Conclusion Conclusion

Towards certain ends or for certain purposes, a few aspects of the neo-ilustrados ’ pursuit and assumption of political power deserve more than just passing consideration. For ours at least two issues are decidedly most significant, namely, First, the basis of Cory Aquino’s 'claim of right' to the presidency (or as set out in chapter 2, supra, 'setting out the source and basis of "legal authority" in the ensuing neo- ilustrado revolutionary government'); and Secondly, the nature or extent of the People’s Power Revolution (or in chapter 2, supra, 'the problem of understanding the "People’s Power" Revolution in the Philippines'). Correlatively with the first issue, we may also consider whether the four-day Uprising in February 1986, insofar as the close ilustrada was concerned, involved or betokened no more than what we may call a mere 'ad hoc change' in ilustrado factional rule—that is, even if by non-constitutional mediation.^ 2 Contrariwise—or rather, corollary to this—there is the further question of whether there really was 'no change' in the structure of class domination by the ilustrada.83

This argument may be called 'synthetic': Among others, it may include such variations as putting emphasis on U.S. influence on Philippine socio-political relations (e.g., 'the US will not allow the Philippines to fall into the communists’ hands'); or the one attributed to KBL vice-presidential candidate Arturo Tolentino, 'that the few thousand blockaders on EDSA couldn’t be interpreted as a national revolution because, even of just the population of Manila, they formed only a small fraction’. (See Quijano, op cit., 109.) All of them, however, lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the so-called people’s power revolution was not a revolution, and that the ensuing government between February 1986 and February 1987 could not have been revolutionary. This is the counterpart of the 'synthetic' argument, and may be called 'analytic'. It bases a 'revolution' on the change in social and economic structure, not on the political. 'The Philippine revolution of 1896', Sison remarked, ‘took full form only after the peasantry became mobilized into a powerful national liberation movement against colonialism and serfdom'. See his speech delivered at the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, Los Banos, Laguna, on March 23, 1966. See also Guerrero, op cit., 181 et seq., in which the revolution in the late nineteenth century and

293 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION

Let us first analyze the 'ad hoc change' argument inasmuch as, being more relevant to the question of formal 'priorities', it conveniently delimits the scope of the other issues, such as the 'no change' proposition, or even whether there really was a revolution or not. We may also delineate it in its most complete sense--that is, in terms of so-called enforcement action, the extent of change, and leadership. To begin with, this argument may imply that (1) whatever 'changes' were instituted were for this case only, (2) correctively, the 'process' or procedure followed was not to be regular or repetitive; (3) the scope of changes was limited to the control or direction of the government or bureaucracy; and (4) factions or groupings of the same 'social class' were the main protagonists. In its most specific sense, the argument is concerned only with the transfer of political power from the Marcos regime to the Enrile-Aquino-Laurel alliance. And by the latter’s 'enforcement action', the procedure that they followed simply sought the regime’s compliance with the 'true results' of the snap presidential elections on February 7 of that year. There was, however, no other effectual means of enforcement (which was lawful) except by non-constitutional mediation (reformist) because constitutional mediation had already broken down. At any rate, the 'people’s'—or, specifically, the masses’- -participation in it (i.e., the enforcement action) is deemed of merely secondary importance—that is, to the 'results' of the election (as well as to the 'will' of the ilustrada to subrogate one political grouping [Aquino’s] for another [Marcos’s]). Such was the basis of the changes which followed, such as those concerning economic policies and the highest-ranked positions of the government as well as constitutional—or, more appropriately, administrative—law and other relationships. There were, however, hardly any structural change (such as 'land reform') in the relations of production and economic priorities. On the whole the structure of priority involving the CPP-NPA insurgency in the 1960s-70s are merged into the 'continuous Philippine Revolution: the national-democratic and socialist stages'; A. R. Magno, 'The Filipino Left at the Crossroads: Current Debates on Strategy and Revolution', in Third World Studies Center (ed.), Marxism in the Philippines (Quezon City, Phil.: Univ. of the Philippines, 1988), 80, in which the 'class-based struggle' led by the CPP is discussed: 'The Party is the revolution'; and Hick, op cit., 100-101.

