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Carter Administration outlooks, 1977-1979 including Camp David 1978 Originals located at Documents and Sources, www.israeled.org [email protected] April 2020

April 19, 1977 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting About the Middle East, Anticipating as Israeli Prime Minister—(FRUS) https://israeled.org/minutes-of-a-policy-review-committee-meeting-about-the-middle-east- anticipating-shimon-peres-as-israeli-prime-minister/

In 1977, one of the early foreign policy initiatives of the incoming Carter Administration was to jump-start the quasi-dormant peace process by reconvening the Geneva Conference, which first occurred in 1973. Carter and his team much preferred an international conference to 's shuttle diplomacy; it also aligned with the call for a comprehensive settlement outlined in Zbigniew Brzezinski's Brooking's Report, Toward Peace in the Middle East. In this Policy Review Committee Meeting, Carter's staff discusses the necessary prerequisites to reconvening the Geneva Conference, such as garnering Soviet buy-in, the possibility of PLO participation, and understanding 's security requirements vis-a-vis borders, which Brzezinski refers to as "the gut issue for Israel." The meeting also features discussion related to Israeli politics and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's resignation. The Carter administration assumed that Shimon Peres would win handily in the Israeli election, as illustrated by Roy Atherton’s comment that “Peres will lose fewer seats than Rabin would have.” They did not anticipate 's impending victory. This meeting also marks one of the earliest examples of Carter’s staff ideating on how to apply pressure on Israel. The question raised by Philip Habib, "How far can Israel be pushed?" would be revisited countless times over the course of the administration.

July 19, 1977 Memorandum of a Conversation Between President and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The White House, Washington, DC (FRUS) https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between-israeli-prime-minister-menachem-begin- and-us-president-jimmy-carter/ Unexpectedly in May 1977, Menachem Begin was elected Israel’s Seventh Prime Minister. Since the US was Israel’s most important ally, it became custom for every Israeli Prime Minister to meet the American president as early as possible after new elections. As his predecessor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had done two months earlier, Begin made immediate plans to meet President Carter. In preparing for his Washington visit, Begin read the protocols of the unusually unfriendly Rabin-Carter encounters in March. Carter had already denied Israel promised weapons and was the first president to promote publically a Palestinian homeland. Begin had heard Carter’s declarations about Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories Israel had captured in the defensive war of June 1967. Begin was opposed to any foreign sovereignty over the . He and his political party fervently believed that this area was an integral part of the Jewish homeland. Begin had no such emotional feeling for the Sinai peninsula. At their meetings, Begin sought to establish a positive rapport with Carter. And he gave Carter a

2 negotiating plan to focus on Sinai. As for Carter, he insisted on a comprehensive negotiating format that required Israeli negotiations with all Arab states and the PLO. While these initial meetings were frank yet cordial, each met the others stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come. , October 4, 1977 Memorandum of Conversation Between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan (FRUS) https://israeled.org/resources/documents/us-israeli-working-paper-conference-procedures/

Six weeks before Sadat’s historic trip to , Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan clearly identified to President Carter substantive and procedural differences that existed between the Begin government and Carter administration. Dayan said that there would not be a withdrawal on all fronts. Israelis were opposed to four items favored by the Carter administration: a Palestinian state, PLO participation in negotiations, removal of settlements and application of any foreign sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, or the West Bank. The Labor Party that had just left office in Israel held similar positions. Carter told Dayan that Israel was the least cooperative participant in the anticipated diplomatic process to be driven by the United States. Carter threatened Israel with a possible ‘confrontation’ with US sponsored diplomatic isolation. At the Camp David talks in September 1978, Carter again threatened Israel with punishment for being uncooperative with US ideas on what a political resolution to the West Bank should look like. Common to both the Labor Party and to Begin’s government was a fear that the US would pressure Israel into unwanted concessions and deny Israel sovereign decision-making. It was a fear that Dayan expressed in this October 1977 meeting, and one that he would express on several occasions during the Camp David talks.

