Prioritization and Sequencing of Peacekeeping Mandates: The Case of MONUSCO

DECEMBER 2019

Introduction

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in December 2019. In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a workshop on November 21, 2019, to discuss MONUSCO’s mandate and political strategy. On November 21, 2019, the International Peace Institute (IPI), This workshop offered a platform for member states, UN staff, and outside experts to develop a shared understanding and common strategic assessment the Stimson Center, and Security of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The discus- Council Report organized a sion was intended to help the Security Council make informed decisions with workshop to discuss the mandate respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of and political strategy of the United MONUSCO’s mandate and actions on the ground. Nations Organization Stabilization Discussions during the workshop’s first session focused on the current Mission in the Democratic Republic political and security dynamics in the DRC, including conflict drivers at the of the Congo (MONUSCO). This local, provincial, national, and regional levels, the implications of the event was the fourteenth in a series country’s ongoing political transition, and recent diplomatic initiatives at the of workshops examining how the regional and international level. In the second session, participants examined activities included in peace how to adapt MONUSCO’s mandate to strengthen the mission and help the operations’ mandates can be better UN achieve its objectives over the coming year. prioritized, sequenced, and grounded in political strategies. This Conflict Analysis meeting note was drafted collabora- tively by IPI, the Stimson Center, and The past year has seen a reduction in insecurity in some areas of the DRC, and Security Council Report. It notable progress in the governance space and regional relations under the new summarizes the main points raised Congolese government. However, many root causes of violence remain in the discussion under the Chatham unaddressed, and the potential to address them depends on the continuation of a fragile political transition. House rule of non-attribution and does not necessarily represent the SECURITY SITUATION views of all participants. This project While violence throughout the country has decreased in scope and intensity is funded with the support of the in recent years, high levels of insecurity and criminality persist in different government of Germany. regions of the DRC. In the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, there are open clashes between government forces and a diverse array of non- state armed groups. Some of the estimated 130 armed groups operating in the country are deeply connected to local communities through economic, sociocultural, and political ties; others are perceived as illegitimate actors, 2 MEETING NOTE motivated predominantly by their own political or Disputes within and between communities over economic interests.1 Continued fighting between access to and use of land also contribute to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of increasing violence at the local level, especially in the Congo (FARDC) and armed groups poses areas where displaced civilians or refugees are serious threats to the physical safety and rights of returning after many years. In addition, non-state civilians, sustainable peace, and national and armed groups and state security services alike regional political cohesion. illicitly extract natural resource wealth as part of a While the FARDC carries out direct operations political economy that fuels human rights abuses against certain armed groups with support from and persistent criminality. MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), National and regional actors often have complex the national government and the mission continue political and economic linkages to this community- to face challenges creating and maintaining a based violence. For example, transnational armed protective environment throughout these groups operating within the DRC often include provinces. In particular, logistical challenges, a local militias in their patronage networks. limited ability to counter asymmetric threats, Additionally, some political elites throughout the predatory behavior by some state security services, country continue to rely on identity-based and political and economic linkages between state discourse to incite localized violence for personal officials and armed groups prevent them from gain. These issues are compounded by conflicts realizing these objectives. between neighboring countries that have spilled The provinces of Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai- over into the eastern DRC, where national and Oriental, and Tanganyika confront different regional elites channel these political tensions into conflict dynamics. While direct conflict with armed support for competing armed groups. groups has largely subsided, militias and criminal Nonetheless, these dynamics also give space to organizations continue to employ extractive recent efforts to foster intercommunal cohesion. practices toward local communities, including Successful peacemaking efforts have often involved through their exploitation of natural resource close cooperation between local communities and economies. Intercommunal violence remains subnational or national government officials who prevalent in these provinces and has contributed to strive to build relationships with the communities widespread displacement and violence against they represent. Locally driven reconciliation civilians. Humanitarian challenges remain acute, efforts, including peacebuilding workshops and and much of the population lives in poverty trust-building exercises, have proved partially without access to public services. effective at creating pockets of peace at the local STATUS OF THE ROOT CAUSES AND level, notably in remote areas of the Kasai region DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE and in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Unresolved conflict drivers continue to fuel insecu- rity across a number of provinces. Weak or absent POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE government institutions, particularly at the provin- GOVERNANCE TRANSITION cial and communal levels, perpetuate conditions The DRC has seen significant shifts in its political where citizens’ basic needs are not met and civil landscape following a peaceful governance transi- rights are not respected. This challenge fuels cycles tion and the handover of executive power to an of criminality, and populations in some cases opposition candidate. Félix Tshisekedi was inaugu- reluctantly embrace non-state armed groups as de rated as president in January 2019, and a new facto providers of security and administrative coalition government was instituted in September support. 2019.2 Encouragingly, there appear to be early