294 Conclusion

state-oriented and folk-charismatic relations remained largely as they were before. (It follows that, without going into details, if this argument were correct, then the 'no change' argument correspondingly would be true too.) Upon these grounds, it may then be concluded that the 'Revolution' of February 1986 was not so much a true revolution as a mere (even if unusual) change of the ways by which to determine which ilustrado faction would have the pouvoir to govern. In such a context, the 'ad hoc change' argument (and also that of 'no change') has a twofold basis; that is, on both the 'parcellized' and 'absolutist' leadership of the ilustrada. To briefly illustrate the former, since the Americans’ Occupation of the Philippines the ilustrada or, rather, ilustrado factions had been dominating state-oriented power structures and relations as against the taos’ unsubstantial leadership. This means that whereas the colonizers had already pre-empted sovereign power, the ilustrados’ legal authority (or, more appropriately 'authority as negative opportunity') followed the constitutional doctrine of 'popular representation' in the government. And most effectually, the means by which this domination was secured was the formal electoral or voting process. The political choices and options of the people, however, were largely predetermined by folk-charismatic (such as 'patron-client') relationships. Thus, as the taos habitually looked up to the ilustrada for 'leadership', the latter’s factions were able to long dominate colonial state-oriented relations. Such factional or parcellized leadership patterns carried over to post-independence politics. And so the Nacionalista and Liberal parties alternately gained control of the government. But with sovereignty—or le Pouvoir—having now devolved upon the ilustrada, the electoral system was re­ established as a mere means of conflict resolution between the factions of ilustrados—that is, for each to succeed in government and to assume authority as negative opportunity. This parcellized leadership changed into the latter—the absolutist—with the institution of the Marcos regime. After martial law was declared he reversed the traditional functioning of electoral politics in the Old Society. He manipulated its representational structuring so that his regime—or more specifically, the KBL candidates—always 'won' in all subsequent voting by huge or at least clear margins. By sheer 'force'

295 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION

(military or otherwise), however, no effectual opposition to his regime was allowed. In doing so Marcos reduced the electoral process to a mere trivial formality (e.g., no secrecy of the ballot, no freedom of choice, etc.). Yet, by holding it he could still claim his regime’s 'legitimacy'; and in orchestrating (or propagandizing) it, he also could make a showing of his 'adherence to democratic principles'. In substance, then, voting and election ceased as a conventional means of conflict resolution within the ilustrada. As a matter of fact, there was no longer any conflict resolution by constitutional mediation. On the contrary, the sovereignty (power) of the State had absorbed all government (authority) in his legal-absolutist regime. And so the basis of 'legal authority'—whether as positive or negative opportunity- disappeared. Non-constitutional mediation, then, became the only practicable means by which opposition groupings could resolve worsening political conflicts, not because it was likely to lead to substantive rationality, but because there was no other lawful way by which the Marcos regime might be replaced. The subsequent change in the form of conflict resolution did not, however, imply a parallel change in the substance of state-oriented and folk-charismatic relationships. Ilustrada-tao (class) relations were maintained in the New Society as they had built up in the Old. And after the faction of Aquino’s had succeeded in its enforcement action, the absolutist leadership of Marcos’s was eventually replaced again with the parcellized leadership of the ilustrados. But without further changes—that is, no direct participation, no overhaul of educational values, no land redistribution—state-oriented and folk-charismatic relationships remained substantively the same as in the Old Society. This viewpoint, however, does not explain the 'massive and spontaneous' participation of the taos in the multi-pronged struggle towards their 'liberation' from the Marcos regime. Long before the enforcement action (ilustrado) had taken place, this struggle already had firm stirrings. In fact, long before the snap elections the 'revolutionary mood' (anti- Marcos, anti-American) had been building up among the masses. All this brings up the question of origination again— that is, of cause-and-effect relations. Specifically, there is here an instance of Gottschalk’s fifth—the necessary and

