UN Peacekeeping Under Kofi Annan: Recourse to Force

UN Peacekeeping under Kofi Annan: Recourse to Force

James Sloan*

"Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter." (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, December 1999)1

Introduction

With the end of Kofi Annan's second term as the Secretary-General of the United Nations in December 2006 comes the opportunity to consider the legacy he has left behind him. One of the most significant changes in the functioning of the UN during his tenure has been the sea change that occurred in relation to the use of force in pea­ cekeeping.2 Whereas previously, peacekeeping operations were authorised to use only limited levels of force - what may conveniently be described as force only in "self­ defence," so long as the concept of self-defence is defined very broadly and subject to exceptions- during Annan's Secretary-Generalship, a trend has emerged whereby

* Lecturer in International Law, University of Glasgow, School of Law. Several of the themes developed in this article were considered in an earlier article in which the author examined the use of offensive force in UN peacekeeping more generally. See Sloan, James, The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?' Hastings lnt'l & Comp. L Rev., 30/No. 3 (2007), 385. United Nations (Press Release), 'Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or Mass Slaughter' (UN document SG/SM/7263 AFR/196), 16 December 1999. The statement was made on the same day as the release of a report critical of the UN' s role in Rwanda in 1994. (United Nations, 'Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council [enclosing "The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda", 15 December 1999]' (UN document S/1999/1257), 16 December 1999.) 2 For the purposes of this discussion, the term "peacekeeping" is used to indicate a UN-authorised, UN­ led operation mandated to maintain or assist in the restoration of peace through its activities in situ. The need for the operation to use only limited force (or force in self-defence) as well as issues relating to consent and impartiality will be considered in the discussion but will not form part of the definition.

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Harvey Langholtz, Boris Kondoch, Alan Wells (Eds.), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 12, pp. 51-82. © 2008 Koninklijke BrillN. V. Printed in the Netherlands 52 James Sloan the use of virtually any amount of force is routinely authorised for at least some of the functions of new peacekeeping operations. The establishment of peacekeeping operations and the level of force attributed to them are clearly matters which fall primarily to the Security Council which authorises the operations.3 Nevertheless, Annan's influence in this regard has been considerable. While at some level the Secretary-General acts as a servant of the Security Council, the influential nature of his role is not to be underestimated. This is particularly so with peacekeeping where the Security Council, in establishing peacekeeping missions, routinely relies on and endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General in rela­ tion to the nature and forcefulness of the operations. Moreover, once a peacekeeping operation is established by the Security Council, it is the Secretary-General who has day-to-day command of an operation.4 As such, the question of whether force is to be used a particular circumstance will fall to the Secretary-General or those acting under him, such as members of the Secretariat or the force commander. In addition, it is the Secretary-General who is responsible for drafting an operation's rules of engagement (ROE). When he was sworn in as Secretary-General in 1997 Annan was not a UN outsider. Among the positions he had held in the Organisation before obtaining the Secretary­ Generalship was Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from March 1992-February 1993 and Under-Secretary-General from March 1993-December 1996. Tellingly, he held these positions at a time when peacekeeping came under some of the most sustained and aggressive criticism in its history: during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and during the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995.5 As an important member of the Secretariat at that time, Annan had was involved in difficult decisions in relation to peacekeeping operations, including the Secretariat's decisions that force

3 As is well known, the General Assembly has, exceptionally, established peacekeeping operations. This would appear, however, to be a feature of an historical set of circumstances, unlikely to be repeated. For more on the legality of the establishment of peacekeeping operations by the General Assembly, see Certain Expense of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151. For a discussion of the General Assembly's powers in this regard, see White, Nigel D., The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) at Chapters 4-6. 4 On the role of the Secretary-General in peacekeeping generally, see Sarooshi, D., "The Role of the United Nations Secretary-General in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations", 20 Aust. YBIL (1999), p. 279. See also Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at Chapter 14. 5 The situation in Somalia from 1992-1995, while not discussed herein, also represented a black mark against peacekeeping. See United Nations, 'Note by Secretary-General, Appendix: Report of the Commission on Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to investi­ gate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them' (UN document S/1994/653), 1 June 1994.