March 21, 1978 Meeting Between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The White House, Washington DC. (FRUS) https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between-us-president-jimmy-carter-and-israeli- prime-minister-menachem-begin-and-their-delegations/

After a year in office the Carter administration’s effort of seeking a comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors had stalled. Egyptian President Sadat’s unexpected visit to Israel pushed the prospects of a bi-lateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement to the forefront. What had not changed in Carter’s foreign policy was a systematic effort to improve US relations with Arab states while intentionally showing Israelis feel that their special relationship with the United States was on a decline. Carter flirted with the PLO, restricted Israel’s access to promised weapons, voted at the UN against Israel’s use of force in reply to a PLO terrorist attack. Finally a month before this Begin-Carter meeting, the administration presented a highly controversial Egyptian-Israeli-Saudi plane deal to Congress. The plane deal when passed three months later provided sophisticated offensively-oriented F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. At this White House meeting, Israeli Foreign Minister provided a lucid review of Israel’s concerns about the West Bank falling under foreign sovereignty. Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated his clear animus toward Israel’s policy in the West Bank when he stated that Israel only wanted a continuation of their “military and political control” over the territories. He blasted Prime Minister Begin’s autonomy plan for the . Like

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Carter, Brzezinski wanted the West Bank to become a Palestinian state. Since the conversation revealed that Israel and were finding areas of agreement, the administration’s objective of a comprehensive negotiating outcome was losing steam. Begin and Carter’s mutual dislike over policy choices continued to rise.

September 7, 1978 Memorandum of Conversation between Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Israeli Defense Minister with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Camp David (FRUS)

By the time the American, Egyptian, and Israeli delegations convened at Camp David, dozens of direct meetings had occurred between Israeli and Egyptian diplomats and with American diplomats acting as intermediaries. The narrowing of differences and lowering of expectations gave the Camp David negotiations chances for some limited successes. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser defined those issues that focused on the West Bank as “the source of authority (of the proposed autonomy plan), security, withdrawals, settlements and sovereignty.” Brzezinski made it clear at this meeting as he and Secretary of State Vance would repeat throughout the negotiations and afterwards, that the US was seeking the evolution of a Palestinian state. A month earlier, Sadat had told US State Department officials that Palestinian self-determination would be an absolute pre-requisite for Egyptian-Israeli negotiations to continue. However, establishing a Palestinian state was not a Sadat perquisite for talks to resume.. When the Camp David talks began, Israel had not agreed to negotiate on the basis of Palestinian self-determination. Begin’s government was backed by an Israeli parliamentary majority overwhelmingly opposed to a Palestinian state. Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, Israeli Foreign Minister and Defense Ministers respectively, presented cogently detailed summaries of Israel’s willingness to resolve the 1967 refugee issue and Israel’s security needs in the West Bank, , and Sinai. Despite American prodding, Israel balked at any discussion of the 1948 Palestinian or Jewish refugee issues.

September 11, 1978, Memorandum of Conversation between Egyptian Delegations at Camp David (FRUS)

Like all other US records of conversations from the Camp David negotiations, this conversation too was a summary of what was discussed and raised, and not a verbatim transcript of who said what at the meeting. By comparison, the records of conversations held at the White House between President Carter and other heads of state are verbatim transcripts. Reliance for accuracy and completeness of the Camp David conversations, from American sources found in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) therefore rests solely upon the person or persons who wrote the summary. From this meeting we learn that when it came time for the Egyptians to respond to Israeli ideas, Egyptian President kept very tight control over his advisers’ input. The Egyptian delegation’s frustration at being ignored by their President appears in this summary. They wanted more than just an Egyptian-Israeli agreement; they wanted Palestinian self-determination, return of Jerusalem, and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. For example, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel pointed out that the draft under review did not “state the illegality of settlements.” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

4 reassured the Egyptians that “President Carter will make a speech which will include a reference to [the US] long-standing view that settlements are illegal.” When Kamel wanted to know why there was no reference to Palestinian refugees, Vance replied, “the Jewish refugees also have rights.” The Egyptians strongly opposed making that equivalence, with Kamel describing the language as making them “deeply troubled.” Vance responded that “part of the language on this subject comes directly from Sadat…stressing that Sadat’s very words were used,” the implication being that Sadat was negotiating with the US team without looping in the rest of his delegation.

September 14, 1978, Memorandum of Israeli Delegation Consultation with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Camp David (ISA)

After the first two days of the two weeks of the Camp David negotiations, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin barely met face-to-face. Sadat did not enjoy talking to Begin, and with President Carter’s eager willingness, Sadat gave President Carter and his team the prerogative to negotiate on Egypt’s behalf, and where necessary pressure the Israelis. Sadat gave President Carter a list of concessions that he was prepared to make. Sadat had no problem in adding to the known personal discomfort that characterized the Carter and Begin relationship. If Sadat could gain Sinai back and remove Israeli settlements from Sinai, it was a bonus to add to the friction in the US-Israeli relationship. Vance’s meeting with the Israeli delegation exemplified promotion of American interests. Vance gave the Israelis a document that had the Israelis accepted it would have eventually devolved the West Bank area into a Palestinian state. He suggested that a referendum be held by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the end of the autonomy period of five years. Begin told Vance that the Israelis at Camp David and therefore in Israel “are unanimous [in the belief from] what we have received from you on the last day of discussions is a formula that inevitably leads to a Palestinian state.” Israel at Camp David refused the Carter administration’s incessant demand to provide self-determination and a state for the Palestinians.