296 Conclusion

immediate—cause of revolution. And it also exemplifies our notion of the struggle for sovereignty. Thus, vis-a-vis the weakening of the Marcos regime—the conservative classes, the revolutionary masses were gaining strength. Meanwhile, a common functional demand (means-to-ends) did not so much involve their 'control of government' as their freedom from Us control.84 This meant bringing down or overthrowing the government by any means. Yet, this also meant that the masses’ participation was inevitable. But even if we' put this aspect aside, it may still be seen that the role played by the taos in such enforcement action was anything but secondary. The Enrile-Ramos clique could not have prevailed over Marcos’s loyalist forces especially because the Reagan administration continued to support him. The people’s 'coercive will' (recognized as sovereign), however, obliged those forces to back down and made Marcos’s 'lawful' claims meaningless. Such will of the people also obliged Enrile and Ramos to accept Aquino’s 'mandate to take power'. (In fact, the several coups that followed Aquino’s accession to power all failed— and so did the 'destabilizations' by the Marcos loyalists—simply because they lacked the support of the masses.) If the masses were denied such a 'dominant' role in the anti-regime struggle, it may still be said that their participation was by no means less necessary. Aquino’s neo-ilustrado faction and the Enrile-Ramos troops were no match against Marcos and Reagan. Even they quickly realized that they needed the taos’ support: Aquino had already been campaigning for the 'boycott', and Enrile sought Cardinal Sin. What made the masses back Aquino’s challenge to Marcos? And why did they support the military rebels? Howsoever individual sentiments went,85 the masses should generally be

64 See, e.g., 'Primer of the "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All", Movement, . . . September 1983, (Extract)', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 566-568. The so-called sympathy vote in Philippine electoral politics had at times proved significant. Cory Aquino might have won more votes from voters who only blamed the regime for the assassination of her husband, Ninoy Aquino, on August 21, 1983. There was only one other comparable instance in post-independence national politics. In the 1967 senatorial elections, re-electionist senator Gaudencio Antonino died in a helicopter crash while campaigning. His wife, Magnolia, took his place, and while

297 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION expected (or presumed) to have acted according to what they perceived would promote their interests and were consistent with their values.86 Indeed, whatever they were, such a perception that the masses’ interests and values had not been duly observed by the Marcos regime was a basis of their withdrawal from the regime of the justification of its 'authority'—even though this perception was inconsistent with the actual legal-absolutism of the regime. Correlatively with this consciousness, the meaning of laws based, for instance, on Heckel’s criteria would have been weakened—or else invalidated (based upon J. W. Harris’s formulation). As a result, in such enforcement action the exercise by the people of its sovereignty directly over­ determined the law. And in joining up with the neo-ilustrados the masses had shown that they were already conscious of the revolutionary situation as well as the need to liberate themselves. But if what they have achieved since then was not quite revolutionary (e.g., in the 'constitution-making' stage, their attitude at least was (i.e., 'liberating'). Thus, the participation by the masses in the February Uprising was necessary in at least two ways, namely, as a mandate-giving support of a change in government (or 'authority as negative opportunity') and as a change in the consciousness of their role in state-oriented relationships. Accordingly, they were also the main protagonists. In sum we may consider the role of the plebeian masses in the February Uprising in two ways; namely, either in a weak sense ('necessary') or in a strong sense ('dominant'). * 8 comparatively 'unknown' made history by winning as an independent candidate. Among others yet, Genaro Magsaysay won repeatedly as senator after his popular brother, the late President Ramon Magsaysay, died in a plane crash in March 1957. 86 See, e.g., Carl H. Lande, The Political Crisis', in Bresnan, op cit., 133, in which he acknowledges that 'no Marxist-inspired revolution can justify itself ... if it does not rely heavily on the peasant and working classes whose interests it professes to serve'. See also 'Statement of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino on her Acceptance of Presidential Candidacy, . . . December, 1985', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 667, in which she recognizes that: 'The people clamor for a distinct and unequivocal change. We must offer them that unequivocal change'. Whatever else they may imply, these statements assume that the 'people' knew and would act upon their interests and values.