1 UN Security Council, Transitioning from Stabilization to Peace: An Independent Strategic Review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2019/842, October 16, 2019, para. 21. 2 The coalition is a partnership between the party of President Tshisekedi, the Cap pour le changement (CACH), and that of former President Joseph Kabila, the Front commun pour le Congo (FCC).

Prioritization and Sequencing of Peacekeeping Mandates: The Case of MONUSCO 3 efforts within the governing coalition to pursue critical for understanding security developments in proposed political reforms to restructure security the country, particularly in the DRC’s eastern agencies, combat corruption, and improve the provinces. President Tshisekedi has sought to transparency and efficiency of existing accounta- improve diplomatic relations in recent months, bility mechanisms. including at the head-of-state level, which is Some participants also highlighted newfound exemplified by concerted outreach to Angola, political space for opposition parties and civil Rwanda, and Uganda. Relations between Rwanda society organizations to operate through and Uganda have shown signs of improvement, democratic channels. For example, senior opposi- although relations between Rwanda and Burundi tion leaders have recently returned from exile, and remain tense, and the risk of domestic unrest in 3 some parties are focusing their political capital on Burundi ahead of the 2020 elections is growing. building broad electoral constituencies ahead of At the multilateral level, the DRC is a member of elections scheduled for 2023. many subregional organizations, including the In this context, public expectations are high for International Conference of the Great Lakes the new government to deliver on its promises, Region (ICGLR), the South African Development particularly those relating to subnational Community (SADC), and the Common Market for governance reforms. One participant Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). These recommended measuring progress on key organizations are necessary for promoting stronger challenges facing the government using the regional integration and for helping the countries following indicators: a defined strategy for security address persistent transnational threats. The 2013 sector reform (SSR) and defeating armed groups, Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSC an accountable budget to build state capacity, and Framework), supported by the UN special envoy the implementation of political reforms at the for the Great Lakes region, remains a useful tool for national and state levels. coordinating political initiatives aimed at addressing structural drivers of conflict in the However, significant challenges remain. The region. Continued room for improvement exists, governing coalition is based on a fragile alliance especially given the PSC Framework’s limited focus that took nine months to build. Widespread public on the protection of civilians, growing concerns by perceptions that former President Joseph Kabila Congolese citizens over the potential presence of continues to exert significant influence throughout foreign troops within the country’s borders, and the coalition, in addition to his party’s control over continued transnational linkages between regional the national legislature, could restrict President governments and armed groups operating in the Tshisekedi’s ability to implement his policy agenda. DRC. Some participants also speculated that levels of political violence could rise if governance reforms President Tshisekedi has also prioritized stall or if the coalition collapses. Rising political diplomatic initiatives with international partners in tensions would similarly restrict national authori- an attempt to generate political goodwill and ties and the UN from systematically addressing the mobilize donor support. For example, the country’s structural drivers of violence. International Monetary Fund’s decision to reopen its loan program with the DRC is expected to help REGIONAL DYNAMICS AND fund stabilization initiatives and increase service MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES 4 delivery. However, broader diplomatic engage- Regional and international dynamics are also ment is also intertwined with the country’s political important for the DRC’s political and security transition. For example, this financial assistance trajectory and, by extension, for MONUSCO’s was delayed by several months over the ruling future. Neighborhood dynamics have long been coalition’s inability to agree on a budget.