September 16, 1978 Memorandum of Conversation between US President Jimmy Carter, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan at Camp David ISA - https://israeled.org/carter-vance-begin- dayan-camp-david/

During the penultimate day of the Camp David negotiations, President Carter enumerated to Prime Minister Menachem Begin the progress that had been made in the trilateral negotiations. With some adjustments to the almost completed agreements, Israel’s prospects for peace and security with Egypt were at hand. Begin praised Carter for his “work for peace” and acknowledged that several issues had not yet been resolved, including Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula. Begin agreed to submit the question of Sinai settlements to a vote in the Israeli parliament, affirming that as Prime Minister, he would not require his party members to vote a certain way. Begin refused to give Egyptian President Anwar Sadat any say on the future of other settlements, remarking at one point that the West Bank “is not his business.” In this meeting, the contents of which have not been released by the Foreign Relations of the United

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States (FRUS) but are available from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Begin clearly committed that “perhaps one military settlement” in the Valley would be established during the three months of the treaty negotiations. As to a complete freeze on new settlements, Begin said, “That’s out of the question.” Carter asked Begin for a letter stating, “After the signing of the [framework] agreement during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in the area, unless otherwise agreed.” Ultimately, Begin did not send Carter such a letter. And yet, Carter insisted publicly from the day after the accords were signed throughout his post- presidency that Begin had promised to freeze settlements for five years. The extraordinarily contentious public dispute on the settlements would mar the diplomatic success of the and add tension to the already fraught Carter-Begin relationship.

September 17, 1978 Memorandum of a Conversation between President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan at Camp David (FRUS) https://israeled.org/resources/documents/camp-david-accords/

Stunning Foreign Minister Dayan, President Carter opened the discussion by raising the issue of Jerusalem, on what was the afternoon of the last day of the Camp David negotiations. Carter said, “Sadat’s compassion for Jerusalem is very strong; he is willing to be flexible about the settlements if Israel will be flexible with regard to Jerusalem. I will not be able to handle [Jerusalem] unless you agree to leave East Jerusalem.” Said Dayan,”we are in the midst of negotations and are willing to make peace with Egypt and being confronted by the US postion.” Emphatically Dayan argued that both the Hebrew University on , the Wailing Wall, Hadassah Hospital and the Jewish quarter were taken from us by force. They were occupied. I am referring to lands that we purchased from the Arabs. Carter had apparently promised Sadat to have US views read into the final Camp David document, or at least an accompanying letter stating the US position that said that East Jerusalem was occupied territory. Dayan confronted Carter, “If we had known that you would declare your position on Jerusalem we would not have come here. All your positions with regards to settlements are insignificant compared to our confrontation on the issue of Jerusalem.” The Carter administration planned to bring up the highly sensitive issue of Jerusalem at the very end of the negotiations when an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was well in sight. It was under pressure from Sadat and the Saudis to have the US position included that said Jerusalem or east Jerusalem were occupied territory. The Carter administration would repeat that exact view in its support of an August 1980 UN Resolution. Most of the most sensitive issues – settlements, Jerusalem, the Palestinian Arabs future --that existed between Israel and Egypt before the Camp David talks were still gnawing at each other when the talks ended.

March 2, 1979 Memorandum of Conversation between US President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The White House, Washington, DC (FRUS) https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between-us-president-jimmy-carter-and-israeli- prime-minister-menachem-begin/

Despite the success of the Camp David Accords in September 1978, the Carter Administration was force to focused its energies over the next half year detailing the fine points in the Egyptian- Israeli treaty. Jordan, written into the Camp David Accords without their participation balked at becoming involved as a steward for implementing Palestinian autonomy. Egypt and Israel continued to sharply disagree over building/expansion of Israeli settlements. Begin angered

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Carter by insisting that he would not set a target date for implementing autonomy. Suddenly, events in Iran impacted Egyptian-Israeli talks. The Shah of Iran fell from office. Begin’s fear of the PLO prompted him to request from Carter, “a guarantee that there will not be a Palestinian state…this would be a mortal danger to us. Arafat has taken over the Israeli embassy in Tehran.” Carter tried to mollify Begin’s fear that a Palestinian state would be established, “We are not tricking you,” he told Begin. For Israel, more than half of its oil supply had come from Iran, it was now lost. Israel obtained a commitment from the US to supply it with oil, if it could not receive needed supplies from the Sinai oil fields returned to Egypt as part of their treaty agreement. To prevent the Egyptian-Israeli talks from totally unraveling, Carter travelled to Egypt and Israel and negotiated intensely with Begin over several days o prevent the Egyptian- Israeli talks from unraveling. Ultimately, Carter succeeded as mediator because Begin and Sadat wanted an agreement. The Treaty was signed on the White House Lawn on March 26, 1979.