298 Conclusion

(The former does not deny that other 'forces' might also have had 'necessary' roles comparable to the taos’ role. Accordingly, elites and plebeians could have had equally necessary roles and participation. But the latter excludes any other 'force' from being 'dominant' as well. In effect, if the participation of the masses were dominant, then the ilustrados could only have been subordinate to it.) In both of them, however, we cannot but see the inadequacy of the ad hoc change arguments to explain the significance of the 'revolution' of 1986. As a matter of fact, this participation by the masses (in both dominant and necessary senses) which had its beginnings at least in the early 1970s was what made the Uprising revolutionary. In terms of causation, sufficient preconditions (including precipitants) had been there before the Uprising; and consequent liberation and constitution­ making occurred after. Such participation could thus be explained according to both origination and functionalization. Neither do these arguments throw much light on the masses’ strong support which gave stability to Aquino’s government— both the 'revolutionary' and then the 'constitutional'. We can see, then, that the implications of such ad hoc change arguments do not fully explain, inter alia, the facts that to the masses a most important change was their liberation or freedom from the Marcos regime; and that their participation in the Uprising was at least necessary to the outcome (if not altogether dominant). On this account, what might be the basis of Cory Aquino’s claim of right? And what was the nature of the People’s Power Revolution?

a. Aquino’s Claim of Right: Revolution as Cause?

Quite explicitly, such a claim of right might be based either on the results of the elections on February 7, 1986, or on the Uprising on February 22-25 of that year which toppled the Marcos regime. Cory Aquino and her supporters (and other observers too) claimed that she had won in the elections. 8? 5

5' See, e.g., 'Victory Statement of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino, . . . February 8, 1986', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 724­ 725, in which she says: 'The people and I have won and we know it.

299 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION

(By the way, these elections were held according to the 1973 Constitution which was then still in force.) This claim was still being made even after she had already been installed as president after the Uprising (Proclamation no. 1, February 25, 1986). (In July 1989 Senator Saguisag still claimed it to be so.) In spite of all this, the 'revolutionary government' was in effect: the 1973 Constitution was abrogated and a new one— the so-called Freedom Constitution—proclaimed (Proclamation no. 3, March 25, 1986). In doing so she assumed absolutist powers. How did this then affect the 'Aquino-being-the- election-winner' claim? Is it contradictory to make both claims? a) In the first place, we may consider a few aspects of the ilustrada’s 'formal rationality'—as distinguished from the taos'. In their case (i.e., the ilustrada’s), the suggestion that 'force' or 'violence' became a legitimate or regular mode of succession in government would be self-defeating. There was always the risk that in an armed confrontation between ilustrados, one side would lose all its powers and possessions to another. Intermittent or continuous hostilities between ilustrado factions might eventually weaken the whole social class causing it to lose its superior position to another. Even if such struggles were controlled, 'warlordism' could proliferate; and the State would remain in a 'state of siege'. Besides all this, such struggles might precipitate the masses’ participation and cause one faction to defeat another. And this might also lead to the same result, namely, that the ilustrada as a whole would lose to the masses. On the contrary, a formal 'voting system' may continue to guarantee their monopoly of state power (or 'authority as positive opportunity'); that is, to the extent that ilustrado factions continue to dominate the elections and the masses’ participation remains 'constitutional' (or is over­ determined by the ilustrada’s sovereignty). This means that sovereign power (pouvoir) will remain with them and legal

Nothing can take our victory from us'. See also NAMFREL Statement on the Philippine Presidential Elections, . . . February 25, 1986, (Extract)', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 726-728; and "'Report to the President of the United States of America on the February 7, 1986 Philippine Presidential Elections", by the U.S. Observer Delegation and Center for Democracy, . . . June 1986, (Extract)', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 728-732.

300 Conclusion authority ('authority as negative opportunity') with some of its factions. Aquino’s claim should thus hold with those who either adhered to the ad hoc change arguments or who believed that succession ought not generally to be decided by armed subversion or by the notion 'might is right'.88 it then, subjectively 'rational' for Aquino to say that her mandate derived from her 'winning* the 1986 presidential elections. And so it is for the ilustrada too. b) Objectively, however, we may also consider other things—specifically, social and political relationships. In terms of contingent causation, they may involve coercive relations, class structures, and social and economic standards. On the one hand, whether or not she had won the voting could neither be verified nor proved. 8 9 The results had been so discredited as to make the 'lawful' proclamation of Marcos as president­ elect widely unacceptable. But in itself this is no proof that Aquino had won, only that they did not reflect the 'will of the majority'. In fact, to many Filipinos the elections were a mere excuse (and another chance) to oust Marcos—any other result would not be acceptable.90 But so was the reverse (i.e., that Marcos must win) true with him and his supporters.^ * To the