3 UN Security Council, Transitioning from Stabilization to Peace: An Independent Strategic Review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2019/842, October 16, 2019, paras. 29–30. 4 Michael Kavanagh, “IMF Eyeing $370 Million Rapid Credit Facility for Congo,” Bloomberg, November 9, 2019, available from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-09/imf-eyeing-370-million-rapid-credit-facility-for-congo . 4 MEETING NOTE

Prioritization and operations, they suggested, should primarily be used to pressure non-state armed groups to engage Sequencing of MONUSCO’s in political dialogue. They also recognized that Mandate active operations and political dialogue alone are insufficient for promoting sustainable peace and Participants agreed that MONUSCO’s strategic encouraged the mission to expand complementary priorities, detailed in UN Security Council stabilization programming related to justice, Resolution 2463 (2019), remain relevant for corrections, arms registration, and community guiding the mission’s upcoming mandate. Gradual violence reduction. openings in the country’s political space and a In areas of low-intensity conflict, such as the small but noticeable reduction in violence provide provinces of Kasai, Kasai-Central, Kasai-Oriental, new opportunities for the council to consider how and Tanganyika, participants agreed upon the need to reconfigure the mission to undertake stabiliza- for MONUSCO to increase its engagement on rule- tion tasks and begin preparations for its eventual of-law activities. This approach could also entail a drawdown and transition. However, participants continued focus on resettling displaced popula- discouraged significant changes to the mission’s tions and demobilizing communal militias. Doing mandate at this time, noting that any changes so would also require a surge in police presence and should not restrict the mission’s ongoing efforts to increased civilian capacity to maintain a focus on support national actors in addressing political, the rule of law and the humanitarian-development security, and humanitarian challenges. nexus. However, some participants disagreed with Instead, they highlighted opportunities for the the approach of completely demilitarizing Security Council to update the mandate so that MONUSCO’s presence in these areas, citing the MONUSCO can more actively support the need for a military response to counter threats country’s ongoing political transition and regional posed by criminal organizations or community- engagements, continue with stabilization efforts based militias. that are founded on a comprehensive approach to In addition to this geographic reconfiguration, the protection of civilians, and begin working with participants suggested greater emphasis on an array of national actors and international political engagement and programming that partners to lay the groundwork for the mission’s complements MONUSCO’s military operations. eventual transition. First, they argued that the mission should continue RECONFIGURING STABILIZATION- its long-term focus on strengthening and profes- ORIENTED TASKS sionalizing national security forces in order to In light of changing conflict dynamics and the prepare national authorities to reassume full country’s new political dispensation, participants responsibility for providing security throughout encouraged the UN Security Council to maintain a the country. As part of this, the mission should also focus on the protection of civilians while adjusting sustain its efforts on SSR, an already significant the mission’s mandate to ensure that MONUSCO’s task, in order to reduce the security sector’s footprint and activities reflect conflict dynamics on incentives for predatory behavior against civilians. the ground. Second, the mission should continue its stabiliza- tion efforts through both political engagement and Participants reflected on the potential for programming, including demobilizing armed reconfiguring MONUSCO’s force posture, in light groups and supporting community-based of the increasing sub-regionalization of conflict mediation efforts. To achieve greater progress in dynamics within the DRC. This could entail these areas, Congolese authorities, with support consolidating military operations in specific from MONUSCO, will have to foster community regions and relying more on nonmilitary tools to support and promote intercommunal reconcilia- consolidate gains elsewhere. Some participants tion and transitional justice. recognized the need to maintain MONUSCO’s force posture in areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, Participants also reflected on the future of the and Ituri where active fighting persists. Ongoing FIB. While it was successful in neutralizing the M23 group in eastern DRC in 2013, it has recently