17 March 1979 - Memorandum of Conversation Between US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Arabian Prince Saud on Camp David Accords and Other Regional Issues Zbigniew Brzezinski Historical Materials Collection. Box 36. Serial Xs (3/79). The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library https://israeled.org/memorandum-of-conversation-between- us-national-security-advisor-zbigniew-brzezinski-and-saudi-arabian-prince-saud-on-camp-david-accords- and-other-regional-issues/

Nine days before the March 26, 1979 signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud carried out an extraordinarily frank conversation. It included discussions about their bilateral relations, common fears of regional turbulence, and Sadat’s building estrangement from Arab leaders. Brzezinski reminded the Saudis that local radicalism, instability in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Iran and the ’s external intrusion posed regional threats. The US was addressing these issues in part by supplying advanced weapons to the Saudis and maintaining an enhanced American military presence in the region. Working with Arab states, not “to split the Arab world” was a core US foreign policy objective. Saudi economic support of Sadat was critical to this end. Brzezinski feared that undermining Egypt by limiting economic assistance might weaken Sadat and “see a pro-Soviet regime there.”

Prince Saud concurred that a strong Egypt was in Saudi interests. “…it is essential to the security of the region…Egypt as the leader of the Arab world with moderate forces spreading… we would be harmed if Egypt were isolated,” Prince Saud noted. Brzezinski made the case that President Carter was “the first president since 1948 to mortgage his political future to [resolving the conflict] and the administration’s effort at a comprehensive settlement “proved painfully that it would not work…with some pain,” Brzezinski acknowledged that “even getting two parties together is extremely difficult.” On the upcoming peace treaty, the Americans tried to assure their skeptical Saudi listeners that within a month of the treaty’s ratification, negotiations for a self-governing authority of the West Bank and Gaza would ensue. Brzezinski’s estimation was wildly optimistic. More reasonable, he acknowledged that the US “cannot guarantee a Palestinian state but it is important that the Palestinians be engaged more as partners,” the Saudis knew that neither the Jordanians nor the Palestinians were prepared to recognize Israel let alone join the negotiations. That had not changed since the Carter administration had taken office.

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Further, Prince Saud emphasized that his country, like most Arab states, believed that Egypt made too many concessions in the negotiations with the Israelis. Saud chastised Sadat for not seeking the support of his Arab peers. Finally, Saud told the Americans that his country would draw a circumspect line between not undermining Egypt economically, but supporting moderate Arab states who wished to ‘punish’ Sadat for signing a separate peace treaty with Israel. The Saudi and Arab reprimand included Egypt’s suspension from the Arab League and removal of its headquarters from Cairo. Both US and Saudi diplomats made their cases for a strong US-Saudi relationship while acknowledging that the recently completed Egyptian-Israeli talks highlighted new and what would be sustaining frictions in their bilateral relations.

26 March 1979 - Israel- Egypt Peace Treaty - https://israeled.org/israel-egypt-peace-treaty/

Sixteen months after Sadat’s visit to Israel, the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed in Washington. It contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex dealing with the relations between the parties, and agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty; among them were Article 6, the withdrawal schedule, exchange of ambassadors, security arrangements, and the agreement relating to the autonomy talks. The latter issue was contained in a letter addressed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Carter. In a separate Israel-U.S. Memorandum of Agreement concluded on the same day, the U.S. spelled out its commitments to Israel in case the treaty was violated, the role of the UN, and the future supply of military and economic aid to Israel.

20 July 1979 – UNSC 452 - https://israeled.org/resources/documents/united-nations-security- council-resolution-452/

This was the first UNSC resolution where the US, by abstaining, deplored Israel’s settlement expansion. Seeking to engage the PLO in accepting Israel and placating Saudi Arabia on the issue of Israel’s control over Jerusalem, the resolution’s contents further soured the Carter-Begin relationship. The Carter in 1980- (UNSC460) and Obama administration in 2016 (UNSC 2334) would respectively reinforce the content of UNSC 452, namely that Washington viewed Israel’s presence in the territories and in building settlements as illegal. .