°° See, e.g., 'Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Post­ Election Statement', op cit., 48, in which it is stated: 'According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of the citizenry'. The 'verification' or 'proof that is referred to here is no other than 'legal'—and thus accepted by a court of law, not a speculative or probable or 'common-sensical' conclusion. We may thus dismiss such statements as, for instance, Hernandez', to wit: 'She [Cory Aquino] quite evidently was the choice of a large majority of the citizens who voted or tried to vote in the election of February 7'. See Carolina G. Hernandez, 'Reconstituting the Political Order', in Bresnan, op cit., 176. ^ 'Electoral' politics and 'pressure' politics were combined in the Opposition’s effort to institute 'change' in government. See the "'Cry of the People" Joint Manifesto of Support for Cory Aquino by Cause-Oriented Groups, . . . January 6, 1986', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 679-680, in which the election is viewed as an 'opportunity' to 'end the Marcos dictatorship'. For our purposes, both types of 'politics' may be taken up by constitutional mediation. 9* See, e.g., Lyons and Wilson, op cit., 154, in which it is said that (citing members of the International Observer Group) 'key military officers

301 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION more extreme Filipinos who boycotted the polls, the elections were simply futile since the results--that Marcos will win!--had already been predetermined.^ Or that it was nothing but a 'circus of the reactionaries'. In effect, they only confirmed that the conflicts had even now become 'legally insurmountable'. On the other hand, the Uprising effectively superseded whatever 'majority decision’ could be gleaned from the voting. So far as the masses were now concerned, it could be said that the Uprising was no longer a mere representational expression of the 'people’s will' but a direct, palpable demonstration of their own. And as their numbers swelled (and their voices raised), the factional struggles within the clase ilustrada-- Marcos, Imelda, and Ver’s, Enrile and Ramos’s, and Sin and Aquino’s—had to abide by (or yield to) the 'necessary' or 'dominant' participation of the masses. At the moment of rising, class distinctions seemed to have paled before this 'people’s will' to win liberation. For this purpose, the principal protagonists in the Revolution were the Marcos regime ('above') and the Filipino people ('below'); only secondarily was the struggle between the conservatives ('Right') and the radicals ('Left') or the clashing factions of the clase ilustrada ('Right'). With the masses, then, Aquino’s claim of right could also—or even more rationally—be based on the 'People’s Power' Revolution.

b. The Nature of the Revolution~as Cause and as Effect

The struggle by the masses towards their liberation from the Marcos regime had been long but decisive. Since Ninoy Aquino’s assassination, however, greater numbers had joined in calling for drastic changes—specifically, for President Marcos to resign and his regime dismantled. The February Uprising finally forced him to step down and flee the country, and also resulted in Cory Aquino being installed in his stead. What 'revolutionary changes' could they have looked for? (a)

and Marcos leaders had been instructed to "win at all costs"'. See also Almendral, op cit., 187-188. See, e.g., 'Interview with Jose Ma. Sison, . . . December 26, 1985, (Extract)', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 685-689.

302 Conclusion

To begin with, Marcos had to go. His 'one-man' rule must end and despotic institutions abolished. They were also seeking relief from the looming economic bankruptcy and the entrenched crony capitalism. But more positively, they were demanding 'political freedom', 'legal justice'—the chance to participate and improve their lot. 9 3 Such a clamor for 'political change' even went alongside—or became the practical rationale for—that of the more extreme segments of Filipino society.94 Unlike them, however, the latter pushed not only for such political change but no less than a radical transformation of folk-charismatic relationships. Thus, in typological terms, the latter (who were still a small minority) sought a 'social revolution', whereas most would opt for merely a 'political revolution'—that is, to get rid of Marcos and his clique and cohorts. (b) None the less, as the regime fell the revolution achieved a number of things. Among others, the people regained their 'sovereignty' or, rather, by their revolutionary experience the masses proved they could—if they willed—force the ilustrada to yield to them. In other words they could become truly the sovereign people: specifically, (aa) in the sense in which the laws (as those of the New Society) are over­ determined by their dominant values and interests; and (bb) in terms of such a social formation in which their participation is dominant (whether, e.g., in what Etzioni calls 'normative' or 'utilitarian' social relations or in Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft). In unmistakable terms they did this against Marcos and Reagan, and against Enrile and the military too. Based on all this it may also be said that the masses’ social and economic conditions would only change (and their interests promoted) whenever they could effectually bring their