Prioritization and Sequencing of Peacekeeping Mandates: The Case of MONUSCO 5 confronted challenges achieving its mandate. Some incorporate the protection of civilians into these participants called for a greater emphasis on efforts. nonmilitary tools and questioned the FIB’s PREPARING FOR AN EVENTUAL relevance moving forward; others called for TRANSITION increasing the FIB’s funding and logistical support Participants agreed that the UN should begin so it can more effectively neutralize armed groups. preparing for MONUSCO’s eventual drawdown Participants encouraged the Security Council to and transition. The findings of the independent use the upcoming mandate to better align the FIB strategic review of the mission, submitted to the with the mission’s overall approaches to political UN Security Council in October 2019, helped engagement and stabilization. frame discussions on the concepts of national SUPPORTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS ownership, sustainability, and the primacy of Participants welcomed the mandate’s continued politics. focus on supporting national political processes. Participants agreed that an immediate drawdown Given MONUSCO’s comparative advantage in and exit would be premature. They instead helping create space for political dialogue, partici- advocated for an approach that recognizes transi- pants also urged it to continue engaging in this area tions as primarily political exercises, links to a at the subnational, national, and regional levels. stable and cohesive national political environment, Some recommended that the mission continue to and provides the space for national actors and the use its good offices to help sustain political space UN to develop a long-term roadmap for the UN’s for dialogue among the parties within the reconfiguration. They similarly recognized the governing coalition, as well as between the importance of the Congolese government’s active governing coalition and opposition parties. input into discussions on these issues; in this light, Additional efforts by the mission to continue they acknowledged the government’s commitment promoting an open national political space, to deliver a formal response to the Security Council especially for opposition forces, civil society regarding the independent strategic review. organizations, and underrepresented communities, Participants discussed mechanisms that could were framed as necessary to help the country help the Security Council guide the mission’s consolidate the gains achieved through the political transition. For example, some suggested the transition. Some participants encouraged the adoption of clear and realistic benchmarks for the mission to continue supporting subnational mission, which would help the council better government authorities by conducting sensitiza- understand whether MONUSCO and the tion campaigns and implementing local concilia- Congolese government are achieving progress on a tion committees to provide mediation and arbitra- range of priorities. While some argued that tion services. To mitigate challenges from weak benchmarks could clarify engagement with state capacity at the local level, participants called stakeholders and help measure policy gains (partic- for MONUSCO to continue supporting and ularly in regards to SSR and disarmament, demobi- advising subnational political institutions. lization, and reintegration activities), others Participants also urged MONUSCO’s leadership warned that it was too early to determine to continue incorporating a regional lens into its benchmarks. They called for continued informal political and security engagements throughout the consultations between the Congolese government country. They encouraged frequent collaboration and the UN to account for the fluid political with the UN special envoy for the Great Lakes environment. region, along with regional and subregional organi- Participants identified several ways for the zations, to develop a political strategy to address Security Council to help MONUSCO strengthen the linkages between local militias and transna- the partners that will assume its responsibilities tional armed groups. One participant highlighted post-transition, including the national government emerging coordination between the DRC and its and UN agencies, funds, and programs operating neighbors on regional security threats and asked in the DRC. They also identified several ways the whether the mission could help the government council should encourage the mission to work 6 MEETING NOTE more closely with partners, such as the national such clarity, the mission risks unintentionally government, UN agencies, and civil society, to creating a vacuum in the humanitarian space and transfer its remaining responsibilities. Participants facing public backlash. urged the council, following inputs from the mission, to explore ways to increase the Congolese Conclusion government’s ownership of tasks currently mandated to the mission, particularly on the The DRC’s political and security dynamics protection of civilians and SSR. continued to improve over the past year, with the ongoing political transition, regional rapproche- Additionally, participants encouraged the ment, and a conflict that has decreased in scope Security Council to mandate a clearer division of and intensity. However, the underlying fragility of labor between the mission, the UN country team in the political process, as well as persistent low- and the DRC, national authorities, and international high-intensity conflicts in certain regions, pose partners. Some encouraged the country team to continued challenges. Effective state governance is assume more of a leading role on stabilization- absent in much of the country, insecurity and poor related activities so that MONUSCO can stream- infrastructure hamper humanitarian access, and line its priorities over the coming years. For civilians face pervasive threats from armed groups example, one participant identified the mission’s and the FARDC. current work on natural resource management: although this has a tangible impact on conflict In this context, MONUSCO’s current mandate dynamics, one participant made the point that UN remains highly relevant. Workshop participants agencies would be better placed than the mission to encouraged the Security Council to maintain the focus on this issue. mission’s mandate to engage on political develop- ments and the protection of civilians. However, Finally, some participants suggested that the they also highlighted opportunities to refine Security Council reevaluate MONUSCO’s role in existing tasks, including contextualizing stabiliza- providing logistical support to humanitarian tion efforts, bolstering the police presence, and actors. The mission is regularly called upon to promoting an expanded state presence without deploy its air assets in support of providers of undermining protections for civilians’ safety and humanitarian assistance in remote areas of the rights. Finally, they called for the Security Council country. However, one participant described this to take a cautious approach to planning for the practice as costly, unsustainable, and outside of transition by mandating a clear division of labor MONUSCO’s mandate. Participants called for between MONUSCO, the government, and other greater engagement with UN agencies and other actors and considering tools to track progress on actors to ensure a sustainable approach to humani- gains made so far. tarian assistance and clear expectations about what kind of support is feasible from the mission. Absent

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