Monusco and Drc Elections

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Monusco and Drc Elections MONUSCO AND DRC ELECTIONS With current volatility over elections in Democratic Republic of the Congo, this paper provides background on the challenges and forewarns of MONUSCO’s inability to quell large scale electoral violence due to financial and logistical constraints. By Chandrima Das, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, UN Foundation. OVERVIEW The UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Dem- ment is asserting their authority and are ready to ocratic Republic of the Congo, known by the demonstrate their ability to hold credible elec- acronym “MONUSCO,” is critical to supporting tions. DRC President Joseph Kabila stated during peace and stability in the Democratic Republic the UN General Assembly high-level week in of the Congo (DRC). MONUSCO battles back September 2018: “I now reaffirm the irreversible militias, holds parties accountable to the peace nature of our decision to hold the elections as agreement, and works to ensure political stabil- planned at the end of this year. Everything will ity. Presidential elections were set to take place be done in order to ensure that these elections on December 23 of this year, after two years are peaceful and credible.” of delay. While they may be delayed further, MONUSCO has worked to train security ser- due to repressive tactics by the government, vices across the country to minimize excessive the potential for electoral violence and fraud is use of force during protests and demonstrations. high. In addition, due to MONUSCO’s capacity However, MONUSCO troops are spread thin restraints, the mission will not be able to protect across the entire country, with less than 1,000 civilians if large scale electoral violence occurs. UN Peacekeepers deployed to the capital of MONUSCO is helping the Independent Na- Kinshasa, which has a population of 9.5 million tional Electoral Commission (CENI), the group people. The mission does not have the capac- responsible for executing the elections. The UN ity to address large-scale violence, especially has worked to provide technical support and if it extends to urban areas. This responsibility promote women’s participation in the election. remains with the DRC government. But unlike the elections in 2006 and 2011, the Congolese government has substantially scaled back the UN’s support. The Congolese govern- from former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba SETTING THE SCENE and business tycoon, Moise Katumbi. On December 23, 2018 forty million Congo- Another set of opposition groups are support- lese citizens are slated to elect a new President. ing Felix Tshisekedi and Vital Karmehe. Karmehe If the elections proceed as planned, this will be is a longtime Congolese politician, who ran and the first peaceful transfer of power since the lost against Kabila in 2011.Tshiskedi lacks po- country’s independence six decades ago. The litical experience but is using the legacy of his current President, Joseph Kabila, attempted to deceased father Etienne Tshisekedi, who was seek a third term, despite the Constitution pre- an opposition leader over the last two decades. venting this, but eventually gave up his pursuit. Tshesekedi promised to Karamehe that if he wins, Kabila has been in office since 2001 after his he would make him Prime Minister. father, then-President Laurent Kabila, was assas- MONUSCO BACKGROUND sinated. Kabila is accused of using his power to enrich himself and loyalists around him. President In 1999, after decades of war and political Kabila throughout the years has consolidated unrest, the UN Security Council (UNSC) autho- power, marginalized opposition voices, restrict- rized a UN Peacekeeping mission to deploy to ed freedom of speech and media, and used his DRC, following the second African World War security forces to commit atrocities and create which involved nine countries and over two instability throughout the country. dozen armed groups, resulting in the deaths of Meanwhile, the National Assembly recently 5 million people. In 2013, the UNSC created a passed laws granting immunity to past presi- specialized force called the Forward Intervention dents for any crimes committed during office. The Brigade (FIB) as part of MONUSCO–a first for Assembly also agreed to provide housing and UN Peacekeeping–to carry out targeted offen- security for former Presidents. sive operations against rebel groups in eastern Three candidates are vying for the Presiden- Congo, including the M23 armed group which cy. President Kabila has thrown his support for overtook the city of Goma in eastern DRC. The president behind Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, FIB is composed of 3,000 troops and operates the former Interior Minister and Secretary-Gen- under the direct command of MONUSCO. eral of Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction After the defeat of the M23 in eastern Congo in and Democracy (PPRD). Critics argue Shadary November 2013, the FIB continues to address was chosen to protect Kabila and those that other armed groups operating in the region that have benefited from his corruption. Shadary is a pose a significant threat to civilians, specifically Kabila loyalist, with little international support or the Ugandan Islamist Allied Democratic Forces recognition, and meager finances. He has been (ADF), an armed group which has killed hun- sanctioned by the European Union for his part in dreds of innocent Congolese in the region. In oppressing anti-government protests. November 2018, MONUSCO launched an operation against the ADF that led to the death Several opposition groups recently united of eight peacekeepers, and several Congolese around Martin Fayulu, who worked for Exx- soldiers. This is the second brutal attack in a year on-Mobil for two decades and was educated in by the ADF that killed blue helmets. In Decem- France and the United States. Fayulu has been ber 2017, MONUSCO lost 15 peacekeepers a vociferous critic of Kabila and participated in and over fifty were wounded, which is the worst anti-government demonstrations. He has support attack in MONUSCO history. early warning system that will hopefully deter Currently, there are less than 15,000 UN some electoral violence. Peacekeepers (including civilians, police, and In preparation for the elections, UN Peace- military) deployed to DRC, a country that is keepers are deployed to four areas: a battalion three times the size of Afghanistan, with less in Kinshasa (west); Kasia (center of the country); than 15 percent of the U.S. coalition troops a small battalion of less than 1,000 troops in during the height of the conflict. Tanganyikal and the rest of the force in near Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where most ELECTION SUPPORT of the armed groups are located. In total, there are five Rapidly Deployable Battalions, includ- The Security Council mandated that MON- ing in Kasai and Tanganyika, that can to deploy USCO monitor and support the election. The to rural areas quickly if there is an escalation of MONUSCO BACKGROUND government actively rejected MONUSCO’s violence. MONUSCO has determined that if assistance for the elections including obstructing large-scale electoral violence spreads in any the force from receiving the necessary equipment of the major cities, Kinshasa, Goma, Lubum- to operate in the country. While this has been bashi, and Kinsangani, the peacekeeping force resolved due to high-level negotiations with the will not be able to address the violence. If the DRC government, it highlights the government’s security situation deteriorates across the country reluctance for UN support. The UN’s election including in the Equateurs and Nord and Sud plan focuses on preventive action and internal Ubangui provinces which have no MONUS- crisis management, which involves enhanced CO presence, this could be detrimental to the deterrence efforts, human rights monitoring and humanitarian situation. MONUSCO is already reporting, as well as national police training challenged in implementing its civilian protection to combat potential election-related violence. mandate with its existing resources. It will be un- So far, MONUSCO police forces have trained able to respond to threats to civilians across the 4,600 Congolese Police officers on crowd country if the security situation declines sharply control and response to human rights violations due to the election. to minimize the potential use of excessive force during protests and public demonstrations. CHALLENGES & CONCERNS MONUSCO has 59 Standing Combat De- ployments across the country which facilitates The Congo Research Group has documented civilians teams that meet with communities that the government led by President Kabila, the and prevent outbreaks of electoral violence. parliament, and CENI were responsible for the MONUSCO is providing technical assistance elections delays. The government has delayed to over two-thirds of the DRC’s 26 provinces by the election calendar and the disbursement of advising CENI on housing election materials, the election budget to the each of the country’s training members on data management, and 26 provinces. They have also slowed the political providing training material and implementing negotiations and refused technical support from training for poll staff. In addition, MONUSCO the international community. strengthened its mobile monitoring and response In addition, CENI voter rolls could have more teams to respond to threats of violence. Through than 7 million potential fraudulent voters. CENI this coordinated effort, these teams will gather has been unwilling to investigate or audit the information, provide analysis,
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