JSee, e.g., Diokno, op cit., 132 et seq., in which the setting up of the 'Justice for Aquino, Justice for All' (JAJA) movement is discussed, in particular, also its credo (or raison d'etre) which referred to 'a deep-seated yearning for justice and freedom', and also 'democracy and sovereignty'. 94 Among the most conspicuous attempts at unification of the struggle against the Marcos regime was the KOMPIL (Kongreso ng Mamamayang Filipino—Congress of the Filipino People). 'Alternative leaders' chosen by the Congress included such conservative oppositionists as Laurel, Guingona, Kalaw, and others, and leftists like Sison and Morales. See ibid., 149 et seq.

303 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION puissance to bear upon the Stated (c) Finally, it may be observed that such a situation (origination) invariably reflected upon the strength and effectiveness of putative plebeian leaders.96 But these conditions having been determined for so long by folk- charismatic and state-oriented relations, the ilustrada had unavoidably succeeded in hindering the growth of the masses’ leadership. As a result, they had been able to mould and redirect mass actions in the past to favor their class’s interests (or so those interests would not be jeopardized). Hand in hand with this, plebeian leadership—workers’ unions, farmers’ groups, populist political parties—never got off very far. Armed revolutionary leadership was also unexceptional (as in the case of the late nineteenth-century Katipunan revolution). And so as 'revolutionary changes' in state-oriented relations appeared imminent in the 1980s, the ilustrada succeeded again in 'intercepting' (or pre-empting) the swing of power after the 'explosion' phase (or before) of the revolution. (The tragic return of Ninoy Aquino in August 1983 could be considered as an attempt at 'pre-empting'; the mutiny by Enrile and his military faction and the accession by Aquino and her allies was 'intercepting'.) The neo-ilustrados once again fulfilled the habitual need of the masses for leadership through the revolutionary government from February 1986 to the following February 1987, and the constitutional government that followed after. In other words, there was hardly any revolutionary leadership—a. 'remote cause' proposed by Gottschalk. We can be more specific about such leadership. It must be remembered that besides this climax (or anti-climax) in the revolutionary struggle, a change in such struggle had

See, e.g., 'Message of Jose Ma. Sison to KOMPIL . . . , January 8, 1984, (Extract)', in Javate-de Dios, Daroy, and Kalaw-Tirol, op cit., 603­ 607, esp. p. 604, in which he says: 'The resignation of the fascist clique [the Marcos regime] will depend on the effective power of the people to oust the despot'. 96 The 'careers' of numerous men and women who took on the leadership of the masses had not been promising, e.g., (to name only a few) Evangelista, Abad Santos, Taruc, the Lava brothers, Voltaire Garcia, Sison, Buscayno, Nilo Tayag, Nelia Sancho, Dr. Juan Escandor, Olalia, and Lean Alejandro.

304 Conclusion

already taken place the significance of which, when its cause occurred, seemed to have escaped the notice of many Filipinos. After Aquino was killed in 1983, it might have seemed a foregone conclusion that the regime would fall. (The question which was then widely asked was, What will happen to the Philippines when Marcos’s one-man rule does come to an end?) Yet, there was hardly any doubt as to the impact such tragedy had on the struggle or on non-constitutional mediation as a whole. Until that time a number of revolutionary leaders had either been killed or captured. New ones were continually replacing them, however. And there did not seem much appreciable effect on the whole struggle. Thus, as the 'polarization' of Filipino society continued to intensify, it also seemed the 'revolution'—or, more appropriately, the revolutionary 'explosion'—was inevitable. What then was the significance of Aquino's death? It is this: His demise did not precipitate the revolution; in fact, it stopped the revolution. Aquino was not a revolutionary; he was an ilustrado leader- influential and popular. He was coming back to convince Marcos to agree to a compromise in order to avert a violent and bloody civil war or a Communist takeover. Instead, he gave his life and became a 'martyr'. And at once his death seemed to be every Filipino's grievance—a powerful precipitant. Oppositionist ilustrados held out a new issue against the regime. And many Filipinos closed ranks behind them. Thus, as conservative politicians, other Aquino partisans, and anti-Marcos Filipinos laid the blame on the Marcos regime, the resurgent rivalry between the Right Opposition and Marcos finally deflected such polarization towards the customary election contests between ruling class factions. The most stirring anti-Marcos issue now became 'Justice for Aquino, Justice for All', (JAJA) seemingly subsuming both 'provocation' and 'program of action' in revolutionary causation. And Marcos, his cronies, the KBL, and the military were depicted as epitomizing everything that was inimical to the values of the masses. In the end, however, it made certain that the traditional ruling classes of Filipino society—from the principalia (during Spanish times) to the ilustrada (during the Spanish period and American Occupation) to the post-war neo-ilustrados to the Marcos crony clique and back to the neo- ilustrados—would retain their ascendance. Once more,

