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Carter Administration Outlooks, 1977-1979 Including Camp David 1978 Originals Located at Documents and Sources, [email protected] April 2020

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Carter Administration Outlooks, 1977-1979 Including Camp David 1978 Originals Located at Documents and Sources, Kstein@Emory.Edu April 2020 1 Carter Administration outlooks, 1977-1979 including Camp David 1978 Originals located at Documents and Sources, www.israeled.org [email protected] April 2020 April 19, 1977 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting About the Middle East, Anticipating Shimon Peres as Israeli Prime Minister—(FRUS) https://israeled.org/minutes-of-a-policy-review-committee-meeting-about-the-middle-east- anticipating-shimon-peres-as-israeli-prime-minister/ In 1977, one of the early foreign policy initiatives of the incoming Carter Administration was to jump-start the quasi-dormant peace process by reconvening the Geneva Conference, which first occurred in 1973. Carter and his team much preferred an international conference to Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy; it also aligned with the call for a comprehensive settlement outlined in Zbigniew Brzezinski's Brooking's Report, Toward Peace in the Middle East. In this Policy Review Committee Meeting, Carter's staff discusses the necessary prerequisites to reconvening the Geneva Conference, such as garnering Soviet buy-in, the possibility of PLO participation, and understanding Israel's security requirements vis-a-vis borders, which Brzezinski refers to as "the gut issue for Israel." The meeting also features discussion related to Israeli politics and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's resignation. The Carter administration assumed that Shimon Peres would win handily in the Israeli election, as illustrated by Roy Atherton’s comment that “Peres will lose fewer seats than Rabin would have.” They did not anticipate Menachem Begin's impending victory. This meeting also marks one of the earliest examples of Carter’s staff ideating on how to apply pressure on Israel. The question raised by Philip Habib, "How far can Israel be pushed?" would be revisited countless times over the course of the administration. July 19, 1977 Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The White House, Washington, DC (FRUS) https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between-israeli-prime-minister-menachem-begin- and-us-president-jimmy-carter/ Unexpectedly in May 1977, Menachem Begin was elected Israel’s Seventh Prime Minister. Since the US was Israel’s most important ally, it became custom for every Israeli Prime Minister to meet the American president as early as possible after new elections. As his predecessor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had done two months earlier, Begin made immediate plans to meet President Carter. In preparing for his Washington visit, Begin read the protocols of the unusually unfriendly Rabin-Carter encounters in March. Carter had already denied Israel promised weapons and was the first president to promote publically a Palestinian homeland. Begin had heard Carter’s declarations about Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories Israel had captured in the defensive war of June 1967. Begin was opposed to any foreign sovereignty over the West Bank. He and his political party fervently believed that this area was an integral part of the Jewish homeland. Begin had no such emotional feeling for the Sinai peninsula. At their meetings, Begin sought to establish a positive rapport with Carter. And he gave Carter a 2 negotiating plan to focus on Sinai. As for Carter, he insisted on a comprehensive negotiating format that required Israeli negotiations with all Arab states and the PLO. While these initial meetings were frank yet cordial, each met the others stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come. , October 4, 1977 Memorandum of Conversation Between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan (FRUS) https://israeled.org/resources/documents/us-israeli-working-paper-conference-procedures/ Six weeks before Sadat’s historic trip to Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan clearly identified to President Carter substantive and procedural differences that existed between the Begin government and Carter administration. Dayan said that there would not be a withdrawal on all fronts. Israelis were opposed to four items favored by the Carter administration: a Palestinian state, PLO participation in negotiations, removal of settlements and application of any foreign sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, or the West Bank. The Labor Party that had just left office in Israel held similar positions. Carter told Dayan that Israel was the least cooperative participant in the anticipated diplomatic process to be driven by the United States. Carter threatened Israel with a possible ‘confrontation’ with US sponsored diplomatic isolation. At the Camp David talks in September 1978, Carter again threatened Israel with punishment for being uncooperative with US ideas on what a political resolution to the West Bank should look like. Common to both the Labor Party and to Begin’s government was a fear that the US would pressure Israel into unwanted concessions and deny Israel sovereign decision-making. It was a fear that Dayan expressed in this October 1977 meeting, and one that he would express on several occasions during the Camp David talks. March 21, 1978 Meeting Between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The White House, Washington DC. (FRUS) https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between-us-president-jimmy-carter-and-israeli- prime-minister-menachem-begin-and-their-delegations/ After a year in office the Carter administration’s effort of seeking a comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors had stalled. Egyptian President Sadat’s unexpected visit to Israel pushed the prospects of a bi-lateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement to the forefront. What had not changed in Carter’s foreign policy was a systematic effort to improve US relations with Arab states while intentionally showing Israelis feel that their special relationship with the United States was on a decline. Carter flirted with the PLO, restricted Israel’s access to promised weapons, voted at the UN against Israel’s use of force in reply to a PLO terrorist attack. Finally a month before this Begin-Carter meeting, the administration presented a highly controversial Egyptian-Israeli-Saudi plane deal to Congress. The plane deal when passed three months later provided sophisticated offensively-oriented F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. At this White House meeting, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan provided a lucid review of Israel’s concerns about the West Bank falling under foreign sovereignty. Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated his clear animus toward Israel’s policy in the West Bank when he stated that Israel only wanted a continuation of their “military and political control” over the territories. He blasted Prime Minister Begin’s autonomy plan for the Palestinians. Like 3 Carter, Brzezinski wanted the West Bank to become a Palestinian state. Since the conversation revealed that Israel and Egypt were finding areas of agreement, the administration’s objective of a comprehensive negotiating outcome was losing steam. Begin and Carter’s mutual dislike over policy choices continued to rise. September 7, 1978 Memorandum of Conversation between Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Camp David (FRUS) By the time the American, Egyptian, and Israeli delegations convened at Camp David, dozens of direct meetings had occurred between Israeli and Egyptian diplomats and with American diplomats acting as intermediaries. The narrowing of differences and lowering of expectations gave the Camp David negotiations chances for some limited successes. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser defined those issues that focused on the West Bank as “the source of authority (of the proposed autonomy plan), security, withdrawals, settlements and sovereignty.” Brzezinski made it clear at this meeting as he and Secretary of State Vance would repeat throughout the negotiations and afterwards, that the US was seeking the evolution of a Palestinian state. A month earlier, Sadat had told US State Department officials that Palestinian self-determination would be an absolute pre-requisite for Egyptian-Israeli negotiations to continue. However, establishing a Palestinian state was not a Sadat perquisite for talks to resume.. When the Camp David talks began, Israel had not agreed to negotiate on the basis of Palestinian self-determination. Begin’s government was backed by an Israeli parliamentary majority overwhelmingly opposed to a Palestinian state. Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, Israeli Foreign Minister and Defense Ministers respectively, presented cogently detailed summaries of Israel’s willingness to resolve the 1967 refugee issue and Israel’s security needs in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Sinai. Despite American prodding, Israel balked at any discussion of the 1948 Palestinian or Jewish refugee issues. September 11, 1978, Memorandum of Conversation between Egyptian Delegations at Camp David (FRUS) Like all other US records of conversations from the Camp David negotiations, this conversation too was a summary of what was discussed and raised, and not a verbatim transcript of who said what at the meeting. By comparison, the records of conversations held at the White House between President Carter and other heads of state are verbatim transcripts. Reliance for accuracy and completeness of the Camp David conversations, from American sources
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