital part of any bioterrorism counterattack measures. If threat assessments deem that prevention strategy. This does not imply that the United the food supply is a likely target of a biological attack, States should cater to terrorist demands. As with extrem- building a pathway will provide an understanding of how ists groups in the United States, terrorists must be such attacks would likely occur and allow counterattack marginalized and their activities condemned. But a sober measures to be developed and implemented.34 understanding of the conditions that ultimately help form
8 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 A NEW APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COUNTERPROLILFERATION
FIGURE 3 FOUR STAGE MODEL OF BIOTERRORISM
Biological Weapons Proliferation Biological Weapons Use
Stage 1 Stage 1
Conditions leading to Conditions leading to motivation/intention to motivation/intention to attack with produce/aquire biological biological weapons weapons
Alter conditions Alter conditions
Successful Successful
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Motivation/intention to Motivation/intention to attack with biological produce/acquire weapons formed biological Bioterrorism weapons formed Prevented
Successful Successful Opportunity-reducing Opportunity-reducing counterproliferation counterattack measures measures
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Biological weapons production/acquisition Bioterrorism
Stage 2 Stage 4
Source: Adapted from R. Wortley, “A Classification of Techniques for Controlling Situational Precipitators of Crime,” Security Journal 4, 2001, pp. 63-82.
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terrorist motivations will enable the United States to work terrorists in order to disrupt the cycle of violence and fos- effectively toward addressing those conditions. ter long-term security.
CONCLUSION 1 Ronald V. Clarke, “Introduction,” in Ronald Clarke, ed., Situational Crime The effects of a bioterrorist attack are not the same as Prevention: Successful Case Studies, Second Edition (Guilderland, NY: Harrow those posed by naturally occurring infectious diseases be- and Heston, 1997), pp.1-43; Julie Samia Mair and Michael Mair, “Violence Pre- vention and Control Through Environmental Modifications,” Annual Review of cause there is a “thinking enemy” whose aim is to inflict Public Health 24 (2003), pp. 209-225. as many casualties and cause as much damage as possible.40 2 Julie Samia Mair, et al., “Violence Prevention and Control Through Environ- mental Modifications.” Studying a potential bioterrorist’s decisionmaking pro- 3 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Intelligence Committees, Joint In- cess, as suggested in this article, offers a new and comple- vestigation of September 11 Intelligence Failures, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, Oc- mentary approach for reducing the threat of bioterrorism. tober 17, 2002. 4 BBC News, “Al-Qaeda ‘plotted nuclear attacks’,” September 8, 2002,
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18 Genevieve J. Kenzo, “Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Ac- www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Governance_Symposium/o’toole.pdf>. tions; Ruth Ellen Wasem, “Foreign Students in the United States. 32 Gigi Kwik, et al., “Biosecurity.” 19 Genevieve J. Kenzo, “Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Ac- 33 Ted Anthony, “Chinese Students Denied Visas Protest Outside U.S. Embassy,” tions; The Australia Group, “AG Common Control List—List of Biological Agents Associated Press, News Tribune, Tacoma, WA, August 8, 2002, The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 11