305 PEOPLE’S POWER REVOLUTION plebeian leadership was defeated. Exploiting the popular outrage at the Marcos regime, the leadership of the revolutionary movement was seized by the likes of Mitra, Maceda, Butz Aquino, Laurel, and their partisans, not a single one of whom could be said to be revolutionary. Neither were they sympathetic to the masses’ substantive rationality. (Earlier, in 1972, Marcos had done the same, calling his New Society 'revolutionary'.) But consistent with their own interests, they chose another 'big landlord' to be their figurehead leader to confront Marcos—Aquino’s widow, Cory; that is, with the help of the clergy many of whom were already alienated by the Marcos regime. Yet besides their support—or as the basis of it—Cory Aquino was likely to win anyway. There was another time, specifically, in 1967, when a 'crusading' re-electionist senator, Gaudencio Antonino, died in a helicopter crash while campaigning. His wife, Magnolia, took over his candidacy. And she won. It was astonishing— that is, since the likes of Manglapus, Manahan, Pelaez, Recto, Tanada, decidedly 'better qualified', could not achieve the same feat when they had run as independent or third-party candidates against the Nacionalista and Liberal national slates. There was, however, some difference in her makeshift candidacy. Surely, it was not because of her political skills that she won, but because of the sympathy of the people for Antonino’s widow—a political-cultural peculiarity. This time the new disguised leaders of the 'revolutionary' opposition were once more playing on the sympathies of the people. (And now drawn to ilustrado rhetoric besides, the masses seemed to have forgotten their own interests as well as the country’s.) On top of that, the coup d’etat on February 22-25 broke out. Two trusted cohorts of Marcos’s turned their backs on their erstwhile patron to join the Opposition. Enrile had been the long-time defense minister and Ramos the vice chief of staff. Their volte-face was a calculated move of self­ preservation and aggrandizement. (In a short time afterwards, each would seek—or become a pretender to—the presidency of the Philippines. In fact, Ramos won the presidency in 1992.) Marcos and Ver were reportedly poised to crack down on the former and his RAM soldiers. And the latter had been by­ passed when Ver was appointed—and after being acquitted in the Aquino murder case, reinstated as—chief of staff. With

306 Conclusion malice aforethought, the self-righteous Cardinal Sin now hailed them; and the people rallied behind (or in front!) of them and their co-mutineers. Overnight they became transformed from 'criminals' of the reactionary regime to heroes of the Revolution. Incredible! Yet in Philippine politics, perhaps, hardly so. Turncoatism, volte-face, and the like have a long history in state-oriented relations. In general, it was reminiscent or typical of those like Magsaysay, Pelaez, Marcos himself, and nearly every other politician in the country who did—or could—change their party affiliations for any reason or even without one. And the Revolution was concluded—or rather, camouflaged—with the institution of the de facto revolutionary government by Cory Aquino and Laurel. Among the changes instituted by the new regime were those tending to delimit 'direct participation' by the masses in government decison making (for example, in the selection of the members of the Constitutional Commission) and those policies aimed at 'national reconciliation' (including the Marcos loyalists). In fact, instead of ushering in a 'new beginning' as happened after so many a revolution—such as the American, French, Russian, Iranian, Nicaraguan—the landlord-dominated Aquino government simply turned back the clock on the masses. Once again, Philippine politics was a throwback of pre-martial law practices. And just as Antonino did nothing after being elected, so now Aquino was to do nothing as head of the revolutionary government. From its background and until the plebiscite was held the next year it was a most un-revolutionary revolutionary government.

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